2020 me 103 sloboda · [¶4] sloboda contends that the trial court lacked subject matter...
TRANSCRIPT
MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2020ME103Docket: Yor-19-280Argued: May11,2020Decided: August11,2020Panel: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HUMPHREY,HORTON,andCONNORS,JJ.,andHJELM,A.R.J.Majority: MEAD,GORMAN,andHUMPHREY,JJ.,andHJELM,A.R.J.Dissent: HORTON,JABAR,andCONNORS,JJ.
STATEOFMAINEv.
EMANUELJ.SLOBODAGORMAN,J.
[¶1] Emanuel J. Sloboda appeals from a judgment of conviction for
violating a condition of release (Class C), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(B) (2020),
enteredby the trialcourt (YorkCounty,Douglas, J.)aftera jury-waived trial.
Sloboda contends that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his
prosecutionbecausetheviolationat issueoccurred inNewHampshire.1 We
agree,vacatetheconviction,andremandfordismissaloftheindictment.
1BriefsofamicicuriaeweresubmittedbytheOfficeoftheMaineAttorneyGeneral;AEquitas;and
LawrenceC.Winger,Esq.
2
I.BACKGROUND
[¶2] In2019,Slobodawasindictedforviolatingaconditionofrelease
(ClassC), 15M.R.S. §1092(1)(B), towhichhepleadednot guilty.2 Duringa
one-day jury-waived trial on the indictment, Sloboda challenged the court’s
subjectmatterjurisdictionbasedonthefactthathisallegedviolationoccurred
outside Maine, in New Hampshire. Among its findings and conclusions
renderedattheendofthetrial,thecourtdeterminedthatithadjurisdiction.
[¶3] The court also found, based on competent record evidence, that
Slobodawasonpreconvictionbail,aconditionofwhichwasthathehaveno
directorindirectcontactwithaparticularindividual,when,onNovember25,
2018,heviolatedthatconditionbyhavingcontactwiththatindividualatastore
inRochester,NewHampshire.Basedonthesefacts,thecourtfoundSloboda
2Slobodawasalsochargedwithaggravatedassault(ClassA),17-AM.R.S.§§208(1)(C),1252(4-A)
(2018); domestic violence assault (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) (2020); 17-AM.R.S.§1252(4-A); and two additional counts of violating a condition of release (Class C), 15 M.R.S.§1092(1)(B)(2020).Section208hassincebeenamended,P.L.2019,ch.91,§1(effectiveSept.19,2019),andsection1252hassincebeenrepealedandreplaced,P.L.2019,ch.113,§A-1(emergency,effectiveMay16,2019)(codifiedat17-AM.R.S.§1604(2020)),butthesesubsequentenactmentsdonotaffectthisappeal.TheStatedismissedthechargesofaggravatedassault,domesticassault,andonecountofviolating
aconditionofrelease.Slobodawasfoundnotguiltyoftheotherchargeofviolatingaconditionofrelease.Noneofthesechargesisatissueinthepresentappeal.
3
guiltyoftheoffenseandsentencedhimtoservesixmonthsin jail.3 Sloboda
timelyappeals.See15M.R.S.§2115(2020);M.R.App.P.2B(b)(1).
II.DISCUSSION
[¶4] Sloboda contends that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdictionbecausethecourtfoundthatheviolatedtheconditionofreleasein
NewHampshire.Wereviewdenovothetrialcourt’ssubjectmatterjurisdiction
by interpreting thecriminal jurisdictionstatute,17-AM.R.S.§7 (2020). See
Statev.McLaughlin,2018ME97,¶9,189A.3d262;Statev.St.Onge,2011ME
73, ¶ 13, 21 A.3d 1028; see also M.R.U. Crim. P. 12(b)(2); State v. Liberty,
2004ME 88, ¶ 7, 853A.2d 760 (stating that the issue of the trial court’s
jurisdictionmayberaisedatanytimeduringthependencyoftheproceeding).
Wefirstinterprettheprovisioninaccordancewithitsunambiguousmeaning
basedontheplainlanguageofthestatute.SeeMcLaughlin,2018ME97,¶9,
189A.3d262.
[¶5] A trialcourt’s “[t]erritorial”criminal jurisdiction is limited to the
sevenbasesforwhich17-AM.R.S.§7(1)provides:
1.Exceptasotherwiseprovidedinthissection,apersonmaybeconvictedunderthelawsofthisStateforanycrimecommitted
3 The judgment and commitment incorrectly reflects that the findingswere reached by jury
verdictratherthanbythecourt’sdetermination,thatSlobodapleadedguiltytothecharge,andthatSlobodawasconvictedofasecondcountofviolatingaconditionofrelease.
4
bytheperson’sownconductorbytheconductofanotherforwhichthepersonislegallyaccountableonlyif:
A.EithertheconductthatisanelementofthecrimeortheresultthatissuchanelementoccurswithinthisStateorhasaterritorialrelationshiptothisState;B. Conduct occurring outside this State constitutes anattempttocommitacrimeunderthelawsofthisStateandtheintentisthatthecrimetakeplacewithinthisState;C. Conduct occurring outside this Statewould constitute acriminalconspiracyunderthelawsofthisState,anovertactinfurtheranceoftheconspiracyoccurswithinthisStateorhasaterritorialrelationshiptothisState,andtheobjectoftheconspiracyisthatacrimetakeplacewithinthisState;D.ConductoccurringwithinthisStateorhavingaterritorialrelationshiptothisStatewouldconstitutecomplicityinthecommissionof, or anattempt, solicitationor conspiracy tocommitanoffenseinanotherjurisdictionthatisalsoacrimeunderthelawofthisState;E. The crime consists of the omission to perform a dutyimposedonapersonbythelawofthisState,regardlessofwherethatpersoniswhentheomissionoccurs;F.ThecrimeisbasedonastatuteofthisStatethatexpresslyprohibitsconductoutsidetheState,whenthepersonknowsorshouldknowthattheperson’sconductaffectsaninterestoftheStateprotectedbythatstatute;orG.Jurisdictionisotherwiseprovidedbylaw.
