syria cw.pdf

9. Reducing security threats from chemical and biological materials

Overview

At the international, national and regional levels in 2011 states continued to develop strategies to prevent and remediate the effects of the possible misuse of toxic chemical and biological materials.

The Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) agreed to conduct a third inter-sessional meeting process that will ‘discuss, and promote common under-standing and effective action’ on cooperation and assistance, the review of relevant developments in science and technology, and the strengthening of, among other things, national implementation of the convention. Despite the expectations of many states and analysts that the BTWC would somehow be ‘bolstered’ (e.g. by taking additional steps with respect to institutional strengthening and various operational-level or ‘practical’ measures), the political conditions at the conference inhibited taking decisions to establish an intersessional process that is more ‘action-’ and decision-oriented. Thus, the regime is evolving incrementally and is focused on process (see section I in this chapter).

The 16th Conference of the States Parties to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) witnessed exchanges between Iran and the United States that partly reflected wider international tension regarding the nature and purpose of Iran’s nuclear activities (see section II). Russia and the USA con-firmed that they would be unable to complete the destruction of their chemical weapon stockpiles by the final CWC-mandated deadline of 29 April 2012 but would nevertheless undertake to complete the destruction expeditiously. In the case of Iraq, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) concluded that progress has been made in razing chemical weapon production facilities. An advisory panel to the OPCW’s Director-General sub-mitted its final report after reviewing the implementation of the CWC with a focus on how the convention’s activities should be structured after the des-truction of chemical weapon stockpiles ends, sometime after 2012. The Director-General, together with the states parties and the OPCW Executive Council, used the process of formulating the report as a means to develop agreed policy guidance for future OPCW priorities and programmes in the lead-up to the Third CWC Review Conference, which will be held in 2013. The report therefore presented options and activities that had been subjected to political and technical review, which the Director-General may use to inform the balance and focus of future activities by the OPCW Technical Secretariat. The report also reflects the CWC regime’s continuing transition towards other

392 NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, 2011

priorities that will become more apparent once chemical weapon stockpiles are eliminated.

During the Libyan civil war concern was expressed that the regime of Muammar Gaddafi would employ a stock of residual sulphur mustard against anti-government protestors and armed rebel groups. Similar concerns were expressed regarding the nature and fate of possible chemical and biological weapons in Syria over the course of the country’s civil unrest and tension (see section III). The OPCW sent a special inspection team to Libya in November to investigate reports of undeclared chemical weapons and it was confirmed that the Gaddafi regime had not declared a secret chemical weapon stockpile. The fact that the OPCW did not uncover Libya’s deceptive declarations prior to the 2011 overthrow of Gaddafi raised questions about the organization’s ability to detect violations more generally and prompted calls to review the CWC’s verification regime, although little discussion occurred on how to link this problem to the convention’s challenge inspection request provisions.

Science and technology and related research can strongly affect chemical and biological warfare prevention, response and remediation efforts (see section IV). Research on avian influenza in particular has raised a number of policy implications, such as whether it is preferable to describe scientific research on its merits for peaceful purposes and to avoid characterizing it in terms of potential security threats. The debate also affects research funding, publication policies (e.g. lack of common international standards), agreed principles in research oversight and differences in approach on agreeing and implementing appropriate safety and security standards.

JOHN HART

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 393

I. Biological weapon arms control and disarmament

JOHN HART

The principal activity in 2011 in biological arms control was the Seventh Review Conference of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in December and preparation for it, which included considering and structuring relevant topics and drafting background text. Much of this activity was procedural and referred to long-standing implementation prin-ciples contained in the various articles of the convention, such as those dealing with the strengthening of national implementation and economic cooperation and development. Lack of consensus continued to affect the parties’ ability to consider possible specific compliance concerns regarding past, current or planned activity by states, or specific consideration of known or suspected bioterrorist activity. The parties also remained divided on the question of whether and how to put in place permanent or legally binding mechanisms to encourage a more substantive exchange of views on such concerns. The review conference nevertheless continued to provide the parties with a framework in which to exchange views and experience on the implementation of the convention, and the Seventh Review Confer-ence agreed that another intersessional programme should continue this practice. Two new parties joined the BTWC in 2011: Burundi and Mozam-bique. A further 12 states had signed but not ratified the convention.1

Before the Seventh Review Conference the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) collated support documentation and various analyses and proposals concerning biosecurity and biosafety, science and technology (S&T), dis-ease and health surveillance, dual-use issues, the intersessional meeting process, confidence-building measures (CBMs), education and awareness, and non-state actor threats.2 The BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP), a coalition of non-governmental organizations, developed a list of 12 topics, each introduced by a briefing paper, to discuss prior to the review confer-ence: (a) exploring the influence of technological developments on the BTWC; (b) ascertaining whether verification is needed and its nature; (c) determining the requirements for reporting; (d) implementing Article X successfully; (e) studying how countering bioterrorism and the BTWC

1 For a summary and list of parties and signatories of the Convention on the Prohibition of the

Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction see annex A in this volume. The states that had signed but not ratified the BTWC were Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Guyana, Haiti, Liberia, Malawi, Myanmar, Nepal, Somalia, Syria and Tanzania. The states that had neither signed nor ratified the convention were Andorra, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea, Israel, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia, Namibia, Nauru, Niue, Samoa, South Sudan and Tuvalu.

2 UN Office at Geneva, ‘Disarmament: think zone for the Seventh Review Conference’, <http:// www.unog.ch/bwc/thinkzone>.


relate to each other; ( f ) establishing how national implementation, or its absence, affects the strength of the BTWC; (g) educating life scientists, including how to conduct that process and its content; (h) determining the place of public health issues in bioweapon control forums; (i) ensuring global accountability of biodefence activities; ( j) learning how existing United Nations investigation mechanisms can be used to fortify the con-vention; (k) ascertaining the role that biosecurity plays in preventing bio-weapon development; and (l) assessing the effectiveness of the inter-sessional process in strengthening the BTWC.3 Together with their associ-ated comments, the BWPP-moderated discussion presents an up-to-date review of the various political and legal nuances associated with the BTWC.

In the lead-up to the review conference many parties signalled their expectations for preferred outcomes. The common position of the Euro-pean Union (EU) called for ‘examining annual CBM declarations as the regular national declaration tool on implementation and compliance and developing them further with this objective in mind’.4 In its opening state-ment, Iran cautioned that CBMs, while important, ‘shall not constitute a mechanism for verification of compliance’.5 The United States stated that it viewed the review conference ‘as an opportunity to bolster’ the convention, ‘to take on the challenge of encouraging scientific progress, but constrain-ing the potential for misuse of science’.6 The US representative went on to say that:

We will ask for member states to come together and focus on new ways to enhance confidence in compliance through richer transparency, more effective implemen-tation, an improved set of confidence building measures, and cooperative use of the BWC’s consultative provisions. We need to work together, moreover, on measures to counter the threat of bioterrorism, and to detect and respond effectively to an attack should one occur.7

Russia criticized the US focus on ‘raising the so-called transparency of bioresearch’ and said it was no ‘substitute for full verification’.8 Some of the

3 BioWeapons Prevention Project, ‘Civil society preparations for the 7th BWC Review Conference

2011’, [n.d.], <http://www.bwpp.org/revcon.html>. 4 Council Decision 2011/429/CFSP of 18 July 2011 relating to the position of the European Union

for the Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction (BTWC), Official Journal of the European Union, L188, 19 July 2011, p. 44.

