agustín santella, conflicto in villa constitucion, 1970-75

Workers' Mobilization and Political Violence: Conflict in Villa Constitución, Argentina, 1970-1975Author(s): Agustín SantellaSource: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 35, No. 5, Violence: Power, Force, and SocialTransformation (Sep., 2008), pp. 146-157Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27648125 .

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Workers' Mobilization and Political Violence

Conflict in Villa Constituci?n, Argentina, 1970-1975

by Agust?n Sont ella

The labor and political conflicts that took place in the city of Villa Constituci?n between 1970 and 1975 show in detail crucial aspects of the national social and political contention in Argentina that ended in the coup d'?tat of 1976. Both working-class struggles and civil

war intensified during this period and conditioned each other in complex ways.

Keywords: Working class, Political violence, Argentina, Peronism, Political system

The degree of consensus with regard to popular violence in Argentina in

the 1970s continues to be a topic of discussion. In postdictatorship public debate, the predominant idea has been that the 1976-1983 dictatorship was the culmination of an irrational "spiral of violence" that led the guerrilla and the state-terrorism sector to behave in similar ways, equally moving away from

democracy (CONADEP, 2006). The academic literature has thoroughly ana

lyzed this question with a view to explaining how corporatist-based behavior

prevented any consensus. Despite differences in the assessment of the process, there is general agreement on the view of the 1960s-1970s period as a crisis of

hegemony that led to civil war or state terrorism (O'Donnell, 1982; Halperin Donghi, 1994). There are few historical-empirical studies on the relationships between political violence and the struggles of social actors. Although the

dynamics of the insurgent left wing have been discussed in detail (Oilier, 1998; Pozzi, 2000; Tortti, 2000), we still have a long way to go to achieve solid

progress in the analysis of these relationships (Mar?n, 1996; Moyano, 1999), and exploration of the interaction between armed radicals and the social

movement has received even less attention. The objective of this study is to

examine the relationship between working-class and political struggles in an

industrial city in Argentina in the mid-1970s. It is difficult to deny that since 1969 popular violence has had no significant

support. Any assessment of the mood of the time based on interviews with

participants in the events will necessarily be incomplete, partial, and diffuse. It is probably better to observe the degree to which acceptance of the idea of armed resistance was expressed through the activities associated with mass

struggles. The assumption here is that workers, like other social groups, are

Agust?n Santella is a researcher at the Instituto de Investigaciones "Gini Germani" of the

University of Buenos Aires. He is grateful to Pablo Pozzi, Ronaldo Munck, Ines Izaguirre, Nicol?s I?igo Carrera, Francisco Zapata, Mar?a Luisa Torregrosa, and the EAP referees for their

comments. This research was funded by the University of Buenos Aires and FLACSO-Gobierno

de M?xico.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 162, Vol. 35 No. 5, September 2008 146-157 DOT. 10.1177/0094582X08321967 ? 2008 Latin American Perspectives

146



Santella / CONFLICT IN VILLA CONSTITUCI?N, ARGENTINA 147

not essentially either peaceful or violent?that all forms of struggle and polit ical participation are relative to the background of power relationships in

which action takes place. This study first discusses the historical background of the period in ques

tion and then examines the specific case. In the conclusions, it links the results to political and academic discussions of political violence and social protest.

Background information will be limited, since readers can be expected to have a basic acquaintance with the period in question.

ARGENTINA IN THE POST-CORDOBAZO PERIOD

The mass rebellions that took place in C?rdoba and Rosario in 1969 led to a

mobilization and radicalization that caused the downfall of the military gov ernments of the "Argentine Revolution." The protests had an impact on the dominant classes, giving rise to the Great National Agreement that served as a framework for the elections of 1973. That agreement called for the reinstate

ment of the Peronist party as a legitimate force in the political system. The role

assigned to Peronism was preventing the protests from turning into a revolu tion. Among these protests were the increasing armed actions of revolutionary groups (kidnappings, executions, propaganda) and forms of popular violence associated with street demonstrations, factory takeovers, and other forms of

expression. All this took place in the context of the ideological radicalization of the society as a whole and within the Peronist movement, a fact that would be reflected in Per?n's position in the Frente Justicialista de Liberaci?n

(Justicialist-Peronist Liberation Front?FREJULI) electoral campaign and in

the composition of the candidates' lists (see Balve and Balve, 1989; Torre, 1989; Brennan, 1996; Izaguirre and Aristizabal 2000; Graham Yool, 1989).

