the madhyamaka and modern western philosophy
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8/20/2019 The Madhyamaka and Modern Western Philosophy
1/14
Peter
Della Santina
The
Madhyamaka
and
modernWestern
philosophy
INTRODUCTION
The task
of
comparative
hilosophy
resupposes
more or
less
intimate
c-
quaintance
with he
philosophies
r
philosophical
raditions
o be
compared.
Whilethewriter f this
rticle
mayperhapspretend
o a
reasonable
familiarity
with
he
Madhyamakaphilosophy,
e
cannot
pretend
o a similar
amiliarity
with he
Western
hilosophical
radition. his s
said not as an
excuse,
butas
a
justification
or
the
approach
that is
proposed
for
adoption
in this
article.
Moreover,
n
the case in
hand,
it is
proposed
not
simply
o
compare
one
philosophy
with nother
hilosophy,
utrather
philosophy
ith
philosophi-
cal
tradition
which s
by
no means
homogeneous.
ince
it is
in
any
case
not
practicable
o
attempt
o
considermodernWestern
hilosophy
n
its
entirety,
certain
ignificant
ovements ithin he
radition illbe dealtwith
nstead,
nd
reference ill
be made to
specific ystems
nly
nsofar s
they
erve
o illustrate
thesemovements rphilosophical ttitudes.n this ontext,t mustbe saidthat
the
task of selection
as been
made easier
by
the
fact hat n this
entury,
here
have
been a
number f
attempts
o
identify
estern
ounterparts
f the
Mad-
hyamaka
philosophy.
his s
of
particular
nterest hen
he
question
f
critique
is to be
approached,
because it will be
of
greater
alue
if
the
Madhyamaka
s
evaluated
n
relation o
philosophies
which
t
least on the
surfacehave
some
claim o
share he
ameuniverse
f
discourse.
he
examination fwhat
might
e
the
Madhyamaka
critique
f
the
thought
f Kant
and
Wittgenstein
s
more
promising,
ecause
these
philosophies
o bear
some
resemblance
o the
Mad-
hyamaka,
nd have
been
recognized
s
such
by
modern
cholars.
Nonetheless,
f
comparison
nd
critique
re
to be
something
more
than
merely
n arid
in-
tellectual
xercise,
t
will
be
necessary
o
ook not
only
t the
enets f
the
ystems
to
be so
treated,
ut also
at their
ntecedents
nd their
purpose.
Finally,
n
concluding
his
preamble,
et
t
be
said that
philosophical
omparisons
ave
all
too often
n
the
past
been
undertaken
with the
idea of
securing
nhanced
philosophical
espectability
or
ne of
the wo
ystems
nvolved. hat this
hardly
does
justice
to the
ntrinsic
alue,
such
as it
is,
of the
system
whose
status
s
sought o beenhancedneed carcely e said.Alternatively,omparisonsmaybe
undertaken
ith
view
o
facilitating
he
understanding
f
given
hilosophy
n
an
alien
universe f
discourse.
While
this
objective
s
undoubtedly
orthy,
ne
must
guard
gainst
acile
nd
superficial
quations
which
may
do
more o
foster
misunderstanding
han
to
promote
omprehension.
t
is
therefore
mperative
that
genuine
differencesot
be
glossed
over
in
the
excitement
f
discovering
apparent
arallels.
PeterDella Santina eceived isPh.D. in
Buddhist
tudies
rom
he
Universityf
Delhi,
nd s
a
part-
time
ecturer t
the
National
University
f
Singapore.
Philosophy
ast
and West
6,
no. 1
January, 986).
©
by
The
University
f
Hawaii Press.All
rights
eserved.
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42
Della
Santina
PHILOSOPHY: EAST AND
WEST
Before
roceedingny
further,
t
may
be useful orme
to restate
omething
hich
may
eemobvious o thosewho are
used
to
these
nvestigations,
utwhich s
yet
so
important
hat
t
may
profitably
e
reiterated
f
only
because
t
nforms uch
ofwhatwillbe said ater: amely,hat henature ndhistoryf hephilosophical
enterprise
n
the
East,
specifically
n
ndia,
has been
very
ifferentrom hat
n
the
West.
t
may
be
said without ear
f
arousing
much
ontroversy
hat
hilosophy
in
ndia has
alwayspartaken
fwhathas
come to
be called
n
theWest
religion,
and,
conversely,
hat
eligion
n
ndia
has
always
partaken
f whathas come
to
be
called
n
the
West
philosophy.
o
put
t
another
way,
he
distinction
etween
philosophy
nd
religion,
hich
as
until ather
ecently
een
o
sharply
rawn
n
the
West,
oes not
by
nd
arge pply
o the
ndian
tradition.
ndian
philosophy,
therefore,
as
always
ontained nd often een
haracterized
y
a
soteriological
preoccupation.
his is
not,
however,
o
say
that t
thereby
eases to be
philo-
sophy.
On the
contrary,
t
may
be
argued
hat
t s
philosophy
ar
excellence,
philosophy
with n existential
elevancewhich
hilosophy
n
theWest
has
not
until
very
ecently
nd even
now
not
fully
ecured.
Moreover,
his
existential
relevance
f
ndian
philosophy
as not
been
purchased,
s some
would
ike
to
think,
t
the
ost
of
ntellectual
larity
r
even
cientific
igor.
In
the
West,
the
story
f
philosophy
has
been
something uite
different.
Although
he
philosophical
nterprise
itnessed
promising
tart
n
Greece,
t
soonfell ntodisreputeargelys the esult fthegrowthfChristianrthodoxy.
Philosophy
id
not
accord
well either
with
Semitic
monotheism
r
with
the
Christian
mphasis
n
faith.
espite
occasional
nd furtive
lirtations
ithNeo-
Platonism,
s
for
nstance
n
Augustine,
hristian
rthodoxy
emained
tead-
fastly
ary
f
reason nd
gnosis.
mallwonder
n a
tradition
hich ad
nherited
the
Judaic onviction
f the
absolute
otherness
nd
inaccessibility
f God
and
which
was anxious o
preserve
he
uniqueness
f Christ
nd
of faith
n Christ
s
the sole
means of
bridging
he
gulf
between
he
absolute
and man.
Although
Neo-Platonism
id
to
some extent
ubvert
hristian
rthodoxy
n
the
hape
of
mystical
xperience,
he ccommodation etweenheJudeo-Christianradition
and
a
gnostic
oteriology
as
always
n
uneasy
ne.
