analysis of evacuation procedures in high speed trains fires

Fire Safety Journal 49 (2012) 35–46

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Fire Safety Journal

0379-71

doi:10.1

n Corr

E-m

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/firesaf

Analysis of evacuation procedures in high speed trains fires

J.A. Capote, D. Alvear n, O. Abreu, A. Cuesta

GIDAI Group – Fire Safety – Research and Technology, University of Cantabria, Ave. Los Castros, s/n 39005 Santander, Spain

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 4 October 2010

Received in revised form

21 September 2011

Accepted 8 December 2011Available online 20 January 2012

Keywords:

High speed trains

Evacuation procedures

Egress modelling

12/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. A

016/j.firesaf.2011.12.008

esponding author. Tel.: þ34942201826; fax:

ail address: [email protected] (D. Alvea

a b s t r a c t

This paper uses egress modelling to explore the impact that crew procedures have on evacuating two

high-speed trains under different fire scenarios. The paper begins by analysing an evacuation drill

performed by the Spanish Railroad Administration, RENFE Operadora. This analysis is used to obtain

input data for the simulations. The second part of the paper analyses the effects of passenger pre-

evacuation activities and train crew procedures (when the fire is detected and the train is still in

motion). For each scenario, multiple simulations are performed to capture the stochastic variations in

egress times. The results have important implications for rail safety and also show that there are

qualitative and quantitative advantages for evacuating under conditions controlled by the train crew

rather than using a self-rescue strategy, which allows us to make safety recommendations for

managing emergencies.

& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Fire incidents inside passenger trains can constitute a signifi-cant risk to life. Therefore, it is necessary to define effectivepassenger evacuation strategies, both when the fire is detected inthe moving vehicle and when evacuating a vehicle that hasstopped. The train crew are responsible for passenger safetyduring an on-board fire emergency. The first priority is to directpassengers away from fire in a controlled manner. The train driverneeds to inform the train operations centre about the situationand reach an appropriate place for the evacuation (i.e., the closeststation). If this is not possible, the second priority is to perform acontrolled evacuation to the tracks. Furthermore, the train crewneeds to establish the urgency of the situation and determinehow to perform the evacuation. To do this, the crew needs toknow the number of passengers and disabled persons on-board,the dangers present inside and outside the train, a safe area wherepassengers should be moved and which doors need to be opened.In most cases, however, the conditions dictate the specific actionsand choice of the appropriate egress strategy. Therefore, it is noteasy for the train crew to make the correct decisions. In addition,there may be fewer crew members for the number of passengersthan for other modes of transportation, and PA (public address)systems are usually used to issue emergency instructions. Infact, there is less direct contact between crew members andpassengers, and this may delay passenger responses. All thesefactors should be considered when analysing train evacuations.

ll rights reserved.

þ34942202276.

r).

To improve passenger safety, the train crew needs to be presentedwith a variety of scenarios for practicing and testing theirdecision-making skills. Many accident reports have described alack of training and preparedness in emergency procedures [1]. Toaddress this problem, rail companies perform full-scale drills.These tests have various problems, however, such as their lack ofrealism and their economic cost. It is well known that single trialsproduce little information on the variety of potential outcomesseen in evacuation process.

In addition, there are standards describing the general require-ments for ensuring passenger safety. For example, the ATOC(Association of Train Operating Companies) Vehicles Standardstipulates a passenger evacuation time of 90 s, a minimum flowrate of 30 per/min in evacuation to the track level and a minimumflow rate of 40 per/min to the adjacent coach when the vehicle inquestion is at the end of the train [2]. These values are called‘‘magic numbers’’ by some fire engineers. If we consider them asoptimal values, they may be achievable but not realistic. Thestandards do not consider passenger characteristics and beha-viours, the train crew’s responsibilities and behaviour or theeffects of different procedures in a variety of changing scenarios.In fact, passenger decision-making process can be particularlyinfluential on evacuation procedures during emergency situationsin compact spaces such as trains [3,4]. In summary, the propertiesof passenger train evacuation procedures have not been studiedin depth under a variety of conditions. To the authors’ knowledge,there has been little research using computer modelling toanalyse crew procedures in transportation systems [5,6], particu-larly in passenger trains. The current study uses egress modellingand reliable data to examine various evacuation strategies andassess passenger safety. Introducing computer modelling analyses

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J.A. Capote et al. / Fire Safety Journal 49 (2012) 35–4636

could improve evacuation procedures under a variety of condi-tions. The selected model is STEPS (Simulation of TransientEvacuation Pedestrian movementS) [7], and the technique exam-ines the effects of crew procedures in simulations to analyse theirimpact on the evacuation process.

