adkins friendship and self-sufficiency in homer and aristotle

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'Friendship' and 'Self-Sufficiency' in Homer and Aristotle

Author(s): Arthur W. H. AdkinsSource: The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 13, No. 1 (May, 1963), pp. 30-45Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/637932

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'FRIENDSHIP' AND 'SELF-SUFFICIENCY' IN

HOMER AND ARISTOTLE

This articlefallsinto two parts: the firstis an analysis,in the light of my earlierdiscussions of dper'I and r7./x,2 of the Homeric usage of ltAos, bLXev, and

OLAoTr,s;he second, an attempt to show that, as in the case of aper4, the effectsof Homeric usage persist to a considerabledegree in the moral philosophyofAristotle. In the earlierdiscussionsI have argued that the highervalue placedupon the competitive dpe-ralin Greek entails that co-operative relationships,even when valued and necessary, take the form dictated by the more valued

qualities, the dperal. The most general words to denote co-operative relation-ships in Greek are AIXosnd its derivatives: my purpose here is to show howthe Homeric usage of these words is related to the Homeric dperiq-standardand to Homeric society, and to sketch in the outline of a wider discussion,which I hope to be able to fill in later.

The manner in which we are accustomed to think of the usage of tI'Aos,cAE?tv, nd OFdAor7Sn Homer resultsfrom the translations and classifications

of the lexicographers. Ebeling,3 having suggested the meanings 'carus','dilectus', etc., for OlAos-,dds 'nonnumquamhaud multum abest a sensupro-nominis reflexivi, sed num haec significatio primaria sit, id quod nonnulli

volunt, admodumdubiumvidetur'.Ebelingseems not to questionthe existenceof one or more 'meanings',4merely the possibilityof assigning priority to oneof them; and Liddell and Scott behave similarly, separatingthe sense 'one'sown' found in Homer and the early poets, and classifyingit quite separatelyfrom those usageswhich we usuallytranslate 'dear'or 'beloved'. We shall finda similar classificationof the uses of tAAEetvnd tAo'7r-Sn the lexicographers;but it will be convenient to begin by discussingthe usagesof l,Aos in Homer,and to inquire firstwhether there is any real difference between these usages.

The Homeric usage of liAos, OLAe?V, nd fAo'rXS is, I shall argue, closelyrelated to the

structure of Homeric society revealed and moulded by theHomeric use of dyao's, dper4, and allied words. It will accordingly be usefulto consider the manner in which the Homeric dyao's (warrior-chieftain in

charge of his own otKoS) uses l'Aosof his various faculties, possessions,andfellow men, beginning as near as possible to the man himself and workingsteadily outwards.Those who were not dyaOoln the Homeric sensecould useliAos n the manner which I shall illustrate below;5 but they could not use

qALELtvn the Homeric manner6of their relationswith those who were ayaol,7

I MeritandResponsibility,hapteriii. those used of persons, under the general2 ' "Honour" and "Punishment" in the

heading 'carus','dilectus'.

Homeric Poems,' Bulletinof the Institute f 5 The 'beggar'Odysseus(hopefully)ad-ClassicalStudiesii (I960), 23 ff. dresses Antinous as 6iAe, Od. I7. 415, when

3 LexiconHomericum,.v. asking for alms.4 It is difficult to discover exactly how 6 See pp. 34 f.

Ebeling understood the usage of cl,Aos. 7 For OtAdevequires possessions, Od. 19.Having stated that the usage sometimes I94f., and the dyaGo'swould have more of

appears very close to that of a reflexive pro- these anyway. Non-ayaOoi could use 4tAe!vnoun, he nevertheless classifies the instances of the benefits they conferred on their de-in which tiAosgs used of things as parallel to pendants, e.g. Eumaeus tJActehe 'beggar',



'FRIENDSHIP', 'SELF-SUFFICIENCY' IN HOMER, ARISTOTLE 31

and Homer is not much interested in the relations of non-dya0oiwith oneanother. Accordingly, we can satisfactorily study only the Ao'Xrrjs,f ayaOoIin Homer.

We can begin no closer to the dyaoosthan the parts of his own body andhis psychological functions. (The distinction is, of course, post-Homeric.)ltAos an certainly be used of these. So, Iliad I 1. 407, we find iAa' trlpot

ravTa ltAos S&EAearoOvd'os;and 13. 85, r&v p' ta r' apyaAe' Kap&,drqhAa

yvta AeAvvTo.n English we may translate the phraseswith i'Aoseither dearlimbs (or Ovfios)' or 'own limbs (or Ovtos)'; but in either case, if we bear inmind the whole range of q[Aos-,what do we imagine that we mean, or thatHomer meant? Widening the scopea little, we findsuch phrasesas IXAatLara(Iliad 2. 261) and i'Aa e'Lvta(Odyssey8. 277): 'own clothes (bed)' or 'dearclothes (bed)'? We might perhaps give different answers in these two cases;but the usage is evidently the same. Again, Homer speaksof iArsa...Trarpl8osaL'7s (e.g. Iliad 2. 178): a phrase which we will readily translate by 'dearnative land', but would feel no difficultyin translatingby 'own' or 'own dear'.If we considerthese usagesnot as lexicographersor translatorsbut as speakersand thinkers n Greek,it is difficultto find a clear line of demarcationbetweenthem.

Even if we consideronly those instancesin which ItAos-s used of persons,noclear line can be drawn. In most cases we translate by 'dear', 'friend', or'beloved' withoutfeeling any problem.' (Thisdoesnot entail,of course,thatanyof these words is

a full and accurate translation in any instance,merely thatsuch translation causes no difficultiesto the English reader.) Some examples,however, seem odd. Oddest of all is Odyssey I. 326 f.: Odysseus says thatamong the ghosts in Hades he saw arrvyEprv' 'Ept;vArXv, Xpvaov otiAov vSp6s

E''aEaro rtxevr-a. Here we have to choose. We can either suppose that Homermeans 'own a7jp' or 'dear av'rp'. 'Dear' is absurdly inappropriate in thecontext. We might avoid the problem by claiming that qiAovdvSpos s aHomeric formula, usually appropriate,since 'dear' is an adjective commonlyapplied to husbands,but here used in an unsuitable context. This explanationis sometimesnecessary,2but should be used with caution: it may be seriously

misleading, particularly in the field of values,3 and the interpreter, beforeassumingthat Homer is talking nonsense,should make every effort to under-stand the text before him. 'Her own', with no overtones of affection, seemsa good translationhere,particularlysosince the translationof avryps 'husband'

requiressome such idea to be suppliedfrom the rest of the context. 'Her ownman' causes no difficulties to the reader; but if we translate in this manner,it is hard to see the relationshipof this usage to the generalusageof 0iAoswhen

applied to persons,on the assumptionthat the general usage is correctlyren-dered by 'dear'.