5 Seventh BTWC Review Conference, Statement by H. E. Mr. Mohammed Reza Sajjadi, Perman-ent Representative of Iran, 7 Dec. 2011.

6 Gottemoeller, R., US Department of State, ‘Remarks by delegation of the United States of Amer-ica First (Disarmament and International Security) Committee’, 4 Oct. 2011, <http://www.state.gov/ t/avc/rls/175000.htm>.

7 Gottemoeller (note 6). 8 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Russian MFA Press and Information Department comment

in relation to the publication of the US State Department reports on adherence to and compliance with arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments’, Press Release


other parties to the convention remain, at the margins (i.e. informally), interested in learning further details of the fate of the former Soviet offen-sive biological weapon programme. However, such consultation has been largely absent during the past decade.9 Finally, the parties broadly sup-ported another intersessional process and the inclusion of S&T in it.10

Ambassador Paul van den IJssel of the Netherlands chaired the Seventh Review Conference, which considered the legal and political implications associated with efforts to achieve universal membership for the convention and what constitutes ‘full’ and ‘balanced’ implementation of its provisions under the chairman’s theme of ‘ambitious realism’. In the final two days it became evident that a number of political markers, indicated earlier in the conference, were in fact firm ‘red lines’ not to be crossed, including no decision-making power for the intersessional programme meetings and minimization of further transparency measures via CBMs. Five delegations notably coordinated their positions during the conference: China, India, Iran, Pakistan and Russia.

The review conference agreed to conduct an intersessional meeting process, the third such process, which will explicitly consider cooperation and assistance, S&T review, and strengthening national implementation.11 Annual meetings of the parties and annual meetings of experts will be held in 2012–15 until the Eight Review Conference, to be held in 2016. The review conference also agreed modified formats for CBMs, including more detailed reporting of disease outbreaks. The existing three-person ISU will support the new process and remain the same size (the non-expansion reflects political constraints and ongoing international financial uncer-tainty). The ISU will compile a database of information relevant to eco-nomic and technological development to assist in strengthening cooper-ation and assistance under Article X of the BTWC, which calls for the con-vention to be implemented in a manner that avoids hampering economic and technological development while facilitating the exchange of infor-mation, material and equipment for peaceful purposes. Text that allowed for conceptual discussion on verification and compliance with the BTWC was dropped from the final review conference document because some states had proposed alternative text that diverged from an essentially con-ceptual exchange of views. The parties were generally aware that such a

1292-02-09-2011, 2 Sep. 2011, <http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/f53d23a14bf702b8c32579010047c 468>. Available in Russian at <http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/C2356A2C34FC35A6C32578FF00 5CA2E9>.

9 See Kelly, D. C., ‘The trilateral agreement: lessons for biological weapons proliferation’, eds T. Findlay and O. Meier, Verification Yearbook 2002 (Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC): London, 2002), pp. 93–109.

10 E.g. ‘Proposal for structured and systematic review of science and technology developments under the convention: submitted by India’, Working paper, Think Zone for the Seventh BTWC Review Conference, 2011, <http://www.unog.ch/bwc/thinkzone>.

11 Seventh BTWC Review Conference, Final Document, Advance copy, 22 Dec. 2011, p. 19.


shift would risk US rejection.12 The new intersessional process will consist of an exchange of views and best practice among the parties. Notably, the parties will consider S&T developments systematically for the first time since the 1992–93 Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint (VEREX) meetings on the BTWC.

12 BioWeapons Prevention Project, ‘The Seventh BWC Review Conference: outcome and assess-

ment’, RevCon Report no. 16, 31 Dec. 2011, <http://http://www.bwpp.org/reports.html>, p. 2.


II. Chemical weapon arms control and disarmament

JOHN HART

As of 31 December 2011, 188 states had ratified or acceded to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the principal international legal instrument against chemical warfare; a further two states had signed but not ratified it; and six states had neither signed nor ratified the convention.1 No state joined the convention in 2011. The activity of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 2011 was, with the notable exception of the Director-General’s advisory panel report, largely process-oriented.

The 16th Conference of the States Parties (CSP) agreed a 2012 budget of €70 561 800 ($94 million) of which €33 296 600 ($44 million) is allocated for verification-related costs and €37 265 200 ($50 million) for adminis-trative and other costs; this represents a 5.4 per cent reduction compared to the 2011 budget.2 In a unique, non-precedent setting measure, the CSP gave the Director-General, Ahmet Üzümcü, the authority to grant contract extensions or renewals to staff (who may not work longer than 10 years) with expertise applicable to the ‘operational requirements of verification and inspection of destruction-related activities’ until 29 April 2016.3

The 2012 regular budget consists of (a) administration (21 per cent), (b) executive management (12 per cent), (c) external relations (3 per cent), (d) support for the OPCW’s policymaking organs (7 per cent), (e) inter-national cooperation and assistance (10 per cent), ( f ) inspections (35 per cent), and (g) verification (12 per cent).4 The inspection component of the budget will decline by a little over 5 percentage points for 2012. Reduced inspections reflect the April 2012 deadline for the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles. Since the CWC’s entry into force, approximately 85 per cent of the inspection resources of the OPCW have been devoted to verify-ing chemical weapon destruction.5 Although the overall inspection effort is declining, the chemical weapon destruction deadline will not be met by

1 For a summary and a list of parties and signatories of the Convention on the Prohibition of the

Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction see annex A in this volume. The states that had not signed or ratified the CWC were Angola, Egypt, North Korea, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria. Israel and Myanmar had signed but not ratified the CWC.

2 OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, ‘Programme and budget of the OPCW for 2012’, Decision C-16/DEC.12, 2 Dec. 2011, pp. 2, 9. In each of the previous 6 years the OPCW had nominal zero growth budgets.

3 OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, ‘Future implementation of the tenure policy of the OPCW’, Decision C-16/DEC.9, 30 Nov. 2011.

4 OPCW, C-16/DEC.12 (note 2), p. 11. 5 Üzümcü, A., OPCW Director-General, Statement to the United Nations, General Assembly, First

Committee (Disarmament and International Security), 12 Oct. 2011, p. 1.


