armor january february 1986 web

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In this the first issue ofARMOR for 1986, Iwant to thank all of ourreaders who havewrit-ten to compliment uson the magazine. Know-ing that the readershipappreciates the efforts

of our small staff and enjoys the insight ofthe contributing authors makes this posi-tion truly satisfying.

Our first feature of this issue, "AnIntroduction to the NTC," written byCaptain Mike Christie, willbe of interestto both those who have trained at theNational Training Center and those whoare looking forward to their first battlethere. This story isn't just a scenic tour ofthe countryside; the author provides uswith some excellent tactical tips on howto fight.

We in the United States Army havealways been proud of the innovativenessof our soldiers; that quality is certainly oneof our Army's strong points. The article byCaptain Judd Squitier, "Inherent M1Decon Capabi ties," iI ustrates howsol-diers' ideas have developed the capabili-ties of the M1 tank platoon to increaseour chemical decontamination capability.ARMOR also reinstitutes a feature inthis issue that ran for over25years in themagazine: "What Would You Do?". Thisfeature -the first of which was writtenby Colonel (later General) Hamilton H.Howze- uts the reader into realisticsituations both on the training fields andthe battlefields. I ommend it to you.

"Cavalry in AirLand Battle" by MajorJohn RosenbergerandColonel ThomasWhite is the first of three articles inwhichthe authors discuss just how Cavalry fitsinto our operational and tactical levels ofwarfare. It is an excellent appreciation.

Our historical article for this issue is"The Defense of the Vienna Bridgehead,"byFirst Lieutenant Peter R. Mansoor. Inthe last decade, we have talked at greatlength about "fighting outnumbered andwinning." Inthis extremely well-writtenstory based on interviews, we see howone German tank crew did, in fact, fightoutnumbered and won against the So-viets. Our presentation of this fine articlefeatures the illustrations of our neweststaff member, Sergeant First ClassRobert Torsrud. I know you will enjoyboth this interesting article andSergeantFirs t Class Torsrud's skillful drawings.

Throughout its history, this magazinehas been the leader of the Army's profes-sional journals in bringing to its readersspeculative articles on equipment anddesign. Robin Fletcher, a noted interna-tional defense writer, gives us in thisissue "Trunnions on the Move," inwhichhe analyzes the advantages and disad-vantages of the conventional, turretedtank. This detailed and complex view offuture tank design is well-supported andoffers some intriguing alternatives.

Finally, I want to point out two otherfeatures in this issue. The first is aboutthe Soviet's BMP-2. The article is anexcellent description of this new infantryfighting vehicle and its capabilities. Thesecond feature describes how a group ofROTC cadets have preserved the tradi-tions of horse cavalry. Captain EdwinKennedy, Jr . writes that "At TexasA&M,Cavalry IsMore Than aState of Mind."

The past, the present,and the future -that'sa good way to describethis issue of ARMOR:The Magazineof MobileWarfare.- PR


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Magazine StaffEditor-in-ChiefMAJOR G. PATRICK RllT ERManaging EditorJ ON T. CLEMENSAssistant EditorROBERT E. ROGGEProduction AssistantVIVIAN THOMPSONContributing Arti stMARK K AYROUZSFC ROBERT TORSRUDHENRY PENN

United States Army Armor SchoolCommandantMG FREDERIC J. BROWNAssistant CommandantBG PAUL E. FUNKDeputy Assistant CommandantCOL CLAUDE L. CLARKChief of StaffCOL RALPH R . WOLFECommand Sergeant Majo rCSM JOHN M. STEPHENSMaintenanceCOL G. L. THO1Command and SLTC ALAN G. Vll TERS

MA Sktaff

WeaponsCOL DAV ID V. HARBACHTraining GroupLTC JA MES L. KLUENDERNCO AcademyDrill Sergeant SchoolCSM JAMES M. GREENWELLEvaluation and StandardizationCOL ROBERT HURLEYTraining and DoctrineCOL CLAUDE W. AB ATECombatcDevelopmentsCOL ROBERT W. DeMO NT

Units2d Armor Training Br igadeCOL WILLIAM M. BOICE1s t Armor Training BrigadeCOL ROBERT B. FRANK LIN, JR.4th Training BrigadeCOL JOHN N. SLOAN194th Armored BrigadeCOL SAMUEL D. WILDER, JR.

Directorate o fReserve Component Support 'DirectorCOL JAMES E. DlERlCKXJanuary-February 1986 Vol XCV No. 1

FEATURES10

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An Introduction to the NTCby Captain Mike ChristieWhat Would You Do ?by the Command & Staff Department, USAARMSInherent M I Decon Capabilitiesby Captain J udd E. SquitierCavalry in the AirLand Battleby the Command & Staff Department, USAARMSNew Soviet BMP-2 Unveiledby the ARMOR StaffThe Defense of the Vienna Br idgeheadby First Lieutenant Peter R. MansoorTrunnions on the Mov eby Robin FletcherA t Texas A&M, Cavalry Is Moreby Captain EdwinL. Kennedy, J r.The Symbol of Armorby Robert E. Rogge

Than a State of Mind

DEPARTMENTS2 Letters 49 Recognition Quiz Answers4 Commander's Hatch 50 Regimental Review7 Driver's Seat 51 The Bustle Rack9 Recognition Quiz 52 Books

47 Professional Thoughts

ARMOR magazine (ISSN 0004-2420) ispublished bi-monthly by the U.S. ArmyArmor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road,Fort Knox, Kentucky 401 21. Unlessotherwise stated, material does notrepresent policy. thinking, or endorse-ment by any agency of the US. Army.Use of appropriatedunds for printing ofthis publication was approved by the De-partment of the Army 6 J anuary 1984.ARMOR is not a copyrighted publicationbut may contain somearticles whichhave been copyrighted by individualauthors. Material which is not undercopyright may be reprinted if credit isgiven toARMOR and the author.Permission to reprint copyrighted materi-al must be obtained from the author.ARMOR may be forwarded to militarypersonnel whose change of address iscaused by official orders (except at APOaddresses) without payment ofadditional postage. The subscriber mustnotify the postmaster.

CORRESPONDENCE: Address allcorrespondence to US . Army ArmorCenter, AlTN: ATSB-MAG, Fort Knox.Kentucky, 40121. (Telephone:AUTOVON 464-2249/2610 orcommercial (502)624-2249/2610.)SECOND class postage paid at FortKnox, Kentucky and additional mailingoff ce.

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On Soviet "Tank Destroyers"Dear Sir,Having just finished reading CaptainWarford's article, 7-64. IT-122 and IT-130: The Soviet Advantage," Iwould liketo share a few thoughts along this line.As the author noted, the Soviets haveon many occasions during and sinceWorld War I1tested a new cannon on atracked chassis of the artillery branchprior to mounting that weapon on a new orderivative model tank chassis. In eachcase historically, the cannon mountedwas larger than the previous tank-mount-ed weapon. Thus, acase is builtforwatch-ing the development of antitank capabilitythrough the developments of the Sovietartillery.

However, the point where Imust dis-agree with the author is in his projected"tank destroyer" development as a resultof the recent Soviet heavy artillery devel-opment. Iam certain he is aware, thoughthe 152-mm 2s-3 howitzer and 152-mm2s-5 gun are both deployed on trackedchassis, neither design is in the all-tellingcategory of tank destroyer as currentlydeployed. Specifically, they are both cur-rently designed for and employed by tac-tical doctrine as supporting weapons, fir-ing HE and smoke either by indirect ordirect fire. Point destruction is a missionfor these weapons, as for all other trackedand towed guns of the Soviet Army sinceWorld War II, but antiarmor action is aclear second. The design of the vehiclespoint to a Soviet appreciation, rather re-'cent, of the western capability of self-propelled howitzers for both instant firesupport and higher survivability.If, on the other hand, we are looking at"tank destroyers,'' two points must bemade clear. First, historically the role of"tank destroyer" was that assigned totowed guns within a unit - 6.2-mmguns during the war and the T-12 orRapira-3 today. Second, the heavily ar-mored assault gun (tank destroyer) de-signs fielded by the Soviets during thewar, including the SU-85, SU-100. SU-122, ISU-122andISU-152,weretheself-propelled artillery of the Soviet Army atthat time. The guns were also turned totank destroyer duties as the case de-manded. Today, as he has noted, theSoviets field the IT-130 as a "tank de-stroyer," while the 2s-3 and 2s-5 fill thespecific roles of SP artillery. Thus, theSoviets have managed to catch up withthe West in terms of design-specific ve-hicles.My primary objection then to theauthor's thesis is the question of, "Whatwouldbegained byattemptingtomountahuge 152-mm gun for direct fire anti-armor actions?" As Soviet experience dur-ing the war points out, the separate am-

