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8/3/2019 4664386 Consti SupremacyPows of State Judicial ReviewPop Sovereign

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGESTS (Atty. Gwen De Vera)All by LOUDETTE CALPO (A 2008)

1. MARBURY v. MADISONAction: A petition for writ of mandamus for delivery of documentFacts:

On the December Term, 1801, petitioner, with Dennis Ramsay, RobertTownsende Hooe and William Harper petitioned for a rule to compel respondent toshow cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue. Petitioner is asking to befurnished with the commission as Justice of the Peace (JOP) of Washington, D.C.Witnesses Wagner (not all commissions signed, recorded; did not personally seecommissions), Daniel Brent (almost certain of Marbury and Hooes appointment,signed and affixed with a seal but not recorded; Ramsay not included), Lincoln(Secretary of State during Adams, term) that no commissions were sent out.

James Marshall (delivered commissions, returned some including Hooesand Harpers), and Hazen Kimball (Marbury and Hooe commissions signed)attested to the existence of the commissions, duly signed and affixed with US seal.Petitioners were denied requests for the commission, and thus appeal to the Courtfor a writ of mandamus. On February 24, 1803, the Court rendered its decision.

Issues:1. WON applicant has right to commissions demanded.2. WON this right, if violated, has a remedy in law.3. WON writ of mandamus is the remedy, and if so,4. WON writ can be issued by the Court to respondent.

Held:1. YES, the applicants have the right to the commissions demanded. When

the commission was signed by the President, and the seal affixedverifying the verity of the signature, the commission is complete. Theoffice of the JOP is independent of the Office of the President; oncesigned, commission is irrevocable. The transmission or acceptance of the

commission is a practice of convenience and not law, since the documentis delivered to one ALREADY appointed. The petitioner thus has a vestedright to the office of JOP.

2. The violated right has a remedy in law. The Secretary of State has both a

public ministerial duty to the US and an agency to the President. It is inthis former capacity that he is accountable to the people. His executive ordiscretionary power ended with the signing of the President of thecommission.

3. Mandamus is the proper remedy. There is no other adequate specificlegal remedy. Since a detinue involves an object or its value. Mandamusis the proper remedy since the office is not to be sold (no attendant value;all or nothing).

4. No, A writ cannot be issued by the court to the respondent. AlthoughCongress gave the Court the right to issue a writ of mandamus to anycourt appointed, for any person holding office, ART.3 SEC. 2 of USConstitution clearly outlines the original and appellate jurisdictions of theCourt. While a writ may be issued to the respondent the basis of which isnot the office but the nature of the thing to be done, it cannot be issued bythe SC following the Constitution. The jurisdiction to issue writs to publicofficers lies within the inferior courts. To do otherwise would be to givethe legislative supreme power over the law, and any act contrary to theConstitution cannot be valid and given effect by the courts.

WHEREFORE, Court holds that the petitioner has a legal right to the office of JOPfor five years, and the refusal to deliver the commission is a violation of that right.While mandamus is the proper remedy, jurisdiction to issue the writ lies with theinferior courts.

2. ANGARA v. ECFacts:

On September 17, 1935, petitioner was elected member of the national

assembly for the first district of Tayabas. The provincial board of canvassersproclaimed him on November 15, 1935, NA passed Resolution no. 8 confirming allmembers whose election has not been contested. On December 9, 1935,respondent Ynsua filed a protest of petitioners election, with a prayer that he bedeclared winner or election declared null and void. He filed on the last day set bythe electoral commission. On December 20, 1935 petitioner filed a motion todismiss protest before the Electoral Commission on the following grounds:

1. Res. No. 8 valid exercise of legislative powers2. Resolution has the object of limiting protest period3. Protest filed outside prescribed period

Ynsua argued that there exists no constitutional provision or statuteprohibiting protest of election of a NA member after confirmation. On January 23,

1936, the EC denied the protest of which are the following grounds:1. Constitut ion confers exclusive jurisdict ion to EC as regardselectoral disputes under Sec 4 Art 6

2. This excludes the power to regulate proceedings o f saidelection contestsreserved to NA

3. EC can only regulate if Na has not avai led of the power to doso

4. Resolution no. 8 valid5. SC has jurisd iction over question; involves Consti tut ional ity

under Par 13 Sec 1, ordinance appended to constitution andSec 1 and 3 of PC

The Solicitor General replied:1. EC on independent instrument of NA, and its fixing of the deadline is

a valid exercise of its powers

Loudette Calpos Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)1


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2. Res. No. 8 should and can not deprive EC of this jurisdiction3. EC invested with quasi-judicial powers created by PC- it is not an

inferior tribunal

Respondent Ynsua argued:1. No law prescribing protest period was in effect at the time EC set the

deadline2. He filed within the set deadline3. EC has no jurisdiction, not reviewable by a writ of prohibition4. No law requires confirmation of NA members5. EC renders independent, final, and unappealable decisions6. EC not inferior tribunal but empowered by Sec 226 and 516 of Code

of Civil Procedure7. The Tydings-Mcduffie Law as invoked by petitioner is not applicable

to case at bar.

Issue:1. WON SC has jurisdiction over EC case at bar2. WON EC acted in excess of its jurisdiction, given the resolution passed by

NA

Held:1. The SC has jurisdiction. There is a need to determine the scope,

characteristics, and extent of the Consti grant to EC under Sec 4 Art6.

2. No. The deliberation of the Constitutional Commissioners show thatthe purpose in creating the EC was to transfer all power related to judgment on electoral dispute from NA to independent tribunal.Absent a Consti provision stating otherwise, all powers to promulgateits judgment of election contests lies with EC. The argument of abuseis not relevant as everything can be actually met. Confirmation ofelected officials is not necessary. The Constitution abrogated theJones Law and Sec 478 of Act 3387, which gave NA the power to fixthe time period within which protests can be filed.

Wherefore, petition is denied, with costs to petitioner.

Also, Abad-Santos concurring: The power of EC to judge electoral contests judicial in nature The power to regulate time to protest legislative in nature

3. TANADA v. CUENCOFacts:

On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party electedrespondents Cuenco & Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon

the nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP member. The two seats, originally for

minority party nominees, were filled with NP members to meet the Constitutionalmandate under Sec. 2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party SenatorTaada. Consequently, the Chairman of the Tribunal appointed the rest of therespondents as staff members of Cuenco & Delgado. Petitioner alleges that thenomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate,violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since 3 seats on the ET are reserved for minoritysenators duly nominated by the minority party representatives. Furthermore, asrespondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate, the case atbar is a violation not only of Taada's right as CP member of ET, but respondentMacapagal's right to an impartial body that will try his election protest. Petitionerspray for a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents (cannot exerciseduties), to be made permanent after a judgment to oust respondents is passed.Respondents contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to try the appointment ofET members, since it is a constitutional right granted to Senate. Moreover, thepetition is without cause of action since Taada exhausted his right to nominate 2more senators; he is in estoppel. They contend that the present action is not theproper remedy, but an appeal to public opinion.

Issues:1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter

2. WON Constitutional right of CP can be exercised by NP, or the Committeeon Rules for the Senate

Held:1. Yes. The Court has jurisdiction. The case at bar is not an action against

the Senate compelling them to allow petitioners to exercise duties asmembers of ET. The ET is part of neither House, even if the Senate electsits members. The issue is not the power of the Senate to elect ornominate, but the validity of the manner by which power was exercised(constitutionality). The Court is concerned with the existence and extent ofsaid discretionary powers.

2. No. Although respondents allege that the Constitutional mandate of 6Senate members in the ET must be followed, this cannot be done withoutviolating the spirit & philosophy of Art. 6, Sec. 2, which is to provideagainst partisan decisions. The respondents' practical interpretation of thelaw (modifying law to fit the situation) cannot be accepted; although theyfollowed mandate on number, they disobeyed mandate on procedure. Thecontention that petitioner Taada waived his rights or is in estoppel is nottenable. When interests of public policy & morals are at issue, the powerto waive is inexistent. Taada never led Primicias to believe that hisnominations on behalf of the CP are valid.

WHEREFORE, The Senate cannot elect members of the ET not nominated by theproper party, nor can the majority party elect more than 3 members of the ET.Furthermore, the CRS has no standing to nominate, and the election ofrespondents Cuenco & Delgado void ab initio. The appointment of the staffmembers are valid as it is a selection of personnel - a matter under the discretion

of the Chairman.



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Paras, dissenting: The procedure or manner of nomination cannot affect Constimandate that the Senate is entitled to 6 seats in the ET. The number of seats (9)must be held fixed, since the Consti must have consistent application. There is norule against the minority party nominating a majority party member to the ET.Furthermore, the Senate, and not the parties, elect on the ET members, brushingaside partisan concerns.