Mysticism,
hanks
erhaps
to ts
soteric
uality,
managed
o
survive
n the
hostile
limate
f
orthodoxy,
ut
philosophy
ell
by
the
wayside.
It
was
notuntil
he
dvent
f
modern
cience
nd the
European
nlightenment
that
Western
hilosophy
gain
dared
o
raise ts
head,
nd when
tdid
so,
t
found
itself
n
the
unenviable
osition
of
being
neither
ere
nor
there,
n
a sort
of
halfway
ouse
between
eligion
nd
science.
t
could
not
spire
o the
oteriolog-
ical content nd existentialelevance freligion, utneitherould itpretend,
despite
ometimes
ervent
fforts,
o the
ntellectual
igor
f science.As a
result,
philosophy
n the
West
remained
ntil
very ecently
n academic
diversion,
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43
parlor
game
for he
ducated
ew
who neither ere alled
to the hurch
or
hose
to follow
heutilitarian
ay
of science.
The effectsf
the
imitation
f the
wider
and,
one
might
well
argue,
egitimate
ole
of
philosophy
re still
very
much
evident
n
the
hought
f Kant
and
in
that f
his
contemporaries
nd
immediate
successors.
ndeed,
t was
not until
this
century
hat
philosophy
n the
West
begantoshow igns frecoveryrom he rippling xperienceforthodoxynd
an
inclination
o
resume ts lassicalrole
as a whole cience
of
becoming)
with
soteriological
oncern
nd an existential
elevance.
RATIONALISM
AND
EMPIRICISM
The
history
f
modernWestern
hilosophy egan
with
he
onflict etween
atio-
nalism nd
empiricism.
t
is
an
accepted
fact hat
ven
the
philosophy
f
Kant
(which
will
be
dealt
with
t some
ength resently)
as an
attempt
o resolve
his
early
and
apparently
nsoluble
problem
of Western
philosophy.Briefly,
he
conflict
evolves
roundthe
question
f
whether
ertain
eneral
ropositions-
that
A is A
and not
non-A,
and
that
every
vent
must
have a
cause,
and so
forth-are a
priori
acts
bout
reality
r
merely
posteriori
onventions.n
the
first
lternative,
uch
propositions
re
assumed
o
be
innate,
he
result f direct
rational
nsight
nd so
universally ecessary.
n
the
econd
lternative,
hey
re
derived rom
xperience
nd
therefore
erely
ontingent.l
The
Madhyamaka,
nd
ndeed
Buddhists
n
general,
ave
no
difficulty
ealing
with
he
problem
f
general
ropositions
hich
ppear
to be innate
r a
priori-
that s,nottheproducts f mmediatexperience.hey re abletodo so because
of the
conception
f
rebirth.n
the
Buddhist
view,
this
ife s
the
effect f a
countless
eries f
earlier
ives.The
totality
f
experience
ccumulated
hrough-
out these
xistences
esults
n
what
are
termed
mental
ormations
r
predispo-
sitions
samskdra).
or
Buddhists,
uch
predispositions
ontain
not
only
static
element
ut
also a
dynamic
ne,
forwhich
eason theterm
s
sometimes
rans-
lated s
volitions.
n
other
words,
he
otality
f
ccumulated
xperience
ot
only
supplies
he
pattern
f
experience,
ut lso
inclines
ne
to act
n
a
particular
ay
according
o
habitual
tendencies.
owever,
here
t
is
the
static
more
than the
volitional
spect
ofmental ormationshat s of
nterest,
nd Buddhists
ave
a
specific
word
for
this
static
aspect
of
intentionality.
t is
vdsana,
mental
m-
pression
r
propensities.
ental
mpressions
re
the
habitual
patterns
reated
n
the
mind
byrepeated
xperience.
agarjuna
s
quite
pecific
bout
ascribing
he
appearance
f
the
world
o
mental
mpressions.2
o
what
f
priori
ropositions?
For
Buddhists,
hey
re a
priori
n
the
ense
that
hey
re
not
derived
rom
he
experience
f
this
ife
lone;
n
other
words,
hey
re
with ne
at
birth.
Nonethe-
less,
hey
re
not
a
priori
n
the
ense
hat
hey
re
notthe
result
f
what
has been
called rational nsight, utare rather ltimatelyheoutcomeof accumulated
experience
ver
nnumerable
xistences. or
are
they
necessary.
his
last does
not
concern
Buddhists
ecause
they
have
never
een
exercised ver
how
things
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44
Della Santina
must
be
in
all
possible
worlds,
ut
on
the
contrary,
heir
oncern
s
withhow
things
re
here
nd
now.
IDEALISM
AND
REALISM
If the
history
fWestern
hilosophy
as been oloredfrom
he
beginning
y
the
conflict etween ationalism
nd
empiricism,
here s also another
onflict hich
has
been
perhaps
of even
greater mportance.
hat is the conflict etween
idealism nd
realism. ike the onflict etween ationalismnd
empiricism,
he
conflict etween dealism nd realism
may
be traced o an ambivalence
n
the
attitude f
Descartes,
ut
unlike hefirst-mentioned
onflict,
hat etweendeal-
ism and realismdid
have a similar
history
n the Buddhist
hilosophical
ra-
dition.
Descarteswas able
to
hold
that ational
nsight
upplies
necessary
ruth
about
reality
despite
he
devil,
who
nduced
him o doubt
the
very
xistence f
the xternal
orld)
nly
ecauseofhis onfidence
n
the
goodness
fGod.3
While
the attermayhave constituted satisfactoryolution orDescartes, hedoubt
whichhe so
unambiguously
rticulated as to
dog
philosophy
or
very ong
time
n
the
West.
Naive realism
s content o
acceptthings
orwhat
they ppear
to
be;
it s
the
attitude
f
theman
n
the treet.
ut
philosophers
re often ot
content
o eave
things
lone.
If
they
were,
hey
would
not be
philosophers,
ut
tradesmen
r
agriculturists.
n
addition,
ertain bvious
xamples
f
llusion,
uch
s
themoon
appearing
arger
t
the
horizon
hat t
the
enith,
may
have
contributed
o the
growing
reoccupation
ith he
question
f
the
reality
f
the xternalworld.
This led
to the
emergence
f
representative
r critical
ealism,
notoriously
unstable
philosophical
osition.
