2016 us economic & transportation industry...
TRANSCRIPT
Industrial Research
March 15, 2016
2016 US Economic & Transportation Industry Outlook
Benjamin J. [email protected]
Please refer to Appendix – Important Disclosures and Analyst Certification
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| 2
Key Focal Points
1. Reviewing 2015’s trends: Decelerating growth and transport stock underperformance.
2. Will 2016 be a recession year? A look at what the markets think.
3. Looking to 2016: “It’s always darkest before the dawn.”
4. Transports this cycle: regulatory changes, demographics and technology separate winners from losers.
| 3
A Look Back at 2015: Where Was The
Consumer?
| 4
Transports Were Notable
Underperformers During 2015…
Transports were notable underperformers during 2015, and the underperformance was indiscriminate across subsectors.
Source: FactSet
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
Jan-15
Feb
-15
Mar-15
Apr-15
May
-15
Jun-15
Jul-1
5
Aug
-15
Sep
-15
Oct-15
Nov-15
Dec-15
Jan-16
Feb
-16
Mar-16
3PL Less-Than-Truckload Truckload Integrators Rails
| 5
...Given Normalizing Capacity
Conditions...
Spot demand was muted, falling below 2013 levels after a weak 4Q15.
Source: Industry data, Baird estimates
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%Wk 1
Wk 14
Wk 27
Wk 40
Sp
ot
Tru
ck D
eman
d:
R
elat
ive
to 2
013'
s A
vera
ge
2013 2014 2015 2016
| 6
...And a Strong USD...
A strong USD correlates with relative underperformance of transport stocks.
Source: FactSet
30
50
70
90
110
130
15065
75
85
95
105
115
125
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
Rel
ativ
e P
erfo
rman
ce
Ind
exed
(Ja
n 1
986=
100)
US
Do
llar
In
dex
(In
vers
e, J
an 1
986=
100)
US Dollar Index (left axis) DJT Relative Performance to S&P 500 (right axis)
Source: Institute for Supply Management, AAR, Baird estimates | 7
...Driving Weaker-Than-Expected
Volumes...Weak US industrial activity and lower crude oil prices/a stronger USD led to below-seasonal volume trends in 2015, particularly in industrial end markets.
(7.5)
(5.0)
(2.5)
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
15.0
46
48
50
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
2012 2Q 3Q 4Q
2013 2Q 3Q 4Q
2014 2Q 3Q 4Q
2015 2Q 3Q 4Q
2016
Ind
ust
rial
Car
load
s vs
. S
easo
nal
ity
US
IS
M P
MI
US ISM PMI (left axis)2012-Present Industrial Carloads vs. Normal Seasonality (right axis)
Source: Company data, Baird estimates | 8
...And Decelerating Core Pricing Growth.
Weak demand and tough comparisons (after 2014’s positive inflection in pricing growth) led to decelerating pricing growth in 2H15.
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Pri
cin
g G
row
th (
%, y
oy)
LTL Pricing IM Pricing TL Pricing Railroad Pricing
| 9
A Look Ahead at 2016
Source: FactSet | 10
2015’s Pressures Remain Risks to Begin
2016Crude’s slide has continued and the USD remains strong – but some important reversals have happened to begin 2016:
Crude’s Weakness US Dollar’s Strength
$20
$30
$40
$50
$60
$70
$80
$90
$100
$110
$120
Jan-13
Jul-13
Jan-14
Jul-14
Jan-15
Jul-15
Jan-16
WTI Crude Oil ($/bbl)
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
Jan-13
Jul-13
Jan-14
Jul-14
Jan-15
Jul-15
Jan-16
vs. Euro vs. Swiss Franc
vs. Japanese Yen vs. Canadian Dollar
vs. Australian Dollar vs. Chinese Renminbi
Source: Thomson Reuters | 11
2015’s Pressures Remain Risks to Begin
2016Taking the long view, this new environment could be with us for a while longer.
Source: FactSet | 12
2015’s Pressures Remain Risks to Begin
2016Current crude oil’s price is more representative of its long-term average than 2005-2014 levels.
$0
$20
$40
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
WT
I C
rud
e O
il P
rice
WTI Crude Oil Price
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve | 13
2015’s Pressures Remain Risks to Begin
2016In our view, the USD’s direction in upcoming months will go a long way in determining the sources and direction of trade growth rates.