munition/charge is slow and cumber-some where antiarmor action is con-cerned. This has been demonstrated inthe considerably slowed rate of fire of theautoloaded 125-mm cannon of the T-64/T-72 tank. Of even greater concern,however, are such factors as the recoilforce of the weapon, the size of the re-cuperators, the size of the fighting com-partment to house and service the system,and the weight of the chassis required toabsord the recoil forces of the weapon.Again, as Soviet studies directly con-firmed in World War II, the short-barreledML-20 Model 1937 152-mm gun/howit-zer mounted for antiarmor work required aheavy tank chassis of the KV series in the50-toncategory. By comparison, the muchlonger 152-mm howitzer of the 2s-3 andespecially the rifled gun of the 2s-5 wouldseem to indicate the need for a traditionaltank chassis far in excess of 50-tons.Though such a "tank destroyer" could beproduced, the historical trend in Soviettank development, including assaultguns, has been to increase weight onlygrudgingly and never to exceed approxi-mately 50 tons after 1941. To exceed thisweight limit by a substantial marginwould indeed be a remarkable step in thehistory of Soviet armor developments.Also, I must point out the oversight inthe author's argument, that the West hasno equivalent to the IT-122 and IT-130.Certainly, at the very least, the WestGerman Kanonenjagdpanzer-90 is a pri-mary example of a turretless, design-specific tank destroyer. Its very name saysso. Also, the Swedes long ago fielded theso-called S-Tank, which is no more than arather more complex version of a turret-lesstankdestroyer. To the point, however,is that the West was not convinced by theold World War II German Artillery Branchargument that assault guns (tank de-stroyers) cost 20 percent less to manu-facture than tanks. NATO recognized thatthey were, in act, 80percent of the cost ofa tankand didn't have 360-degreecombatcapability. Admittedly, again a case ofhalf-empty orhalf-full, but a veryclear-cutdecision, and one made years ago.Finally, I might suggest that far frombeing an "aging" design, the 125-mmhypervelocity smoothbore cannon meetsthe majority of Soviet requirements forpenetration of NATO standard heavy tanksat long range (1,500 meters as long forWestern Europe), "quick draw" fire, andsimple training. It may not be perfect, andperhaps is not really as good as rifledcannons of the lengthened 105-mm (be-ing considered for the U.S. Army) or the120-mm L-1 1 of the British Army at rang-es greater than 1,500 meters, but they dohave the rifled 130-mm cannon in handandinstock (according to Viktor Suvorov)and their tactical doctrine, considerablyapart from ours, requires that armor close

the range and fire on the move throughthe assault. Thus, itwould seem unlikelythat a requirement is in the offing for acannon capable of identical penetration ofNATO armor at twice the current range ofeither the 125-mm or the 130-mm can-nons. Probably more the case, the Sovietslearned through our years of sufferingwith the M-551, M-60A2 and MET-70that 152-mm gun/howitzer/missilelaunchers are at best a heartbreak in thearmor field. In any event, time will cer-tainly tell an interesting tale.My compliments to the author for histhought provoking article.

J OSEPH R. BURNIECEArlington, VA

FIST-V Fails This User's TestDear Sir:I am writing with some dismay, as Idiscover the Army has decided to buy theFire Support Team Vehicle (FIST-V).As ateam commander during the four-weektest of the FIST-V at Ft. Riley, I ound thevehicleto have manyweak pointsandveryfew strong points.To be specific, the vehicle had the fol-lowing problems (which were pointed outby most, if not all, of the team command-ers):The FIST-V was underpowered and

overweight. As a result, itcould not keepup with my tanks, M113s. and ImprovedTow Vehicles. Itwas constantly in need ofrecovery because of breakdowns in thepower train, and constantly becomingmired.In order to usethe laser, the vehiclehastostop, incover, whichcausedittofallbehind the moving elements of the team.After finishing the laser mission, itcouldnot catch up.When using the laser, thevehicle hadto button up. Therefore, the FIST wasmuch less responsive than if he were inanM113, from which he could see me and Icould point to where Iwanted the fire to

land.It could not hold all the equipmentrequired (particularly TA 50) in an orga-nized, easy-to-retrieve manner.Since it is a highly specialized ve-hicle, itis not suitable to be taken over forcommand and control purposes, as is astandard M113.If my tank is lost or the radio is dead-lined, Iswitch to-or"stea1"-the radiosfrom the executive officer's tank. He thengoes to the FIST'S vehicle. In addition,since the FIST has secure radios and myplatoon leaders do not, he assumes com-mand of the company. if both the XO andmyself are lost, unti l the senior platoon

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leader can get to the FIST track andassume command.

The TACFIRE system, the FIST DMDs,and the many radio nets are strengths,since they allow fires to be requested anddelivered faster. Ibelieve the weak pointsmentioned above significantly outweighthese advantages.

Because of the lackof agilityof the FIST-V, the only time Iwas able to have respon-sive, in-place fire support was when Ihadmy FIST as well as the battalion's inde-pendent lasing team. Having two teamsenabled me to bound the F lSTforward as Iwould a TOW.I strongly recommend conversion ofBradley Fighting Vehicles into FIST-Vs.They are large and powerful enough totransport the crew and equipment andmaintain the speed of the tank/infantryteam in the attack. If this is not possible,then find a larger engine for the FIST-V ordo not use the hammerhead to mount thelaser. Adapt the laser to the caliber 50mount instead.

MICHAEL K. ROBELCaptain, ArmorFRG

Closing the Equipment LoopDear Sir:In reading MG Brown's very well-writ-ten piece inthe September-October "Com-mander's Hatch", Icould not help but get asickening feeling over one of his leadstatements. The general's goal for his"technological leap" with BMS (Battle-field Management System) is to "get in-side the enemy's decision loop, seize theinitiative before he can react, and main-tain this initiativesothat his reactions arealways inappropriate or too slow". Thisstatement is uncanny inthat itdescribesexactly what the Soviet research, devel-opment and acquisition (RD&A) process isdoing to us. Time after time, inspiteof ourtechnological advantage, the Soviet Armyfields equipment that our supposedly su-perior developmental hardware can bare-ly match.

There once was a time when our nu-merical inferiority was said to be offset byour qualitative superiority. No more. Wenow frankly admit we must leap ahead,knowing full well we are qualitativelybehind inmost areas. But our reactions towhat the USSR does in a very timelymanner seem to be "always inappropriateor too slow". Why is itthat ittakes theUS20 years and 145 different vehicle de-signs to field an infantry fighting vehiclewhen almost every other army in theworld has had one for at least a decade?Why did Congress have to tell the Armythe M 2 needed an antitank missile beforethey could fund it?How can a country likeSouth Africa take US technology and fieldartillery superior to both the USandUSSRwhile we idly look on? How can we have arecord of failures like M60A2, M551,MBT70, XM803, ARSV, Shillelagh, Chey-enne, DIVAD and many other less-than-

successful programs without realizingthat we have serious deficiencies in ourmilitary management?The money wastedon DIVAD alone was more than the moneyinvested in the entire US tank productioncapability. That failure was like burningdown the government plants at DetroitArsenal and Lima, Ohio, and starting over.Take something as mundane as trucks,which this country should know how tomanufacture. Almost every army in theindustrial world has military trucks withsuperior mobility to the fleet we field.

The P resident talks about a window ofvulnerability inmissiles. Our vulnerabilityis not a window; it is a barn door, and it isour inability to equip the best soldiers inthe worldwith equipment theydesperate-l y need o defend this nation. This does notcome from a lack of money; itcomes froma lack of professional decision-making. Itis requirements by committee and designby committee with too many people tryingto run or regulate the show. the USRD&Aprocess is managed like a Soviet collectivefarm. The ultimate irony is that the reasonthe Soviets cannot feed themselves is thevery same reason why we can't equipourselves. U ntil wecan get a decision loopin ielding equipment (with unding that isinsync) that is shorter than the Soviets', itwill continue to be Soviet initiatives thatwe will have to react to.

PHILIP J . MURPHYRoyal Oak, MIEditor's Response:

Every professional in our army wantsthe best equipment for our soldiers, and Iwould tell you that for every one of thefailures you cite (and I'm not convincedthat any of these were totalfailures, sincewe've developed better equipment as aresult of these projects) I can cite hun-dreds of successes.

We have the best tank inthe world, andprobably the best infantry and cavalryfighting vehicles. (By the way, Congressdidn't "have to tell the Army the Bradleyneeded an antitank missile.")Certainly, DIVAD did not meet ourneeds. As a rsult, the Department of theArmy cancelled it before we spent moremoney on it. But the money we didspendcertainly didn't equal the investment ourgovernment has put into our tank produc-tion capability. Infact, DODwill be able torecoup much of the investment in DIVADby using components planned for it inother projects.Iwould also tell you that our trucks arepretty darned good. Both the 5-tOn and2%-ton cargo trucks have served us wel lfor a long time. With the introduction ofthe new HEMTTvehicles, our capabilitieswill be even greater.

What you say about the window ofconventional vulnerability may have beentruefive year sago, butwith he supportofthe nation, we've gone a long way towardclosing that window, both in the activeand the Reserve components. We havefielded hundreds of items of new equip-ment in all functional areas, from thepreparation of meals to combat vehicles,

and we'vedone that all veryquickly. Sure,there are problems. But in almost everycase, we inthe Defense Department havediscovered them and taken action to cor-rect them. The Non-Developmental nitia-tive concept is one way to do that.

Wi th this concept, DOD goes out toacquire and test equipment that has al-ready been developed. This saves usbothtime and money. We test it, and if it's goodenough, we buyit.The new M-9pistol, theAT -4 antitank weapon, and the new fieldtelephone systems are just a few exam-ples of the successful use of NDI.

Finally, the "leap-ahead strategy"which MG Brown discusses is exactlywhat we need to ensure that any potentialthreat country ends up reacting to us,instead of vice-versa. What we are talkingabout here is not evolution, but revolutioninequipment design. Itwill be this equip-ment revolution and the innovative Amer-ican soldier that will help us deter war.And, God forbid, if weever haveto ight, itwill be this superior equipment and thosewell-trained soldiers whowill help uswin.

--GPR

Armor ConferenceI s Scheduled forMay 13 to 15

The United States ArmyArmor School and Center atFort Knox will host the an-nual Armor Conference on13-15 May, 1986. This year,a special day- he 16th-will be devoted to cavalry.The theme of this year'sconference is "Close CombatHeavy and the AirLand Bat-tle- eeds and Initiatives."Inthe next issue ofARMOR,we will publish a completeagenda of the conferenceevents.Requestsfor general infor-mation will be handledthrough the Deputy Assis-tant Commandant's office,AUTOVON 464-1 050 (Com-mercial 502-624-1050). In-formation on equipment ex-hibits is available from theDirectorateofCombat Devel-opments (1555); and hous-ing arrangements can bemade through the Fort KnoxProtocol office (6951).