Od. I4. 388, and is addressed as tAce, 15, II. 24. 775, can be translated as passive, andetc.; but menial services performed by the should be so translated.dependants in return would not be charac- 2 e.g. rrova 7rrvraeTerpov is used appro-terized by ,tAecv,and Eumaeus does not priately of a bull, II. 2. 402, inappropriatelyaddress the 'beggar' as LAce.ristotle finds of a pig, Od. 14. 419.similar difficulties in 'unequal AtAa',E.JV. 3 e.g. diaLvf'ovoslyiaOoLo,Od. I. 29, is not1159b1 fi. a misapplied formula: a1ov,uwvelongs to the

I 'Beloved', not 'friendly'. The active dperq7-group, and Aegisthus is as dyaos' asusages of /ih'osapplied to persons in Homer the suitors are.

alleged by the lexicographers, Od. 1. 313 and



Two other passagesmay be compared.At Iliad9. 44 if., Agamemnon says:

E,

,'i, EVL ,pels s pOLtla1t OvyaTpes evt /Leyclp) evTrr-Krw,XpVcr0?eEis Kal AaosiKcr KQa

'Iqcavaacra.rTaco v K' ce Acrn, aetiA\vvaEavov cyeacu

7Tpos OLKOVH7rAXos.

At Iliad 3. 136 if., Iris says to Helen:

avrap AAefavSpos Ka. aCprqtqtAXoseveAaos

ltaKp,Ts eyXet,tcrt aXja'ovrat Irepl arEto'

TCZ SE KE VLKj)aaLVTl rtA KEKAXjaO1KOLrILS.

The versions of the translators and editors are interesting. Lang, Leaf, and

Myersin their

translation,and Leaf and

Bayfieldin their

notes, each translatethe Helen example by 'dear'. Leaf and Bayfield translate the other exampleby 'own', and add: 'Here the original sense of the word, "own", is very wellmarked.' Lang, Leaf, and Myers do not translate the word at all on thisoccasion. The reason can only be that we know Helen to have been desirable,while we know nothing of Agamemnon's daughters in this respect. The usagein the Greek seems identical. Indeed, 'own' seems very apposite in the second

passage, for aKcortls simply means 'bedfellow':' some word seems needed toindicate that Helen will be the 'own bedfellow', without any possibility of

dispute, of the victor in the single combat between Paris and Menelaus.

There are, then, a number of occurrences of [Aos1n Homer in which thetranslation 'dear' seems extraordinary, some in which 'own' and 'dear' seem

equally appropriate, and of course a great number which we translate 'dear'without question. If we adopt the strict lexicographical approach, we may saythat i'Aos originally 'meant' '(his, her, etc.) own', and gradually passed overinto the 'meaning' 'dear'. Homeric Greek, however, has a full range of pro-nominal adjectives: if tiAos s a mere synonym, it seems a singularly unneces-

sary one. On the other side, we might maintain that in saying (1Aos Gvp'os ndc [AaeiLaara Homer was using a strained 'poetizing' diction, doubtless the resultof formulaic technique. Here we must distinguish between (a) an expression

introduced as normal usage by an earlier poet in the tradition which has nowbecome obsolete or obsolescent and (b) an expression which was strained andunnatural at its first coining. The latter seems to me quite uncharacteristicof the Homeric poems; and in the former case we have still to explain whyljtlos at someearlierperiodhad, as its normal usage, the range which we find inHomer: I can discover no criteria for distinguishing an earlier from a later

usage of 'XAosn the poems as we have them.At first sight this appears to be a difficult problem; but if we examine the

use of 4Alos in the context of Homeric society the solution seems clear. TheHomeric ayaoos or warrior-chieftain was the head of a virtually autonomoushousehold.2 In Homer's Ithaca the heads of such households might meet todecide questions which affected more than one of them; but they did not meetduring the twenty years of Odysseus' absence until Telemachus summoned ameetingjust before his father's return; and the lack of such meetings is nowheresaid to be the cause of the troubles of Ithaca. The dayaos, then, finds himselfpractically autonomous in a largely hostile or indifferent world, the nearer

2 Cf. Merit and Responsibility, p. 34 ff.

32 A. W. H. ADKINS

I Cf. II. 6. 350-




sections of which, being equally autonomous and in actual or possible com-

petition with him for the produce of a not very fertile land, are quite as likelyto be hostile as indifferent. I have tried to show elsewhere' that the qualities

which thechieftain needs to survivein such a world are those commended

bythe Homeric use of dpE7r.But no man can surviveby his strengthalone, with-out tools, possessions,and associates:what things so to speak)can the Homeric

dyaOosrely on? He has his own limbs and psychological functions, his tools,

weapons, possessions,and portion of land; and he has his wife, children, ser-

vants, and other dependants.On these he can rely, or should be able to; apartfromthese,only on thosewith whom he has enteredinto relationsof 0Aor'T7sr

{ev'a. Human beings have no rights quahuman beings in Homer,z only in

virtue of some definite relationship,whether resultingfrom birth, from directeconomic dependence, from marriage, or from some other cause. The rest of

the world is indifferentor hostile: it competes.If we try to imagine this situation as the dyaOosmust have seen it, thereason for the range of the Homeric usage of IXAosecomes clear. In a hostileor indifferent world the persons and things on which his survival dependsmust appear to him sharply defined from the rest of his environment. He is,

accordingly, likely to use some word to demarcate these things from things in

general: a man (or a society) is likely to classifyhis experience in the mannerwhich seemsmost significantto him.

It is evident that /lAosin Homer demarcatesin preciselythis manner; andit should be equally evident that for this very reason no English word will

renderaccuratelythe Homeric ltAos.We are not acutelyconsciousofpossessinga limited stock of personsand thingson whom ourvery existencedepends.TheHomeric dyao's is; and it follows that his possessionof them is of the utmost

importance to him. I stress the word 'possession'.He has these persons andthese things which he can employ to ensure his continued existence. These

things are his own: all else is hostile or indifferent,and the possessiveaffectionhe feels for what is c)iAovs based on the need and desire for self-preservation.These are the good things, dyaOa,he possesses;and since the belief that human

beings should be treated as ends-in-themselvesrather than as means is totallyun-Greek, there is no reason

why personsand

thingsshould be

thoughtof

differently.3To distinguishthe use of 1'Aosn Homer fromtheuseof 'friend' n English,we

may usefully employ the distinction between the descriptiveand the emotive

aspect of the word. Xt'Aoss perhaps not a word which we should normallyregard as a value-term; but undoubtedly anyone who uses tXAosf a personor thing does so in virtue of an emotion which he feelsfor that personor thing,as does a man who uses the word 'friend'.

It is clear that, in its range of application, the Homeric (lAosdoes not coin-cide with the English 'dear' (or, when used as a noun, with the English

'friend'); and that, though we could always use 'own' where Homer usesb1Aos, e feel in most cases that something important has been left out of thetranslation.We ought to feel this in all cases: what has been left out is theemotive aspect of lAosg,which is far more powerfulthan that of 'own' in Eng-lish, in proportion as the needs of the Homeric dyaOos are far more evident

I Cf. Merit and Responsibility, pp. 34 ff. 3 The (post-Homeric) idiom XprjOa&2 Cf. ' "Honour" and "Punishment" in qtIAws illuminating.

the Homeric Poems', passim.

