an assessmentof usaid’s global development alliances · an assessment of usaid’s global...

Bureau for Policy and Program CoordinationOctober 2004

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1An Assessment of USAID’s

Global Development Alliances

Cover PhotosTop: Cassava Enterprise Development Project-Andrew Levin, USAID/Nigeria; Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance; Central American Coffee Initiative.Middle: AMORE Renewable Energy-USAID/Philippines; Remittances for Economic Growth Alliance-Denise Knudsvig, WOCCU; Sea-Freight Exporters/Atomic EnergyCommission Alliance-Pineapple Exporters of Ghana.Bottom: Netmark Alliance-Sheila Somashekhar, AED; Achieving Market-Friendly Initiatives and Results (AMIR) Project-The Case Foundation; Huancavelica EconomicService Center.

Cynthia Clapp-Wincek Assessment Team Leader

Donald Pressley, Dan O’Brien, Wendy Stickel, Woody Navin, Jeff Swedberg, Lane Vanderslice, Caryn Sweeney, Katie Croake, Jill Jackson, Brianne Miers

Assessment of USAID’s Global Development Alliances

U.S. Agency for International DevelopmentBureau for Policy and Program Coordination

October 2004

An Assessment of USAID’s Global Development Alliances III

ContentsOverview 1

Methodology 1

Key Ideas 2

A New Approach to Development 3

Phase I Is a Success 5

Creating and Managing Alliances 10

Recommendations on Moving to Phase II 14

Appendix: GDA Alliances Investigated 19

An Assessment of USAID’s Global Development Alliances 1

Overview

USAID’s GDA initiative, announced in2001, actively promotes strategic alliancesbetween USAID and private- and public-

sector partners. These alliances serve as an important way of achieving U.S. Governmentdevelopment assistance objectives.

The GDA concept is well known and broadlyaccepted in the Agency. Its business model has beenapplied to USAID programs in all regions of theworld. Successful GDA alliances exist, and signifi-cant activities have begun. Alliances that partneredproducers and buyers along a supply chain—in timber, coffee, and cocoa—were particularly suc-cessful. Other promising partnerships were in information technology training and distribution of vaccines and treated bednets. A few high-profilepartnerships between extractive industries and theirlocal communities are progressing toward sociallyand environmentally responsible operations.

It will take time and effort to realize GDA’s hugepotential. USAID management discussed the find-ings and recommendations from this assessmentand is collaborating to act on them. USAID willimplement most assessment recommendations. The Agency will

■ fully integrate GDA into standard Agency operations and planning

■ develop a new procurement approach for GDA alliances

■ improve monitoring and evaluation

Management supported the idea of moving awayfrom Washington-based incentive funds. It will leave decisions on incentive funds to regionalbureaus while maintaining a modest reserve fund inthe GDA Secretariat. Recommendations from thisassessment also include phasing out the GDASecretariat and moving GDA functions from theAdministrator’s office to USAID bureaus. Afterreviewing various options, USAID managementdecided to maintain the current structure for thetime being—until the GDA approach can be more

fully mainstreamed within the Agency—and con-tinue to provide the private sector with a one-stopentrance into USAID. Splitting GDA functionsmight undercut that objective.

Methodology

This assessment was coordinated by USAID’sOffice of Development Evaluation andInformation (DEI). The GDA Secretariat

and the Bureau for Asia and the Near East (ANE)were key participants. The assessment entailed over60 interviews in Washington, D.C., and brief fieldvisits to Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Mexico,Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Zambia.With the exception of Morocco and Jordan (addedfor geographic balance), countries selected for fieldvisits were those with the greatest number ofalliances—a total of 50.

Working with missions, the assessment team selected a few alliances to be examined in depth.The team also used a web-based survey of random-ly selected holders of USAID email addresses tocapture data from missions that were not visited

The Need for Change

In the 1970s, 70 percent of resource flowsfrom the United States to the developing worldwere from official development assistance and30 percent were private. Today, 80 percent ofresource flows from the United States to thedeveloping world are private and 20 percentare public, underscoring the need to diversifydevelopment approaches. In response to thechanging global environment, USAID’s GlobalDevelopment Alliance is an initiative designedto encourage public-private partnerships withfor-profit companies, NGOs, foundations, andothers. These alliance partners share risks,responsibility, planning, and decisionmaking.This approach combines the complementarystrengths of government, the private sector, andnonprofit organizations to broaden and deepenUSAID’s development impact.

2 Evaluation Paper No. 1

Key Ideas■ The Global Development Alliance (GDA) concept has been broadly accepted in the Agency. Its

purpose is well known, there is broad acceptance of the value of partnering with the for-profitprivate sector, and there are successful examples of GDA alliances in all regions where USAIDoperates.

■ Large alliances that engage the core business interests and senior managers of private-sector partners are more likely to have high impact and become sustainable.

■ While useful in defining and promoting the GDA concept, the focus on leveraging resourcesshould not overshadow the importance of targeting maximum development impact in the selection and design of alliances.

■ Procurement and competition remain challenging issues. Negotiating alliances with the privatesector and nontraditional partners is a dynamic process that requires flexibility, but many of the Agency’s processes are rigid and slow. Accordingly, the Agency Procurement Office is working on new approaches to better support this model.

■ Because alliances are new and complex, more attention should be paid to monitoring and evaluation to accelerate Agency learning.

■ Written GDA agreements should set out planned development impacts and the roles, responsibilities, and contributions of partners. More focus is needed on such impacts and specific, local situations. Direct and honest communication about the objectives and motivations of each partner is required.

■ The Agency is taking steps to better incorporate GDA into the Agency’s mainline operations.These steps should include 1) emphasizing GDA in the joint strategic thinking of theDepartment of State and USAID, regional bureau strategic frameworks, and country strategicplans; 2) phasing out GDA incentive funds so that alliances compete for Agency resources on a level playing field; 3) phasing out the GDA Secretariat and relocating its key functions ofadvocacy and support to permanent USAID organizational structures; and 4) building up theAgency’s capacity to provide technical support to missions developing GDA through recruit-ment, training, and advancement of GDA champions.

and those not as active in alliance building. Thesurvey was anonymous, to encourage objectiveresponses to the primary question: Have public-private alliances and strategic partnering permeatedthe Agency? The team also sought staff views onthe appropriateness of USAID participation inpublic-private partnerships and whether such part-nerships add value to the Agency’s programs.

