asa and asean, 1961-1967 southeast asian regionalism

8/12/2019 ASA and ASEAN, 1961-1967 Southeast Asian Regionalism

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ASA and ASEAN, 1961-1967: Southeast Asian RegionalismAuthor(s): Vincent K. PollardSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Mar., 1970), pp. 244-255Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642577 .Accessed: 15/11/2013 07:30

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ASA AND ASEAN,1961-1967:

SOUTHEAST ASIANREGIONALISM

/ Vincent K. Pollard*

7he comparatively hort ut turbulent olitical development f the As-sociation f Southeast sia (ASA) fromJuly 961 through ugust 1967provides n excellent pportunity o understand ow a subregional atternof alliance, pparently promising n terms f publicly tated bjectives,can often ail to meet hose objectives n the context f Sino-American e-lations. he development f ASA up until he aunching f the Associationof Southeast sian Nations ASEAN) in August 967 also affords xamplesofhow he policymakerswithin hese outheast sian nternational rgani-zations elate o theAmerican oreign olicy bjective f containing hina.

The central, ut not exclusive, ocus of this study elates he notion ofregionalism romoted y ASA andASEAN to the deological hrust f theorganizations' eclared oreign olicy. These aspects, n turn, re relatedto the frequency nd nature f the American erception f these rganiza-tions.Thepaper does not attempt otake nto ccount developmentsubse-quent oAugust 967.Thefocuswillbe on an examination f the ndividualand collective elf-perception f the ASA and ASEAN states, s revealedthrough heirpublic diplomacy, nd related o (1) contemporary vents

and (2) their arying erceptions f the two major national loc actors nEast and Southeast Asia-China and the U.S. We will thereby entativelysuggest hemajor political meaningsASAand ASEAN assumed n the re-spective oreign olicies of the severalASAstates.SOURCES AND MOTIVATIONSFOR ASA

ASAoriginally ncluded heformer ederation f Malaya, hePhilippines,and Thailand.The ideological lignment f these tateswith he West hap-pens to serve s a continuing eference rame or explaining ome of themore ignificant ariables ncountered n ASA'shistory f expectation, is-appointment, talemate, nd self-subsumation.

*1would like to express my appreciation o Norton Ginsburg nd Tang Tsou of theUniversity f Chicagofor their comments nd suggestions. Responsibility or the viewsexpressed s entirely mine.

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VINCENT K. POLLARD 245

Initially oth the U.S. and Chinabarely cknowledged SA's existencein their oreign olicy tatements, hich uggests hat ither 1) from hina'spoint f view, t wasdifficult r pointless o distinguish SAactivities rom

SEATO activities, articularly fter eking's denunciation f an abortiveprototype f ASA in the proposedSoutheastAsian Friendship nd Eco-nomic reaty,' nd/or 2) ASA's politico-economicotential or trengthen-ing the Western loc was greatly nderestimated y the U.S.

The Charter f the Association f Southeast sia, more ommonly nownas the BangkokDeclaration f July 1, 1961,2 uggested o a number fobservers hatMalaya, he Philippines, nd Thailand were on the verge ofa new era of awakening nd of real economic ooperation n SoutheastAsia. One could, f course, evelop selected ist of ndications hat sub-regional rganization uch s ASAwouldbe a viable conomic lliance venin a political tmosphere hilled y coldwar tensions he renewal f armedstruggle n Vietnam nd elsewhere n SoutheastAsia. For example, hePhilippines, alaya, nd Thailandhad, respectively, hethree ighest atesof growth n Southeast sia by 1960, and together hey roduced alf theworld's in, rubber, nd coconut il.

Implicit nd Explicit Goals of ASA: Despite the real predispositionfor meaningful egionaland subregional conomiccooperation he two

SEATO-aligneduturemembers f ASAprematurely overplayed heir andand disclosed hetrue goalsof ASA. For example, remark ttributed oGeneralThanomKittikachorn, efense Minister f Thailand, on the eveof the signing f the BangkokDeclaration, ntimated hat while the ASAstates were to develop ultural nd economicprograms uring he earlystageof the organization, his tage or level of cooperation houldquicklybe replaced y or subordinated o a coordination f military olicies.3

During heJuly 961sessions f the preliminary orking roupof whatwouldbecomeASA,it was reported romManilathat:

If Philippine roposals re followed, heAssociation ould providefor hefollowing: . preferential rade greements mongmembers;2.free rade n certain ommodities;. lowering f tariffs; . easing fcustoms ules nd procedures; . standardizationnd control f ex-ports; . oint usiness enture; nd7.cooperationn commercialvia-tion nd shipping.4

1 'Neutral'Malaya, eprinted rom A So-CalledNeutral tate, Jen-min ih-pao,March 2,1961, n PekingReview,March 7, 1961, . 13.