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MG Frederic J. BrownCommanding GeneralU.S. Army Armor Center

Armor Assessment,

4,

Part I:Assessing Our Strengths

Since our early days in he Forties, armor has been aleader in the nnovative application of combined arms:the integration of tank hnfant ry teams; the integra-tion of the helicopter into squadron formations; an dtoday, the integration of the microprocessor into a nArmy of Excellence which tra ins , main tains, cares,and leads. It is a magnificent record which has,together with our combined arms partners and ourAllies, successfully deterred war for over 40 years inour most vital external area of interest, WesternEurope. We know we are good; we thi nk we areaccelerating on a sound course to stay ahead ofpotential threats. But are we?This isa vital issue to the defenseofour great nation,particularly the adequacy of deterrence on the Euro-pean heavy battlefield against a foe whose medium ofexchange is tanks. It is, therefore, appropriate toquestion our assessments. In fact, if we are as good aswe say and th ink we are, we should seek assessmentsof our program -reviews of the present and the future.Therefore, we sha ll look at our challenges, primarilythose posed by the Soviet Union leading the WarsawPact, then ass ess our strengths, and finally review theprograms th at we have underway across the Armorand Cavalry force to capitalize on our strengths.We face a broad range of challenges. First andforemost must be the Soviet Unions unrestraineddrive toward mili tary superiority acrossa broad rangeof military capabilities, but most particularly for ourconcern in the ground maneuver heavy area. There areno apparent constraints on their drive for qualitativean d quantita tive superiority. We are paid the compli-ment of thei r dudication of our technoloeies and ourequipment -_ou; ideas, _good and bad. BGt then they4 ARMOR. he Magazine of Mobile Warfare January-February 1986

combinethiswith theirownvisionsofexcellence n thedevelopment an d fielding of armored vehicles. I n tankdesign, they are a world leader in their own right.Recall the technological surprise of th e T-34 when itwas introduced i n WorldWa r 11.After the fact, the T-34was generally acknowledged as among the best, if notthe finest, new armored vehicle introduced duringWorldW a r 11.So there is a genuine talent in the Sovietarena, combined with virtually unrestricted resourcesand unyielding will to dominate the maneuver heavyworld.A difficult situation has been exacerbated as theirlong-term development plan has come to fruition,giving them an inordinately high rate of moderniza-tion. It isprobably some two to four t imes our moderni-zation rate, in terms of sheer output. They havematched and, in fact, bested us in the West in theability to produce conventional track-laying combatvehicles.A further challenge is their linkage of equipmentmodernization to scientific ana lys is of war, that is, thedevelopment over time of the scientific laws of war- he norms of war which, t o the Soviets, govern theebb and flow of the battlefield. It isa logical outgrowthof their deterministic viewof th e world exemplified inSoviet political a nd economic theory. It posits thepredictability of war which can be developed by de-tailed study. This asserted predictability is comple-mentary to their enormous bureaucracy. It permits aclear prioritization and focusing of effort- he neces-sary accompaniment to a massive national armamentprogram. Here, I am making no value judgments withrespect to the quality of their analysis or the norms ofbattle which they have developed. But we must be


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aware tha t they exist and tha t they will influence theRussians conduct of battle, particularly at the tacticaland operational levels of war.As we know, this battlefield capability is balancedby a n outmoded economic system - system thatcannot organize to respond to the basic expectations ofthe Russian people. So the Russians are most certainlynot 10 eet tall, but they do have great current capa-bility and future potential for maneuver-heavy groundcombat. It is significant, and it is growing at an.accelerating rate.Modernization is a grea t challenge for the UnitedStates. There is genuine concern about the rising costsof weapons systems- hat many see as an unendingcycle of qualitative improvement, matched with quan-titative demand a t he cost of other national programs.This concern stimulates our search for new technolo-gies or new ways to use effectively our existing in-vestments to deter war or to fight should deterrencefail. Today thi s search manifests itself i n the West in adrive to develop jump aheads - ignificant in-creases in capability which can compensate for quan-titative shortages. The development and fielding ofjump aheads has been a major preoccupation of ourArmor a nd Cavalry force for the pas t several years.Unfortunately, this challenge - which tends toquality- s matched by increasing constraints on theability to tra in quality personnel t o employ the jumpahead improvements. Unlike the Soviets, for exam-ple, we must contend with issues like the noise disrup-tion associated with training. In all of the Westerndemocracies, there is also increasing concern aboutthe use of land to train. The tolerance of free citizens tosupport aggressive training appears to be declining,atlea st within the Western democracies.These, then, are the challenges. They are substan-tial, but certainly not insurmountable. We- articu-larly in the West- ave great abiding strengths. Ourchallenge in the Armor-Cavalry force is to capitalizeupon these strengths.Our first and probably greatest strength is thetradition an d reality of Yankee Ingenuity- he fabledAmerican ability to innovate. Given the initiative ofthe average soldier, we will invariably figure out abetter way to do something. It is a characteristic ofunpredictable outcome. In deterministic terms, theUnited States hockey team should not have won theOlympics, yet it did.Contrary to the laws -the normsof predictable human behavior - ur hockey teamwon. This unpredictability must be a great source ofuneasiness and insecurity to the philosophy and prac-tice of the Soviet Union. This characteristic is rein-forced by our culture, which is the dominant worldculture - Coca-Cola, our music, our fashions aremimicked around the world, including within theSoviet Union. Our system exerts a magnetic attractionupon talented individuals who wish to develop asindividuals- nd to an Army striving to Be All ItCan Be.We preach unbridled individualism. This individual-ism is ana thema to the very precepts of central totali-ta rian control which characterize the political systemof the Soviet Union. This power to the individual,which is characteristic of the United States , has been

national television, which can rapidly focus our na-tional spirit an d will. National spirit is volatile, but itcan be focused with remarkable intensity. It is a sourceof unpredictability and, therefore, uncertainty, to theRussians.Most recently, the microprocessor extended thispower in the hands of individuals by tying themtogether in a pervasive communications networkwhich isexpanding at an exponential rate. Innovativeindividuals are being given more an d more capabilitybecause of thi s information revolution, which ha s thusfar been quite sensibly discouraged in the SovietUnion. We face not a contest between Sparta andAthens; rather it is the contest between a ponderoustortoise and a n agile, innovative, and somewhat un-predictable hare.A second major strength which we possess is theprofound integration of individuals across race andsex which ha s occurred within our country, and par-ticularly within our Army, which has led the way. It isa source of great talent to us. The ask of integration iscertainly not complete, but increasingly it is an issueof execution. We understand the necessity of full andcomplete integration and we are the only pluralistic

...National spirit i s volatile, but itcan be focused with remarkableintensity...I

society possessing this degree of cohesion across raceand sex. Certainly we as leaders can never becomeoverconfident. The reinforcement of integration mustbe a continual concern of the cha in of command. Yetthe problem has been met head on, is essentiallyresolved, a nd today it provides the quality and quan-tity of skills essential i n a volunteer force. We will facechallenging days ahead in sustaining the volunteerforce with changingnational attitudes and a decliningdemographic base, but quality begets quality. With areasonable sha re of national support, it should con-tinue successfully. We must train and educate ourleaders to maintain the progress th at we have madeand not take it for granted. It is a major source ofstrength which is almost uniquely ours here in theUnited States.The microprocessor is also a sourceof grea t strength.It represents power decentralized to the individual, theantithesi s of s tate domination of the individual in theCommunist sphere. We apply thi s strength to theinnovative individual with a tradition of entrepre-neurship. This is combined with a knowledge of themicroprocessor gained by our youth both at work an da t play in the video arcades. We possessed a similargenerational advantage in World War 11, because ouryoung people understood motor vehicles- strengthderived from our leading the world in mechanization. Iwould hypothesize tha t the microprocessor will haveas grea t an impact on the battlefield as that caused bythe internal combustion engine. We, as a nation,possess today a significant advantage over othereinforced with he impact of mass media, particularly-

January-February 1986 ARMOR: Th e Magaz ine ofMobile Warfare 5

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nations in thi s area, particularly the Warsaw Pact,and we should exploit it.Another of our streng ths is organizational i n nature.Our predecessors within t he Army had the foresight todevelop an organizational structure tailored to takeadvantage of our nationa l strengths, tha t is, theTraining and Doctrine Command, a service commandresponsible for ensuring the integration of doctrine,organization, equipment, and training. No other armyhas brought together all of the elements of combatcapability in a structure With such unity of command.We reinforced this fundamentally sound decisionseveral years ago by establishing the role of theproponent. The school commandants became responsi-ble for developing the doctrine, organization, equip-ment, and train ing tied to proponency- n th e case ofFort Knox, for maneuver heavy, and tied to thisproponency the responsibility to ensure the develop-ment of the officer an d noncommissioned officer corps.Increasingly, there is both the responsibility, theauthority, a nd the expectation tha t the proponent willwork across the Army to ensure full and completeintegration of capability - working for the majorArmy command and the leadership of the Army withinthe Department of the Army, as well as through thechain of command of Training and Doctrine Com-mand.Of equal and perhaps greater importance for thefuture is the development of a sense of longitudinalresponsibility for the adequacy of the integrationeffort over time. We have not only assessed thestrengths and the weaknesses for which we mustcompensate, but we have also established a n institu-tional framework to ensure that thi s is done for theArmy on a decentralized basis, responsive to thestrategic direction of the leadership.We have one other strength, still more lat ent t ha nrealized.Thisis the national basis of our Army, drawnas it is across a continent. More th an half our Armorand Cavalry force today is in our National Guard orArmy Reserve with a n assured national distribution.This nat ional distribution is combined with a largeretiree population created from our substan tive stand-ing forces since WorldW a r I1 and our retention of th e20-year retireme nt policy. Here, the re ar e highlytrained individuals who we can call back in time of warto facilitate a considerable expansion should we desireto do so. Also as a function of our accession policies, wehave relatively young soldiers in the IRR, or beyondthe IRR, who could be available at time of nationalemergency. We have not yet fully thought through howto take best advantage of th is st rength . We will neverhave the bank of young veterans which we possessedat the st ar t of th e Korean War, but nonetheless, as aresult of the size of our Army over the years, there is avery considerable untapped source of trained man-power within our country.Our assessment up to th is point h as been primarilytheoretical, but it is clear, I think, th at despite theconsiderable challenges we face, we have some na-tional strengths of considerable magnitude and im-portance. In my next column, I will examine- n moredetail - he areas I believe we can exploit in order tocapitalize on those strengths. Forge the Thunderbolt!