A New Approach toDevelopment

A Global Development Alliance is an initia-tive and business model designed toencourage public-private partnerships that

more effectively achieve U.S. Government develop-ment assistance objectives. Recognizing that pri-vate, for-profit companies and NGOs are signifi-cant participants in the development process, GDAbrings new partners, resources, and approaches tointernational development. GDA involves, at aminimum, an equal ratio of partner and U.S.Government funds, shared risk and responsibility,and joint planning and decisionmaking. The initia-tive seeks to link the rapidly expanding stream ofprivate financing to the U.S. Government’s devel-opment assistance programming, thereby maximiz-ing the impact of both. Each partner brings its ownstrengths to bear on development problems of com-mon interest and concern.

USAID has a long history of working with part-ners—public and private, for profit and not forprofit. But the GDA model is somewhat different.It was proposed in 2000 by career USAID employ-ees preparing for the new administration. The con-cept, announced in 2001, was built around bestpractices of Agency partnering and the NewPartnership Initiative. GDA was embraced byAdministrator Andrew Natsios and Secretary ofState Colin Powell. It is a new Agency tool for car-rying forward the basic principles of the MonterreyConference on Financing for Development. GDAalso exemplifies USAID’s response to objectives laidout at the World Symposium on SustainableDevelopment in 2002.

The Role of the GDA SecretariatTo advance GDA objectives and mainstream thebusiness model throughout Agency operations, theGDA Secretariat was established as a temporaryunit reporting to the USAID Administrator. Itssmall staff does not manage alliances. Instead, it

■ offers outreach to prospective and currentstrategic partners

■ provides in-house outreach and education

■ addresses legal and regulatory issues, includingdue diligence examinations

■ advocates reforms of policies and practices tosupport effective use of alliances

■ manages the GDA incentive fund

The GDA incentive fund was established in FY2002 with $20 million to finance startup alliances.Proposals for innovative public-private partnershipssubmitted to the GDA Secretariat were reviewed bya panel. One review criterion rigorously applied wasthat U.S. Government funds needed to be matchedby private-sector resources. This was called a 1:1leverage ratio. The fund supported several large,high-profile alliances, including the Entra 21Alliance, which targeted unemployed youth; theSouth America Coffee Corps volunteer program;and the Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance.

In FY 2003, the GDA Secretariat changed thefunding approach and introduced the AnnualProgram Statement (APS) as a solicitation instru-ment. It was the first time the APS had been usedto solicit development proposals across a range oftechnical sectors and organizational units. The APSoutlined broad criteria for applicants outsideUSAID. In addition to meeting the criteria, a suc-cessful proposal had to win an implementationexpression of interest from a bureau or mission.Some resources from the FY 2003 incentive fundwere used to expand FY 2002 alliances, but all newalliances it funded were proposals received throughthe APS. Proposals accepted could be funded fromthe incentive fund, other bureau funds, or individ-ual mission funds.


Part of the secretariat’s role was to inculcate thebusiness model throughout the Agency. Eachbureau was to develop an approach for supportingGDA. The secretariat supported in-house outreachand education, providing over a dozen two- orthree-day training programs to USAID staff atheadquarters and overseas. The secretariat also presented modules on GDA in other USAIDtraining programs. Taken together, this trainingreached some 530 people. Two other outreachapproaches were the online Tools for AllianceBuilders and advice and support provided to field missions.

GDA and the Regional BureausIn FY 2002, ANE created a $20 million GDAincentive fund and required a 2:1 leverage ratio. At least part of this contribution had to be in cash.ANE staff believed that bigger alliances were morelikely to engage senior management and core business interests of private-sector partners. Thisapproach was believed to lead to the greatest levelsof partner commitment and impact and the bestchances for sustainability. In FY 2002, ANE’sincentive fund supported alliances in six countriesand two regional alliances. In FY 2003, the fundsupported nine alliances with $14 million. In FY 2003, ANE put more emphasis on providingtechnical assistance to missions during the applica-tion process. Indonesia, India, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Egypt were among missions receiving assistance.

In FY 2002, the Bureau for Africa set aside $30million for GDA. Missions submitted over 50 proposals for committee review and 35 were fund-ed. Among them were Ghana’s Food IndustryDevelopment Program and Zambia’s WarehouseReceipts Program. In FY 2003, the bureau took adifferent approach: each mission was asked todevelop alliances. The budget office did not pro-vide mission budgets until a sufficient number ofmissions demonstrated that they had developedalliances. This became known as the “no alliances,no allowances” approach. The bureau had a GDAcoordinator, but did not provide significant techni-cal assistance to missions.

In FY 2002 the Bureau for Latin America and theCaribbean (LAC) set aside $10 million for GDA.Rather than burdening missions with developingproposals, LAC’s Office of Development Resourcesdesigned four regional alliances that were fundedfrom set-aside resources. These included theCenters of Excellence for Teacher Training and theMesoamerican Coral Reef Alliance. In FY 2003,LAC attracted the largest share of secretariat fund-ing. LAC set aside another $10 million to fundideas generated by the APS and expand earlieralliances. Much of the set-aside money was ear-marked for environmental programs.

The Bureau for Europe and Eurasia (E&E) was notan active early participant in GDA for a variety ofreasons. But E&E now has a comprehensive busi-ness plan and a bureau-managed GDA incentivefund at a planned level of $15 million for two years.

GDA and the Pillar BureausThe Bureau for Global Health (GH) and EGAT,which have long histories of working with public-private alliances, facilitated GDA’s development. In resource terms, GH alliances dwarf other Agencyalliances. World-changing alliances have been estab-lished in the health sector, though these may not bebroadly transferable as GDA models. Some missionsbenefited directly from GH alliances, but their staffhad little knowledge and understanding of theprocess of developing or implementing them. SomeGH alliances reportedly face some of the same pro-curement obstacles as field alliances, although some-times on a bigger scale.

EGAT also has a long history of public-privatepartnerships. There have always been such opportu-nities in the sectors in which the bureau works. InFY 2002, EGAT supported $10–12 million inalliances, including some of the most visible andinnovative in the Agency’s portfolio. The CertifiedForests and International Markets Alliance and theWest Africa Water Initiative were partially fundedby EGAT. The bureau has a large and growingnumber of alliances in development, including theGlobal Gene Bank Conservation Trust.



EGAT is also responsible for the DevelopmentCredit Authority (DCA). The Agency views DCA-funded activities as leveraged partnerships. Not allDCA activities meet the test of being GDAalliances. For example, convincing a local bank toexpand its credit window in exchange for USAIDbearing 50 percent of the risk does not constitutepartnership. Shared management—joint planningand decisionmaking and shared responsibility andrisk—is a key factor in GDA alliances.

Partnering with the private sector has long been at the core of the programs of the Bureau forDemocracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance(DCHA). Work done under DCHA’s matchinggrant program evolved into some of the Agency’searliest public-private alliances. In addition, DCHAsponsored a program designed to identify opportu-nities for private voluntary organizations (PVOs) topartner with corporations. The program providedtraining in support of this partnering.