50

60

70

gers

2. Data collection

There is a wide range of available models for simulating themovement and behaviour of people during emergencies. Some ofthese models have been applied to evacuation analyses forpassenger trains [8–11]. These models rely on a broad range ofdata for simulating evacuation processes in a given scenario.There is also research about human performance on trains[12,13]. However, there is a need for more data that willsignificantly increase the capacity to simulate emergency condi-tions in passenger trains.

The input data for the STEPS model were obtained from anannounced evacuation drill for a high-speed train that wasperformed by RENFE Operadora (the Spanish Railroad Adminis-tration). The University of Cantabria was not responsible for theorganisation of the drill. The evacuation drill took place on 19thSeptember 2009. The train was a high-speed S 130. A total of 218participants took part in the evacuation drill (73.15% of themaximum load). The participants included staff members andsome of their families. Table 1 shows the characteristics of theparticipants.

The evacuation drill consisted of a simulated fire that hadstarted in coach 04 (the lounge coach), and the relocationprocedure was performed coach by coach along the length ofthe train before the train stopped inside the Guadarrama Tunnel.The passengers were divided into two distinct evacuation groupsaway from the fire (see Fig. 1). The drill procedure followed thepreferred method of train evacuation in which the driver stopsand then opens the doors onto the platform.

Table 1Characteristics of the participants.

Gender/age groups %

Male younger than 40 years old 47

Male older than 40 years old 34

Total 81

Female younger than 40 years old 16

Female older than 40 years old 3

Total 19

11 10 09 08 07 06

Evacuated coaches

Fig. 1. Layout of the relocation proce

Fig. 2. Location of video cameras

Once the train had stopped, the doors were automaticallyopened by the driver. There was a 35 s delay between stoppingthe train and opening the doors. It should be noted that thescenario in which the passengers manually open the doors andself-evacuate should only occur in the most extreme situation.

Two video cameras were located in passenger coach 09. Onecamera was located inside the passenger compartment, andthe other camera was in front of the exit (see Fig. 2). The footagecollected from the evacuation drill was analysed frame byframe using software tools, such as Vegas Pro 9.0, to determinethe passenger walking speeds, flow rates, response times andmerging flows at the exit door.

2.1. Flow rate during the relocation procedure

Before the train had stopped, the flow rates of 66 passengersfrom coaches 05, 06, 07 and 08 during the relocation process weremeasured. Fig. 3 shows the number of passengers passing acertain point on coach 09. There were clearly four stages thatcorresponded to the different evacuation groups from coaches 05,06, 07 and 08. The average flow rate calculated from Fig. 3 was36 per/min. However, if we consider the evacuation rate averagedover the relocation period, the flow rate was 24 per/min. Boththese values are lower than the 40 per/min established by ATOCstandard. The density level of relocated passengers in the aisle ofthe coach 09 was 2.55 per/m2.

2.2. Walking speeds within the aisle

The walking speeds of the passengers in the aisle during therelocation procedure were also measured.

05 Fire 03 02 01

dure during the evacuation drill.

during the evacuation drill.

0

10

20

30

40

0

No

of p

asse

n

Time [s]20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180

Fig. 3. No. of passengers passing a certain point in coach 09 during the relocation

procedure.

Table 2Distribution of time to prepare for the evacuation.

Variable l r Max. Min.

Time to prepare (uniform dist.) (s) 12 8.0 26 1.5

0

1

2

3

4

No

pass

enge

rsTime intervals [s]

From Coach 09 From Coach 10

Fig. 5. Merge ratios between coach 09 and coach 10 towards the exit door of

coach 09.

0

0.5

1

1.5

0

Flow

[per

/s]

Time [s]

Drill AverageSFPE N&M Doorway SFPE N&M Stair

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Fig. 6. Comparative of the flow variations through the exit of coach 09 and the

maximum constant flow rates N&M (Nelson and Mowrer).

J.A. Capote et al. / Fire Safety Journal 49 (2012) 35–46 37

The data were obtained from passengers moving in a singlequeue without being constrained by others while the train wasstill in motion (see Fig. 4a). The sample of the walking speeds fit anormal distribution, as assessed by the K2 D’Agostino test, with amean value of 0.99 m/s and a standard deviation of 0.20 m/s.Fig. 4b shows the histogram and the curve distribution.