D



and urgent. The distinction between AIXosnd 'dear' or 'friend' (in addition

to the difference in range of application) is that we, with our very different

society and presuppositions,include much more generosity in our view of

friendship.The word is quite untranslatable,for it is locked firmly into theHomeric situation.

Homer's view of 4Ao',rqs,he associationof one human being with another,

appears unappetizing, though thoroughly comprehensible.Thus far, however,we have only consideredthe manner in which A finds B 'dear' to him: howA shows himself 'friendly'to B must be discussed next. Since <lAos n Homeris alwaysI passive in sense, we must now examine examples of the Homericuse of >bLAEtv.beling divides these into (i) 'amo, diligo' and (ii) 'benealiquemtracto,mprimisfficioccipio'.Though most of the examplesconsideredhere aredrawn from Ebeling'ssecond group, I shall argue that there is really only one

usage here too.We learn, Iliad 6. 14f., that a certain Axylus was

dLvEcoLos flo&roto, tAios8' ?IvavOpc7TTOLactv

7rdvras yap lAE'ECKEVyoa E7rLOLKta vatwv.

Evidently, as one might expect, <'Aos-nd 0XAEFvre linked in usage.2Again,in Odyssey 5. 200, Telemachus, who has already experienced Nestor's loqua-city, on returningto Pylos asksPisistratusto allow him to get down from thechariot and return to his ship before they reach the palace,

Lj 0uo yEpWovaEKovTa KaTacr X7 ) EVLO'KtO

LtEUEVOS LCA'ELV.

In 1. 74 of the same book (which, though not in the best manuscripts, is

Homeric/Hesiodic in thought and expression)we find

Xp-7 tElvov 7rapEoVTa qLELtv, 6E'0Eovra 8? rtTELVr .

All these examples are listed under 'welcome, treat kindly' by Ebeling.Ignoring for the moment the relationship between such examples and the

rest, we may say that LtAelv ay denote merely the actions one can perform

when the guest-friend is present; and that consequently one may desire o)tLEitvomeone, but be prevented from doing so by his absence. In fact, in

these examples at all events, OLAtevrequires of the subject of the verb not

primarilyemotions or intentions,which one might still have when the objectof the verb was not present, but actions and results.

In the context of Homeric society, this is a familiar situation. In order tobe an Homeric ayaos-, or to display Homeric aperr', actions and results were

necessary,not emotionsor intentions.3The reasonlay in the natureof Homeric

society; and this is so also in the case of Homeric LtAo'rs-.he essenceof the

1Aos-relationships co-operation, not competition, so that we might expectintentions to be relevant;4but it is co-operation to meet the harsh demandsof Homeric life. When a man is away from his own otcos he has no rightsquahuman being, only the rights he is guaranteed by some member of thenew society into which he has come.5 He is a [KETWr, a comer (or suppliant, for

Cf. p. 30, n. 6. 3 Cf. Merit andResponsibility, p. 46 ff.2 t(Aoss passivehere'too: the LAetEtvlause 4 Ibid., p. 6.

does not repeat the sense of the earlier clause, s Cf. "'Honour" and "Punishment"',but explainswhy Axylus was >i;Aoso men. p. 25.

A. W. H. ADKINS4




all comers must be suppliants); and if accepted, he may be given the status of

setvosI by some one sufficiently powerful member of society, some dyao's. Now

this relationship only subsists between the comer and the man who bAcEFim.

The unit of power, the social unit, the economic unit is the individual ot'COS;

accordingly, the comer has no relationship of LtAo'-TrSwith the remainder of

the society into which he has come. When he is in the oLKOS f the man who

OLAehim, he is dependent on the actionsof that man for his continued existence,outnumbered as he is in a land of potential enemies with no strong centralized

government and no belief that human beings have certain rights qua human

beings. Furthermore, the comer, particularly if he comes by land, can carrylittle with him: this is a society with no coined money, no readily transportablewealth. What he needs is not primarily sympathy or affection, which are luxuries

for a man in his position, but actions: the provision of food, shelter, and pro-tection if he needs it-in short, rtl.2

This may readily be illustrated. Odysseus, in Odyssey8. 208, excepts Laoda-

mas from his general challenge to the youth of Phaeacia to compete with him

in athletics, saying

?etvoS yap uocLS' etar' 7rSav XLAteovrTuaXOro;

Ebeling does not list this as an example of the sense 'welcome, treat kindly';but this is evidently the same use of XAetiv. Odysseus is not saying that it would

be morally wrong to strive with one who has friendly feelings for you. He

continues:

a(qpwcv rJ KEivoS YE Kal ovTtravos 7TEAECdvrp,

OO7TLS 6ELVOOKC pot&8arTpoop7 -rat L AcdXov

r4jlu) Ev dAAoa77-O 6s0o0' avTovr 7rTavTra KOAOVEL.

To compete with one's host would be the height of folly; and the reason is

clear: the games are one field for the display of dperr4, the most importantHomeric quality. To defeat a man is to alaXX,vvcvis cperj,3 to cause him

A,EYXXeU?.o greater affront can be caused to one Homeric hero by another;and this makes dispute and anger certain when it is caused, so that av...

iuaXOIroand 'p8a ... adOAcovre not overstatements. Now the man in a strangeland may not need friendly feelings from his protector, but he cannot affordto quarrel with him. He needs non-hostile actions, 'friendly relations' in the

sense in which one autonomous state may maintain such relations with an-

other.4 On his side, the feeling is one of reliance.

In Homer, then, there are two aspects of the OAocrqs-relationship, expressed

by l:tAosnd OtAEEv.When the chief concern of the ayao's is to secure his own

continued existence, a (lAov object, whether animate or inanimate, is some-

thing he can rely on to use for his own preservation. But dperT, the quality of

the dyaods, is also shown in protecting one's dependants, whether permanent

I The comer can be termed 'IAos only acutely when a man considered 'worse'prospectively if he is an equal (cf. p. 36 defeats a man considered 'better'; but abelow and Od. i. 158, where Telemachus stranger is likely to be considered 'worse';does not know who his guest is), not at all and if he wishes, as Odysseus does, to dis-if he is unlikely ever to be able to OFtaEvn prove this, strife will result.return (cf. p. 30 n. 7 above). 4 For such a use of iXAia n later Greek,

2 Cf. ' "Honour" and "Punishment"', cf. S.I.G.3 II22, Thuc. 6. 78. i. (I am in-

passim. debted to Professor Dover for these3 Cf. II. 23. 57I, and Merit and Respon- examples.)

sibility, p. 56. The EAeyXcEls felt most



residents or transients; and LtAEFv,hich, as we can see from the examplesquoted above, includes giving food, lodging, and protection to transients,characterizesthis activity, at all events in its lessviolent manifestations.I

In the second part of this article, I shall discussthe degree of selfishnessofthe differenttypesof Aristotelian )Alta; nd it will be convenientfirst to discussHomeric 4XAodrTsrom this point of view. If one considers only the usage of