Labrador, dissenting:The petition itself is unconstitutional under Art. 6 Sec. 2 because:

1. 9-member ET mandate violated2. right to elect of Senate held in abeyance by refusal of minority party to

nominate3. process of nomination effectively superior to power to elect (party v.

Senate power)4. SC arrogation of power in determining Con Cons proviso of


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procedural issues and the legislative power of Congress, but failed toaddress the Constitutional questions. Moreover, the absence of aprovision prohibiting separate elections does not precludesynchronization.

WHEREFORE, RA 7056 is unconstitutional & therefore null & void. The TRO ismade permanent.

6. RUBI vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDOROAction: For Habeas CorpusFacts:

Plaintiff alleges that he and other Mangyans are being illegally detainedby provincial officials in a reservation in Tigbao, Mindoro. Plaintiff further allegesthat Doroteo Dabalos is being held in custody in Calapan by the provincial sherifffor escaping from the reservation.

Sec. 2145 (power to delegate tribes to lands) delegating power to theprovincial governor, and Sec. 2759 of Act No. 2711 (detainment for violation) arealleged to be in violation of the August 29, 1916 Act of Congress, Sec. 3 of which

guarantees equal protection under the laws.

Defendant contends that the exercise of police power was valid andpromulgated for the interest of the nation: the Mangyans need to be civilized

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711 are invalid by virtue of:1. Illegal delegation of power from legislative to provincial officials

(legislative avoided full responsibility)2. Discrimination based on religious belief3. Denying plaintiff of right to equal protection of the laws4. Illegal detention is tantamount to involuntary servitude

*Act 547 expressly for Mangyans

Held:

1. There is no illegal delegation of power. The legislative only conferreddiscretionary authority to the provincial governor considering his familiaritywith the best places for relocation. Such delegation of power is necessary forthe execution of the law.

2. No discrimination based on religious belief. Legal practice and legislativeintent clearly show that the term Non-Christian does not discriminate on thebasis of religion, or even geographical location. The term is used to indicatewhether or not a particular community has been civilized.

3. No denial of right to equal protection. While the law is universal in its

application, liberty must be understood to mean liberty restrained byreasonable regulations to assure public safety. Thus, given the Mangyans

tendency to slow Philippine progress, their civilization is necessary to protectthe interests of their more fortunate brothers.

4. No slavery/involuntary servitude imposed. The Mangyan are not being askedto work for anyone other than themselves. The prohibition against theirleaving is necessary to ensure the interests of others (practice of caingin,etc.). There remains to the plaintiff the avenue of redress. Challenging thevalidity of the law without showing specific instance of oppression will onlyhamper the government from achieving its goals. This is consistent with thegovernment policy in the Philippines being effective in bringing about thecivilization of inhabitants.

WHEREFORE, Writ denied. Habeas corpus cannot issue if plaintiff is notunlawfully restrained of liberty.

CARLSON, concurring: The power to provide for the issuance of Sec. 2145 and2759 is akin to orders governing children and persons of unsound mind. It is fortheir own good.

MOIR, dissenting: The Mangyans are legal citizens of the Philippines,

unlike American Indian tribes who have treatises with the government. Thereasons of caingin practice and their subsequent burden to the State is notjustification for incarceration. The arbitrary and unrestrained power to do harm (byprovincial governor) must be measure of laws validity rather than the potential todo harm.

7. ROXAS & CO.,INC v. CAFacts:

Petitioner is the registered owner of HAACIENDAS PALICA, BANILAD,and CAYLAWAY, all located in NASUGBU, BATANGAS. On June 15, 1999, RA6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) took effect. Petitioner has tendereda voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway to DAR, and haciendas Palico &

Banilad were later put under compulsory acquisition. On May 4, 19993, petitionerapplied for the conversion of his lands from agricultural to non-agricultural, citingthe SANGGUNIAN NG BAYAN NG NASUGBUs reclassification of the land;petitioner was denied. On August 24,1993, petitioner filed a case before theDARAB with a prayer to cancel the CLOAS issued in the name of several persons.Petitioner contended that the land was no longer suitable for agricultural purposes.DARAB remarked that the determination of the lands suitability for agricultureshould be determined by DAR, and remanded the case to SDAR. The petitionciting a lack of due process in the acquisition of lands was denied by the CA onApril 28, 1994. Petitioner submitted the following assignment of errors:

1. CAs determination of a premature cause of action. (did not exhaustadministrative remedies given patent illegality of DAR acts)

2. CAs ruling that land is subject to CARL.3. DAR acquisition of land void for lack of due process. (no notice and

identification of land)



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4. Lack of compensation even after petitioner was stripped oflandholding.

Issues:1. WON SC can take cognizance of petition.2. WON acquisition on proceeding valid in accordance with law.3. WON SC has power to rule on the reclassification of land.

Held:1. Yes. Petitioner had recourse to SC because he had been denied a

speedy, adequate remedy by DARAB.

2. No. The acquisition of DAR of the land violated due process rights ofpetitioner. He did not receive compensation, was not informed whichpart of the land was to be taken, an uninformed of proceedings. Underthe law, compensation must be made in cash or LBP bonds; theconversion of trust fund accounts to cash & bonds did not remove theprocedural lapse. Moreover, JAIME PIMENTEL is not sufficientlyintegrated with the company to know what he should have done with thecorrespondence. Neither was he authorized. The petitioner likewise

had no chance to exercise his right of retention given that DAR had notclearly shown the part of the land it placed under compulsory acquisition.

3. No. The lack of due process does not give the court justification todecide whether the lands in question are agricultural or non-agricultural.Neither are the CLOAs nullified at the expense of the land owners whohave tilled it for the last few years. DAR must be given time to correctits procedural lapses.

WHEREFORE, The petition is granted in part. Acquisition proceedings arenullified because of lack of due process. The case is remanded to DAR for properacquisition proceedings and determination of application of conversion.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, dissenting:The remanding of the case should not be done, given how DAR has

already sat on the petition for seven years. Fruits of wrongful acts must benullified & the CLOAs revoked. The DAR acceptance of Presidential Proclamation1520 which identified Nasugbu as a tourist zone implies recognizance that the landis non-agricultural. Vote to grant certiorari, declare lands non-agricultural andoutside the scope of RA 6657.

8. ICHONG, ET AL v. HERNANDEZ & SARMIENTOAction: Petition for mandamus & injunctionFacts:

Petitioner alleges that RA1180, by limiting the participation of aliens in retailtrade, is unconstitutional because:

1. denies alien residents equal protection & due process

2. subject of Act not expressed in Title3. violates International & Treaty obligations of RP4. provisions against hereditary succession & capital requirements

violate sec1 & sec5 Art 13 and sec8 of Art 14 of PC

Respondents argue that the Act was a valid exercise of Legislative Power,that there was only one subject in the title, that there was no infringement of any

international treaty, and that in the case of hereditary succession, only the formand not the value of property was impaired. Moreover, the institution of inheritanceis of statutory origin.

Issue: WON exclusion of aliens from retail trade is unreasonable under sec1 Art 3of PC.

Held: No. It is a valid exercise of power. Police power is said to be the mostpositive & active of all governmental processes, and as such is essential,insistent & illimitable. The Constitution does not define the scope of policepower, but only imposes limits in the form of due process & equalprotection of the laws. Equal protection of the laws does not demandabsolute equality among residents so long as there is like treatment under

like circumstances. If it applies to all members of the same class, there isno infringement so long as the distinction is reasonable. Moreover, courtscan only inquire into the legality & not the wisdom of the law.

Alien domination is a fact proven by official statistics and felt by all Filipinosacross industries. The alien group is a well organized and powerful groupdominating the economic sphere and perpetrating abuses. Alienage is areasonable distinction given that aliens are here for gain & profit. Theyhave no real contribution to national economy & wealth (dont invest). Theabuses done are against Filipinos goes against petitioners argument thatretail trade is only a continuance of nationalistic protective policy laid downas law in the primary objective of the Constitution.

Wherefore, Petition DENIED.

9. PEOPLE v. FERRERFacts:

On May 5, 1970 a criminal complaint was filed against respondent FELICIANOCO charging him as a ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, inviolation of RA 1700 (Anti-Subversion Law). On May 25, 1970 a criminal caseagainst NILO TAYAG and others was filed for subversion respondent was amember of the Kabataang Makabayan, a subversive group, and tried to inviteothers to revolt against the government. On July 21, 1970, TAYAG moved toquash, arguing that RA 1700 is:

1. a bill of attainder;2. vague;

3. with more than one subject expressed in title;



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4. a denial of equal protection of laws.

On September 15, 1970, the statute was declared void on the grounds that itis a bill of attainder, vague, and overbroad.