With the end of DCHA’s matching grant programand the shift to capacity building for indigenousPVOs, the bureau reports greater challenge in find-ing promising alliance opportunities. Nevertheless,its leadership strongly supports alliances and active-ly seeks out new opportunities for them. DCHAhas sponsored bureau-wide GDA training andrecently issued an RFA that gives additional pointsto cooperative development proposals that bring insignificant private-sector funding. The bureau isalso implementing the Capable Partners Program,which is designed to help create local partnershipsbetween business and PVOs.

Phase I Is a Success

GDA is clearly recognized as a priority andbroadly accepted by headquarters and field staff. While not every staff member

is familiar with GDA concepts and principles,there is sufficient awareness and openness to GDA principles. The survey questions for thisassessment were designed to capture respondents’knowledge and understanding about 1) what stepsto take to develop a GDA alliance, 2) how to con-

duct due diligence, and 3) how to develop analliance under existing procurement regulationsconcerning competition.

Most respondents expressed confidence in theirabilities to develop alliances: 24.1 percent had solidconfidence, and another 20.7 percent said theyknew exactly or mostly knew what to do.1

However, 47 percent of respondents expressedmuch less confidence in their ability to conductdue diligence. One-third said they understood theprocurement process and competition, contradict-ing information received in interviews. Though sur-vey respondents said they felt comfortable initiatingprivate-sector discussions and scanning the businessenvironment for alliance opportunities, staff whowere interviewed said they needed help with these tasks.

USAID staff acknowledge that public-privatealliances can achieve development impact. Thebroad spectrum of respondents felt the private sec-tor is an appropriate partner for USAID and couldadd value to Agency programs. Though seniormanagers showed broad support for GDA’s poten-tial to achieve development impact, they consistent-ly added these questions:

■ Is this the only business model for the Agency,and does it merit continued status as a pillar?

■ Should resources such as incentive funds be setaside for alliances?

■ How much management attention shouldGDA have?

Senior managers strongly supporting GDA alsostated that the approach needs to be selectivelyapplied. Development impact requires more thanone tool, and adjustments may be needed in howGDA is implemented.

1 One-third of respondents indicated they had very little or no ideawhat to do to develop alliances, but they were not among staffexpected to know about GDA. Nearly all were in missions. Of these, 67 percent were foreign service nationals, and 41 percentcharacterized their work as support. Another 21 percent wereengaged in contract work.

The GDA Secretariat and USAID leaders haverapidly instilled GDA as a viable methodology forachieving the Agency’s development objectives.The GDA business model’s success at the countrylevel is due in part to the fact that similar public-private partnerships have existed for some time.The original GDA concept deliberately built onthis history. Many activities now counted as GDA grew out of years of prior discussion, pilotundertakings, and partnership activities. Todemonstrate GDA’s newness to Congress and others, the Agency discounted some importantefforts already underway.

GDA is a long way from becoming “the” Agencybusiness model. Most do not regard it as a pillar ofAgency strategy. Instead, GDA is an evolving andincreasingly important business methodology thatis taking hold at country, regional, and global lev-els. Though its potential has not yet fully material-ized, GDA’s approach is of increasing interest toAgency staff.

What Constitutes a GDA AllianceGDA comes out of a long heritage of USAID part-nering.2 Since direct-hire staff stopped implement-ing projects in the 1970s, all of USAID’s work is apublic-private partnership in one form or another.But GDA means that private-sector partners sharerisks, planning, responsibility, and decisionmaking.The definition used in GDA training and itstoolkit included partnering criteria of sharedresponsibility, shared decisionmaking, and jointplanning, including defining the developmentproblem jointly.

The assessment team considered the participationof private-sector resource partners as the definingfactor of GDA alliances, along with greater thannormal resource contributions for USAID activi-ties. To be considered a GDA alliance, the private-sector contribution had to be a notable combina-tion of cash, technology, and/or knowledge. Thepartner had to have proprietary rights to the tech-

nology and knowledge, or these had to be uniqueto the partner.3 If the knowledge or technology wascritical to the development impact, a cash contribu-tion was not required.

The assessment team reviewed 50 alliances in 10countries, analyzing 25 that met the team’s GDAstandard. The other 25 were various forms of pre-alliances and projects, not failed or unsuccessfulGDA efforts. While some were too new to analyzefully, they offered information on developingalliances and obstacles that may be encountered.Others were excellent development projects withinsufficient partnering.

Almost half the 25 alliances investigated beganprior to 2001. Most of the others built on relation-ships and trust already established, though partner-ships intensified after the GDA initiative began.Several of the strongest alliances built on preexist-ing relationships to work in new ways. For exam-ple, GDA empowered Indonesia’s pre-GDA cocoaalliance to take risks. Royal Ahold’s work in Ghanabuilt on established relationships between USAIDcontractors and grantees and farmer organizations.Royal Ahold’s participation provided a sharperfocus on export-market connections and greatercredibility with farmers, greatly enhancing thepotential for market development. However, somealliances built from the ground up seemed as strongas those built on longstanding relationships. WhileUSAID needs to acknowledge that good partner-ships can take years to develop, the Agency needsthe flexibility to respond to opportunities that pres-ent themselves unexpectedly.

Who Alliance Partners AreAlliance partners were placed into four categories:

1. Resource partners provide resources for analliance.

2. Resource and implementing partners contributeresources and implement an alliance.

3. Implementing partners are paid to provide services.


2 Anne Marie Spevacek, USAID’s Experience with MultisectoralPartnerships and Strategic Alliances: An Analysis of Best Practices andLessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2001).<http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNACN271.pdf>

3 This proviso captures the important alliance criteria of innovationsand new ideas. For example, the unique technology and knowledgeof Sesame Street were critical to a GDA project.


4. Beneficiary partners receive the benefits from an alliance and, in most cases, are expected to contribute development impact over time.

Many partnering models appear to be successful.There were approximately 120 instances of partner-ing within the 25 alliances investigated. There wasan average of 4.5 partners per alliance, and therange was broad.

Most instances of partnering occurred in Indonesiaand Zambia and the least in the Philippines. InIndonesia, the Sustainable Forest ManagementAlliance comprised 21 partners, while the HybridCorn Production, Procession, and MarketingAlliance (with Monsanto) and the AMORERenewable Energy Alliance in the Philippines con-sisted of one partner each. Nevertheless, eachalliance had the potential for high impact.

