albertelli, pedro. on metaphor and metonymy in jakobson

On Metaphor and Metonymy in JakobsonAuthor(s): Pedro AlbertelliSource: Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure, No. 39 (1985), pp. 111-120Published by: Librairie DrozStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27758339 .Accessed: 15/08/2011 23:48

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Librairie Droz is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Cahiers Ferdinand deSaussure.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=libdroz

http://www.jstor.org/stable/27758339?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

Pedro Albertelli

ON METAPHOR AND METONYMY IN JAKOBSON

To my father, Dr. Jorge F. Albertelli

1. Introduction

This paper does not intend to be a new theoretical elucidation nor a

historical or systematic research into the concepts of metaphor and

metonymy, but rather an exegesis of Roman Jakobson's well-known text

Two aspects of language and two types of aphasie disturbances (Jakobson

1956). We will try to show that the importation of a given linguistic model,

the syntagmatic-paradigmatic model, which ultimately comes from

Saussure's Cours de linguistique g?n?rale, and its application by Jakobson

leads to a contradiction, and to the undefined introduction of ad hoc

concepts. This article, however, is not to deny the clinical usefulness of

Jakobson's findings.

2. The model

2.1. Let us note, first of all, the title and the first two subtitles of Jakob

son's work, namely: "Two aspects of language..."', "Aphasia as a linguistic

problem"; "The twofold character of language" [my italics]. We know that 'language' may correspond to (French) 'langue', as well

as to 'langage', or, alternatively, both French terms can be rendered into

English by 'language'. Now, even if we admit this translation polysemy,

112 Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure 39 (1985)

or, what amounts to the same, the different "valeur" (Saussure 1931) of

the terms in English and French, undoubtedly we have in English the contrast 'language'/'speech', which (with the above-made proviso) corre

sponds exactly enough to the contrast 'langue'/'parole' introduced by Saussure (1931).

I will not deal here with the diverse conceptions of 'langue' which

exist in Saussure (1931), but I will only recall two quotations:

a) "...La parole est au contraire un acte individuel de volont? et d'intelli

gence, dans lequel il convient de distinguer: Io les combinaisons par

lesquelles le sujet parlant utilise le code de la langue en vue d'exprimer sa

pens?e personnelle; 2? le m?canisme psycho-physique qui lui permet d'ext?rioriser ces combinaisons..." (Saussure 1931: 30-31)

b) "...On peut ? la rigueur conserver le nom de linguistique ? chacune de ces deux disciplines et parler d'une linguistique de la parole. Mais il ne

faudra pas la confondre avec la linguistique proprement dite, celle dont la

langue est l'unique objet." (Saussure 1931: 38-39)

We could then expect that Jakobson, who begins chapter 2 of his

work with the words "Speech implies..." (Jakobson 1956: 58) is going to

use the contrast 'language'/'speech'. But this is not so: instead, the

contrast 'code'/'message' is introduced.

What is the purpose of introducing this new pair? Its purpose is, as

we shall demonstrate in this paper, to present time and time again

aphasia as a "linguistic" problem (this adjective appears throughout the

text), and furthermore to simultaneously permit an ad hoc semiotic

expansion of a linguistic model sensu strictiore instead of explicity admit

ting from the very beginning that an extrapolation from linguistics to

semiotics is being made and that many times aphasia is treated as a semi

otic problem.

2.2. Let us now expound the relations and operations presented by Jakobson in his model:

A) Combination ( concurrence (simultaneous)

concatenation (non-simultaneous)

B) Selection

P. Albertelli : Du Metaphor and Metonymy in Jakobson 113

Contiguity Alineation

Metonymy

Syntagm

Contexture

Relations in praesentia

Substitution

Relations in absentia

Similarity Alternation

Metaphor

Paradigm

2.3. Let us now discuss the following sentence:

"The constituents of a context are in a status of contiguity, while in a

substitution set signs are linked by various degrees of similarity, which

fluctuate between the equivalence of synonyms and the common core of

antonyms". (Jakobson 1956: 61)

What is exactly a "substitution set"? If we consult Saussure (1931), we see that there, during the discussion

of the "associative" relations it is affirmed:

"...Les groupes form?s par association mentale ne se bornent pas ?

rapprocher les termes qui pr?sentent quelque chose de commun; l'esprit saisit la nature des rapports qui les relient dans chaque cas et cr?e par l? autant de s?ries associatives qu'il y a des rapports divers... Donc il y a

tant?t communaut? double du sens et de la forme, tant?t communaut? de forme ou de sens seulement..." (Saussure 1931: 173-174)

That is to say that the relations can exist on the level of the totality of the sign, on the level of the "signifi?", or on the level of the "signifiant".

We may conclude thereby that the "substitution set" is an associative (i.e.

paradigmatic) series of community according to the "signifi?".

3.1. Let us examine the following sentence:

"For aphasies of the first type (selection deficiency), the context is the

indispensable and decisive factor. When presented with scraps of words or sentences, such a patient readily completes them". (Jakobson 1956: 63)

3. The semiotic expansion


Here 'context' is clearly defined, implicitly, in purely linguistic terms.