2For fficial ext, f. Thailand, Economic nd SocialCooperationn the AssociationofSoutheast sia. Official earbook, 964 Bangkok: 964),pp. 124-125.

3Hugo Durant, ASA-Prospects and Results, Eastern World, Vol. XVII (August1963),p. 12.However, careful heck f the Bangkok ost for July-August, 961,un-covers oreferenceoThanom's emark.

'Straits cho nd Times fMalaysia Penang),July 1, 1961, . 4.



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246 SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM

These proposals suggested lessened Philippine dependence on the U.S. andmay have been intended o give Asian states new Philippine osture oevaluate.'

A different erspective as given by an American olitical ommentatorwhosaw ASA as politically ubordinate o U.S. interests n East and South-east Asia:

They may have taken another irst ital step toward he consolidationof all the defense rrangements f the Far East, from Japan to NewZealand, nto single ort of Pacific NATO, able to concert ts defenseefforts ffectively. uch a consolidation ould be the greatest victoryfor freedom ince the creation of NATO back in 1949.6

Whilenot triking recisely he ame mechanical otion f containment,Thailand'sMinister f ForeignAffairs, hanat Khoman, hreemonths atercharacterized herelationship etweenASA'seconomic lans and its anti-Communistenormore ubtly:

. . . to the extent hatwe achieve political, conomic nd social progressat home, we strengthen ur ability to withstand olitical subversion,economic enetration, nd outright ttempts t domination. t the same

time,we acquire the capacity o assist other ountries nd to participateactively n the collective ffort o expand the area of security nd con-tentment n the world.

In line with his wo-fold oncept, hePhilippines .. has also joinedhands with ts close friends nd neighbors, Malaya and Thailand, n acooperative enture or mutual assistance n the economic ocial andscientific ields hrough he establishment f the Association f South-east Asia.... This strictly on-political rganization s taking he firstmodest tep towards what we believe to be an essential and inevitabledevelopment, lready foreshadowed n other reas of the world,namely,the ugmentation f national fforts y freely greed and mutually ene-ficial modes of regional cooperation.7

The July 31, 1961, BangkokDeclarationwas an executive greementsigned y Thanat Khoman, rime Minister unku Abdul Rahman of Ma-laya, ndthePhilippine ecretary f ForeignAffairs, elixberto . Serrano.WZhilehecontents ereformally onideological,he context was not. The

'Straits Times (Singapore), August 1, 1961, p. 1. Cf. also Straits Echo and Times ofMalaysia,July 8, 1961, p. 4, for Felixberto Serrano's response to the neutralist ationswhich had declined to join ASA. Cf. len-min Jih-pao Commentator ells U.S. to GetOut of Philippines, New China News Agency (English), December 30, 1964, in U.S.Consulate-General, ong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 3370,pp. 36-37.

'Edgar Ansel Mowrer, New Asian Agreement Will Help Stop Reds, in Extensionof Remarks f Walter H. Judd, CongressionalRecord, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. A6518.

7 Statements y His Excellency, Mr. Thanat Khoman, Leader of the Delegation ofThailand, Made During the Colombo Plan Meeting held at Kuala Lumpur n November1961, SEA TO Record, (February 1962), p. 11.



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however, e chose to softpedal hekey role he had played n 1959 in theabortive outheastAsian Friendship nd EconomicTreaty SEAFET) 12

DespiteASA'sconcerted tress n the non-political haracter f the alli-

ance, one commentator oted aconically hat most of the neighboringcountries referred o remain ilent observers.'3 When Lee Kuan Yew,PrimeMinister f Singapore, was in NewDelhi n 1962, kepticism asex-pressed over Mr. Lee's belief hat SEATO members n ASA can breakthemselves way immediately rom he military act. The skeptics'mis-givingswerewell-founded.