The course of social confrontations from the Cordobazo on advanced through increasingly violent struggles culminating in the political regime of 1976-1983,

which organized the systematic disappearance of social and political activists and militants and exercised military control over the society. Two researchers have assembled quantitative records of this process. Mar?n (1996) takes the 1973-1976 period and compares two competing political-military strategies in terms of their objectives with regard to human and material losses. He concludes that while the regime's actions caused human losses (mainly arrests and, later, deaths and injuries), the popular forces' objective was to obtain material results and human losses played a secondary role. These strategies represent different

moments in the development of the social forces (with corresponding differences in the relationship between these forces). Whereas the regime was pursuing con

solidation, the popular forces aimed at building a political-military structure. Between 1973 and 1976, the confrontations increased, and the repression hit key activists first and then armed militants.

This framework is complemented and enriched by the data provided by Moyano (1999). Extending the time span (1969-1979), Moyano distinguishes not only between the regime's and the people's violent actors but also between the actions of armed organizations and collective protests that involved violence. Dividing the 10-year period into three stages, she shows that violence between 1969 and 1973 was mainly caused by protests and



148 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

armed organizations (46 and 43 percent of the violent acts, respectively), whereas governmental or paragovernmental actions represented 11 percent. Between 1973 and 1976, mass violence dropped to 14 percent of the cases

against 51 percent of violent acts by the organizations and 33 percent by the

repressive forces. Between 1976 and 1979, the repressive right-wing forces were responsible for 93 percent of the violent acts. This survey shows that at

first protests involved violence but over time they turned nonviolent. This

happened from 1973 on, when political change modified the conditions for armed protest. It also shows that in spite of the cessation of direct violent action by mass mobilizations, the armed organizations7 actions increased in

direct opposition to the repressive forces.

SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF VILLA CONSTITUCI?N, 1970

The establishment of several metallurgical plants (Acindar, Metcon, Marathon, Villber) and their subsidiary workshops around 1970 turned Villa Constituci?n into a predominantly industrial city. Other inhabitants became manual and administrative workers in the state-owned railway and textile

companies. Most workers lived near the factories, whereas management-level employees settled in neighboring cities. These changes accentuated the city's largely working-class profile (Videla, 1985; Jos? Actis, interview, 1994). In this

respect Villa Constituci?n was similar to certain other industrial cities (San Nicol?s, Zarate, Campana) whose characteristics predisposed them to radical ization and classist and antibureaucratic mobilization (Torre, 1989: 55).

However, it was only in Villa Constituci?n that workers' rebellions managed to replace the old union leaders. The situation of labor in Villa Constituci?n

played a key role in the 1970 strike, the 1974 Villazo, and the strike of 1975.

Despite the fact that their wages were higher than those of workers in other

companies in the area, Acindar 's workers had not achieved the working con

ditions enjoyed by those workers. The Uni?n Obrera Metal?rgica (Metalworkers' Union?UOM) local had been placed under its authorities'

inspection several times because of the failure of its leadership to align itself with the national orthodox Peronism. At the same time, the central union's

management was being challenged by left-wing militants opposed to Peronist

unionism, and these groups coordinated local union action at the national level and formed an alternative union leadership. The high levels of industrial

mobilization and organization reached in those years were part of the devel

opment of a social and political force?though one that was rather heteroge neous at the working-class level.