Briefly,
t affirmed
hat
lthough
he external
world
xists,
erception
oes not
provide
irect ccess to
t.
All
that
perception
provides
s
acquaintance
with he
epresentations
r effects
f
he
xternal
orld.
The
problem
s
that
f one is never
irectlycquainted
with he
external
world,
but
only
with
ts
representations
r
effects,
ow
s
one
to know
for ertain
hat
t
exists
t all.
The
inescapability
f this
uestion
nce
again
brought
hilosophy
face
to
face
with
Descartes'
devil.
The
only
obvious
solution
was idealism
f
eitherhedogmatic r thepragmatic ariety. he inevitabilityf thisprocess s
clearly
llustrated
n theWest
by
Locke
and
Berkeley.
The
history
f theevolution
f Buddhist
chools
n India is also not
without
examples
of the
movement
romnaive realism
to
representative
ealism
to
idealism.
he
firsts
nicely
llustrated
y
the
Vaibhasika
chool,
perhaps
he
first
systematic
ormulation
f
the
philosophy
f
the
Buddha.
The
Vaibhasika
nter-
pretation
ould
not,
however,
emain
unchallenged
or
long
in
the
critical
environment
f
the Buddhist
radition,
nd
soon it
was
supplanted
by
the
Sautrantika
chool,
a
species
of
representative
r
critical ealism
which
had a
muchgreaterole oplay nthe volution fBuddhisthoughtn ndia.Nonethe-
less,
the
nherent
nstability
f
the
Sautrantika
osition
was not
ong
to endure
unnoticed.
he
Yogacara
or
Vijiinnavada
esponded
o theSautrantika
iewof
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45
representative
ealism
y
ettisoning
he
externalworld.
This
was
easy
for
he
Yogacarins,
because
they,deeply
nfluenced s
they
were
by
the
model
of
meditative
xperience,
ad
no
particular
ove
or
use for xtra-mental
eality.
The
foregoing
iscussion
resents
tidy
icture
f a scholastic
hilosophical
evolutionwhich its
erynicely
ntothe
pattern
f naive
realism,
epresentative
realism,
nd
idealismmentioned
arlier,
ut s this
ll
that
Buddhist hilosophy
offersn
reply
o theWest?
What
of the
Buddha's
own
attitude nd what
of
the
Madhyamaka,
which,
t will be
argued, epresents
he
systematicxpression
f
theformer?
The
Buddha
was
preeminently
oncernedwith
experience.
His
rejection
f
metaphysical peculation
s
well-documented
nd
has
been
acknowledged
y
scholars.4 o
was the Buddha an
empiricist?
ot
so far as
the term
has
been
accepted
within he Western
hilosophical
radition.
Why?
Because
he
recog-
nized ll
experience
o
be
essentially
nd
finally
mental.
he
sense
organs
do
not
see, hear, nd so forth, ivorced romonsciousness. o theBuddha wasnotan
empiricist
n the
Western ense of the
term,
lthough
t
may
be
argued
hathis
attitudes more
genuinelympirical
han hat
f
theWestern
mpiricist,
ecause
the
assumption
f
an
extra-mental eferents
hardly ustified
y experience;
rather t s moreof
thenature f
dogmatism.
ut what
of
the
nature
f
reality?
Quite
simply,
he
Buddha was not
interestedn
questions
bout
the
ultimate
natureof
reality.
He
was
not
interested
n
describing
t.
He
rejected
ven
the
categories
f
existence
nd
nonexistences
ultimatelyredicable
f
reality.5
So what
s
one
to make of
a
philosophy
whichdoes not
concern tselfwith
describing
heultimate ature f
reality?
number
f
answers o this
uestion
have
been
proposed.
One
common,
lthough
ow
somewhat
utdated,
nswer s
thatthe
Buddha was
not a
philosopher
t
all.
According
o this
view,
he
was
interested
n
ethics.Another
more
modern
iewholds
that he
Buddha did not
teach
philosophy,
ut
psychology. lthough
more
satisfying
han
the
former,
this
nswer,
ike
he
irst,
egs
he
uestion.
he
real
point
t ssue s the
definition
of terms.
How is one
to deal
with n
intellectual radition
which
does not fit
comfortably
nto
he
ategory
f
either
hilosophy
r
religion
s
they
ave been
understood ntheWest?Like theproblem ftheconflict etween ationalism
and
empiricism,
nd like
o
many
ther
roblems
hat tem
rom
hat
ttempt
o
apply
alien
conceptual
modelsto a
tradition
hich
s not
constrained
y
them,
the
onflict etween
hilosophy
nd
psychology
oes
notoccurfor
Buddhists.
f
all
experience
s
essentially
nd
finally
mental,
hen
system
f
oteriology
hich
provides
or
he
realization f
an
existentially
esirable
mode of
experience
must
also
resolve he
problem
f
reality.
he
pragmatism
f
the
Buddha
did
notallow
him
o
concern
himself
ith
he
question
f
the
nature f
a
reality
which n
fact
was not
experienced,
eing
extra-mental.
his is
the
point
of the
rejection
f
metaphysicalpeculation s notconducive o edification,s exemplifiednthe
parable
of the
woundedman.6
The
important
act o
remembers
that,
s
the
Yogacarins
realized,
his
attitude
oes
not
for
practical
purposes
alter one's
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8/20/2019 The Madhyamaka and Modern Western Philosophy
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46
Della Santina
picture
f
the
everyday
orld.
One can
very
well
go
on
acting
s
if
there
were
external
bjects,
ecause that
s
the
way
t all
appears
o
one,
without
ssuming
their xtra-mental
eality.
The
Madhyamaka,
t s
argued,
mbodies
hat
pragmatic
nd
antimetaphys-
ical attitudewhichwas the
real
heart of the Buddha's
teaching.
As
such,
t
acknowledgeshefact hat llexperiencesmental ndthatmetaphysicalpecu-
lation is
soteriologicallyounterproductive.
his is
evident
n
the works of
Nagarjuna.
He
has
said,
This
world of
llusion,
delusion
of
consciousness,
comes
not
from
nywhere,
oes
not nor
really tays.
The
wheel f
becoming
is
producedthrough
he
propensity
vasana)
for
erroneous
onceptualisation
(vikalpa).