Issues:1. WON RA 1700 is a bill of attainder

2. WON RA 17700 is overbroad and vague (due process)

Held:1. No, it is not a bill of attainder. The act does not specify which CPP

members are to be punished. The focus is not on individuals but onconduct relating to subversive purposes. The guilt of CPP members mustfirst be established, as well as their cognizance as shown by overt acts.Even if acts specified individuals, instead of activities, it shall not be a billof attainder not unless specific individuals were named. The court hasconsistently upheld the CPPs activities as inimical to public safety andwelfare. A bill of attainder must also reach past conduct and appliedretroactively; Section 4 of RA 1700 expressly states that the act will beapplied prospectively to give members time to renounce their affiliations.

The legislature is with reasonable relation to public health, morals, andsafety and the government is with right to protect itself againstsubversion.

2. No, the statute is not overbroad and vague. The respondents assertionthat the term overthrow is overbroad is likewise untenable, since it couldbe achieved by peaceful means. Respondents disregarded the termsknowingly, willingly, and by overt acts, overthrow is understood to be byviolent means. Whatever interest in free speech/associations that isinfringed is not enough to outweigh considerations of national securityand preservation of democracy. The title of the bill need not be acatalogue of its contents it is valid if it is indicative in broad but clearterms the nature, scope, and consequences of proposed law andoperation.

Guidelines Set Forth by the Supreme Court:1. In the case of any subversive group

a. establish purposes to overthrow and establish totalitarian regimeunder foreign domination;

b. accused joined organization;c. knowledge, will and overt action.

2. in CPP casea. pursuit of objectives decried by the government;b. accused joined organization;c. knowledge, will, and overt action.

WHEREFORE, Resolution set aside, cases remanded to court a quo for trial on

merits.

Fernando, dissenting:RA 1700 must be appraised in light of meaning prescribed to

increasing complexity of subversive movements in the country. A taint ofinvalidity is seen even in the title of the Act, which state the specific name ofan organization and create presumption of guilt. The right to dissent isconstitutionally protected, even if it contains a subversive tinge. Dissent is not

disloyalty. A line is drawn when words amount to incitement to sedition orrebellion. Other means could have been taken to stem the issue and spread ofthe CPP.

10. US v. POMPEYAFacts:

On June 1, 1914 a petition against appellee was filed by the ProsecutingAtty of Iloilo. The complaint charged appellee with a violation of sec 40(m) of themunicipal code, which required able-bodied men of specific characteristics torender patrol and/or police duty to the community, given a certain situation. He wassentenced by the Justice of Peace to pay P2 and court costs, whereupon hecontended before the CFI that the said ordinance violated the liberty of citizens

under the Philippine Bill. On August 22, 1914 a decision in favor of the appelleewas rendered. Upon appeal, appellee contended that the facts of the case are notsufficient for cause of action.

Issues:1. WON sec 40(m) of the municipal code is constitutional (liberty assured by the

Organic Act of the Philippines)2. WON complaint is enough to sustain a cause of action

Held:

1. Yes, Sec 40(m) of the Municipal Code requires all able-bodied men ofspecific characteristics to render service, and all householders to furnishrelevant information in cases the community is infested by ladrones. This

statute recognizes the common law right of the state to exercise policepower. The powers of the country orposse comitatus, vests those withauthority to maintain good order the power to call upon all able-bodiedmen to assist in maintaining the security of the community.

Generally speaking, the Philippine Legislature can adopt laws onmatters not expressly given to Congress, whereas the latter can onlylegislate on matters expressly granted to them by the Constitution. Policepower is inherent on this power of the state and cannot be limited in theinterest of presuming public order and preventing conflict of rights. Policepower is so extensive that the courts have not been able to define it, suchthat each case is decided on its merits. Thus Act 1309 is a legitimateexercise of police power.



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2. No. While Act 1309 applies only to special individuals under specialcircumstances, the complaint must show that the appellee falls within thescope of that class. The complaint did not show appellee was part of theclass, or that special circumstance existed

Wherefore, Judgment affirmed and petition dismissed.

Pertinent Provisions of Sec 40(m) of Act 1309 empowers municipal government, if province is overrun by ladrones and

outlaws to:1. require able-bodied males between 18-50(55) to assist for not more

than 5 days per month in the apprehension of outlaws; patrol duty fornot more than once a wee.

2. Exact a fine or issue penalty for failure to comply ( not more thanP100; not more than 3 months) or both at the discretion of the courts

3. Docs not extend to US officers/employees4. officers/employees of common carriers (sea and land), priests,

ministers, physicians, druggists, physicians engaged in business, andlawyers when in court

Purpose of Act 13091. amendment of Municipal Code for organization of municipal governor2. amendment to create sec 40 (m)3. enunciation of municipal council powers4. empowerment on additional areas to the council

11. AGUSTIN v. EDUAction: Action for prohibitionFacts:

Petitioner assails Letter of Instruction No. 229 which provides for themandatory use of early warning devices for all motor vehicles. Petitioner owns aVolkswagen Beetle equipped with blinking lights that could well serve as an early

warning device. He alleges that the statute:1. violates the provision against delegation of police power2. immoral will only enrich the manufacturer of the devices at the car

owners expense3. prevents car owners from finding alternativesPetitioner prays for a declaration of nullity and a restraining order in the

meantime.On the other hand, respondents answers are based on case law and

other authoritative decisions of the tribunal issues.

Issues:1. WON LOI 229 is constitutional (due process)2. WON LOI 229 is an invalid delegation of legislative power, as far as

implementation is concerned

Held:1. Yes. Respondents assert that LOI 229 is backed by factual data &

statistics, whereas petitioners conjectural assertions are without merit.The statute is a valid exercise of police power in so far as it promotespublic safety, and petitioner failed to present factual evidence to rebut the

presumed validity of the statute. Early warning devices have a clearemergency meaning, whereas blinking lights are equivocal and wouldincrease accidents. The petitioners contention that the devicesmanufacturers may be abusive does not invalidate the law. Petitionersobjection is based on a negative view of the statutes wisdom-somethingthe court cant decide on.

2. No. The authority delegated in the implementation is not legislative innature. Respondent Edu was merely enforcing the law forms part ofPhilippine law. PD 207 ratified the Vienna Conventions recommendationof enacting road safety signs and devices. Respondents are merelyenforcing this law. Moreover, the equal protection under the lawscontention was not elaborated upon.

Wherefore: Petition is dismissed. Judgment immediately executory.

Teehankee, dissenting:The rules and regulations outlined by the LTO Commission does not

reflect the real intent of LOI229.1. Effectivity and utility of statute not yet demonstrated.2. public necessity for LOI not yet shown3. big financial burden on motorists4. no real effort shown to illustrate less burdensome alternative to early

warning device5. imperative need to impose blanket requirement on all vehicles

-people still drive dilapidated vehicle-need for sustained education campaign to instill safe driving

The exercise of police power affecting the life , liberty, and property of any personis till subject to judicial inquiry.

12. US v. GOMEZ JESUSFacts:

On July 17, 1913 a complaint was filed before the COFI MANILA chargingdefendant with practicing medicine without a license1. Contrary to SEC. 8 ACT 310of the PC. Defendant contends that:

1. Complaint was not in the form required by law2. Facts stated do not constitute a crime3. Complaints allegations are justifications to legally exempt the accused.

1Defendant found guilty of violating the OPIUM LAW



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The demurrer was overruled and COFI found the defendant guilty of chargesfiled against him.

Defendant presented the following errors on appeal:1. The provisions of SEC 8 ACT 310is contradictory to the PHILIPPINE BILL2. Powers vested in BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINER to revoke licenses of

physicians convicted of unprofessional conduct should not be valid (basisof defendants licenses revoke)

3. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERs decision should not be taken as finalpending the appeal to the BOARD OF HEALTH (later withdrawn bydefendant)

4. Objection to defense evidence that the practice is worth more than P600was sustained

5. Lower court took HOTEL QUIRUGILO as a cloak to aid defendantscontravention of the law

6. Sentence of fine and subsidiary imprisonment invalid

Defendant further alleged that SEC 8 of ACT 310 is void because of:1. It violates PAR 1 SEC 5 of ACT OF CONGRESS (no deprivation of life,

liberty, property without due process)2. Power to revoke licenses only with COFI & SC3. Power of BOME to revoke licenses repealed by SEC 88 of the

PHILIPPINE BILL.

Issues:1. WON state can require certain standards of morality/scholarship in the

practice of certain professions2. WON the state has the right to revoke licenses3. WON State can punish those who practice medicine without a license

Held:1. Yes. The state has the general power to enact laws in relation to persons

and property to promote public health, morals, safety and welfare. Thus,police power cannot be deprived from the state to deprive it from thestate would be to destroy the purpose of the state. The deprivation ofrights of certain people cannot curtail police power. Private interests mustbe subservient to the general interest of the community. Police power isso extensive and pervasive that the courts do not give it exact definition.There is no arbitrary deprivation of rights if the exercise is nor permittedby virtue of the detriment to society.