SeeGinnv.PenobscotCo.,342A.2d270,274(Me.1975)(“Thecourtiscreated
bystatute,andhasthatjurisdictiononlywhichthestatutehasconferredupon
5
it,andthatisalimitedjurisdiction.Ithasnootherauthority.”(quotationmarks
omitted));Statev.Baldwin,305A.2d555,559(Me.1973)(“Itiselementarylaw
thatthestatutesofastatehavenoextra-territorialforce,nordoitscourtshave
any jurisdiction of offenses committed in other states or foreign countries.”
(quotationmarksomitted)).
[¶6]Viewedmostsimply,section7(1)(A)setsoutfouralternativesby
whichaMainecourthassubjectmatterjurisdictioninacriminalmatter:when
(1) conduct that is an element of the crime has a territorial relationship to
Maine,(2)theresultthatisanelementofthecrimehasaterritorialrelationship
toMaine, (3) conduct that is an element of the crime occurred inMaine, or
(4)theresultthatisanelementofthecrimeoccurredinMaine.Thecourtfound
jurisdiction in this matter based specifically on one of the territorial
relationshipalternatives;itdeterminedthatMainehadasufficientnexustothe
crime because the relevant bail condition that Slobodawas alleged to have
violatedwasissuedinMaineastoanunderlyingcrimecommittedinMaine.As
17-AM.R.S. §7(4)states,however, territorial relationship jurisdictionexists
onlywhenitisimpossibletodeterminewheretheconductoccurredinrelation
tothestateboundaryline:
4. Conductor a resulthas a territorial relationship to thisStateifitisnotpossibletodeterminebeyondareasonabledoubt
6
thatitoccurredinsideoroutsideofthisState,becauseaboundarycannotbepreciselylocatedorthelocationofanypersoncannotbeprecisely established in relation to a boundary, and if the courtdeterminesthatthisStatehasasubstantialinterestinprohibitingthe conduct or result. In determining whether this State has asubstantialinterest,thecourtshallconsiderthefollowingfactors:
A.TherelationshiptothisStateoftheactororactorsandofpersons affected by the conduct or result, whether ascitizens,residentsorvisitors;B.Thelocationoftheactororactorsandpersonsaffectedbytheconductorresultpriortoandaftertheconductorresult;C. The place in which other crimes, if any, in the samecriminalepisodewerecommitted;andD. The place inwhich the intent to commit the crimewasformed.
Because,basedon thecourt’ssupported findings, it ispossible todetermine
precisely where Sloboda’s conduct occurred, the territorial relationship of
Sloboda’scrimetoMaineprovidesnobasisforjurisdiction.SeeStatev.Collin,
1997 ME 6, ¶ 10, 687 A.2d 962 (vacating the trial court’s employment of
territorial relationship jurisdiction because therewas no “reasonable doubt
aboutthelocationofaboundaryorthelocationofapersoninrelationtothe
boundary”andnotingthat“[t]hestate’ssubstantialinterestinprohibitingthe
conduct is not sufficient by itself to support a finding of a territorial
7
relationship”).Thecourt’srelianceonterritorialrelationshipjurisdictionwas
thereforeerror.
[¶7] The State argues that, despite this error, we should affirm the
convictionbecausethecourthadjurisdictionpursuanttooneoftheothertwo
alternativesinsection7(1)(A)basedonwheretheconductorresultelement
occurred.Wethereforeconsiderwhatconstitutesaconductelementoraresult
element.
[¶8]Title17-AM.R.S.§32(2020)organizestheelementsofacrimeinto
fourcategories:“theforbiddenconduct;theattendantcircumstancesspecified
in the definition of the crime; the intention, knowledge, recklessness or
negligence as may be required; and any required result.”4 A state-of-mind
element is statutorily definedwith reference to themental processes of the
defendant—i.e.,thedefendant’sawarenessofariskorwhetherthedefendant
hasa “consciousobject.” 17-AM.R.S. §35(2020)(defining“[i]ntentionally,”
“[k]nowingly,” “[r]ecklessly,” and “[c]riminal negligence”). This is
distinguishedfromthe“conduct”categoryofelements,whichistheonlyone
among the four in section 32 that could reasonably be read to refer to the
defendant’sphysicalactions. SeeModelPenalCode§1.13(5)(Am.LawInst.
4Wewillusethephrase“state-of-mind”todiscussthethirdelement.
8
1962)(defining“conduct”as“anactionoromissionanditsaccompanyingstate
ofmind, or, where relevant, a series of acts and omissions”); Conduct, New
OxfordAmericanDictionary(3ded.2010)(statingthat“conduct”means“the
mannerinwhichapersonbehaves”);seealsoStatev.Lindell,2020ME49,¶19,
---A.3d---(concludingthat“thejurywasentitledtointerpret[‘conduct’]within
itscommonmeaning”);Statev.Gladu,2014ME23,¶9,86A.3d1182(stating
that,“asageneralrule,wordsandphrasesthatarenotexpresslydefinedina
statutemustbegiventheirplainandnaturalmeaningandshouldbeconstrued
accordingtotheirnaturalimportincommonandapprovedusage,”including
accordingtodictionarydefinitions(quotationmarksomitted)).