LABOR CONFLICT, 1970-1974

In December 1969 and January 1970 there was an unsuccessful strike at

Acindar (Rodriguez, 2000). It was not the first important strike in Villa

Constituci?n, which has a unionist tradition, but it was the first one that was

important for the Metalworkers' Union. It came to an end when the fired




leaders accepted the amnesty offered by the employer. The resulting disap pointment of the membership led to sustained mobilization by a left-wing activist group. This group had various names?the Acindar's Workers' Group, the Brown List, the September 7th Movement?and was initially promoted by "Gringo" Sacristani, a militant of Vanguardia Comunista (Communist

Vanguard) and leader of the 1970 strike. This activism produced new union

cadres, many of which became the most active of the workers' organizations. The Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores (Workers' Revolutionary party? PRT), Poder Obrero (Workers' Power), the Juventud Peronista-Montoneros

(Monteneros-Peronist Youth?JP-Montoneros [a guerrilla group]), Vanguardia Comunista, the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Workers' Socialist

party?PST), and the Partido Comunista (Communist party?PC). The PC's militants ran the Villa Constituci?n Railway Union, with Tito Martin as their

head, and had a strong influence on the creation of the Confederaci?n General de Trabajadores (Workers' General Confederation?CGT) in early 1975. The

struggles of 1973, 1974, and 1975 led to an intense and politically influenced activism that was partly responsible for the strikers' capacity for resistance to

the repressive forces of the period. In 1973 the scheduling of national elections raised expectations of a return

of the Peronists to government. The Metalworkers' Union local was under

investigation, and the issues that had caused the 1970 strike had not been resolved. Besides, the local was in violation of the new Medical/Welfare Scheme Law (No. 18.610) that established benefits for the workers. Per?n's return to government created a stronger basis for mobilization. In Villa

Constituci?n this resulted in a workers' protest against the investigation of the union local. The union leaders defused the protest with the argument that

now, with Per?n in power, everything would be resolved "with two or three decrees" (Porcu, 1999).

The truce in Villa Constituci?n was broken almost a year later (March 7,

1974), when the national union challenged the local leaders and immediately mobilized the workers in its favor. This incident gave rise to a lengthy occu

pation of the metallurgical factories of the city and gestures of solidarity by most of the city's inhabitants. All aspects of the occupation were organized by the union's plant committees and a new strike committee based on them. The

workers held managers hostage and surrounded the factories with explosives. In the light of the power of the mobilization, the national government inter

vened in favor of the workers. On March 16 a memorandum of agreement was

signed that satisfied their claims: the fired personnel were rehired, the union

held free elections, and the social welfare laws were complied with. The strike and factory takeover and the mobilization called the Villazo marked an esca

lation of workers' struggles at the local and national levels at a moment when armed and political struggles in Argentina were intensifying. The local suc

cess strengthened the workers' overall mobilization, thus generating new

labor achievements and a new activism that quickly became political and rad ical and established links with the revolutionary organizations operating in

the city. The activists who directed the Villazo developed political unionist

groups from the beginning. In the elections, they formed a front that united various left-wing tendencies?the Brown List, which defeated the Pink List

proposed by the national Metalworkers' Union leadership. The campaign




platform of the List defined its orientation as "antibureaucratic, antiemployer, and anti-imperialist." The ideology of the Villa Constituci?n movement was

not much more radical than that of the general population at that time with

regard to national liberation, anti-imperialism, and the working class. Also, the strong notion of struggle against the union bureaucracy, as well as a rather

heterogeneous anticapitalism, placed the movement's discourse in clear oppo sition to that of the Peronist union leadership.1 That discourse expressed a

relationship between the politically Peronist bases and their union organizers, who became increasingly leftist as they gained experience in the first conflicts. This is observable in the candidates proposed by the Brown List, the winner

of the elections of November 25-29,1974, with 60 percent of the votes. Of the

4,158 members of the Metalworkers' Union local, 2,623 voted for the Brown List and 1,473 for the Pink List, with 62 votes being declared void.