Libya, Russia and the United States. It is noteworthy that the number of future inspections is determined primarily by the number of active destruc-tion facilities, which will drop in 2012, before increasing somewhat when the final two US chemical weapon destruction facilities are commissioned.

The CSP also established an international support network for victims of chemical weapons along with a voluntary trust fund; among other activ-ities, the OPCW Technical Secretariat will administer the fund, and coord-inate and facilitate the establishment of contacts and appropriate infor-mation.6 The CSP undertook further efforts to achieve universal member-ship of the CWC.7

The Director-General established an advisory panel in order to help clarify how the OPCW’s focus on chemical weapon destruction can best be shifted to a broader objective of sustained chemical weapon disarmament. The report emphasized that the OPCW, among other functions, should ‘remain the global repository of knowledge and expertise’ on chemical weapon disarmament as well as on the verification of the non-possession and non-use of such weapons.8 The delegations praised the report, which presented a menu of options and associated principles that could serve to validate the balance and scope of activity that the Director-General wishes the Technical Secretariat to implement over the coming years. For example, Pakistan stated that the report correctly assigns priority to completion of chemical weapon destruction and strikes a proper balance between regu-latory aspects (industry, verification and national implementation) and international cooperation in chemistry.9 The Director-General stated that effective industry verification and data monitoring are the ‘bedrock’ for the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical weapons.10

Mexico expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which the OPCW’s policymaking organs have functioned since the CWC entered into force, stating that adjustments should be made to administration practice and asking whether it is ‘appropriate to place the weight of decisions lengthy and intensively negotiated on the discussions of report language during the

6 OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, ‘The establishment of the international support net-

work for victims of chemical weapons and the establishment of a voluntary trust fund for this pur-pose’, Decision C-16/DEC.13, 2 Dec. 2011.

7 For a summary of universality efforts in Africa see the newsletter of the South African Institute for Security Studies. Broodryk, A. and Stott, N., ‘Enhancing the role of the OPCW in building Africa’s capacity to prevent the misuse of toxic chemicals’, Africa’s Policy Imperatives, no. 6 (May 2011).

8 OPCW, Technical Secretariat, ‘Report of the advisory panel on future priorities of the Organisa-tion for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons’, Note by the Director-General, S/951/2011, 25 July 2011, para. 35.

9 OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Statement by Ambassador Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, Leader of Pakistani Delegation, 28 Nov.–2 Dec. 2011, p. 3.

10 OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Opening statement by the Director-General, C-16/ DG.18, 28 Nov. 2011, para. 21.


adoption of the final report, many times reflecting occurrences that did not take place or decisions that were not taken during the formal sessions?’11

Destruction of chemical weapons

As of 30 November 2011, of 71 195 agent tonnes of declared chemical weapons, 50 619 agent tonnes had been verifiably destroyed; of 8.67 million declared items and chemical weapon containers, 3.95 million had been des-troyed.12 As of November 2011, 13 states had declared 70 former chemical weapon production facilities, of which 43 had been destroyed and 21 con-verted to peaceful purposes.13 The states that had declared chemical weapon stockpiles to the OPCW are Albania, India, Iraq, South Korea, Libya, Russia and the USA. Albania, India and South Korea had destroyed all of their declared chemical weapons, and all declared Category 3 chem-ical weapons had also been destroyed.14 The OPCW estimates that approxi-mately three-quarters of the declared chemical weapon stockpiles were to be destroyed by the extended (and final) CWC deadline of 29 April 2012.15

Iraq

Iraq continued to explore and develop options for the OPCW-verified des-truction of chemical weapons in bunkers 13 and 41 at Al Muthanna in the south of the country.16 Iraqi authorities have deemed physical entry to bunker 41 possible, while bunker 13 is still too hazardous to enter.17 Iraq is committed to destroying the contents of bunker 41 and rendering harmless the contents of bunker 13 by encapsulating it in concrete.18 The files of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and those of its successor, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), remain sealed and thus largely unavailable to the OPCW Executive Coun-cil.19 Technical meetings involving representatives of Iraq, Germany, the United Kingdom, the USA and the OPCW have been held to discuss base-

11 OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Statement by Ambassador Jorge Lomónaco, Perman-

ent Representative of Mexico, C-16/NAT.23, 28 Nov. 2011, p. 2. 12 OPCW, ‘Demilitarisation’, <http://www.opcw.org/our-work/demilitarisation/>. 13 OPCW, C-16/DG.18 (note 10), para. 52. 14 The CWC’s Annex on Chemicals comprises 3 ‘schedules’. Schedule 1 chemicals consist of

chemicals and their precursors judged to have few, if any, peaceful applications. Chemicals listed in schedules 2 and 3 have wider peaceful, including commercial, applications. The definition of chem-ical weapon categories, which is partly based on what schedule a chemical may be listed under, is given in CWC (note 1), Verification Annex, Part IV(A), para. 16.

15 OPCW, C-16/DG.18 (note 10), para. 5. 16 The other bunkers have been ascertained to be either empty or containing only conventional

munitions. 17 Al Sharaa, M., Director General, Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate, ‘Al Muthanna bunkers

decommissioning project’, Slide presentation at the 14th Annual International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference (CWD 2011), Interlaken, 23–26 May 2011, p. 16.

18 Al Sharaa (note 17), p. 15. 19 Al Sharaa (note 17), p. 16.


line data on the contents of the storage bunker (‘containers and munitions . . . too volatile to attempt to destroy’)—characterized by former UNSCOM Deputy Chairman Charles Duelfer as reminding him of the ‘Great Pyramid at Giza’—and the extent to which the verification of any destruction of the contents of the bunkers should be non-intrusive (i.e. remote sampling, ana-lysis and verification) or intrusive (i.e. involving physical entry).20

In May the OPCW also conducted a low-altitude aerial inspection of Iraq’s former chemical weapon production and storage facilities, using UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) helicopters. The visual inspection and overhead imagery from these flyovers confirmed that Iraq has made pro-gress in razing chemical weapon production facilities and that the two storage bunkers at Al Muthanna appear to remain undisturbed and intact.21 Iraq has approved $55 million for the decommissioning project.22 Bunker 13 appears to contain (a) approximately 2500 partially destroyed 122-mm chemical rockets, (b) approximately 180 tonnes of sodium cyanide, (c) approximately 1.75 tonnes of ‘potassium cyanides’, (d) 75 kilograms of arsenic trichloride, and (e) 170 one-tonne containers that were previously used to hold tabun. Bunker 41 is believed to hold (a) approximately 2000 empty 155-mm artillery shells, (b) 605 one-tonne sulphur mustard con-tainers, which originally held residues of polymerized sulphur mustard, (c) incinerator equipment, (d) about 200 one-litre barrels that contain waste material from decontamination, and (e) ‘heavily contaminated con-struction material scrap’; bunker 41 also suffers from ‘serious’ contamin-ation from chemical weapon precursor barrel leakage.23 An Iraqi Experts Technical Committee (established by the head of Iraq’s Ministry of Science and Technology) has issued a report that outlines possible solutions to these problems. After Iraq’s Council of Ministers approves the committee’s recommendations, the Ministry of Science and Technology will ‘take the necessary measures to start the Decomissioning project’.24

Libya

During the war in Libya concern was expressed that a stock of residual sul-phur mustard might be used by forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi against anti-government protestors and armed rebel groups.25

20 Al Sharaa (note 17), p. 8; and Duelfer, C., Hide and Seek: The Search for the Truth in Iraq (Public-

Affairs: New York, 2009), pp. 96–97. 21 OPCW, C-16/DG.18 (note 10), para. 48; and OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Statement

on behalf of the European Union by H. E. Mara Marinaki, Managing Director for Global and Multi-lateral Issues, European External Action Service, C-16/NAT.25, 28 Nov.–2 Dec. 2011, p. 4.