[¶9]Attendantcircumstanceselementsrefertofactorssuchasthestatus
ofadefendant,theageorotherattributesofthevictim,ortheexistenceofprior
convictionsthatincreasetheclassofacrime.SeeStatev.Sumulikoski,110A.3d
856, 858, 862-64 (N.J. 2015) (holding that the fact that the defendant had
assumed responsibility for the victims as chaperone for a school trip
constituted an attendant circumstance rather than conduct, and defining
“status” as “a person’s legal condition, whether personal or proprietary; the
sumtotalofaperson’slegalrights,duties,liabilities,andotherlegalrelations”
(alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted)); Attendant, New Oxford
9
American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010) (“occurring with or as a result of;
accompanying”);Circumstance,NewOxfordAmericanDictionary(3ded.2010)
(“afactorconditionconnectedwithorrelevanttoaneventoraction”).
[¶10]Astotheresultelement,17-AM.R.S.§33(2020)provides,“Unless
otherwiseprovided,whencausingaresultisanelementofacrime,causation
maybefoundwhentheresultwouldnothaveoccurredbutfortheconductof
the defendant, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause.”
Thus,aresultelementisonethatrequiresthedefendanttohavecausedsome
specifiedharmorotheroutcome.SeeResult,NewOxfordAmericanDictionary
(3ded.2010)(“aconsequence,effect,oroutcomeofsomething”).
[¶11] Interpreting section7(1)(A) against thebackdropof section32
reveals that not all elements of a crime are relevant to jurisdiction. Only
conductelementsandresultelementsaffectsubjectmatterjurisdiction;ifonly
an attendant circumstances element or a state-of-mind element occurs in
Maine,Mainehasnojurisdictionpursuanttosection7(1)(A).Forexample,ifa
defendantwithaMainefelonyconvictionthenobtainedpossessionofafirearm
in New Hampshire, Maine would not have jurisdiction over the crime
committedby the defendantbecauseonly thedefendant’sunderlying felony
status—theattendantcircumstance—occurredinMaine.
10
[¶12]Inordertodeterminewhichelementsofthecrimeofviolatinga
conditionofreleaseshouldbeconsideredindeterminingMaine’sjurisdiction,
wedetermineinwhichcategory—conduct,result,state-of-mind,andattendant
circumstances—those elements belong. Violation of a condition of release
requiresproofthatthedefendantisonpreconvictionorpostconvictionbailat
the time that he or she “in fact, violates a condition of release.” 15 M.R.S.
§1092(1)(2020);seeStatev.LeBlanc-Simpson,2018ME109,¶17,190A.3d
1015.ItisaClassCcrimewhentheunderlyingchargeonwhichthedefendant
wasbailedwas“punishablebyamaximumperiodofimprisonmentofoneyear
ormoreandtheconditionofreleaseviolatedisonespecifiedinsection1026,
subsection3,paragraphA, subparagraph(5), (8), (10-A)or (13).” 15M.R.S.
§1092(1)(B). Violation of a condition of release is a strict liability crime,
15M.R.S.§1092(3),meaningnoproofofaculpablestateofmindisrequired,
but theStatemust establish that thedefendant “hadprior knowledgeof the
relevantconditionsofrelease.”LeBlanc-Simpson,2018ME109,¶18,190A.3d
1015.
[¶13]Asdiscussedabove,theStatechargedSlobodawithaviolationof
aconditionofreleasebasedonitsallegationsthat(1)Slobodawassubjectto
preconvictionbailonNovember25,2018,thatrequiredhimtohavenocontact
11
with certain individuals; (2) the underlying bail was for a burglary charge
(ClassB),17-AM.R.S.§401(1)(B)(4)(2020),punishablebyuptotenyearsin
prison, see17-AM.R.S. § 1252(2)(B) (2018); and (3)heviolated thebail by
havingcontactwithoneoftheprohibitedindividuals.Twooftheseelements—
that Slobodawas subject to apreconvictionbail conditiononNovember25,
2018,thatrequiredhimtohavenocontactwithaparticularindividual,andthat
theunderlyingchargeonwhichhewasbailedwasforburglary,punishableby
up to ten years in prison—constitute attendant circumstances elements
pursuanttosection32.15M.R.S.§1092(1)(B).TherequirementthatSloboda
hadpriorknowledgethathewassubjecttothatconditionofreleaseiseithera
state-of-mindelementoranattendantcircumstanceselement,butweneednot
determinewhichbecausethefactthathisknowledgeoftheconditionmayhave
occurredinMaineisirrelevanttoajurisdictionanalysispursuanttotheplain
languageofsection7(1)(A).See17-AM.R.S.§32.
[¶14]TheconductelementinSloboda’scrimeistheactofhavingcontact
withthevictim,andthecourtfound,basedoncompetentrecordevidence,that
suchconductoccurredonlyinNewHampshire.Thus,thelocationofSloboda’s
conductisnobasisforthecourt’sjurisdictioninMaine.
12
[¶15]Theonlyremainingsourceofjurisdiction—andthealternativeto
which theparties dedicate their arguments—is if the crimeof violationof a
conditionofreleaserequiresproofofaresultelementandthatresultoccurred
inMaine.517-AM.R.S.§7(1)(A).
[¶16]TheStatecontendsthataresultelementexistsintherequirement
thatSloboda’scontactwiththevictim“infact,violatesaconditionofrelease,”
inMaine.Thatis,theStatearguesthatalthoughthedefendant’sconductwas
thecontactwiththevictiminNewHampshire,theresultwasabailviolationin
MainebecauseSlobodawasnotsubjecttoabailorderinNewHampshireand
5 Section7containsadditionallimitationsapplicabletojurisdictionbasedonthelocationofa
resultthatisanelement:
2.Subsection1,paragraphAdoesnotapplyif:A.Causingaparticularresultordangerofcausingthatresultisanelementandtheresultoccursorisdesignedorlikelytooccuronlyinanotherjurisdictionwheretheconductchargedwouldnotconstituteanoffense;orB.CausingaparticularresultisanelementofthecrimeandtheresultiscausedbyconductoccurringoutsidetheStatewhichwouldnotconstituteanoffenseiftheresulthadoccurredthere.