THE ANTISUBVERSIVE OPERATION AND THE MARCH 1975 STRIKE

Having overwhelming electoral support and the support of the working class and the representative national industrialists' organizations, the Peronist administration carried out the "social pact" and sought a truce in the wage conflict. Per?n started to fight radicalization and "subversion" inside and out side the movement. He ordered the investigation of the provincial govern

ments oriented toward "revolutionary Peronism" and trade unions led by combative, classist, and independent left-wingers, whether Peronist or not. This "Marxist purge" was the beginning of selective executions of rank-and file militants and activists by state-backed para-police groups and mass

arrests. The government and the CGT enacted new legislation aimed at

strengthening labor organization by centralizing it and giving more control and veto power to the central bases. The purpose was to get the workers'

struggles under control. The historical Peronist ruling nucleus was thus more

widely represented within the unions as a combined result of repression and more centralized state-supported control.

In this context, on March 20, 1975, the government announced the discov

ery of a "subversive conspiracy" in which the new Villa Constituci?n union

leaders were apparently involved. This conspiracy was supposed to be aimed at "bringing the country's production to a halt." The Ministry of Domestic Affairs ordered the deployment of the police in an area stretching from the industrial northern part of the Province of Buenos Aires to Rosario, Province of Santa Fe, along the Pan-American Highway and the Paran? River. The oper ations stopped some 150-200 activists and militants, mainly from Villa Constituci?n. The brand-new Metalworkers' Union committee, except for Luis Angel Segovia, the administrative secretary, collapsed. The "security forces" were made up of local, state, and military police, but there was un

official participation by armed para-union groups (wearing Peronist Union

Youth armbands) and nonuniformed para-police. Although the company denied all responsibility for the conflict, the people I interviewed saw it as

having participated in the repression. On Thursday, March 20, the metalworkers went on strike, took over the

factory, and began holding meetings there. Since the union was under




government investigation, the workers reorganized through a strike commit tee made up of two representatives from each factory. A week later, the strike committee and neighborhood associations came together in a single move

ment. The police called on the workers to vacate the factories, invoking the

recently passed National Security Act. As a defensive strategy, the strike com

mittee decided to leave the factories and reorganize in the neighborhoods. Even though the workers left peacefully, there were more arrests. The strike

objectives conceived during the week of the occupation were the release of the detained union leaders, reinstatement of the union, a raise in pay, and the ces

sation of all forms of repression. As days went by, support was expressed in

different ways by all the working and popular sectors in the city and the

region. Postal and railway employees (whose leaders had also been arrested) and small traders went on limited strikes. Small and medium-sized farmers from the Argentine Farm Federation cooperated by providing food for the strike fund. High-school students participated in fund-raising. Every political party in the province issued a protest communiqu? against government

repression, condemning not only the antidemocratic procedures used by the

repressive forces but also the potential investigation of the provincial govern ment. The Santa Fe Confederaci?n General Econ?mica (Economic General

Confederation?CGE), representing medium-sized industrialists, joined the

attack, and the guerrillas responded to the repression with executions and

sabotage. At the same time, the antisubversion operation was backed by the national Metalworkers' Union and the CGT.

Repressive measures extended to the para-police semioccupation of working class neighborhoods. Para-police launched armed attacks against the homes not

only of militants but also of rank-and-file members of the movement. They vio

lently broke up public meetings and carried out selective assassinations as terri

fying as those of the Triple A (the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance, a

right-wing death squad). The neighborhood associations defended themselves from "the fascists" with a surveillance system, particularly at night. Meetings

were concealed behind sports or social events (soccer games, barbecues), which were also disrupted with shootings and terror by para-police groups.

After the reorganization of the strike movement in the neighborhoods, the

increasing public sympathy allowed the holding of mass meetings. One of these was held on April 15 in the main square of Villa Constituci?n and drew

