ad 2010 list

Number

23-Jul-2007DGAC-INDONESIA PAGE - 1

No.Applicability Subject

Reference

List of Airworthiness Directives 2010Sort by Type

A/C EQUIP. OF CABIN SAFETY& INTERIOR

Type H1-10 AIR Halon (BCF) portable fire extinguishers, SICLI P/N 1708337B4, serial numbers (s/n) as listed in Appendix I of tthis AD.

"Fire Protection - Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers - Identificaton / Replacement". This AD to prevent contamination nature of Halon 1211 gas, when used againts a fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of the aircraft and its occupants. This AD requires the identification and removal from service of certain batches of fire extinguishers and replacement with serviceable units.

EASA AD 2009-02781 10-02-009

ASI-500 Life Raft Deployment System System (S-76A, S-76B, S-76C helicopter)

The affected Aero Seats and System STC modifies the helicopter by introduction of the externally mounted life raft deployment system. Deploying the system is accomplished by means of handle which is accesible to the pilot or co-pilot. Recent hangar testing has result in failures of the deployment handle. This AD to prevent delay or failure of deployment of the life raft.

EASA AD 2010-02292 10-11-024

AEROSPATIALE ATR 42 & ATR 72

ATR42-200, ATR-42-300, ATR-42-320, ATR42-400, ATR42-500, ATR72-101, ATR72-201, ATR72-102, ATR72-202, ATR72-211, ATR72-212 and ATR72-212A aeroplanes, all serial numbers.

"Time Limits / Maintenance Checks - Certification Maintenance Requirements and Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (Fuel Tank Safety)". The assessment showed that it was necessary to introduce specific fuel system related Maintenance Significant Item (MSIs) and Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation (CDCCL) items in order to preserve the fuel tank system ignition source prevention features from any configuration alterations that could occur during maintenance actions, repair or modifications. Failure to preserve those critical igniton source prevention features could result in a fuel tank explosion. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) and Structural Significant Items (SSIs) are requisites of the design approval. Failure to comply with the CMRs and SSIs requirements nullifies the design approval because any non-compliance could result in a catastrophic failure.

EASA AD 2009-02423 10-01-010

ATR42-200, ATR42-300, ATR42-320, ATR42-400, ATR42-500, ATR72-101, ATR72-201, ATR72-102, ATR72-202, ATR72-211, ATR72-212, and ATR72-212A aeroplanes, all serial numbers, if equipped with L'Hotellier Halon 1211 (BCF) fire extinguishers, Part Number (P/N) 863521-01, serial number (s/n) as listed in L'Hotellier Service Bulletin (SB) 863521-26-001.

"Fire Protection - Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers - Identification / Replacement". The result of the ongoing investigation have now established that LyonTech Engineering Ltd, a UK-based company, has supplied further consignments of Halon 1211 (BCF) to L'Hotellier that do not meet the required specification. This Halon 1211 has subsequently been used to fill certain P/N 863521-01 portable fire extinguisher that are now likely to be installed in or carried on board ATR aeroplanes. The contaminated nature of this gas, when used against a fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of the aeroplane and it occupants. In addition, extinguisher activation may lead to the release of toxic fumes, possibly causing injury to aeroplane occupants. This AD requires the identification and removal from service of certain batches of fire extinguisher and replacement with serviceable units.

EASA AD 2009-02764 10-01-011

by ssi

Number



Reference


ATR42-200, -300, -320, -400, -500, ATR72-101, -201, -102, -202, -211, -212, and -212A aeroplanes, all serial numbers, if equipped with L'Hotellier Halon 1211 (BCF) fire extinguishers, Part Number (P/N) 863521-01, serial numbers (s/n) as listed in L'Hotellier Service Bulletin (SB) 863521-26-001.

" Fire Protection - Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers - Identification / Replacement ". This AD to prevent contamination nature of Halon 1211 gas, when used against a fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of the aircraft and its occupants. This AD requires the identification and removal from service of certain bacthes of fire extinguishers and replacement with serviceable units. This AD has been revised to extend the compliance time.

EASA AD 2009-0276R15 10-01-011R1

ATR 72-212A aeroplanes, manufacturer serial numbers (MSN) 886, 897, 901, 902, 903, 904 and 906.

"Flight Controls Rudder Pedal Rods Inspection / Replacement".This AD is issued to prevent failure of the rudder pedal rod, possibly resulting in reduced control of the aeroplane. In combination with an engine failure or during a landing or take-off under crosswind conditions, such a failure could lead to loss of control of the aeroplane. This Emergency AD requires inspection of the four rudder pedal rods, to detect a lower than acceptable outer diameter at each rod end, and replacement of any rods that fail the inspection criteria.

EASA AD 2010-0063-E6 10-04-007-U

ATR42-200, ATR42-300, ATR42-320, ATR42-400, ATR42-500, ATR72-101, ATR72-201, ATR72-102, ATR72-202, ATR72-211, ATR72-212, and ATR72-212A aeroplanes, all serial numbers, if equipped with L'Hotellier Halon 1211 (BCF) fire extinguishers, Part Number (P/N) 863521-01, serial number (s/n) as listed in L'Hotellier Service Bulletin (SB) 863521-26-001 Revision 2 dated 04 February 2010.

Fire Protection Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers Identification / Replacement .This AD is issued to prevent contamination nature of Halon 1211 gas, when used against a fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of safety of the aircraft and its occupants. This AD retains the requirements of DGCA AD 10-01-011R1 ( EASA AD 2009-0276R1), which is superseded, and expands the applicability by referencing the corrected LHotellier SB 863521-26-001.

EASA AD 2010-00617 10-04-009

ATR 42-200, -42-300, -42-320, -42-400 and -42-500 aeroplanes, all Manufacturer Serial Number (MSN) up to MSN 643 inclusive, and ATR 72-101, -72-102, -72-201, -72-202, -72-211, -72-212 and 72-212A aeroplanes, all MSN up to MSN 728 inclusive.

Stabilizers Elevator Inboard Hinge Fitting Lower Stop Angles Inspection / Replacement.

One ATR operator has experienced in-flight elevator travel limitations with unusual effort being necessary on pitch axis to control the aeroplane, while the pitch mistrim message appeared on the ADU display. The elevators seemed to be jammed. During the post-flight inspection, it was discovered that the LH elevator lower stop assembly was broken at the level of the angles, which may have prevented the elevator to respond normally to the flight control input.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to reduced control of the aeroplane.

This AD requires a one-time inspection of the elevator hinge fittings and the reporting of all findings.

EASA AD 2010-01388 10-07-010

AGUSTA

by ssi

Number



Reference


A119 and AW119 MKII helicopters, all serial number, if equipped with tail rotor 90o gearbox (TGB) Part Number (P/N) 109-0440-06-103

"Tail Rotor Drive - Tail A case of nonformity has been discovered in the tail rotor 90o gearbox installed on an AW119MKII helicopter where a bushing (P/N) 109-0135-14-101 was missing, if not detected and corrected, could cause abnormal vibration of the tail rotor controls possibly leading to their damage and consequences loss of the yaw control function.This AD requires an inspection of the TGB (tail rotor gearbox) assembly P/N 109-0440-06-103 to verify the installation of the bushing. If the bushing is not installed, this AD requires the replacement of the TGB assembly with serviceable part, while if the bushing is found installed, this AD requires the re-identification of the TGB P/N by installing an additional nameplate.

EASA AD 2010-0059-E9 10-04-006-U

AIRBUS A318 A319 A320 AND A321

Airbus A319, -A320 and -321 aeroplanes. "Equipment / Furnishing - 80VU Rack Attacments - Inspection / Repair / Replacement". This AD is issued to resived of DGCA AD No. 09-06-010-U (EASA AD 2009-0125-E), to introduce the new reinforced lower central support as an optional terminating action to the repetitive inspections.

EASA AD 2007-0276R110 07-10-016R1

Airbus A319, -A320 and -A321 aeroplanes. "Equipment / Furnishing - 80VU Rack Attachments - Inspection / Repair / Replacement". This AD is to prevent damage to the lower laterial fittings and central support fitting of the 80VU rack. In the worst case scenario a complete failure of the 80VU fittings combination with a high load factor or strong vibration could lead to failure of the rack structure or computer or disconnection of the cable harnesses to one or more computers located in the 80VU. During critical phase of flight the multiple system failure/reconfirguration may consitute an unfafe condition. DGCA AD 07-10-016 (EASA AD 2007-0276) has been revised to introduced the new reinforced lower central support as an optional terminating action to the repetitive inspection.

EASA AD 2007-0276R111 07-10-016R1

Airbus Model A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233 aeroplanes, all manufactures serial numbers, if equipped with Hamilton Sundstrand/ Dowty Ram Air Turbine (RAT) Part Number (P/N) 680203037 with a Serial Number (S/N) from 0101 to 0354inclusive, except aeroplanes which have received Airbus modification 27189 in production or Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A320-29-1100 in service, and without having received Airbus modification 28413 in production.