17-AM.R.S.§7(2)(2020).Bytheseexclusions,Mainehasnojurisdictionifabailviolation“wouldnotconstituteanoffense”inNewHampshire. 17-AM.R.S.§7(2)(A)-(B). Theseexclusionsdonotapply in the instant matter because violating a bail condition is an offense in New Hampshire.AlthoughitisnotacrimepursuanttoNewHampshirestatute,theNewHampshireSupremeCourthasheldthatviolatingabailconditionconstitutescriminalcontempt,whichisacommonlawcrimepunishableby finesor imprisonment. Statev.Smith,35A.3d646,649-50(N.H.2011)(“WehaveexpresslyrejectedtheargumentthatcontemptisnotacrimesimplybecauseitisnotdefinedintheCriminalCode.”);Statev.Nott,821A.2d976,978(N.H.2003)(holdingthat“violationofabailorder”constitutes“criminalcontempt”);Statev.Martina,600A.2d132,137-38(N.H.1991)(requiringthattheStatemustprovecriminalcontemptbeyondareasonabledoubtandnotingthat theresulting“impositionofafineorimprisonmentispunitiveratherthanremedial”(quotationmarksomitted)).
13
itwasMaine’sbailorderthatSloboda“infact,violate[d]”byhavingcontactwith
the victim. 15M.R.S. §1092(1). Contrary to the State’s assertion, however,
section1092(1)(B)hasnoresultelement.Aswehavealreadyconcluded,the
fact that the defendantwas on preconviction or postconviction bail is not a
result element. It is instead an attendant circumstance element. Thus, the
State’s argument fails because jurisdiction cannot be conveyed pursuant to
section 7(1)(A) based on the locus of an attendant circumstance. See
Sumulikoski,110A.3dat862(“[A]defendant’sstatusalonedoesnotprovidea
basisforjurisdiction.”).
[¶17]Althoughtherearemyriadcriminalstatutesthatexpresslyrequire
proofofaparticularharmorresultcausedbythedefendant,6theplainlanguage
ofsection1092(1)(B)doesnotrequireanyparticularharm.Therequirement
in section 1092(1)(B) that Sloboda “in fact, violates a condition of release”
refersboth to theconduct element,which, it isundisputed,occurred inNew
6 See,e.g.,17-AM.R.S.§201(1)(A)(2020)(definingmurder to include“caus[ing] thedeathof
anotherhumanbeing”);17-AM.R.S.§454(1)(A)(2020)(including,asanelementoftamperingwithawitness,thatthedefendant“[i]nducesorotherwisecauses...awitness...[t]otestifyorinforminamannertheactorknowstobefalse”);17-AM.R.S.§501-A(1)(A)(1)(2020)(statingthatonemeansofcommittingdisorderlyconductisby“caus[ing]annoyancetoothersbyintentionally...[m]akingloudandunreasonablenoises”);17-AM.R.S.§703(1)(B)(2020)(settingouttheelementsofforgery,includingthatthedefendant“causesanother,bydeception,tosignorexecuteawritteninstrument”);17-AM.R.S.§805(1)(C)(2020)(providing,asanelementofaggravatedcriminalmischief,thatthedefendant’s act “thereby causes a substantial interruption or impairment of [gas, water,transportation,etc.]servicerenderedtothepublic”);17-AM.R.S.§1002-A(1)(A)(2020)(statingthatthecriminaluseoflaserpointersiscommittedwhen,interalia,thedefendant’suseofalaserpointer“[c]ausesbodilyinjuryto[an]otherperson”).
14
Hampshire,andtotheattendantcircumstanceselement,whichcannotconfer
jurisdiction.
[¶18]Pursuanttotheunambiguouslanguageofsection7(1)(A),onlythe
occurrenceof the conductor the result elements inMainewill affordMaine
jurisdiction. BecauseSloboda’sconductoccurredinNewHampshireandhis
offensecontainsnoresultelement, section7(1)(A)providesnobasis for the
court’sexerciseofsubjectmatterjurisdictionoverSloboda’sprosecution.This
conclusionisalsoconsistentwiththeholdinginCollin,inwhichthedefendant
wasconvictedoftheftbyreceivingstolenpropertythatbelongedtoavictim
fromMaine.1997ME6,¶¶2-4,687A.2d962.Althoughthedefendantacted
onlyinCanada,theStatearguedthatMainehadjurisdictiontoprosecutehim
becausetheresultofthetheftwastodepriveaMainecompanyofitsproperty.
Id.¶¶3,11.Wedeclinedtoapplysection7(1)(A)becausetheassertedresult—
losstothevictim—wasnotanelementofthecrimeoftheftbyreceivingstolen
property,and,therefore,thefactthatthevictimwasinMainewas“irrelevant.”7
Collin,1997ME6,¶11,687A.2d962.
7Thisisunliketheanalysisemployedinthosestateswhosestatutesprovideforjurisdictionwhen
theresultoccursinthatstatebutthatdonotrequirethattheresultbeanelementofthecrime.InArizona, for example, the legislature has “maximize[d] the reach of its criminal jurisdiction byomitting the restriction that the result occurring within the state must be an element of theoffense.Thus,underArizonalaw,if[thedefendant’s]conducthadadirecteffectinArizona,Arizonacanassertjurisdiction.”Statev.Flores,188P.3d706,713(Ariz.Ct.App.2008)(emphasisomitted)(citationomitted)(quotationmarksomitted).
15
[¶19]Wealsodiscernnobasisforthecourt’sexerciseofjurisdictionin
the other subdivisions of section 7. In particular, the AttorneyGeneral and
AEquitas,asamici,suggestthatthecourthadjurisdictionpursuanttosection
7(1)(E),whichapplieswhen“[t]hecrimeconsistsoftheomissiontoperforma
duty imposedona personby the lawof this State, regardlessofwhere that
personiswhentheomissionoccurs.”8Byitsplainlanguage,an“omission”is“a
failuretodosomething.” Omission,NewOxfordAmericanDictionary(3ded.