80
90
100
110
120
130
1973
1976
1979
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
Rea
l Tr
ade
Wei
gh
ted
US
D I
nd
ex
Real Trade Weighted USD Index
A breakout?
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, ISM, NBER | 14
2015’s Pressures Remain Risks to Begin
2016USD strength tends to bring slowing global growth and global crises.
| 15
Will 2016 Be a Recession Year? What The
Market Is Saying
Source: FactSet, NBER | 16
Will 2016 Be a Recession Year?
S&P 500 (and broader equity markets) showing signs of topping.
Source: FactSet | 17
Will 2016 Be a Recession Year?
S&P 500 (and broader equity markets) showing signs of topping.
Source: Institute of Supply Management, National Bureau of Economic Research | 18
Will 2016 Be a Recession Year?
Comparing this cycle to prior cycles, current US ISM PMI conditions do not yet reflect the beginning of a US recession.
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
7519
80
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
2016
New
Ord
ers
-In
ven
tori
es
US
IS
M P
MI
Recession US ISM PMI New Orders - Inventories
Source: Institute of Supply Management, National Bureau of Economic Research | 19
Will 2016 Be a Recession Year?
Mid-1980s into the 1990 recession: New Orders less Inventories deteriorated into the beginning of the recession.
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
Jul-85
Jul-86
Jul-87
Jul-88
Jul-89
Jul-90
New
Ord
ers
-In
ven
tori
es
US
IS
M P
MI
Recession US ISM PMI New Orders - Inventories
Source: Institute of Supply Management, National Bureau of Economic Research | 20
Will 2016 Be a Recession Year?
Similar conditions existed entering the 2001 recession...
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
Mar-96
Mar-97
Mar-98
Mar-99
Mar-00
Mar-01
New
Ord
ers
-In
ven
tori
es
US
IS
M P
MI
Recession US ISM PMI New Orders - Inventories
Source: Institute of Supply Management, National Bureau of Economic Research | 21
Will 2016 Be a Recession Year?
…As well as entering the Dec-2007 start of the last recession.
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
Dec-02
Dec-03
Dec-04
Dec-05
Dec-06
Dec-07
Dec-08
New
Ord
ers
-In
ven
tori
es
US
IS
M P
MI
Recession US ISM PMI New Orders - Inventories
Source: Institute of Supply Management, National Bureau of Economic Research | 22
Will 2016 Be a Recession Year?
We don’t have the same set-up at the moment.
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
New
Ord
ers
-In
ven
tori
es
US
IS
M P
MI
US ISM PMI New Orders - Inventories
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), FactSet | 23
Will 2016 Be a Recession Year?
The US Treasury yield curve is flattening but hasn’t inverted.
-1.0%
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Del
ta i
n Y
ield
(US
10y
r -
US
2yr)
US Recession 10-yr less 2-yr
Source: AAR, FactSet, Institute for Supply Management, Baird estimates | 24
Will 2016 Be a Recession Year?
The USD has weakened recently and has not made fresh highs since mid-March 2015, setting up for potential improvement in seasonally adjusted industrial-related volumes in the coming months (relative to well-below seasonal trends during 4Q15).
(7.5)
(5.0)
(2.5)
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
15.0
46
48
50
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
2014 2Q 3Q 4Q
2015 2Q 3Q 4Q
2016
Ind
ust
rial
Car
load
s vs
. S
easo
nal
ity
US
IS
M P
MI
US ISM PMI (left axis)2014-Present Industrial Carloads vs. Normal Seasonality (right axis)
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
Jan-14
Apr-14
Jul-14
Oct-14
Jan-15
Apr-15
Jul-15
Oct-15
Jan-16
Ind
ex,
Inve
rse
ICE US Dollar Index
Source: FactSet | 25
Will 2016 Be a Recession Year?
Falling crude oil prices also historically inflate equity valuations...
-100%
-50%
0%
50%
100%10x
12x
14x
16x
18x20
05
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Bre
nt
Cru
de
Oil
Pri
ces
Ch
ang
e, I
nve
rse
(%, y
oy)
S&
P 5
00 N
TM
P/E
S&P 500 NTM PE Brent Crude Oil Prices YoY Change, Adv. 4-mo
Source: Bloomberg, NBER | 26
Will 2016 Be a Recession Year?