2.3. Time to prepare for evacuation

The passengers were informed about the emergency over the PAsystem before the train had stopped. In this case, the response timeswere dependent on the available space to move inside the coaches(i.e., space available to access the aisle). When the train stopped, theaisles were occupied by the relocated passengers. Once they decidedto start the evacuation procedure, however, some of the seatedpassengers spent time performing other actions, such as preparingthemselves for the evacuation (e.g., donning jackets, collectingbelongings) or waiting for others. The distribution of the timespent by passengers to prepare for the evacuation is presented inTable 2.

2.4. Merging flows at exit door of coach 09

Results of merging relations are displayed in Fig. 5.A total of 28 passengers from coach 10 used the exit door of

coach 09, and 16 passengers from coach 09 used this same exit.Significant deference behaviours were observed, and male parti-cipants deferred to allow females to first proceed to the exit.It should be noted that during 15–20 s of the evacuation process,a young male from coach 09 deferred to allow 4 participants(including 2 females) to proceed to the exit. The same behaviourwas observed in another male participant from the same coach(coach 09), who deferred to allow 2 females and 1 male partici-pant to proceed to the exit between 30 and 35 s. The averagemerge ratio between coach 09 and coach 10 was 36.4:66.6.Between 35 s and 50 s, however, the merge ratio was 50:50.During this time, the density levels increased, and passengersalternated their access to the exit door.

2.5. Flow rate at the exit door of coach 09

The passenger flow rate at the exit door of coach 09 wasmeasured. This door was 0.81 m wide (0.51 m of the effectivewidth). Fig. 6 shows the flow rate of the evacuation drillcompared to the SFPE maximum specific N&M (Nelson andMowrer) flow rates [14]. An average flow rate of 0.57 per/s wasobtained during the overall evacuation process. This value wasbetween the SFPE maximum doorway flow rate of 0.66 per/s andthe SFPE maximum flow rate for stairs (with a riser of 19.1 cm

1

1

2

Freq

uenc

y

Fig. 4. (a) Passengers walking during evacuat

and a tread of 25 cm) of 0.47 per/s. Furthermore, the flow rateobserved during the drill was lower than values from otherstudies [11] due to the height of train steps (0.25 m) and thegap. This result suggests that the exit/door width, its design andhow passengers respond to it have to be considered [15]. Fig. 7shows how each passenger required different times to negotiatethe train steps. It should be noted that passengers exhibitedhesitation at the exit before negotiating the train steps and that

0

6

2

8

4

0Walking speed [m/s]

0.5 1 1.5 2

ion drill. (b) Walking speed distribution.


2 of the 46 passengers who negotiated the exit of coach 09 werepersons with mobility problems who required more than 3 s toaccess the platform.

Fig. 9. Layout of Train A.

Table 3Configuration of Train A.

Coaches 12 11 10 09 08 07 lounge 05 04 03 02 01

No. of seats 30 36 36 36 36 19þ2a – 24 26 26 21 24

Exit/side – 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

a Disabled people (wheelchair users).

3. Evacuation modelling analysis

3.1. Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) calculation in trains

Trains can be in motion when emergencies occur. TheRequired Safe Egress Time (RSET) calculations should considerthe time necessary for the train to stop, the time spent openingthe doors and the time spent by the train crew setting up theevacuation elements (i.e., portable ladders or ramps). Therefore,the RSET contains three main components: (1) the detection time(tdet), (2) the time required for the train to stop (tstop) and (3) theevacuation time from the train (tevac). The egress time model forfires on trains is presented in Fig. 8.

When a fire is detected aboard a running train, it is necessaryto move the passengers to a place of relative safety (otherpassenger coaches). The time required for a high-speed train tostop can be more than 15 min. For this reason, the passengersmay need to be protected from the effects of the fire for severalminutes. Therefore, the response strategy should include com-pleting the relocation procedure before the train stops. Thisstrategy leads to formulating the following questions. How muchtime does the crew take to complete the relocation procedure?How many passenger coaches should be evacuated? In otherwords, what is the most appropriate strategy? In the nextsections, we define the pre-evacuation procedures and exploretheir impact on the evacuation process.

0

1

2

3

4

5

0

Tim

e to

neg

ocia

te th

e ex

it [s

]

Passengers2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46

Fig. 7. Time spent by each passenger to negotiate the train step (exit of coach 09).

Fig. 8. Egress time mod

3.2. Selected trains

Two high-speed trains are modelled: Train A (see Fig. 9 andTable 3) and Train B (see Fig. 10 and Table 4). The trains are

el for fires in trains.

Fig. 10. Layout of Train B.

Table 4Configuration of Train B.

