ecb interventions in distressed sovereign debt markets: the case of
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ECB interventions in distressed sovereign debt markets:
The case of Greek bonds
Christoph Trebesch and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Discussion by:Athanasios Orphanides
MIT
Macroeconomics After the Great Recession
IMF Seventeenth Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference
Washington DC, November 3–4, 20161
Pertinent questions
I Do central bank purchases of sovereign debt reduce long-term yields?
I Do the modalities of asset purchases matter?I CommunicationI Clarity of objectiveI TransparencyI Commitment
I Was the ECB’s SMP effective?
2
Findings
I ECB SMP purchases of Greek debt had a sizeable temporary effect on yields.
I Effect was highly localized, reducing yields of specific securities purchasedand only as long as purchases continued.
I The SMP did not achieve a generalized sustained reduction of yields.
I The result is in stark contrast to evidence on QE programs. QE delivers ageneralized reduction of yields beyond the securities purchased. (e.g.D’Amico and King, 2013, for Fed’s QE program.)
3
Praise and lessons
I Amazingly resourceful use of public data sources and careful empiricalanalysis shed light on an episode where the ECB has not been transparent.
I An important implicit lesson for designing asset purchase programs: Acentral bank’s clear communication and commitment to reduce yields maybe far more important than the quantity of actual purchases made.
I Results raise questions about the wisdom of ECB’s SMP decision, which wasalready quite controversial when made. (Under its current secrecy norms,the ECB may keep the identity of dissenters under wraps until 2040.)
I Failure of the ECB’s SMP raises further uncomfortable questions about theoverall mismanagement of the euro area crisis.
4
Some questions about the SMP
I What was the ultimate objective?
I Was it “monetary policy”?
I What determined the size and timing of purchases?
I What determined the member states whose debt was purchased?
I Was there explicit or implicit conditionality involved?
5
A snapshot of the SMP (after its termination)3/7/13 ECB: Details on securities holdings acquired under the Securities Markets Programme
www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr130221_1.en.html 1/2
PRESS RELEASE
21 February 2013 - Details on securities holdings acquired under the SecuritiesMarkets Programme
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) decided today to publish the Eurosystem’s holdings ofsecurities acquired under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). This decision is in line with the envisagedtransparency stance for the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) as communicated on 6 September 2012, atwhich time the SMP was terminated.
To this end the following table shows the breakdown of the Eurosystem’s SMP holdings as at 31 December 2012,per country of issuer, indicated at nominal value, book value and average remaining maturity.
Issuer country
Outstanding amounts
Average remaining maturity (in years)Nominal amount
(EUR billion)Book value [1]
(EUR billion)
Ireland 14.2 13.6 4.6
Greece 33.9 30.8 3.6
Spain 44.3 43.7 4.1
Italy 102.8 99.0 4.5
Portugal 22.8 21.6 3.9
Total 218.0 208.7 4.3
[1]The SMP holdings are classified as held-to-maturity and consequently valued at amortised cost.
European Central Bank Directorate General Communications and Language Services Press and Information DivisionKaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main Tel.: +49 69 1344 7455, Fax: +49 69 1344 7404 Internet:http://www.ecb.europa.euReproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged.
6
SMP: Government bond purchases with conditionality?
“Dear Prime Minister,
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank discussed on 4 August thesituation in Italy’s government bond markets. The Governing Council considers thatpressing action by the Italian authorities is essential to restore the confidence ofinvestors. . . .
In view of the severity of the current financial market situation, we regard as crucialthat all actions listed in section 1 and 2 above be taken as soon as possible withdecree-laws, followed by Parliamentary ratification by end September 2011. Aconstitutional reform tightening fiscal rules would also be appropriate. . . .
We trust that the Government will take all the appropriate actions.”
(Letter by Mario Draghi and Jean-Claude Trichet sent to Silvio Berlusconi on August5, 2011, as published by Italian press.)
7
The data: Official Gazette of the Hellenic Republic
ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΩΝ ΓΕΝΙΚΟ ΛΟΓΙΣΤΗΡΙΟ ΤΟΥ ΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ ΓΕΝΙΚΗ ΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΣΗ ΘΗΣΑΥΡΟΦΥΛΑΚΙΟΥΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΫΠΟΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΥΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΣΗ :23η Δημοσίου ΧρέουςΤΜΗΜΑ: Α΄
Αθήνα, 15 Φεβρουαρίου 2012 Αριθ. Πρωτ. 2/13203/0023Α
ΑΝΑΡΤΗΤΕΑ ΣΤΟ ΔΙΑΔΙΚΤΥΟ(Πρόγραμμα Διαύγεια
Ν. 3861/2010)Ν.