But we see immediately:

"The sentence "it rains" cannot be produced unless the utterer sees it is

actually raining". (Jakobson 1956: 64)

"The deeper the sentence is embedded in the verbal or non-verbalized

context..." (Jakobson 1956: 64)

Let us examine one more example: the patient is shown a pencil, which he cannot name. Jakobson then concludes :

"If one of the synonymic signs is present (as for instance the word bach

elor, or the pointing to a pencil) then the other sign (such as the phrase unmarried men or the word pencil) becomes redundant and consequently

superfluous." (Jakobson 1956: 66)

We can see that a very comprehensive "semiotic expansion" is being made, since an object (the pencil) or a properly linguistic sign (the words 'bachelor' or 'pencil') are considered to be on the same level. An inter

mediate case would be the one in which the patient is shown the drawing of a compass, which he cannot name either. (Jakobson 1956: 66)

In any case, the main remark is that a word and an object are

considered "synonymic signs".

3.2. Let us consider another case:

"From the two polar figures of speech, metaphor and metonymy, the

latter, based on contiguity [my italics] is widely employed by aphasies whose selective capacities have been affected. Fork is substituted for

knife, table for lamp, smoke for pipe, eat for toaster... Such metonymies may be characterized as projections of the line of habitual context into

the line of substitution and selection: a sign (e.g. fork) which usually occurs together with another sign may be used instead of this sign. Phrases like "knife and fork", "table lamp", "to smoke a pipe" induced the

metonymies fork, table, smoke;..." [my italics] (Jakobson 1956: 69-70)

In other words, the contiguity by means of which the metonymies are

accounted for is the purely linguistic contiguity, the contiguity in the

phrase, in the syntagm in its strictly linguistic sense; but the "semiotic

expansion" we have already noted above allows us to think that the same

P. Albertelli: Du Metaphor and Metonymy in Jakobson 115

phenomena could be explained by the spatial contiguity of the objects: we

frequently see knife and fork together; usually, the table lamp is on the

table, and so on.

Let us discuss another example:

"Actually, Goldstein's tests justify such an expectation: a female patient of this type, when asked to list a few names of animals, disposed them in

the same sequence she had seen them in the zoo..." (Jakobson 1956: 69)

The explanation given is that "...any semantic grouping would be

guided by spatial or temporal contiguity rather than by similarity". (Jakobson 1956: 69) But what prevents us from thinking that the animals

in the zoo had already (and independently) been placed in their cages according to species, e.g. felines, ruminants, and the like?

We may think that the way this example is presented is at least not

conclusive.

The explanation given by Jakobson also holds for the following

example:

"...similarly, despite instructions to arrange certain objects according to

color, size, and shape, she classified them on the basis of their spatial

contiguity as home things, office materials, etc.; and justified this

grouping by a reference to a show window where "it does not matter what

the things are", i.e. they do not have to be similar..." (Jakobson 1956: 69)

But what prevents us from thinking that the classification was (at least also) based on similarity of function! In other words, that the objects classified in such a way (adopting ourselves the same "semiotic expan sion" that Jakobson adopts) constituted associatives -

i.e., paradigmatic series linked by community of the "signifi?".

4. A matricial examination

Jakobson tells us about a test which consists of producing a word as a

stimulus and registering the obtained responses as reactions. He divides

the reactions into a) predicative and b) substitutive.

We could expect, in principle, that these two reactions would corre

spond respectively to metonymy and to metaphor. But we shall see this is

not the case.


We have first the predicative reaction:

"To the stimulus hut one response was burnt out; another, is a poor little house. Both reactions are predicative; but the first creates a purely narra

tive context, whereas in the second there is a double connection with the

subject hut: on one hand, a positional (namely, syntactic) contiguity, and on the other a semantic similarity". (Jakobson 1956: 77)

In the case of the first predicative reaction I lack data in order to construct a matrix, but not in the second. Namely:

1. [Insufficient data]

2. Positional Semantic

Similarity + Contiguity +

We then have the substitutive reaction.

"The same stimulus produced the following substitutive reactions: the

tautology hut; the synonyms cabin and hovel; the antonym palace and the

metaphors den and burrow. The capacity of two words to replace one

another is an instance of positional similarity (or contrast)." (Jakobson

1956:77)

(Incidentally, the "contrast" agrees with the "common core of antonyms" of the "substitution set" we have seen in 2.3 above.)

The corresponding matrix is:

Positional Semantic

Similarity + Contiguity

The point to be singled out here is that tautology, synonyms, anto

nyms, and metaphors all have the same matrix. It was said at the beginning that the predicative and substitutive

reactions would seem to have to correspond to the two poles, the

metonymical pole and the metaphorical pole, and it was said this was not

the case. Because, in fact, we shortly read :


"Metonymical responses to the same stimulus such as thatch, litter, or

poverty, combine and contrast positional similarity with semantic conti

guity." (Jakobson 1956: 77)

Therefore, their matrix would be :

Positional Semantic

Similarity +

Contiguity +

There would remain another at least theoretically possible matrix

which Jakobson makes no reference to :

Positional Semantic

Similarity Contiguity -f +

4. Some incidental observations

4.1. The relation between synecdoche and metonymy is introduced in a

not very clear way, without it being possible to ascertain, in this model,

whether the synecdoche is a subcase of metonymy or an equivalent case.