Malaysia'sresponse o the ncreased ttention aid to the politicizationor alignment f ASA was to stress conomic aols,pure and simple, n itsforeign olicy tatements.t characterized henegative ndonesian esponse,for example, s a smear actic.14Similarly, espitedefense rrangementswith he United Kingdom,Kuala Lumpur felt ompelled n late 1963 toclaim hat t was not a member f any military locand not nvolvedin any regional ollective efence rrangement. '5

However, hese ublicprotestations f neutrality either ttracted ewmembers o ASA nor forestalled ubsequent ifficulties mong the ASAstates.As already uggested, he arlier Chinese ampaign gainst EAFETprobably ucceededrather well. A July 1961 news release from Manila

indicated for xample, hat he ASAForeignMinisters ere cutely ware

that heir ro-Western lignment ould essen hechances or heorganiza-tion's xpansion.'6

The development escribed boveset the tone and the climate or fur-ther eriesof events which nvolved woASA states nd provoked ariousreactions. he outcome ffectively isrupted SA'snew economic nd cul-tural proposals s well as its ncipient echnical, conomic, ocial and cul-tural programs.

In 1963the Philippines enewed ts century-old laim to North Borneo

(Sabah) in response o the formation fMalaysia.Manila aw the xpansionof the Federation f Malaya as an unfriendly ttempt o consolidate heremnants f the United Kingdom'sformer ossessionsn SoutheastAsia.Therewasa strong nti-Chinese nd anti-Communistlement nvolved lso,and attention as drawn o the fact hat he Chinese wouldconstitute helargest minority est. 41%) in the new Malaysia.The Philippine'snon-recognition f Malaysia, xacerbated y Indonesia's esumption f ts Kon-

2Bernard K. Gordon, Dimensions of Conflict n Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 966), pp. 165-66.3M.P. Gopalan, The Launching of ASA, Far Eastern Economic Review XXXIII

(September 1, 1961), p. 551.Dato Muhammed Ghazali bin Shafie. Malaysia in Afro-Asia, peech by the Perma-

nent Secretary for External Affairs, Malaysia, to the Consular Corps in Singapore, onNovember 6, 1964, 1965), p. 8.

Malaysia, Department f Information, alaysia In Brief Knala Lumpur: Tai ThanFong Press, 1963,1964),p. 116.

Straits Echo and Times of Malaya, July 8, 1961,p. 4.



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Irontasi ampaign gainstMalaysia, roduced stalemate n ASAthat astedalmost hreeyears. t was only on June 1, 1966, that an agreement asreached etween ndonesia nd Malaysiaending heKonfrontasi. formal

PeaceAgreement as signed n Djakartaon August 1, 1966.The Philippine overnment's ecision o press ts claimto Sabah so em-phatically n the arly 960'smayhavebeen manifestation f burgeoningdesire oalter ne tendency n foreign olicy hat had been an obstacle othe expansion f ASA membership: hat s, how to distinguish ts anti-Communist oliciesfrom ts real links to the West. The Philippineswaslessthan nthusiastic bout beingregarded y their eighbors s a South-eastAsiansubsidiary, f the U.S., as exemplified y the presence f U.S.military stablishments nd personnel n the Philippine slands. Manilaprobably nticipated ashington's xtreme ack of enthusiasm ver ts laimto Sabah which ould only erve o dividethe oyalties f nations lreadyalignedwith he West. urther, f the laim o Sabah is regarded s evidenceof a growing rive oward elf-assertion is-a-vis heU.S.rather han sub-sidiary orm f imperialism, henManila'sactions ssume dded meaningin the ight f the xpected hasing ut n 1972 of uchforms f dependencyas special rade oncessions.

Prior to the preliminary essions f the SecondASAForeignMinisters'

Meetingn

April 1962,Tunku AbdulRahmanhad issued

a statement ndi-cating that t was the ntention f the ASAcountries . . to show heworldthat he peoples f Asiacouldthink nd plan for hemselves. '7 SA,whichwent o such engths o posture s a non-political-i.e., on-aligned-andsolely conomic rganization, oundered hrough ts first wo years al-

though otnecessarily ecause t was inspired nd guidedby political ndideological onsiderations. ather lack of attention o national nd blocconsiderationshat hapethe tructure f nternational olitics n the regionprobably mpeded he development f a larger number f joint regional