22 Al Sharaa (note 17), p. 13. 23 Al Sharaa (note 17), p. 4. 24 Al Sharaa (note 17), p. 12. 25 US House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, ‘Chairman Rogers

comments regarding recent developments in Libya’, Press release, 22 Aug. 2011, <http://intelligence. house.gov/press-release/chairman-rogers-comments-regarding-recent-developments-libya>. Simi-


The OPCW had verified that Libya had destroyed 54.4 per cent of its declared stockpile of Schedule 1 chemical weapons as of 8 February 2011, when destruction operations were stopped because of the need to demolish a heating unit at the destruction facility.26 On 1 September the Executive Council convened an informal meeting to discuss the situation in Libya and the unspecified ‘delivery of assistance’ that had been provided by the Office of the Director-General.27 On 22 September, representatives of the new Libyan Government stated that its forces had captured a sulphur mustard depot in the Al Jufra area (the so-called Ruwagha depot, located 700 kilo-metres south-east of Tripoli).28 On 3 October the Libyan Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs sent a note to the Director-General ‘confirming . . . and reiterating’ the importance of sending an OPCW inspection team to Libya to inventory and verify the status of the country’s chemical weapon stock-piles, to confirm that they are secure and to prepare for the resumption of destruction operations ‘at the appropriate time’; on 4 October the Libyan representative to the Executive Council stated that the new government had secured the chemical weapon storage sites at Ruwagha.29

On 2 November an OPCW inspection team visited Libya to verify the status of a temporary chemical weapon holding facility at the Ruwagha Hydrolysis and Neutralisation System to confirm whether sulphur mustard and two chemical weapon precursors had been diverted (the previous inspection had taken place in February when destruction operations were stopped).30 The inspection was financed by Germany’s Federal Foreign Office with further support provided by the UN Department of Safety and Security.31 The one-day inspection examined the chemical weapons stock-piled at the Ruwagha depot and was meant to verify whether Libya’s chem-ical weapon stocks remained intact and, if so, that they were properly secured in the aftermath of the country’s civil conflict.32 The team con-firmed that the facility’s stock of sulphur mustard and chemical weapon precursors had not been diverted.33 On 28 November Libya provided a revised declaration to the OPCW that presents information on previously

lar concerns have been expressed regarding the nature and fate of possible CBW in Syria over the course of the country’s civil unrest and tension. On the conflicts in Libya and Syria see chapter 2, sec-tion I, and chapter 3, section II, in this volume.

26 OPCW, C-16/DG.18 (note 10), para. 34. 27 OPCW, Executive Council, Statement by the Libyan delegation, EC-66/NAT.17, 4 Oct. 2011, p. 2. 28 Black, I., ‘Libyan rebels discover Gaddafi’s chemical weapons’, The Guardian, 22 Sep. 2011. 29 OPCW, Libya, EC-66/NAT.17 (note 27), p. 2. 30 OPCW, C-16/DG.18 (note 10), para. 39. 31 German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Securing Libya’s chemical weapons’, Press release, 4 Nov. 2011,

<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Aktuelle_Artikel/Libyen/111104-OVCW-Inspektion-node.html>; and OPCW, C-16/DG.18 (note 10), para. 13. Germany is also cooper-ating with Libya to remove small arms and landmines in Libya.

32 German Federal Foreign Office (note 31). 33 OPCW, ‘OPCW inspectors return from Libya’, Press release, 4 Nov. 2011, <http://www.opcw.

org/news/article/opcw-inspectors-return-to-libya/>.


undeclared chemical weapons (known and suspected).34 However, Libya will be unable to complete the destruction of its stockpile by 29 April 2012.35 The UN Security Council has called on Libya to ‘continue . . . close coordination’ with the OPCW to destroy its chemical weapons.36 The new government reiterated that the country remains committed to ‘all inter-national conventions and treaties it has signed’, including the CWC.37 The OPCW will undertake a full determination of the status of the previously undeclared chemical weapons (mainly artillery shells) in 2012.

Russia

In 2011 chemical weapon destruction operations were carried out at four facilities in Russia: Leonidovka (c. 6000 tonnes of chemical weapon agent, 87 per cent of the total facility stockpile), Maradykovsky (c. 5600 tonnes, 82 per cent of the facility stockpile), Pochep (c. 1800 tonnes, 24 per cent of the facility stockpile) and Shchuchye (c. 2500 tonnes, 47 per cent of the facility stockpile).38 The seventh and final chemical weapon destruction facility is scheduled to start operating at Kizner in 2012 (Russia had earlier completed destruction operations at Gorny and Kambarka).39 As of 31 Octo-ber Russia had ‘destroyed and withdrawn’ 57 per cent (22 714 tonnes) of its Category 1 chemical weapons.40

The United States

As of November 2011 the USA had spent $23.7 billion on destroying its chemical weapon stockpiles.41 It completed destruction operations at Anniston, Alabama (22 September 2011); Umatilla, Oregon (25 October 2011); and at Tooele, Utah (21 January 2012). The remaining stockpile is located at Blue Grass, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado. Of the total original chemical weapon stockpile, 1.7 per cent is located at Blue Grass (consisting of sarin, VX and sulphur mustard), and 8.5 per cent is located at Pueblo (consisting of sulphur mustard). A neutralization-based destruction tech-nology will be used at both sites, although the time frame to complete oper-ations at these two sites is uncertain.42 The USA will also continue to

34 OPCW, C-16/DG.18 (note 10), para. 40. 35 OPCW, C-16/DG.18 (note 10), para. 13. 36 UN Security Council Resolution 2017, 31 Oct. 2011. 37 OPCW, Libya, EC-66/NAT.17 (note 27), p. 2. 38 OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Statement by V. I. Kholstov, Acting Head of the Rus-

sian Delegation, C-16/NAT.12, 28 Nov. 2011, pp. 1–2. 39 OPCW, Russia, C-16/NAT.12 (note 38), p. 2. 40 OPCW, C-16/DG.18 (note 10), para. 41. Russia has now destroyed all of its Category 2 chemical

weapons (10 616 tonnes) and its Category 3 chemical weapons. 41 OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, US

Permanent Representative, C-16/NAT.31, 29 Nov. 2011, p. 2. 42 Weber, A. C., ‘United States chemical demilitarization program’, PowerPoint presentation to

the 16th session of the Conference of the States Parties, OPCW, The Hague, Nov. 2011, p. 5; and OPCW, USA, C-16/NAT.31 (note 41), p. 1.


destroy non-stockpiled chemical munitions as they are discovered in coming years (other parties to the CWC will continue to face this problem).