4,AXos,uch 4)tAod'r ppears entirely selfish; but clearly one does not ObAE?v

personfromimmediatelyselfishmotives: when one OlAEFman who has comefrom a distance, he is the immediateeneficiary. In normal circumstanceshecannot be a benefactorwhile he is in a strangeland. 4&AErvs to bring a personwithin (or if he is already a <4Aos, o continue him within) a circle of co-

operationwhose members have a right to feel mutual reliance, and a right towhatever basic necessities are available for consumption.2When one 4lAcEmember of one's own OL'KOS,he pattern is the same: 4XtAELs to do useful ser-

vices fora man, not in orderto makehim immediatelyore usefulto oneself,but

simply to secure his own existence in his own interest. It is not, of course, analtruisticact. It makes,and is intendedto make, the otherpersona 4lAov bjecton whose help one can rely when one needs it, perhapsat some distant futuretime if he is a 4lAos romsome distance,almostat once if he is a memberof the

same OKOSg.LAEWvs an act which creates or maintains a co-operative relation-

ship; and it neednotbe accompaniedy any riendlyeelingat all: it is the actionwhich is all-important.

The range of )Adrr7Tn Homer illustratesthe

importanceof the

AAo'r7s-relationship. Every relationshipfrom sexual passion to guest-friendship,3re-

lationships whose differences we should emphasize much more than their

resemblances, is denoted by )tAor7S.The reason is evidently not that the

Greeks were unusually warm friends or unusually cold lovers, but that a

different aspect of these relationshipsis emphasized by )tAor's".he reason

for the range of tA&orqss the same as that for the range of <lAos. In a hostileor indifferent world, a small number of persons is united with the Homeric

ayaOos n co-operative relationships.Naturally this resemblancebetween the

relationshipsseems to him much more importantthan the differences:4L;Aodr7s

denotes the structureof that part of the world which is, or should be, reliable.The existence of such 4Aro'Tr-relationshipss naturally of the utmost im-

portance; and this may have resultswhich appearodd to us. In Iliad6. 119 f.,the Greek Diomedes meets the Lycian Glaucus and, in the conversationalmanner of Homeric fighting, askshim who he is. Glaucusreplies that he is theson of Hippolochusand grandson of Bellerophon; whereupon Diomedes says,2I5 ff.;

r pa vv IOot elvoS Ta.rp.lCoO Eca.t TraAatos

OlvEvs yap Troreo osOdtjvova BeAXepoVq'vrrqV

lEwvot Evi /Ecyapolwtcv EELKOcOrV /a.rspgC ' Ka't a'AA-q'Aotat r 'X eEt,l a.o0 oE KCa aiAA4OL TOpov ?elV7ta KcaAa.

He concludes, 224 ff.:

Tr6 vvv crotl Iev Eyco e?tvos L'Aosg pyEc IecracpEtd, TV 8' ev AvKi, ore KEV rTOJVre7ov r KCo!at.

For this aspect of aper'j cf. Merit and great value to a wanderer in a moneylessResponsibility, . 35. society.

2 "o,a' rda fiAwvwould be a principle of 3 Cf. Od. . 336; II. 3. 354.

36 A. W. H. ADKINS




He suggeststhat in consequencethey should avoid one another in the fighting,and look for enemies elsewhere among the armies.

These two men have never seen one another before, and yet, in virtue of

a compact of guest-friendshipmade between their grandfathers, they will notfight against one another in a war in which they find themselveson oppositesides. tAod6rss the basic structureof co-operative life: Diomedes is far more

closely bound to a Lycian who is his qIAos han to a Greek who is not, even

during the Trojan War. This is not a war between nation states: the OFKOS n

peace, and the contingent loyal to an ayao's, their local lord, in war, are the

largest co-operatingunits in normal circumstances. LXAor;surnishesHomericlife with such stability as it possesses,and is a permanent thing which cannotbe overset by a transientoccurrencesuch as the Trojan War; and it does not

depend on the feelings or inclinations of the individuals who inherit it, since

Glaucus and Diomedes have never seen one another before. It follows that

<LAodrs-relationshipsave a very objective character: we can now see whyAmphiarauswas Eriphyle's tAosadvp, once she had enteredinto the relation-

ship of co-operation and reliance with him, whatever her subsequentfeelingsfor Amphiaraus. Even in this extreme case lAos. s not reduced to 'own': the

differences, as I have already said, lie in the emotive aspect of the word;'and this, like its range of application, is closely related to the structure ofHomeric society.

The Homeric usage of 0Aos and bAiEvhas great importance for Greekethical

thought.To

illustrate this,in

the remainder of this article I shalldiscuss a short passage from the Nicomacheanthics(E.N. I 55bI7-I 156b32),and try both to elucidate it and to show its wider significance.For this purposeit must be emphasized that Homeric 6tA'r7sis not really co-operative, but

reciprocal:hen A LAcXE, he is not behaving as a 0lAos o B, for fdAoss passive;but B finds A to be a 1AWovbject when A bLAEcim, and A will find B to bea q[Aovobject when B LtAeLim. In the case of members of the same olKS,A may be doing a service for B while B is doing a service for A; but the two

aspects, >t'ovand tLAEIV,emain quite distinct.These distinctionsmay appearto be hair-splitting: the remainderof the article will show their importance.

The passage begins i I55bI7:

7raxa 8' av yevoLto 7repi avcWov favepov yvcoptraev-ros roiv tArrov. 8OKELapov TrdvL?AEciOatcAAar6o LA77rov,oivro ' elvat ayaOovq rlSv

`XpjaL,vov.

The next relevant passageis II55b27 f.:

rpt6iv 8' ovTov (i.e. the three tiAr-ra) t' a tAovaotv,E7rl levrL riv atvXtovqlA7)CEL2v AXEyeraLlAl'aov yap cranv vrtLA7(ircs,vo f3 vArlatsE`KEtVpayaOovi

(yeAoLov yap 7awS nr oL'VC flovAca0aL -racyaOa, cAA'Trep, crceaaLrOal oAerat

avrov,tva avros

EXQ7)'SC'

Of? Oaaloev

fovcrOea rdayada EKE?VOVVEKa.

Aristotle goes on to say that to wish a friend well for his own sake is to showevvota,3 and that if the person for whom one feels e'voLa is aware of it andreturns the feeling, on account of one of the fAXr-qraddaya0o'v,Xpauiov, or 786V)

Above,p. 33. referto the LAetiv-aspect,f. I68aIg.2

4[i\qatsand avTtlDlAqaLShere each refer 3 Discussedbelow,pp. 41ff.to the l'Aov-aspectf qtAia. heymayalso



mentionedabove, this is bLAta. ackham, the Loeb translator,rendersthe pas-sage thus:

To befriends,therefore,

men must(i)

feelgoodwill

for oneanother,

that

is, wish each other'sgood, and (ii) be aware of each other's goodwill, and

(iii) the cause of their goodwill must be one of the loveable qualities men-tioned above.