2. Yes. Reliance is placed on the medical license issued by competentauthority by people who invoke the aid of physicians. State police powerto regulate/monitor/revoke licenses extends to all areas affecting publicinterest and welfare

3. Yes. The law is not necessarily invalid if it provides a remedy to thoseaffected simply because it does not provide for appeal to the courts. Dueprocess of law is not judicial process. Once revoked the right to appealthe issuance of ones license is only a statutory right not an inherent right.

WHEREFORE, Judgment affirmed

13. MORFE v. MUTUCFacts:

Petitioner alleges that RA 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT PRACTEICES ACT) byrequiring periodic ruling of the SAL of public officers is an unlawful exercise ofpolice power and is unconstitutional because:

1. It violates the right to privacy2. Violates ban against unreasonable search and seizure and the prohibition

against self-incrimination.

The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner and granted the petition forinjunction. Appellant contends that RA 3019 is a valid exercise of public powerto safeguard public morals. Appellee contends the statutes presumption ofguilt is an affront to dignify tax law & tax census law already require

documents relevant to RA 3019s purposes.

Issues:1. WON case exhibits evidence to rebut presumption of constitutional

validity2. WON statute violates the right to privacy, self incrimination &

unreasonable search & seizure (valid exercise of police power?)

Held:1. The evidence is not enough to rebut the presumption of i ts

constitutionality. There is no factual basis for the allegation, and thevalidity of the statute must be upheld. It has been said that when freedomis impelled by law, freedom must be respected, but if property is curtailed,

the legislators judgment must be respected.

2. There is no violation of any right to privacy, self-incrimination andunreasonable search and seizure. 3019 (Sec 7) was drafted in order toaddress the rampant corruption in politics. Restriction of liberty is donefor the greater good, and is allowable so long as due process is observed.Public servants are protected in so far as they cannot be removed fromoffice without just cause. RA 3019 is thus not arbitrary exercise of policepower. There is no unconstitutional intrusion to the public servantsprivacy nor an unreasonable search & seizure. The statute is withreference to a determinate provision and a procedure that must befollowed. Invoking the violation of the self-incrimination clause will haveto wait until charges have been filed. Arguing that the statute is an affiantto dignity is likewise untenable. The court can only decide in the legality& not the wisdom of the statutes.



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WHEREFORE, Judgment is affirmed.

14. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INCv. CITY MAYOR

Facts:On July 5, 1963 petitioner filed for a writ of prohibition against respondent,

challenging the Municipal Board of Manila from enacting Ordinance No. 4760.Petitioner alleged that said ordinance was unconstitutional, unreasonable,oppressive, arbitrary, denies rights to privacy and self-incrimination, and void sincethe respondent was without authority to regulate motels (not expressly granted bylaw or the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The petition was granted bythe lower court and the statute declared null and void.

Respondent, in appealing to the Supreme Court, contended that:1. petitioner was without cause of action;2. ordinance had a reasonable relation to a public purpose (curb immorality);3. ordinance a valid exercise of police power;4. only guests/customers can argue for abridgement of right to privacy and

self-incrimination;5. preliminary injunction issued is contrary to law, and the petition should be

dismissed.

Issues:1. WON case at bar has shown that the ordinance is unconstitutional;2. WON ordinance violates due process rights;

3. WONordinance is vague or uncertain.

Held:1. The case at bar has not shown that the ordinance is unconstitutional. The

presumption of a statutes constitutionality is presumed and the burden toprove otherwise rests with the petitioner. The absence of evidence doesnot impair the statutes validity. Police power, being the most essential,insistent and least limitable of powers aims to safeguard public morals,and must be respected until clearly shown to violate constitutional rights.

2. The ordinance did not violate due process. There is no controlling andprecise definition of due process. It is the standard to which governmentalaction must conform in order that life, liberty or property deprivation isvalid. The test of an ordinance is its responsiveness to reason and thedictates of justice. Much wider discretion is afforded to the state in termsof licensing non-useful corporations, and the state generally does notinterfere with such discretion. The fact that some may lose their jobs doesnot curtail police power, which is exercised in the interest of thecommunity. Liberty is not absolute and is regulated by law. When theliberty curtailed by statutes affects property, the permissible scope ofregulatory measure is wide.

3. The ordinance is not vague. The petition seems to indicate that theproblem with the statute is that it is too detailed rather than vague. Itconcerns (such as whether it is the owner or operator who determinesprofits) such as those raised by the petitioner are not enough to invalidatethe ordinance. As Justice Holmes said, there is no canon against usingcommon sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean.

WHEREFORE: Judgment is reversed; order prohibiting statute enforcement isset aside.

15. BUCK v. BELLFacts:

Plaintiff is a feeble minded woman, daughter of a feeble-minded womancommitted to the same institution. She is likewise the mother of a feeble minded,illegitimate child. The petition is to review the decision of SCA Virginia upholdingthe order of salpingectomy issued by the Circuit Court of Amherst City.

Plaintiff alleges that such order, under the act of assembly; isunconstitutional as it violates plaintiffs right to bodily integrity, and is repugnant to

the due process provision of the 14

th

Amendment. In Mann vs. Illinois the Courtruled that the inhibition against deprivation extends to all limbs and facultiesthrough which life is enjoyed, and of what God has given everyone with life. Whilethe statute provides for a hearing before the operation, and may be in a court oflaw in case of appeal, it does not meet the constitutional requirement of dueprocess of law (form of procedure cannot convert process to due process ifconstitutional rights are denied).

The test of due process of law must show that proceedings are legal &preserves liberty of citizens. Furthermore, the statute denies institutionalizedindividuals equal protection of the law as the classification is not enough to justifythe statute. Such classification must be on reasonable grounds considering thelegislative purpose; it cannot be arbitrary. The statutes objective of preventing thereproduction of mentally defective people would give the state legislature, as theyare the ones who determine the standards for mental capacity. Tyranny of medical

professionals & its system of judicature would be established.For its part the defense contends that the statute does not constitute cruel

& unusual punishment, which necessarily involves torture. In State vs. Felin it washeld that the asexualization process is not a cruel punishment. The statute is avalid exercise of police power, as provided for in Sec 159 of the VirginiaConstitution (police power never to be abridged). The states confinement of thefeeble minded precludes their procreation, and is a deprivation of liberty that wasnever questioned. Compulsory vaccinations are similar ways to protect theindividual & society.

Issues:1. WON Virginia statute is a constitutional deprivation of liberty2. WON classification is reasonable

3. WON plaintiff has been denied due process of law



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Held:1. Yes, the Virginia statute is constitutional. The Virginia statute has for its

purpose the protection of individual & and societal health by thesterilization of mental defectives, who may be safely discharged by virtueof sterilization. The plaintiff contends that the statute is patently

unjustifiable. Yet public welfare can call upon some citizens to sacrificetheir lives it is reasonable to call upon those who already burden thestate to make lesser sacrifices. It is better for the world to executedegenerates for crime now, and prevent imbeciles from starving. It is areasonable desire to prevent the manifestly unfit from continuing theirkind. The principle sustaining compulsory vaccination is broad enough tocover salpingectomy. Given the policy, the law has done all that is neededby striving to bring all similarly situated within the scope of the policy.

2. Yes, the classification is reasonable. The statue is based on a reasonableclassification. In Virginia, marriage with feeble minded is prohibited, andconsummation is heavily penalized. In Peterson vs. Widule, the Courtupheld the necessity of requiring males applying for marriage to present a

physicians certificate attesting in their freedom from disease.

3. No. The statutes strict guidelines on the procedure to be followed in thecase at bar illustrates the protection the state affords to the feebleminded. The power of the state superintendent must be preceded by strictcompliance to procedure. In the case at bar, every step taken was inkeeping with the procedural requirements.

WHEREFORE, judgment affirmed.

16. RUTTER v . ESTEBANFacts:

On Aug. 20, 1941 appellant sold to appellee two parcels of land in Manilafor P9,600 ( P4,800 up front, P2,400 on August 7, 1942 and 1943, at 7% interest).A mortgage to secure the first payment was taken in the name of the plaintiff,whereupon a deed of sale in favor of defendant was executed. On August 2, 1949,plaintiff filed a petition before the COFI to recover the unpaid balance and accruedinterest, as well as attorneys fees. There was also a prayer for the sale of theproperties pursuant to law should the plaintiff fail to collect.Defendant contended that he is protected by:

1. Moratorium clause in RA 3422. He is a war sufferer with a claim with the Philippine War Damage

Commission for losses3. The liability was incurred as a pre-war obligation4. Sec 2 of RA 342 suspend the payment of obligations until after 8 years

from the settlement of claims

Defendant argues said period ha not expired, the COFI ruled that theobligations were not yet demandable pursuant to the Moratorium Law. A motion forreconsideration assailing the constitutionality of the moratorium was likewisedismissed.