Abandoned chemical weapons and old chemical weapons

As of December 2011, 4 countries had declared that abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs) are present on their territories, and 15 had declared that they have possessed old chemical weapons (OCWs) since the convention’s entry-into-force.43 OCW destruction operations in 2011 were carried out in Belgium, Italy, Japan, Germany, Switzerland and the UK, while France continued to develop a comprehensive OCW destruction programme.44

Destruction operations for ACWs in China continued.45 ACW sites are clustered in five, geographically distinct projects.46 As of 30 September 2011, 35 203 ACWs had been destroyed at Nanjing, Jiangsu province: this represents 99 per cent of the declared ACWs at that location and 75 per cent of the declared ACWs in China.47 Two mobile destruction chambers were scheduled to be used in Haerbaling, Jilin province, and in the north-ern part of China. As of October, Japan had shipped one destruction cham-ber.48 Japan provided further information on its destruction operations in Nanjing, which began on 12 October 2010.49

43 The 4 countries that have declared ACWs to the OPCW are China, Iran, Italy and Panama. The

Technical Secretariat determined the ACW munitions declared by Iran to be conventional. The 15 countries that have declared OCWs to the OPCW are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. ACWs are defined as chemical weapons that were abandoned by a state after 1 Jan. 1925 on the terri-tory of another state without the permission of the latter. CWC (note 1), Article II, para. 6. OCWs are defined as chemical weapons that were produced before 1925 or chemical weapons produced between 1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated to such an extent that they are no longer usable in the manner in which they were designed. CWC (note 1), Article II, para. 5. For information on countries not discussed here see CBW chapters in previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbook.

44 OPCW, C-16/DG.18 (note 10), para. 51. 45 On World War II-era chemical weapons see Tu, A. T., ‘Chemical weapons abandoned by the

Imperial Japanese Army in Japan and China at the end of World War II’, Toxin Reviews, vol. 30, no. 1 (Feb. 2011), pp. 1–5.

46 The projects are (a) Mobile Destruction Facility (MDF)-South at Nanjing and Wuhan; (b) MDF-North at Shijiazhuang and Haerbin; (c) Haerbaling; (d) ‘activities at other burial sites’ at Jiamusi, Heilongjiang province; Hunchun, Jilin province; Lianhuapao, Jilin province; and Guangzhou, Guangdong province; and (e) identification operations at Anqing, Bengbu, Hangzhou, Shijiazhuang, Shouyang, Wuhan and Xinyang. Fujiwara, H., Deputy Director-General, Abandoned Chemical Weapons Office, Japanese Cabinet Office, ‘Japan’s ACWs in China’, PowerPoint presentation at 14th Annual International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference (CWD 2011), Interlaken, 23–26 May 2011, slide 5.

47 OPCW, Executive Council, Statement by H. E. Ambassador Takashi Koezuka, Permanent Representative of Japan, EC-66/NAT.8, 4 Oct. 2011, p. 1; OPCW, C-16/DG.18 (note 10), para. 50; and OPCW, Correspondence with author, May 2012.

48 OPCW, Japan, EC-66/NAT.8 (note 47). 49 Fujiwara (note 46), slide 4.


Political tension

The CSP was marked by political tension between Iran and (mainly) the USA. The Iranian representative stated that ‘The former regime of Iraq in its aggression against Iran, deployed chemical weapons against the inno-cent people of my country, which had been provided to that regime by the United States of America and its western allies’. He also stated that it is ‘unfortunate’ that the USA ‘has explicitly stated that it cannot meet the [chemical weapon destruction] deadline, which is a clear-cut case of non-compliance’ that should therefore be referred to the United Nations. Iran also called on the persons and companies that supplied Saddam Hussein with chemical weapon-related ‘equipment’ to be sued and stated that Israel possesses ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and therefore poses ‘the most dangerous threat against the regional peace and security’.50

The US representative replied that the USA has not deliberately failed to destroy its chemical weapon stockpiles by the April 2012 deadline and has no intention of retaining such stockpiles. The delay rather reflected exigen-cies of its destruction programme over previous years. He stated that ‘A delay in destroying one’s stockpile, even though we are destroying it as rapidly as practicable, is not a deliberate attempt to illicitly retain chemical weapons.’51 The US representative also denied that the USA had provided the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons.52

At the end of the CSP Iran cast the sole vote against an OPCW decision on the final extended deadline for chemical weapon destruction.53 It requested the OPCW to sanction the USA (but not Russia, which will also fail to meet its April 2012 chemical weapon destruction deadline).54 Dis-cussions by the Executive Council and the CSP centred on the language used by the chemical weapon possessor states to reiterate their unequivocal

50 OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Statement by H. E. Kazem Gharib Abadi, Permanent

Representative of Iran, 28 Nov.–2 Dec. 2011. Israel attended the CSP as an observer and, for the first time, addressed the meeting from the floor. Although it expressed support for the object and purpose of the CWC, Israel stated that it was unable to join the regime at present given the current broader geopolitical circumstances in the Middle East—arguing that a broader peaceful accommodation must be reached among the states in the region prior to any accession to the various arms control and disarmament regimes.

51 OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Supplemental US statement distributed as an official document, The Hague, 29 Nov. 2011, p. 1.

52 OPCW, USA (note 51). 53 OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, ‘Final extended deadline of 29 April 2012’, Decision

C-16/DEC.11, 1 Dec. 2011. Previously, CSP decisions had almost always been taken by consensus, with the notable exception of the vote to end the tenure of the second OPCW Director-General in 2002. See Hart, J., Kuhlau, F. and Simon, J., ‘Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control’, SIPRI Yearbook 2003, pp. 651–52.

54 OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, ‘Explanation of vote on the draft decision on the final extended deadline of 29 April 2012’, Statement by H. E. Kazem Gharib Abadi, Permanent Represen-tative of Iran, 28 Nov.–2 Dec. 2011. The document was circulated at the CSP.


commitment to destroying their stockpiles in the shortest time and to submit further details to the OPCW of their destruction programmes.