Since
regarding
hat
very
ame
object
one
s
desirous,
nd
regard-
ing
hat
very
ame
object
one s
malevolent,
nd
regarding
hat
ery
ame
object
one is
deluded;
herefore
hey
desire,
malevolence,
nd
delusion)
re
produced
through onceptualization.
onceptualization
lso
is,
n
reality,
ot existent. 9
The afflictionsklesa) and action karman) rise from onceptualizationnd
this
from
onceptual
onstructions
prapanca).
10
As
the
painter
ainting
terrible
monster
s
himself
rightenedhereby,
o is the
fool
frightened
ith
transmigration.
1
All
phenomena
re
interdependently
riginated
s shown
through
he
examples
of
magical spells,
drugs,
nd
illusion.
Therefore,
hey
are
ultimately roved
to be
perfectly
eyond
xistence nd
non-existence.
2
Ultimately,
hisworld
s
beyond
ruth nd
falsehood,
herefore,
he Buddha
does
not ssert
hat t
really
xists
r does not....
How could
the mniscientne
say
t
has
imits
r no imits r has both
r neither? 3
Those whothink
n
terms
ofexistence nd
non-existence
o
not
grasp
he ruth
f theBuddha's
teaching.
The
Buddha
repudiated
oth
he
hought
hat
omething
xists nd that
ome-
thing
oes
not.
4
Know that
he mbrosia
ftheBuddha's
teaching
s
the
pro-
found
nd
uncommon
octrine
oing
ar
beyond
xistence
nd
non-existence. 5
Here attention
hould
be
drawn
o
three
ey
erms:
ropensities,
onceptuali-
zation,
and
conceptual
constructions.
he
first
f
these
has
already
been
encountered.
he
second,
onceptualization
vikalpa),
as sometimes een
rans-
lated
s
imagination
r
as
Sprung'6
does)
hypostatizing
hought.
ven n
the
Sautrantika iew,twasresponsibleor henotions fthe elf, hewhole, ndso
on,
but
n the
Madhyamaka,
t
is
responsible
or
he
totality
f the
objects
of
experience.
inally,
onceptual
onstructions
prapanca)
has
been a source
of
difficulty
or
ranslators
nd
nterpreters
f
he
Madhyamaka
hilosophy.
his
s
perhaps
n
part
because
n
the
Brahmanical
radition,
thas an
ontological
lavor.
Even
Sprung
ranslates
t
as the
manifold
f
named
things,
which
s at
best
ambiguous
ecause
one s not
ure
whether
he
mphasis
hould
be on named
r
on
things.
The Tibetan
exegetical
radition
olds
that
the
term
ught
to
be
understood
n
the ense
f
expressing
he
objectively
xperienced
ounterpart
f
conceptualizationvikalpa)-in otherwords,the crystalizednd objectified
aspect
of
conceptualization.
t
is
interesting
o
note
that
Cheng,
basing
himself
on
an
early
hinese
Madhyamaka
radition,
grees
with
his
nterpretations.17
t
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8/20/2019 The Madhyamaka and Modern Western Philosophy
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47
would
be
remarkable
f
his
nterpretation
fthe ermwerenot
correct,
iven
he
fact
hat wo
recognized,
ndependent,
nd venerable uddhist raditions
gree
upon
it.
Significantly,
his
nterpretation
voids
going
beyond
the
exclusively
mental ature
f
xperience
nd
does not
ontologize
he
bject.
At the ame
time,
however,
t can
deal with he
object
s if t
were
real
for
practical
urposes.
So istheMadhyamakaphilosophyeducibleo dealism; nd what hen sthe
distinction
etween
he
Madhyamaka
nd the
Yogacara,
the
recognized
chool
ofBuddhist
dealism?
ndeed,
t s
argued
n the
basis
ofthe
passages
ust
quoted
that
the fundamental
ttitude
of the
Yogacara
was
already
mplicit
n the
Madhyamaka
and
even
more
n
the Buddha's
own utterances.
his much s
supported y
the
nterpretation
f
Santaraksita,
ounder
f the
ynthetic
chool
of
the
Yogacara-Madhyamaka,
who,
it is
contended,
nly
made
explicit
nd
systematic
he endencies
lready
vident
n theworks f
Madhyamaka
uthors.
Nonetheless,
he
Madhyamaka
s
not dealism
n
the
metaphysical
r
ontological
sense.This s infact hepointuponwhich heMadhyamaka nd theYogacara
split.
The
Yogacara, according
o
the
Madhyamaka
view,
err nsofar s
they
make consciousness ntoa
real,
n
existing, hing,
n
ontological
r
metaphys-
ical
entity. hey tray,
oo,
from
heBuddha's
way
n
thatrather han
voiding
thealternativesf existence nd
nonexistence,
hey
ssertboth the
existence f
consciousness nd the
nonexistence
f the
object.
The
Madhyamaka,
while
acknowledging
he
fact
hat ll
experience
s
mental,
an
yet
void
the
pitfalls
f
metaphysical
ogmatism,
ecause
this
act eads
t not to
metaphysical
ssertion
and
negation,
utrather o
soteriological
reedom.
he
Madhyamaka ndeed,
s
Candrakirti
oints
out,
has no
difficulty
n
employing
he
attitudes
f
realism,
idealism,
nd so
forth,
ecause all
these formulations re
just
pedagogical
devices,
oteriological
ools,
not
ontological
ssertions.18
TRANSCENDENTAL
IDEALISM AND EMPIRICAL REALISM
In the
West,
mmanuelKant
attempted
o resolve he onflict etween ational-
ism
and
empiricism,
nd themore
fundamental
ne
between ealism nd ideal-
ism,
by
means
of
his
critique
f
pure
reason.
It
has been
suggested
hat
his
solution aisesmoreproblemshan tsolves, ndithas sometimes eenregarded
as
skepticism.19
t
is
ironic hat the
Madhyamaka
has been
compared
o this
system.
t
may
be
ventured hat certain
ffinity
n
philosophical
ttitude
nd a
striking
oincidencewith
egard
o a setof
philosophical
roblems rompted
his
comparison.
ike the
Madhyamaka,
Kant's characteristic
hilosophical
method
is
critical nd
dialectic, nd,
ike he
Madhyamaka,
his
philosophy
s
ostensively
opposed
to
metaphysical
peculation.
he
antinomies f
Kant
correspond
xact-
ly
to
the
ets
of
metaphysical roblems
ejected
s not
tending
o
edification
y
the Buddha.20
Notwithstanding
hese
similarities,
t will
be
argued
that the
analogybetween he views ofMadhyamakaand Kant is moreapparent han
real.
