Institute of Pacific Relations

Another Ambitious Plan to Colonize ManchuriaAuthor(s): J. R. S.Source: Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan. 6, 1937), pp. 12-13Published by: Institute of Pacific RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3022903 .

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12 Another Ambitious Plan to Colonize Manchuria January 6

Canton. This will provide additional means of pro- moting the interior markets for the mills in Tientsin.

Statistics issued in early 1936 show that of all the textile mills in China, the Japanese operated 30% of the factories, 39% of the yarn spindles, 45% of the

looms, and 65% of the thread spindles. The new devel?

opment in Tientsin will obviously accelerate the further

decline of Chinese mills which have shown a marked

inability to withstand Japanese competition. (For data on Chinese mills see Far Eastern Survey, Jan. 16, 1935, pp. 1-4; Feb. 13, 1935, p. 22; April 10, 1935, p. 55; Jan. 1, 1936, pp. 6-7; Aug. 12, 1936, pp. 185-86.)

C. H-S.

ANOTHER AMBITIOUS PLAN TO COLONIZE MANCHURIA

Press reports from Manchuria and Japanese propa- ganda literature from the same region abound with stories of new and ambitious projects of development ?industrial, agricultural, railway, water power, etc. While actual progress has not been remarkable (see Far Eastern Survey, March 12, 1936, pp. 51-58), there has at least been no dearth of ambitious schemes.

Among these?in fact ever since the Russo-Japanese War?one theme has constantly recurred: Japanese colonization of Manchuria. To date the various migra- tion plans have not materialized, but phoenixlike from the ashes of previous projects, arises a new and grander scheme of colonization. Now the Overseas Ministry presents a plan, backed by the Army, for the settlement of one million Japanese families in Manchuria over a

twenty-year period. On the surface, with overpopulated Japan adjacent

to undeveloped Manchuria, this would seem like an excellent opportunity for relieving population pres- sure in Japan (see Far Eastern Survey, June 17, 1936, pp. 127-34). The Japanese population in Manchuria, it is true, has increased considerably and is now in excess of 500,000, having more than doubled since the establishment of Manchoukuo. However, these Japa? nese have gone to Manchuria as the dominating eco? nomic class, as officials, business men, technicians and

artisans, and are located in the cities. There has been no significant Japanese settlement on the land.

This has not been due to any lack of organized eflfort. Prior to the Mukden Incident, three major attempts were made to foster Japanese colonization. The first in 1914-18 provided for the subsidized settlement of ex-service men in the South Manchuria Railway zone.

Only 34 families were settled, of which half still re- main on the soil. The second in 1915-16, sponsored by the Kwantung Government, resulted in the settlement of 32 families at Aikawa Village near Chinchow. Of

these, only 7 families remain. The third in 1929 was made by a S.M.R. subsidiary which settled 73 families on the land in the Kwantung Leased Territory.

In 1932, after the Mukden Incident, the Department of Colonial Affairs evolved a plan for the settlement of

100,000 subsidized farm families in a 10-year period. This plan has operated only in a very limited way and to date but four small groups of colonists have been settled. The first band of 500 armed reservists went

to Yungfengchen near Chiamussu in the spring of 1933 under the guidance of the special service section of the

Kwantung Army. Despite initial difficulties, this col?

ony now consists of 563 persons, with 39,640 hectares of land available. The second group of 482 men settled at Hunanying near the first settlement in July 1933. It now embraces 582 persons, with 12,288 hectares of land. The third band of 259 persons was established at Peitokuo north of Harbin in October 1934; while the fourth group of 400 went to Chengchiho and Hadaho, south of Mishan in northeastern Manchuria, in March and April of 1936.

Thus, since 1933, about 1,800 Japanese have been settled in "collective" farm colonies, in addition to which there are a small number of "free" settlers mostly from certain religious sects. It is said that these col? onies have been sufficiently successful to justify settle? ment on a larger scale, but there has been no evidence that they are yet self-supporting. However, the colo? nies seem on a fairly permanent basis, wives have been

brought in for the settlers, houses built, farmland

opened up, and small industries started. During the current fiscal year, the fifth wave of settlers, consisting of 1,000 families plus 500 ex-service men from Man?

churia, is to be established near Mishan and will be

followed by 10,000 families in the fiscal year 1937, the

first installment on the 20-year colonization program. Manchuria would therefore seem to be on the thresh-

old of a period of large-scale Japanese immigration, pro? vided of course the money is made available. This is

an important proviso, for Japanese settlement in Man?

churia does not appear to be a natural process but one

requiring heavy government subsidies. The cost is thus

one of the determining factors in any program of coloni? zation. It is estimated that the 1,000,000 family pro?

ject will cost ?2,000,000,000, of which ?800,000,000 would come from the government in direct subsidies

and the balance in the form of public investments.