The OPCW has continued to make special visits to destruction sites in Russia and the USA; the visits serve to underline the political commitment of both states to destroy their chemical weapon stockpiles as soon as is practical. The CSP decision requires future meetings to undertake an annual review of the progress of chemical weapon destruction by those parties that have not met their April 2012 deadline and sets aside a specially designated meeting at the 2017 CSP to consider this matter.55 Previous dis-cussions on setting a new chemical weapon destruction deadline will thus be superseded by a process of annual information submission, verification and review by the parties that will probably continue for at least five more years.

55 OPCW, C-16/DEC.11 (note 53), para. 3(f ).


III. Allegations of chemical and biological weapon programmes

JOHN HART

Allegations of activity related to chemical and biological weapons (CBW) continued in 2011 with little official or otherwise authoritative reporting to clarify these contentions.

A report written by a doctor for the World War II Japanese military, which was uncovered in October 2011 in ‘a local office’ of the National Diet Library in Kyoto Prefecture, states that 25 946 people were infected by the Japanese military’s biological weapons during the 1937–45 Second Sino-Japanese War. The report states that the Imperial Japanese Army’s Unit 731 released plague-infected fleas in six operations between 1940 and 1942 in several provinces including Jiangxi, Jilin and Zhejiang.1

North Korea

In May 2011 China voted not to allow the UN Security Council to release a report on sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) under Security Council Resolution 1874.2 According to the leaked text of the report, North Korea is ‘suspected to possess a large stock-pile of chemical weapons, and of maintaining a biological weapons pro-gramme to independently cultivate and produce agents such as the bacteria of anthrax, smallpox and cholera since the 1980s’.3 It also stated that ‘it is broadly believed’ that North Korea possesses 2500–5000 tonnes of chem-ical weapons, including phosgene, sarin, sulphur mustard, tabun, unspeci-fied blood agents and other persistent organophosphorus nerve agents; and that North Korea has at least eight chemical weapon production facilities, including at the Chungsu and the Eunduk chemical plants.4 An unnamed UN member state told the panel that the Second Economic Committee of the National Defence Commission (via its Fifth Machine Industry Bureau and the Second Academy of Natural Sciences) are ‘believed to play leading roles in activities related to the production, import and export’ of North

1 ‘Report shows Japanese Imperial Army used bioweapons during Sino War’, Jiji Press, 15 Oct.

2011. For background see Harris, S., Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–1945, and the American Cover-up, revised edn (Routledge: London, 2002).

2 Kan, S. A., China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress RL31555 (US Congress: Washington, DC, 9 Nov. 2011), p. 29. See also chapter 8, section IV, and chapter 10, section III, in this volume.

3 Panel of experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), Report, para. 74. The leaked report is available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/55808872/UN-Panel-of-Experts-NORK-Report-May-2011>. The report was partly informed by South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND), 2010 Defense White Paper (MND: Seoul, 2011).

4 Panel of experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (note 3), para. 75.


Korea’s CBW programme. The panel also stated that the Green Pine Associated Company is ‘deeply engaged in the illicit procurement of chem-ical material and other specialty items abroad’.5

Additionally, in 2011 diplomats were quoted as saying that in 2009 Greece had seized almost 14 000 chemical protection suits from a North Korean ship that was possibly headed for Syria. The UN Security Council con-sidered the information on the seizure during its deliberations on ongoing sanctions against North Korea in 2011.6

Iran and Libya

The United States reportedly investigated whether Iran had supplied the Libyan regime of Muammar Gaddafi with ‘hundreds of special artillery shells for chemical weapons that Libya kept secret for decades’. The sus-pected shells were filled with sulphur mustard and were those uncovered by Libyan rebel forces in late 2011 (see section II above).7 The former Libyan regime had declared air bombs as the only chemical munitions in its stockpile.

Donald A. Mahley, a retired US Army colonel and State Department official who was involved in the discussions in 2003 between Libya, the United Kingdom and the USA on the modalities for Libya to verifiably renounce nuclear and chemical weapons and long-range ballistic missiles and who also served as head of the US delegation that negotiated a draft protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the 1990s, stated that ‘we will have to think very seriously about finding inspectors with a different skill set, and about more intelligence-sharing, and about looking widely, not just at declared sites’.8

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied that Iran had provided such shells and attributed motivation for the story to a form of ‘soft warfare’.9 The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) did not publicly react on the matter. The ability of the OPCW to verify locations outside declared facilities is partly dependent on the willingness of the parties to implement the 1993 Chemical Weapons Con-

5 Panel of experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (note 3), para. 76. 6 Agence France-Presse, ‘Greece seizes N. Korea chemical weapons suits: diplomats’, Korea

Herald, 17 Nov. 2011. 7 Smith, R. J., Warrick, J. and Lynch, C., ‘Iran may have sent Libya shells for chemical weapons’,

Washington Post, 21 Nov. 2011. In Jan. 2012 an OPCW official erroneously stated that the shells were not filled. The OPCW subsequently issued a clarification to the effect that they were.

8 See Hart, J. and Kile, S. N., ‘Libya’s renunciation of NBC weapons and longer-range missile pro-grammes’, SIPRI Yearbook 2005, pp. 629–48. For Mahley’s remarks see Smith et al. (note 7).

9 ‘Iran denies claims of supplying chemical weapon parts to Al-Qadhafi regime’, Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television, 22 Nov. 2011, 9:33:05, Open Source Center transcript. The media does not appear to have addressed the question of whether the shells, whatever their origin, were empty when (or if ) shipped to Libya.


vention’s challenge inspection procedures (which have not been used).10 The OPCW nevertheless continues to train to carry out such an inspection should one be requested.

Syria

US intelligence services reportedly believe that Syria possesses sarin, VX and sulphur mustard, as well as missile and artillery shells for their delivery.11 Anonymous current and former US officials have been cited as saying that Syria has ‘at least five sites where it produces chemical-weapons agents, including mustard gas, Sarin and VX’.12 The officials stated that these facilities are located in Aleppo, Damascus, Hamah and Lattakia, among other places, and that some chemical weapon production facilities are located at military sites that also store Scud missiles.13 In response to the question of whether Syria possesses such weapons, the US Department of State stated:

We have long called on the Syrian Government to give up its chemical weapons arsenal and to join the Chemical Weapons Convention . . . we do believe that Syria’s chemical stockpile remains under government control and that there is no change in the lockdown status of those weapons. Syria has a stockpile of nerve agent and some mustard gas, and we will continue to work closely with likeminded countries to ensure that there is no proliferation of that material.14

10 See Chemical Weapons Convention, Article IX, paras 8–25; and Verification Annex, parts X–XI. 11 Solomon, J., ‘U.S., Israel monitor suspected Syrian WMD’, Wall Street Journal, 27 Aug. 2011. 12 Solomon (note 11). 13 Solomon (note 11). 14 US Department of State, ‘Daily press briefing’, 30 Aug. 2011, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/

dpb/2011/08/171281.htm>.