Issues:1. WON Sec 2 of RA 342 is unconstitutional (impairs the obligations of

contract; prohibited under Sec 1 Art 3)2. WON RA 342 is a valid exercise of police power

Held:1. No, it is constitutional. A moratorium in essence an application of sovereign

power, adopted during the times of national emergency. It is consideredconstitutional as long as the determination of the suspension of remedies isdefinite and reasonable. The policy of protecting contractual obligationspresupposes the maintenance of a government with adequate authority tosecure the peace and order of society, without which contracts areunenforceable in the first place. The statute is constitutional insofar as itprotects national economic interests. The assumption is that all contracts are

subject to the implied reservation of the states protective power.

2. Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. RA 342 is a valid exercise of policepower given the emergency situation and need for action.

Police power is limited by:1. impairment (only remedy, never the substantive right) determinate and

reasonable suspension2. justified by emergency situation, temporary and reasonable conditions

The statute protects war sufferers from debtors, and gives them the opportunity torehabilitate themselves. However, creditors in effect will have to wait for 12 yearsbefore they can collect under RA 342, which is an unreasonable amount of timegiven the local situation of progress due to American aid and local spirit. Thuswhile RA 342 has a reasonable relation to public welfare, the rime of themoratorium is impossible.

Wherefore, Act 342 unreasonable and oppressive, declared null and void. EO 25and 32 are likewise lifted, given it has no limitations and can only be lifted oncedeclared null and void. Decision reversed.

Notes:Sec 2 RA 342All debts and monetary obligations incurred before December 8, 1941 are due anddemandable after 8 years after settlement of war damages claims before thePhilippine War Damage Commission.

Sec 3 RA 342



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If Sec 2 is nullified, provision of EO 25 as amended by EO 32 shall take no effect.The nullification of the Act revives the former moratorium by the President.

17. UNITED STATES v. TORIBIOFacts:

Evidence shows that appellant slaughtered a carabao for humanconsumption without a permit from the municipal treasurer pursuant to sec. 30 and33 of Act 1147, regarding the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.Appellant contends that since there are no municipal slaughter house in Carmen,Bohol, the provision of Act 1147 do not apply, since the wording of the statute limitsthe prohibition and slaughtering in a municipal slaughterhouse. The defendantsprevious application for a permit to slaughter was denied because the animal wasnot found to be unfit for agricultural or draft purposes. He further alleges thatpenalizing those who slaughter animals without a permit is unconstitutional byviolating sec 5 of the Phillippine Bill (due process). The prohibition unjustly limitsdefendants enjoyment of his property.

Issues:1. WON provision of ACT 1147 apply despite an absence of a municipal

slaughterhouse.2. WON Act 1147 is unconstitutional for violating due process rights of

defendant.

Held:

1. Yes, provisions apply. Sec 30 and 33 of Act 1147 must be taken in thecontext of the legislators intent. Given that the purpose of the bill is toprotect large cattle theft and facilitate the return of the cows/cattle toowners, the interpretation of the Act must be consistent with the intent.The court holds that in general, the Act prohibits the slaughter of largecattle anywhere, and in particular, the slaughter of large cattle inmunicipal slaughterhouses (both without permits). When a statuteslanguage is susceptible to 2 or more constructions, interpretation should

be according to the intent of the legislator.

2. No. It is not clear whether the defendant assailed the statue for being (1)unlawful taking of property by right of eminent domain (withoutcompensation) or (2) an undue and unauthorized exercise of policepower.

All property acquired and held under the condition that it is not used toinjure the equal rights of others, or impair public rights. While the statute detractsfrom the enjoyment of property by owners, it does not constitute a taking ofproperty. Act 1147 is not an exercise of the right to eminent domain, but areasonable limitation of the law of rights of property in keeping with the policepower for public welfare. The state can interfere whenever public interests so

demand. A large discretion is vested in the legislative to determine public interests

and the measures necessary for their protection. The justifications of police powerexercise are (1) the interests of the public (versus a specific class) requireinterference and (2) must be through reasonable means, and not oppressive. Thedetermination of proper exercise of police power is subject to the courtssupervision.

Wherefore, Judgment affirmed.

Notes:The statute was drafted after a virus attacked the carabao population.

Lands were not tilled and need to import rice arise. Cattle rustling increased. Thus,exercise of police power is justified. There is a necessity and a right of self-protection.

Act 1147, sec 30: Requirement of approval from the municipal treasurer wheneverlarge cattle are slaughtered.

Sec 31: Permit to slaughter does not extend to animals still fit for agricultural ordraft purposes.

Sec 33: Slaughter must be in municipal slaughterhouses for food or humanconsumption.

18. JM TUASON & CO. vs. LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATIONAction: An Appeal from CFI.Facts:Feb 18, 1970- Court rendered judgment reversing the lower courts decision that

RA 2616 is unconstitutional.March 30, 1970 motion for reconsideration was filed by appellee invoking his

rights to due process & equal protection of lawsMay 27, 1970 detailed opposition to the reconsideration was filed by SG Felix

AntonioJune 15, 1970 - a rejoinder of petition was filed. Petitioner contends that the

expropriation of Tatalon Estate in Quezon City is unconstitutional (byvirtue of its denial of due process for landowners) pursuant to RA 2616sec 4. *the statute prohibits suit for ejectment proceedings & continuanceof proceedings after expropriation proceedings have been initiated.

Issues:1. WON sec4 RA2616 is unconstitutional by virtue of its denial of due

process & equal protection2. WON procedural mistakes invalidate the statute

Held:1. No, the statute is constitutional. The statute is held to be constitutional

given the opportunity and protection it affords to land owners inrecognizing their right to evict subject to expropriation proceedings and just compensation. RA 3453 amended sec4 of RA 2616 in order to



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address this precise problem (sec4 of RA 3453 previously held to beunconstitutional.)

The amendment was drafted in light of Cuatico vs. Court ofAppeals where the landowners right to due process was impaired bytenants invocation of as-yet-to-be instituted expropriation proceedings.

2. The procedural mistakes do not invalidate the statute. Inaccuracies

committed by Congress in determining who owns the land does notinvalidate the statute. Dominical rights cannot be conferred on thoseobviously not entitled to them. Appellees fears are without legal basis.The government will only compensate rightful owners.

Wherefore, Judgment AFFIRMED.

19. US vs. CAUSBYFacts:

Respondents are owners of 2.8-acre farm outside of Greensboro, NorthCarolina. Said property was close to the municipal airport leased by thegovernment. The Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) designated the safe path to

glide to one of the airport runways over the property of appellees. They contendthat the noise and glare from airplaines landing and taking off constituted a takingof property under the FIFTH AMENDMENT. The Court of Claims found the factsof the case to constitute a taking of property and rewarded appellees with $2,000as value of the easement.

Issues:1. WON appellees property was taken as provided for the Fifth Amendment2. WON awarding of damages is reasonable3. WON Court of Claims is with jurisdiction

Held, Ratio:

1. Yes, US Congress enacted the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (as amended

by Civil Aeronautics Act of 1930), which outlines that the US had completeand exclusive national sovereignty in air space. The Act deemednavigable air space as that above the minimum safe altitude of flightprescribed by the CAA. While appellant contend that the flight is wellwithin the minimum safe altitude (take-off and landing), and that there wasno physical invasion or taking of property, the Court ruled that renderinglands unusable for purposes of a chicken farm entitles petitioners tocompensation under the Fifth Amendment, despite the Courtsunfavorable view of the application of the common law doctrine. Themeasure of value is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The path ofglide as defined by the appellant is not within the meaning of minimumsafe altitude of flight in the statute. Land owners are entitled to at least asmuch space above ground as he can occupy in connection with his use ofthe land. The damages sustained were a product of a direct invasion of

respondents domain. It is the character of invasion, and not the amount

of damage resulting, that determines WON property was taken.Furthermore, the definition of property under the Fifth Amendmentcontains a meaning supplied by local law as in the case of NorthCarolina Law.

2. No, the value of the land was not completely destroyed; it can still beused for other purposes. Thus, appellees are only entitled to a lowervalue given the limited utility of the land. However, there is no precise

description of the nature of the easement taken, whether temporary orpermanent. These deficiencies in evidentiary findings are not rectified bya statement of opinion. The finding of facts on every material matter is astatutory requirement. The Court of Claims finding of permanence ismore conjectural than factual; more is needed to determine US liability.Thus, the amount stated as damages is not proper.

3. Yes, the Court of Claims has clear jurisdiction over the matter. Thequestion of WON there has been a taking property is a claim within theconstitutionally-granted jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is reversed. Case remanded to the Court of Claimsfor evidentiary hearing.

Justice Black, dissenting:The Courts opinion seems to be that it is the noise and glare of planes,rather than the flying of the planes themselves, which constitutes taking. Theappellees claims are at best an action in tort (nuisance, statute violation,negligence). The Government cannot be sued in the Court of Claims unless overmatters of implied or express contracts. There is no contract involved in the case atbar.