Coaches 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 lounge 03 02 01

No. of seats 20 36 36 36 36 36 36 – 22þ1a 26 14Exit/side – 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 –

a Disabled people (wheelchair user).


2.94 m wide. The exit doors are single-leaf sliding, 0.81 m widestructures, and the aisles have maximum widths of 0.69 m in thefirst-class coaches and 0.52 m in the second-class coaches. Boththe trains have one train manager (guard), two employees(contracted by the railroad company) in the lounge coach andone train host in the first class coaches. From the viewpoint of firesafety, both the trains have smoke detectors in each passengercoach (in the electric cabinets but not in passenger compart-ments) and in the toilets. The on-board equipment in case ofevacuation includes one emergency ladder stored in one locomo-tive and one ramp stored in the lounge coach of Train A and incoach 03 of Train B. It should be noted that the ramp is normallyused to transfer passengers from one train to another in cases oftrain technical failure. Both the emergency ladder and the rampare 3 m long and consist of two separate parts that have to beassembled. These evacuation elements hold only two passengerssimultaneously.

3.3. Scenarios

Figs. 11–14 show the evacuation scenarios considered for thesimulations. It should be noted that we have used the definitionsestablished by the Health & Safety Executive ‘‘Guide for providingequipment and arranging evacuation and escape from trains in anemergency’’ for evacuation (controlled) and escape (uncontrolled)[16]. These definitions do not consider whether the exit is anormal or abnormal route, as established by ATOC standard.

In the fire scenarios, two consecutive dynamic processes weresimulated (1) evacuating passengers to a place of relative safetyalong the train (pre-evacuation activities) and (2) evacuating fromthe train. They were simulated using the ‘‘exit events’’ feature ofthe STEPS model, which allows changing the availability of certainexits during the course of the simulation. Using this feature, theuser can open, close or make exits unavailable. When an exit is setto closed, the agents will still consider the exit when choosing

Scenario 1.1 (uncontrolled) and 1.2 (controlled) 12 11 10 09 08 07

Scenario 2.1 (uncontrolled)

Scenario 2.2 PR (controlled)

Scenario 2.2 FR (controlled)




Fire exposed coach Controlled = EvacuAdjacent coach 1 Uncontrolled = SelfAdjacent coaches 2, 3...n

12 11 10 09 08 07

12 11 10 09 08 07

12 11 10 09 08 07

12 11 10 09 08 07

12 11 10 09 08 07

12 11 10 09 08 07

12 11 10 09 08 07

Fig. 11. Evacuation scenarios

their target and form a queue in front of it. When the exit isunavailable, it is considered to be no longer usable, and nobodymoves towards that exit. In most cases, the conditions dictate thespecific actions and the choice of the appropriate egress strategy.Two adaptive procedures are considered. The first procedure iscalled partial relocation (PR). It consists of evacuating the fire-exposed coach and the two immediately adjacent coaches. Thesecond procedure is called full relocation (FR) and consists ofevacuating as many coaches as possible away from the fire.

Due to the train immediately stopping in scenarios 1.3, 1.4,2.3 and 2.4, the passengers have to evacuate to the track level andare forced to use the emergency ladder. This scenario is theevacuation procedure usually applied by the rail operator (RENFEOperadora). In these cases, the ramp is not used as an additionalevacuation element. Note that the ramp is mainly used to transferpassengers from one train to another. During an evacuation to thetrack level when a fire occurs in an intermediate coach, however,two evacuation elements are required to ensure that all passen-gers can safely leave the vehicle. In reality, the devices (emer-gency ladder and ramp) can only be installed in the followingfixed locations: coaches 05 and 07 in Train A and coaches 03 and05 in Train B.

Other scenarios require considering other locations for theseevacuation elements. The hypothetical location of evacuationelements is considered in Scenarios 3.3 and 3.4 (Figs. 13 and14). In these scenarios, the evacuation elements are located farfrom the fire, which facilitates an adequate distribution of thenumber of passengers per exit. An evacuation strategy that givespriority to the passengers that are closer to the fire is simulated inScenarios 2.4 and 3.4 (controlled) [17].

3.4. Input data in the model

The pre-evacuation activity is defined as the time from thedetection of the fire to the time the train stops. The fire is

06 05 04 03 02 01

ation supervised by crew members -rescue (escape)

06 05 04 03 02 01

06 05 04 03 02 01

06 05 04 03 02 01

06 05 04 03 02 01

06 05 04 03 02 01

06 05 04 03 02 01

06 05 04 03 02 01

to a platform in Train A.