economic entures.Revivaland Response,1964-1966:The U.S. paid considerablymorepublic ttention oASAduring 964-1966 han t had the preceding hreeyears. ASA'spotential or containing hina, had probably een over-estimated y policymakers.As a result, .S. foreign olicy tatements advirtually gnored he ack of spectacular uccesses y ASAin the region.But there s no evidence o suggest hat the ASA stateswere discouragedfrom maintaining heir ubreional anti-China osture, ither s abstractanti-Communismr as a heightened oncern, or xample, ver heir hineseminorities.The lack of overt American nterest n ASAduring he 1961-63periodwaspartly reflection f the greater oncern verdevelopmentsn Vietnam.But t is alsopossible hat Washington ad tentatively oncluded hatASAwasnotparticularly ermane o the chievement f U.S.foreign olicygoals

Straits Echo and Timesof Malaya (Penang), April 4, 1962,p. 1.



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in East Asia. Thismay xplain why here were o few ublic tatements romthe United tates, which n any case would have had to explain way (andthereby ublicize)the nternal issension nd the failures f ASA in South-

east Asia. Between anuary 964,and August 1, 1967, ASA's relationshipto a loosebipolar nternational ystem as articulatedmore clearly ndmore ften y both ASA and the U.S., the major actor n the Western loc.In the content f the scalating olitico-military onflict n Southeast Asia,the U.S. cameto regard ASA as of increasing mportance o the nterestsof the Western loc in Southeast sia.

The nature f the onflict n Southeast sia suggests wo further uestionsregarding SA: 1) Did the U.S. see ASA as a curious bversion f China'sprinciple f self-reliance or the carrying ut of People's War, and 2)

did U.S. statements boutASA seem o encourage r condition ny specificASA response?An examination f the major developmentsn ASA during1964-1966 eveals o clear-cut nswer o either f hese uestions. Whatdoesemerge learly s that he expressed .S. foreign olicy on ASA's relation-ship to a desirable egionalism n Southeast Asia did reinforce he publicexpression f the organization's ro-Western deological lignment.

Although resident ohnson made no reference o ASA in his April 1965Johns HopkinsSpeech,he evidently elt hat, n general, xpanded eco-nomic ooperation mong U.S.-aligned outheast sian nations was in theinterests f the U.S. This was in no way nconsistent ith he massiveU.S.military nvolvementn the region r with he scalation f thewar. Contain-ment f China, s willbe seen,had not become hoary liche, ut was to befleshed ut and supplementedn ways more ensitive o the mmediate ir-cumstances.

Thesubsequent emporary evival f ASA,formalized t the 1966meetingof theASAStanding ommitteen Bangkok, as been ttributed o the pa-tient iplomacy f Thailand's Thanat Khoman,'8 the most vocally nti-Communist SAforeignminister. n January , 1966, he was reported ohave tated hat he newly-electedhilippine resident arcoshad ndicatedthat Manilawouldmove o recognizeMalaysia.19 owever, hePhilippinesstalled t this ointwhen t became lear hat oospeedy recognition ighttrigger renewalf ndonesia's onfrontasi policy.20

At theMarch , 1966,meeting f the ASAStanding ommittee, heThai,Malaysian, nd Philippine fficials n attendance ecided to reactivate heJoint Working arty f ASA.At the subsequent SA MinisterialMeetingin late April 1966,Thanat Khoman alledfor n Asian attempt o end theVietnamWar. He may have hoped thereby o arouse greater nterest n

18 ASA and ASPAC, 1967 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review,1967), p. 65.

9Amando oronila, Khoman on Vietnam, abah, ASA Revival, Manila Times, Janu-ary , 1966, p. 14-A.

20ThanakanKrungthep Chamkat, The Southeast Asian milieu, Monthly Review,(Bangkok Bank Ltd.), March 1966, p. 96.