Let us consider the following passage where, speaking about the

literary trend he designates as "realism", Jakobson says :

"Following the path of contiguous relationships, the realistic author

metonymically digresses from the plot to the atmosphere and from the

characters to the setting in space and time. He is fond of synecdochic details." (Jakobson 1956: 78)

And again:

"A salient example of the history of painting is the manifestly

metonymical orientation of the cubism, where the subject is transformed

into a set of synecdoches;..." (Jakobson 1956: 78)

And still again :


"Thus, in an enquiry into the structure of dreams, the decisive question is

whether the symbols and the temporal sequences are based on contiguity (Freud's m?tonymie "displacement" and synecdochic "condensation") or

on similarity (Freud's "identification and symbolism")." (Jakobson 1956:

81)

4.2. The relation of similarity is made to correspond to a metalinguistic relation. Let us see the text:

"Similarity in meaning connects the symbols of a metalanguage with the

symbols of the language referred to. Similarity connects a metaphorical term with the term for which it is substituted. Consequently, when

constructing a metalanguage to interpret tropes, the researcher possesses more homogeneous means to handle metaphor..." (Jakobson 1956: 81)

[my italics]

Jakobson's implied concept of metalanguage seems to be the one

most commonly used by linguists, and was originally and very clearly formulated by Russell: "...that every language has, a structure

concerning which, in the language, nothing can be said, but that there may be another language dealing with the first, and having itself a new struc

ture, and that to this hierarchy of languages there may be no limit...."

(Wittgenstein 1922: 23) But, if we consider, e.g., Taris is the capital of France' and '"Paris'

has five letters", although a relation of complete similarity would seem to

hold, 'Paris' has no similarity at all in meaning with Paris, or even (which

might be considered a different case) "Paris" with 'Paris'. It is very clear that in the second case, were we to be positing the

similarity thesis, we would also be positing that the difference in levels makes no difference in category, and that therefore nothing would be left to account for the very concept of metalanguage.

In short, here the very general problem is posited of the relations

holding between an object-language and its metalanguage as regards making statements in the latter that refer to the former, and of their

validity, or criteria for them. Concerning all this, it is affirmed here that the relation between levels is either based on similarity, or entirely consists of it.

Summing up so far, the line of solution which Jakobsons suggests for the metalinguistic question seems unsatisfactory, but in addition, to my


knowledge, reflects the current opinion among linguists as regards this

complex subject. But undoubtedly, in order to have attempted a proper discussion of this, a different goal would have had to have been set for this article.

5. The inconsistency of the model

Let us consider again Jakobson's third quotation in 4.1; there the

following relations were established :

Contiguity: metonymical "displacement" and synecdochical "con densation".

Similarity: "identification" and "symbolism".

Now, let us consider Ruwet's note to his translation of Jakobson:

"On remarquera que ce rapprochement ne coincide pas avec celui fait par J. Lacan (cf. ?L'instance de la lettre dans l'inconscient?, en La Psychana

lyse, III, 1957); celui-ci identifie, respectivement, condensation et

m?taphore, et d?placement et m?tonymie. Roman Jakobson, ? qui nous avons fait la remarque, pense que la divergence s'explique par l'impr? cision du concept de condensation qui, chez Freud, semble recouvrir ? la fois des cas de m?taphore et des cas de synecdoque.? (Jakobson 1963: 66)

That is to say, according to the above quotation, in Lacan we have:

Contiguity : "displacement", metonymy.

Similarity: "condensation", metaphor.

In other words, and assuming that Lacan also uses the syntagmatic

paradigmatic model, we have the contradiction that, whereas in Jakobson

"condensation" is based on contiguity, in Lacan it is based on similarity. The question would be: of what consists, or rather, where lies this

inconsistency? The answer could be found in the following passage:

"Finally, a paradigm... presents the same semantic concept from different

viewpoints associated with each other by contiguity, ..." (Jakobson 1956:

73) [my italics]


I.e., contiguity relates terms in the paradigm where, by definition, the

relations were those of similarity.

Riobamba 611, 1 ? Pedro A Ibertelli

1025 Buenos Aires

(Argentina).

References

Jakobson, R. (1956). "Two aspects of language and two types of aphasie disturbances". In Fundamentals of Language, R. Jakobson and M. Halle, 55 82. 's-Gravenhage: Mouton.

? (1963). Essais de linguistique g?n?rale, vol. I. Paris: Minuit.

Saussure, F. de (1931). Cours de linguistique g?n?rale. Paris: Payot.

Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. (With an Introduction by Bertrand Russell, F.R.S.). London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.

albertelli, pedro. on metaphor and metonymy in jakobson

Documents