The assessment focused on for-profit private-sectoralliances because these reflect the GDA businessmodel. However, the NGO sector is still very activein GDA. There were more examples of partnershipswith local, for-profit, private-sector organizationsthan with multinational corporations. There werealso more alliances with multinational NGOs thanwith local NGOs. This may be attributed to thedual tactic used by missions in alliance building:relying on existing relationships—such as with multinational NGOs—while seeking out new part-ners and approaches in the local private sector.

Many variations and combinations can lead to successful alliances.

There is no one-size-fits-all approach to building andmanaging alliances. A number of governance struc-tures seemed successful in specific circumstances.Alliances are relationship based, requiring a degree oftrust and understanding that comes from direct andhonest communication about each partner’s needsand motivations. The best alliances are those whereall partners participate actively in the planning fromthe outset and feel a sense of ownership throughout.All partners should define and record their expecta-tions for development impact, the responsibilitiesand contributions of each, and how expectations andresponsibilities will be monitored.

Sectors Where GDA Alliances OccurSome sectors have lent themselves more readily topublic-private alliances than others. All but one ofthe alliances studied were in economic growth,agriculture, and environment.4 These are the sectorswhere USAID has the skills and relationships. Theavailability of earmarked funds may have influ-enced activity selection. The ANE incentive fundwas largely earmarked for environmental alliances,and LAC alliances also used environment funds.Furthermore, in the environment sector, contactsand relationships with the for-profit private sectorthat furthered GDA alliances had already beendeveloped in the United States-Asia EnvironmentalPartnership (USAEP). GDA-level environmentalalliances in South Asia tended to be a direct resultof USAEP’s work.

Some sectors have been a less natural fit withalliance building, particularly within the missioncontext. In the health sector, there is longstandingexperience with public-private alliances managedfrom USAID headquarters. Centrally funded health

Banking Services in Mexico

GDA funding permitted the Caja Popular,Mexico’s largest savings and loan institution, toadd remittance payments from family membersliving in the United States to services providedto clients. When community members come toCaja branches to receive remittances, they areoffered other financial services, such as savingsaccounts and loans. The productive use ofremittances is increased, and useful financialservices are offered to very low income clients.

4 Many of the 25 alliances studied combined all three sectors.Twenty-two were economic growth (including agriculture), two wereenvironment (without significant economic growth components), andone was health. About three-quarters of activities in the preallianceand project group were a combination of economic growth, agricul-ture, and environment. There were four education activities and onegovernance activity within this group.

alliances relate to development issues that can beaddressed globally, including availability and afford-ability of vaccines, medicines, and treated bednets.In mission health programs, strategies tend to focuson system-wide institutional change and reform inthe public sector. In 10 countries investigated, onlyone GDA health alliance was identified: theNorthern Border Trauma Center in Mexico.

Governance and education alliances may takelonger to organize and achieve impact thanalliances in other sectors. In the education sector,prealliance projects reviewed included theScholarship for Success in Morocco, the Center forExcellence in Teacher Training in Latin America,the Quality Education and Skill Training activity inIndia, and the new education initiative in Jordan.Governance was included in two alliances. ThePapua Bird’s Head Alliance in Indonesia includedgovernance and civil society capacity building,along with economic growth, environment, andhealth. A pre-GDA project, the Cities Alliance inTetouan, Morocco, has potential to support decen-tralized governance.

Resource Contributions andLeverage RatiosThe size of alliances—the level of resources investedand their leverage ratios—has been emphasized tothe point that they have come to define a GDAalliance. A leverage ratio of 1:1 was the thresholdfor inclusion in the GDA database. This causedsome friction when offices and missions felt theyhad accomplished other criteria—new partners,innovations, joint planning—without necessarilyachieving required leverage ratios.

When the initiative was new, such tracking ofresources demonstrated momentum and provided aconcise way to define and promote GDA alliances.However, leverage ratios are not an effective defini-tion. They may undervalue technology and knowl-edge contributions as well as the creative designsynergies fostered in strategic partnerships. Ratherthan focusing on the quantity and nature of inputs,

a more inclusive and flexible approach would be tofocus on the developmental impact of GDAalliances. This requires greater emphasis on moni-toring and evaluating results.

The assessment team used resource contributions to calculate leverage ratios, though the methodolo-gy was fraught with problems. Data relating to private-sector resources were not accurate or con-sistently developed. Reasonable professionals disagreed on what should be counted as resourcecontributions. Numbers were not comparable fromone mission or alliance to another.

In-kind contributions—estimated values for stafftime, travel, per diem expenses, and office space—were part of the calculation if they were the onlycontribution from resource partners. However,partners’ overhead and money received from otherdonors or as grants were not counted. The teamincluded estimated costs of project management asresource contributions only if the costs wereincurred specifically for the alliance. The teamcounsels against alliances that rely too heavily onin-kind contributions. Partners are more commit-ted to the success of the alliance when cash is onthe line.


Indonesia’s tropical rain forests are being lost atan alarming rate, mainly due to the demandwithin Asia for timber and pulp. Two-thirds oflogging in Indonesia is illegal, but law enforce-ment is ineffective. The military and govern-ment are responsible for a large percentage ofthe logging. The Sustainable ForestManagement Alliance in Indonesia provides anopportunity to approach the problem from anew angle—the demand side—by encouragingmajor retailers (such as IKEA, The HomeDepot, and Lowe’s) to exclude illegally cuttimber from their supplies. USAID also workswith Japan and China, which are importantmarkets for Indonesian timber.

Timber Alliance, Indonesia


Development Impact andSustainabilityLarge alliances with cash contributions engage sen-ior management and the core business interests ofprivate-sector partners. On balance, these providethe best models for high impact and sustainability.This drive is most apparent in ANE, one of thefirst bureaus to take up the GDA initiative.

Alliances with the most potential for sustainabilitywere those in which the private sector seemed tohave a strong motivation to invest. This was partic-ularly true of resource-based, extractive industries.Oil, cocoa, mining, and timber companies cannotsimply move elsewhere. Their stake in the commu-nity makes investment their best choice. Still, private financing cannot guarantee sustainability.Resource contributions for one Asian alliance were delayed, perhaps due to Chapter 11 filing by the U.S. private-sector partner. And within theprealliance group, some private donors did not fulfill commitments.

The assessment analyzed the level of impact eachalliance was designed to achieve in relation to thelevel of resource contributions. Resource contribu-tions included all non-U.S. Government resources

reported, including estimates of in-kind contribu-tions. Of 12 high-impact alliances, five had highresource contributions. Three of the five wereregional alliances, and four of the five were in Asia.