Required Manuals forArmor/Cavalry Leaders

The purpose of this list is to tell each Armor/Cavalry leader whichArmor School-proponent manuals he must have to train for combat.Battali odBrigade Commander

FC 71-3 (coordinating Draft), The Armor and Mechanized InfantryFM 71 2J (Coordinating Draft). Tank &Mech Inf Battalion/Task Force,FC 71-1J (Coordinating Draft), The Tank and Mechanized InfantryFM 17-12-1 (Approved Final Draft), Tank Combat Tables M1, Dec 84.FM 17-12-2 (Approved Final Draft), Tank Combat Tables M48A5/FM 17-12-3(ApprovedFinal Draft).TankCombatTabIesM60A3,Feb85.FC 71 1 1, The Armor Task Force Training Plan, Apr 84.FC 71 4, Combined Arms Live fire Exercise (CALFEX), ul85.

Brigade, Oct 85.Dec 84.Company Team, Dec 85.

M60A1, Apr 85.

Squadron/Regiment CommanderFM 17-95(H) (Approved Final Draft), Cavalry Operations,Oct 83.FC 17-102 (Coordinating Draft), Reconnaissance Squadron (LID), MarFC 17-102-1 (coordinating Draft), Reconnaissance Squadron (LID)FC 71-3 (Coordinating Draft), The Armor and Mechanized InfantryFM 71 2J (Coordinating Draft). Tank&Mech Inf Battalionflask Force,

85.ARTEP Mission Training Plan, Sep 85.Brigade, Oa 85.Dec 84.

Company CommanderFC 71-1J (Coordinating Draft), The Tank and Mechanized InfantryFM 17-12-1 (Approved Final Draft), Tank Combat Tables M1, Dec84.FM 17-12-2 (Approved Final Draft), Tank Combat Tables M48A5/FM 17-1 2-3 (ApprovedFinal Draft), Tank Combat Tables M60A3, Feb 85.FC 17-16-1, Div 86 Tank Heavy Co/Tm ARTEP Mission Training Plan,FC 71 5, Fire Coordination Exercise, J an 85.FC 71 7, Situational Training Exercise(STX)for Logistics, Apr 84.'FM 17-15 (TEST). Tank P latoon Div 86. Oct 84.FC 17-15-1, Tank Platoon ARTEP Mission Training Plan, J an 84.Division 86TankCompanySOP. May83(will bepublishedasFC 71-1-3

Company Team, Dec 85.

M60A1, Apr 85.

May84.

in Mar 86).Troop CommanderFC 71-5, Fire Coordination Exercise, J an 85.FC 71 7, Situational Training Exercise (STX) for Logistics, Apr 84.FM 17-95(H) (ApprovedFinal Draft), Cavalry Operations, Oct 83.FC 17-101 (Coordinating Draft), Light Cavalry Troop, Sep 85.FC 17-101 1 (Coordinating Draft), Light Cavalry Troop ARTEP MissionTraining Plan, Sep 85.

Tank Platoon Leader/Platoon Sergeant'FM 17-15 (TEST), Tank Platoon Div 86, Oct 84.FC 17-15-1, Tank Platoon ARTEP Mission Training Plan, J an 84.FC 17-15-2, Tank Platoon Leader's Notebook, J an 84.FC 17-15-3, Tank Platoon SOP, May 85.FC 71-1J (Coordinating Draft), The Tank and Mechanized InfantryFM 17-12-1 (Approved Final Draft), Tank Combat Tables M1, Dec84.FM 17-12-2 (Approved Final Draft), Tank Combat Tables M48A5/FM 17-12-3(ApprovedFinaI ra f t ) .TankCombatTablesM60A3, Feb85.

Company Team, Dec 85.

M60A1, Apr 85.Scout Platoon Leader/Platoon Sergeant

.*FM 17-98 (Approved Final Draft). Army 86 Scout Platoon, J an 85.FC 17-98-2, Scout Platoon Leader's Notebook, Apr 85.FC 17-98-3, Scout Platoon SOP, Apr 85.All commanders and leaders should have SOPS and references forechelons one level above and one level below them.Manualsdenotedwithan asterisk(')are DAprint and mustbesecuredfrom AG Publications Center in Baltimore. All other manuals areavailable n irnitedquantitiesfrom he Armor Center and can be orderedby calling The Army Wide Training Support Branch, Non-ResidentTraining Division, atAUTOVON464-2914(Commerci al502-624-2914)or by writing: Commander, U.S. Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-DPT-NRT-AWS, Fort Knox. KY 401 21 5000. Inquiries about publication offuture manuals should be directed to the Armor Hot Line, AUTOVON464-TANK (Commercial 502-624-TANK).

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Armor Safety: The Six-Paragraph Operations OrderRecent messages from th e Chief of Staff of th e Armyand the Sergeant Major of th e Army have challengedthe Noncommissioned Officer Corps to police safetystandards in the Army. Every command has hadmeetings a nd classes to discuss the views of thosemessages a nd to review the five points of safe tydiscussed by th e Chief of Staff.Lets look at safety in Armor an d review the leader-ship responsibilities of its noncommissioned officers.Most of us would natu rally respond th at t he ArmorForce is the most safety-conscientious branch in theArmy, for all th e right reasons. We know th at thosetanks and personnel carriers will injure or kill asoldier. We emphasize safety in everything we do. We

know our equipment!At Fort Knox, we also had meetings to discusscommand policies and programs in each major com-mand. We shared each others concerns, a great learn-ing procedure. Let me sha re with you some ideas thatgreatly assist in preventing accidents and injury.First, we must start with the individual. Why?Because it is the individual who must initiate thedefense agains t accidents an d injuries. Lets look a t afew basics th at challenge our leadership skills. Indi-vidual clothing a nd equipment can be a soldiers bestfriend and worst enemy, depending on the chain-of-command attitudes. Those leaders who actually per-form periodic inspections for accountability an d ser-viceability in a timely manner prevent numerous typesof injuries, especially those associated with weather.However, the success of those inspections must beamplified by the commander an d the leadership of theorganization. Sometimes we forget the purpose of acommand. Look around your organiza tion twohours after the commander has prescribed the uniformof the day. Are there soldiers out of uniform? Somemight s ay, Who cares? We are in garrison now. Butsoldiers who ignore their leadership in garrison ignoretheir leadership in the field. And noncommissionedofficers who allow their soldiers to ignore orders ingarrison do the s ame in t he field.Lets leave the individual an d address the team -crew, squad, section, etc. - ach has a leader. The

noncommissioned officer is the only leader who ha stotal supervision over his soldiers. Besides his sol-diers, he has responsibility over the equipment associ-ated with a squad or crew. To supervise squad/crewsafety properly, a noncommissioned officer must knowhow his equipment works a nd how to use it. You showme a noncommissioned officer who does not know hisvehicle and weapons, and Ill show you an accidentlooking for a place to happen. You can pin on a set ofstripes an d ass ign a n MOS to a n individual, but aleader is lost if he does not know the equipment. Anoncommissioned officer must grow with the equip-ment. He has to work with equipment, learn its pitfalls,and anticipate dangerous actions or attitudes. We needto ensure that our institutions tie safety in withtraining. We need to train noncommissioned officersvisual ly to recognize accident-preventive measures-the right an d wrong way to slave a vehicle, to ground-guide, to replace a track. He must visually identifysafety problems before they happen an d take correc-tive actions.Knowing th e vehicle and the equipment is not goodenough! The leader must maintain discipline. Thediscipline of a crew is really demonstrated in the fieldwhere the vehicle becomes a pa rt of the crew, da y andnight. The discipline of both the leader and thosesoldiers assigned are really exercised in the fieldenvironment.The concern of th e noncommmissioned officer mus tnow expand beyond his equipment. He must thorough-ly understand th e safety requirements in the StandingOperating Procedures (SOP). Uni t SOPSshould coversafety management rules laid out by the command.The assembly a rea of a t ank company or an armoredcavalry troop is a busy a nd dangerous place, especiallyat night. We cannot tolerate unsupenrised sleepingrules and vehicle control - noncommissioned of-ficers responsibility .Finally, lets discuss the command role in safetyas itapplies to the first-line supervisor: we cannot over-emphasize leadership by example. The uniform of theday applies to everyone in the organization, the com-mander who designated it, the first sergeant who

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announced it, an d th e platoon leaders, platoon ser-geants, and first-line supervisors who have the re-sponsibility to check the soldiers and make correc-tions. If a noncommissioned officer cannot superviseasimple order, then the more complex orders becomeimpossible. You cannot have different rules! Soldiersdont understand different standards ;but more impor-tantly,a soldier isnot going tofollow a leader who doesnot follow stand ardshimself. This applies to any thi ngwe do- rom the simplicity of the uniform of the d ay toth e complexities of uni t movements, a n all-nightoccupation of a blocking position in sub-zero tempera-tures, nver-crossing exercises, or a passage of lineswhere the sl igh t mistake of not knowing the location ofyour fla nks or field of fire can be fatal. Sleeping in yourvehicle, not knowing how to ground-guide properly,and a multitude of other mistakes ca n lead to seriousinjury or death. We do a great ob preparing to go to thefield, but most of our accidents occur returning fromthe field, mostly due to unsupervised movements bythe leadership of the organization.How do we transm it the orders? In written format, inclasses, in formations? One of the ways that wasdiscussed by a brigade commander in our meetingswas t he use of the Six-Paragraph Operations Order:situation, mission, execution, admin and logistics,command and signal, and SAFETY. Every noncom-missioned officer in our Army le arns the Five-Para-

graph Operations Order in the Prim ary LeadershipDevelopment Course. The Six-Paragraph OperationsOrder (adding safety in t raining) will greatly assistevery commander in th e execution of th e mission. B yadding thi s factor to the SOPS, we have developed astandard understood by all noncommissioned officers.It is not t ank lingo or artillery lingo; it is somethingth at all soldiers understand- simple procedure tha tis disseminated by the chain of command, supervisedan d enforced by the noncommissioned officers. Usingthis system will greatly enhance a units safetyprogram.