The next paragraph begins, I 56a6:

8tabEpEL be ravra aAAX'Awvt'iEL'Kat ai L)ArjacELSpa Kal atl LAFat.rpia Ir)

rad r7S bLAcasEst'Sa, lcrclptiOLa Tots ALXr7TOLs'KaO' EKaorrov yap Ertlv avTtlA-qortLs

ovhavcavov0a, ot 8e LtAovrTESa- AAjXAovs /3oAovvrat-rcyaOdAA 'Aots ravrr D

LtAovOatv.

Up to ravTrT7 j qAovcrLv it seems quite evident that Aristotle means whatRackham's translation of the earlier passage would suggest: a man wishes goodthings for his #XAos, nd his reason for doing so, the reason why he has the otheras his tIAos, is that the q'Aospossesses one of the XtA7r'a:e is dya0es, Xp7'l40os,or 7y'Usgo him. The ayaaOwhich A does or wishes for B, since these are 'equal4tALat',iare of the same kind as A receives: if the tAl'a s 'on account of the

XpjattLov', hen A has B as his friend because B is useful to him, and the ayacOwhlich A does or wishes for B are things which B will find useful. This seemsa reasonable schema, and quite Greek in tone, up to Tav'r- Dj btAoiv^ov,which is

ambiguous.'A and B want

good thingsfor one

anotherin

the manner in whicheach ftA~E the other' could be analysed as I have suggested; but Stewart2

glosses the words thus:

Friends wish good to each other in respect of that which is the ground oftheir friendship-virtue, pleasure or utility: i.e., they wish their friendsto be as virtuous, as pleasant or as useful as possible;

and this seems to be the usually accepted interpretation.Prima facie Stewart seems to be correct, for Aristotle immediately continues,

I 156ao:

ot [LEV ovv 8La Tro Xp7)crtlLov oLAoVVTESdaAA-~Aov V Ka03' aviroVS3 q!tAoOrtv,aAA'7 a4yvera tr avrots ,rap' aAAXiAcv dyao'v. OtJoiws SE Kalt ol &t' r7ov1v. ov yap rTC

7TOlovs' TLrvas'tvat acyarct5 rovs EVrpaTeovS, dAAo'OTr ES' avro" ot T?EO

0ta TO Xpr{Tp,ov qlAovTre9 oaa r6oavroFs- aya0ov crrepyovut,5 Kal oi St' Ooviriv

dTO avTros 775V,Kal ovX D o (/tAovJLvevos eartLV,aAA'7 Xp aLiLos 7) VS KaTa

aVyJL/E/f%KOS TE ?3 at XbtAiatrait clatv ov yap 7e

EOTLV oTrep EaTLA (o)LAOV/SEVOS,

TLavrT7 lAcETaL, CAA' ToOpi^ovaLV Ot leVLvayaGov Tt ol 8' Movv.

If Aristotle can maintain that both those who tbLAElvn account of the xpcrac.lwovand those who 9tAEFV on account of the &8vfeel affection for'5 their LA&osgn

account of their own ayaOov(or $v'), not for what the friend is, but for beinguseful or pleasant, it seems clear that the transaction is entirely selfish, andStewart's gloss fully justified: A, in desiring good things for B, desires things

I Unequal htAtIa, I163a24 ff., could be 4 This clause might well appear neatlysimilarly analysed. parallel to TavTri D tAotvavabove.

2 Notes on theNicomacheanEthics, ii. 274. 5 It should not be assumed that these are3 This phrase, and KaraatUV/flelqKos, will synonyms for q&tAEv.ee below, p. 42.

be discussed below.

38 A. W. H. ADKINS




which A, not B, will find to be dyaOov.But if this is the case, Aristotlecannotalso assert, as he does in a passage already quoted, that one cannot have

LAtla ith wine. That passage refersexplicitly to all three tLArda,nd hence

to all types of Atia.Aristotle is arguing that one cannot have any type offtAiawith wine; and one proof is that it would be ridiculous to want goodthings for the wine for its own sake in an unselfish sense: one merely wishes tohave it for oneself,that it may exist in such a manner as to be (more) pleasantor (more)useful to oneself. But this is preciselythe manner in which, accordingto Stewart,one does XtAXefvne'spleasantor useful IoAoL;nd if thisis a sufficient

proof that one cannot have iLAc'aith wine, it seems that either Aristotle or

Stewart, or possiblyboth, has become confused.

taKalaar' dperjv, however, remains to be discussed. Perfect <tia, I 56b7 ff.,is

,rijv ayaOov iAtla Kal Kar' apEr qv J[LotlUv ovTOL yap radyadaacotwos

f3ovAovrat dAAMAols dyaOoi,yaOoa ' elcla9Ev`rovs. oa r eSovA'6E?voL rdyaOd

7TOS )lAOLSX1KE?LVWVEKCLJCuaALOTaiAOt. Ot'av'rovsyap oTursEXovar,Kal ov Kara

(rvf4LE/7fKos' SLaftlEvEL v v 7)TOV7Wc)V tAbaEcs av acyaOot CaLtv,Q d'apenr) ulovuLov.

The use of EKetvcWvvEKa is a linguistic trick. Earlier, II55b3I, in a passagewhich is relevantto all three typesof ktAla,EcKeIOVEKcas used in an 'ordinaryGreek' sense, and must be intended to include wanting useful or pleasantthings for a man 'for his own sake'. Here, however, 'for their own sake' is

opposed to 'as a result of some accidental quality'; and this must refer back

to the same phrasein II56aI6, and be intended to exclude the other two typesof dAtla;nd if we accept Stewart'sinterpretation,the effect of the linguistictrick is to suggest that tAtiaKcar'perrv is (largely) unselfish, the other two

types of ktA/acompletely selfish.Aristotle's terminology suggests this in other ways. He speaks of tALian

account f pleasure and utility. Surely in II56b7 f. we should expect to beinformedquite soon why (on account of what)ayaoltXtAoivrtvne another, or

alternativelyto be told that there are no selfishreasonsfor this.Aristotleavoidsthis question for some time; but at II56bI9 we are informed that all AtXla

exists on account of ayaOovor 7Soyvr, ither darrActr for the person who LAcF.This does not mean that Agathos A qLAcrAgathos B on account of an ayaodvwhich is not ayaOovfor AgathosA himself but for AgathosB, whereas ChresimosA

and HedusA LtAovauhresimos and HedusB on account of Jya0a which are

only daya0dor themselves, Chresimos and HedusA. It means that all men

}tAooatv n account of the things which are or seem to them to be daya0aor

themselves,but that in the case of dayaOohe things which are dya0dfor themare alsoaTrAWsJya0d.Quite late in the discussionwe are informed that all three

types of tALlare equally selfish.' Earlier, Aristotle carefully avoids mentionof any reason for the tA'la f ayaOoi.He does not say 'those who (tAovua on

account of the dyaov', but instead insists that these men are dr7AcrsyaOoi(though they are also adyaOoio their IXAoL,156b 3, and this, bI4, is evidentlyequivalentto 'beneficial to one another').