The five high-impact alliances with high resourcecontributions were the following:

■ Indonesia Sustainable Forest ManagementAlliance, which aims to sustain the country’stropical rainforest

■ Papua Bird’s Head Alliance (Indonesia), whichis helping establish a well-planned economicboom by generating employment and income,managing environmental resources, and provid-ing increased access to services

■ Philippines Cleaner Fuels Alliance, whichincludes an innovation with the potential todrastically lower toxic emissions from diesel fuel

■ West Africa Sustainable Tree Crops Alliance(Ghana), which seeks to raise cocoa farmers’incomes and reduce child labor

■ India Livable Communities Initiative, which isdeveloping designated high-occupancy buslanes in Delhi and purchasing 30 buses that useclean fuels

Seven high-impact alliances had lower resourcecontributions:

■ Indonesia SUCCESS Asia Alliance (Cocoa)

■ Mexico Remittances for Economic GrowthAlliance

■ Mexico portion of the Central American Coffee Initiative

■ India Solar Finance Capacity Building Initiative

■ Sri Lanka Air Pollution Reduction Alliance

■ Ghana Food Industry Development ProgramAlliance

■ Ghana Sea Freight Pineapple Exporters/AtomicEnergy Commission Alliance

Four of 12 high-impact alliances were centrallydesigned, multicountry alliances. In this model, the

Highimpact

Lowimpact

$5 million or more$1–3 million

Alliance

Alliance with strategyto achieve higher impact

Development Impact and Partner Resource Contribution

alliance relationship is developed and nurtured bythe Agency’s technical leaders, including the GDASecretariat. Technical staff then hammer out withindustry representatives a framework for develop-ment interventions. The alliance then gets “market-ed” to missions where the strategic fit is good andstaff can support in-country implementation. Thismodel of alliance design offers maximum payoutfor the time it takes to develop an alliance and significant potential impact. It can attract private-sector players with substantial resources, and itoffers transnational reach.

Nine of 15 other alliances had discernible strategiesfor becoming high impact. But two low-impactalliances with high resource contributions had nosuch strategies.

Creating and ManagingAlliances

Procurement and CompetitionChallengesProcurement and competition were the most fre-quently identified challenges in building alliances.GDA does not fit existing procurement models.Many USAID processes are rigid and slow; negoti-ating with the private sector requires flexibility.Early alliances suffered the longest delays, whileexceptions and variations on procurement andlegal problems were identified and addressed.Alliance managers said they spent more time indialogue with contract officers and lawyers than inother procurement activities. The dialogue was further complicated when a contracting officer was not experienced with GDAs or in the samecountry as an alliance. However, the contract offi-cer corps has been building understanding, andtime delays are decreasing.

Although GDA planned for reform of Agency pro-cedures, USAID’s contracts office continued to follow standard regulations. The office identifiedproblems and crafted exceptions on a case-by-casebasis, though consistency in procurement decisions

is essential to missions planning and developingalliances. Policies and regulations that are more sup-portive of the unique qualities of GDA are needed.

GDA has inherent conflicts with full and opencompetition. Some mission staff were concernedthat seeking out private-sector partners called intoquestion fair and open competition. They thusreacted to opportunities rather than seeking themout. These missions also tended to fit alliances intonormal USAID procurement models. More than athird of the alliances studied had cooperativeagreements, a de facto best practice for dealingwith difficult competition issues. Though somecooperative agreements provided support in thebest way possible, in many cases they distorted thebalance of responsibility.

Some competitive procurement regulations alsoconflict with the need for continuity after alliancerelationships are established. The procurementcycle—prescribed deadlines for contracting in agiven year—impeded the development of someGDA alliances. Zambia lost two partners whilewaiting for USAID procurement actions to worktheir way through the cycle. A longer “life of project” as an accepted practice for alliances couldmake a difference.

Because USAID is precluded from signing legallybinding memoranda of understanding (MoUs),some contractors or grantees signed MoUs withprivate-sector partners. This puts the Agency atarm’s length to the partnerships. Without sharedresponsibility and decisionmaking, such allianceswill become a variation on USAID programming,but with extra GDA rhetoric.

The obstacles inherent in the Agency’s usual practices also affect technical bureaus. Several global alliances—such as GAIN and the CitiesAlliance—used the World Bank for fiduciaryresponsibility. Though this creative approach solved legal problems in the short term, some realproblems emerged.


Approaches to Initiating AlliancesThe APS mechanism for soliciting alliance ideasplayed a role in a number of alliances. Staff citedinstances where contracting went more smoothlybecause the process met U.S. Government competi-tion requirements. However, some partners in high-impact alliances would not have responded to theAPS. Other respondents thought the APS exacer-bated the problem of missions being held responsi-ble for activities they had not initiated.

GDA alliances were also initiated by the local pri-vate sector and multinational corporations. InGhana, all alliances were initiated by interests out-side the mission. The West Africa Sustainable TreeCrops Alliance was initiated by the cocoa industry.The World Cocoa Foundation collaborated withthe international agricultural research communityto develop a regional program of research andextension to support more environmentally sustain-able cocoa production. This alliance won USAID’sparticipation as a result of a series of planningworkshops conducted at the industry’s expense in1999–2000. The first step was bringing in leadersin industry and research to shape the program’sparameters and create a broad programmatic frame-work. Then governments and donors were broughtin to help define how to make these ideas opera-tional. A fruitful approach for global or multicoun-try alliances appears to be developing a coherentstrategy and then building ownership for it by suc-cessively bringing in all stakeholder groups.

In Zambia, GDA training was open to private-sec-tor partners. The mission asked all teams to identi-fy potential partners and invite them to a workshopthat introduced GDA concepts, offered success sto-ries, and addressed corporate social responsibility.The workshop attracted 117 participants. The U.S.ambassador was the keynote speaker and the minis-ter of finance the chief guest speaker. Other partici-pants included representatives from banks, govern-ment, the mining sector, microfinance, small andmedium enterprises, farmers’ associations, andNGOs. There was good media coverage, and theworkshop fostered relationships with new partners.

Though this workshop could be used as a modelfor finding GDA partners, not all contracting offi-cers viewed it as an adequate means of competition.

Because mission staff time is scarce, it seems logicalto delegate responsibility to contractors or grantees.However, issuing RFAs that give extra points tobidders who bring in private-sector partners maynot be the most effective method of developing sus-tainable alliances. Delegating such tasks to contrac-tors has the appearance of business as usual.Further, having USAID contractors (or contractor-like entities) “beating the bushes” for private-sectorpartners is less likely to successfully engage the corebusiness interests of the private sector and gain thecommitment of its senior managers.