here is a lot of pride in soldiers who belong to a unitth at h as had no major safety incidents. I have had theopportunity to belong to units such as these. A Reforger exercise or a major gunnery exercise in Januarywith a troop/battalion/regiment/brigade returningwith all its soldiers free from major injuries is asatisfying accomplishment. It is not easy; it is tough.It requires a lot of preplanning, execution, and super-vision. Sometimes a relief of a leader is in orderbecause of poor leadership, but it must be done. Some-times UCMJ actions ar e necessary because a n orderwas not followed, and th at must be done. The impor-tant point is that command involvement and non-commissioned officer involvement prevent accidentsor injuries.TLC for AN/VVS-2

Armored crewmen -attention! Your AN/WS-2 NightVision Viewer is a delicate i n s t rume n t that demands a lotof gentle, loving care. If you treat it roughly, you can be infor some rough nighttime treatment on t h e battlefieldwithout your eyes.Treat your AN/WS-2 tenderly; learn its limitations,and u s e it only when conditions are right.The Night Vision Viewer does not make its own light. Itonly increases t h e low-level light available on a normalnight. Cloudy nightswith no moon or stars wont produceenough light to use the viewer.If the night isextremelydark, ortheweather conditionsare poor, adjust theviewerto maximum resolution. If thatdoesnt help, stop your vehicle before you have anaccident. Get some guidance. If you cant see well, e v e nwith your viewer, remember that nobody else can see welleither. So , rather than taking a chance, exercise caution.Let your vehicle commander know the problem.A few words of caution. Never expose t h e viewer todirect sunlight, and never use t h e viewer when thereslightning around. Strong, direct light will blind yourviewer, and you, in t u r n , will be night blinded.When your viewer is not in use, keep t he head assemblycovered, whether its mounted for u s e or stored. Protectthat head! f you need a cover, NSN 5855-01 -066-4398 or5855-01 -027-1 553 will get you one.W h e n you dont need t h e viewer, store it to protect itfrom b u m p s and shocks that can snap power receptaclesor knock its insides out of whack.Before you store your viewer, disconnect it from thepower source and make s u r e t h e batteries are out. Thiswill prevent corrosion.

1

Neverplug i n the viewer when t he batteries are inplace- he batteries will explode.When you store the viewer, make s u r e that its n itsboxsnug ly . Lock all t h e box latches so that t h e viewer wontfall out.Youll f ind the storage box in different places in dif-ferent vehicles.O n the M1, its to the left and rear of t h e driver. On theM60A3, itsunderneath the g u n breech.The M2/3 Bradleys do not have viewer storage boxes,so youwill havetostrap i t f i rmlytoastoragepadtothelef tof t h e driver.Take care of that viewer! Its an ex p en s iv e piece ofeauiDment, and more imoortantlv, itsyour eves.8 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare January-February 1986


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An Introduction to the NTCby Captain Mike ChristieTo most of you, itsknown a s theNational Training Center - heNTC. To me, and to m any otherswho served there, it was home fornearly three years. But for all of us,the NTC offers the finest maneuverand live-fire area in the world. Inthis article, I wan t to give those ofyou who have not been to the NTCalook at what you can expect. For themany of you who have fought onthat battlefield, this article willserve as- hope- confirmationof what you experienced and as a

s o r t of lessons-learned packet toimprove your training experiencewhen you return.What is the NTC?

Located i n the high desert northof Los Angeles, California, theNTC is approximately 1,000squaremiles of open terrain, broken up bygranite and lava mountains andhills. There are about half a dozendry lake beds that gather waterduring the winter but then dry to ahard clay during the summer. Tha tsummer is nearly nine monthslong.Newcomers to thi s land find thefluctuating temperature the mostdifficult adjustment to make. Whileit is common knowledge that thedaytime temperature is usuallyabove 100 degrees, few peoplerealize tha t th e temperature atnigh t often drops 40 o 50 degrees.That swift drop in temperaturemakes you feel extremely cold, even

though the actual temperaturemight be as high as 70degrees. Andthe wind makes the cold a t nightseem even worse.The wind never seems to end, andit penetrates everywhere. It numbsyour face when you are movingagainst it, and its presence is com-pounded by the fact ha t thereis norefuge, no trees or manm ade struc-tures to provide protection. Buteven more important than its ef-fects on your body a re the windseffects on your tactical operations.The wind can become a formid-able ally if you capitalize on itsstrengths, but it can be a consider-able enemy if you fail to take intoaccount its impact. The simplesttask, such as putting up a tent,becomes difficult and takes longerto accomplish. The wind can ca rrysounds great distances, or permityou to operate close to the enemywithout being heard. It can playhavoc with the performance of yourground surveillance radars andmake them the source of much falseinformation. But the winds great-est impact on operationsis its effecton the use of smoke.Those who have fought at theNTC know th at smoke operationsplay a key role in the OPFORsability to move on the battlefield.Far too many times, however, visit-ing Blue Force unit s fail to considerthe winds direction, its strength, orchanges i n wind conditions whenthey employ smoke. You must rou-

tinely sample the winds direction.These frequent checks become moreimportant just before sunrise untiljust after the sun has risen and theground begins to get the effects ofthe suns heat. As these groundtemperatures increase, wind direc-tion and speed can change dra-matically; frequent, routine checkscan either confirm the wisdom ofyour smoke plan or warn you tomake changes if the plan mightendanger your forces.Another physical aspect of theNTC which often surprises new ar -rivals is the vastness of the area.While the openness of the terrainallows you to see the enemy at amuch greater distance, it also pre-vents you from moving undetected,or makes it nearly impossible. Itsnot uncommon to be able to observeenemy formations of battalionstrengt h for 30or 40 minutes beforethey close into direct fire range. Soin t his vastness, you must use yourimagination in the use of existingcover an d concealment, and rely onspeed, darkness, and smoke.The Observer-Controllers

The observer-controllers are acontingent of commissioned andnoncommissioned officers whosejob is to see that the visiting unitmeets its training objectives. Theobserver-controllers do th is by ob-serving how the unit tr ains , con-trolling the flow of the units opera-tions - without sacrificing therealism of the situation - nd byoffering candid after-action reviewsfor the soldiers of the visiting units.~

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All Photos by Michael Green

Visiting un its are often surprised by thevastness of the NTC,.with almost un-limited visibility but little cover.The OPFOR Contingent, which fightsunits in 14 rot ation s a year. m ay be thebest prepared Soviet uni t in theworld.

Quite frankly, they dont have a neasy job or one tha t ismuch fun, butthey do have perhaps the most im-portant job at th e NTC. While theyare not members of a TOE unit,they observe thousands of sol-diers from hundreds of units in allsorts of tr aini ng situations on themost realistic battlefield in theworld, shor t of a n actual one. Thesededicated soldiers learn lessonstha t ar e reinforced through repeti-tion, the foundation of training. Sowhen a n observer-controller recom-mends a better way to accomplishyour mission, you can bet that heknows it usually works an d worksquite well. You may not agree withhim, and you may go ahead and doit your way. Thats all right , too. Ifitworks, the observercontroller hasjust learned a new technique thathe can pass on to other units. Ifyour technique doesnt work, thenyouve learned something, too!

TheOPFORWhenever you talk ab out the

NTC, you inevitably get around totalking about he OPFOR, the badguys. The f irst point to consider isthat the OPFOR a re soldiers of theUnited Sta tes Army, and these sol-diers like to win just asmuch asyoudo. But dont kid yourself: chea tingsimply is not tolerated in the OP-FOR. The mission of the OPFOR isto provide the most realistic threatsituations possible under existingpersonnel and equipment con-straints- nd to do tha t accordingto correct Soviet doctrine each andevery time. You often hear the

words awesome,77 r incrediblewhen someone describes the OP-FOR. But again , dont kid yourself.They can be defeated.But there are a few factors thatmake the OPFOR effective in com-bat testing the tactics and trainingof the visiting unit.The first of these advantages isthat t he soldiers of the OPFOR areacclimatized to the deserts effects.The OPFOR soldiers know wha t toexpect in terms of temperature,wind, darkness, a nd the sand. Thesecond factor which may give theOPFOR an advantage is tha t theyknow the terrain. In t he course ofplanning for their operations, theOPFOR usually has a good idea ofwha t to expect in terms of observa-tion, fields of fire, cover and con-cealment, avenues of approach, andobstacles to movement.The OPFOR also knows his en-emy: YOU. The OPFOR fightsvisit-ing units in fourteen rotations ayear (Thats 28 maneuver battal-ions.). Hence, the OPFOR can fair-ly well guess at what course ofaction th e visiting unit will ta ke ina given tactical situation. Addition-ally, the OPFOR is a United State sArmy unit, and as such must gothrough their own ARTEPs. Final-ly, the OPFOR has the advantageof numbers in vehicles an d weaponsystems, but that advantage is onethat our potential adversary of thereal world would have, too. Sowhatdoes that all add up to? In short,when a visiting unit comes intocontact with the OPFOR, th at visit-ing unit is fighting probably the

best prepared Soviet uni t in thereal world. But the OPFOR doessuffer from some disadvantagestoo.The first disadvantage that theOPFOR has is that, like an y otherUS. nit, the OPFOR ha s a prob-lem with personnel turbulence.There ar e always people on leave,people on sick call, people inschools, and people on detail. Allofthese things take away soldierswho could be fighting you on thebattlefield.A second disadvantage is thatthe OPFOR fights from VISMODs.Most of these vehicles are quite oldM551 Sheridans that have beenvisually modified to appea r some-what like Soviet combat vehicles.While the OPFORdoes a n excellentjob at maintaining their equip-ment, these vehicles are out fight-ing nearly every week, and even thebest-maintained vehicles wear out.Another disadvantage is tha t nor-mally th e OPFORis short on infan-try, though this is being remediedwith some augmentation. Addition-ally, until the OPFOR is fullyequipped with VISMOD M113Als(made to look like BMPs),it will bedifficult to move the infa ntr y sol-diers quickly around the battle-field. A final disadvantage, ofwhich I will s ay more later, is thatthe OPFOR does not have thermalsights.