…And current valuations aren’t unreasonable in the context of the last 25 years (or against recent 1.75% US 10-year Treasury yields).
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
10x
14x
18x
22x
26x
30x
S&
P 5
00 N
TM
P/E
US Recession S&P 500 NTM PE
Source: Conference Board, NBER, U.S. Employment and Training Association | 27
Will 2016 Be a Recession Year?
Consumer confidence and initial jobless claims are near cycle peaks (but jobless claims in particular are a lagging indicator, and recent readings have weakened).
Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch, FactSet, FRED, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) | 28
2016’s Economic Landscape Reflects A
Late-Cycle US RecoveryWidening yield spreads are reflective of a later-cycle US recovery.
200k
250k
300k
350k
400k
450k
500k
550k
600k
650k
700k
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%19
97
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Init
ial C
laim
s, S
A (
4-w
k. M
A)
Yie
ld S
pre
ad
US Recession
BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield Master II OAS
Initial Claims, SA (4-wk. MA)
Source: BAML, ISM | 29
2016’s Economic Landscape Reflects A
Late-Cycle US RecoveryWidening yield spreads also tend to coincide with a weakening US ISM PMI.
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
652%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
22%
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
US
IS
M P
MI
Yie
ld S
pre
ad, I
nve
rse
BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield Master II OAS US ISM PMI
Source: BAML, JP Morgan | 30
Implications for 2016 Freight Demand
Weakening international PMI also coincides with widening yield spreads...
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%32
38
44
50
56
6220
05
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Bo
fA U
S H
igh
Yie
ld M
aste
r II
OA
S,
Inve
rse
JPM
Glo
bal
PM
I
JPM Global PMI BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield Master II OAS
Source: FactSet, JP Morgan | 31
Implications for 2016 Freight Demand
...And a softening US stock market.
-75%
-50%
-25%
0%
25%
50%
32
38
44
50
56
6220
05
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
S&
P 5
00 G
row
th (
%, y
oy)
JPM
Glo
bal
PM
I
JPM Global PMI S&P 500 YoY Change
Source: ATA, ISM | 32
Implications for 2016 Freight Demand
PMI weakness is correlated with declines in ATA trucking index growth...
-30%
-24%
-18%
-12%
-6%
0%
6%
12%
18%
24%
30%
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
ATA
Tru
ck I
nd
ex G
row
th (
%,
yoy)
US
IS
M P
MI I
nd
ex
US ISM PMI ATA Truck Index, 3-mo. MA, YoY Change
Source: AAR, ISM | 33
Implications for 2016 Freight Demand
...And declines in industrial carload growth.
-45%
-30%
-15%
0%
15%
30%
45%
32
38
44
50
56
62
68
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Rai
l In
du
stri
al C
arlo
ad G
row
th (
%, y
oy)
ISM
PM
I
US ISM PMI Rail Industrial Carload YoY Growth
Source: BAML, NBER, US Census Bureau | 34
Implications for 2016 Freight DemandWidening spreads and US recessions can also trigger inventory destocking, another risk to freight volumes.
0%
3%
6%
9%
12%
15%
18%
21%-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Yie
ld S
pre
ad, I
nve
rse
Ret
ail
Inve
nto
ries
vs.
Sea
son
alit
y
US RecessionRetail Inventory Vs. SeasonalityBofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield Master II OAS
0%
3%
6%
9%
12%
15%
18%
21%-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Yie
ld S
pre
ad, I
nve
rse
Wh
ole
sale
rs'
Inve
nto
ries
vs.
Sea
son
alit
y
US RecessionWholesaler Inventory Vs. SeasonalityBofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield Master II OAS
0%
3%
6%
9%
12%
15%
18%
21%-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Yie
ld S
pre
ad, I
nve
rse
Wh
ole
sale
rs'
Inve
nto
ries
vs.
Sea
son
alit
y
US RecessionTotal Business Inventory Vs. SeasonalityBofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield Master II OAS
Source: FactSet | 35
Implications for 2016 Freight Demand
Consumer discretionary stocks outperformed staples during 2015, but the gap has narrowed to begin 2016.