IV. Chemical and biological warfare prevention and response

JOHN HART

In 2011 further details regarding the ‘anthrax letter’ investigation in the United States, which began in October 2001 and was conducted by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), were released.1 Discussions focused on how the Department of Justice had determined that Bruce E. Ivins, a US Army scientist, was responsible for the letters and acted alone. The Depart-ment of Justice found that Ivins’s psychiatric history provides ‘considerable additional circumstantial evidence’ that he was guilty. However, the US National Academy of Sciences issued a report that concluded ‘It is not pos-sible to reach a definitive conclusion about the origins of the Bacillus anthracis in the mailings based on the available scientific evidence alone’.2 The US Congress will continue to consider this matter in 2012.

In 2011 the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the UN Secretary-General concluded a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the World Health Organization (WHO) concerning the the Secretary-General’s authority to investigate alleged use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW).3 Other MOUs with the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons were still being negotiated.

In August 2011 the Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Attacks, which had taken on some of the activities of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force in support of the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, called for enhancing coordination between all relevant international actors and strengthening response capacities at regional, national and local levels.4 The report con-cluded that, while lead international agencies for dealing with nuclear and

1 Guillemin, J., American Anthrax: Fear, Crime, and the Investigation of the Nation’s Deadliest Bio-

terror Attack (Times Books: New York, 2011). 2 Amerithrax Expert Behavioral Analysis Panel, Report of the Expert Behavioral Analysis Panel

(Research Strategies Network: Vienna, VA, 2011), p. 2; and National Research Council, Review of the Scientific Approaches Used during the FBI’s Investigation of the 2001 Anthrax Letters (National Acad-emies Press: Washington, DC, 2011), p. 4. See also US Public Broadcasting Service, ‘The anthrax files’, Frontline, 11 Oct. 2011, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/anthrax-files/>.

3 United Nations, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), Interagency Coord-ination in the Event of a Terrorist Attack using Chemical or Biological Weapons or Materials (United Nations: New York, Aug. 2011), para. 152; and United Nations, Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the World Health Organization and the United Nations concerning WHO’s support to the Secretary-General’s mechanism for investigation of the alleged use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons’, 31 Jan. 2011, <http://www.un.org/disarmament/ WMD/Secretary-General_Mechanism/>.

4 The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Plan of Action are contained in UN General Assembly Resolution 60/288, 20 Sep. 2006.


radiological threats are readily identifiable, organizations with responsi-bility for CBW threats are more diffuse and characterized by having ‘partial mandates’ in the various activities associated with prevention, prepared-ness and response.5

In 2011 the US Trade & Aid Monitor blog released primary documents and information on planned environmental remediation activity to clean up the after-effects of the US use of defoliants in Viet Nam in the 1960s and early 1970s.6

Scientific research

In late 2011 two research groups, one in the USA and the other in the Netherlands, released preliminary results of work to modify the virulence of the A(H5N1) strain of the avian influenza virus. Biosafety and biosecurity concerns led the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to request, for the first time since the body began to meet in 2005, that the researchers withhold part of their research findings from pub-lication.7 The NSABB’s authority in the matter derives from the fact that both research groups have received funding from the US National Insti-tutes of Health.

At the Fourth European Scientific Working Group on Influenza (ESWI) in September 2011, Dr Ron Fouchier of the Dutch Erasmus Medical Centre, who leads one of the two research groups, presented findings that show how a modified avian influenza virus strain became readily transmissible among ferrets, the animal model that Fouchier was using to study human infections.8 The second research group is led by Dr Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin and the University of Tokyo. Fouchier’s group submitted its research to Science, while Kawaoka’s group submitted its work to Nature. The editorial board of Nature indicated that it would con-sult with the researchers concerning the NSABB’s request.

This research exemplifies the growing ability of scientists to manipulate and create pathogens with novel characteristics. The NSABB reviewed the draft research and stated that neither manuscript should be published in its

5 United Nations, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (note 3). 6 ‘Da Nang Agent-Orange/dioxin technical documents obtained’, US Trade & Aid Monitor blog,

23 May 2011, <http://www.tradeaidmonitor.com/2011/05/da-nang-agent-orangedioxin-technical-documents-obtained.html>.

7 As of 5 Jan. 2012, 576 cases of A(H5N1) infection had been reported to the WHO since 2003, and 339 of those infected had died. The mortality rate, c. 50%, is perhaps too high because it is possible that some proportion of those infected went unreported, partly because they recovered without being tested. World Health Organization (WHO), ‘Cumulative number of confirmed human cases for avian influenza A(H5N1) reported to WHO, 2003–2011’, <http://www.who.int/influenza/human_ animal_interface/H5N1_cumulative_table_archives/en/index.html>.

8 European Scientific Working Group on Influenza (ESWI), Fourth ESWI Influenza Conference, Malta, 11–14 Sep. 2011, <http://www.eswiconference.org/>.


entirety ‘with complete data and experimental details’, and that text should be added to describe, among other things, (a) the goals of the research, (b) the potential health benefits, (c) the risk assessments carried out prior to the start of the research, (d) the biosafety oversight and related meas-ures, (e) the biosecurity practices and the facilities’ ‘adherence to select agent regulation’, and ( f ) text ‘addressing biosafety, biosecurity, and occu-pational health [that] is part of the responsible conduct of all life sciences research’. It is less clear how the adherence of facilities to select agent regulation would apply to non-US entities that receive US grants. However, the harmonization of such standards internationally is a broader policy objective within, for example, the framework of the Australia Group. The NSABB also stated that the US Government should ‘encourage the authors to submit a special communication/commentary letter’ to the journals ‘regarding the dual use research issue’.9

The WHO stated that it was ‘deeply concerned about the potential negative consequences’ of the research.10 In January 2012 it requested a 60-day moratorium to suspend such research during which time the WHO member states were asked to consider what approaches and decisions (if any) should be taken. Some observers and analysts have expressed concern that such work unnecessarily risks the accidental release from a laboratory of a modified virus, or that such work might suggest to states and non-state actors unorthodox avenues for biological weapon attack. Conversely, observers and analysts have argued that it is important to better understand the mechanisms by which influenza viruses become readily transmissible among humans.11 There were further disagreements regarding whether and how the research proposal could have been modified to make it less ‘proliferation sensitive’.

DNA recovery and sequencing from deteriorated (‘ancient’) and novel specimens are becoming increasingly common, mainly due to rapidly improving capabilities to extract, duplicate and sequence minute and ancient DNA samples. Such work yields greater insight into the function of pathogens and the nature of associated virulence factors. On 12 October 2011, Nature published a draft genome of Yersinia pestis (the causative agent of plague) that was derived from victims of the Black Death, dating

9 US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), ‘National Science Advisory Board

for Biosecurity Recommendations’, 21 Nov. 2011, <http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2012/0120sp_ flu.shtml>.