TheAttackUp until th is point, I have tried toshow you what you can generallyexpectat the NTC. Now, I am going

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togive you some food for thoughtin terms of the ac tual tactical op-erations that you will conduct atthe NTC.One of the missions that you willperform will be the deliberate at-tack, usually both in the day andnight, against an O P F O R rein-forced motorized rifle company(MRC) in the defense. The MRCwill usually consist of 4 T72s, 10BMPs , 63 dismounted infantry, 9Vipers, 4 Dragons, and 1 ground-mounted .50cal. machinegun. Theassortment of US. equipment isused to replicate similar equipmentfound in the actual Soviet MRC orattached to it.) The biggest weak-ness of the MRC is the small num-ber of inf ant ry available to him todefend the terrain that he is as-signed. (Though, as I mentionedearlier, augmentation of infantrywill help in th is area.)This problemof the MRC commanderiscompound-ed when he is fighting against aJ-Series MTOE battalion task forcewhich contains usually four ma-neuver companies that can attackfrom two different directions at th esame time. The MRC commandercannot rapidly shift his infantryaround unless he is fully equippedwith the new B M P VISMOD madefrom a n M113. Hence, the MRCcommander must try to position hisinfant ry where they will do the bestjob, knowing that any attempt toreposition them during the battlewill be slow a nd will expose them tothe effects of indirect fire. Anotherdisadvantage of the defendingMRCcommander is his relative lack ofcounter-surveillanceand reconnais-sance assets.The OP F OR does not have anythermal sight s or nigh t vision gog-gles, and has only I R sights on thecombat vehicles and a minimumnumber of passive sights for thecrew-served and individual weap-ons. The MRC will be augmentedby a ground surveillance radar(GSR), though. This situation forcesthe MRC commander to rely heavi-ly on the GSR, OPs, LPs, nd indi-

can exdoit.This nterference shouldich he usuallyntil th e bulk oflis designatedhim with earlyind when hised by your ef-ions. While thenforced with a

sance screen (oneBMP , one BRDM,and one motorcycle), his biggestworry remains the possibility thatyour dismounted infantry will at-tack or infiltrate dur ing periods oflimited visibility.Not only is theMRC ommanderconcerned with hi s ability to identi-fy your possible dismounted attackor infiltration - ut he is alsoconcerned about how to deal withit. Just about his only recourse is touse indirect fire. His lack of nightvision devices almost totally elim-inates the MRC commanders abili-ty to maneuver his forces aroundthe battlefield quickly and withoutunnecessarily exposing them to di-rect fire or exposing hi s dismountedinfantry to indirect fire. In additionto the problems of identifying andreacting to your limited visibilityattack, the O P F O R s B M Ps , T-72s,and S AGGERsare reduced to abouta 1,000-meter effective range atnight because of the limited capa-bility of infrared searchlights. Youcan reduce that capability evenfurther if you can put effectivesmoke on his position and keep itthere.In attacking the O P F O R , youmust continually apply pressureand never let him rest; certainly,that is his objective when he at-tacks you. The MRC commanderwill usually begin to operate hisGSR soon after darkness begins.You can capitalize on this. TheGSR will normally be positionednear to the MRC commander sothat he can quickly receive anyinformation t ha t the G SR can givehim on your intent. You need toposition your G SR teams so thatyou can get a fix on his GSR. Thatwill tell you just about where theenemy is: th e MRC commander isusually in the center of ma ss of hisdefensive position an d located be-hind the platoon battle positionsfor security.After identifyingthe MRCs oca-tion, you need to position yourGSRs so that they can interferewith his radar on a sector tha t you

begin bnly after you have initiateda small deception, on a differentaxis, by using tinfoil to create falseimages on the MRCs radar. Thisaction will begin to apply the pres-sure on the MRC commander be-cause he willfirstbecome concernedabout the force that his radaridentified and then will becomeeven more concerned about the lossof his G S R s capability when youbegin to jam it.To compensate for this lost capa-bility, the MRC commander willattempt to offset the problem byincreasing his OPs and LPs andpossibly even by using patrols.That will increase the fatigue of theMRCs soldiers as the night goeson.

In order not to lose this initiativeof pressure, you now should requesta round of illumination every hourin the vicinity of the known enemyGSR location. That will increasethe MRC commanders anxiety bymaking him think th at someone istrying to observe his position froma nearby location. He will alsoprobably increase his sta te of alertand make an effort to locate thephantom observer. This will fur-ther increase the fatique of h is sol-diers, and as the night continuesand the fatique se ts in, the MRCssoldiers - ike all soldiers of theworld- ill become less and lessconcerned (and less alert) aboutcries of wolf. Using helicopters tofly within hearing distance, on dif-ferent axes, in simulated airmobileoperations will also enhance thisdeception effort. If possible, decep-tive radio trafficcould also ncreaseOP F OR anxiety since it is not un-common for the O P F O R to searchand monitor enemy radio traffic.The next phase of the attackshould have the task forces dis-mounted infantry closing towardthe MRCs position. The first par tof this phase is to reinforce the taskforce scouts with a dismountedelement of infantry. The ir missionis to fix and destroy the OP F ORreconnaissance element. For thatreason, they should have sufficientnight-vision equipment, man-car-.ried antiarmor weapons, and theability to request and adjust indi-rect fire.You should cover this ac-tion with feints by armored ve-hicles in order to distract theOP F OR recon element. Even if the

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enemy recon element is not de-stroyed, these efforts should forceits withdrawal and thus increasethe anxiety level in th e MRC posi-tion.Next, infan try should be task or-ganized into two or three separateelements an d move out toward theMRC position on at least two- rpreferably three- ifferent axesofadvance. This movement will beassisted by the hourly illuminationround falling on the MRCs posi-tion.One of these infantry forces hasthe mission of locating routes, ob-stacles, and possible enemy posi-tions that will affect the follow-onassault forces and vehicles. Thisfirst force must have radios in suf-ficient number so that , if they aretaken under fire and have to splitup, they c an continue their missionin reporting critical information tothe follow-on forces. That is theirfirst priority. If they locate bar-riers, this first force should notspend time attempting to breachthem; this force should mark andreport the bam ers so that follow-onforces can breach them. Anothermission for thi s firs t force might beto set up OPs to mainta in contin-uous observation of the battlefieldfor the task force commander.When this f irst in fan try force com-pletes its mission, it should departand return to the task force loca-tion, or a pick-up point, following adifferent route tha n will be used bythe follow-on forces in their mount-ed attack. This will minimize thechance that the follow-on forcesattack route will be discovered bythe OPFOR before the mountedattack.The second infan try force- hedismounted assault force- houldthen approach, or preferably infil-tra te into, the MRCs position so asto be ready to at tack a nd destroyenemy vehicles as the mounted at-tack commences. This force musthave the majority of the ask forcesman-portable antitank systems so

that if it is discovered,it can breakup into small killer teams and con-tinue its mission. This dismountedassault force must be prepared tocause a ll so rts of confusion withinthe MRCs position as the attackbegins. It should also be briefed onthe predesignated signal that willalert all the infiltrated elementsth at preparatory artillery fire willstart within a designated time for adesignated period. This briefingshould also include a signal whichpermits warning the assault forceof any change in the attack timeand the preparatory fires so thatthe force can take cover an d canassault at the correct times.You should plan for the use ofsmoke during the movements ofthese inf antr y forces so that youcan conceal the ir movements andinhibit the MRCs capability to re-act. Plan this smoke in front of themoving forces and on the MRCsposition until the dismounted as-sau lt force is in its assau lt position.Once the t ask force scouts haveeliminated or driven off the OP-FOR recon elements, the scouts canbe used to recon or clear anticipatedarmor routes of advance an d thenbe positioned to guide the mainmounted attack.These infa ntry effortscan, if suc-cessful, cause th e OPFOR defenset o collapse prior to the scheduledattack time. You should take thispossibility into consideration inthat the armor a ttack force must beprepared to begin its attack aheadof schedule. If you cannot attackahead of schedule, the dismountedassault force should make everyeffort to remain undetected untilthe main a ttac k commences. Thenthe mounted attack and the dis-mounted assault should occur si-multaneously.If attack helicopters are avail-able, they should only be commit-ted upon the collapse of th e enemysdefense in order to catch the MRCwhile attempting to reposition.These valuable asse ts should never

be sent directly into a preparedenemy position. The infan try car-riers or Bradley Fighting Vehicleswithout their squads (those belong-ing to the dismounted assau lt force)should move as a unit in the armorattack to give the impression to theMRC commander that he is facinga full-strength mounted a ttack. Ofcourse, these vehicles should beprepared to support the attack byfire.I do not intend wha t I have writ-ten here to be a blueprint for vic-tory. As we all know, th e factors ofMETT-T have great impact onwhat you do on the battlefield.However, the OPFOR does haveweaknesses th at you ca n exploitasyou attack.The Movement toContactA visiting battalion task forcenormally conducts a movement tocontact against a reinforced mo-

torized rifle batta lion (MRB) of theOPFOR. That unit will normallyconsist of 31 BMPs, 13 T-72, 2ZSUs, 2 BRDM (AT-~s ),nd 6 122-mm howitzers. The number ofBMPs can be higher if additionalvehicles are present to replicatecertain combat support elementsfrom the regiment.The lead element of the MRBwillbe a combat reconnaissanc patrol(CRP) consisting of 3 BMPs. TheCRPs mission is to find you anddestroy you if he can. If he cant, theCRP will hunker down and try tofix you until the MRBs forwardsecurity element (FSE) can arriveto either destroy you or thicken t hebattle until the main body of theMRB arrives.The key elements here are thatthe FSE follows the CRP by up to 10kilometers, and that the m ain bodyof the MRB, which is the advanceguard of t he regiment, follows theFSE by another 5 or 10 minutes.This knowledge allows you to planto ensure that you amve at thepoint of contact first and with themost.