Hydraulic Power Ram Air Turbine (RAT) Gerotor Pump - Replacement This AD is issued to reduce the Applicability to certain A320 models only, Airbus A318, A319 and A321 series aeroplanes are basically equipped with Sundstrand RATs (per Airbus modification 22803) and there is no option for those aeroplanes to install a Hamilton Sundstrand (formerly Dowty) RAT.

EASA AD 2008-0034R112 08-02-022R1

by ssi

Number



Reference


Airbus A320-111,A320-211,A320-212,A320-214,A320-231,A320-232,and A320-233 aeroplanes,all certified models, all serial numbers, except aeroplanes that have received Airbus modification 22626 in production or Aibus Service Bulletine (SB) A320-24-1062 at revision 06 in service.

Fuel/Electrical Power Prevention of fuel Tank Exploision Risks Electrical Cables Modification. DGCA France AD F-2004-173 was issued to require the modification of the cable route of trailing edge, aft of the rear spar and wing tip, in according with the instruction of the airbus SB A320-24-1062 revision 05.However , additional work introduced by Airbus SB SB A320-24-1062 Revision 05 was not included as part of the normal accomplishment instruction s, and therefore this additional work may not have been accomplished.DGCA AD issued DGCA AD 08-03-006, retaining the requirement of DGCA France AD F-2004-173 (EASA Approval no.2004-10570),which was superseded and required the accomplishment of the additional work in accordance with the instruction of the Airbus SB A320-24-1062 Revision 06.This AD has been revised to reduce the applicability of this AD and to clarify that the accomplishment of Airbus SB A320-24-1062 Revision 05, including the instruction reference as additional work in paragraph 3.B.(3) or 3.B.(4) of that SB,as applicable to aeroplane configuration , constitutes an acceptable method of compliance with requirements of this AD.

EASA AD 2008-0051R113 08-03-006R1

Airbus A320 aeroplanes. "Hydraulic Power - Auxiliary Hydraulic Power - Ram Air Turbine (RAT) Ejection Jack - Replacement". To avoid failure of the ejection jack that may prevent the effective deployment and use of the RAT in emergency conditions.

EASA AD 2008-0199R114 08-11-010R1

Airbus A321 aeroplanes, -211, -212, -231 and -232 models, manufacturer serial number : 3051, 3067, 3070, 3075, 3081, 3098, 3106, 3112, 3120, 3126, and 3130.

"Fuel - Fuel Tank Harness Ring Tags - Inspection". A manufacturing quality non-conformity has been identified that resulted in the under-crimping of ring tags on a batch of In-tank Fuel Harnesses. This AD requires a one time inspection to check the integrity of the ring tags and peformance of corrective actions as necessary.

EASA AD 2010-002715 10-02-008

Airbus A319-100 and A320-200 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

"Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Damage Tolerant Airworthiness Limitations Items - ALS Part 2 - Amendment". This AD retains the requirements of DGCA AD No. 06-06-042 (EASA 2006-0165), which is superseded, and requires the implementation of more restrictive maintenance requirements/airworthiness limitations.

EASA AD 2010-007116 10-04-013

Airbus A319-132, -A320-212, -A320-216, -A320-231 and -A320-232 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Damage Tolerant Airworthiness Limitation Items - ALS Part 2 - Amendment". This AD retains the requirements of DGCA AD No. 10-04-013 (EASA 2010-0071) which is revised and requires the implementation of more restrictive maintenance requrements/airworthiness limitations as specified in reference AD. This AD has been revised to clarify the special compliance times defined in Table 1 of reference AD.

EASA AD 2010-0071R117 10-04-013R1

by ssi

Number



Reference


Airbus A319-100, A320-200 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

"Stabilizer Elevators - Inspection".It has been reported that some elevators may have been moved from the aeroplane on which they were originally fitted to another aeroplane, and spare parts may have been installed without being traced with regard to the ALI Document requirements. Consequently, those elevators might not have been inspected within the applicable required time frame as per ALI task 552007 requirements.For the reasons described above, this AD requires the identification of the elevators installed on the aeroplane to determine whether these elevators have been inspected within the applicable required time frame as per ALI task 552007. If this has not been done, this AD requires the accomplishment of that inspection and, depending on findings, associated corrective action(s).

EASA AD 2010-009118 10-05-013

Airbus A319 and A320 aeroplanes. Stabilizer Elevator Inspection.This AD revises the requirements of DGCA AD 10-05-013 (EASA AD 2010-0091) which is require the identification of the elevators installed on the aeroplane to determine whether these elevators have been inspected within the applicable required time frame as per ALI task 552007. If this has not been done, this AD requires the accomplishment of that inspection and, depending on findings, associated corrective action(s).

EASA 2010-0091R119 10-05-013R1

Airbus A318, -A319, -320 and -321 aeroplanes.

"Hydraulic Power - Hamilton Sundstrand Ram Air Turbine Balance Weight Screws - Inspection / Replacement". To avoid loss of RAT functionality, that in combination with double engine failure or a total loss of normal electrical power generation, could result in loss control of the aeroplane. Also, this AD requires the replacement of the set of balance weights screws before the next operational or functional check of the RAT assembly.

EASA AD 2010-012020 10-07-025

Airbus A320-214, -216, -232 and -233 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers on which Airbus Modification (MOD) 38310 has been embodied in production.

"Flight Controls - Elevator Aileron Computer (ELAC) System Power Supply - Modification". In case of emergency electrical configuration combined with a green and yellow hydraulic system loss, during landing phase (nose landing gear extended), the roll control would only be provided by the left aileron. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to an asymmetrical landing configuration, resulting in reduced controlof the aeroplane. This AD required a modification of the electrical installation of ELAC2 and THS Motor 1 power supply, restoring the aeroplanes to the pre-mod 38310 configuration.

EASA AD 2010-014921 10-08-001

by ssi

Number



Reference


Airbus A319, A320 and A321 aeroplanes. "Equipment & Furnishings - DASELL Lavatory Walls - Inspection / Repair". It has been reported that cracks have been detected due to corrosion on the lower part of the lavatory wall. If this corrosion becomes too extensive, the wall onto which one or two cabin attendant seats are attached may not support the required load cases and maylead to injury and/or prevent the attendants from carrying out their safety duties.

EASA AD 2010-014822 10-08-002

Airbus A319 and A320 aeroplanes. "Stabilizers - Rudder Side Shell Skin - Inspection". This AD is retains the requirements of DGCA AD 09-07-001 (EASA AD 2009-0141) which is superseded and requires: - a local ultrasonic inspection for reinforced area instead of the local thermography inspection, which is maintaind for non-reinforced areas, and - additional work performance for rudder on which this thermography inspection has been performed in the reinforced are, and - additional work performance for some rudders on which an additional area requiring inspections is defined. This AD also addresses the populations of rudders affected by AOT A320-55-1039 and Airbus SB A320-55-1035, A320-55-1036 and A320-55-1037 were not included in DGCA AD 09-07-001 (EASA AD 2009-0141).

EASA AD 2010-016423 10-08-011

Airbus A319-111,A319-112,A319-113,A319-114,A319-115,A319-131,A319-132,A319-133,A320-211,A320-212,A320-214,A320-215,A320-216,A320-231,A320-232,A320-233,A321-111,A321-112,A321-131,A321-211,A321-212,A321-213,A321-231,and A321-232 aeroplane, If equipped with one more Additional Centre Tank(s) (ACT(s)) with a Part Number (P/N) listed in Appendix 1

Fuel system Additional Centre Tanks Manhole Cover Seal - Replacement . - Following an automatic ACT fuel transfer failure on an

A319 , it was noted that the ACT manhole cover seals were extruded , allowing leakage. - This Condition , if not corrected , can leadto fuel and/ or

vapour leakage , possibly resulting in combustible fuel vapour / air mixture in the cargo compartment , which would constitute a fire risk. - DGAC France AD F-2004-038 was issued to require the

replacement of the ACT manhole cover and its seal in accordance with SB A320-28-1105, but this modification has proved not to be fully effective. Therefore , it is necessary to replace the seal material and change the installation process in order to prevent such seal material and change the installation process in order to prevent such seal deformation and possibility of leakage. - For the reason described above, this AD supersedes DGCA

France AD F-2004-038 ( EASA Approval 2004-2110) and requires the replacement of the existing manhole seal with a new seal.

EASA AD 2010-017724 10-10-001

by ssi

Number



Reference


Airbus A319 and A320 aeroplanes. Flight Controls / Wings Inboard Flap Trunnion and Sliding Panel - Inspection .Several A320 operators reported wear damage on the unprotected area of the inboard flap trunnion. This wear damage is generated by the hook of the sliding panel which moves out the protection pad during flap operation.The inboard flap trunnion wear associated with a drive failure at flap track 2 or associated with a hard jam at flap track 1 could lead to the loss of inboard flap surface control. Consequently, a free moveable flap could detach from the wing, possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane and injury to persons on the ground.