The concept of taking has been given a sweeping meaning. The oldconcept of land ownership must be made compatible with the new field of airregulation. The damages should not be elevated to the level of the Constitution, asit would be an obstacle to a better-adapted, vital system of national progress.

20. US v. CALTEXFacts:

At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, oil companies hadterminal facilities in Pandacan. The US army restricted the distribution of productsfor civilian use requisitioning most of the supplies for the war effort. On December26, 1941, the order for the demolition of all unused products and terminals wasissued to prevent the approaching enemy from using the supplies.

On December 31, 1941, demolition was completed just as the enemyentered Manila. Following liberation, appellees are demanding compensation forthe property the US Army used and destroyed. While the US Government paid forthe petroleum stocks, transportation equipment used and destroyed, they refusedto compensate appellees for the Pandacan terminals. The appellees concede thatthe US army had the right to destroy such installations, but argue that they areentitled to compensation just the same. Appellees cite Mitchell v. Harmony and US

v. Russel as legal basis for their claim.



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Issue: Whether or not appellees are entitled to compensation for propertiesdemolished for public welfare.

Held: No they are not. The appellees use of Harmony and Russel is untenable.In neither case was the US Army bound by the sole purpose of destroying strategicproperty to prevent the use by the enemy. On the other hand, US v. Pacific R.

Company governs the case at bar. It was held that the losses and injury to privateproperty are borne by the sufferer alone as a consequence of war. The order ofdemolition by the Commander General is justified by war necessities. The safetyof the state takes precedence over personal loss. Common law likewise holdsthat the sovereign is immune from liability when he destroys public property in theinterest of society.

Wherefore, Judgment reversed.

Justice Douglas, dissenting: The Army may have authority to destroy, butthe 5th amendment requires compensation for taking of property. Whenevergovernment appropriates private property for public use, the public purse shouldbear the loss.

21. HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA v. REYESFacts:

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of PD 564 (Revised Charter ofPTA) and proclamation No. 2052 (declaring certain Cebu towns and municipalitiesas tourist zones). They contend that expropriation cannot continue because:

1. To do so would be uconstitutional (no specific constitutional provisions fortourism expropriation, and that expropriation under PP 1533 does notoffer unjust compensation)

2. Land in question is part of the Land Reform Program (jurisdiction underCourt of Agrarian Relations, and tourism concerns cannot be superior toland reform concerns)

3. Expropriation proceedings / Writ of possession issued premature(necessity of taking unestablished)4. Forcible ejectment of tenants criminal under PD 583 (prohibits orders

contrary to the Land Reform Act)Issues:

1. WON expropriation for tourism purposes is unconstitutional.2. WON land meant for land reform can be expropriated for tourism

purposes.3. WON the taking was premature4. WON ejectment of tenants is unconstitutional

Held:1. Expropriation for tourism purposes is constitutional. The taking of the

land for tourism purposes is supported by the constitution. Sec 2 Art4 provides for taking with just compensation. Sec 6 Art 14 empowers

congress to expropriation of private lands with just compensation.

The petitioners view or the states right of eminent domain isrestrictive and based on a misconception of fundamentals. Tourismis a specific term that may not be found in the constitution, which isphrased in general terms of objectives that are archived by varyingprograms. The provisions for agrarian reform do not preclude theexercise of eminent domain for tourism / development projects.

2. Yes, but the issue is moot. Petitioners claim that the certificate of landtransfer and Emancipation Patents issued to them as proof that theland has been expropriated under PD 2 (Agrarian Reform Law), andthus can no longer be expropriated for tourism purposes. Yet thepetitioners failed to show that the land is indeed a land reform area towhich they are entitled. The area to be expropriated is hilly andunproductive, and few of the petitioners have the necessarydocument anyway. Thus, there is no real need to determine thesuperiority of one public interest over another. Even contracts havenever impaired state right to expropriate.

3. No, the taking was not premature. PD 42 as amended by PD 1533empowers the government to take immediate possession of land

provided 10% of the property value has been deposited with theproper agencies. This is supported by Art 8 Sec Par 2 of PC, whichgives Presidential Decrees the character of law. Given the fidelity ofthe PTA in following procedure, the writs of possession issued are notpremature.

4. The ejectment of the tenants is constitutional. Petitioners claim thatPD 583 prohibits the implementation of orders contrary to the LandReform Law. However, the law refers to tenant farmers forcingemancipation rights, and does not apply to the expropriation of thestate. The land in question is not even a tenanted area.

Wherefore, Petition dismissed for lack of merit

Makasiar, dissenting:The rights to land under the Land Reform Law is greater than the states

right to develop land for tourism. But since petitioners are not tenants of the land,petition must be dismissed.

22. PHILIPPINE REALTORS v . SANTOSFacts:

Petitioner is with judgment against defendant in an ejectment suit datedAugust 14, 1959, the land in question being in Sampaloc, Manila and of 20,500square meters. Writs of ejectment and demolition were issued despite appeals ofdefendants. On August 5, 1963 the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) filed for theexpropriation of the land for subdivision and sale to its tenants. Respondent argues

that the condemnation is in keeping with Sec. 2 of RA 1400, since the land was



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formerly part of Hacienda Tuazon and, thus, in keeping with Sec. 4, Art. 13 of thePhilippine Constitution (PC).

Issue: WON land is expropriable under Sec. 4, Art. 13 of PC

Held, Ratio:NO, the condemnation proposed by respondents is inadmissible as

illustrated in RP vs. Manotok Realty. While the government has the right toexpropriate lands/estates relative to small urban lands (5 hectares or so), it doesnot mean that land can be expropriated once more years after it has beenpartitioned. Land cannot be expropriated on the argument that it was once landedestate. Landed estates are determined by area or extension, not the number oftenants.

WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari is granted, COFI order of August 6, 1963 setaside and therein petition dismissed.

23. GUIDO v. RURAL PROGRESSFacts:

Petitioners filed for a Writ of Prohibition to prevent the expropriation of her land inMaypajo, Rizal. Petitioner contends that:1. Respondent is without authority to negotiate for a bank loan used as

partial payment for her property.2. Land in question is in part commercial, making it exempt from Act

359 (expropriation of private lands)3. Expropriation will impair the obligation of contracts4. Value set by lower court is erroneous

Issue: Whether or not the land is expropriable under sec 4 of Art13 of PC.Held: No, the land is not. Various laws support the legitimacy of expropriation of

private lands (Commonwealth Act 539, sec1 provides for expropriation/purchase of private lands & expropriation for subdivision of small lots,sec2 provides for the designation of authority to any agency to carry outexpropriation, and sec4 art13 PC empowers CONGRESS to expropriateprivate lands). Whether or not private lands can be expropriatedregardless of location, area or nature is reflected in the purpose for theConstitutional provision, which is to break up large estates for the benefitof small landowners. The constitution does not seek to undermineproperty rights, and sec 4 art 13 allows only for expropriation for publicbenefit of a few families does not constitute public benefit. There is no lineto determine when public use can be used as basis for expropriation;decisions must be made on a case-to-case basis. Deciding in favor of therespondents may only give rise for more oppressive cases ofexpropriation.

Wherefore, Petition GRANTED

Torres, concurring Art 13 sec4 was not intended to be applicable in allcases. Not judging on the merits of individual cases may give rise tosocialism.

24. REPUBLIC v. JUAN

Facts:On September 28, 1964 the lower court to expropriate appellants land to

be used as La Union Regional argricultural school, with compensation set atP190,000 given pre-expropriation correspondence with appellants. On april 15,1963, the government had taken immediate possession of the land after depositingP90,000 with the provincial treasurer of La Union, defendants had petitioned to liftthe writ of possession, arguing that:

1. value of land higher than the value set by the provincial appraisalcommittee in resolution 13, series of 1962

2. expropriation must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction3. provisional value should be at P300,0004. writ of possession set aside until jurisdiction is determined or provisional

value deposited

The defendant, after the trial court had found in favor of apellee and ordereddeposit of P100,000. appealed for the reconsideration of value and dismissal ofexpropriation, they present the following errors:

1. manner of expropriation objectionable (no valid negotiation prior to takingin violation of EO 132 series of 1937)

2. value of property determined contrary to legal requirements (value far lessthan that determined by provincial agriculturists)

Issues:1. WON defendant was denied due process2. WON value of compensation was just

Held:1. No, the defendant was not denied due process. Negotiations were

evident even before expropriation proceedings began, givencorrespondence with defendants. The appellee is excercising its right ofeminent domain, and EO 132 being an administrative requirement, doesnot impair the exercise of the plaintiffs right. Defendants withdrawal of themoney precludes any objection to the expropriation proceedings.