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
15020
06
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Rel
ativ
e P
erfo
rman
ce t
o S
&P
500
Consumer Discretionary Consumer Staples
Source: FactSet | 36
Implications for 2016 Freight Demand
The outperformance of consumer services vs. goods has continued into 2016.
85
95
105
115
125
135
145
15520
06
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Rel
ativ
e P
erfo
rman
ce t
o S
&P
500
Consumer Services Consumer Goods
Source: FactSet | 37
Implications for 2016 Freight Demand
Retail stock performance masks clear winners and losers.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
100020
06
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Rel
ativ
e P
erfo
rman
ce t
o S
&P
500
Apple Inc Amazon.com Inc Wal-Mart Stores Inc Best Buy Co Inc
Source: FactSet | 38
Implications for 2016 Freight Demand
Retail stock performance masks clear winners and losers.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
45020
06
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Rel
ativ
e P
erfo
rman
ce t
o S
&P
500
TJX Companies L Brands IncGap Inc/The Urban Outfitters IncAmerican Eagle Outfitters Inc Abercrombie & Fitch Co
Source: FactSet | 39
Implications for 2016 Freight Demand
Retail stock performance masks clear winners and losers.
0
50
100
150
200
250
30020
06
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Rel
ativ
e P
erfo
rman
ce t
o S
&P
500
Macy's Inc Nordstrom Inc Kohl's CorpJC Penney Co Inc Sears Holdings Corp Bon-Ton Stores Inc/TheTarget
Source: FactSet | 40
Implications for 2016 Freight Demand
Retail stock performance masks clear winners and losers.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
50020
06
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Rel
ativ
e P
erfo
rman
ce t
o S
&P
500
Home Depot Inc/The Lowe's Cos Inc Tractor Supply CoBed Bath & Beyond Inc Staples Inc Williams-Sonoma IncCabela's Inc Ethan Allen Interiors Inc Pier 1 Imports Inc
Source: ATA, Blue Chip Economic Indicators, Federal Reserve, Port data, US Dept. of Commerce, Baird estimates | 41
Implications for 2016 Freight Demand
Preliminary 2016 consumer spending forecasts do not reflect a strengthening consumer demand outlook, either.
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017
ATA
In
dex
Gro
wth
(%
, yo
y)
PC
E G
row
th (
%,
yo
y)
Personal Consumption Expenditure Growth ATA Truck Tonnage Index, SA
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016E
2017E
US
In
bo
un
d O
F V
olu
mes,
3-m
o.
MA
(%
, yo
y)
PC
E, D
PI
Gro
wth
(%
, yo
y)
Personal Consumption Expenditure Growth, yoyDisposable Personal Income Growth, yoyTotal US Inbound OF Volumes, 3-mo. MA
Source: FactSet, Baird estimates | 42
Implications for 2016 Freight Demand
Risks to industrial and consumer demand set transports up for a continuation of the deceleration in core pricing growth, and we expect a very active 2016 bid season, which should produce core 2016 TL pricing growth of +1-2% yoy.
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
Co
re C
on
trac
tual
Tru
cklo
ad
Pri
cin
g G
row
th (
%, y
oy)
Tru
cker
s' R
elat
ive
Per
form
ance
vs
. R
uss
ell
2000
Asset-based Truckers - Relative Performance vs. Russell 2000 Index (L)Core Contractual Truckload Pricing Growth (R)
| 43
A Look at Transports Since Deregulation
Source: FactSet | 44
Perspective on Transports Since Deregulation
The modern transportation industry is defined by four key Eras: 1) Regulation, 2) Growth, 3) Logistics Era 1.0, and 4) Maturity.
Source: FactSet | 45
Rails Across Eras
Industry deregulation in the ’80s and consolidation in the ’90s allowed for the pricing renaissance and outperformance of the 2000s.
Source: FactSet | 46
3PLs Across Eras
The commercialization of IT in the mid-’90s set the stage for the next 15 years of massive growth for 3PLs.
Source: FactSet | 47
TLs Across Eras
Excess capacity in the mid-to-late ’90s led to industry attrition, consolidation, and outperformance in the early-to-mid 2000s.