This is very curious.Aristotlebegan by saying that the natureof tA'awouldbecome clearer if the nature of the tAL7ro'vere discussed. He divided the

I For darrA)s aoyaOo'v does not mean which are really ayao'v ayaOov for him be-

'dcyaoov for both A and B at the same time', cause he is ayadosg'.but 'really dyao'v for A, who finds things



9lA?q7TOVnto aiyaOo'v,8 , and Xpacn,ov, I I55b7 ff.; and, I 156a7 if., maintained

that there were three types of qtAla,equal in number to the O4LtA-7pA-implyingsome kind of correspondence.' But the best type of OtAlas not treated as

OtAta n account of the aiyaGo'v, ut as bLtAan respect of apEpTq.et Aristotlefinds the division into Ob&Xqra'o importantthat he beginshis detaileddiscussionwith it.

Aristotle's purpose is to contrast ObLAtaaL ' ap-r-vjv s sharply as possible with

the other types of Ob&Ala.his is also the purpose of Stewart: liking a manbecause he is virtuous (to mistranslate both kAcEi-V nd a'yaGo's-n the usual

manner) is very different from liking a man because he is useful, and A'sdesire that B should become more virtuousisverydifferentfrom C'sdesirethatD should become more useful to him. There are indeed points of contrastbetween the types of OtAta,ven if they are not those suggestedby Aristotle's

Greek, or by Stewart'sinterpretationof that Greek; but the real nature of thedifferencescan best be indicated by pointingout the resemblances n structureof all three types, which Aristotle and Stewart in differentways conceal.

To reveal these resemblances we must now consider Aristotle in the lightof what we have learned fromHomer; and a passage alreadydiscussed,I I56a6 if., is particularly relevant. From I 55ib 7 to I I56a5 Aristotle is recordingand basing his argumentupon 'ordinaryGreek' 2but from I 156a6he discusses

#tAt'a in his own philosophical terminology, and the language immediatelybecomesmoreprecise.While discussing 'ordinaryGreek',AristotletreatsOtAq-rd'as the direct object of

0tAEFV;ut at I 156aio, as we have seen, he introduces

the phrases'OtAet-vn accountof the useful' and 'ObtActvn account of pleasure':it is the other man who is the object of OtAeFv,nd the O&A-qpro'vs the reasonforthe activity, OtctbAEV.ow the Homeric a'ya0'g~ObLAEi,enefits, other people, inthe hope that at some futuretime he will find them usefulor beneficial to him:in the hope, that is, that they will then possesswhat Aristotle termsa 0Xp-cr0V:we have at least a linguisticparallelwith the Homeric situation.

That we have in fact much more than this is shownby the opening sentencesof the discussion of $btAt'a,I 55a, if.:

/iLeT- ~ra IEpLc btAaS EITIT aV&EE EaTtL yap ape-r-9 -tL5 77I-tEr apE-77Sg,

EItL 8' JvayKa ctTo,arvelsl TOyv it'ov.a"vEv yap t'Awovv'SetSg ZAor' a'v 4~v, 'xovw rA'

Aourad aiya0ad 7a'vrav KaLLya'p vrAovrovecnKa'L a'pXa' KaLL vvao7TE1'aS-KEK7rflLEVOCS'

8OKEF #&AwOVjuaAuar' EWva Xp"t'a it ya'p o' EAosg rg -rotav1rqgS eve-r7ptcLS aLa-

pEGeLt,?7S. v'Epyeatas-, 9 ytyve-rat (LUaALTa Kat effatveTWT-a-r-q7iTpos OL'AOVS.;, 6ja3v77)qpv)EL'?7Ki"aw'upor'r avev 4Acova; 'orc ya'p 7TAELWv,roaoVrcp e7florqoaAEcre'pa.

eV 7T4EVita TE Kat TaFg AotraFg ova-rvx~t'aL uoL0v-qv otovTal& KaTaUovy7v ELvat 7oV5g

The resemblance seems complete. ctiAotmay still be regarded as external

aya0a': they are necessitiesof life for both rich and poor. Again, no affection

is expressedforone's Ot'Aot:he rich and powerfulman, the a'yaGo's,,eeds riendsto benefit,as an exerciseof his a'pEr4',ust as he needs hem to protecthimngainsthis enemies. Clearlyin Aristotle,as in Homer, one may speakof a 0,btAov-aspectand a OtAEw--aspectf ObtAla. hen one finds someone fd'Aov,ne feels emotion,

IThis remains true even though the ObtA('a an easily be distinguished by the

#cAip-acan be reduced to two, II 55 b1 fif. appropriate OLAqra'.though Xp'Iat/Loy s only Xp7Ia7L/ov because it 2 155b,8 OKC, b23 SOKE& b2 cyerat,

is a means to dya0o'Yr 'Sov', three typeS Of b31#a' b3 Acyouatv.

A. WV.H. ADKI~NS0




of an entirely selfishkind, as in Homer, for an external aya0ov: this is 1A'IXaLs

which, I I55b27, one may have for wine. To LAtiaoth 5IAov-aspectnd tAc?Ev-

aspect are necessary:the reasonwhy one may not have btAia ith wine isboth

the absence of any dvrtfAirTlS,reciprocalselfish emotion felt by the wine, andalso that it would be ridiculousto benefit wine in its own interest.

In essentials, the concept of cAiearemains as it was in Homer. Nor is this

surprising,for in essentials the conditions of life have not changed. I havetried to show elsewhere' that the individual paterfamiliasof fourth-centuryAthens is still in much the same position, and has much the same values, asthe head of the Homeric oo'So.His aim, as Crito'sadvice to Socratesshows,2 sto help his iLAo( nd to harm his enemies, in accordance with the law or indefiance of the law, as occasion demands. These are the requirements of

apeCr7as commonly recognized;3 and the average Greek in the position of

Socrates would have expected his <[AoLo display their appErr nd ftAEFvimby making every effort to rescuehim fromprisonand execution, therebyshow-

ing themselves to be external dayaOacor him. In such circumstances, ust as inHomeric society, actions and results are needed, not emotions or intentions.LtAEtv,hen, must lay emphasison actions,as in Homer; and in such a society,

no less than in Homer, one needs <iAoLs external ayaaO. Socrates' needs areextreme, or would be if he wished to escape; but the paterfamiliascould lookto none but his 1iAotor any materialhelp he might need: actions and resultsmust be most important in all cases.

Beforediscussing

thissituation,

we must consider evvota. AtII55b33 ff.,already quoted, reciprocated and mutually recognized LtAt'as Evvota; and

we might translate this in such a way as to suggest that SLAthaonsistsin dis-interested generous emotion felt by both 'AhoL.ut evvoELvs to wish acyaOatfor someone else, I I55b32, onaccountof one of the QLtAraC, 56a5: it expresses no

generous emotion for the man as a man, merely the wish that good thingsmay come to him because he is (say) Xpuacptoso oneself. If two Xp7autpodo

this, Aristotle, in this passageof 'ordinaryopinions',iswilling to term the result

btAXta;ut at I I66b30 f. it is not only not hlAia ut not eivota either: evVot,1I67a8,

only wish radya0d to those to whom they are EvvoL: they would not joinwith them in any activity, nor inconvenience themselves on their behalf.