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ASA onthe part of neutralist outheast sian states ince ending he warmeant ifferent hings o different arties. f this washis ntention, efailed,for his call did not disassociate tself rom American oreign olicy nSoutheast sia, nor was he assisted y the ASAgovernments' epetition fthe U.S. position n regionalism. hanat's tatement s illuminating:

Malaysia nd Thailand re ready o have full participationn ASA.Therelevance f the ASAto the Vietnam onflict s that ts membersshould ook to [ASA] as a significant ttempt o collaborate ndstrengthen hemselvesnternally hile he Vietnam ituation waitspolitical olution. he success f theASA willhave great eal to dowith he ong-rangefforts four ountries or peaceful uture n thisregion.We cannotwaituntil eace s restored n Vietnam.We thinkthat ASA is only he tarting oint. t is bound o develop, row ndspread.... It is difficult o divorce conomics rom olitics.21

Bangkok's nderstanding f this particular elationship etween egionaleconomic rograms nd politicswasfurther larified n a joint tatement yU.S.Vice-President umphrey nd Thai Prime Minister hanomKittaka-chorn:

ThePrimeMinister oncurred ith heprinciple nderlyingheDecla-ration f Honolulu: hat he war n Southeast siamust e waged ntwo ronts imultaneously-the ilitary ront nd the trugggle o m-prove he social,economic, nd physicalwell-being f the people.... ......................... ............................ .......................... ............................. ... . .. ....... .. .......................

It wasagreed hat rganizationsuch as the Associationf South-east Asia could play a valuable ole n fostering ewcooperativen-stitutions nd timulatinghe deas hatwouldmake ramatic conomictransformationsossible.22

In an address othe nfluential ouncil f ForeignRelations n New Yorkon May 24, 1966, U.S. Secretary f State Dean Rusk used ASA as an ex-ampleof how Western-aligned outheastAsian nations ould begin to dofor themselves hat the United Stateshad been trying o do overtly orsome ime nd by tself.23 rimeMinister ahman f Malaysiawasreportedto haveproposed n expansion f ASAto include ndonesia, urma, outhVietnam, aos, Cambodia, nd Singapore.This was publicized fter heexchange f notes n the normalization f full diplomatic elations etweenthe Philippines nd Malaysiaon June , 1966.24On this occasion, heThai

21Doronila, p. cit.22 VicePresident Reviews Asian Problems with Thai Premier, (text of joint com-

munique released in Bangkok on February 15), Department of State Bulletin, LIV(March 14, 1966), pp. 396-397.

23 Organizing hePeace for Man's Survival, bid., LIV (March 14, 1966), 933.2 Malaysia,Department f Information, alaysia at a Glance (Kuala Lumpur: Life

Printers, 967), p. 37. The Agreement o Normalize Relations Between the Republicof ndonesia and Malaysia was signed at Djakarta on August 11, 1966 (Foreign AffairsMalaysia, , no. 3, pp. 1-2).



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threat o Southeast sia was to stabilize nd strengthen he conomy f everycountry n the region.30 ahmanwas not being nconsistent; oth lementswere oo tightly ntertwined obe separated or ong, but one or the othercouldbe emphasized, epending n the ircumstances. urther, f Rahman'sexpressed dmission hatASAhad yet to prove tself o its own membersis remembered, heemphasis n making ASA succeed becomesmore ob-viously rounded n his operational et of assumptions bout China.

Secretary f State Rusk reiterated is earlier views on ASA and rec-ognized ts key role in the background o the October 1966 All-AsianConference n the VietnamWar-one ofmany ttempts o de-Americanizethe war. He declared:

. . . We will ee substantial dvantagen the developmentmong heAsiannations hemselves f systematic achinery or onsultation npolitical roblemsnd ecurity uestionsnwhich hey re all involved.We havebeengreatly ncouraged y what has happened n the astseveralmonths n just that ort f direction , including] herecentmeeting f he ASA countries hich edto the ormal roposal y hesenations hat here e an Asian Conferenceo take up the question fVietnam.3'

President Johnson expressed a similar viewpoint n Canberra32 and inKuala Lumpur33during his Southeast Asian sojourn to and from heManilaConference.

EXPANSIONAND CONCLUSION

The fundamental problem as preceived during 1961-1967 by the ASAgovernments as their lignment with he Western bloc, possible exacerbatedby evidence of U.S. encouragement of the revival of the organization. Al-though no ASA state openly repudiated their anti-China stance, even theJuly 31, 1967, Philippine-Malaysian attempt to stress the non-politicalaspects of ASA34 was undermined by Thailand's more militaristic nter-pretation of ASA to the region. However much Kuala Lumpur or Manilamay have interpreted angkok's position as a threat o the economic promiseof regionalism, heir rebuttals were indirect, hesitant, nd could be inferredonly with difficulty.