Source: FactSet | 48
LTLs Across Eras
Distribution trending towards shorter lead time and quicker delivery requires DCs to be closer to destination points, driving regional carrier share growth.
| 49
What Defines the Maturity Era?
The trade maturity era is characterized by:
1. Structurally slower end-market demand
2. Productivity headwinds
3. Demographic changes
4. Increasing regulation
Source: ATA, Blue Chip Economic Indicators, Federal Reserve, Baird estimates | 50
TL Tonnage Growth Has Slowed...
Truckload volume has experienced structurally slower growth...
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017
Gro
wth
(%
, yo
y)
ATA Truck Tonnage Growth, 3-mo MA US IP Growth, 3-mo. MA
TL CAGR from July 2006 - Nov 2015: 1.7%
TL CAGR from 1981 - June 2006: 3.2%
Source: ATA, Federal Reserve | 51
…As Has LTL Tonnage Growth...
...As has LTL volume growth, which has shown a volume CAGR of just 0.1% post-2006 freight recession.
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%19
94
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
Gro
wth
, 3-
mo
. N
A (
%, y
oy)
LTL Tonnage Growth, 3-mo. MA US IP Growth, 3-mo. MA
LTL CAGR from July 2006 - Dec 2015: 0.1%
LTL CAGR from Jan. 1993 - June 2006: 3.5%
Source: World Bank | 52
...And International Trade Growth
Annualized growth post-2006 has been 5.0% versus the 8.5% 1978-2006 CAGR.
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%19
78
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
Gro
wth
(%
, yo
y)
Global Export Growth Global GDP Growth
Source: IATA, World Bank, Baird estimates | 53
Global Trade’s Penetration a Driver of Recent
Slowdown in Growth
| 54
Maturity Era
The trade maturity era is characterized by:
1. Structurally slower end-market demand
2. Productivity headwinds
3. Demographic changes
4. Increasing regulation
Source: AAR, Company data, Baird estimates | 55
Long-Term Productivity Headwinds Are Real
Trucking has followed a similar trend line since the mid-1990s.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008
2012
Ind
exed
(19
95=
50)
Ind
exed
(19
81=
100)
Rail Operating Cost Rail Rates TL Rates ($/LM, ex-fuel) TL Costs ($/LM, ex-fuel)
US transportation industry deregulated in early 1980s
Productivity declines/operating cost inflation began in late 1990s for Rails and Truckers alike
Source: ACT Research, BLS, Baird estimates | 56
Long-Term Productivity Headwinds Are Real
Since 2003, large public truckload carriers’ fleet productivity has fallen ~5% due to the cumulative effect of various drivers’ hours-of-service regulations.
Over the same period, US labor productivity has risen ~27%.
60
80
100
120
140
160
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
Ind
exed
(19
96 =
100
)
US Labor Productivity: Output/HourTruck Productivity: Miles/TruckTruck Productivity: Loaded Mile/Cost (ex-fuel)
| 57
Maturity Era
The trade maturity era is characterized by:
1. Structurally slower end-market demand
2. Productivity headwinds
3. Demographic changes
4. Increasing regulation
Source: BLS, Baird estimates | 58
Rates Need to Rise in Order to Address The
Demographic IssueSince 2000, long-haul truck driver employment has risen ~1%, while US private non-farm employment has risen ~12%.
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
13519
94
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
Ind
exed
(Ja
n 1
994
= 1
00)
US Private Non-Farm Employment Long-Haul Truck Driver Employment
Source: BLS | 59
Rates Need to Rise in Order to Address The
Demographic IssueTruck driving wage growth has lagged competing jobs and broader US labor wage growth over the past 25 years.
Hourly wage (CAGRs) since 1990:
Construction: 2.5%
Oil & Gas: 3.4%
Repair: 2.6%
US Average: 2.9%
Truck Driver: 1.8%90
110
130
150
170
190
210
230
250
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Ind
exed
(Ja
n 1
991
= 1
00)
Construction Hourly Wage Long-Haul Truck Driver Average Hourly Wage
O&G Extraction Hourly Wage Repair Hourly Wage
US Average Hourly Wage
| 60
Maturity Era
The trade maturity era is characterized by:
1. Structurally slower end-market demand
2. Productivity headwinds
3. Demographic changes
4. Increasing regulation
Source: senate.gov, Company data, Baird estimates | 61
Despite the short-term tailwind from the July 2013 HOS modifications being suspended (~2-4% tailwind to productivity among compliant carriers), long-term productivity headwinds are real.