2,000 workers. A subsequent one held by the strike committee and the politi cal parties called for a general city strike and mobilization on April 22. From

early on that day there were between 7,000 and 10,000 people in the square. The police broke up the demonstration with tear gas and bullets. One worker was killed and dozens were injured and arrested. The workers withdrew to

the neighborhoods, where several groups briefly offered armed resistance, but the police finally controlled the situation (La Capital, April 23, 1975). The fol

lowing day, the local general strike continued, and there were strikes at sev

eral important industrial companies in other places. After a month, facing redoubled repression and a refusal by the govern

ment to negotiate, the strike reached an impasse. The strike committee

appealed to public sympathy and called on the country's workers and unions to observe a "National Day of Movement" on May 1. That same day, the CGT

organized a mass meeting in Buenos Aires's Plaza de Mayo with speeches



15 2 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

supporting the government. New arrests that morning prevented the coordi nation of mobilization activities in Villa Constituci?n. The strike committee had intended to go to the Plaza de Mayo and put pressure on the CGT, but the call for the "National Day of Movement" had no significant support. Despite isolation and increasing repression, the strike managed to continue because of the sustained support of its bases. The strike newsletter continued to be issued and distributed, and a food provision system for the strikers was created. After a time, however, there were signs of weakening. As the sixtieth day of the strike approached, so did the possibility of dismissal under the law, and this was probably the reason for the return to work of those who had sus

tained the strike up to that time.2 In terms of the collective activities performed during the strike week by

week (including, in addition to those of the metalworkers directly affected, those of everyone who participated in or supported it), the movement reached its peak in the fifth and sixth of its nine weeks. These activities ranged from

requests or formal complaints to the collection of funds, meetings, sympathy strikes, demonstrations, and armed actions.3 The strikers did not, however,

respond with violence to the mass arrests, the para-police occupation of the

city, the eviction of the factory occupiers, and the execution and repression of demonstrators. The strike was accompanied by the armed actions of the revo

lutionary organizations that, as we have seen, were important for the struc

turing of the activists' and union leaders' movements. All in all, it can be said that the workers prevented armed confrontation during the strike. As we have

seen, in March 1974 the threat of eviction of the factory occupiers was

answered with the capture of hostages and the use of explosives for defense. In 1975 the power of repression, the government's antagonistic policy, and the lack of allies created a different relationship between the political forces involved and unfavorable conditions for union opposition. While the local strike movement triggered sympathy meetings and strikes in the province and in other industrial centers, these had very little weight. At the national level, the isolation of the workers' movement could not be overcome.

In the last days of the strike, the strikers decided to continue the struggle inside the factories and came to an agreement with the companies that there

would be no reprisals. However, during the first days after the return to work,

May 18 and 19, the companies dismissed hundreds of workers. This purge of activists hit the factory union organization hard. A nucleus remained secret and organized as a "strike committee," distributing flyers and demanding the release of arrested leaders. As the company dismissed workers, it also granted

wage increases and soon erased the achievements of the strike. It also retained the intimidating police guard in the plant. The conflict ultimately resulted in a profound demobilization.

The immediate interpretations of the conflict corresponded to the inter

preters' framing of the political process. The PRT-ERP (Ej?rcito Revolucionario del Pueblo [People's Revolutionary Army]) interpreted the events that had taken place as "the first confrontations in the struggle for power, a true revo

lutionary struggle that begins to draw on the strength of the masses" (Roberto Santucho in El Combatiente, April 7,1975). Many strikers may have shared this

point of view, although it did not characterize the strike itself. The PST under stood the struggle not as an armed struggle for power but as a union effort:




"Being able to develop an authentic classist policy to overcome our isolation and distinguish ourselves from non-working-class and centrist currents, in

particular the guerrillas, will help us in the forthcoming battles, in which the

lasting memory of the huge strike of Villa Constituci?n will always be pre sent" (Avanzada Socialista, May 24, 1975). In this sense, and in the most force ful manner, the strike became an important factor in the general strikes of

June/July and the unions' strike committees of 1975-1976.4 Mariano Grondona interpreted the strike much as did various members of

the dominant classes. It was difficult, he said, to "distinguish democratic dis

sidents [the new unionists] from subversive dissidents [the guerrillas]," and

the events were an expression of "industrial terrorism" (Mercado, May 15 and

June 12,1975). Before the conflict was over, the government had declared that it had evidence that the "subversive group, declared illegal, called the