CommunicationFrequent and open communication was repeatedlycited as an important factor in the ongoing successof alliances. The right kind of communicationbuilds trust, gets issues resolved, and sustains energy and commitment. Strong communication in early stages helps USAID understand the motiva-tions and decisionmaking processes of private-sectoractors and potential areas for overlapping objectives.Communication is the currency of alliances. Earlyand open communication between Agency head-quarters and the field contributed to some of thestrongest alliances. Communication between mis-sion staff and the secretariat is also important. Itconveys corporate leads, the energy and excitementof the new way of doing business, and helps mis-sions keep up with the latest thinking.

Patterns of communication can reflect sharedresponsibility and decisionmaking. For example,partners in the Cleaner Fuels Alliance in thePhilippines are competitors who communicateinfrequently. USAID enhances communication,serving as a buffer and liaison. The Air PollutionReduction Alliance in Sri Lanka was characterizedby interaction between partners, though coordina-tion and communication centered on USAID. The Solar Finance Capacity Building Initiative inIndia is implemented by a local affiliate of a U.S.


contractor, but USAID maintains a strong advisoryrole and serves as cheerleader, moderator, negotia-tor, and convener between banks, agencies, andevaluators. The level of partner investment inEnergy Wise India is more modest and cautious.Communication problems have resulted becausethe alliance is implemented more unilaterally andthe project manager is located in Washington,D.C. The mission’s involvement in the ongoingcommunication and relationship building con-tributes to making the Solar Finance CapacityBuilding Initiative a potentially stronger alliancethan Energy Wise India.

Monitoring and EvaluationMonitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems areneeded to capture the impact and key lessons ofGDA alliances. But most lacked baseline data andprocesses to obtain information about how they arefunctioning. This makes it more difficult to makemidcourse corrections or assess impact. The dearthof good information on effectiveness and impactleads to more pressure to report on resources andleveraged contributions.

Because GDA emphasizes new partners andapproaches, more resources need to be invested inM&E. Instead, USAID missions expected imple-menters to monitor and evaluate GDA alliances,using annual reporting processes and normal imple-mentation mechanisms. However, these are notlikely to measure anything directly relevant to public-private alliances. One of the best approacheswas to allot a portion of the funds to an independ-ent contract for M&E. USAID expanded theM&E budget for the Indonesia Sustainable ForestManagement Alliance after the U.K. Departmentfor International Development, a potential partner,suggested building in a bigger M&E component.Implementing partners then contracted a researchinstitute to handle an M&E system that allowseach partner to find out how much of its contribu-tion is going toward timber tracking and theamount of wood it saved. Similarly, the SolarFinance Capacity Building Initiative in Indiaretained a separate partner to conduct M&E and

impact-level evaluations at various points in theproject cycle.

Mission Support for AllianceBuildingMissions with sufficient budgets, staff, and leader-ship have the time and resources to initiate anddevelop alliances. Most missions visited—notablyIndonesia and the Philippines—were in this catego-ry. By contrast, some smaller missions were particu-larly creative and active in alliance building. Smallermissions tended to dwell on money made availableby incentive funds. Incentive funds set aside fromFY 2002 and FY 2003 budgets encouraged mis-sions to build alliances and, in some cases, repack-age old work.


In 1995, the U.S. Department of Agriculture(USDA) started a program with the WorldCocoa Foundation, Masterfood, and Hersheyto increase the quantity and quality of small-holder production through combating cocoapod borers and funding farmer field training.The SUCCESS program started in 2000, whilethe private, nonprofit organizationACDI/VOCA was already working with indus-try partners. In early 2002, as the USDA pro-gram was about to end, the cocoa industry sawan opportunity to link with USAID. The cocoaindustry had representatives in Indonesia tobuy cocoa and interact with processing plants.ANE brought in newer partners such as ArcherDaniels Midland. USAID/Indonesia submitteda proposal to ANE for incentive funds, and theCocoa Alliance was officially launched in June2003. As a result, industry is already beginningto see improvements in yields, quality, andincreased farmer incomes. The GDA model hasalso sparked ideas for other activities, such ashow manufacturing plants and universities canwork together to make cocoa production inSouth Sulawesi more sustainable.

Indonesia Smallholder Cocoa Production


Secretariat-conducted training was valued by atten-dees. Private-sector panels were valued the most.Examples of alliances, ideas for future alliances,procurement and legal issues, and introductorymaterials were deemed informative and useful.

The GDA Secretariat developed an online hand-book, the Tools for Alliance Builders. Though manystaff were unaware of its existence, those who werefound its sample MoU particularly useful. Staff alsoconsulted the handbook’s section on due diligence.Technical assistance in initiating and buildingalliances was also assessed as very useful, but mis-sions reported they wanted more assistance thanwas available.

The training that introduced the GDA businessmodel to Agency staff was a good start, but shouldbe continued and enhanced. Participants were sup-posed to share what they learned with mission col-leagues, but this plan did not always succeed.Capacity building, in-depth learning, mentoring,and technical assistance are needed. In Zambia,GDA offered a different training program thatincluded potential private-sector partners. Thoseattending the training workshop were betterinformed about the potential for USAID alliances.This approach could be useful.

Support for Champions and Risk-TakingWhen senior managers support the energy and creativity of GDA champions, risks are taken andinnovative alliances result. When their bureaus support them, mission directors are more willing to take risks. In turn, mission staff are more willingto take risks when supported by their directors.GDA models were more successfully integratedinto operations when mission directors rewardedrisk-taking and recognized that alliances take timeand effort. Another key factor was the presence ofGDA champions within the mission. One or theother—champions who offer powerful advocacy or leadership-level engagement and support—is the minimal requirement for a mission to imple-

ment alliances. Having both resulted in the mostsuccessful alliances.

Direct Involvement of USAID StaffThe strongest alliances reduce USAID’s manage-ment burden. Citing the Food Industry Alliance,the USAID/Ghana mission director reported,“When you have a partner who has commercialinterests at stake, alliances drive themselves.” Themission reaped the benefits of the time invested in negotiating overlapping goals with the private-sector resource partner. However, USAID/SriLanka managed alliances because it was unwillingto use limited resources to pay for implementationand preferred direct involvement. A concern wasexpressed about losing the “closeness and spirit” ofan alliance if the Agency relied on an implementingpartner.

Procurement and competition problems, along withlack of staff, encourage USAID missions to delegatealliance building to contractors. This can reduceGDA alliances to “business as usual.” Successfulalliances require shared planning and identificationof shared objectives, which are beyond the negotiat-ing authority of contractors and grantees.