EASA AD 2010-020925 10-11-004

Airbus A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231 and A320-232 aeroplanes models, all manufacturer serial numbers, if equipped with Air Cruisers / Aerazur Part Number (P/N) D31865-109,P/N D31865-110, P/N D31865-209, or P/N D31865-210 off-wing Escape Slides (OWS).

This AD is issued to prevent both left Hand (LH) and Right Hand (RH) off-wing exits being unserviceable which, during an emergency, would impair the safe evacuation of occupants, possibly resulting in personal injuries. this AD requires the modification of the OWS enclosures on both sides and this AD has been republished to delete A321 aeroplanes from the applicability, which included by mistake.

EASA AD No. 2010-021026 10-12-004

AIRBUS A330 SERIES

AIRBUS A330 aeroplanes, all manufactures serial numbers. If fitted with Goodrich Pitot Probes P/N 0851HL, having s/n 267328 through 270714 inclusive

"Navigation - Pitot Probe Quick-Disconnect Union - Torque Check". Several reports have recently been receive of loose pneumatic quick-disconnect unions on Goodrich pitot probes P/N 0851HL. These may be the the results of mis-torque of the affected unions at equipment manufacturing level. Investigations are still on-going to determine the root cause(s).This condition, if not corrected, could lead to an air leak, resulting in incorrect total pressure measurement and consequent erronous Calibrated Airspeed (CAS)/MACH parameters delivered by the Air Data Computer (ADC). This AD is revised in order to exclude from the torque-check required those pitot probes marked with a red torque check-mark.

EASA AD 2009-0202R127 09-09-013R1

Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343 aeroplanes. All manufacturer serial numbers on which Airbus modification 48809 has been embodied in production, if delivered before 26 October 2009.

"Oxygen - Oxygen Containers - Inspection". In-service experience has shown cases where several oxygen containers could not fully open, investigation have revealed that these events are due to an insufficient clearence between the oxygen container and the adjacent panels (Passenger Service Unit (PSU), space or filler panels). Incorrect opening of the oxygen container could lead to non deployment of oxygen masks, this condition, if not detected and corrected, could prevent passengers from being supplied with oxygen in case of in flight cabin depressurization, which would constitute an unsafe condition. This AD require a one-time inspection of the oxygen container and adjacent panels installation and corrective actions, as necessary, to ensure and adequate clearence between these.

EASA AD 2009-0237-E28 09-11-013-U

by ssi

Number



Reference


Airbus A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -322, -323, -341, -342, -343 aeroplanes models, all manufacturer serial numbers, if equipped with Thales Avionics AoA probe having part number (P/N) C16291AA.

"Navigation - Thales Avionics Angle of Attack (AoA) Probe - Inspection / Replacement". This AD to prevent oil residue on incorrect cleaning of the machining oil during the manufacturing process of the AoA resolvers. At low temperatures, this oil residue becomes viscous (typically in cruise) causing lag of AoA vane movement. If not corrected, and if two three AoA probes were simultaneously affected and provided wrong indications of the AoA to a similar extent, it could lead to a late activation of the angle of attack protection, which in combination with flight at high angle of attack would constitute an unsafe condition. This AD requires a one time inspection of the Thales Avionics AoA probe P/N C16291AA in order to identify the suspect parts and to remove them from service.

EASA AD 2010-001629 10-02-001

Airbuss A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343 aeroplanes models, all manufacturer serial number, if equipped with Thales Avionics AoA probe having part number (P/N) C16291AA.

" Navigation -Thales Avionics Angle of Attack (AoA) Probe - Inspection / Replacement". This AD to prevent oil residue on incorrect cleaning of the machining oil during the manufacturing process of the AoA resolvers. At low temperatures, this oil residue becomes viscous (typically in cruise) causing lag of AoA vane movement. If not corrected, and if two or three AoA probes were simultaneously affected and provided wrong indications of the AoA to similar extent, it could lead to a late activitation of the angle of attack protection, which in combination with flight at high angle attack would constitute an unsafe condition.This AD requires a one time inspection of the Thales Avionics AoA probe P/N C16291AA. This AD revision is issued to specify that the indication of the affected AoA probes is also possible in accordance with aeroplanes maintenance records data analisy.

EASA AD 2010-0016R130 10-02-001R1

Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all manufacturer serial numbers.

" Stabilizers - Rudder Side Shell Skin - Inspection ". Surface defects were visually detected on the rudder of an A319 and an A321 in-service aeroplanes. Investigation has determined that the defects reported on both rudders corresponded to areas that had been reworked in production. The investigation confirmed that the defects were as a result of de-bonding between the skin and honeycomb core. An extended de-bonding, if not detected and corrected, may degrade the structural integrity of the rudder. The loss of the rudder leads to degradation of the handling qualities and reduces the controllability of the aeroplane. This AD retains the reqiurement of DGCA AD 09-07-007, which is superseded, and in addition requires for the vacum loss hole restoration: - a local ultrasonic inspection for reinforced areas instead of the local thermography inspection, which is maintained for non-reinforced areas, and - an additional work for aeroplanes on which this thermography inspection has been performed in the reinforced area.

EASA AD 2010-002131 10-02-002

by ssi

Number



Reference


Airbus A330 aeroplanes, -201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343 models, all Manufacturer Serial Numbers, equipped with Part Number (P/N) HTE69000-1 wing tank pressure switches installed at Functional Item Number (FIN) locations 74QA1, 74QA2, 75QA1, and 74QA2.

Fuel- Wing Tank Fuel Pressure Switch Replacement An A330 experienced an uncommented engine #1 in flight spool down, which occurred while applying fuel grafity feed procedure, in response to low pressure indications from all fuel boost pumps, in both left and right wings.The investigation revealed that the wing tank pressure switches P/N HTE69000-1 had frozen due to the water accumulated in their external part, causing spurious low pressure indications.As per procedure, the main pumps are then switched off, increasing the level of unavailable fuel. This, in combination with very low fuel quantity or another independent trapped fuel failure scenarios, can lead to fuel starvation on the affected engine(s). This condition , if not corrected , could lead to a potential unsafe condition.This AD requires the replacement of all four wing tank pressure switches associated to main pumps by new one with a more robust design preventing water accumulation and freezing

EASA AD 2010-001832 10-02-003

Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all manufacturer serial numbers, except those on which Airbus modification 55306 or 55792 has been embodied in production.

Wing Centre Wing Box Keel Beam Fastener Holes at Frame FR40 Inspection.This AD, which supersedes DGCA AD No. 06-10-019 (EASA AD 2006-0315R1):- Retains the inspection requirements of DGCA AD No. 06-10-019 (EASA AD 2006-0315R1)- Extends the AD applicability to aeroplanes which have embodied Airbus modification 49202, and- Modifies the inspection thresholds and intervals.

EASA AD 2010-002433 10-02-007

AIRBUS A330 aeroplanes. Landing Gear - Nose Landing Gear (NLG) Main Fitting and Sliding Tube - Inspection

During the overhaul of two different Nose Landing Gears (NLG), cracks were found on the main fitting of one and the sliding tube of the other. Investigations concluded that the cracks initiated as a result of residual stress in the parts following damage due to impact during towing incidents. The failure of the main fitting or sliding tube could lead to NLG collapse.

To prevent the above unsafe condition, this AD requires a one-time inspection followed by repetitive inspection of the main fitting and sliding tube of the NLG serial numbers listed in the Applicability section of this AD:- One time Magnetic Particle Inspection (MPI) of the affected areas to detect any crack,- Repetitive Detailed Visual Inspection (DVI) of the affected areas to detect any damage of the surface protections or corrosion.

EASA AD 2010-003434 10-03-005

Airbus A330 aeroplanes. Fuel - Main Fuel Pump System - Water Scavenge System - Deactivation / Dispatch Restriction.

EASA AD 2010-0042-E35 10-03-011-U

by ssi

Number



Reference


Airbus A330 aeroplanes. "Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Certification Maintenance Requirements - ALS Part 3 - Amendment". This Airworthiness Limitations are currently distributed in the Airbus A330 Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS). The Airworthiness Limitations applicable to the Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMR) are given in Airbus A330 ALS Part 3. The Revision 2 of Airbus A330 ALS Part 3 introduces more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations. Failure to comply with this revision constitues an unsafe condition. This new AD retains the requirements of DGCA AD 08-08-002, which is superseded, and requires the implementation of the new or more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations as specified in Airbus A330 ALS Part 3 revision 02.

EASA AD 2010-004836 10-03-012

Airbus A330-243, A330-341, A330-342 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

"Flight Controls - Elevator Servo Controls Solenoid Valve O-ring Seals - Replacement & Airplane Flight Manual / Master MEL - Temporary Revision & Flight Controls - Elevator Servo Controls - Modification & Flight Controls - Primary and Secondary Computers - Modification". This AD is issued to supersedes DGCA AD No. 07-01-010 (EASA AD No. 2007-0009), which this AD requires the embodiment of the latest software standard on the three Flight Control Primary Computers (FCPC) and on the two Flight Control Secondary Computers (FCSC), which cancels the operational requirements of paragraph (3.1) 0f the reference AD.