Δημοσιεύθηκε στο ΦΕΚ 574 Β/2012
Ταχ. Δ/νση : Πανεπιστημίου 37Ταχ. Κώδικας : 101 65 Αθήνα
ΘΕΜΑ:«Απόφαση ανταλλαγής ομολόγων του Ελληνικού Δημοσίου».
ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗΟ ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΣ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΩΝ
Έχοντας υπόψη:
1. Τις διατάξεις του άρθρου 1 του ν.2187/94 «Ρύθμιση θεμάτων δημοσίου χρέους» (ΦΕΚ 16Α/8.2.1994).
2. Τις διατάξεις των άρθρων 5 έως και 12 του ν.2198/1994 «Αύξηση αποδοχών δημοσίων υπαλλήλων εν γένει, σύναψη δανείων υπό του Ελληνικού Δημοσίου και δημιουργία στην Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος Συστήματος Παρακολούθησης Συναλλαγών επί τίτλων με λογιστική μορφή (άυλοι τίτλοι)» (ΦΕΚ 43Α/22.3.1994).
3. Τις διατάξεις των άρθρων 31 και 32 του ν.1914/90 «Εκσυγχρονισμός και ανάπτυξη του Δημόσιου τομέα και της Κεφαλαιαγοράς, φορολογικές ρυθμίσεις και άλλες διατάξεις» (ΦΕΚ 178Α/17.12.1990).
4. Τις διατάξεις του άρθρου 11 του ν.2459/1997 «Κατάργηση φορολογικών απαλλαγών και άλλες διατάξεις» (ΦΕΚ 17 Α’ /18.2.1997), όπως τροποποιήθηκε με το άρθρο 9 του ν. 2579/98 (ΦΕΚ 31 Α/1998).
5. Τις διατάξεις των άρθρων 90 & 91 του ν. 2362/1995 «Περί Δημοσίου Λογιστικού, ελέγχου των δαπανών του Κράτους κ.α.δ.» (ΦΕΚ 247 Α/1995) και του άρθρου 64 του παραπάνω νόμου, όπως τροποποιήθηκε και ισχύει με το άρθρο 38 του ν. 3871/2010 (ΦΕΚ 141 Α/2010).
6. Την αριθμ. 2021180/2981/0023/31.3.1997 απόφαση του Υπουργού των Οικονομικών «Περί των δαπανών σύναψης, έκδοσης και εξυπηρέτησης κλπ. των δανείων του δημοσίου (ΦΕΚ 286/Β/10.4.1997)».
7. Την αριθμ.2/4627/0023/25.01.2001 απόφαση του Υπουργού Οικονομικών «Καθορισμός όρων, τύπου και κειμένου των ομολόγων Ελληνικού Δημοσίου σε Ευρώ, σταθερού επιτοκίου (ΦΕΚ 370 Β/2001)».
8. Την αριθ. 2/20187/0023/Α/20-4-2004 (ΦΕΚ 670/Β/10-5-2004) απόφαση του Υπουργού Οικονομικών «Καθορισμός γενικών όρων, τύπου και κειμένου των ομολόγων Ελληνικού Δημοσίου σε Ευρώ, κυμαινόμενου επιτοκίου».