Scenario 1.1 (uncontrolled) and 1.2 (controlled)11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01







Fire exposed coach Controlled = Evacuation supervised by crew members Adjacent coach 1 Uncontrolled = Self-rescue (escape) Adjacent coaches 2, 3...n

11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

Fig. 12. Evacuation scenarios to a platform in Train B.

Scenario 1.3 (uncontrolled) and 1.4 (controlled) 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01







Fire exposed coach Controlled = Evacuation supervised by crew members Adjacent coach 1 Uncontrolled = Self-rescue (escape) Adjacent coaches 2, 3...n Evacuation elements

wolfytiroirPwolfyradnoceS

12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

Fig. 13. Evacuation scenarios to the track level in Train A.


Scenario 1.3 (uncontrolled) and 1.4 (controlled)11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

11 10 09 08 07 06 05 03 02 01

11 10 09 08 07 06 05 03 02 01







Fire exposed coach Controlled = Evacuation supervised by crew members Adjacent coach 1 Uncontrolled = Self-rescue (escape) Adjacent coaches 2, 3...n Evacuation elements Priority flow Secondary flow

11 10 09 08 07 06 05 03 02 01

11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

04

04

04

Fig. 14. Evacuation scenarios to the track level in Train B.


considered to be manually detected in the passenger coach whereit starts. The detection time is set to 60 s. Therefore, the passengerresponse time is assumed to follow a log-normal distribution witha minimum value of 60 s, a mean of 75 s and a standard deviationof 15 s. The passenger response times in adjacent coaches aresummarised in the following equation:

trf ireotradj 1otradj 2 � � �otradj i � � �otradj n

where trfire is the average response time of fire exposed coach; tradj

the average response time of i-th adjacent (at both sides ofexposed) coaches.

The uncertainties about passenger response times under theseconditions lead us to consider the following simulation hypotheses.

�
Fast response times. The passengers from adjacent coachesstart evacuating before the previous coach has been comple-tely evacuated. High levels of interaction between the passen-gers and leadership behaviour are assumed. � Medium response time. The same conditions as above apply,
but the response times of the passengers are slower. The traincrew is assumed to have a high level of assertiveness.
� Slow response time. The passengers from the adjacent coach
remain in their seats waiting for the passengers from theprevious coach to cross the coach or to receive instructionsfrom the train crew.

Once the train has stopped, different response times for theremaining passengers (the non-relocated passengers) are consid-ered. Case1 assumes emergency notification after the train hasstopped for uncontrolled evacuation, it has m¼53 s and s¼47 sbased on data from [18]. Case 2 assumes emergency notification

before the train has stopped (controlled evacuation). In this case,the response time of the data described above (m¼12 s ands¼8 s) applies.

3.5. Assumptions

The following assumptions were used in the simulations.

1.
As explained above, the applied technique consists of deter-mining and imposing the simulated outcomes of crewprocedures.
2.
The passengers involved in the pre-evacuation procedures areready to start evacuation once the train stops.
3.
The passengers are compliant with the train crew’s commands.This assumption is a basic requirement for seeing the effects ofthe evacuation procedures that are implemented.
4.
The impeding effect of the internal sliding doors is ignored. 5. The train crew does not use the PA system during the pre-
evacuation stage. Only the passengers directly involved in thefire are warned, while the passengers distant from the fireremain in their seats.

6.
For the evacuation to the track level, no alternative escaperoutes, such as other exit doors where the passengers have toclimb higher than 1.1 m, are considered.
7.
In Train A, the ramp is stored in the lounge coach. In Scenarios3.3 and 3.4 (fire in the lounge coach and evacuation to tracklevel), it is assumed that the ramp is available for theevacuation.
8.
For the evacuation to the track level, the time spent by thetrain crew setting up the evacuation elements (the portableladder and ramp) is ignored.


4. Results

Each evacuation scenario described in Figs. 11–14 was run 50times. Examples of the dynamic simulations can be viewed athttp://www.gidai.unican.es/.

4.1. Relocation procedures

The results in Table 5 show that the predicted average evacua-tion times of the fire exposed coach under maximum loadingconditions are longer than 90 s in both trains, as established by

Table 5Evacuation time distributions of the fire exposed coach.

Scenario/strategy Train A Train B

Mean (s) S.D. (s) Mean (s) S.D. (s)

2.1 119 10 112 9

2.2/PR 119 10 117 11

2.2/FR fast response 117 11 114 10

2.2/FR med. response 119 10 116 13

2.2/FR slow response 118 8 115 8

Table 6Predicted time to evacuate the passenger coaches inside Train A (s).