Further, private-sector partners often want access totop USAID officials—for advice as well as the sakeof credibility with host governments. Alliances withpolicy implications also require USAID’s closeinvolvement. Partners in two alliances—SolarFinance Capacity Building in India and Sri Lanka’sEcotourism Alliance—testified that establishing arelationship with the U.S. Government made thealliance a valuable investment. In other cases, therole of the U.S. Government was not attractive.One multinational corporation said it had no inter-est in partnering with the U.S. Government: it wasabove partnerships with bilateral agencies. InJordan, the manager of a Ministry of Educationinformation and communication technology initia-tive stays at arm’s length from USAID/Jordan.


Knowing the CountryMany missions noted that familiarity with the busi-ness practices of a country is essential. Though ahandshake is binding in Asia, it is not in other cul-tures. For example, the Scholarships for Success inMorocco, managed by a small NGO, wronglycounted on a verbal commitment from a multina-tional’s local affiliate for $30,000 for each of threeyears, but received only the first $30,000. For thisreason, written GDA agreements should spell outplanned development impacts and the roles,responsibilities, and contributions of partners.

A full-time resident technical advisor learns aboutcountry conditions, makes informed decisions onthe spot, and can deal with issues and problemspromptly. For example, Royal Ahold’s marketingexpert for Ghana’s Food Industry Alliance spokewith authority to producers and modeled private-sector business practices and standards.

All development activities need to be crafted to specific circumstances. Joint planning means part-ners come to a common understanding of a localproblem and work together to plan the best possi-ble solution in that location. Layers of individualityare added by each partner’s objectives and styles.

Recommendations onMoving to Phase II

The Agency needs to share ownership of theGDA business model. To develop its poten-tial and enter Phase II requires significant

modifications for the mandate and structure of theGDA Secretariat. Its role should be divided amongthe mainstream functions of the Agency. Thiswould engage a wider talent bank of staff resources,strengthen the depth of the involvement withinoperating bureaus, and continue the permeation of GDA concepts into the Agency’s thinking ondevelopment.

Since it reports directly to the Administrator’soffice, the GDA Secretariat could be perceived as apolitical unit. While this gives GDA visibility and

attention, it also makes the secretariat—and theGDA initiative—vulnerable to administrativeturnover. To internalize the public-private conceptsof GDA into the mainstream structure of theAgency, the team recommended that the GDASecretariat be phased out over a reasonable transi-tion period.

To make GDA an integral business model, engage-ment on a much broader front is required. GDAneeds to be included across key functions in a waythat encourages involvement and ownership at themany levels of Agency operation. At a minimum,this should occur in four areas: strategy, funding,obtaining services, and human resources.

StrategyAs a means of achieving development impact, GDA should be emphasized as a specific priority of USAID strategy. It should be highlighted moreexplicitly in the joint strategic thinking of theDepartment of State and USAID, strategic frameworks of regional bureaus, and country strategic plans.

The team recommends that PPC’s Office of Policyor another appropriate PPC unit should add“strategic support for GDA” to its mandate. Theoffice should develop an action plan to moreexplicitly incorporate GDA into the Agency’sstrategic approach. Policy leaders need to developclear guidance around achieving results and resultsreporting with GDA. PPC-developed guidelines formonitoring, evaluating, and reporting on the devel-opmental impact of GDA will enhance the shift inthinking.

FundingIncentive funds were useful in GDA’s startup phaseand tangibly demonstrated the commitment ofAgency leadership. Now two predictable reactionshave set in. First, new alliances get funding whilethose already designed move into crowded operat-ing year budget plans of regular mission funding.Second, money outside normal channels may notbe regarded as core to mission strategies. Incentive


fund money may not have the same level of mis-sion ownership. It is frequently perceived as a wayto fund an otherwise nonstrategic activity.

This assessment recommends that GDA incentivefunds be eliminated, except for a small reserve ofunallocated funds for very high priority GDAopportunities. Some seed capital may be requiredfor new, unanticipated alliances. If a new GDAopportunity is so good that it is an Agency priori-ty—not just a mission or bureau priority—it shouldwithstand the scrutiny and competition required togain access to this kind of high-level reserve.

The Agency’s best interests do not lie in creatingyet another internal funding constraint. Missionsare already hamstrung by earmarks, requirements,directives, and other funding limitations. Instead,GDA should be made a policy practice. Thismeans removing procurement obstacles that make building alliances difficult. It also meansproviding the support and technical assistance thatmissions need to develop good alliances and hold-ing mission directors accountable for followingAgency guidance.

Obtaining ServicesEstablished concepts of grants and contracts do notmeet new Agency needs. USAID should devise anew way of entering into alliances that is independ-ent of existing grant and contracting regulations.This may require legislation or, more simply, anamendment to the AID Acquisition Regulations.The obligation of funds via contracts, grants, andcooperative agreements is not yet a critical bottle-neck, thanks to creative use of the APS and grantand cooperative agreements. However, theseworkarounds may not be sustainable.

Using traditional solicitation documents to awardalliance-based cooperative agreements can causeproblems. USAID may not reach the private-sectorand nontraditional alliance partners it seeks.Serious resource partners want a tailored, specificnegotiation, whether or not an implementing partner brings them to USAID. Alliances clearly

in the interests of the U.S. Government need to be funded using more dynamic and flexible pro-curement processes.

Leveraging resources is a clear benefit to the gov-ernment. But this practice needs to be evaluatedon its own merit, not squeezed under existingrules. At present, leveraging is not the basis for anoncompetitive action. Moreover, in-kindresources are hard to value correctly and compara-bly. The Agency should be able to determine gov-ernment best practices and adapt them to fit itsunique needs.

Some consistency from procurement officersshould be possible. Missions trying to copy bestpractices of other missions have run into opposi-tion from contracting officers. For example, aworkshop that invited private-sector partners wasconsidered adequate competition in some cases butrejected in others. Since the Policy Division in theOffice of Procurement is overworked, it may beworth contracting out the solution to problemscaused by inconsistency.

A related issue is that MoUs among GDA partnersare not legally binding. However, incorporating spe-cific terms into alliance agreements that clearly iden-tify the roles and responsibilities of parties wouldhelp alliances achieve desired developmental goals.

Human ResourcesThe Agency should pay more attention to therecruitment, training, motivation, and advance-ment of GDA champions. In order to address theskill set needed to develop good alliances, theOffice of Human Resources emphasizes the abilityto manage resources. This may not go far enough.The Agency needs more staff who are familiar with—and comfortable dealing with—the productiveprivate sector. Adding alliance-building skills to therecruitment skills matrix would be helpful. Alliancebuilding requires facilitation and resource manage-ment skills and the ability to work with othersbringing their own resources, objectives, andrequirements to partnerships.