The long-awaited Electronic Logging Device (ELD) mandate was approved on December 10, and is a potential 4-8% headwind to productivity over the next several years.
Rates Need to Rise in Order to Address The
Regulation Issue
Source: senate.gov, Company data, Baird estimates | 62
And the ELD mandate is just one of a long list of pending/potential regulations that could limit productivity:
Rates Need to Rise in Order to Address The
Regulation Issue
• Electronic Stability Controls
• Speed Limiters
• Minimum Training Requirements
• OSHA Worker Protection
• Increase in Minimum Insurance
• Safe Harbor
• Drug & Alcohol Database
• Prohibition of Coercion
• Pattern of Violation
• Employee Free Choice
• Safe Food Transportation
• Health Regulations and
Treatments
• Immigration Effects
• Regional Equipment
• Etc.
| 63
The Next Era?
Consolidation
Logistics 2.0
| 64
Industry Consolidation
• 2015 was a year of large deals.
• 11 deals were larger than $100 million during 2015.
• Deals were across subsectors.
Sector Date Acquirer Target
EV
($mln)
EV to
EBITDA
LTL Sep-15 XPO Logistics Con-Way Inc. 3,000$ 5.9x
Freight Forwarding Oct-15 DSV A/S UTI Worldwide 1,350$ 8.4x
Domestic Brokerage Jul-15 UPS Coyote Logistics 1,800$ 18.0x
Parcel Apr-15 FedEx TNT Express 4,800$ 10.3x
Rail Offer only Canadian Pacific Norfolk Southern 29,000$ 7.0x
Source: Armstrong & Associates, Company data, Moody’s, Baird estimates
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Annual number of acquisitions over $100 million
Source: Company data, Baird estimates | 65
In Our View, Carriers and Brokers With
Scale
$15 bln
$1.5 bln
$150 mln
$15 mln
$1.5 mln
$0.15 mln
Dynamics this cycle
Bro
ker/
carr
ier
Tra
nsp
ort
atio
n S
pen
d
(lo
gar
ith
mic
ally
pro
po
rtio
nal
)
*Pressures to shippers operating private
fleets (rising equipment costs, capital
scarcity , driver regulations) leading to
elevated inquiries about outsourcing
management to dedicated fleet operators
*Core carrier concept among shippers
highlights credible concerns about access
to reliable capacity
*Carriers with scale strategically
positioned to protect margins and expand
service offering
*Small carriers/indiv idual owner-operators
facing numerous headwinds, limiting
capacity adds
*Pressures to small carriers/owner-
operators (~80% of TL market) limit
available capacity base
*Coupled with slower end-market
growth and increasing competition,
expect gross margin pressure for
brokers lacking scale
*Constraints to capacity base
similarly pressures gross margins
*But, brokers filling need
(exception/emergency freight) or
niche (specialized equipment) in
position to deliver value,
particularly among small/medium-
sized shippers
Dedicated Irregular Route/For-Hire Scheduled Exception
Exception
"Asset-based" "Non-asset based"
Dedicated Irregular Route/For-Hire Scheduled
LSTR
CHRW
RRTSHUBG
ECHO
JBHT SWFTWERN
KNXHTLD
R
| 66
The “Dawn”: Healthy Pricing, Industry
ConsolidationReduced productivity and increased attrition from demographics and regulation should drive healthier long-term pricing fundamentals and further industry consolidation.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Annual number of acquisitions over $100 million
?
Source: Armstrong & Associates, Company data, Baird estimates
?
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Pri
cin
g G
row
th (
%, yo
y)
LTL Pricing IM Pricing TL Pricing Railroad Pricing
| 67
Three Key Focal Points
1. 2015: The year of decelerating growth and transport stock underperformance.
2. 2016: “It’s always darkest before the dawn.”
3. A new era of transportation is upon us; successful models will deal with the challenges facing the industry, including:• Regulations• Demographics• Technology
| 68
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| 69
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| 70
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| 71
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