Kant arrived t
his
characteristic
hilosophical tandpoint hrough
n
examination f the
mind
or
reason.
For
this,
he
has been credited
y
T. R. V.
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8/20/2019 The Madhyamaka and Modern Western Philosophy
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48 Della
Santina
Murtiwithwhathas beentermed he
Copernican
evolution
n
philosophy.21
n
other
words,
e
focused
he
ttention
f
philosophy
pon
the
ubject
ather
han
the
object.
But Kant was unable to
dispense
with
he
assumption
f an extra-
mental
reality.
ndeed,
he
sought
to
explain knowledge
s the result
f
the
combination
f the
data
given
n
experience
ith
heforms
f ntuition
nd
of
understanding:pace, ime, ubstance,ndcausality. hisbeing he ase,all that
is
known,
ll that an
ever
be
known,
s
phenomenal-that
s,
what
s
presented
to the
knowing ubject
hrough
he tructures
f
hemind.
he
absolute,
hings
n
themselves,
he
noumenal,
an
never e known ut
an be assumed ecause
ense
data,
ccording
o
Kant,
must
have cause which
s not he
ubject.
he effects
f
the
unknown
hings-in-themselves
hich
nfluence
ensibility
re
representa-
tions.
The
purpose
of
Kant's
critique
was to
limit
he
domain
of
knowledge
o
the
mpirical.
n
this
way,
he
hoped
to
expose
the
pretensions
f
metaphysicians
who
vainly
eekto
say
something
bout
theunknowable
oumenal.
hereby
e
intendedo makeroomfor aith hrough isallowingeason n the phere fthe
absolute,
essentially
he
same concern
hat
had
animated
he doctors
of the
Church
t
Nicaea
more han
millenniumarlier.
From
the
Madhyamakapoint
of
view,
Kantian
philosophy
s riddled
with
difficulties.
espite
being
dialectical,
t
s
dualistic
nd
ontological,
ven
meta-
physical,
s
Chengpoints
ut.22
ynthesis
s
not
a
solution,
s
is clear
from he
Madhyamaka
critique
f
the
Jaina
philosophy.
n
ascribingknowledge
o
a
combination
f
objective
ense
data and
the
ubjective
orms
f the
mind,
Kant
betrays n ontologicalcommitmento both
the
object
and the
subject.
n
addition,
he
ssumption
fan
extramental
eality
equires
hat
he
gap
between
subject
and
object
be
bridgedby
a
representative
heory
f
perception,
he
instability
fwhich
has
already
een
pointed
ut.
Moreover,
heradical
polarity
between
he
ontological
haracter
f
Kant's notion
of
the
noumenal
nd
the
phenomenal
re
foreign
o
the
Madhyamaka.
Finally
nd
significantly,
he
end
of
Kant's
critique
s
trivial
rom he
Madhyamaka
point
of
view.
Kant's
system,
s it has
been
said,
grew
out
of
the
attempt
o resolve
he
conflict
etween
ationalism
nd
empiricism-a
conflict hich
id not exist
or
theMadhyamakanor ndeedfor nysystemf ndianthought,or hereasons
explained
arlier.
Again,
Kant
sought
o
resolve
he
ontroversy
etween
deal-
ism
nd
realism
y
ascribing articular
unctions
o the
ubjective
nd
objective
components
n the
formation
f
knowledge.
n the
process,
ant
had to resort
o
a
representative
heory
f
perception.
lthough
he
history
f
Buddhist
hought
in
ndia
did
nclude
phase
of
ritical
ealism
n
the
ourse
fwhich
representa-
tive
heory
f
perception
as
entertained,
he
Madhyamaka
never
had to
face
this
predicament,
ecause
it
never
ssumed
an
extra-mental
eferent
f
expe-
rience.
hese
onsiderations,
owever,
hough
elling
nough
n
themselves,
ave
never,
o theauthor'sknowledge, eenconsidered ythosewho liketo find
parallels
between
he
Madhyamaka
and
Kantian
philosophy.
Here,
too,
they
shall
not
be treated
t
length,
ecause
it is
when
the
real heart
of Kant's
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8/20/2019 The Madhyamaka and Modern Western Philosophy
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49
philosophy,
hedoctrine f the noumenal nd
the
phenomenal,
s reached
hat
there
s
a
greater
emptation
o see
apparent
oincidences
nd
yet
n
even
greater
danger
hat facile
dentification
f
actually
iverse
hilosophies
will
engender
misunderstanding
ather han
ppreciation.
The
Kantian
noumenal
nd
phenomenal
ave been
termed
he
absolute
nd
therelative,ndthese erms avebeen mposed s itwere pontheMadhyamaka
conceptions
f
ultimate
ruth
paramdrtha-satya)
nd conventional
r
appa-
ritional ruth
vyavahdra
r
samvrti-satya).
he
Madhyamaka's dvocacy
of
the
ultimate ruth as ed T.
R.
V. Murti o
call
t bsolutism.
lthough
n
all
fairness
itmust
e said that
he
does so
in
order o
save
the
Madhyamaka
from
he
harge
of
nihilism,
oes
he
do it
ustice
n
clothing
t
with nother hreadbare
arment
from
he wardrobe f
philosophical
abels which
s,
to
say
the
east,
ll-fitting?
Surely
Murti knows
that
the
translation f
paramdrthaliterally, ighest
nd,
purpose,
or
meaning)
s absolute can
scarcely
be
justified
tymologically.
Similarly,hetranslation f the ermsvyavahdrarsamvrti literally,onven-
tion,
usage, anguage
or
obscured, overed,
eiled)by
relative tandson
no
firmer
round.
What, hen,
ther
han
fascination ith
conceptual nalogy,
could
induce
a
competent
cholar
to
adopt
these
terms orthe
Madhyamaka
conceptions
fthe
ultimate nd conventional
ruths;
nd
yet,
whole
generation
of
ranslators,
nfluenced
y
his
ame
fascination ith
conceptual nalogy,
ave
adopted
these erms
nd
have
characterizedhe
Madhyamaka
s
absolutism.