EASA AD 2010-0081]37 10-05-002

Airbus A330-243, -341, -342 aeroplanes. "Fuel - Fuel Pump Non-Return Valve (NRV) - Operation Test". Multiple NRV failures in combination with certain trapped fuel cases could potentially increase the quantity of unusable fuel on the aeroplane, possibly leading to fuel on starvation which could result in engines in flight shut down and would constitute an unsafe condition. - To prevent and detect this condition , EASA AD 2008-0209

( DGCA AD 08-12-001) required repetitive operational tests to check the correct operation of NRV and to apply the associated corrective actions. - This AD retains the requirements of EASA AD 2008-0209

(DGCA AD 08-12-001) which is superseded, and requires for aeroplanes which have replaced a NRV to perform an additional operational test to confirm that corrective maintenance action has been successful for the affected collector cell.

EASA AD 2010-008338 10-05-004

Airbus A330-201, -202, -243, -341 and -342 aeroplanes.

"Indicating & Recording Systems - Flight Warning Computer (FWC) - Software Installation". Require all holders of type certificates for transport aircraft after 01 January 1958 with capacity of 30 passengers or more, or a payload of 3.402 kg or more, to carry out a definition review against explotion hazards. To be compliant with SFAR88/JAA INT/POL 25/12 requirements, this AD requires the installation of the update FWC software standard which ensures correct operation of the APU bleed leak detection system before each flight.

EASA AD 2010-008939 10-05-009

by ssi

Number



Reference


Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all manufacturer serial numbers, except those on which the three Airbus modifications 58773 and 55923S18878 and 45968 have been embodied in production.

"Electric and Electronic Common Installation - Hydraulic Pump Electrical Motor Connectors - Modification". Several A330 operators have reported in service occurences of hydraulic pump electrical motor connector internal arching, resulting in : - Either false hydraulic system overheat Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) and - And/or hydraulic pump electrical motor malfunction. Investigations have shown that, due to the manufacturing tolerances of the cables and the connectors rear Grommet, there is a possible path for fluid ingress, resulting in connector internal arching and hydraulic system malfunction. In addition, as the connectors are located in areas adjacent to fuel tanks, such arching assocociated with the presence of a fuel leakage could lead to an uncontrolled fire. This AD requires modification of the three hydraulic pump electrical motor connectors associated to the Blue, Yellow and Green hydraulic systems.

EASA AD 2010-008640 10-06-001

Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all manufacturer serial numbers, except htose on which Airbus modifications 58773 and 45968 have been embodied in production.

"Electric and Electronic Common Installation - Hydraulic Pump Electrical Motor Connectors - Modification". Several A330 operators have reported in service occurences of hydraulic pump electrical motor connector internal arcing, resulting in : - Either false hydraulic system overheat Electronic

Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) - And/or hydraulic pump electrical motor malfunction.

Investigations have shown that, due to the manufacturing tolerances of the cables and the connectors rear.Grommet, there is a possible path for fluid ingress, resulting in connector internal arcing and hydraulic system malfunction. In addition, as the connectors are located in areas adjacent to fuel tanks, such arcing assocociated with the presence of a fuel leakage could lead to an uncontrolled fire.This AD requires modification of the three hydraulic pump electrical motor connectors associated to the Blue, Yellow and Green hydraulic systems. This revises is issued to delete Airbus modifications 55923S18878 and 55924S19452 from the applicability of this AD.

EASA AD 2010-0086R141 10-06-001R1

by ssi

Number



Reference


Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Stabilizers Rudder Side Shell Skin - Inspection.

Investigation has determined that the defects reported on both rudders corresponded to areas that had been reworked in production. The investigation confirmed that the surface defects were a result of de-bonding between the skin and honeycomb core.

An extended de-bonding, if not detected and corrected, may degrade the structural integrity of the rudder. The loss of the rudder leads to degradation of the handling qualities and reduces the controllability of the aeroplane.

This AD addresses the rudder population that has also been reworked in production but is not part of DGCA AD 10-02-002 (EASA AD 2010-0021) applicability.

EASA AD 2010-012742 10-07-009

Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -243, -243F, -341, -342 and -343, all manufacturer serial numbers on which Airbus modification 56966H16199 has been embodied in production or Airbus Service Bulletin A330-28-3105has been embodied in service.

"Fuel Main Fuel Pump System - Water Scavenge System Deactivation / Dispatch Restriction".During a recent in-service event the flight crew of a Trent 700 powered A330 aircraft reported a temporary Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) shortfall on engine 2 during the take-off phase of the flight. The ENG STALL warning was set. The flight crew followed the standard procedures which included reducing throttle to idle. The engine recovered and provided the demanded thrust level for the remainder of the flight.Based on previous industry-wide experience, the investigation of the event has focused on the possibility for ice to temporarily restrict the fuel flow. While no direct fuel system fault has been identified,the operation of the water scavenge system at Rib 3 cannot be excluded as being a contributory factor. Testing and analysis are continuing to identify the root cause of the event. The scenario of ice being shed and causing a temporary blockage in the engine fuel system may lead to a temporary fuel flow restriction to the engine. This may result in a possible engine surge or stall condition, and in the engine not being able to provide the commanded thrust. This AD, which supersedes DGCA AD 10-03-011U (EASA AD 2010-0042-E) retaining its requirements, is issued to extend the applicability to the newly certified model A330-243F.

EASA AD 2010-013243 10-07-022

Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, -202, -203, -223, -223F, -243, -243F, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all serial numbers.

"Flight Controls - Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) - Dispatch restriction and Operational Test". To prevent a transient loss of elevator control during takeoff rotation.

EASA AD 2010-010944 10-07-023


"Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Safe Life Airworthiness Limitation Items - ALS Part 1 - Amendment". The revision 04 of Airbus A330 ALS Part 1 introduces more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations. Failure to comply with this revision constitus an unsafe condition.

EASA AD 2010-013145 10-07-024

by ssi

Number



Reference


Airbus A330 aeroplanes. "Electrical and Electronic Common Installation - Cable Loom Installation - Modification". It was noticed in production that the distance between the wire harnessess 5376VB/2M and 53377VB/1M which are above left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) DOOR 4, and the air conditioning duct could be too small. This could result in collision between the flexible air conditioning hose and wire harnessess. This condition, if not correctred, could lead to the short circuit of wires dedicated to oxygen, which, in case of emergency, could result in large number of passenger oxygen masks not being supplied with oxygen, possibly causing personal injuries. For the reasons described above, this AD requires the installation of a protective sleeve and and additional bracket to maintain the appropriate distance between wires.

EASA AD 2010-010346 10-07-027

Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, -202, -203, -223, -223F, -243, -243F, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all manufacturer serial numbers.

"Hydraulic Power - High Pressure Manifold Check Valve - Inspection". An A330 operator experienced a low level of the yellow hydraulic circuit due to a loose of check valve part number (P/N) CAR401. During the inspection on the other two hydraulic systems, the other three CAR401 check valves were also found to be loose with their lock wire broken in two instances. Investigations are on-going to determine the root cause of this event. This AD, which supersedes DGCA AD 09-10-014-U (EASA AD 2009-0223-E) retaining its requirements, is issued to extend the applicability to the newly certified models A330-243F.

EASA AD 2010-014547 10-07-030


"Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Damage Tolerant Airworthiness Limitation Items - ALS Part 2 - Amendment". The airworthiness limitations are distributed in the airbus A330 Airworthiness Limitation Section (ALS). The issued 17 of A Airbus A330 ALI Document introduces more restrictive maintenance requirements/airworthiness limitations. Failure to copmly with this issue constituse an unsafe condition.

EASA AD 2010-017448 10-09-004


Landing Gear Main Landing Gear (MLG) Retraction Bracket - Replacement.During fatigue testing of the MLG, three failures of the retraction bracket occurred before the calculated life limitation. Further analysis has confirmed that those failures were do to fatigue initiated by fretting between the bush and lug bore.The failure of the retraction bracket, if not detected, could lead to a MLG extension with the no damping resulting in MLG structural damage.

EASA AD 2010-020549 10-10-008

by ssi

Number



Reference



Flight Controls Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator Screw/Nut Assembly Inspection / Lubrication.Several cases of transfer tube disconnection from the ball-nut of the trimmable horizontal stabilizer acTuator (THSA) part number (P/N) 47172 and 47147-400 were detected on the ground during greasing and maintenance.This condition is caused by water ingress into the ball-nut resulting in the jamming of the ball transfer circuit when the water freezes.

EASA AD 2010-019250 10-11-002

Airbus A330 aeroplanes. Flight Controls Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) PRIM 3 Dispatch Restriction / Modification.During a Back-up Control Module (BCM) retrofit campaign in accordance with EASA AD 2006-0313 requirements, some BCMs have been found with loose gyrometer screws.

