American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies by Hajo HolbornReview by: M. M. KnappenThe Journal of Modern History, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Dec., 1947), pp. 345-346Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1876105 .

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS 345

York, I936), it is made clear that it was the secretary's feeling of knowledge of Japanese (or oriental) psychology which initially set the lines of American policy, the purpose being to enable the civil government of Japan, and especially the foreign minister, Shidehara, to regain con- trol over the military. This purpose was to be realized by avoiding all appearance of direct pressure on the Japanese from the outside. If the secretary had immediately called for and received the report (No. 423, III, 689-95) which Ambassador Forbes sent him under date of De- cember i8, I93I, on the autonomous power of the Japanese Army, his views in this respect might possibly have been changed earlier than they were. But it was this view that no direct pressure should be applied which-was impressed on the Council members and which helped to determine the action taken at Geneva.

Aside from confirmation of accounts already published, this volume of documents should serve to clear up some of the questions relating to the evolution at Geneva and the devolution at Paris of the relationship of the United States to the League. In this area, it is true, there is naturally little material, except by occasional reference, on the domestic factors which must have shaped Stimson's attitudes. It is made clear, however, that the policy of limited direct co-operation with the Council of the League was that of the secretary of state, following sugges- tions from Geneva, and that Ambassador Dawes at Paris acted on his detailed instruc- tions, just as did Gilbert at Geneva, although with more discretion in their application. The process of withdrawal from participation in Council meetings was begun at Geneva and continued at Paris. The change of meeting place merely made it easier to put the policy into full effect. Finally, the documents, as well as de- velopments since the Manchurian crisis, make it clear that the views consistently expressed by the Chinese and by the American embassy in China as to Japanese policy and purposes were informed rather than alarmist views and should have had more weight than they did in shaping American policy. There was some excellent re- porting from China and Manchuria-a good ex- ample being that of Hanson and Salisbury, sent on a special fact-finding mission for the United States into Manchuria. The latter's final report (enclosed in No. 374, charge in Japan [Neville] to the secretary of state, October 24, I93I, I, 3I5-28) gives a concise and accurate review of the situation to that date, together with sound

conclusions as to the reasons for, and justifica- tion of, Japan's actions.

In conclusion it should be said that the vol- umes of Foreign relations, because of their ex- cellent editing, are becoming increasingly useful and usable. There is still present, however, the weakness, resulting from the strict application of the chronological method, that the reader sometimes finds pages of material intervening between questions asked and answers given.-

HAROLD M. VINACKE

University of Cincinnati

American military government: its organization and policies. By HAJo HOLBORN. Washing- ton: Infantry Journal Press, I947. Pp. 243. $3.50. A welcome by-product of the enlargement of

this country's responsibilities as a world power is an increase of interest in overseas administra- tion and its problems. The American Political Science Association has already established a research panel to assist in the development of this field of professional work. Military govern- ment, being the chief means by which we have thus far administered the overseas territories recently occupied, has been the subject of a number of articles in various journals in the social science field. Now Professor Holborn, who during the war in his capacity as an O.S.S. official in Washington was in touch with high- level policy-making, has undertaken the first comprehensive treatment of this topic.

In the first one hundred and twelve pages of text the author surveys the organization and planning for American military government, both at Washington and in the major theaters of operations. The second half of the volume consists of documents, beginning with the Com- bined Directive on Military Government in Sicily, and includes the major formulations of occupation policy concerning Germany, Aus- tria, Japan, and Korea. These documents, for the most part, are printed from the versions ob- tainable in I945, usually in the department of state Bulletin.

The difficulties of improvising an effective organization and of securing clear and prompt decisions on matters of military government policy during the period of hostilities are well described. When primary attention was focused on winning the war and when any effort to de-

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346 REVIEWS OF BOOKS

velop an informed public opinion on subjects closely linked with foreign policy would have disturbed relations with our Allies, it was in- evitable that military government officers in the various theaters should be handicapped by what they frequently considered a lack of adequate support from home. Yet ultimately there were established the civil affairs division of the war department, the state-war-navy co-ordinating committee, the advisory council for Italy, the European advisory commission, and the Far Eastern commission, which could have provided adequate direction for military government op- erations had there been good will among the Allies-and perhaps a bit more insistence at the very top that policy-making not be hindered by bureaucratic obstacles or interdepartmental jealousies.

With much of the volume devoted to prob- lems of such high policy, many matters of im- portance, even at the Washington level, are in- evitably slighted. There is no clear explanation of how the direction of military government operations was divided between the provost marshal general's office and the civil affairs division after the establishment of the division in March I1943. Cumbersome security regula- tions may account for the omission of any refer- ence to the preparation and content of the very influential war department training manual for military government officers. The inadequacies fo the facilities for communication between Washington and the various theaters are well known, and, if the chapters on the European theater of operations are a fair sample, the ac- counts given of developments in these theaters, while substantially accurate, need checking on

matters of detail. For example, the reader is told that the "early draft plans for the military government of Germany" eventually "em- bodied in the so-called SHAEF Handbook for Military Government in Germany" were "pre- pared by G-5 SHAEF" (p. 34); that "in June I1944 the nucleus of what was to become the American component of the Allied Control Council, the so-called U.S. Group Control Council, began to assemble in England and started planning its operations in September' (p. 44); and that the Berlin element was called the U.S. Group Control Council after the es- tablishment in Frankfurt on the Main of the operating agency "Office of Military Govern- ment in the American Zone (OMGUS)" (pp. 49-50). Actually there was a single organiza- tion, always distinguishable from G-5 SHAEF, which from March I1944, under various names (German Country Section; German Country Unit; U.S. Group, Control Council; and Office of Military Government for Germany [U.S.], which was and is O.M.G.U.S. [the Office of Military Government for Germany, U.S. zone, was called O.M.G., U.S. zone]), did the top-level planning and eventually became the American element of the Allied Control Authority in Berlin.

In spite of these inevitable shortcomings, this volume is certainly to be welcomed as a pioneering sketch of the general organization of, and the planning for, American military govern- ment at high levels. On the matter of civilian supply problems-a field beyond the compe- tence of the reviewer-it would appear to make a special contribution.

M. M. KNAPPEN Michigan State College

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