On
the
evidence
f
the
Madhyamaka's
own
texts,
oo,
the
ultimate
ruth as
nothing
o do
withKant's
things-in-themselves.ndeed, hedivision etween he
ultimate nd
conventional
ruths,
or he
Madhyamaka,
s
nothing
more
han
pedagogical
device.23
mptiness
sunyatd)
s
said to be the
ultimate
ruth,
ut
emptiness
s
not an
ontological
ategory,
ut a
soteriological
herapy.24 mpti-
ness,
the
relativity
f
all
things,
s
itself
elative.The
ultimate
ruth,
ike the
conventional,
s
devoid
of
ndependent
eing.
This
muchhas
been
ndicated lso
by
Cheng.25
What then
of the
things-in-themselves,
ant's
absolute,
his
nou-
menal?
They
ould
perhaps
be
likened
o
the
uniqueparticulars
f theSautrant-
ikas,
the
onception
o
elaborately xplained
y
Th.
Stcherbatsky,26
ut
hardly
to theMadhyamaka onception femptinessrtheultimateruth.
Now
what
of
Kant's
notionof
the
phenomenal,
he
absolutely
nknowable
things-in-themselves
nown
through
he
forms f
time,
pace,
substance,
nd
causality?
Kant
believed
hese
forms
o be
necessary
nd
unalterable,
nd so
from
he
Madhyamaka
point
of
view
inescapablyontological.27
or
Kant,
empirical
knowledge
was
true,
unlike
metaphysics,
ecause
here,
reason
was
limited
o its
proper
phere.
This
was
natural
nough
for
one
who
wished
to
guarantee
he
philosophical
oundations
f
science,
ut
for
he
Madhyamaka,
the
onventional r
apparitional
ruth
s
neither
ecessary
nd
unalterable,
or
s
empirical nowledgerue.Thefirstfthese onsiderationsas
important
ami-
fications or
the
results f
the
Kantian
and the
Madhyamaka
philosophical
exercises,
espectively,
nd the
econd,
pplied
to themore
recent
ttempt
o see
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8/20/2019 The Madhyamaka and Modern Western Philosophy
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50 Della Santina
similarities
etween
he
Madhyamaka
and the school
of
language analysis,
disallows
nother
opularmisconception
f the
Madhyamakaphilosophy.
Kant's
philosophy ields
ew xistential
enefits,
ecause
n
consonancewith
theWestern
hilosophical
raditiont s concernedwith
escription
ather han
with
hange.
As Hume was
pleased
to
go
back to
playing
ackgammon
fter
having ndulged
himselfn
philosophical iversions,
o
Kant
was
resigned
o
continuing
o live
n
a world
of
llusion,
inally
nd
unalterably
ondemned o
ignorance
f
he
bsolute,
he
higher
ruth,
xcept erhaps hrough
aith. hus
he
damned
man
through
hilosophy
n
order o save
him
hrough eligion,
ut no
such
maneuvers re
necessary
or
he
Madhyamaka.
The
only
positive
esult f
Kant's
critique
f
metaphysics
hich oes
not
dependupon
revelation,
s that t
ostensively
urbs
he
pretensions
f
metaphysicians
nd
limits
nowledge
o the
empirical.
As a
consequence,
hilosophers
re
warned
o
avoid the
forbidden
ground
f
rational
sychology,
peculative osmology,
nd natural
heology
nd
areencouraged o concentrateheir escriptivealents,uch s theymaybe,on
the
phere
f the
mpirical.
For the
Madhyamaka,
heforms
f
experience-space,
time,
ubstance,
nd
causality-are
neither
ecessary
nd
unalterable,
or
are
they
ntrinsically
rue
even
on the evel
f
conventional
ruth.
y
the
ame
token,
heultimate
ruth,
r
emptiness,
s
not
n
principle
nknowable.
he forms f the
mind,
pace,
nd so
on are
for the
Madhyamaka
the
result
f
conceptualization
onditioned
y
mental
mpressions
nd
corresponding
o
conceptual
onstructions;
hey
re,
n
other
words, bjectifiedoncepts.
he
habitual
endencies
hat
give
rise o these
forms
f
experience
an
be
self-consciously
ltered,
nd
this ndeed
s the im
of
the
Madhyamaka philosophy.
The ultimate
ruth,
nlike
Kant's
things-in-
themselves,
s knowable
not
onlyby
nondual
perception
ouchsafed
y
medita-
tion,
ut
lso
by
nference,
or
By
the
eason
hat unders
onceptualisation,
he
ultimate
s
known
mediately. 28
he result
f
this
knowledge
f the
ultimate
mediately
nd
mmediately
s the
progressive
ransformation
f
experience
rom
the
undesirable
o the
desirable.
his
s
possible,
or he
Madhyamaka,
ecause
neither
he conventional
or
the
ultimate
s set
up
as an
ontological
ntity
existings it wereobjectivelynd in itsownright. othare rathermodesof
experience,
he
latter
preferable
ecause
psychologically
nd
soteriologically
desirable.
n other
words,
hat
which
makesone
free
s the
truth.
It
is of course
not
suggested
hat
Murti s oblivious
to
all or
any
of
these
considerations.
What is
suggested
s
that,
persuaded
by
the
fascination
f
a
conceptual
nalogy,
istreatment
fthe
Madhyamaka
hilosophy
n relation
o
Kantian
concepts
nd
his
iberal
se
of
Kantian
terminology
nexorably
ead
to
the
mergence
f
a
somewhat
istorted
icture
f
the
Madhyamaka.
This s not
to
deny
he
lluminating
haracter
f much
of what
Murti
has to
say
about
the
Madhyamaka. t is to warnofthedanger facceptinghe pplicabilityfalien
concepts
nd
terminology
o
a
system
f
thought
o
patently
ifferent
n
its
orientation
nd
fundamental
oncern.
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51
LANGUAGE ANALYSIS
The
Madhyamaka,
as
it
has been
suggested,
s a
system
f
soteriology.
he
system
works
by
the
application
of
progressive egations
f
(perhaps
better)
correctives. hus the
ultimate ruth
egates
r
corrects
he
conventional,
hile
theultimate ruths tself egated rcorrectedyenforcingherecognitionf ts
therapeutic
unction
o
the xclusion f
any
ontological
laim
on
itsbehalf.
t
is
suggested
hat he Kantian
nterpretation,
y
making
he
Madhyamaka
nto
a
kindof
transcendental
bsolutism,
mphasizes
he
negation
f
the
onventional,
while he
nterpretation
long
the ines
uggested y
modern
anguage
nalysis,
by
making
he
Madhyamaka
nto
kindof
positivism,mphasizes
he
negation
of the
negation
f the conventional
ruth,
hat
s,
the
negation
f the
ultimate
truth.
owever,
he
negation
f
a
negation
or he
Madhyamaka
does not
mean
the
reinstatementf
the
riginal ypothesis.
hen
t
s
said that he
herapy
s
no
longer eededonce thedisorder as beencured, his s nottoaccept hedisorder
as it
was before he
therapy
was
applied.