EASA AD 2010-019151 10-11-003

Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -243, -243F, -341, -342 and -343 all manufacturer serial numbers.

Exhaust Thrust Reverser Opening Mechanism Inspection .During flight tests, unexpected fatigue high loads were measured on the hinges integrated on the 12 oclock beam which form the upper extreme edge of the thrust reverser unit C duct. This situation, if not corrected, could lead to the separation of the thrust reverser from the aeroplane and therefore to damage of the aeroplane and hazards to persons or property on the ground. DGAC AD F-1997-118-047 was issued to prevent structural damage of the thrust reversers. This AD, which supersedes DGAC AD F-1997-118-047R2 retaining its requirements, is issued to extend the applicability to the newly certified model A330-243F.

EASA AD 2010-018752 10-11-006

Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, -202, -203, -243 and -341 all manufacturer serial numbers.

-Fuel Fuel Pump Non-Return Valve (NRV) Operational Test -It has been assessed that multiple NRV failures in

combination with certain trapped fuel cases could potentially increase the quantity of unusable fuel on the aeroplane, possibly leading to fuel starvation which could result in engines in-flight shut down and would constitute an unsafe condition. To prevent and detect this condition, DGCA issued DGCA AD 10-05-004 (EASA AD 2010-0083). Based on in service experience, mainly on the results of the operational test required by DGCA AD 10-05-004 (EASA AD 2010-0083), Airbus has performed a safety analysis on the NRV to check if the safety objectives are met. This analysis of the Collector Cell motive flow line NRV, taking into account all failure scenarios, concludes that the previous non compliance can be alleviated. Consequently, no unsafe condition exists any more on the affected NRV. For the reasons described above, DGCA AD 10-05-004 (EASA AD 2010-0083) is cancelled..

EASA AD 2010-0083-CN53 10-11-007-CN

by ssi

Number



Reference


Airbus A330 aeroplanes. "Flight Control Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) PRIM 3 Dispatch Restriction / Modification".During a Back-up Control Module (BCM) retrofit campaign some BCMs have been found with loose gyrometer screws. This AD issued is to prevent a lack of design robustness of the BCM when the aeroplane is in control back up configuration, an oscillation of the BCM output order may cause degradation of the BCM piloting laws, potentially leading to erratic motion of the rudder and possible subsequent impact on the Dutch Roll, which constitutes an unsafe condition. This AD requires the installation of: - A new BCM on A330 series aeroplanes fitted with

electrical rudder,and - An improved PFTU on A330 series aeroplanes fitted with

an electrical rudder,Which, once installed, eliminate the root cause of the unsafe condition and cancel the operational limitation

EASA AD 2010-019154 10-11-009

Airbus A330 aeroplanes To prevent the aeroplane to deviate from its steered direction and/or allow an uncontrolled corrosion propagation of the main fitting barrel due to presence of water that could freeze the grease and thus jam the gearboxes or the Rotary Variable Differential Transformer (RVDT) of the streering system.

EASA AD 2007-0070R155 10-12-008

Airbus A330 aeroplanes model A330-200 series and A330-300 series , all manufacture serial number , except those on which Airbus modification 56985 has been embodied in production.

-Uncontained APU generator failures on ground have occurred on Airbus A330 Aeroplane in service. Prelimary investigation confirmed that these failures have resulted in structural damage to the APU compartment and, in one case, to the stabilizer compartment. Loose APU generator part can lead to damage to the APU firewall , reducing its fire extinguishing capability and potentially leading to a temporary uncontrolled fire. The investigation showed a sequence of events where a collapse of the Drive End Bearing (DEB) lead to an uncontained failure. -EASA issued Emergency AD 2007-0188-E, requiring

repetitive inspections of the APU generator Scavenge filter element and filter housing and the APU generator Drain plug for signs of small debris coming from the APU generator failure. -Consequently , EASA issued AD2008-0017, superseding

AD2007-0188R1 and requiring the following additional action : a visual inspection of the APU generator seal plate fitting, and following MMEL item 36-11-01 or 24-22-01 rectification and inspection time a new serviceable APU generator or APU is installed and airplane. - EASA issued AD2008-0017R1 to call the inspection refer

to required indicated compliance times,for A330 aeroplanes, when operated within the provision of MMEL item 36-11-01 further to ETOPS certification of A330 APU. -EASA AD2008-0173 retained the requirement of EASA

AD2008-0017R1, which was supersedes, and added the rquirment to install secondary housing on the APU generator. -This revision 1 is issued to clarify that both initial and

repetitive inspection are not required the installation of secondary APU generator housing on an aeroplane.

EASA AD No.2010-0173R156 10-12-013

by ssi

Number



Reference


Airbus A330 and A340 aeroplanes To prevent an unsafe condition due to failure to comply with the revision 4 of Airbus A330 ALS part 1 and revision 5 of Airbus A340 ALS Part 1 that introduces more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations.

EASA AD 2010-025357 10-12-017

Airbus A330-202, A330-243, and A330-341 aeroplanes

Time Limits and Maintenance Checks Certification Maintenance Requirements ALS Part 3 AmendmentThis AD supersedes DGCA AD No. 10-03-012 (EASA AD 2010-0048) and requires the implementation of the new or more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations are specified in Airbus A330 ALS Part 3 revision 03.

EASA AD No. 2010-026458 10-12-025

Airbus A330-243, A330-341 and A330-342 aeroplanes manufacturer serial numbers (MSN), up to MSN 0220 inclusive

Flight Control Wing Tip Brakes (WTB) Operational Test From result Inspection by supplier of Wing Tip Brake (WTB) units revealed that the drive shaft was found free to rotate and the braking worn. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could, in some specific failure cases, result in loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires a one-time Operational Test of the Wing Tip Brake (WTB)/Pressure Of Brake (POB) performance on the flap and slat systems to detected any dormant failure and, depending on finding, associated corrective action.

EASA AD No. 2010-026759 10-12-027

AIRTRACTOR Inc

Air Tractor AT-802 and AT-802A airplanes, all serial numbers (SNs) beginning with -0001, that are: - Certificated in any category; - Engaged in agricultural dispersal

operations, including those airplanes that have been converted from fire fighting to agricultural dispersal or airplanes that convert between fire fighting and agricultural dispersal; - Not equipped with the factory-supplied

computerized fire gate (part number (P/N) 80540); - Not engaged in only full-time fire fighting.

This AD to detect and correct cracks in the wing main spar lower cap at the center splice joint, which could result in failure of the spar cap and lead to wing separation and loss of control of the airplane.

FAA AD 2010-17-1860 10-09-013

BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ SERIES

by ssi

Number



Reference


BAe and AVRO 146-RJ Aeroplanes. Fuselage External Forward Fuselage Inspection / Repair.

During the period 2001/2002, skin cracking was found adjacent to the butt joint forward of frame 19 when unrelated in-service maintenance inspections of the forward fuselage structure were being completed. The cracks emanated from chemically-etched pockets on the internal surface of the skin. The then current MRB inspection requirements were not adequate to address cracking in multiple adjacent bays, which could compromise the structural integrity of the fuselage in the event that the multiple cracks joined into a single crack. This AD is revised to acknowledge the issuance of Bae Systems (Operations) Limited ISB.53-167 Revision 3, which allows the repetitive inspection intervals to be extended and introduces grace periods to carry out the initial inspections.

EASA AD 2009-0070R161 09-03-017R1

BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ aeroplanes, all serial numbers, except those modified to frighter configuration in accordance with BAe Systems modfication No. HCM50200B.

"Flight Control - Aileron Interconnect Cable Pulley Guards - Installation". This AD is issued to revises DGCA AD No. 09-10-006 (EASA AD 2009-0205). To excude aeroplanes from the Applicability that have been modified to freighter configuration in accordance with BAE System modification No. HCM50200B. This AD requires the installation of additional guards, bolts and nuts on the aileron interconnect cable pulleys atframe 29 (left and right).

EASA AD 2009-0205R162 09-10-006R1

BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ aeroplanes, all models, all serial numbers, if equipped with a Nose Landing Gear (NLG) which has been modified in accordance with Messier-Dowty (M-D) Service Bulletin (SB) 146-32-150, and which had that modification carried out after the NLG accumulated more than 5000 flight cycle (FC).This AD also applies to aeroplanes with NLG units installed on which M-D SB 146-32-150 has been accomplished by Messier Service facility in Sterling, Virginia, USA, only after it has been established on that NLG units, in accordance with the instructions of M-D SB 146-32-173.

Landing Gear Nose Landing Gear Main Fitting Inspection/Replacement".To prevent undetected crack was present at the time of embodiment of M-D SB 146-32-150, it could continue to grow while the NLG is in service and could lead to the failure of the main fitting and possible collapse of the NLG. This AD requires the introduction of repetitive NDT inspection on NLG main fitting following embodiment of M-D SB 146-32-150.