2010).Theessenceoftheamici’sargumentisthatSlobodafailedtoperform
hislegaldutytocomplywiththebailorderbyaffirmativelyactinginviolation
of thebailorder. Thisattemptedapplicationofsection7(1)(E) toSloboda’s
prosecutionis,however,anexerciseinsemanticgymnastics.
8Wenotethatneitherofthepartiesthemselvespresentedanargumentrelatingto17-AM.R.S.
§7(1)(E)(2020),eitherinthetrialcourtorinthisappeal,andonlytwooftheamicihavedonesohere. Ordinarily,wewill recognizeacontentionraisedbyanamicuscuriaeonly ifthe issuewasraisedinthetrialcourtandatleastoneofthepartiesalsopursuestheargumentonappeal.SeeRossv.AcadianSeaplants,Ltd.,2019ME45,¶5n.2,206A.3d283;Jacobsv.Jacobs,507A.2d596,597n.1(Me.1986).Jurisdictionalquestionsarenothamperedbythesepreservationprinciples,however,becausejurisdictionisfoundational.See,e.g.FordMotorCo.v.Darling’s,2014ME7,¶41,86A.3d35(statingthat“theissueofjurisdictionmayberaisedatanytimeinaproceeding,includingsuaspontebythisCourt”);GuardianshipofGabrielW.,666A.2d505,507-08(Me.1995)(“Lackofsubjectmatterjurisdictionmayberaisedatanytime,includingincollateralproceedingswhenlackofsubjectmatterjurisdictionappearsonthefaceoftherecordofthejudgmentattacked.”(citationomitted));Pedersonv.Cole,501A.2d23,25n.2(Me.1985)(“Thedefenseoflackofsubject-matterjurisdictionmayberaisedatanytime,evensuaspontebyanappellatecourt.”);Moodyv.PortClydeDev.Co.,102Me.365,384,66A.967(1907)(“Theveryfoundationofjudicialproceedingsisjurisdiction.Thequestionofjurisdictionmay therefore be raised at any stage of the proceedings by any suggestion thatwillapprisethecourtofthewantthereof.”).Here,giventhatwecouldnoticeandresolvejurisdictionalissuesevenifnototherwiseraisedatall,andgiventhattheamicihavepresentedargumentregardingsection7(1)(E)throughanestablishedproceduralmechanism,seeM.R.App.P.7A(e),weconsiderthatargument.
16
[¶20]WerejectedasimilarapproachinStatev.Branch-Wear,inwhich
the defendant was convicted of tampering with a victim by preventing her
daughterfromtestifyinginaprosecution.1997ME110,¶¶2-6,695A.2d1169.
Thedefendantargued that theStatehad impermissiblyprosecutedher fora
crimeofomissionforfailingtomeetherlegalobligationofproducingthechild
atthetrial.Id.¶8.Wecharacterizedthedefendant’sargumentas“aplayon
words,” noting that the “failures to act” that the defendant described were
instead“actsofevasion...anddeceit...thatcausedherdaughtertowithhold
testimony.”Id.¶¶8,10(“TheStateand[thedefendant]arelookingatthesame
conduct. Theyaresimplydescribingitdifferently.”). Weconcludedthatthe
State had “presented evidence of a crime of commission, not voluntary
omission,” in the defendant’s efforts to keep the child from reaching the
courthouse.Id.¶10.
[¶21] The crimes of omission to which section 7(1)(E) might apply
instead include the failure to pay taxes or child support due in Maine, for
example—instances of criminal nonfeasance rather than any affirmative
criminal act. SeeModel Penal Code& Commentaries §1.03 cmt. 5 at 52-53
(Am.LawInst.1985);cf.Lindell,2020ME49,¶25,---A.3d---(concludingthat
17
thedefendant’saffirmativeconductinfalsifyingtaxreturnsinMaineallowed
theMainecourtjurisdictionoverhisprosecutionpursuanttosection7(1)(A)).
[¶22]Ourdecisiontodayisentirelyafunctionofourconstructionand
applicationofthejurisdictionalstatuteastheLegislaturehasenactedit. For
thereasonswehavediscussed,throughitsenactments,theLegislaturehasnot
conferredMaine’scourtswithauthoritytoadjudicatethechargefiledagainst
Sloboda. In the absence of any basis for the court’s exercise of jurisdiction
pursuanttosection7(1),Sloboda’sconvictioncannotstand.9
[¶23] ContrarytotheState’ssuggestion,however,ourconclusionthat
Maine lacks jurisdiction to prosecute Sloboda on a charge of violating a
condition of release for his conduct in NewHampshire does not altogether
depriveMaineofameansofenforcingitsbailconditions.Bailconditionsare
imposed “inorder to reasonably ensure the appearanceof the defendant as
required,tootherwisereasonablyensuretheintegrityofthejudicialprocess
and, when applicable, to reasonably ensure the safety of others in the
community.”15M.R.S.§1002(2020).Where,ashere,adefendantviolatesbail
conditions—eveninNewHampshire—Maineisfreetoinitiatebailrevocation
proceedings andask that thedefendantbeheldpending trial. See15M.R.S.
9BecauseweagreewithSlobodathatthetrialcourtlackedsubjectmatterjurisdiction,wedonot
addressSloboda’schallengetothesufficiencyoftheevidencesupportinghisconviction.
18
§§1095-1097 (2020). Moreover, when a defendant’s violation of a bail
condition constitutes a new criminal act—if, for example, Sloboda had
assaultedtheprotectedindividual—thatnewcriminalactcouldbeprosecuted
as such in the appropriate jurisdiction. This, however, does not change the
conclusionthat,aswritten,theunambiguousprovisionsofsection7(1)donot
giveMainecourtssubjectmatterjurisdictioninthiscase.Forustoconclude
otherwise,wewouldberequiredtorewritethestatute,andthatwecannotdo.