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The FSE will s is t of the re-mainder of th e lead MRC and willconsist of the remaining 7 BMPsand 4 T-72s. The important facthere is that you have the oppor-tunity to a ttack and deal with onecompany a t a time. You will have15 to 40 minutes to deal with thiscompany before confronting themain body of the advance guard.This affords you the opportunity touse at tack helicopters, too, since itis highly probable that the ZSUswill be moving with the main body.Additionally, the rapid emplace-ment of OPs and small antitankkiller teams on key terrain can alsoprovide effective indirect fire ad-justment on request, and can serveto deny the OPFOR this sameterrain.As the task force concentrates,the FSE commander will realizethat he is outnumbered and that hemust go into a has ty defense untilhelp arrives. It is at this point thatthe OPFORis most vulnerable. TheBMPs are greatly degraded whenmoving since they posssess noSTAB system, an d his makes their73-mm gun practically useless. TheBMPs are also unable to fire theSagger on the move. These BMPsare now easy game for all of yourvehicles except the M113.With the addition of the M1, M2,and M3, your chances of successduring thi s running gun battle areeven greater. Even against theOPFORT-72, you can outmaneuverand outshoot him in mobile com-bat. You have greater range, andwith your greater speed you caneasily maneuver out of his rangewhile you pick off thre at vehicles a twill.Once you have identified the

route that the m ain body is using- sually the same one that theFSE used - ou should start tosmoke that route in front of theenemy main body. The smoke willslow his advance a nd hinder hisability to deploy into combat for-mation. Anything you can do toslow the main body down will giveyou more time to complete the d estruction of the FSE and prepare totake on the main body. This isanother good time to use attackhelicopters; they should try to pickoff enemy vehicles as they come outof the smoke. The attack helicop-ters should engage ZSUs, tanks,and BMPs in that order.

I also recommend that you con-sider off-loading a portion of yourinfant ry soldiers -on key terrain ifpossible- o as not to chance theirloss in the maneuver battle. Theycan be transported tokey terrain byother means or given the mission todefend the train s until the maneu-ver battle is complete.OPFOROffensiveOperations

The OPFOR relies very heavilyon intelligence that it receiveswhen it is about to a ttack visitingunits. The OPFOR offensive opera-tions a re characterized by simplic-it y an d regimentation - ust likethose illus trated by Soviet doctrine.Hence, intelligence - ood intelli-gence - s the OPFORs key toplanning its maneuver.The regimental staff even pre-pares its artillery plan from tha tintelligence because the OPFORconsiders artillery fire as a orm ofmaneuver. The plan is essentially aschedule of fires that fall basedupon the predetermined rate of

movemenattack. for the regiment in theDon't believe, though, that theOPFOR is totally without flexibil-ity. The regimental staff does planfor contingencies, and if updates totheir intelligence indicate that theoriginal plan will not be appropri-ate, the OPFOR will change itsplan to accomplish its mission.To gather this vital intelligenceinformation, scouts from the regi-ment deploy at different time inter-vals along different axes of ad-vance. Normally, motorcycles willmove out first, around midnight ifthe regiment is to attack at dawn,The mission of these motorcyclescouts is not only to gather intelli-gence on where your positions andobstacles are; they ar e also taskedto penetrate deeply into your sectorand set up OPs.About 1 to 2 hours after themotorcycle scouts depart, the scoutsand engineers, mounted in BMPsand BRDMs, move out to clear theobstacles reported by the earlierscouts. The BRDMs will move sothat they c an cover their movementwith the noise of the BMPs. In thisway, if the BMPs are discoveredbecause of their noise, the BRDMscan slip around the confusion andcontinue to infiltrate in to your reararea.The OPFOR will also use dis-mounted infantry to attempt to in-filtrate your positions. Their mis-sion is to attack at first ight, simul-taneously with the main mountedattack and as the lead MRBs closein on the initial obstacle locations.How can you overcome these tac-tics? First of all, you must be ex-tremely concerned about OPSEC.Light and noise discipline are man-

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datory if you dont want to giveaway your positions to the regi-menta l scouts. Secondly, you mustcover barriers and obstacles withfire. When the scouts attempt tofind them or clear them, destroythe scouts and ensure that theobstacles can still accomplish theirpurpose when the main attackcomes. Finally, make maximumuse of all of your night vision ca-pability to discover, report, anddestroy the OPFOR intelligencegathering units.

Your Successful DefenseThe success of your defense willdepend on how well you can denythe OPFOR the intelligence that it

.so desperately needs to conduct itsattack. You must fix responsibilityfor that mission, not only at theFLOT, but also in depth. Failure todo this ha s caused great confusionin visiting units, and on many oc-casions has caused friendly frat-ricide and assisted the OPFOR reg-imental scouts in their attempts tolocate friendly positions and pene-tra te deeply into the rear area.A company team commandershould have a small reaction forceavailable at his location, so thateven if the command net is jammed,the reaction force can be orderedout quickly. The team commanderalso should position his combat ve-hicles closer to avenuesof approachduring periods of limited visibilityto ensure that OPFOR vehiclescant slip by.

At the battalion task force level,there must also be a larger reactionforce available under the commandof a key leader who can personallymaneuver that force to stop anypenetration reported by other ele-ments. Infantry should be orga-nized into antitank killer teamsand dismounted elements. This willallow you to make the best use ofyour weapons systems. For exam-ple, tank killer teams can be placedin depth along the likely vehicleavenues of approach to reinforce

company teams. By working withthe company teams, the t ank killerteams can assist in providing goodsecurity an d support the companyteams sleep plan.The organized dismounted infan-try need to sleep during the day asmuch as possible. Their primaryjobs are done at night. These teamswill not only gather intelligencethrough active patrolling, but willrepel an d destroy the OPFOR reconelements who try to find and de-stroy your obstacles.Dont leave -50 caliber machineguns in the r ear of the ba ttle area.Position them in groups or pocketsalong likely avenues of approach.These weapons can ake out BRDMsand BMPs. Groups of four heavymachine guns in mutual supportstraddling likely avenues of ap-proach ca n be very effective.As much as possible, companyteam commanders should use theirsoldiers to put in wire and mines,freeing engineer units to preparethe barriers and the fighting posi-tions so important to survivability.Soldiers from the service supportelements should also be used toemplace barriers and provide se-curity so that infantry can rest forthe battle; they will be up all night.You should concentrate the firesof all tank-killing systems onT-72s.BMPs are less formidable and allsystems down to the 50-caliber cankill them.Use sniper tactics. DesignateTOW ystems to pick out a ll enemyvehicles with numbers ending in a6. These are command vehicles;taking them out will limit theOPFORs flexibility.A good way to cover barriers is todig your OPs in close to them, i n

spider holes if possible. Theseclose-in OPs can detect OPFOR breach-ing elements in smoke or darknessmore effectively th an can vehiclesin battle positions.Finally, keep in mind that anysmall elements or even individualvehicles of your force tha t the OP-FOR bypasses in their attack cancause extreme difficulties for theOPFORs follow-on battalion. It isbetter sometimes to hide and fightlater th an to die on the move.

SummaryMy purpose here has not been totell you how to beat the OPFOR, butto pass on some of the lessons I

have learned. These lessons canmake you and your force more ca-pable on any battlefield in theworld. And that is the purpose ofthe National Training Center.

CAPTAIN MIKE CHRISTIEwas commissioned in Armorin 1976 following OCS atFort Benning. He has servedasatankplatoon eader, tankcompany XO, support pla-toon leader, and battalionand squadron motor officerin assignments in CONUSand USAREUR. He has alsoserved as a squadron com-mun ca ons off icer, tankcompany commander andheadquarters company com-mander and is pr esently as-signed to t he Company Teamand Cavalry Division, Com-mand and Staff Department,USAARMC.