'Workers' Power Revolutionary Organization' had caused real subversive ter ror in the most sensitive areas of the country by means of two fundamental

methods: political subversion and industrial terrorism. ... It had been a gen eral dissident movement and had gradually been taken over by a subversive

organization" (La Capital, May 10, 1975). Ricardo Balb?n, the leader of the

Uni?n C?vica Radical (Radical Civic Union?UCR), declared, "We said at the

national convention that in contrast to the obvious guerrilla there is something that can be called the 'factory guerrilla'; therefore, this situation must be exam

ined with good sense and impartiality because sometimes behind the basis of a social protest is an evil plan in disguise" (La Naci?n, May 16, 1975). During the conflict, La Naci?n had published an editorial entitled "Chain of Strikes"

(April 14, 1975) on the meaning of the Villa Constituci?n strike. It referred to

the wave of conflicts and pointed to the disconcerting result that the repres sion that was meant to unravel a conspiracy to stop production had produced a strike that had left industry without supplies. It further read:

It's possible that these events, and many others, too, are produced so often by mere coincidence, but their repetition arouses the well-founded suspicion that there are groups

. . . whose goals extend beyond a union's victory to inducing chaos in the life of the country. This may not be the case; it is possible that those who are taking part in these demonstrations are just the unconscious tools of

experienced agitators. Various hypotheses can be considered; however, the con

cern raised in the responsible sectors by the repetition of acts of this kind and the examination of their real causes cannot be avoided.

Almost a month after the metalworkers' strike in Villa Constituci?n had

ended, and in anticipation of national collective bargaining, a strike with mas

sive demonstrations started throughout the country. It originated in the union

locals of the principal factories and was taken up by the national unions and

the CGT. At the end of June and then on July 7, the CGT organized two mas

sive general strikes demanding ratification of the agreements negotiated between the unions and management. The CGT also called for the resignation of the right-wing members of the government: L?pez Rega, the social welfare

minister, and Celestino Rodrigo, the economy minister and the driving force

of the price increase plan and price and wage controls. It made clear, however, that it supported the Peronist government as it was and was simply objecting to part of it. The protest ended with the satisfaction of the demands (Cotarelo




and Fern?ndez, 1998).5 This strengthened the unions in the government but also intensified the economic conflict between capitalists and workers. The big firms had also embarked on an economic offensive to maintain profitability in circumstances that were less favorable not only because of the renewed pres sure on wages but also because of the international situation created by the oil crisis.

The government's stability was affected by the workers' mobilization and union support, and therefore the dominant capitalists came up with a military solution aimed at ending the cycle of social mobilization. The new government

was trying to create the political conditions for a new modality of economic

growth. Opposed to the former economic model based on industrial expansion that had brought low unemployment rates, increased consumption, and

import substitution with external controls, the new capitalist strategy intensi fied the productive forces, increasing both the exploitation of the existing

workforce and the use of technology and thus creating a surplus of labor. Clear results of this can be observed in Argentina today, among them the conditions that gave rise to the popular rebellion of December 19 and 20, 2001.

CONCLUSIONS

After 1973, Per?n's return became a difficult problem for the revolutionary movements opposing an actively Peronist working class. His leadership satis fied the expectations and struggles of much of the working class, but new

workers' sectors joined the rebellion of the union bases. In the case of Villa Constitution's metalworkers, the failure to satisfy the workers' basic eco

nomic demands created the conditions for a new orientation based on factory union organization in place of the old Peronist management. The workers

imposed their demands through factory occupations and defended the new

leadership aligned with the revolutionary organizations. Acts of collective political violence had been spreading as a form of strug

gle since 1969 but had significantly decayed under the Peronist government. However, the armed events of the disguised civil war increased in number after 1973 and in 1975 in particular. This process created a complex political situation for the popular struggles. This study has examined the dynamics of the political violence of this period, the forms of repression that preceded the

military government that took power in 1976, and the changes they produced in workers' mobilization. There is a vast bibliography on the workers' move

ments, Peronism, and the national politics of those years, on the one hand, and on the civil war and political violence, on the other. However, the links among these topics have not been empirically explored.