Evacuated coaches. PR¼Partial Relocation, x¼Cannot move forward (no more room in

Table 7Predicted time to evacuate the passenger coaches inside Train B (s).

Evacuated coaches. PR¼Partial Relocation, x¼Cannot move forward (no more room in

the ATOC standard. These times are seen because a detection timewith a minimum value of 60 s is assumed. In fact, the firstpassengers start to move at 60 s. Therefore, the time required bythe passengers to leave the coach is approximately 58 s in Train Aand 54 s in Train B. If a safety factor of 2, which is suggested in [19]as a design margin, is applied to these times, the total evacuationtime obtained is close to the values displayed in Table 5. The resultssuggest that the detection and passenger response times need to beadded to increase confidence in the egress calculations.

The results summarised in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that in theevent of a fire in rear most coach, the predicted average evacuationtimes from the fire-exposed and adjacent coaches can be lower than180 s for both trains. In this case, a self-rescue strategy is assumed.Furthermore, by applying the PR procedure, the train crew canrelocate 96 passengers in Train A and 86 passengers in Train B inless than 210 s. In this case, only the fast response time is consideredin the simulations. In case of a fire in the rearmost coach of Train A,it is possible to evacuate 6 passenger coaches with 195 passengersbetween 4 min 55 s and 7 min 23 s when the FR procedure isapplied. By applying the FR procedure to Train B in Scenario 2.2,the train crew can relocate a maximum of 164 passengers from5 coaches between 4 min 28 s and 6 min 22 s. In these cases, there isavailable space to relocate passengers along the train.

passenger coaches) and FR¼Full Relocation.

passenger coaches) and FR¼Full Relocation.

http://www.gidai.unican.es/


In the scenarios where a fire in the lounge coach is considered(Tables 6 and 7), the adjacent passenger coaches were found notto be completely relocated, and the passengers were caught incongestion until the doors were opened for evacuation. It isnoteworthy that due to the specific configuration of Train B, thepassengers relocated towards the front end have only one coachbetween them and the fire-exposed coach (see Table 7). In thissituation, the passengers cannot be considered to have relocatedto a safe place in the moving train, and the evacuation has toproceed as quickly as possible.

4.2. Evacuation to a platform

In the fire scenarios, some exits are unavailable when the trainstops, which increases the evacuation times. Fig. 15a and b show theminimums, means and 95th percentiles of the total evacuationtimes to the platform for Train A and Train B. The horizontal brokenline in Fig. 15a and b represents the evacuation time established bythe ATOC (90 s) in addition to the assumed delay time in openingthe doors once the train has stopped (35 s). As expected, only

90105120135150165180195

1.1PR

2.2FR

3.1PR

3.2FR

Evac

uatio

n Ti

me

[s]

ScenariosMin.Mean95th Perc.ATOC(90s+35s to open the doors)

1.2 2.1 2.2 3.2

Fig. 15. (a) Evacuation times of Train A

0

20

40

60

80

12

N° o

f pas

seng

ers

Coaches/exit

Scenario 2.1Scenario 2.2 Partial RelocationScenario 2.2 Full Relocation

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

90

Prob

abili

ty

Time from the

9 7 5 3 2 14681011

110 130

Fig. 16. (a) Exit usage in Train A. (b) Exit usage in Train A. (c) Cumu

Scenario 1.2 satisfies the 90 s criteria for Trains A and B, and the95th percentile from the simulations results is below the brokenline. In this scenario, the passengers are ready to start evacuationonce the train stops, and all the exits are available. In Train B (seeFig. 15b), the FR in Scenario 2.2 produced the longest evacuationtime. In this scenario, the average predicted evacuation timeincreased by 18% compared to the PR in Scenario 2.2. It should benoted that when a lounge coach fire in Train B is considered, usingthe PR and PF procedures have no impact on the predicted egresstimes. In these scenarios, the relation between the passengers andthe available exits is similar to that in Scenario 3.1.

Passenger management during the pre-evacuation stage had apositive impact on evacuation efficiency when the PR procedurewas used. It can be seen from Fig. 16a–c that using the PRprocedure for Train A in Scenario 2.2 allowed an adequatedistribution of passengers to each exit, thus reducing the evacua-tion times compared to Scenario 2.1, in which an unsupervisedescape from the train is considered. In Scenario 2.2 (Train A), theaverage evacuation time for the FR procedure is 27% greater thanthat for the PR procedure. This increase occurred because 316

90105120135150165180195

1.1PR

2.2FR

3.1PR

3.2FR

Evac

uatio

n tim

e [s

]

ScenariosMin.Mean95th Perc.ATOC(90s+35s to open the doors)

1.2 2.1 2.2 3.2

. (b) Evacuation times of Train B.