AccordinglyonemighttermevvoLa inactive(fLAta'.owever, it might becometAlta ith the passageof time and the growth of familiarity,not, however,

iLAta n account of the Xprjatulovr the q8v'; or EvvoLaoes not come abouton these termsin the firstplace (A). For the man who has been benefitedbyanother renders Eivota in return for his benefits (B)-and this is just; butthe man who wishes another to fare well because he hopes to become pros-perous through his agency does not seem to be EV'VovUo him but rather to

himself,justas he is not a iAosg

either,if he does services on account of some

use he hopes to make of him (D). In short, vvota comes about on accountofsome adp?r or good quality... (E).

The contrast is clear: ,Altarequires activity, v'voLamerely 'wishing goodthings'. But Aristotle is attempting much more than this here: he wishesto restrict the use of ev;vota(A, E) and <FAlia D) to the field of CA[taKar'

" Cf. Merit and Responsibility, hapter xi, 3 Cf. also Plato, Meno 71 e 2 ff., and Meritespecially pp. 230 ff. 2 Crito45 c 5 ff. and Responsibility, p. 228 ff.



aperqv.' (D), however, characterizes what Aristotle earlier terms 'tlAia onaccount of the xp'at/ov', and proves that our account of such XAtias correct;and the denial that wishing doyaca or a man in the hope that he will laterprove

usefulis EVvoLandicatesthat this is indeed the patternof the relationshipwhichhe is willing to term evvota on account of the Xpriac,ovin I 56a5. (E) seems to

show that EvivoLas restricted in I I66b30 ff. to a feeling (disinterested, one would

suppose) occasioned by another man's aperr4, though (B), which almost equateseivoLawith gratitude, and 'on accountof some apEnr' in (E) might give us second

thoughts. It is clear, at all events, that EvvoLadoes not affect the structure of

the ,tAla-relationship: evvotaon account of the XporjtLov is no less self-centred

than bLAl'aon account of the Xprjaluov, and ev;votaKa-r' apejv exists because

of the other's dpenr in exactly the same manner as does L,AtiaKar' adpETIjv.The

discussion of ctA/a KaT' dpErjv below will show the extent to which EVvoLa Kar'

apETrjv is self-centred.

We can now remove the misunderstandings of the nature of Greek Alctiacaused both by Aristotle's Greek and by Stewart's interpretation. Since

'AiElv on account of the Xpr'7t,iov' does not mean 'to like a man because he is

useful' but 'to do useful services for a man because he is (or has been, or will

be, or is under contract to be) useful to you', btAactn account of the xpqOaL!xov

(and qfA,'aon account of the r$vd an be similarly analysed) is not so self-centred

as Stewart implies. (Nor is v'votaas self-centred as Stewart's L,Atia:houghone only wishes dyacadfor the other man, one does wish things that will beuseful to him, not to

oneself.) I56aIo if.

maybe translated as follows,

renderingXlAECv s 'treat in a friendly manner', and interpreting this as signifying actions

only:

Those who treat one another in a friendly manner on account of the

useful do not treat each other thus because of what the other is in himself,but in respect of the aspect of each other through which some aya0ovcomes to them from each other (A). And similarly those who treat one

another in a friendly manner on account of pleasure; for they do not like (B)wits because they are the sort of people they are, but because they are pleasantto them. Those then who treat one another in a friendly manner on account

of the useful feel affection for one another (C) each on account of his ownaya0ov (D), and those who do this on account of pleasure feel affection for

one another each on account of his own 1&v,and not in respectof what theman so treated really is, but in respectof his usefulnessor pleasantness(E).

This removes the misinterpretations of Stewart; but Aristotle too is tryingto draw a false distinction between ,Atc'aKar' apeTrrv and the other types. That

he is at the same time pointing out a genuine contrast makes the paragraphmore difficult. The genuine contrast is expressed by (A) and (E) above: one

OtA,EFn account of the useful or pleasant because of some accidental charac-

teristic, useful or pleasant, that the other man possesses; whereas in ,tAt'a Kar'

apeTrrjv one btAcE, reats the other in a friendly manner, because the other man

is what he is. This is an important difference, but it does not prove that the

pattern of tAtL'as not the same here as in the other cases: we have already seen

I This despite his use of 'ctA(a on account range of cftiat in Aristotle is of course theof the xpqmalov r the 7'v" earlier in the pas- same as that for the range of rtAo'6r7sn

sage quoted, I I67a12. Aristotle's language is Homer, p. 36 above.confused here. The reason for the usual

A. W. H. ADKINS2




that Aristotleadmits that all Greek XtAiaxistson account of the adyaodv r the?&V,nd the fact that the other man is an dya6ovbecausehe is what he is' doesnot affect the pattern at all.

The false distinction is expressedin the remainderof the quotation. In (B)and (C) 'like'and 'feel affectionfor' lay emphasison the (bLAov-aspectf such

AtAia,or such affection is only felt for the other in virtue of the ilAov-aspect;and thoughtheOtAE?v-aspectasmentionedin theprevioussentence,by append-ing his explanation to the iA,ov-aspectnd to the selfishemotion aroused bythisaspectAristotleemphasizesthe latter: it would bejust as true, however, to

say that men otAEtiwits, treat them in a friendlymanner,not becausethey arewhat they are, but because they are pleasant to them. (D) is true but mislead-

ing: suchmen do feel affectionof a selfishkindon account of theirown ayaOdv;but this is trueof LAtiaKca'dperrjvswell, so that it is unfair towriteas if it were

merely a defect of the other types of LtAca.In fact, throughout his discussionof btAla n account of the useful or the

pleasant, Aristotle is emphasizing the biAoov-aspectf such LtAtla,hough theLhAECv-aspects present, just as in qtAta Kar' apeT7v. The tlAciv-aspect s given

the most prominent place in the discussion of tAtaKaT' dpETjv, though Aristotlecannot deny that the XiAov-aspectxists and is important here too. We cannow interpret I56bgff. more accurately:

But those who want rdyacOfor their lAhot or theirsake are most of all

<tbAoH;or they are in this condition on accountof what theyare in themselves St'avTrov), not as a result of some accidental quality.