The Agency has established two GDA awards andhas tried to give credit to GDA builders. This effortshould be continued and strengthened. Notablealliance builders could be in the bonus pool. Thereare concrete ways to motivate behavior outside theaward system; all possibilities should be explored.The Agency should also offer GDA championsgood onward assignments with advancementpotential and seek them out for highly competitiveassignments.

GDA-specific training needs to focus more on“how to.” Instead of treating GDA as a separate,new initiative, the Agency should include it as one alternative option for achieving its objectivesand offer training that will make it work. GDAbest practices, skills, and approaches should beincorporated into orientation for staff with pro-gram management responsibilities. Junior staffrequire clear guidance and training that promotesmainstreaming GDA.

AdvocacyThe evaluation team recommends that a deputyassistant administrator (DAA) position be estab-lished to be GDA’s advocate. This would retain theprominence of GDA among USAID’s priorities aswell as the energy and drive provided by the GDASecretariat.

The advocacy and reporting functions, as well asrepresentational roles, for GDA might be housed in LPA. This bureau is the point of contact withmany elements of the private sector, and is respon-sible for public outreach. Another option is to create an office that incorporates GDA, otherinnovative relationships, and public outreach. Ineffect, this would mainstream other parts of theAgency into the concept of public-private partner-ships. In addition, university relations, NGO relations, and other partnerships would receive the kind of attention that GDA has brought toalliances with the private sector.

The advocate would be the central point of contactfor GDA. Top-level and center-driven internal sup-

port ensures consistency of message and promotesgreater coordination and partnership possibilities.The advocate’s role would ensure that one GDAface is presented to the rest of the government,including Congress. The advocate would activelypromote and continue to spread GDA principlesthroughout the Agency. The advocate would alsoexplain the value and potential of alliances to mis-sions and encourage them to invite private-sectorparticipation in their activities. Finally, the advocatewould be the main interlocutor between USAIDand the private sector, assuming responsibilities forproactive outreach, marketing, and networking.Having a central GDA organization to communi-cate with multinational corporations and globalorganizations is important, since multiregionalpartnerships affect multiple missions and bureaus.The advocate could negotiate large-scale allianceswith private-sector partners, working closely withimplementing arms of the Agency or delegatingsuch actions.

Alliance SupportSome USAID missions feel that the GDASecretariat has been focused more on “its” alliancesthan on supporting missions to develop their ownalliances. During Phase II, GDA activities by mis-sions should receive central support. A field-sup-port focus makes sense. Requiring the advocate toserve missions as a technical expert in GDA deep-ens the advocate’s role. In addition, field supportwould require the formation and maintenance ofan Agency-wide network to guide alliance building.

An Alliance Support Office (ASO) could be housedin EGAT. Wherever it is, the office should beassigned several key functions. It should becomethe GDA expert within USAID. The ASO woulddisseminate information and expertise to missions,including technical assistance on how to establishalliances. ASO staff could assist cross-mission support efforts, including making mission-basedchampions available to provide advice and counsel.The ASO should create a centralized repository ofinformation and expertise on alliance building andprivate-sector involvement in development. It


should collect best practices from missions and theprivate sector, compiling them into a centralizedform. The ASO should then institute a knowledgemanagement system, including computer databasesand websites. The ASO should maintain this sys-tem and market its use to missions.

To this end, the ASO would formalize a supportnetwork to help missions establish and runalliances. This network would include GDA cham-pions—staff who know how to establish and imple-ment alliances. The network would include expertson the private sector and staff at regional bureauswho are dedicated to fostering alliance building.The ASO would cultivate these experts, encouragestaff to become GDA champions, and convinceregional bureaus to develop their own experts. Aninformal mentoring system between missions—orfrom ASO to missions—could be formed andencouraged.

As noted, USAID management discussed the find-ings and recommendations from this assessment

and is collaborating to act on them. USAID willimplement most assessment recommendations,including fully integrating GDA into standardAgency operations and planning, developing a newprocurement approach for GDA alliances, andimproving monitoring and evaluation

Management supported the idea of moving awayfrom Washington-based incentive funds over time.But it will leave decisions on incentive funds toregional bureaus and maintain a modest reservefund in the GDA Secretariat through FY 2006.

This assessment also recommended phasing out theGDA Secretariat and moving GDA functions fromthe Administrator’s office to USAID bureaus. Afterreviewing various options, USAID managementdecided to maintain the current structure until theGDA approach can be more fully mainstreamedwithin the Agency and because it continues to pro-vide the private sector with a one-stop entranceinto USAID. ■


Appendix: GDA Alliances Investigated

Partner Contributions DevelopmentLocation Alliance ($ million) Impact

Africa

Zambia Fresh Vegetable Exports Alliance 1–3Milk Collection Centers Alliance 1–3Copperbelt Economic Diversification Alliance 1–3ICT Skills Building Alliance < 1*

Ghana Food Industry Development Program Alliance 1–3 HighSea-Freight Pineapple Exporters/

Atomic Energy Commission Alliance < 1Sustainable Tree Crops Alliance > 3 ** High

Asia and the Near East

Philippines AMORE Renewable Energy > 3 HighCleaner Fuels to Reduce Vehicle Emissions > 3Hybrid Corn Production, Processing, and Marketing < 1

Indonesia Papua Bird’s Head Alliance (Biodiversity) > 3 HighSUCCESS Asia Alliance (Cocoa) 1–3 HighSustainable Forest Management Alliance > 3 High

India Green Business Center > 3 Solar Finance Capacity Building Initiative 1–3 HighLivable Communities Initiative > 3 High

Sri Lanka Air Pollution Reduction Alliance 1–3 Alliance Supporting Environment and Community

through Ecotourism (SENCE) 1–3

Latin America

Peru Huancavelica Economic Service Center 1–3 Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance < 1Cordillera Azul National Park 1–3

Mexico Remittances for Economic Growth Alliance < 1 HighNorthern Border Trauma Center 1–3Certified Sustainable Products Alliance < 1Central American Coffee Initiative < 1 High

* The Zambia portion of a much bigger alliance.** The total amount for all countries.

This Evaluation Paper can be ordered from USAID’sDevelopment Experience Clearinghouse (DEC). To downloador order publications, go to www.dec.org and enter the document identification number in the search box. The DECmay also be contacted at 8403 Colesville Rd, Ste 210, SilverSpring, MD 20910; tel 301-562-0641; fax 301-588-7787;email [email protected].

Editorial, design, and production assistance was provided byIBI–International Business Initiatives, Arlington, VA, undercontract no. HFM-C-00-01-00143-00. For more information,contact IBI’s Publications and Graphics Support Project at703-525-2277 or [email protected].

For more information, contactU.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, D.C. 20523-1000

Telephone: 202-712-4810

Internet: www.usaid.gov

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