Such an expenditure would double the present Japa? nese investment in Manchuria. The 1,000,000 family

program has been adopted in principle, but for finan?

cial reasons it is apparently being cut to an initial

5-year program to settle 130,000 families at an esti?

mated cost of ?100,000,000. Financial considerations are not the only factor lim?

iting Japanese colonization. Physical difficulties and

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1937 Another Ambitious Plan to Colonize Manchuria 13

economic factors are also important. The climate is

severe, and the colonists must learn entirely new meth- ods of farming. Then there is the traditional unwilling- ness of the Japanese to emigrate despite serious rural

overcrowding at home. In fact, to make things more

congenial, the authorities have conceived a plan to settle emigrants from the same village in the same

place in order to give a more home-like atmosphere in the Manchurian backwoods.

This is one of the main difficulties facing Japanese emigration to Manchuria. Free settlement seems out of the question, though it is to be encouraged if pos- sible. Apparently the only way by which Japanese colonization can become effective is by the heavily subsidized transplanting of Japanese rural communities to a Manchurian setting on a collective basis. The food

requirements of the Japanese and Manchurian peasants are not greatly different; the main difference in the standard of living lies in the number of community services which the Japanese require in the form of

education, sanitation, etc. The Manchurian peasant or the Shantung coolie immigrant can therefore underlive the Japanese colonist. What remains to be seen is whether the collective villages of the Japanese, with the advantage of liberal subsidies, can become self-

supporting in competition with the lower standard of

living of the Chinese. This will be difficult if the Japa? nese grow the same staple crops of soya beans, kaoliang, millet and wheat. At the same time, can specialized crops, like sugar beets, hemp, tobacco, etc. be devel-

oped by the colonists? Mechanized farming would cover the difference in the standard of living; but the

Japanese themselves are not adapted to this and be- sides it would greatly increase the cost and reduce the possible number of Japanese emigrants.

Another important question is whether there is

enough room in Manchuria for a large influx of Japa? nese immigrants without leading to the displacement of the local population. For one thing Chinese immigra- tion and the movement of seasonal labor are being closely controlled. Manchuria now seems closed to further Chinese settlement; and in addition, the Kore- ans, who have also settled in Manchuria in considerable numbers, are apparently to be restricted in the future to the Chientao area. This leaves the remaining uncul- tivated land in Manchuria open to Japanese settlement.

According to the latest figures the total land area of Manchoukuo amounts to 92,500,000 hectares, of which 13,900,000 are cultivated and 17,750,000 are cultivable. In other words, less than half of the land listed as arable is being used. The 17,750,000 hectares of unused land represent 19.2% of the total area, or roughly

44,000,000 acres. Under the proposed settlement program 50 acres

are mentioned as the allotment for each family. The

1,000,000 family scheme would therefore require

50,000,000 acres, or more than the available area of

uncultivated land. Moreover, this is without allow-

ance for the needs of the natural increase in population which is already over 30,000,000. It should also be

pointed out that the best land, which is in the fertile central plain, has been under cultivation for many years. The unsettled areas are found in northern and eastern

Manchuria, which are mountainous regions and where the climate is more severe. Consequently, Japanese colonization is to be attempted on what are really the less attractive parts of Manchuria.

Present plans call for extensive development in north- eastern Manchuria?an unsettled area which is just being opened up by the new system of strategic rail-

ways radiating from the port of Rashin. As this region is sparsely populated, Japanese colonization there will not involve displacement of the local people. How?

ever, the opportunities of settlement offered by this area are not unlimited; and if the 1,000,000 family program is actually carried out, conflict with the local

population would seem inevitable. The few settlements that have already been established are said to have stirred up local hostility and have also been consider-

ably harassed by "bandits." In fact, banditry is most active in eastern and northern Manchuria; neverthe-

less, the Kwantung Army maintains that peace is suffi-

ciently well established to proceed with colonization

by ordinary farm families rather than by armed col- onists as in the past.

Hostility of the local Chinese authorities and their

unwillingness to lease land to Japanese have been blamed for the past failure of Japanese colonization. The situation, however, has been entirely changed by the creation of Manchoukuo. Under the guise of "the

equality of the five races," the Japanese now have the

right to reside and own land anywhere in Manchuria and the Hsinking Government recently enacted a law

legalizing land rights acquired by Japanese in the past. Japanese colonization can therefore proceed unham-

pered, provided economic and climatic difficulties can be overcome and sufficient money is made available. There is an unquestioned population pressure in Japan and Japanese strategy also sees the need of a strong Japanese community settled on the land in Manchuria. Yet it is still very doubtful whether the latest grandiose scheme of colonization will succeed any more than

previous plans.

J. R. S.

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