network neutrality rules for a digital economy · network neutrality rules for a digital economy...

Post on 25-Sep-2020

3 Views

Category:

Documents

0 Downloads

Preview:

Click to see full reader

TRANSCRIPT

Network Neutrality Rules

for a Digital Economy

Barbara van Schewick

Professor of Law and (by Courtesy) Electrical Engineering,

Stanford University

@vanschewick

11th International CRC Workshop on Regulation

August 29, 2016

I. Background

II. Criteria for Evaluating Net Neutrality Rules

III. Rules

IV. Zero-rating

2

I. Background

3

What is network neutrality?

4

Original Internet

5

Network is application-blind

6

Network can’t control

7

Users decide

8

Today network can control

9

Network neutrality rules

limit network providers‘ ability to interfere

10

I. Background

11

II. Criteria for Evaluating Net Neutrality Rules

12

13

Factors

14

Story 1

15

17

Architecture

18

19

The End-to-End Arguments

(Broad Version)

Network to provide only general services

of broad utility across applications

Network not optimized in favor of specific applications

All application-specific functionality at end hosts

Two versions

20

21

The End-to-End Arguments

(Broad Version)

Network to provide only general services

of broad utility across applications

Network not optimized in favor of specific applications

All application-specific functionality at end hosts

Network is general

22

Innovators decide independently

23

Network is general

24

Users decide independently

25

Low cost of innovation

26

Many different people can innovate

27

Innovation without permission

28

Innovation without permission

User Choice

29

Innovation without permission

User Choice

Low costs of innovation,

very large and diverse group of innovators

30

Story 2

31

32

33

Architecture

34

35

The End-to-End Arguments

Broad Version

Network only general services of broad utility across

applications

Network not optimized in favor of specific applications

All application-specific functionality at end hosts

Consequence: Network is application-blind

Network is application-blind

36

Network can’t control

37

Today network can control

38

Increase profits

39

Unwanted content

40

Manage bandwidth

41

Network can control.

Innovators don’t innovate.

Investors don’t invest.

42

Users decide

vs.

Network providers decide

43

The Impact of Changes

44

45

Market?

€$

€ $€$

Potential Innovator

Benefits > Costs?

Yes:

InnovateNo:

Do not Innovate

Economic Theory

CostsBenefits

46

Market?

€$

€ $€$

Potential Innovator

Benefits > Costs?

Yes:

InnovateNo:

Do not Innovate

Economic Theory

CostsBenefits

Many different innovators decide.

User decide.

47

More and more diverse

vs.

Fewer and less diverse

48

Under uncertainty or user heterogeneity

More and better innovation

that better meets user needs

49

More and more diverse innovators

50

More and more diverse ideas

51

More ideas realized

52

Less and less diverse innovators

53

Less ideas realized

54

Widespread experimentation

Large, diverse group of innovators

55

Users decide

vs.

Network providers decide

56

Innovation without permission

57

Innovation without permission

User choice

58

Innovation without permission

User choice

Network can’t control

59

Innovation without permission

User choice

Application-blindness

Low costs of innovation,

very large and diverse group of innovators

60

III. Rules

61

62

Blocking

Discrimination

Limits on Charging Application Providers

63

Blocking

Discrimination

Limits on Charging Application Providers

64

Blocking

Discrimination

Limits on Charging Application Providers

No discrimination

Between applications and classes of applications

65

Netflix & YouTube vs. XFinityTV.com

66

Internet telephony vs. Online video

67

No discrimination

Between applications and classes of applications

Allow application-agnostic discrimination

68

Exception:

69

Reasonable network management

70

Targeted, tailored

As application-agnostic as possible

71

72

Blocking

Discrimination

Limits on Charging Application Providers

Limits on Charging

* for access to users

* for preferential treatment

73

No discrimination based on provider payments

74

75

76

77

78

Innovation and economic growth

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

All sectors of the economy

87

Democracy and culture

88

89

90

91

92

Collateral damage

93

The devil is in the details

94

Network Neutrality and Quality of Service

95

IV. Zero-rating

96

Zero-rating

Exempting applications from data caps

97

How to think about zero-rating?

98

99

makes zero-rated apps more attractive

100

makes zero-rated apps more attractive

powerful tool to favor some apps over others

101

makes zero-rated apps more attractive

powerful tool to favor some apps over others

same problems as technical discrimination

data

102

powerful impact on user behavior

103

users strongly prefer zero-rated content

104

zero-rating directly limits user choice

105

106

unlimited video

vs.

9 min per day

107

108

109

four forms of zero-rating

110

111

zero-rating for a fee

112

zero-rating for a fee

zero-rating some apps, but not similar apps

113

zero-rating for a fee

zero-rating some apps, but not similar apps

zero-rating all apps in a class

114

zero-rating for a fee

zero-rating some apps, but not similar apps

zero-rating all apps in a class

application-agnostic zero-rating

zero-rating for a fee

115

zero-rating for a fee

same problems as fast lanes

116

zero-rating some apps, but not similar apps

117

zero-rating some apps, but not similar apps

(no fee)

118

zero-rating some apps, but not similar apps

(no fee)

same problems as speeding up some apps

119

120

zero-rating all apps in a class

121

zero-rating all apps in a class

(no fee)

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

slippery slope

131

environment for innovation

132

who gets to chose

133

harm to consumers

134

application-agnostic zero-rating

135

application-agnostic zero-rating

(no fee)

136

137

138

139

140

141

More:

@vanschewick

http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/barbara-van-schewick

142

143

144

Interconnection with last-mile networks

145

146

147

Is this a network neutrality problem?

148

149

150

151

152

153

154

top related