Streng
nd
Gudmunsen ike
to
emphasize
hefact
hat,
ike
Wittgenstein,
he
Madhyamakarejects
he notionof
an
extralinguistic
eferent
f words.
This
is
indeedto
say very
ittle hat s new or
revealing
bout the
Madhyamaka.
The
theory
hatwordsmust
efer o
objects
was
chiefly
dvocated
by
the
Naiyayikas
in
ancient
ndia, and,
like the whole
of their
philosophy
f naive
realism,
t
was a
favorite
bject
of
refutation
or
the
Madhyamaka.
However,
does
the
Madhyamaka's rejection f the notionof an extralinguisticeferentfwords
mean that t
endorses he
everyday
se of
anguage
s somehow
valuable
n
its
own
right?
oes
it
mean,
as
Gudmunsen
uggests,
hat
he
result
f
the Mad-
hyamaka
ritique
s
to
leave
everything
ore
or less as it
s?29The latter n
fact
refers o the
Zen
story
which
uns,
Before
you
have
studied
en,
mountains re
mountains nd
rivers re
rivers;
while
you
are
studying
t,
mountains re no
longer
mountains
nd
rivers re no
longer
ivers;
ut
once
you
havehad
Enlight-
enment,
mountains
re once
again
mountains nd
rivers re
rivers.
0
Waldo
goes
so far
s to claim
that
rdinary
anguage
tatementsre
paradigms
f what
wecalltrue ndcoherent,3so is tthen he nd oftheMadhyamakaphilosophy
simply
o
et
veryone
o
back
to
playing ackgammon
r
the
ordinary
anguage
game
with
he
assurance hat
here
ies
truth?
Wittgenstein,
ike
Kant,
was
interestedn
securing
egitimacy
hrough
elimi-
tation.
Kant
wanted o
rescue
hilosophy
rom
isrepute
hrough
imiting
eason
to the
mpirical.
his
enabledhim
o
disallow
metaphysics
nd
so
open
the
way
for
eligion.
Wittgenstein
anted
o
rescue
hilosophy
rom
onflictnd
perplex-
ity
hrough
imiting
he
philosophical nterprise
o
the
description
f
anguage
and
language
tself
o ts
everyday
ather han
ts
metaphysical
se.
In
this
way,
hebelievedhecoulddissolve
hilosophical
roblems.
Whileboththese
philoso-
phers
re
concerned
with
aving
omething
f
the
descriptive
unction
f
philo-
sophy,
he
Madhyamaka
has
nothing
o
save,
neither
he
metaphysical
or
the
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52 Della Santina
ordinary
se of
concepts
nd
language.
The
Madhyamaka
s not interested
in
description,
ut
in
freedom,
hich nterests after ll a reflectionf their
respective
raditions.
If
Wittgenstein
iffersrom ant
n
his
ttitude
owards
he oleof
philosophy
in
personal
ife,
t
s
n
that
he
no
onger
eels
otally
ound
o
eave
religion
lone,
to divorce tas itwerefrom hilosophy. hisperhapsreflectsheprogressive
liberalization
n
the
Western
hilosophical
radition
hich ccurred etween
he
eighteenth
nd
the
twentiethenturies.
onetheless,
hediscernible
oteriolog-
ical
flavor f
some of
Wittgenstein's
tterancesan
hardlyustify
he
complete
redefinitionf
philosophy
within he
Western
radition.
t
may
be
true,
s
Gudmunsen
uggests,
hat
Wittgenstein
ith
his
religious
oncern
its ather
uncomfortably
nto
a
philosophical
radition otable
for ts ack of existential
relevance,32
ut
Nagarjuna's
position
s
a
so-called
philosophical
writer
n
a
religious
radition
s
by
no means similar.
Wittgenstein
s
something
f an
anomalyntheWesternradition,utNagarjuna'sphilosophy ccupies central
place
in
what
can
easily
be termed
he
predominant
uddhist
eligious
radi-
tion.
Moreover,
Wittgenstein's
ilt
oward
oteriology,
efreshing
s
it
s
in
the
context
f heWestern
hilosophical
radition,
upplies
nly
shallow nd
timid
suggestion
f
freedom
ompared
with hedramatic
nd radical
ransformation
of
experience
ffered
y
the
Madhyamaka.
So
what f
he
Wittgensteinian
laim
madeon
behalf f he
Madhyamaka
hat
the
end of
the
philosophical
xercise
s
to leave
everything
s
it
s?
Nagarjuna
neverdenied therelevance f the wholegamut
of ethical nd
psychological
practices
ffered
y
the
Buddhist radition
s
effective
eans of
altering
he
undesirable
haracter
f
experience
onditioned
y negative
nd dualistic
ro-
pensities
nd so
of
realizing
he transformed
ode of
experience
nown
as
enlightenment.
f
the nd
of
the
process
s the
discarding
f
the
pparatus
s
in-
dicated
n
works ike
he
Mulamadhyamakakdrikd,
t s
analogous
o thediscard-
ing
f
he
aft nce
the iver as
been rossed.33
t
s
not
antamount
o
remaining
on
thenear ide
of
theriver
r,
worse,
eturning
o
t.
s
ittherefore
redible
hat,
for
he
Madhyamaka,
he
nd
of
soteriology
hould
be
a return o
the
mode of
experienceftheman nthe treet,nacceptance f he rdinaryseof anguage
as
a
paradigm
f
truth?
f there
s a
return or he
Madhyamaka,
t s
a
return
dictated
y
he
equirements
f ltruistic
oteriology,
ot
by
positive
valuation
of
the
ordinary
se of
anguage
nd the
ordinary
mode
of
experience.
For
the
Madhyamaka,
anguage
nd
ordinary
xperience
re
neither
rue
nor
false.34
f the
Madhyamaka
esorts
o
ordinary
modes
of
expression
n
order
o
suggest
he
transformed
ode of
experience
hich s
the
goal
of
the
oteriolog-
ical
process,
t is
merely
concession
o a conventional
sage
sustained
y
a
prevalent
llusion.