0

20

40

60

80

12

N° o

f pas

seng

ers

Coaches/exit

Scenario 3.1Scenario 3.2 Partial RelocationScenario 3.2 Full Relocation

stop of the train [s]

Sce1.1Sce1.2Sce2.1Sce2.2PRSce2.2FRSce3.1Sce3.2PRSce3.2FR

11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

150 170 190

lative distributions of evacuation times to a platform in Train A.


passengers were compressed into 5 coaches, and the evacuationwas performed using 5 exits. For the PR procedure in Scenario 2.2,a total of 8 exits were available, and 316 passengers weredistributed between 9 coaches. Using the FR procedure in Scenar-ios 2.2 and 3.2 (fire in the rearmost coach) produces longerevacuation times. However, the passengers leave the trainthrough exits further from the fire.

4.3. Evacuation to the track level

In this section, we examined the impact of crew procedures onevacuations to the track level. The predicted evacuation times inthe present analysis do not consider the time required to stop thetrain and the time expended by train crew in setting up theevacuation elements. These processes could produce a significantincrease in the RSET. The discharge capacity of the evacuationelements (emergency ladder and ramp) determines the evacua-tion times. For this reason, the predicted evacuation times do notdiffer much when comparing controlled and uncontrolled evacua-tion scenarios, as shown in Fig. 17. A larger difference is found inScenario 1.4, in which an emergency notification before the trainstops has a positive impact on total evacuation times compared toScenario 1.3. As mentioned above, the evacuation elements holdonly two passengers simultaneously. The average flow rateobtained from simulations was 27 per/min. This value was sig-nificantly lower than the 30 per/min suggested by the ATOCstandard.

We found that a controlled evacuation that gives priority tothe passengers closer to the fire has a positive impact. While thisprocedure has no effect on the total evacuation times, there is animprovement in the evacuation conditions of passengers insidethe train. Passengers quickly move away from the incident areawhen the priority procedure is applied.

Fig. 18 shows the layout of the passenger coaches analysed.Fig. 19a shows how the time to clear coaches 09 and 08 towardthe exit coach (coach 07) had been considerably reduced inScenario 2.4 when compared with Scenario 2.3. In Scenario 2.3,the mean time to clear coach 09 was 480 s, with a standarddeviation of 31 s. In Scenario 2.4, this time had been reduced by63% (the mean time to clear coach 09 was 176 s, with a standard

300

400

500

600

700

800

1.3

Tim

e [s

]

ScenariosMean95th Perc.ATOC Flow time (30 pass/min)

1.4 2.3 2.4 3.3 3.4

Fig. 17. Mean and 95th percentile of total evacuation times to the track level in

Train B.

Coach 12 Coach 11 Coach 10

Fig. 18. Layout of passeng

deviation of 18 s). In Scenario 2.3, the average time required forthe passengers to evacuate coach 08 was 598 s, with a standarddeviation of 17 s. By applying the priority procedure in Scenario2.4, the average time had been reduced by 47% (a mean of 317 sand a standard deviation of 45 s).

Furthermore, the density levels at the exit coach (coach 07) inScenario 2.4 were lower than those in Scenario 2.3. As the resultsof Scenario 2.4 show (see Fig. 19b), a density over 3.5 per/m2 wasobserved in Scenarios 2.3 and 2.4. In Scenario 2.4, however, thedensity was greatly reduced after 100 s, with values lower than2.5 per/m2, and the passengers from the incident area can leavethe train under optimal conditions. Based on the simulationresults, it can be argued that applying this procedure is moreappropriate in terms of safety during the evacuation process.

5. Discussion

Several passenger performance and evacuation procedureissues for high-speed trains were identified when performing thisanalysis. Although in real emergencies passengers may be moremotivated to escape than they are in an evacuation drill andalthough there were limitations inherent in the drill scenarioanalysed (a lack of realism and cooperative behaviour), it isnecessary to employ conservative settings to prevent an unrea-listic evacuation performance [20]. The main parameters obtainedfrom the evacuation drill observations were used as inputs for theevacuation modelling anlysis.

The data collection results suggest that the default values incurrent egress models (most of which are designed for buildings)may not be adequate for trains. Furthermore, the ‘‘magic num-bers’’ established by the standards may not be realistic for apassenger train evacuation analysis. In fact, the ATOC standardestablishes the minimum required values for design validation.Therefore, it is necessary to perform a more detailed evacuationanalysis by considering different emergency scenarios andprocedures.