2. Yes, the value of the compensation was just. The valuation of the lotsmust be fair not only to owners but to taxpayers as well. The value mustreflect only that which owner has been deprived of. The defendants lastvaluation of P500,000 is binding and admissible sec. 22 rule 130 ofRROC, given that there was no indication of a factual error. The price tobe considered is the value of the property at the beginning of theexpropriation, and nor inclusive of the improvements the government has

made since occupation. Given that the defendants invested only P90,000,



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to require taxpayers to pay P616,000 is unjust. Sec. 2 rule 67 RROCprovides that when the landowner himself fixes the price it becomesbinding. The discrepancy between peso values in 1963 and 1979 is notenough reason to increase the land value drastically, since thegovernment will pay interests anyway.

Wherefore, Judgment modified, plaintiff must pay P200,000 with 6% interest.

Teehankee, concurring: Defendants; valuation binding, given that there is nofactual error.

Antonio, dissenting: defendant only referred to a P300,000 provisional valuevaluation not bindng if unjust valuation affected by land residential potentialProvincial Agriculturist appraisal objective and authoritative, just and realisticdevaluation of peso justifies doubling of price of land.

25. COMISSIONER v. BOTELHO SHIPPING CORP.Facts:

Appellants (Govt) seek to reverse the judgment of the court of Tax Appeals

holding respondents exempt from compensating taxes on vessels M/S MariaRosello and M/S General Lim. The reparation committee of the Philippines hadsold the ships to respondents on Aug 30, 1960 and Sept. 19, 1960 under RA 1789.Respondents were denied due process for the vessels registration until thecompensating tax was paid. While their case was pending before the lower court,RA 3079 amended RA 1789 insofar as the following provisions are relevant:

1. buyers of reparation goods no longer required to pay compensation tax2. Sec 20 of RA 3079 provided for the renovation of previous contracts to

avail of the amendatory acts benefits on the condition that the end usersvoluntarily assumes all new obligations. Respondents applied for andwere granted renovation, whereupon they filed a petition for review beforethe Tax Court, which ruled in their favor.

Appellants contend that the court erred in finding for respondents because:1. no clear intent of retroactivity is seen in RA 30792. Congress could not have intended retroactivity as it would be prejudicial

to the government3. benefits alluded to in Sec 20 of Ra 3079 does not include tax exemptions

Issue: Whether or not retroactivity was intended by Congress in RA 3079

Held: Yes. The appellants contentions are untenable. Tax exemptions, by nature,are prejudicial to the government as it is a waiver of a right to collect what would bedue to the govt. The tax exemption, which is given for a public benefit greater thanmonetary loss, is clear and explicit in RA 3079. The statute is with a valuableconsideration for the retroactivity: the voluntary assumption of all new obligationsunder the act. Sec 14 of the law on reparations exempt not particular persons but

members of a particular class. There is no constitutional prohibition against

granting tax exemptions to specific people anyway so long as a denial of equalprotection does not arise through unreasonable discrimination. Moreover, RA 3079does not explicitly declare the exemption of parties to contracts prior theamendment because those parties still have to apply for renovation of theircontracts. Sec 20 of RA 3079 does not seek to discriminate but to abolishdiscrimination (Phil Ace Lines Inc. vs Commission on Internal Revenue)

Wherefore, Judgment affirmed.

26. LUTZ v. ARANETAFacts:Appellant contests the legality of the taxes imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 567(Sugar Adjustment Act) alleging that the tax is unconstitutional as it is only for thebenefit of the sugar industry and not the public. Appellant seeks to recover P14,666.40 in taxes.

Issue: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 567 is unconstitutional on thegrounds that no benefit directly accrue to the public.

Held: No, the appellants assumption that CA No. 567 is a pure exercise of taxingpower is untenable. Sec 6 of CA No. 567 indicates that the tax is for a regulatorypurpose and to rehabilitate and stabilize the threatened sugar industry. Theprotection and advancement of sugar industry affects the public welfare greatly asthe industry is the biggest contributor to GDP. The authority of the legislature toenact laws for the promotion of the industry is subject only to the test ofreasonableness. As such, taxation can be made the implement of the Statespolice power. It is inherent in the power to tax that the state be free to select thesubjects of taxation. The inequalities that may arise from the choice of who to taxor to exempt are not unconstitutional. Even if other industries may be in likedanger, the protection of the sugar industry is not wrong.Wherefore, Judgment affirmed.

Notes on CA No. 567 (introduction):1. Sec 1- state of emergency due to the Tydings-McDuffie Act, and theimposition of export taxes and corresponding loss of preferential positionin US markets. There is a need to stabilize the industry.

2. Sec 2- an increase in the tax of sugar manufacturers on a graduatedbasis.

3. Sec 3- owners/controllers of sugar land ceded to sugar manufacturers topay taxes equal to the difference between rent and 12% of the land tax.

4. Sec 6- all tax collections for the Sugar Adjustment & Stabilization fund isto be used for achieving the objectives set by law.

CA 567 Objectives1. to place sugar industry in a competitive position despite increasing

competition



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2. readjust industry benefits for all involved to encourage continuedprofitable engagement

3. limit sugar production to more economically suitable areas4. afford improved living wage to laborers subject to certain conditions,

purposes, and through particular means

27. REPUBLIC v. BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING COFacts:

Appellants are sister companies under one controlling management. Thelower court found them liable for special assessments under Sec. 15 of RA 632(Charter of Philippine Sugar Institute or Philsugin). Appellants contend that theyare exempt/ not liable for said tax given Philsugins unlawful acquisition anddisastrous management of Insular Sugar Refinery. They allege that:

1. RA 632 does not authorize the purchase of sugar mills.2. There is only an obligation to pay the special tax as long as

benefits accrue to the taxpayers, since RA 632 is not an act forrevenue generation.

The lower court decided in favor of the plaintiff because:1. Sec 3 of RA 632 authorizes Philsugin to acquire sugar refineries.

2. Claim of fund misappropriation and lack of benefits to appellantsuntenable; Philsugin board is composed of membersrecommended by National Federation of Sugar Cane Plantersand Philippine Sugar Association, of which appellants aremembers.

3. All financial transactions by Philsugin audited by a variety ofagencies.

4. Wrongness of petition: anyone can then refuse to pay taxes if hesuspects fund misappropriation.

To which the appellants rejoined:1. Safeguards do not ensure legality of actions2. Philsugin without authority to acquire sugar refineries given the

difference between central experiment stations and sugar

refineries (Collector vs. Ledesma, Commonwealth Act No. 470)3. Refusal to pay under RA 632 is a refusal to pay a special tax.Refusal to pay ordinary tax would impede government functions.

4. Norwood vs. Baer indicates the imposition of special benefitswithout accruing benefits as a denial of due process.

Issues:1. WON Philsugin is authorized to acquire sugar refineries under RA 6322. WON special assessments are justified by benefits accruing to

taxpayers.

Held:1. YES. The acquisition of a sugar refinery is authorized by Sec 2 (A) of

RA 632, which provides for the conduction of research work for the

improvement of the sugar industry in all its phases. Even if the operation

of the facility resulted in a loss, the experience is still a gain to the entireindustry. Sec 2 (A) of RA 632 and its objectives can only be achievedthrough the actual operation of a refinery.

2. No. There is no need for benefits to accrue to the taxpayer in thecollection of special assessments. Lutz vs. Araneta illustrated that theprotection of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern. Legislature

is with power to do what is necessary for the industrys protection andpromotion, subject to the test of reasonableness. The exercise of specialtaxation is thus an exercise of sovereign power no private citizen canlawfully resist, because of another sovereign power, which is policepower.

Wherefore, judgment affirmed.

NOTES ON RA 632Sec 2. Objectives of Philsugin:

a. Conduct research for the sugar industry in all its phases(agricultural/industrial) to reduce cost and improve efficiencyb. improve methods of sugar cane raising and sugar manufacture

c. ensure stable permanent and sufficient production of sugar for localand international consumptiond. maintain balance between production and consumption, and stabilizeprices with a reasonable profite. improve sugar merchandising in markets to ensure economic securityf. improve living and economic situation of sugar laborers by correctinginequalities.

Sec 15. Ways to achieve objectivesCapitalization annual sugar production tax of 10 centavos per picul of sugar fro 5years from 1951-1952 for funds for Act implementation; borne by sugarcaneplanters/centrals in proportion of milling share.

Sec 16. Special FundLevy for the Sugar Research and Stabilization Fund for Philsugin

Sec 3. Powers of Philsugina. acquire/establish/operate central experiment stations to research onsugar cane culture and manufacture, related subjectsb. purchase equipment for experimentc. expand local and foreign marketd. buy/own/manage materials for production of sugar-related subjectse. enter into or make contracts to attain purposesf. grant loans to laborersg. do all such things to attain objectivesh. execute all corporation powers under the corporation law.