Theentryis:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for entry ofdismissaloftheindictment.
HORTON,J.,withwhomJABARandCONNORS,JJ.,join,dissenting.
[¶24] I respectfully dissent from the Court’s conclusion that the trial
courtlackedstatutoryjurisdictiontoconvictEmanuelJ.Slobodaforviolating
theno-contactbailcondition.Iwouldaffirmtheconvictionbasedonthecourt’s
jurisdictionover the subjectmatter andSloboda’sperson, andbasedon the
sufficiencyoftheevidencetoprovetheallegedviolationbeyondareasonable
doubt.
19
[¶25]JurisdictionexistedbecauseSloboda’sfailuretocomplywithhis
conditionsofreleasefellwithinthestatutoryprovisionconferringjurisdiction
ontheMainecourtstoconvictadefendantofacrimeif“[t]hecrimeconsistsof
theomissiontoperformadutyimposedonapersonbythelawofthisState,
regardless of where that person is when the omission occurs,” 17-A M.R.S.
§7(1)(E)(2020);see15M.R.S.§1092(2020).10
[¶26] Thebail codeauthorizesMainecourts to imposeuponcriminal
defendants the duty to comply with conditions of release. See 15 M.R.S.
§1026(1), (3)(A) (2020) (authorizing imposition of conditions of release);
15M.R.S. § 1092 (criminalizing the failure to comply with conditions of
release). Thatdutyis“imposedonaperson”forpurposesofsection7(1)(E)
whenacourtwithjurisdictionoverthepersonissuesabailbond,commitment
order,andconditions-of-releaseformconsistentwith15M.R.S.§1026(2020).
Asistypicallytrueofadutyimposedbycourtorder,Sloboda’sdutytocomply
10AlthoughIconcludethatthecourthadjurisdiction,Idosoondifferentgroundsthanthetrial
court.SeeBouchardv.Frost,2004ME9,¶8,840A.2d109(“[W]ecanaffirmajudgmentonrationaledifferent than that relied on by the [trial c]ourt.”). I therefore do not address the trial court’sconclusion that it had jurisdiction based on a “territorial relationship” between the results ofSloboda’sconductandtheStateofMaine.See17-AM.R.S.§7(1)(A),(4)(2020).Inaddition,becauseIconcludethatthecourthadjurisdictiontoconvictSlobodapursuantto17-AM.R.S.§7(1)(E)(2020),IneednotaddresstheState’scontentionthattheresultofSloboda’soffenseoccurredinMaineandthecourtthereforehadjurisdictionpursuantto17-AM.R.S.§7(1)(A).ButIwouldnotforeclosethepossibilitythatsection7(1)(A)wasintendedtoencompassresultsinherentinoffensesthatdonotspecify a certain harm. See, e.g., Brehm v. State, 558 N.E.2d 906, 907-09 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)(discussingastatutewithsubstantivelyidentical“result”languageandreachingaconclusionsimilartotheoneurgedbytheStateinthiscase).
20
with his bail conditions, which was imposed by a court having personal
jurisdictionoverhim,11continuedtoapplyregardlessofwherehewas,within
themeaningofsection7(1)(E).SeeCommonwealthv.Maguigan,511A.2d1327,
1332(Pa.1986)(explainingthatacriminalcourt’spersonaljurisdictionover
anabsentdefendantincludestheauthoritytocompelthedefendanttoreturn
fortrial). TheCourt’sobservationthattheStatecouldorshouldhavefileda
motion to revoke Sloboda’s bail instead of prosecuting him implicitly
acknowledges that his duty to comply with bail conditions applied outside
Maine—otherwise,therewouldbenobasisfortheStatetomovetorevokebail.
SeeCourt’sOpinion¶23.
[¶27] The bail bond that Sloboda signed included the following
provision:“Asaconditionofmyrelease,Ishallcomplywithanycondition(s)
setforthontheConditionsofReleaseform.”12Theattachedcommitmentorder
andconditions-of-releaseformincludedaconditionprohibitingcontactwitha
specific person. The court found, based on competent evidence admitted
11“Itiswellsettledthata[criminal]courthaspersonaljurisdictionoveranypartywhoappears
beforeit,regardlessofhowhisappearancewasobtained.”UnitedStatesv.Lussier,929F.2d25,27(1stCir.1991).12 In signing the bail bond, Sloboda also acknowledged: “I agree to obey the following
conditionsofmyreleasesolongasthisbailbondremainsineffect.Iunderstandthatitisacrimeformetoviolateanyoftheseconditions,andthatifIviolatetheseconditionsIwillbesubjecttoarrest,jailand/orafine.”(Italicemphasisadded.)
21
during a trial, that Sloboda failed to comply with the no-contact condition.
Pursuant to the plain language of section 7(1)(E), Sloboda’s conduct
constitutedan“omissiontoperform”hisdutyofcompliance.See,e.g.,Statev.
Conroy,2020ME22,¶19,225A.3d1011(“Welookfirsttotheplainlanguage
ofthestatutetodetermineitsmeaningifwecandosowhileavoidingabsurd,
illogical,orinconsistentresults.”).
[¶28]Focusingontheaffirmativeactconstitutingthebailviolation,the
Courtconcludes,tothecontrary,thatSloboda’sconductcouldnotconstitutean
“omission”toperformadutywithinthemeaningofsection7(1)(E):
The essence of [the argument that jurisdiction exists undersection7(1)(E)]isthatSlobodafailedtoperformhislegaldutytocomplywiththebailorderbyaffirmativelyactinginviolationofthebail order. This attempted application of section 7(1)(E) toSloboda’s prosecution is, however, an exercise in semanticgymnastics.