The parallelismof 'on account of what they are in themselves'with 'on accountof the useful' showsthat the meaningis 'eachXtAEcn account of what the otheris in himself', that is dyaes6,which constitutes him an ayaOdvor the man who

btAEL.The similarity of structure is complete.In order to understand the implicationsof Aritsotle'sanalysis of )AtAXaar'

dpeTrv, we have to remember that the ayaOotare not simply 'good', nor is

dpETrn virtue': ayaOds and dpETrjdenote and commend a leisured social class,the only men who are to be citizens in the state advocated in the Politics.They

are financiallysecure landed proprietors: any help they need fromone anotherwill be in the fields of politics, the law courts,and war. In Greekthought fromthe late fifthcenturyonwardsthese are the fields n which dperrjspre-eminentlydisplayed :2 when help is needed by an Aristotelian dyaOds, it is of the dpeTrrof the other dyaOdshat he has need, and it is onaccountf this dpenr`hat heftAie the other ayaOs-. He will feel a strong and selfish emotion when he needs

him under the bi'Aov-aspect:e need feel none when he XtAer.Aristotle tries to conceal the similarity of structure of the three types of

bt,Ata.he remainderof this article will attempt to show his reasonsfor doingso, and will also point out certain tensionspresent in such a concept of <LAtaKaT' dperTjv, which have important effects upon Aristotle's moral philosophy.

The discussion of teTyaXAoLvXlas relevant here. The ,e7yaAXdvXos is (one of)Aristotle's ideals. He is termed adpLrTos,I23b27: he is possessed of apeTJinthe highest degree. Aristotle says of this paragon, I 24b9:

And he is the sort of man to confer benefits, but he is ashamed when he

I The implicationsof this phraseare dis-cussedbelow.

2 Cf. MeritandResponsibility,haptersxandxi.



is benefited; for the one is the mark of a superior, the other of an inferior.And if benefited, he gives more in exchange; for in this manner the manwho began the benefiting incurs a debt and will have been benefitedhimself.

And such men seemto remember the benefitsthey confer, but not those theyreceive... and to hear about the one with pleasure, the other without

pleasure. ... It is the mark of the xeyaAodvXoslsoto need nothing, orhardlyanything ... .'

He adds, I25aI I:

He is the sort of man to have possessionswhich are KaAaand aKaprrarather than productive and beneficial ones; for it is more the mark of an

avrapK77s.

We have here an account of the social relationships,the L'Aiat,f the manwho (up to Book o of the Nicomacheanthics) s most dya0os n Aristotle'seyes:he confersbenefits ratherthanreceivesthem; he hasbeautifulandunproductivepossessions(and a large and productivepropertywhich enables him to affordsuch things); and he is self-sufficient,or as near so as possible.Here too, as inthe case of tAXlaKar' apen'jv, the LhAelvspect is emphasized, the <IAov-aspectleft in the background; and we see how important it is that the ayaOos houldbe self-sufficient.The keynote of aper7jis self-sufficiency,as it has been since

Homer, and for the same reasons. We have seen that the Athenian pater-familias of the fifth and fourth centuries needed to be almost as self-sufficientas the Homeric head of otKos. ape-rr]always commended those qualities whichseemedmost necessaryto the survival of the social unit ;' hence to become more

self-sufficient,to need less help, was to become more dyaOos,more like the

tLEyaAOvXos, remembering the occasions on which one LtAcE,ot those on

which, falling short in self-sufficiency,one needs help and finds someonel)Aov.Self-sufficiencyis the ideal for the Homeric and later Greek head of

family, in so far as he considers himself dayaOos.he ideal is incapable ofrealization: the dyaOoss certain to need cayaOd,ncluding l'Ao(,which he doesnot possess; but this fact is minimized as much as possible.

In )itAla KaTraperrfv,then,

there is a tension between actual needs andtheideal. In ordinary circumstancesequilibrium is maintained, for no man can

do without qtlAoL.ut if one could by some means be self-sufficientwithout

l,Aot, there seems no need to have any: o"ravod alyptv ev)8L8C0, i etL 1wAcv;2

Ordinarily, this is impossible: no man can become so ayaO's or so evSal'wcovas to be entirely self-sufficient;but if fortune grants prosperityin a new andunusual sense,and a man becomes capable of Oewopa,he situationis different.In NicomacheanEthics Io, Aristotle maintains that Oewp'a is the highest dperr :3it is hence the highest state of evtSaqlovlafor man, and is thus contrastedwiththe lesser evSatlovla of the life of practical apenrj, I I77a27 f.:

And the qualitywhich is called self-sufficiencywould exist mostin relationto the theoretic life; for while the wise man and the just and the rest needthe basic necessities of life, yet when they are sufficiently supplied withthese, whereas the just man needs men to whom he can behave justly andwith whom he can behave justly, the wise man can indulge in Oewp'aeven

I Cf. Merit andResponsibility,assim.2 Quoted by Aristotle, E.N. 1169b7.

3 Cf. Merit andResponsibility, p. 344 ff.

A. W. H. ADKINS4




by himself;perhaps e will do better if he has fellowworkers,but neverthelesshe is the most self-sufficientof men.

Here the tension between the two aspects of btAiaKaT'dperrv is resolved

by abolishing the need for either of them. One ;AclEnother by striving tosecure for him dya0dof the kind he needs, or desires,in the hope of receivinga like return one day; but if one no longer needs the return, there seems noneed to LtAEtvn the first instance; and this is as true of MAtlaaT'dper7jv as ofthe other types of tXlaa. If one can practise Oecoptawithout fiAol, then, since

Ocopla is Aristotle's highest dpEr7,two results follow: ev'8at,ovia and behaviourin accordance with dper1 no longer require associates, so that dperr and

qLtAlare no longer related, and there is no reasonwhy the dya0o'should have

i,AoL;and self-sufficiency,which has been the goal since Homer, has been

achieved. (It has been achieved, of course, only for ayaOoln Aristotle's newsense: the remaining inhabitants of the city will have to form lAitat f dif-ferent types in order to maintain the philosophersin their splendid isolation;but this fact is of much less interest to Aristotle.)

It should be clear, however, that these resultsderive from the structure ofGreek society and Greek values as a whole, not from any belief peculiar toAristotle-and Plato.' True, theoreticactivity is a new kind of dper4developedand commended by philosophers,a new kind of men; but the existence of

Oecoptamerely serves to aggravate the problem, which is always present inGreek values fromHomer onwards: though the oddities (as they appear to us)

in the Homeric range of bIAos s applied to thingsvanish long beforeAristotle,the situation which produced the Homeric usage plays, as we have seen, a

major part in shaping the Aristotelianethic. The tensions in the Greek viewof aperqjand bLAFiaxist independently of Aristotle, and any other form of

completely self-sufficientactivity would produce the same difficulties. Theextent to which Aristotle feels these difficulties is indicated by the curiousnature of the argumentshe is obliged to use to explain the fact that acyaOoldohave OIAot.2 have no space to discuss these argumentson this occasion; buttheir contortions show the gravity of the problems which faced the Greekmoral philosopherin his efforts to create a civic morality out of the primitiveand intractable materials which lay to hand.

Exeter College, Oxford ARTHURW. H. ADKINS

Who has (but does not acknowledge) ego arguments of i69g3 ff. E.N. 9. 7 ff.the same problem. Cf. Merit and Respon- need an article to themselves for adequatesibility, pp. 290 f. . discussion.

2Notably (but not exclusively) the alter

adkins friendship and self-sufficiency in homer and aristotle

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