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28. KILOSBAYAN v. GUINGONAFacts:

Petitioners filed a case for the prohibition / injunction with a prayer for aTRO & preliminary injunction against the implementation of the Contract of Leasebetween PCSO & PGMC in connection to an online lotto system. Petitioners aresuing in their capacity as members of Congress and as taxpayers. OnDECEMBER 17, 1993 the Contract of Lease was executed and approved by thepresident on DECEMBER 20, 1993. Petitioner claims that the respondents & theOFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT gravely abused their discretion tantamount to a lackof authority by entering into the contract, because:

1. Section 1 of RA 1169 (PCSO Charter) prohibits the PCSO fromconducting lotteries in cooperation with any entity

2. RA 3846 & jurisprudence require Congresional franchise before a telecomsystem (public utility) can be established

3. Article 12 of Section 11 of the Constitution prohibits companies with lessthan 60% Filipino Ownership from operating a public system

4. PGMG is not authorized by its charter or by RA 7042 (Foreign InvestmentAct) to install an online Lotto system

a. The contract shows that PGMC is the actual operatior while it isa 75% foreign-owned company. RA 7042 puts all forms of

gambling on the negative list

Respondents answered the allegations by contending:1. PGMC is only an independent contractor. There is no shared franchise2. PCSO will not a operate a public system as a telecom system is an

indispensable requirement of an online lottery system. Petitionerinterpretation of Section 1 of RA 1169 too narrow.

3. There are no violations of laws4. The issue of morality is a political one and should not be resolved in a

legal forum5. Petitioners are without legal standing, as illustrated in Valmonte vs. PCSO

a. The PCSO is a corporate entity and can enter into all kinds ofcontracts to achieve objectives. Arguing that PCSO will operate

a public utility, it is still exempted under Section of Act 3846,where legislative franchisees are not necessary for radio stations

Issues:1. Whether or not petitioners have standing2. Whether or not the contract is legal under Section 1 of RA 1169

Held:1. Yes, petitioners have standing. Standing is only a procedural technicality

that can be set aside depending on the importance of an issue. Astaxpayers and citizens to be affected by the reach of the lotto system,petitioners have standing.

2. No, the contract is illegal. The Court rules in the negative arguing that

whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld. PCSO cannot share

the franchise in any way. The contracts nature can be understood to formthe intent of the parties as evident in the provisions of the contract. Article1371 of the CC provides that the intent of contracting parties aredetermined in part through their acts. The only contribution PCSO will begiving is the authority to operate. All risks are to be taken by the lessor;operation will be taken by the PCSO only after 8 years. Further proof are:

a. Payment of investment acts in the even of contract suspension /

breachb. Rent not fixed at 4.9% and can be reduced given that all risks

are borne by the lessorc. Prohibition against PGMC involvement in competitor games;

strange if gaming is PGMC; businessd. Public stock requirement of 25% in 2 years, which is

unreasonable for a lease contract. It indicates that PGMC is theoperator and the condition an attempt to increase public benefitthrough public involvement.

e. Escrow deposit may be used as performance bond.f. PGMC operation evident in personnel management, procedural

and coordinating rules set by the lessor.g. PCSO authority to terminate contact upon PGMC insolvency

The contract indicates that PCSO is the actual lessor of the authority tooperate given the indivisible community between them.

Wherefore, Petition granted. Contract invalid and TRO made permanent

Cruz, Concurring:The respondent was not able to prove the allegations that the contract

was intentionally crafted to appear to be a lease. PCSO cannot operate without thecollaboration of PGMC. The rental fee underscores the PGMC interest in thesuccess of the venture, since their income depends on the degree of success. Thetransaction is immoral insofar as the activity is fixed by the foreigners on us withgovernment approval.

Feliciano concurring:Locus standi reflects an important constitutional principle: the separation

of powers. The rules is that those assailing statute must show the adverse effect ofits implementation has on them. But it is not a rigid rule. It is not enough that thecourt invoke public mistrust or national concern in brushing aside the requirement,as it would mean standing is dependent on a majority and is far from beingintellectually satisfying. While no principle has been set for determining standing,the guidelines are:

1. character of funds involved (is it public in nature? in this case, thefunds are from the general populace); taxpayer with right to see taxesused properly.

2. clear disregard of a law prohibiting certain actions of a public agency the judicial conclusion on case merits interact with the notion of locus

standi



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3. lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest. In this case, noother government agency filed suit.

4. wide impact or implementation; in this case, nationwide.

Padilla, concurring:Gambling is immoral. Petitioner must show a clear, personal or legal right

violated by the assailed law, but the requirement must be relaxed in the face of

paramount national interest. The PCSO-PGMC contract is clearly a joint venture aseach party contributes its share in the enterprise or project PCSO contributes themarket.

Melo, dissenting:The petition must be dismissed for lack of standing. Petitioners are

without a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy; to invoke publicinterest is too broad and indeterminate. Their capacity as taxpayers does not givethem standing; a taxpayer suit can arise only w\hen public funds derived fromtaxation are improperly disbursed. PCSO is not a revenue-collecting fund and assuch no public funds are involved. The funds in question are corporate in natureand will not fo into the National Treasury. If the petition is entertained, it may giverise to nuisance suits.

Puno, dissenting:The requirement of standing to sue inheres from the definition of judicial

power. It is not merely a technical rule. Section 1, Article 8 of Consti outlines therequirements to be satisfied / complied with before coming to court:

a) actual case / controversyb) question of constitutionality raised by the proper party with actual or

potential injuryc) question raised ASAPd) judicial decision on question raised necessarily to determine the case.

Even a relaxation of the requirement of standing does not mean all casesshould be heard. Petitioner has no standing because:a) not part of the contract

b) petitioners are not personally injured; they wont even playc) no ordinary tax is involved or tax money used, given that PGMC assumes

all riskd) an action on behalf of other parties must exhibit personal injury and a

need to prevent the erosion of a third party right

The invocation of constitutional rights and the allegation of vioalation areuntenable. Section 1 Article 13(enhance right to dignity and equalitythrough property regulation) is a mere policy direction for the legislative,reminding them to prioritize certain concerns. Section 11, Aticle 12 (60%Filipino ownership) violations cannot be determined by the Court asPGMC has not been proven to be foreign-owned or controlled. Therulings in DE GUIA VS. COMELEC the Court treated standing as a

procedural rule when in fact it is a constitutional requirement under Sec 1,

Art. 8. In FLAST VS. COHEN standing was shown to focus on the partyand not the issue. Standing cannot be granted simply because otherscannot come to court. The taxpayer suit is without legal basis as thePCSO is a quasi-public corporation where taxpayer derivative suitscannot be recognized. The majority struck down the contract on the basisof a statute, but invoked National Importance for overlooking standing.There are no Constitutionally-based arguments. Power unused would be

better than power misused. Petition denied.

Vitug, Separate Opinion:Tax Payer suits are recognized only insofar as public funds from taxation

are misused. Locus standi is not merely a procedural rule but the essence of jurisdiction. The petition strikes at factual issues and requires evidence. Thepetitioners claim that lottery being a game of chance is a crime against morals inthe REVISED PENAL CODE is misplaced. The Court has not power to ignore legalmandates. RA 1169 Section 1 authorizes PCSO to conduct lotteries. Petitiondismissed.

Kapunan, dissenting:There is a need to comply with standards before petition can be

recognized. The judiciary has power to decide on cases only when litigants withreal interests at stake file complaints in accordance with law. The funds inquestions are generated from sources other than taxation / public funds. The Courtmust respect the other branches of government; national interest is not enoughreason to encroach on their powers. The judicial power is to check, not to supplantthose powers of elected representatives. There is no constitutional issue involved;the question of the contracts validity should have been brough before the lowercourts. Petition denied.

29. PHILCONSA v. ENRIQUEZ

30. AVELINO v. CUENCO

31. UNTAL v. CHIEF OF STAFFAction: Resolution on motion for reconsiderationFacts:

Petitioner is a first class private of the 212 th Military Police Company ofAFP, stationed in Manicani, Guiuan, Samar, which was stationed for the solepurpose of guarding surplus supplies in the area.

On November 4, 1947, petitioner killed Sgt. Francisco Estrada with a rifleand charged with a violation of 93rd Article of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408).Petitioner pleaded not guilty, contending that the offense occurred in time of peace,and thus the General Court Martial is without jurisdiction. The defense alleges that

WW II was terminated by the Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945 in Tokyo



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Bay, reinstating the judicial branch. Thus, petitioner is not triable not only under theoriginal 94th Article of War, but also under the amended one, as well as the 93 rd

Article of War.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is triable under Articles of War.

Held: Yes, he is. Petitioner is triable under the Articles of War given that the treaty

of peace had not been signed and officially announced US Jurisprudence indicatethat a state of war ceases only upon the declaration or signing of a treaty of peace.Raquiza v. Bradford illustrates how detainment of POWs is constitutional even afterhostilities have ended, if peace has not been

4664386 consti supremacypows of state judicial reviewpop sovereign

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