The struggles of the Metalworkers' Union of Villa Constituci?n constitute a

case in which these links are apparent. At an early stage, a sector of workers radicalized its methods of struggle, political-union alignments, and forms of

organization; when the political system launched repression aiming to "wipe out subversion," the struggles widened but managed to avoid armed confronta tion. What happened in Villa Constituci?n to some degree reflected a nationwide trend. In this case, when conventional repression took the form of acts of civil

war, the radicalized workers in particular and the workers in general responded




with conventional forms of protest, pursuing legitimacy within the law.

During the national strike of June and July 1975, virtually every worker in the

country took to the streets and joined the strike, which aimed at the ratifica

tion of improved collective agreements and changes in the cabinet in this

direction. At a crucial political moment, with a continuous wave of intense

social struggles initiated by the Cordobazo in 1969, the workers mounted one

of the largest protests ever seen, but their demands focused on changes in

what they still considered their government. At the same time, facing police

repression, the demonstrators avoided direct confrontation.

This case illustrates a phenomenon discussed at length in the political and

academic literature. In the first place, Marxism has argued that class struggles turn into civil wars. "Indeed, is it at all surprising that a society founded on

the opposition of classes should culminate in brutal contradiction, the shock of

body against body, as its final d?nouement?" (Marx, 1955 [1847]: 168). An

oversimplified application of this would lead, should a civil war actually occur, to a direct association between classes and armed sides. However,

although the general concept of civil war as derived from social contradictions remains theoretically useful, historical observation of political violence

demands a more complex analysis. A first step toward such complexity was

taken by Marx's successors. The revolutionary literature understood that van

guards emerging from proletarian struggles were essential, but it also pointed out that revolutionary initiatives can generate armed struggle that has no con

nection with proletarian struggles (Lenin, 1985; Lussu, 1970; Anderson, 1998). Delia Porta (1995: 9) has criticized "Tilly's supposition that political vio

lence is a protest indicator" and argued that "violent repertoires have dynam ics that are different from those of non-violent ones." Taking as a basis the 1966-1979 protest cycle in Italy, this differentiation may be found in the

Argentine case in the same period, although it is important to bear in mind

important differences such as the results in Italy (legal repression) and

Argentina (genocidal repression). The Italian case highlights the role played by political organizations in social radicalization and at the same time points out that the dynamics of the struggle of such organizations against govern ment are typical of armed radicalization. The Villa Constituci?n strike of 1975

enlarged the focus of social and political radicalization, since, in addition to

the movement's organization and interaction with government, it involved

workers' tactical responses in contexts of violence. Thus workers may be seen

as active elements in the historical succession of events that lead to civil wars.

NOTES

1. The most "classist" text on capitalist exploitation is the Informe de Lucha de Villa Constituci?n

of March 1974, written by a committee made up of the plant committees of Acindar, Marathon, and Metcon and reproduced in Balech (1985: 11-13). On the case, see Andujar (1995) and

Cangiano (1996). 2. Mario Hernandez's interview with P.K. of the strike committee, 1998. On this legal justifi

cation of dismissals, see P?rez (1983). The Hern?ndez interview focuses on an important factor

in bringing an end to the strike and its outcome (Victorio Paul?n, interview, August 2001). 3. This assertion is supported by quantitative data collected from La Capital (Rosario) for March

20 to May 20,1975. The result was a database consisting of 250 instances of collective action.




4. Victorio Paul?n, interview, 2001. "The case of Acindar, in Villa Constituci?n, is a symbol. Its strike of several weeks' duration was one of the factors that unleashed the general strike of

1975" (Gilly, 1980: 154). 5. According to these writers, here as in Villa Constituci?n the workers avoided confronta

tions with the repressive forces.

REFERENCES

Anderson, Perry 1998 Las antinomias de Antonio Gramsci: Estado y revoluci?n en el Occidente. Barcelona:

Fontamara.

Andujar, Andrea

1995 "Combates y experiencias: las luchas obreras en Villa Constituci?n {1974-1975)." Taller:

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