The
Madhyamakas
are
very xplicit
bout their
ondem-
nationofordinaryinguisticonvention. ll these onventionsre determined
by
a
fundamental
rror,
henature f
which s
likened o a
mirage,
dream,
nd
a
magical
llusion.35
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53
CONCLUSION
The
Madhyamaka
eaches
he
middle
way,
philosophical
ttitude
nshrined
n
the
very
ame
of
the
ystem.
he middle
way
s
soteriologically
esirable ecause
it
prevents ntanglement
n
extremes-that
s,
n imited
ositions
which
mpede
freedom.No doubt the
Madhyamaka
makes use
of
positions
and
even
of
propositionsntheworkingutof ts oteriology.he literaturef the ystems
replete
with
such
formulations:
ealism,
dealism,
self,
not-self,
nd so
on.
Nonetheless,
o
interpret
he
system
y
choosing
to
emphasize
ny
of these
formulations-the
egation
f the
ordinary
mode,
the
negation
f the
negation
ofthe
ordinary
mode-to
interpret
t
as
absolutism, ihilism,
r
positivism,
s
to
miss
hereal
point
fthe
ystem
nd to
gnore
hedifferenceetween
hilosophy
and
soteriology.
t
is for his easonthat he
nterpretation
f the
Madhyamaka
in
terms f Kantian or
Wittgensteinian
hought
s
hardly atisfactory.
There s no doubt thatphilosophyntheWest s beginningo showsignsof
transcending
he
constraints hich
he
history
f
ts
origins
nd
earlydevelop-
ment
mposed
upon
t.
A
number
f
ndicationswhich
may
be
gleaned
from he
approaches
dopted by
anguage nalysis,
xistentialism,
henomenology,
nd
post-structuralism
re all evidence
of
the dawn
of a new attitude
n
Western
philosophy.
espite
all
this,
n
the
opinion
of the
author,
Western
hilosophy
has
yet
to
produce
a
system
f
thought
hat
successfully
nitesthe
rigor
of
philosophy
with he
relevance f
religion
n an
integratedystem
f
soteriology
capable
of
providing
ccess to freedom
n
its fullest
nd most
complete
ense.
Such a systems available ntheMadhyamaka.36
NOTES
1.
John
Hospers,
An
ntroduction
o
Philosophical nalysis
London:
Routledge
nd
Kegan
Paul
Limited,
956),
pp.
183ff.
2.
L.
Jamspal
nd
P.
Della
Santina,
The
Heartof
nterdependent
rigination,
heJournal
f
the
Department
f
Buddhist
tudies
University
f
Delhi,
1974),
verse and
commentary.
3.
Ibid.,p.
496.
4.
Majjhima
Nikdya
,
pp.
426-432
(Sutta 63);
pp.
483-484
(Sutta 72);
Samryutta
ikdya
II,
pp.
257ff;
arhyutta
ikaya
V,
pp.
374-403
Vacchagotta
amyuttam
nd
Avyakata
amyuttan).
5.
Sarhyutta
ikaya
I,
p.
17.
6.
Majjhima
Nikdya
,
426ff
Cila Malufikya
utta).
7.
Nagarjuna,
RatndvalT
I,
verse113.
8.
The Heart
of
nterdependentrigination,
erse
5 and
commentary.
9.
Nagarjuna,
Sunyatdsaptati,
erse50
author's
ranslation).
10.
Nagarjuna,
Malamadhyamakakdrikd,
hap.
18,
verse
5.
11.
Nagarjuna,
Mahdydna
Viizaka,
trans.
by
Susumu
Yamaguchi,
n
The
EasternBuddhist
,
no.
2
(Kyoto, 1927),
verse10.
12.
Quoted
from
the
Vyavahdra
iddhi
of
Nagarjuna
in
the
Madhyamakalahkarapanjikd
f
KamalaSila author's ranslation).
13.
Ratndval
I,
verses104-106.
14.
Mulamadhyamakakdrikd
V,
verses and 7.
15.
Ibid.,
,
verse 2.
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54 Della Santina
16. M.
Sprung,
ucid
Exposition
f
theMiddle
Way
Boulder,
Colorado,
Great
Eastern,
980).
17.
Cheng,
Hsueh-Li,
Nagarjuna,
Kant
and
Wittgenstein:
he San-Lun
MadhyamikaExpo-
sition f
Emptiness,
ournal
f
Religious
tudies
7
1981):
79.
18.
Candrakirti,
rasannapadd,
ommentary
o
Mulamadhyamakakdrikd
VIII,
verses and 8.
19.
Hospers,
ntroduction
.
185.
20.
MajjhimaNikdya
,
pp.
426ff
Cula Malunkya
utta).
21.
Murti,
T. R.
V.,
The Central
hilosophy
f
Buddhism
London: George
Allen and
Unwin,
1955),pp. 123-124.
22.
Cheng, Nagarjuna,
Kant
and
Wittgenstein, .
75.
23.
Mulamadhyamakakdrikd,
XIV,
verse
10.
24.
Ibid.,
XIII,
verses
and
8;
XXII,
verse11.
25.
Cheng,
Nagarjuna,
Kant and
Wittgenstein,
.
68.
26.
Th.
Stcherbatsky,
uddhist
ogic,
vol.
1
New
York: Dover
Publications,
962).
27.
Mulamadhyamakakdrikd,
V,
verse .
28.
Madhyamakdlankdrakdrikd,
erse
5
(author's
ranslation).
29.
C.
Gudmunsen,
Wittgenstein
nd
Buddhism
London:
Macmillan,
977),
p.
44.
30.
Ibid.,
p.
69.
31. I.
Waldo,
Nagarjuna
and
Analytic
hilosophy, hilosophy
ast and
West
8,
no. 3
(July
1978).
32.
Gudmunsen,
Wittgenstein
nd
Buddhism,
p.
68-80.
33.
Majjhima
Nikdya,
.,
p.
135
Alaguddupama
utta).
34.
RatndvalT,I,
verses 04-106.
35.
Muilamadhyamakakdrikd,
II,
verse 4
Sunyatdsaptati
erse).
36.
Prasannapadd,
CIII,
verse
;
and
XXII,
verse
16
author's
ranslation).
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