The 90 s recommended by the ATOC has been used as a pointof comparison for different evacuation scenarios. The simulationresults suggest that adding the detection and passenger responsetimes to the minimum necessary time to exit the coach where thefire originates will increase confidence in the egress calculations.In these cases, we suggest that it is good practice to double theminimum recommended egress times in the ATOC standard.

During the relocation procedures inside the train, the passen-gers are likely to stop in front of an exit and wait until the trainstops. This behaviour has been observed in evacuation drills [18].The perception of threat also plays a key role in causing passen-gers to stop. The passengers that are further ahead cannot beaware of the conditions further back and closer to the fire. In fact,information slowly propagates among the passengers in a longqueue [21]. Management of the passenger flow by the crew isrequired during the relocation procedure to prevent passengersfrom stopping. At least one crew member should be at the frontof the queue leading passengers and another should be at theend of the queue directing passengers away from the incidentarea. However, we found that in a real situation, disabledpassengers (wheelchair users) are unable to cross aisles that are0.52 m and 0.69 m wide by themselves and require assistance.

Track level

Coach 09 Coach 08 Coach 07

er coaches analysed.

010203040506070

0

N° o

f pas

seng

ers

Time from the stop of the train [s]Sce 2.3 coach 08 Sce 2.3 coach 09Sce 2.4 coach 08 Sce 2.4 coach 09

0

1

2

3

4

0

per/m

2

Time from the stop of the train [s]

Scenario 2.3 Scenario 2.4

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

Fig. 19. (a) Time to clear coaches 08 and 09 in Train A. (b) Density at exit coach 07 during evacuation process: Train A.


This consideration, which was not simulated, can significantlydelay the relocation procedure.

Some exits may be unavailable in cases of evacuation to aplatform. Therefore, the required safe egress times are higherthan the 90 s established by the ATOC standard. Applying the PRprocedure during the pre-evacuation stage had a positive impactfor fires in the rearmost coach and allowed for an adequatedistribution of the number of passengers at each exit. When ittakes longer than 10 min for the train to stop, however, applyingthe FR procedure is recommended to ensure that those passen-gers in immediate danger will be relocated to safe coaches. In thiscase, the average evacuation time increased by approximately30% over that of the PR procedure. In Train B, however, applyingthe PR procedure to fires in the lounge coach did not have theexpected effect on evacuation efficiency due to the specificconfiguration.

The use of emergency ladders was also considered in detail forevacuations to the track level. After the train immediately stops,the passengers need to evacuate down the railway embankment.For the passengers close to the fire, however, evacuation in thismanner represents a significant risk due to the limited number ofavailable exits. A controlled evacuation that gives priority to thepassengers that are closer to the fire minimises the exposure timeand reduces congestion. It therefore allows quick and safe move-ment of the passengers inside the train.

6. Conclusions

In this paper, different evacuation procedures for two high-speed trains have been analysed through computer modelling andsimulation. The simulations used the impact of different pre-evacuation strategies on the evacuation process as a relevant andinformative benchmark of egress safety. The following conclu-sions can be summarised.

�
Single trials produce little information on the variety ofpotential outcomes during the evacuation process. Evacuationmodelling based on reliable data can be used to predict theimpact and benefits of different crew procedures in case of fire.This approach can be incorporated by rail operators whendefining emergency plans and evacuation strategies. � When there is a fire onboard, the number of passengers to be
relocated inside the train is a key factor in selecting anappropriate egress strategy. Relocation procedures inside thetrain can have a great impact on egress calculations. In fact, theevacuation time to the platform is higher than 90 s in most ofevacuation scenarios due to the limited number of exits. Under

these conditions, an adequate distribution of passengers toeach exit is recommended.
� When the passengers have to evacuate to the track level due to
the train immediately stopping, the evacuation elements(portable ladders and ramps) should be located far from thefire and should facilitate an adequate distribution of passen-gers to the exits. Controlled evacuations that give priority tothe passengers closer to the fire were found to be a goodpractice.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the Ministry of Science andInnovation of Spanish government for the Grant for the Projects‘‘Automated Decision Support System for High Speed PassengerTrains in case of Emergency’’ Ref: P65/08 and the ‘‘EvacTrains

Project: An Evacuation Model for High Speed Passenger Trains’’Ref: TRA2011-26738.

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analysis of evacuation procedures in high speed trains fires

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