EASA AD 2010-007263 10-04-014

BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ aeroplanes. "Landing Gear - Nose Landing Gear Main Fitting - Inspection / Replacement". This AD is issued to reduce the applicability of the original issue of this AD by referring only to the embodiment of part B or Part C of the M-D SB 146-32-150. Indeed, NLGs with M-D SB 146-32-150, Part A, embodied are not affected by this AD.

EASA AD 2010-0072R164 10-04-014R1

by ssi

Number



Reference


BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ aeroplanes, all models, all serial numbers.

Landing Gear Main Landing Gear Shock Absorber Lower AttachmentPins Inspection / Replacement.Pin failures were do to corrosion, if not detected and corrected , could lead to a MLG collapse on the ground or during landing and consequently damage to the aeroplane or injury to the occupants.

EASA AD 2010-020165 10-11-001

BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ aeroplane. "Landing Gear Nose Landing Gear Main Fitting Inspection / Replacement".This AD issued is to prevent a crack that found at the top of the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) oleo, BAe Systems (Operations) Ltd (BAE Systems) issued Inspection Service Bulletin (ISB) ISB.32-158. Undetected cracks could lead to failure of the NLG Main Fitting and collapse of the NLG. With that view, BAE Systems issued ISB.32-158 to implement this repetitive 300 FC inspection on all NLG main fittings regardless of their modification standard. ISB.32-158 supersedes existing ISBs A32-180 and 32-181, initially with no closing. This AD requires repetitive NDT inspections of all NLG main fittings and. If cracks are found, replacement of the NLG with a serviceable unit.

EASA AD 2010-020266 10-11-008

BAE ATP

BAE ATP aeroplanes, all serial numbers. "Flight Controls - Aileron and Rudder Tab Hinge Pins - Inspection". To avoid restricted movement of the tab control and consequent reduced control of the aeroplane due to migration of a tab hinge pin out of the hinge.

EASA AD 2010-003567 10-03-004

BAE ATP aeroplanes To correct design of the lower aileron chain drive sprocket that could result in the loss of the pilot and/or copilot aileron control system and consequently reduce the controllability of the aeroplanes

EASA AD 2010-024968 10-12-005

by ssi

Number



Reference


ATP Aeroplanes Stabilizers Elevator Clearance Inspection / Measurement / Report

Incidents have been reported concerning ATP aeroplanes where, after the application of thickened anti-icing fluids, increased elevator control forces were experienced during take-off.

The ATP elevator has an elliptical nose balance over part of the span (from the root to mid-span and out towards the tip). Investigation of these occurrences showed that thickened anti-icing fluid may close the gap between the leading edge of the elevator and the horizontal stabilizer and contaminate the lower surface of the elevator.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to loss of the aerodynamic balance over the affected elevator section, changing the elevator and tab hinge moments and increasing the necessary control forces to achieve rotation.

This AD requires an inspection of both elevators for evidence of rubbing, measurement of the gap between elevator and horizontal stabilizer, the reporting of findings to BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd. and, depending on findings, repair actions.

EASA AD 2010-026369 10-12-028

BEECHCRAFT - B 200 & 390

Beechcraft King Air B300 and B300C airplanes.

This AD to detect and correct the installation of an incorrect bus bar, which could result in failure of the pitot heat annunciators to illuminate. This failure could lead to moisture freezing on the pitot tube(s) and cause erroneous flight instrument indication.

FAA AD 2010-05-1070 10-03-002

Beechcraft Model 390 airplanes, serial numbers RB-248, that are certificated in any category.

To detect and correct improper installation of the MOV and spark gap wiring, which could result in overload of the MOV in a lightning strike and allow electrical energy to continue to the essential bus and disable equipment that received power from essential bus.The disabled equipment could include the autopilot, anti-skid system, hydraulic indicator, spoiler system, pilot primary flight display, audio panel, or the 1 air data computer. This failure could lead to a significant increase in pilot workload during adverse operating conditions.

FAA AD 2010-10-1071 10-05-012

Beechcraft Model 390 airplanes, serial numbers RB-4 through RB-257, RB-259 through RB-265, RB-268, and RB-269, that are certificated in any category.

This AD to detect and replace starter generators with deficient armature insulating materials. This condition could result in the loss of operation of one or both starter generators with consequent loss of all non-battery electrical power.

FAA AD 2010-17-1572 10-10-007

BELL HELICOP. TEXTRON-MODEL 206

by ssi

Number



Reference


Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 206A, 206B, 206L, 206L-1, 206L-3 and 206L-4 helicopters.

"Non-Conforming Tail Rotor Disc Assembly". This AD issued to determined that operating a helicopter with new tail rotor disc assembly P/N 101584-1 or -2 installed may result in loss of control of the helicopter. This directive mandates to removal from service tail rotor disc assembly P/N 101584-1 and -2.

CF-2010-0773 10-03-006


Bell Helicopter Textron Model 212 This AD is prompted by a crack found on a fitting after a recent accident. Subsequently, five additional fittings from two different manufacturing lots were found to have the same type crack. A crack fitting could result in failure of the fitting, loss of main rotor blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

FAA AD 2010-24-5274 10-11-022

Bell Helicopter Textron 204B, 205A, 205A-1,205B,212,412,412CF dan 412EP helicopter

-This AD was prompted by another incident which the tail rotor blade (blade) tip weight separated from a blade during flight causing vibration. This unsafe condition lead to the determination that additional blades could be affected and should be added to the applicability. -The action specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss

of the blade tip weight , loss of a blade , and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter -This AD supersedes FAA AD 2007-19-53 ( DGCA AD 07-

11-10 )

FAA AD 2010-26-5275 10-12-019-U

Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. Model 212 helicopters certificated in any category

Main Rotor HubThis AD supersedes DGCA AD No.10-11-022 (FAA EAD 2010-24-52), and is prompted by the need to require performing a magnetic particle inspection (MPI) on additional serial-numbered main rotor hub inboard strap fittings. The action specified by ref AD are intended to prevent failure of a fitting, loss of a main rotor blade, and loss of control of the helicopter.

FAA EAD 2010-25-5176 10-12-020-U


Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Ltd. Model 407 helicopter serial number 53000 through 53990.

Over-torque of Tailboom Attachment Hardware.A review of the tailboom attachement installation has determined that the torque value of the tailboom attachment bolts specified in the maintenance manual and applied during manufacturing, exceeded the torque range recommended for the bolts.This situation, if not corrected, can lead to bolt failure, detachment of the tailboom and loss of control of the helicopter. To correct the problem, the tailboom attachment hardware has to be replaced.

CF-2010-3377 10-10-004


Bell Helicopter Textron Model 412 and 412EP helicopters.

This AD to prevent failure of a crosstube and subsequent collapse of the landing gear.

FAA AD 2010-10-1678 10-05-015

by ssi

Number



Reference



Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 427 helicopters serial numbers 56001 through 56073, 56077, 58001 and 58002.

"Vertical Fin - Installation Upgrade". This AD is issued to supersedes of DGCA AD No. 07-09-018 (CF-2007-22).

CF-2007-22R179 07-09-018R1

Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC), Model 427 Helicopter, All serial numbers.

"Tail Rotor Driveshaft Hanger Bearing Bracket - Cracking Due To Tooling Mark". Tail rotor driveshaft hanger bearing braket part number (P/N) 427-044-223-101 has been found cracked due to fatigue. It has been determined that the fatigue cracking was initiated by a tooling mart left during manufacture. The existence of tooling marks on the bracket could lead to bracket failure, loss of tail rotor drive and, consequently,loss of control of the helicopter.

CF-2010-1780 10-07-001

Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Ltd. Model 427 helicopter serial number 56001 through 56084, 58001 and 58002.

Over-torque of Tailboom Attachment Hardware.A review of the tailboom attachment installation has determined that the torque value of the tailboom attachment bolts specified in the maintenance manual and applied during manufacturing, exceeded the torque range recommended for the bolts.This situation, if not corrected, can lead to bolt failure, detachment of the tailboom and loss of control of the helicopter. To correct the problem, the tailboom attachment hardware has to be replaced.

CF-2010-3281 10-10-003

Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) helicopter models 206A, 206B, 206L, 206L-1, 206L-3, 206-4, 407, 427 and 430

From result reports that balance weight departing from the tail rotor blades during flight. The cause has been narrowed down to missing weight screws. This failure can happen at any time. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to loss of control of the helicopter. This AD is issued to extends applicability of this directive to cover the affected blades.

CF-2007-21R182 10-12-003


Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Model 430 helicopters serial number 49001 through 49129.

"Transmission Planetary Pinion Gear Damage". Significant mechanical damage to the transmission sungear and planetary pinion gears has been attributed to a planetary system misalignment caused by an excessive mast bending. This condition, if not corrected, may lead to failure of the transmission and loss of control of the helicopter. To prelude excessive mast bending, and consequent damage to the transmission planetary pinion gears and matting gears, revised VNE limits are imposed together with revised restricted center of gravity envelopes and secondary VNE limits.