With establishment f the ASEAN on August 8, 1967, Indonesia and

0As ummarized n Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman's Views on the WorldSituation-Southeast Asia, ibid., (December 1966), pp. 48-49.31 Secretary Rusk's News Conference f September 6, Department f State Bulletin,

IV (October 3, 1966), p. 480.2Lyndon . Johnson, Address at Parliament House, Canberra, October 21 ibid., LV

(November 9, 1966), 821.33 Text of Remarks by President Johnson elivered on October30, 1966, t Parliament

House, Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (December 1966), p. 106.8 Cf.July 1, 1967, See President Marcos' statement f July 1, 1967, n Straits Times,

August 1, 1967,p. 20.



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Singapore oined with he three ASA states n a more broadly regionaleconomic nd cultural nion. The ASEANDeclaration xpressedmotiva-tions nd purposes trikingly imilar o those of ASA. One possible differ-

ence,however, as this passage which tated hat:... all foreign ases re temporary ndremain nly with he xpressedconcurrence f the countries oncerned nd are not ntended o beuseddirectly r indirectly o subvert he national ndependencendfreedom f tates n the rea or prejudice he rderly rocesses f heirnational evelopment;. .35

While his eems o be a concession o Indonesia, t has also been noted hat

any pecific ejection f bloc-oriented ollective rrangements s conspicu-ously absent from he ASEAN document. 36 hat this meant n August1967 is not completely lear. According o a Singaporean nterpretation,Indonesiawished o make t clear that foreign ases on ASEAN territorydetracted rom he non-military ature f the group. 37 n the other and,

Djakartamayhavesensed hecompatibility f ASEAN with possible ro-Western egionaldefense rganization.38

ASA was not to be dissolvedunless ts memberswere convinced hatASEAN'sviabilitywas firmly stablished. he advisability f an ASA/ASEAN mergerwas considered, ut at the August 9, 1967,ASAForeignMinisters' eeting t was decided hat, nstead, everalASAprograms ouldbe transferred o ASEANimmediately n order o prevent uplication factivities nd secureoptimum se of available resources.

In spite of somebilateral ooperation n ASAon specific rojects, co-nomicprograms ere often est understandable n an ideological ontext.To overemphasize he lack of cooperation mong ASA members n thepursuit f regional conomic ooperation s to missASA'sdeeperpoliticalsignificance. ational nd bloc interests verrode uch considerations.

35ASEAN/DOC/1; this style of citation follows hat of a typescript opy of the decla-ration n this writer's ossession, ourtesy f the Ministry f Foreign Affairs, ingapore.The text hereof an also be located, nter lia, in International egal Materials, VI (No-vember 967), 1233-1235.

36 WelcomeASEAN, (editorial), Far Eastern Economic Review, LVII (August 17,1967), p. 311.

7Straits imes, August 8, 1967, p. 22.38Cf. Statement f Dr. Bernard K. Gordon, n U.S., House Committee n ForeignAffairs, he Future United States Role in Asia and the Pacific, Hearings, before he Sub-committee n Asian and Pacific Affairs 0th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 94-95 and 106-109.Bernard K. Gordon, outheast Asia Project Chairman for the Research Analysis Cor-poration RAG), further evelops the rationale for U.S. encouragement f SoutheastAsian regional organizations n his Toward Disengagement n Asia; A Strategy forAmerican Foreign Policy, (Englewood Cliffs, .J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969). My approachsharply iffers rom is analytical framework, s well as from he assumptions e bringsto his study.



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While some ASA members ccasionally sserted heir independencefrom he U.S., this was n no wayenvisioned s a break from he bloc. FromJuly 961 to August 1967,ASA provided structure ithin which tateswith imilar deological nterests ould cooperate, nd hopefully ithoutprovoking trong eactions rom eutralist r Communist locstates n theregion. he available evidence, lso indicates hat he U.S. viewson ASAandASEANdo not represent sharp reak rom he containment f Chinastrategy hat has occupied he forefront f U.S. foreign olicy objectivesfor some two decades,but rather he outgrowth f a more sophisticatedunderstanding f the requirements or nd constraints ponthat olicy. orin the development f the attitude f U.S. policymakers oward regional-ism nd ts ogical orrelate, disengagement, an be found he deologicalunderpinnings or a continued .S. presence nd involvement n East andSoutheast sia during he next decade.

VINCENT K. POLLARD isa graduate student n the Department f Political Scienceat the UniversityfChicago.

asa and asean, 1961-1967 southeast asian regionalism

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