Court’sOpinion¶19.TheCourtnotesthat“[t]hecrimesofomissiontowhich
section7(1)(E)might apply instead include the failure topay taxesor child
supportdueinMaine,forexample—instancesofcriminalnonfeasancerather
thananyaffirmativecriminalact.”Court’sOpinion¶21.
[¶29]TheCourt’sconclusionisinconsistentwiththelanguageofthebail
code.Thebailcodedefinesalloftheconditionsofreleasethatitauthorizesin
mandatory terms so as to create an affirmative duty to comply with all
22
conditions of release, even when the substantive effect of a condition is
prohibitory.13See15M.R.S.§1026(3)(A)(1)-(19).Indeed,theimpositionofa
no-contactconditionsuchastheoneinthiscaserequiresadefendantto
[a]voidall contactwith a victimof the alleged crime, apotentialwitness regarding the alleged crime orwith any other family orhouseholdmembersof thevictimor thedefendantor tocontactthoseindividualsonlyatcertaintimesorundercertainconditions.
15M.R.S.§1026(3)(A)(5)(emphasisadded).
[¶30] Thus, the bail code defines conditions of release as affirmative
mandates.Afailuretocomplywithabailcondition—evenafailurethattakes
the form of an affirmative act—must therefore constitute an “omission to
perform a duty” for purposes of section 7(1)(E).14 See State v. Jones,
13 For example, conditions that restrict residence or travel, impose a curfew, or prohibit
possessionof firearmsarealldefined inmandatoryrather thanprohibitory terms. See15M.R.S.§1026(3)(A)(4)(2020)(“Abidebyspecifiedrestrictionsonpersonalassociations,placeofabodeortravel”); 15 M.R.S. § 1026(3)(A)(7) (2020) (“Comply with a specified curfew”); 15 M.R.S.§1026(3)(A)(8)(2020)(“Refrainfrompossessingafirearmorotherdangerousweapon”).TheplaineffectoftheLegislature’schosenphrasingistocreateaffirmativedutiesofcompliance,suchthatafailuretocomplyisanomissiontoperformamandatedduty.14 ThisconclusionisconsistentwithourdecisioninStatev.Damon,317A.2d459(Me.1974).
There,weequated theaffirmativeactof “[e]scapeof furlough”with the“wilful failure toresumephysicalconfinementattheMaineStatePrison.” Id.at460-61. Courtsinotherjurisdictionshavealsoheld,inothercontexts,thatdefendantsomittedtoperformlegaldutiesbyactingaffirmatively,asopposedtobyfailingtoact.TheDistrictCourtofAppealofFlorida,forexample,concludedthatthe state had jurisdiction to convict a defendant of the affirmative criminal act of identity theftbecausethecrimeconstitutedanomissiontoperformadutytoobtainconsentfromthevictim.SeeStatev.Roberts,143So.3d936,936-39(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2014);seealsoCommonwealthv.Thompson,50N.E.3d 845, 857-58 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016) (examining credit card fraud, discussing similarprinciples,anddecidingthesame);Statev.James,79P.3d169,173-77(Kan.2003)(concludingthatthestatehadjurisdictionwherethedefendantviolatedadutytorefrainfrommistreatingdependentadultsbyleavingthevictimsinahotcar,causingtheirdeaths).TheFloridacourtalsoconcludedthatthestatehadjurisdictiontoconvictadefendantofacrimeprohibitingtheremovalofchildrenfrom
23
673P.2d455,456(Kan.Ct.App.1983)(notingthatastatuteextendingcriminal
jurisdiction to the omission to perform a duty imposed on a person by law
regardlessoftheperson’s location“codifiesthecommonlawprinciplethata
personmaycommitacrimewithinthisstatewhileremainingoutsideit,and
suchcrimemaybeanactofomissionaswellasanactofcommission”(emphasis
added)).
[¶31] The Court’s focus on the affirmative nature of Sloboda’s bail
violationasthesolebasisforitsconclusionthatsection7(1)(E)doesnotconfer
jurisdiction implies a view that section7(1)(E)would apply if Sloboda’sbail
violationconsistedofafailuretoact.Court’sOpinion¶¶19-21.Inthatcase,
section 7(1)(E) would confer jurisdiction to prosecute out-of-state bail
violationsinvolvinginactionbythedefendant,suchasfailingtonotifythecourt
of an address change or to take medications as prescribed, but would not
authorizeprosecutionofout-of-stateviolationssuchashavingcontactwithan
allegedvictimorcommittinganewcrime.
thestateinviolationofacourtorder,wherethedefendant’saffirmativeactsinviolationoftheorderoccurredentirelyoutsideofthestate.Statev.Costa,558So.2d525,526(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990)(citingaterritorialapplicabilitystatuteprovidingthat“[a]noffensethatisbasedonanomissiontoperformadutyimposedbythelawofthisstateiscommittedwithinthestate,regardlessofthelocationoftheoffenderatthetimeoftheomission”(quotationmarksomitted));see,e.g.,Peoplev.Caruso,519N.E.2d 440, 442-46 (Ill. 1987) (concluding that a child abduction crime that prohibited“violat[ing]...avalidcourtorder...byconcealingordetaining[a]childorremoving[a]childfromthejurisdictionofthecourt”was“basedonanomissiontoperformadutyimposedbythelawofthisState”(quotationmarksomitted)).
24
[¶32]Butnothingineitherthebailcodeorsection7(1)(E)indicatesthat
the Legislature intended to confer jurisdiction over violations of some
conditionsofreleasebutnotviolationsofotherconditionsofrelease,andthere
wouldbenocogentbasisfortheLegislaturetodrawthatdistinction.15Infact,
itistheviolationsinvolvingaffirmativeactsthatcanresultindirectandeven
lethal harm to victims, witnesses, and others. The Legislature cannot have
intendedtoconferjurisdictiontoprosecuteanout-of-stateviolationconsisting
of failure to take medications or to report an address change but not to
prosecute an out-of-state violation consisting of contact (orworse)with an
allegedvictim,aco-defendant,orawitness.