CF-2010-1183 10-04-012

Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Models 430 helicopters with hydraulic servo actuators Part Number (P/N) 222-382-001-107.

"Servo Actuator". It has been determined that the output piston rod assemblies of the hydraulic servo actuators may be corroded and, consequently, prone for corrosion cracking. Also in one case, an unapproved repairs was found on the piston rod. This situation, if not corrected, could result in a loss of control of the helicopter.

CF-2010-2984 10-09-001-U

by ssi

Number



Reference


BOEING 737-SERIES

Boeing Model 737-800, -900 and -900ER series airplane; certificated in any category.

This AD to detect and correct a loose bearing in the aft lug of the elevator tab control mechanism, which could result in unwanted elevator and tab vibration. The consequent structural failure of the elevator or horizontal stabilizer could result in loss of aircraft control and structural integrity.

FAA AD 2010-15-0685

Boeing Model 737-200, -200C, -300, -400 and -500 series airplanes, certificated in any category.

This AD to prevent rapid decompression of the airplane due to fatigue cracks resulting from scribe lines on pressurized fuselage structure.

FAA AD 2010-05-1386 07-03-007

Boeing Model 737-800, and -900 series airplanes, certificated in any category, with an original standard airworthiness certificate or original export certificate of airworth issued before March 31, 2006

This AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank fire or explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

FAA 2008-10-10R187 08-05-015R1


This AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alternations, repair, or maintenance action, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

FAA 2008-10-09R188 08-05-016R1

Boeing Model 737-300, -400 dan -500 series airplanes, certificated in any category, equipped with a digital transient suppresion device (DTSD) installed in accrodance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) ST00127BO.

This AD to prevent a potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank fire or explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

FAA 2009-20-1189 10-01-004

Boeing Model 737-800 and -900 series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-32-1376, Revision 2, dated August 6, 2008.

This AD to prevent cracking of the forward trunnion pin, which could result in facture of the pin and consequent collapse of the MLG.

FAA 2009-26-0490 10-01-007

Boeing Models 737-300, -400, -500 series airplanes, Boeing Models 737-800 series airplanes and Boeing Models 747-400 series airplanes.

This AD to prevent a standby static inverter from overheating, which could result in smoke in the flight deck and cabin and loss of the electrical standby power system.

FAA 2009-26-0391 10-01-012

Boeing Model 737-300, -400 and -500 series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-53A1301, dated September 3, 2009.

This AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the fuselage skin panels at the chem-milled steps, which could result in sudden fracture and failure of the fuselage skin panels, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane.

FAA AD 2010-01-0992 10-01-014

by ssi

Number



Reference


This AD applies to Boeing Model 737-600, -700, and -800 series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-5A1294, dted April 23, 2007.

This AD to prevent cracks from propagating from drill starts in the free flange, vertical web, and radius between the free flange and vertical web of the lower stringers of the wing center section lower stringers, which could cause a loss of structural integrity of the wing center section and may result in a fuel leak.

FAA AD 2010-01-0893 10-01-016

Boieng Model 737-800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-28-1272, dated October 31, 2008.

This AD prevent the failure of the valve in the closed position, open position, or partially open position, which could result in engine fuel flow problems and possible and possible uncontrolled fuel leak or fire.

FAA AD 2010-02-0494 10-01-019

Boeing Model 737-200, -200C, -300, -400 and -500 series airplane, certificated in any category.

This AD to prevent rapid decompression of the airplane due to fatigue cracks resulting from scribe lines on pressurized fuselage structure.

FAA AD 2010-05-1395 10-03-007

Boeing Model 737-800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes; certificated in any category.

this AD to detect and correct a loose bearing in the aft lug of the elevator tab controlmechanism, which could result in unwanted elevator and tab vibration. The consequent structuralfailure of the elevator or horizontal stabilizer could result in loss of aircraft control and structuralintegrity.

FAA AD 2010-06-5196 10-03-010

Boeing Model 737-800, -900 and -900ER series airplanes; certificated in any category.

This AD to detect and correct a loose bearing in the aft lug of the elevator tab control mechanism, which could result in unwanted elevator and tab vibration. Consequent structural failure of the elevator or horizontal stabilizer could result in loss of structural integrity and aircraft control.

FAA AD 2010-09-0597 10-05-001

1. Boeing Model 737-200, -300. -400, -500 and -800 series airplanes, Modified in accordance with STC ST01143SE, as identified in Jamco SB 52-2295 Rev.1 dated October 10, 2007.

2. Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes, Modified in accordance with STC ST01194SE, as identified in Jamco SB 52-2303 Rev.1 dated October 10, 2007.

This AD issue to prevent failure of this feature, which could jeopardize flight safety.

FAA AD 2008-01-0198 10-07-016

Boeing Model 737-200, -300, -400 and -500 series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Special Attention Bulletin 737-35-1099, Rev 1 dated April 23, 2009.

This AD to prevent the in-line flow indicators of the passenger oxygen masks from fracturing and separating, which could inhibit oxygen flow to the masks and consequently result in exposure of the passengers and cabin attendants to hypoxia following a depressurization event.

FAA AD 2010-14-0699 10-07-028


This AD to detect and correct cracked, corroded, or fractured carriage spindles and to prevent severe flap asymmetry, which could result in reduced control or loss of controllability of the airplane.

FAA AD 2010-15-08100 10-08-004

by ssi

Number



Reference


Boeing Model 737-300, -400, -500 and -800 series airplanes.

This AD to prevent inadvertent electrical current, which can cause the low-pressure flex-hoses of the crew oxygen system to melt or burn, resulting in oxygen system leakage and smoke or fire.

FAA AD 2010-16-06101 10-09-008

Boeing Model 737-800, -900 and -900ER series airplanes; certificated in any category.

This AD to detect and correct discrepancies in the aft attach lugs of the elevator tab control mechanism, which could result in elevator and tab vibration. Consequent structural failure of the elevator or horizontal stabilizer could result in loss of structural integrity and aircraft control.

FAA AD 2010-17-19102 10-09-009

Boeing Model 737-200 series airplanes, certificated in any category; line numbers 1 through 848 inclusive.

This AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of certain fuselage frames and stub beams, and possible severed frames, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the frames. This reduced structural integrity can increase loading in the fuselage skin, which will accelerate skin crack growth and result in rapid decompression of the fuselage.

FAA AD 2010-17-14103 10-09-011

Boeing Model 737-600, -700,-700C, -800 and -900 series airplane, certificated with any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1201, Revision 1, dated May 28, 2009.

This AD to prevent pump housingburn-through due to electrical arcing, which could create a potential ignition source inside a fuel tank. This condition, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

FAA AD 2010-17-05104 10-09-014R1

Boeing Model 737-800 and -900 series airplane, certified in any category

This AD result from a design review of the fuel tank system. This AD is issued to prevent arching at certain fuel tank fastener in the event of a lightning strike or fault current event, which combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

FAA AD 2010-24-11105 10-12-010

Boeing Model 737-900ER series airplane Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 57: WingsThis AD result from reports of cracks emanating from the keyway of the fuel tank access hole. DGCA is issuing this AD to detect and correct such cracking, which could result in the loss of the lower wing skin load path and consequent structural failure of the wing.

FAA AD No. 2010-24-01106 10-12-026

BOEING 747 SERIES

Boeing Model 747-400, 747-400D, and 747-400F sreies airplanes; certificated in any category.

This AD to prevent the loss of structural integrity of the fuselage, which could result in rapid depressurization of the airplane.

FAA AD 2010-01-01107 10-01-013

Boeing Model 747-400, and -400D series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Srevice Bulletin 747-53A2484, Revision 1, dated February 12, 2009.

This AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking in the specified fuselage stringers, which, if left undetected, could result in fuselage skin cracking that reduce the structural integrity of the skin panel, and consequent rapid depressuruzation of the airplane.

FAA AD 2010-01-02108 10-01-020

by ssi

Number



Reference


Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes. This AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking at multiple adjacent locations in the subject areas, which could connect to form large cracks and result in reduced structural integrity leading to rapid decompression and consequent loss of control of the airplane.

FAA AD 2010-05-03109 10-03-003

Boeing Model 747-400 airplanes, certificated in any category; line numbers 1 through 1307 inclusive.

This AD to prevent fatigue cracking of the body station (BS) 2598 bulkhead structure, which could result in inability of the structure to carry horizontal stabilizer flight loads, and loss of controllability of the airplane.

FAA AD 2010-14-07110 10-07-008

Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28A2261, dated February 19, 2009.

This AD is issued to prevent damage to the fuel pumps caused by electrical arcing that could introduce an ignition source in the fuel tank which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

FAA AD 2010-13-12111 10-07-017

Boeing Company Model 747-400, 747-400D, 747-400F series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28A2280, Revision 1, dated November 25, 2009, and 747-28A2281, Revision 1, dated November 25, 2009.

This AD is issued to prevent uncommanded operation of certain override/jettison pumps which could cause overheat, electrical arcs, or frictional sparks, and could lead to ignition source inside a fuel tank. This condition, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

FAA AD 2010-14-08112 10-07-018

Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2421, Revision 2, dated December 19, 2006 and 747-400F series airplanes identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2422, Revision 2, dated November 16, 2006.

This AD to prevent a potential electrical arc from igniting the BMS 8-39 polyurethane foam insulation on the duct assemblies of the ECS, which could propagate a small fire and lead to a larger fire that could spread throughout the airplane through the ECS.

FAA AD 2010-14-01113 10-07-029

Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes, certified in any category; as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2750, dated August 27, 2009.

This AD to detect and correct such cracking, which could grow and resultin a severed intercostal. If an intercostal is severed, cracks could develop in the adjacent frame structure and skin, resulting in a rapid loss of cabin pressure.

FAA AD 2010-14-07114 10-07-031

Boeing Model 747-400, -400D and -400F series airplanes, certificated in any category; line numbers 1 through 1229 inclusive.

This AD to prevent inadvertent electrical current, which can cause the low-pressure flex-hoses of the crew oxygen system to melt or burn, resulting in oxygen system leakage and smoke or fire.

FAA AD 2010-16-05115 10-08-010

Boeing 747-400 series airplanes, certified in any category; as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-52-2293, dated September 4, 2009

From result report that the current design of the flight deck door is defective. This AD is issued to prevent failure of this equipment, which could jeopardize flight safety

FAA 2009-19-06116 10-11-016

by ssi

Number



Reference


Model 747-400 series airplanes, certified in any category, line numbers 1 through 1419 inclusive, except airplanes that have been modified into 747-400 large cargo freighter configuration.

These AD results from reports of cracked that have been found in the strap and inner chord of the forward edge frame of the number 5 main entry door cutouts, between stringers 16 and 23. This AD issue to detect and correct such cracks, which could damage to the adjacent body structure and could result in depressurization of the airplane in flight.

FAA AD No. 2010-20-08117 10-11-017

Boeing Company Model 747-400, 747-400D, and 747-400F series airplane, certificated in any category; as identified in the service bulletin listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28A2266, Revision 1, dated December 10, 2009 and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-28A2267, dated December 18, 2008.

Electrical hot short from a source outside the fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS) to the densitometer wiring from causing failure of the FQIS densitometer resistors, which could result in an ignition source inside the center or horizontal stabilizer fuel tanks.

FAA AD No. 2010-20-12118 10-11-020

BOLKOW BO-105 SERIES

BO 105 A, BO 105 C, BO 105 D, BO 105 LS A-1, BO 105 LS A-3and BO 105 S helicopters, all variant, all serial number andMBB-BK 117 A-1, MBB-BK 117 A-3, MBB-BK 117 A-4, MBB-BK 117 B-1, MBB-BK 117 B-2, MBB-BK 117 C-1 helicopters, all serial numbers.

"Rotor Flight Control Cyclic Stick Locking Device - Modification".This AD is issued to supersedes DGCA AD 09-04-006 (EASA AD 2009-0079) and adds the BO 105 LS A-3 helicopters helicopters to the Applicability. This AD has been republished to correct the Applicability, making this consistent with the certified Models as specified in the TCDS EASA R.011.

EASA AD 2010-0049119 10-04-003

BO 105 C, BO 105 D and BO 105 S helicopters, all variants as specified in Appendix 1 of reference AD, all serial numbers, if equipped with Roll Royce Corporation (formerly Allison, Detroit Diesel Allison) 250-C20 series engines, except helicopters that have been modified in accordance with ECD VTOL retrofit kit 105-80037.

Engine Power Turbine Speed Operational Limitation.

Several third stage turbine wheel failures have been reported on Roll Royce Corporation (RRC) 250 series engines. Investigation by RRC has determined that detrimental vibrations can occurs within a particular range of turbine speeds, which are potential contributing factor to these failures. This condition if not corrected could result in loss of engines power, possibly resulting in an emergency landing and consequent injuries to helicopter occupants.

To address this unsafe condition, RRC issued Commercial Engine Bulletin (CEB) A-1400, now at Revision 3, to introduce an operational limitation to avoid engine N2 steady-state operation in a certain speed range(86.5% - 95.5%) for more than 60 seconds in single or cumulative events for engines with the third stage turbine wheel P/N 23065833 installed. In response, Eurocopter Deutschland (ECD) issued ASB BO105-60-110, now at revision 1, to introduce the same operating limitation for BO 105 helicopters with the affected engines installed.

This AD requires the introduction of a placard and the amendment of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM).

EASA AD 2010-0128120 10-07-002

by ssi

Number



Reference


Eurocopter BO 105 helicopters. "Time Limits / Maintenance Checks - Main Rotor Blades with Bolted Lead Inner Weight - Life Limitation". T o determine the life limit of 2500 flight hours (FH) for M/R blades due to inner weight deformation during operation.

EASA AD 2010-0153121 10-07-033

BOLKOW KAWASAKI-HELICOPTER

Model MBB-BK117C-2 Helicopters, all serial numbers, if equipped with a Tail Rotor IGB that has a bevel gear Part Number (P/N) 4639 310 065 installed.

"Airworthiness Limitations - Tail Rotor Intermediate Gear Box (IGB) Bevel Gear - Reduced Life Limit". To prevent significant reduction of the lifetime of IGB bevel gears, potentially resulting in failure of the IGB and consequent loss of control of the helicopter. This AD require the implementation of a revised life limit on the effected bevel gears and adds those s/n by referencing the latest Revision of ECD Alert Service Bulletin (ASB).

EASA AD 2010-0096122 10-06-002

MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopters Auto Flight Three-axis-Autopilot Automatic Level-off Function Revised Flight Manual ProcedureThis AD issued is to prevent the problem on autopilot of MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopters, concerning the automatic level-off function, which is normally only triggered upon ground proximity detection. The automatic level-off may erroneously be triggered when radar altitude falls below 2500 feet. When this occurs, the ALT mode reference is wrongly set to either a meaningless high value or to a low value equivalent to 65 feet above ground. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to a descent below the minimum safety altitude. This AD requires operators to amend the applicable Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) Supplement and to inform the flight crews accordingly.

EASA AD No. 2010-0270-E123 10-12-029-U

MBB-BK117 C-2 helicopters Electrical Power Starter/Generator Switch Off Revised Flight Manual Procedure EASA have received reports that on some MBB-BK117 C-2 helicopters, a too high current flow was detected when one generator was deactivated (e.g. during the Engine Power Check).This situation is, if not detected corrected, could lead to failure of the generator, likely resulting in loss of electrical power and inducing loss of systems that are necessary for safe flight.This AD requires the introduction of additional Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) procedures, to include visual monitoring of the electrical power display GEN AMPS on the Vehicle and Engine Mulfunction Display (VEMD) during switching of a generator.This AD is considered to be an interim an interim measure, pending the development of a final solution that will prevent this particular mode of generator failure; further AD action cannot be excluded.

EASA AD No. 2010-0268-E124 10-12-030-U

CFM INTERNATIONAL ENGINE

by ssi

Number



Reference


CFM 56-7B engines in accordance with "applicability" section in reference AD.

This AD to prevent failure of the LP turbine rear frame from low-cycle-fatigue cracks. Failure of the LP turbine rear frame could result in engine separation from the airplane, possibly leading to loss of control of the airplane.

FAA AD 2010-01-05125 10-01-018

CFM International CFM565, 5B, and 7B series turbofan engines with stage 3 low pressure turbine (LPT) disks part number (P/N) 3360020060, installed with the following serial numbers (S/Ns), DE255844, DE256388, DE256622, DE256623, DE256625, DE256627, DE256628, DE256631, and DE256637. The 5 and 5B series engines are installed on, but not limited to, Airbus A318, A319, A320, and A321 airplanes, and the 7B series engines are installed on, but not limited to, Boeing 737 series airplanes.

This AD is issued to prevent uncontained failure of the stage 3 LPT disk and damage to the airplane.

FAA AD 2010-13-09126 10-07-011

CFM56-5B1/3, CFM56-5B2/3, CFM56-5B3/3, CFM56-5B4/3, CFM56-5B5/3, CFM56-5B6/3, CFM56-5B7/3, CFM56-5B8/3, CFM56-5B9/3, CFM56-5B3/3B1, CFM56-5B4/3B1 engines if equipped with Fan Blades Serial Numbers as listed in CFM International Service Bulletin (SB) CFM56-5B S/B 72-0777.These engines are known to be installed on, but not limited to, Airbus A318, A319, A320 and A321 aeroplanes.

-Engine Fan Blade Replacement -During quality inspections at blades manufacturer, a non-

conforming fan blades geometry was detected. The quality investigation isola

ad 2010 list

Documents

lhotellier halon

easa ad

protection halon

system stc

consignments of halon

failure of deployment

tthis ad

contamination nature