9. Τις αποφάσεις έκδοσης του Υπουργού Οικονομικών με αρ. πρωτ. 2/11184/0023Α/13-2-2009, 2/13482/0023Α/27-2-2007, 2/20947/0023Α/18-3-2008, 2/5004/0023Α/26-1-2009, 2/6276/0023Α/29-1-2010,
1
ΑΔΑ: Β44ΥΗ-3ΜΝ
ISIN υφιστάμενων
ομολόγων προς ανταλλαγή
Ημ/νία έκδοσης
Ημ/νία λήξης Τοκομερίδιο
Ονομ. αξία ομολόγων προς ανταλλαγή (€)
GR0110021236 17/2/2009 20/3/2012 4,30% 4.273.195.000,00GR0114020457 2/3/2007 20/8/2012 4,10% 2.517.423.000,00GR0114021463 26/3/2008 20/8/2013 4,00% 1.902.000.000,00GR0114022479 28/1/2009 20/8/2014 5,50% 3.565.820.000,00GR0114023485 2/2/2010 20/8/2015 6,10% 3.020.300.000,00GR0118012609 7/4/2010 20/4/2017 5,90% 1.185.800.000,00GR0124018525 17/1/2002 18/5/2012 5,25% 2.073.950.000,00GR0124021552 17/1/2003 20/5/2013 4,60% 3.288.645.000,00GR0124022568 3/7/2003 3/7/2013 3,90% 84.300.000,00GR0124024580 13/1/2004 20/5/2014 4,50% 2.868.250.000,00GR0124025595 1/7/2004 1/7/2014 4,50% 30.000.000,00GR0124026601 22/2/2005 20/7/2015 3,70% 2.095.880.000,00GR0124028623 18/1/2006 20/7/2016 3,60% 1.446.070.000,00GR0124029639 17/1/2007 20/7/2017 4,30% 2.412.206.000,00GR0124030645 13/5/2008 20/7/2018 4,60% 1.255.900.000,00GR0124031650 11/3/2009 19/7/2019 6,00% 3.317.950.000,00GR0124032666 11/3/2010 19/6/2020 6,25% 1.132.350.000,00GR0128001584 20/5/1998 20/5/2013 7,50% 779.550.000,00GR0128002590 11/1/1999 11/1/2014 6,50% 1.424.750.000,00GR0133001140 22/10/1999 22/10/2019 6,50% 1.450.650.000,00GR0133002155 24/4/2002 22/10/2022 5,90% 539.300.000,00GR0133003161 30/5/2007 20/3/2024 4,70% 1.090.870.000,00GR0133004177 10/11/2009 20/3/2026 5,30% 696.706.000,00GR0138001673 7/3/2005 20/9/2037 4,50% 16.800.000,00GR0512001356 11/2/2009 20/2/2013 6M Euribor + 2,00% 121.278.000,00GR0514017145 21/5/2009 21/5/2014 6M Euribor + 1,30% 40.000.000,00GR0528002315 4/4/2005 4/4/2017 6M Euribor + 0,09% 48.000.000,00IT0006527532 11/3/1999 11/3/2019 5,00% 17.117.000,00
XS0097596463 21/5/1999 21/5/201410YEAR EUSA10*0,85
(floor 4,00%) 1.000.000,00XS0260024277 5/7/2006 5/7/2018 6M Euribor + 0,09% 14.000.000,00XS0357333029 11/4/2008 11/4/2016 6M Euribor + 0,075% 22.800.000,00
Σύνολο 42.732.860.000,00
3. Για την πραγματοποίηση της ανταλλαγής εκδίδονται νέα ομόλογα, χωρίς δυνατότητα αποκοπής τοκομεριδίων και ξεχωριστής τους διαπραγμάτευσης, με τους παρακάτω όρους:
Α) Ομόλογα με ημερομηνία έκδοσης 15.02.2012, ημερομηνία λήξης 20.03.2012, έναρξη 1ης τοκοφόρου περιόδου 20.03.2011, ημερομηνία πληρωμής πρώτου τοκομεριδίου 20.03.2012 και ISIN GR0106004808. Κατά τα λοιπά ισχύουν οι όροι έκδοσης του ISIN GR0110021236 (Απόφαση Υπουργού Οικονομικών με αρ. πρωτ.2/11184/0023Α/13-2-2009).B) Ομόλογα με ημερομηνία έκδοσης 15.02.2012, ημερομηνία λήξης 20.08.2012, έναρξη 1ης τοκοφόρου περιόδου 20.08.2011, ημερομηνία πληρωμής πρώτου τοκομεριδίου 20.08.2012 και ISIN GR0106006829. Κατά τα λοιπά ισχύουν οι όροι έκδοσης του ISIN GR0114020457 (Απόφαση Υπουργού Οικονομικών με αρ. πρωτ. 2/13482/0023Α/27-2-2007).Γ) Ομόλογα με ημερομηνία έκδοσης 15.02.2012, ημερομηνία λήξης 20.08.2013, έναρξη 1ης τοκοφόρου περιόδου 20.08.2011, ημερομηνία πληρωμής πρώτου τοκομεριδίου 20.08.2012 και ISIN GR0108007460.
3
ΑΔΑ: Β44ΥΗ-3ΜΝ
8
The immediate impact of purchases on bond yields
36
Figure 4: The Greek bond yield curve – before and after May 9, 2010
This figure plots the Greek yield curve pre-SMP (on May 7) as well as 1 and 8 weeks after its start (May 17 and July 5, respectively). The sample includes all Greek sovereign bonds for which yield data were available. The size of the circles reflects the volume bought by the ECB, while the figures show ECB bond holdings as a percentage of total amount outstanding. Bonds marked in red are foreign-law bonds.
PanelA:YieldcurveonMay7(pre-SMP)
PanelB:YieldcurveonMay17(1weekafterSMPstart)
PanelC:YieldcurveonJuly5(8 weeks after SMP start)
0
9
0
00000
0 0
0
30333329
3824
2636
21
34
7
22
0
1921162123
31
31
18
6 10 10
0 00
0
2
68
1012
1416
Yie
ld to
mat
urity
(May
7)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Bond Maturity (remaining, in May 2010)
0
9
00 0000
0 0
0
303333
2938 24
2636
2134
7
22
0
1921162123
3131
186 10 10
0 00
0
2
510
15
Yie
ld to
mat
urity
(May
17)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Bond maturity (remaining)
0
9
00
0
00
0
3033332938 24
26
3621347 220
192116212331
31 18610 10
0 00
0
2
510
15
Yie
ld to
mat
urity
(Aug
6)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Bond maturity (remaining)
36
Figure 4: The Greek bond yield curve – before and after May 9, 2010
This figure plots the Greek yield curve pre-SMP (on May 7) as well as 1 and 8 weeks after its start (May 17 and July 5, respectively). The sample includes all Greek sovereign bonds for which yield data were available. The size of the circles reflects the volume bought by the ECB, while the figures show ECB bond holdings as a percentage of total amount outstanding. Bonds marked in red are foreign-law bonds.
PanelA:YieldcurveonMay7(pre-SMP)
PanelB:YieldcurveonMay17(1weekafterSMPstart)
PanelC:YieldcurveonJuly5(8 weeks after SMP start)
0
9
0
00000
0 0
0
30333329
3824
2636
21
34
7
22
0
1921162123
31
31
18
6 10 10
0 00
0
2
68
1012
1416
Yie
ld to
mat
urity
(May
7)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Bond Maturity (remaining, in May 2010)
0
9
00 0000
0 0
0
303333
2938 24
2636
2134
7
22
0
1921162123
3131
186 10 10
0 00
0
2
510
15
Yie
ld to
mat
urity
(May
17)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Bond maturity (remaining)
0
9
00
0
00
0
3033332938 24
26
3621347 220
192116212331
31 18610 10
0 00
0
2
510
15
Yie
ld to
mat
urity
(Aug
6)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Bond maturity (remaining)
Reproduced from Figure 4. Dramatic drop in yields.
9
The impact of purchases on bond yields: After most purchases
36
Figure 4: The Greek bond yield curve – before and after May 9, 2010
This figure plots the Greek yield curve pre-SMP (on May 7) as well as 1 and 8 weeks after its start (May 17 and July 5, respectively). The sample includes all Greek sovereign bonds for which yield data were available. The size of the circles reflects the volume bought by the ECB, while the figures show ECB bond holdings as a percentage of total amount outstanding. Bonds marked in red are foreign-law bonds.
PanelA:YieldcurveonMay7(pre-SMP)
PanelB:YieldcurveonMay17(1weekafterSMPstart)
PanelC:YieldcurveonJuly5(8 weeks after SMP start)
0
9
0
00000
0 0
0
30333329
3824
2636
21
34
7
22
0
1921162123
31
31
18
6 10 10
0 00
0
2
68
1012
1416
Yie
ld to
mat
urity
(May
7)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Bond Maturity (remaining, in May 2010)
0
9
00 0000
0 0
0
303333
2938 24
2636
2134
7
22
0
1921162123
3131
186 10 10
0 00
0
2
510
15
Yie
ld to
mat
urity
(May
17)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Bond maturity (remaining)
0
9
00
0
00
0
3033332938 24
26
3621347 220
192116212331
31 18610 10
0 00
0
2
510
15
Yie
ld to
mat
urity
(Aug
6)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Bond maturity (remaining)
36
Figure 4: The Greek bond yield curve – before and after May 9, 2010
This figure plots the Greek yield curve pre-SMP (on May 7) as well as 1 and 8 weeks after its start (May 17 and July 5, respectively). The sample includes all Greek sovereign bonds for which yield data were available. The size of the circles reflects the volume bought by the ECB, while the figures show ECB bond holdings as a percentage of total amount outstanding. Bonds marked in red are foreign-law bonds.
PanelA:YieldcurveonMay7(pre-SMP)
PanelB:YieldcurveonMay17(1weekafterSMPstart)
PanelC:YieldcurveonJuly5(8 weeks after SMP start)
0
9
0
00000
0 0
0
30333329
3824
2636
21
34
7
22
0
1921162123
31
31
18
6 10 10
0 00
0
2
68
1012
1416
Yie
ld to
mat
urity
(May
7)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Bond Maturity (remaining, in May 2010)
0
9
00 0000
0 0
0
303333
2938 24
2636
2134
7
22
0
1921162123
3131
186 10 10
0 00
0
2
510
15
Yie
ld to
mat
urity
(May
17)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Bond maturity (remaining)
0
9
00
0
00
0
3033332938 24
26
3621347 220
192116212331
31 18610 10
0 00
0
2
510
15
Yie
ld to
mat
urity
(Aug
6)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Bond maturity (remaining)
Reproduced from Figure 4. A notable partial reversal by week 8 of program.
10
Ultimately the program “failed” when purchases stopped
37
Figure 5: Average bond yields and total ECB purchases The figure shows the development of bond yields, averaged across all Greek government bonds for which data were available and weighted by bond size (outstanding volume in €). Source: Bloomberg, own calculations.
Reproduced from Figure 5.11
The broader context: The SMP and the Troika program
I The SMP was just one component of larger scheme for Greek crisis.
I The ECB’s “independent” SMP decision complemented negotiations takingplace over many months between certain governments of the euro area andcertain IMF officials.
I The SMP was, in effect, an integral part of the Troika program designed todeal with the Greek issue.
I Should the design, implementation and failure of the SMP be examined inisolation of the rest of the scheme?
12
Timeline of the May 2010 Troika program for Greece
I May 8, 2010
I Summit of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area: Finalizedprocedures to implement EU/IMF program for Greece.
I May 9, 2010
I IMF: Approval of the Greek program
I EU: Ecofin/Eurogroup announce establishement of EFSF.
I ECB: SMP
13
The Original Sin of the euro crisis: 2010 program vs outcomes
2010
2015
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
Per
cent
of G
DP
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
2010
2015
5
10
15
20
25
30
5
10
15
20
25
30
Per
cent
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Deficit Unemployment
2010 series reflects estimates in program approved by IMF on 9 May 2010. 2015 seriesfrom April 2015 WEO.
14
The Original Sin of the euro crisis: 2010 program vs outcomes
2010
2015
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
260
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
260
Bill
ion
euro
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
2010
2015
80
100
120
140
160
180
80
100
120
140
160
180
Per
cent
of G
DP
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Nominal GDP Debt
2015 series for debt ratio includes effect of 2012 haircut
15
What was the Troika program about?
“It was about protecting German banks, but especially the French banks, fromdebt write offs”
(Karl Otto Pohl, Former Bundesbank President, Spiegel, May 18, 2010.)
16
Summary evaluation of Troika: Winners and losers
Germany
Greece
USA
Italy
France
Spain
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
Inde
x 20
07 =
100
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Real GDP per person, index, 2007=100. IMF WEO, October 2016.17
BibliographyBluestein, P. (2016). Laid Low: Inside the Crisis That Overwhelmed Europe and the IMF. Waterloo: Centre forInternational Governance Innovation.
D’Amico, S. and T. King (2013). Flow and Stock Effects of Large-Scale Treasury Purchases: Evidence on theImportance of Local Supply. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(2), pp. 425-448.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X12002425
Kincaid, R. (2016). The IMF’s Role in the Euro Area Crisis: What Are the Lessons from the IMFs Participationin the Troika? BP/16-02/06. Washington: International Monetary Fund. http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/
files/completedevaluations/EAC__BP_16-02_06__The_IMF_s_Role_in_the_Troika.PDF
de Las Casas, M. (2016). The IMF Executive Board and the Euro Area Crisis—Accountability, Legitimacy, andGovernance. BP/16-02/02. Washington: International Monetary Fund.http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/EAC__BP_16-02_02__The_IMF_Executive_
Board_and_the_Euro_Area_Crisis_-_Accountability__Legitimacy__and_Governance.PDF
Orphanides, A. (2015). The euro area crisis five years after the original sin. Credit and Capital Markets 4/2015,pp. 535–565. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2676103
Wyplosz, C. and S. Sgherri (2016). The IMF’s Role in Greece in the Context of the 2010 Stand-ByArrangement. BP/16-02/11. Washington: International Monetary Fund.http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/EAC__BP_16-02_11__The_IMFs_Role_in_
Greece_in_the_Context_of_the_2010_SBA.PDF
Zettelmeyer, J., C Trebesch and G. M. Gulati (2013). The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy. EconomicPolicy, 28(75), pp. 513-563. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2294273
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