10 World Health Organization (WHO), ‘WHO concerned that new H5N1 influenza research could undermine the 2011 Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework’, Press statement, 30 Dec. 2011, <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2011/pip_framework_20111229/en/index.html>.

11 In birds, the A(H5N1) strain is principally a gut disease that is shed through faeces, while in humans the strain is principally found in the lungs, nose, and throat and shed through mucous and saliva. Scientists have found that a change in the PB2 gene facilitated virus reproduction at a temp-erature 4 degrees Celsius lower than the temperature in the guts of birds. Birds and humans also share similar cell receptors (alpha 2,3 and alpha 2,6, respectively).


from a strain associated with plague deaths in London in 1348–50. The samples were taken from the teeth of victims, and DNA from current Y. pestis strains was used as a complementary template to the historical strain. Analysis of the genetic structure of the strain, including its phylo-geny, ‘reveal[s] no unique derived positions’ as compared to those currently found in nature and, thus, ‘factors other than microbial genetics, such as environment, vector dynamics and host susceptibility’ should be the focus for analysis of the epidemiology of the bacterium.12 The researchers sought to understand why the strain that caused the Black Death was so virulent. The possible reasons include (a) yet to be understood aspects of how the genes are structured in the chromosomes, (b) the possible greater suscepti-bility of the population of 14th century Europe to the bacterium, and (c) a combination of environmental factors—including extended periods of warmer, wet weather, as well as the proximity of humans to rodents and unsanitary living conditions, both of which were more common at the time. One of the principal researchers, Dr Hendrick Poinar, underlined the fast pace of change in science and technology (S&T) by observing that scientists would have been ‘unlikely’ to be able to extract the genome in 2009.13

Future implications of science and technology

The current and future S&T environment poses several difficult questions for CBW arms control, including what is an ‘activity of concern’; what is the appropriate policy response with respect to both general S&T trends and developments and possible future specific activities that may require regu-lation and other governance responses; and what is the expected operating environment of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the coming 10–20 years?14

Many S&T advances have increased the knowledge, material and tech-nologies that could be misused if science were to be applied for hostile pur-poses. Yet, on their own, they do not lead to the emergence of new warfare options. What matters is rather the context in which these scientific activ-

12 Schuenemann, V. J. et al., ‘Targeted enrichment of ancient pathogens yielding the pPCP1

plasmid of Yersinia pestis from victims of the Black Death’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 108, no. 38 (20 Sep. 2011), pp. E746–E752; and Bos, K. I. et al., ‘A draft genome of Yersinia pestis from victims of the Black Death’, Nature, vol. 478 (27 Oct. 2011), pp. 506–10.

13 US Public Broadcasting Service, ‘Reconstructing Black Death: why was plague microbe so deadly?’, Interview of Hendrick Poinar by Ray Suarez, Newshour, 13 Oct. 2011, <http://www.pbs.org/ newshour/bb/health/july-dec11/blackdeath_10-13.html>.

14 Partly based on Hart, J. and Trapp, R., ‘Science and technology and their impacts on the Bio-logical and Toxin Weapons Convention: a synthesis report on preparing for the Seventh Review Conference and future challenges’, SIPRI, Dec. 2011, <http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/ bw/publications/btwc111212.pdf>. See also UN Office at Geneva, ‘Disarmament: think zone for the Seventh Review Conference’, <http://www.unog.ch/bwc/thinkzone>.


ities are carried out. For example, threat assessment and biodefence pro-grammes (depending on how they are structured and implemented) can, if conducted with a lack of sufficient transparency, raise concerns among other states or actors regarding their legitimacy or intent. This, in turn, can destabilize the BTWC and the CWC regimes. However, it is not the nature of the research itself that should be the focus of clarification and evaluation by states. While monitoring scientific activities can assist in the identifi-cation of new discoveries or research activity, what is most important is an in-depth evaluation of their implications for the convention regimes. In particular, states should understand whether these new scientific activities and discoveries could lead to paradigm shifts and, therefore, call for new approaches and responses in CBW arms control. This can be done by states (both individually and collectively) in the context of the BTWC and the CWC regime meetings. Any S&T evaluation mechanisms should be system-atic and participatory in nature.

With regard to policy responses to S&T trends, the nature of science calls for a combination of top-down regulation based on the principles and norms of the BTWC and the CWC, and a bottom-up approach of self-regulation and voluntary measures to increase transparency and strengthen responsible conduct in research and development activity. Interaction between governments and regulators, on the one hand, and science and industry, on the other hand, is also important. Scientists need to have the freedom to carry out research and publish new discoveries and methods. Industry requires a predictable and fair environment in which to conduct science while complying with the BTWC and the CWC norms and the various relevant mechanisms to resolve compliance issues vis-à-vis other parties to these conventions. The entire exercise is both multidisciplinary and driven by the overlapping interests and responsibilities of govern-ments, private enterprise and the science community. Effective chemical and biological arms control calls for a combination of a traditional regu-latory approach and the more fluid networking solutions that bring together a wide range of actors.

It is difficult to predict the future operating environment of the two con-ventions. The focus of concerned practitioners and policy analysts should be on major trends and ‘drivers’, many or most of which can be readily identified today. For example, as the cost of key enabling technologies (e.g. computing, synthesis and screening) drops and the international capacity to utilize them increases, traditional distinctions between ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’ of technology transfer will become increasingly irrelevant. The world is already living in a ‘post-proliferation’ environment that is charac-terized less by the spread of weapons, and more by increasing accessibility to and capacity for work in S&T.


Despite the inherently subjective (qualitative) nature of CBW threat assessments, scientists and technical experts working for states, in prin-ciple, understand such threats—provided their national structures are oriented to take such threats into account. Non-state actors—‘terrorists’ and the proverbial garage science operators—lack institutional depth and capacity to achieve similar levels of sophistication or output. Another key (‘chicken and egg’) conundrum is whether threat pronouncements—often made by those who are not conducting scientific research and develop-ment—prompt al-Qaeda affiliates (or their equivalent) to consider or to pursue the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons.15

Broader challenges include the extent to which threat perceptions are driven by actual interest and activity by non-state actors; whether and how the deliberate spread of disease constitutes a weapon of mass destruction; and whether states can achieve absolute security, or rather prioritize the attention and resources devoted to a variety of threats (qualitatively or quantitatively) according to a ‘reasoned and balanced’ hierarchy of risk. Prioritization implies that decision makers and policymakers (and the public more broadly) can tolerate a degree of ambiguity.

15 Stenersen, A., Al-Qaida’s Quest for Weapons of Mass Destruction: The History behind the Hype

(VDM Verlag Dr Müller: Saarbrücken, 2008), p. 29.

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