~ ~

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The SCOUIPlatoonActions on Contact/Clearing an Obstack

H. PENN2CHARLIE SECTION

SituationYou are the platoon leader for th e scout platoon in 2dBattalion, 14th Armor, which has been in combat forseveral weeks. You have just left the battalion com-mand post where you received the following order fromthe battalion S3:Elements of the 3d Motorized Rifle Division arecontinuing their delay. You are to conduct ahasty zone reconnaissance in sector, forward ofthe Bn to PL Eagle, short of Obj Blue. Reportwhen set on PL Eagle. Time now is 2100 hrs, youwill cross theLD t 0400 hr s tomorrow morning.The firs t company will cross at 0500hrs, but willbe ready to moveat0400 in case you make contactwith a large force and need support.You issue your warning order and start to prepareyour plan. During your map reconnaissance, youdiscover that your sector is roughly 5 kilometers wideand 24 kilometers from the LD to PL Eagle. You alsodiscover several chokepoints which will canalize your

battalion. After considering th e factors of METT, youelect to use the three section organization, and com-plete your plan.Time now is 0345; our order has been issued andyour platoon is deployed along the LD waiting for 0400(Figure 1). Your platoon is 100% operational. Itsfinally 0400, and you order Alpha section to cross theLD and move to their fir st checkpoint. You report tohigher tha t you have crossed the LD and proceed tomaneuver your platoon to PL Eagle. Approximately 12kilometers from the LD, Bravo section, which ismaneu-vering in the eastern part of sector, reports an ab at isobstacle, reinforced with steel girders at a choke pointyou previously plotted on your map. Knowing that theobstacle is probably being overwatched by the enemy,

you have Bravo section move using cover and con-cealment to dominant terrain to locate the enemyforce. Once they report Set, you order Alpha sectionto locate a bypass to the west and move to dominantterrain forward of the obstacle to provide forwardsecurity for possible breaching operations. You th enforward a Blue 1 spot report) to the S3 nd receive thefollowing order:The obstacle must be bypassed or neutralizedwithin 45 minutes. The OPCON engineer platoonhas not shown yet. If you cannot bypass orbreach obstacle, notify me immediately, out.Alpha section reports Set and you then orderBravo to move forward, locatea bypass on the easternside an d set up forward security. As Bravo section ismoving, they come under fire from a Sagger missileand sm all arms.

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Red 1, this is Red 5 , contact, Sagger and ma-chine gun, northeastBravo section immediately deploys, returnsfire,an dattempts to develop the situation. You immediatelyorder Bravo to call for indirect fire support and orderAlpha to maneuver to the flank of the enemy to assistin developing the situation. You then forward a con-tac t report to the S3an d receive the following order:Send me a detailed spot report. You have pri-ority of fire. Destroy enemy if possible. Dontforget the obstacle. Keep me posted, out!After approximately five minutes, Alpha sectionreports visual contact an d sends the following Blue 1..Red 1,this is Red 2, Blue 1 ollows:(S) 2 BMPs w/dismounts.(A) Stationary in treeline.(L) Grid SN467829(U) orward security element.(T) Time0427(E) Equipment not visible.West flank will support a has ty attack.Before you can reply, artillery starts to land andRed 1, his isRed 5, Blue 2 (situat ion report),theBMPs are delaying north at a high rate of speed,last seen grid SN468833, request permission tomain tain contact, over.

Bravo section sends you the following:

WHAT WOULD YOU DO?For 25 years, from 1950 to 1975, one o f the mostpopular features in ARMOR was What Would You007:a series of tacticalproblems concluding with a schoolsolution. In ight of reader survey interest,this feature wi ll again be a regular part of ARMORMaaazine. -Ed.-As th e platoon leader, you a re faced with the fol-lowing: You have been given the order to breach th eobstacle, however, you have the inherent responsibil-ity to maintain contact. What are your actions?

DiscussionDo you pursue th e enemy or do you tak e the time tobreach the obstacle so that the battalion can movefreely and uninterrupted? You do not have he assets todo both. If you were to try to mainta in contact with the

enemy, plus leave a force to breach the obstacle, yourplatoon would be stretched beyond its capabilities. Theimportance placed on the obstacle by the S3, and thefact that he wants it neutralized within 45 minutes,should tell you that its probably in the pa th of themain force and the lead unit will am ve at the obstaclewithin that time frame. In view of OPSEC require-ments, the S3will not tell you th is information over the

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,"Once the security reports 'Set',you move the platoon sergeantw it h his crew t o t he obstacle."

radio unless you both h ave secure capability. A t thi spoint, your primary concern should be the obstacle.Bravo section, which has visual contact with theenemy, should continue to adjust fire to destroy him orimpede his delay. But how do you breach thi s obstaclewhile maintain ing the appropriate security measuresin enemy territory with no engineer squad, an d only asix-vehicle platoon?First,you position yourself an d he platoon sergeant(Charlie section) so that you can both observe theobstacle and the dominant terrain t ha t surrounds it.Once your section is set, move Bravo section as farforward as METT-T will allow for early w arning andsecurity. Bravo must als o locate a bypass in case theobstacle cannot be breached. (Alpha is already set andha s located a bypass on the western side).Once Bravo is set, you have the section leaders sendthe other squads within their sections back to th eobstacle. They will be at MOPP Level I11and have thebypass reports with them. The squad leaders will stopshort of the obstacle, dismount everyone except thegunn er and t he driver, who will then move th e Brad-leys to th e flanks of th e obstacle as fa r as the terrainwill allow to provide additiona l limited security for theclearing party. The Bradleys must be far enough to th eflanks to provide good overwatch and reaction timeshould the enemy atta ck from the flanks. Meanwhile,th e dismounts will establish 360-degree local security.During this type of operation, it's very easy to losecommand and control of your platoon. You must beacutely aware of th is an d tak e the necessary precau-tions to preclude this from happening.Once the security reports "Set", you move the pla-toon sergeant with h is crew (also in MOPP 111)to theobstacle. The platoon sergeant will stop sho rt of theobstacle, dismount with h is crew, recon, an d a ttemp tto clear th e obstacle. If necessary, he ca n select per-sonnel from the local security force to assist with theclearing operation. You are responsible for rear se-curity, overwatch, and keeping the commander postedon the obstacle and any changing situations.Once the obstacle is cleared, th e Bradleys providingflank security will return to th e obstacle, pick up thecrews and rejoin their section. The platoon sergeantwill move through the s ite an d set on t he f ar side. Youwill report to the S3 (or commander) th a t th e obstaclehas been breached, join the platoon sergeant, andcontinue the ha sty zone reconnaissance to PL Eagle.You must keep in mind th at time is critical . Some of

these actions may have o beperformed simultaneous-ly to increase speed. However, risk also increases, andyou sacrifice some degree of security.If during the platoon sergeant's reconnaissance ofthe obstacle, he determines tha t the obstacle cannot bebreached, or that breaching operations will be tootime-consuming, he would immediately return to t heplatoon leader's location with the bypass reports. Theplatoon leader would immediately notify the S3 andforward the bypass reports by radio or messenger tothe leading unit or command C P as directed by th e S3or commander.The intent of this article is to illustrate how a scoutplatoon would reconnoiter a nd clear a n obstacle. Whenthe scout platoon is maneuvering in front of a largerforce, it will normally n ot h ave th e time to conduct abreaching operation. The platoon will locate a bypassand forward its location to higher headquarters. Asthe eyes an d ea rs of t he ma in force commander, theplatoon must s ta y well forward and continue to pro-vide information on th e terrain and enemy. However,there will be occasions when an obstacle must bereconnoitered and cleared, and the only asset avail-able to th e ma in force commanderis the scout platoon.The obstacle can be in t he form of a n abatis , bridge,chokepoint, or any other obstruction tha t can impedemovement. It is of utmost importance that the scoutplatoon be able to conduct this mission to avoidwasting critical time.r i

This tactical problem was developed by CPT Toby W.Martinez, CPT Paul C. Jussel, and SSG Jerry D . Johnson ofthe Platoon Tactics Division, Cavalry Branch, Command1 and Staff Department, Fort Knox, KY. Illustrations w ereprepared by Henry Penn of the Command and Staff De-partment 's Training Development Support Division.

6 I

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Inherent M I Decon Capabilitiesby Captain Judd E. Squitier

Among ma ny of the critical con-siderations for success on the mech-anized battlefield is NBC decon-tamination. These considerationsand concerns in the NBC area a rebased on our own limited combatassets, limited NBC decontamina-tion assets, a nd the well-developedNBC doctrine of the Warsaw Pactnations which possess NBC equip-ment in great quantities. For ex-ample, on a 1983CAMMS, division-level computer simulation conductedwithin the 3d Infantry Division,NBC decontamination became aconcern for commanders a t alllevels.The Army of Excellence (AOE)Heavy Division organization cur-rently ha s a decontamination com-pany at division level. The squadsof this unit are habitually sen t outto provide support to a brigade.This squad has limited capabili-ties, and within a brigade sector atypical decontamination site quick-ly becomes overcrowded with unitsattempting decontamination. As aresult of the traffic jam at atypical site, a n armor or mechanized platoon could expect to spend6-12hours i n waiting an d executionof a complete decontamination.The large volume of uni ts conduct-ing decontamination will also pre-sent unique logistical and resupplyproblems for the chemical unitsthemselves. Ideally, using the.Ml2decon apparatus, a decontamina-tion squad can decontaminate fourvehicles and associated personnelin one hour. Fo r larger volume, the

rormuia is --total numoer or veni-cles divided by four plus one hour.The SANATOR appara tus, with its30-50 personnel-per-hour capacityis entering the supply system andwill enhance our capabili t ies.Again, however, from computersimulations a nd even ARTEP sce-narios, we regularly find that de-contamination is a slow processwhich can keep combat power outof the fight.

in is article aescnoes some unizinitiatives which can be applied atplatoon and company level to en-hance decon capabilities. Some in-novations which have already beensuccessful at company level will beillustrated, and other devices forfuture construction will be dis-cussed. These center on the M1tanks potential and capabilitiesasa major decontamination appara-tus. These capabilities involve in-

e

FIGURE 1. Russians have long used truck -mounted jet engines to decontaminate tanks, car-washstyle.January-February 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine ofMobile Warfare 19


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U

1

hr,

FIGURE 3. Closeup shows how Cannon Device i s mounted on M1 grille.

FIGURE 4. 55-gallon drum mounted on tank deck feeds decon solution to smokegenerator. - "The M I tank doesgive a unit some of itsow n organic decon ca-pabilities... I

FIGURE5. Drum-based scrubdevice sI ttached by hose to brush assembly.

herent characteristics of the tank,such as turbine-engine-producedheat and thrust, as well as th eengine s

armor january february 1986 web

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