[¶33] Atoral argument, evenSlobodaagreed that adefendant canbe
prosecutedforabailviolationinMainebasedonwhollyout-of-statecriminal
15Nordoesthelegislativehistorysuggestsuchaninterpretation.Section7(1)(E)incorporates
languagepresentinsection1.03oftheModelPenalCode. See17-AM.R.S.§7(1)(E);ModelPenalCode & Commentaries § 1.03(1)(e) (Am. Law Inst. 1985) (providing for jurisdictionwhere “theoffenseconsistsoftheomissiontoperformalegaldutyimposedbythelawofthisStatewithrespecttodomicile,residenceorarelationshiptoaperson,thingortransactionintheState”(emphasisadded)).Section1.03“propose[d]broadjurisdictionalbases,withinthelimitsofdueprocess,”based“[o]nthepremise[s]thatitisparticularlydesirableinafederatedstatetoincreasejurisdictionaloptionsandthatifastate’sassertionofjurisdictiondoesnotresultinunfairnesstothepersoncharged,thestateshould be accorded jurisdiction over all those who engage in conduct that affects the state’sinterests.”ModelPenalCode&Commentaries§1.03explanatorynote(Am.LawInst.1985).Giventhe express notice to Sloboda that he would be subject to prosecution if he violated any of theconditionsofhisrelease,andthedetrimentaleffectofthebailviolationwithinMaine,jurisdictiontoconvictSlobodainMainedoesnotpresentfairnessconcerns.SeeStrassheimv.Daily,221U.S.280,284-85(1911);UnitedStatesv.Woodward,149F.3d46,66&n.11(1stCir.1998);Statev.Vetrano,121Me.368,380,117A.460(1922).
25
conductcommittedwhileonbail.16Hisacknowledgmentissignificantbecause
a condition prohibiting criminal conduct is no different, for purposes of
section7(1)(E),fromaconditionprohibitingcontactwithaspecificperson.See
State v.West, 512 N.W.2d 207, 208-09 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a
defendantwhoviolatedaWisconsinbailorderbycommittingacrimeinOhio
could be prosecuted inWisconsin for the crime of “bail jumping”); see also
15M.R.S.§1026(1)(providingthat“[e]veryorderforthepretrialreleaseofany
defendantmustinclude...thecondition[]thatthedefendantrefrainfromnew
criminalconduct”).
[¶34] The Court’s interpretation means that defendants whose bail
conditionsprohibitthemfromhavingcontactwithout-of-stateallegedvictims,
co-defendants, or witnesses; from possession of firearms or dangerous
weapons;fromconsumingalcoholicbeverages;fromoperatingmotorvehicles;
fromaccessingtheInternet;orfromengaginginanyothernon-criminalactivity
can circumvent prosecution simply by violating those conditions in another
16Slobodagavethefollowingexample:“Sayit’sadomesticcase,andsomeparentneglectstheir
child. They’reprosecuted inNewHampshire . . . .They’reconvicted. You take thatconviction toMaineandthenyouprosecutethemundertheMainebailorderandsay,‘See,youdidn’tfollowyourMainebailorder;youwereconvictedofacrime.’”InresponsetoaquestionaboutwhethertheStatecouldenforcebailconditionsbymovingtorevokebail,Slobodareplied,“Ofcourse,orbyprovingthathehadcontactinRochester[NewHampshire];NewHampshiregivesfullfaithandcredittotheMaineorder;he’sconvictedofviolatingalegalorderinNewHampshire;youtakethatcertifiedconvictiontoMaine,andthenprosecutehim.”
26
jurisdiction.ToprotecttheState’sabilitytoprosecutebailviolations,itwould
beunderstandableforprosecutorstoaskmorefrequentlyforbailconditions
prohibitingdefendants from leaving theStateofMaine,although theCourt’s
interpretationnowcalls intoquestionwhetheradefendantsubjecttosucha
conditioncouldbeprosecutedforleavingthestate.
[¶35] Finally, beyond the bail context, the Court’s interpretation of
section7(1)(E)alsocallsintoquestionwhetheradefendantwhoaffirmatively
violatesaMaineprotectionordercanbeprosecutedifthedefendantandthe
plaintiffarebothoutsidethestateatthetime.See17-AM.R.S.§506-B(2020);
see also 5 M.R.S. § 4659(1) (2020); 15 M.R.S. § 321(6) (2020); 19-AM.R.S.
§4011(1),(4)(2020).Iftheorderwereaqualifyingprotectionorder,thefull
faithandcreditprovisionoftheUnitedStatesCodewouldauthorizethestate
in which the violation occurred to prosecute, see 18 U.S.C.S. § 2265
(LEXISthrough Pub. L. No. 116-149), but that state might not, and Maine
definitelycouldnotundertheCourt’sinterpretation.
[¶36] For these reasons, I would affirm, because the court had
jurisdictionandtherecordevidencewassufficienttosupporttheconviction.
27
Harry Center, Esq. (orally), Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith &Jacques,P.A.,Biddeford,forappellantEmanuelJ.SlobodaKathryn Loftus Slattery, District Attorney, and Andrew E. Berggren, Esq.(orally),ProsecutorialDistrict#1,Alfred,forappelleeStateofMaineAaronM.Frey,AttorneyGeneral,andLauraA.Yustak,Asst.Atty.Gen.,OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,foramicuscuriaeOfficeoftheMaineAttorneyGeneralJeffGoldman,Esq.,Morgan,Lewis&BockiusLLP,Boston,Massachusetts, foramicuscuriaeAEquitasLawrenceC.Winger,amicuscuriaeproseYorkCountyUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2018-1073FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY