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afghanistan & pakistan

on the brink

framing u.s. policy options

february 2009

authors

Frederick Barton and Karin von Hippel

with Mark Irvine, Thomas Patterson, and Mehlaqa Samdani

Gulf

Persian

BANGLAD

Indianclaim

Chinese lineof control

BAIJAN

I R A N

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

I N D I A

NEPAL BHKUWAIT

BAHRAIN

QATAR UNITED ARABEMIRATES

OMAN

OMAN

TURKMENISTAN

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

RABIA

Kabul

Baku

Manama

D

T

Tehran

Kathmandu

Muscat

Islamabad

Dohadh

Dushanbe

Abu Dhabi

Tashkent

NewDelhiKuwait

Ashgabat

Esfahan

Mashhad

Kolkata(Calcutta)

Karachi

Hyderabad

Ahmadabad

Kanpur

Mumbai(Bombay)

Lahorerah

briz

Shiraz

Nagpur

LucknowJaipur

- -

-

-

- -

Kashi

Pune

Quetta

- -

Kandahar


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Contents

Executive Summary ii

1. U.S. Policy Challenges 1

2. Assumptions 10

3. Recommendations and Policy Options 13

Acknowledgments 19

Appendix A: Conference Agenda 20

Appendix B: Conference Participants 22

Further Reading 23

Biographies 26

About CSIS 28

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ON THE BRINK i


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Executive Summary

Dramatic changes are needed in order to succeed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Almost

daily, the people of the region experience deteriorating security anda worsening

economic situation. At the same time, Afghans and Pakistanis will both make tough

political choices in the coming months, and the United States and major allies are in themidst of multiple policy reviews. The appointment of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke

should provide the opportunity to transform the current approach into one that has cleargoals and a compelling narrative.

Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Brinkis the result of a 200 person conference, held on

November 21, 2008 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and co-organized by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense

University (NDU). The event included participants from all parts of the U.S.

government. (See agenda in Appendix A and participants in Appendix B).

The report is divided into three sections: 1) Policy Challenges; 2) Assumptions; and 3)Recommendations and Policy Options.

Policy Challenges

Afghanistan and Pakistan pose some of the most complex challenges imaginable. Allparties have struggled with: 1) formulating and implementing an integrated strategy

across U.S. government agencies, and with international and local partners; 2)

understanding the evolving situation on the ground in both countries, especially in thegray zones (or ungoverned spaces); and 3) managing civilian political and economic

development programs in dangerous, conflict environments.

This report outlines eighteen major questions, including:

What U.S. and international force levels are required to achieve the statedobjectives? Are sufficient forces available? (p. 3-4)

Will more equipment and training address Pakistans insufficient counterterrorismand counterinsurgency capacity? (p. 7)

What discussions should take place with the Taliban? (p. 8-9)Assumptions

The report highlights eighteen realistic assumptions that should inform policy. Amongthose discussed are:

Afghanistan is no longer the safe haven or base for the al Qaeda network(though they still maintain a presence) and it is unlikely that a major attack on the

United States will come from that country in the near future (p. 11).

The NATO allies do not all share U.S. priorities, thus the mission inAfghanistan will continue to be opposed by the publics of some of the top

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ii


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AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ON THE BRINK iii

contributing allies. Significant increased force deployments or rules of

engagement that are more flexible are unlikely (p. 12).

Pakistan will not eliminate Taliban/al Qaeda sanctuaries or develop a rapidpolitical solution for the governance problems in the tribal regions. The Pakistani

government is not likely to devise a workable political-military strategy and

doctrine or build the necessary public support to deal with counterinsurgency inthe near term (p. 12).

Extremism could well spread into other parts of Pakistan as provincial issuesare not addressed and economic pressures increase. Greater U.S. and NATO

military efforts in southern Afghanistan may generate a spillover into adjacent

areas of Pakistan (p. 12).

It will not be enough to make incremental improvements. Small increases introops, improved diplomacy, reduced corruption, and a flush of economic

assistance will be insufficient. The publics of Afghanistan and Pakistan have

been losing confidence for more than two years, and it is necessary to make more

dramatic changes in order to gain their full participation and ownership of the

challenges (p. 11, 13).

Recommendations and Policy Options

The report offers five major recommendations for this critical period. Within the

recommendations are the following ideas:

Simplify and clarify the overarching goals to develop a sense of commonpurpose. The people of Afghanistan and Pakistan must believe that their safety

and well-being will be advanced by fighting the insurgents/terrorists andstabilizing the region. Their allies must see targets achieved within reasonable

periods. Shared goals, in turn, will enable all parties and partners to develop theappropriate strategy, realistic objectives, and measures of success, as well assecure the necessary resources (p. 13-14).

Secure a three-year military and economic commitment from the allies andsignal to the Afghans that the military commitment is not open-ended, although

the financial commitment will continue. The 134,000-soldier target strength of theAfghan National Army by December 2011 is consistent with this timeframe.

Ensure that the elected governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan accept

leadership responsibility (p. 4, 14-16).

Focus the vast majority of the effort (70-80%) in a few provinces (in bothAfghanistan and Pakistan) and seek to build governance wherever it is

promising, from select ministries to governors, local village, city, and civil societyleaders, womens groups, and public servants, such as teachers, judges, and police

(p. 15).

Success can be achieved with a clear direction and goals, the assumption of responsibility

by all parties, and regular and open information flows directly to the people of the regionand to allied nations.


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1. Policy Challenges

The critical challenges in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region include widespreadviolence, deep poverty, unsettled border tensions, nuclear weapons, drug trafficking, andpoor governance. Moreover, issues of sovereignty, as well as the complex social,

historical, and religious dynamics in the region, threaten to overwhelm national andinternational capabilities. Thus far, the external provision of financial, military, andtechnical governance support has been fairly significant, yet also largely ineffective and,in some instances, counterproductive.

Afghanistan and Pakistan suffer from terrorist and criminal violence, with some territoryin each that is not fully under national control. Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are betterthan they have been in the past, but they are still strained; the November 2008 Mumbaiterrorist attacks have threatened the slow reduction in India-Pakistan tensions. Coalitionfatalities increased for the fifth consecutive year in Afghanistan in 2008, and more thanhalf of the country is too dangerous for civilian aid workers.1

The U.S. government and most allies recognize the need for a new approach toAfghanistan and Pakistan, one that takes on a broader regional focus. AmbassadorHolbrooke has just completed a visit to the region, initial discussions with allies havebegun, and a 60-day U.S. government-wide review is being prepared for the April NATOsummit, which also will include official Afghan and Pakistani participation.2 The reviewwill incorporate a number of recent assessments,3 including efforts led by LieutenantGeneral Douglas Lute at the National Security Council, Admiral Michael Mullen,Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Petraeus at Central Command(CENTCOM Assessment Team), Jim Bever at the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID), and the recent National Intelligence Estimate.4 Also, the Obama

administration already has made certain decisions, such as the announced deployment ofan additional 17,000 U.S. forces to Afghanistan and the continued use of remote-controlled missiles in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan.

1 UN Programme Accessibility Map, October 8, 2008, from Anthony Cordesman, Burke Chair in Strategy,Center for Strategic and International Studies.2 The White House review is being led by Bruce Riedel and co-chaired by Richard Holbrooke and UnderSecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy. Robert Gibbs, Press Gaggle by Press Secretary RobertGibbs, The White House, February 10, 2009,http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/PressGagglebyPressSecretaryRobertGibbs/.3

Several additional strategy reviews related to Afghanistan and Pakistan were commissioned in 2007-2008.These include: Interagency review of Afghanistan, Afghanistan 2008 Strategic Review Update; NationalSecurity Council, Getting to December 08 paper; UK Regional Command South (RC South) study; UNstudy Towards an Integrated Strategy for Afghanistan; NATO International Staff Strategic Vision paper;NATO/ISAF Comprehensive Political-Military Strategic Plan for Afghanistan; SECDEF GatesAfghanistan Strategy Paper (3-5 year scope); Center for Army Analysis study on the size of the AfghanNational Army; Intelligence Community Bulletin on the Afghan Insurgency; and ISAF Regional CommandSouth (RC South) Comprehensive Campaign Assessment.4 While the CENTCOM Assessment Team is reviewing strategy for CENTCOMs entire area of operations,the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a major area of focus.

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 1
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/PressGagglebyPressSecretaryRobertGibbs/http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/PressGagglebyPressSecretaryRobertGibbs/


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An Afghan National Army soldier scans Korengal Valley for threats on February 16, 2008, outsideKorengal Outpost, Afghanistan. U.S. Army photo by Spc. Jordan Carter.

Admiral Mullen has noted that Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked in acommon insurgency that crosses the border between them.

5The fortunes of both

Afghanistan and Pakistan despite being at different stages of development are indeedinter-connected and will require a carefully calibrated mix of tools, includingcounterinsurgency and counterterrorism as well as short-term humanitarian and long-termeconomic and development activities. Moreover, the wider neighborhood will also haveto become part of the solution in order to prevent any of the neighboring countries frombecoming spoilers.

Important decisions must be made in the coming months. In Afghanistan, the UnitedStates and its allies must determine force levels, address command and controldifficulties, and decide how to localize security and development efforts. In Pakistan, thedeterioration of the security and economic situation, along with the limited levers of

5 Michael Mullen, Opening Statement at the House Armed Services Committee on Iraq and Afghanistan,Department of Defense, September 10, 2008, http://www.jcs.mil/chairman/speeches/10sep08cjcs-hasc-mullen.html. More recently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted that a re-examination of the U.S.strategy and approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan would be one of the first priorities of the [Obama]administration. See Robert Gates, Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates from thePentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, VA, Department of Defense, December 2, 2008,http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4325

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ON THE BRINK 2
http://www.jcs.mil/chairman/speeches/10sep08cjcs-hasc-mullen.htmlhttp://www.jcs.mil/chairman/speeches/10sep08cjcs-hasc-mullen.htmlhttp://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4325http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4325http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4325http://www.jcs.mil/chairman/speeches/10sep08cjcs-hasc-mullen.htmlhttp://www.jcs.mil/chairman/speeches/10sep08cjcs-hasc-mullen.html


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external influence, require a new political calculus that includes mature partnerships inthe region and with allied nations from around the world.

The recent negotiations between the Pakistani government and a part of the PakistaniTaliban in Swat highlight the enormity of the challenges. What is actually going on

there? What is meant by Shariah law in this case? Will either party honor theagreement? Will it bring peace to the valley? Why has the Pakistani military beenunable to quell the violence and stop the intimidation? Is this a capitulation to violentinsurgents that will now be repeated elsewhere or a model to build upon?

This section outlines several of the key questions and challenges that should help defineU.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan in the months and years ahead.Recommendations for dealing with these challenges are addressed in Section 3.

I. Afghanistan

Just over seven years after American forces and coalition partners ousted the Taliban,Afghanistans stability is far from guaranteed. Security in fact has worsened, with theTaliban and other militias expanding their presence. At the same time, Afghanistan ishome to some of the worst health and poverty indicators in the world. Rampantcorruption, drug trafficking, and deterioration in the rule of law are causing widespreaddiscontent among the population.

What is the goal in Afghanistan?

Currently there is a fundamental problem in Afghanistan: the Afghan government, theUnited States, NATO, the United Nations, and other key allies have not agreed on acommon strategy for the country. There are a number of ambitions, which most feelshould be narrowed to a common narrative. Since taking office, President Obama andSecretary of Defense Robert Gates have attempted to ratchet back expectations bycommenting that a key goal will be the elimination of safe havens in Afghanistan andPakistan. How public safety can be provided over the long term withouttheestablishment of basic rule of law institutions still needs to be clarified. In other words,basic good governance will be required to ensure that Afghanistan and Pakistan do notagain become terrorist sanctuaries or authoritarian states.

What U.S. and international force levels are required to achieve the stated objectives?

Are sufficient forces available?

Approximately 65,000 international soldiers, including 36,000 Americans, are currentlydeployed in Afghanistan.6 The United States is considering sending as many as 30,000

6 In a recent Congressional Research Service Report, Kenneth Katzman summarized overall force levels:The United States and partner countries now deploy a 51,000 troop NATO-led International SecurityAssistance Force (ISAF) that commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan. Of those, about 22,000 ofthe 36,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan are part of ISAF; the remainder (about 14,000) is under OperationEnduring Freedom. U.S. and partner forces also run 26 regional enclaves to secure reconstruction



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additional troops to Afghanistan this year (with President Obama agreeing to an initialincrease of 17,000 on February 17) to stem the rise of violence. Even at these higherlevels, the size of the force in Afghanistan continues to be determined by the number oftroops available once force needs in Iraq are met, rather than a considered estimate ofactual needs in country.

Will the allies contribute more troops and/or loosen operational restrictions (i.e.,

national caveats)?

Given U.S. force constraints, significant manpower increases beyond the additionalAmerican troops must come from allied countries in the form of additional deploymentsor loosened operational restrictions. Many NATO countries have geographic and otherrestrictions on how their forces can be used, limiting the overall number of troops thatwill engage in direct combat versus those which are more constrained to a traditionalpeacekeeping role. Despite requests from the Obama administration, support inNATOcountries for increasing force commitments and loosening caveats remains low.7

How can the capabilities of Afghan national security forces be enhanced?

The exit strategy for U.S. troops is linked to a well-trained national army and police.While the army training is considered fairly successful thus far, and national troops arerespected by the Afghan population, the police training lags far behind. The currentprojection is for the total Afghan National Army (ANA) forces to reach 134,000 byDecember 2011 (today it is at 80,000).8 Some argue that the problems in generatingadditional coalition forces could be mitigated by increasing the ANA by two to threetimes the planned figure. In addition, police reform needs to be an urgent priority, giventhe general incompetence and corruption of the forces. Police are also taking the brunt ofTaliban attacks: more than 900 have been killed in the past two years. There are alsoplans on the table to support locally organized militias in the battle against the Talibanand other extremist groups, even though many analysts are concerned about re-arminglocal militias and the control over such forces. Whichever choice is made will requiresubstantial revenue support from the international community.

Can command and control reforms improve operational efficiency and effectiveness?

Coalition forces continue to face command and control difficulties. Elevating GeneralDavid McKiernan to commander of ISAF and U.S. Forces Afghanistan in October 2008substantially improved coordination on the U.S. side, but there are still many layers of

(Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are building an Afghan National Army and National Policenow totaling about 150,000. See Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, andU.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress, January 16, 2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf.7 Jan Cienski and Isabel Gorst, Nato Allies Spurn US Troops Plea, Financial Times, February 19, 2009,http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ca851e0-feaa-11dd-b19a-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1; and CraigWhitlock, Afghanistan Appeal May Temper European Allies Ardor for Obama, Washington Post,February 6, 2009, A13.8 Michelle Tan, Dwell time may increase to 30 months by 2011,Army Times, February 5, 2009,http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/02/army_dwelltime_020209w/.

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdfhttp://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ca851e0-feaa-11dd-b19a-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/02/army_dwelltime_020209w/http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/02/army_dwelltime_020209w/http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ca851e0-feaa-11dd-b19a-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf


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complexity. CENTCOM, European Command (EUCOM), and Special OperationsCommand (SOCOM) all have responsibility for U.S. forces in the country, while ISAF iscomprised of 41 contributing states, which have the numerous caveats on how forces canbe used, often prohibiting any involvement in combat. This may not change, andpeacekeeping forces are also needed, but NATO countries should be persuaded to loosen

restrictions and transfer more authority to the NATO commander.

What actions can disrupt narcotics activities and deny Taliban funding from the drug

trade?

Counternarcotics programs have so far failed to make a major dent in opium production,possibly just moving the production of heroin into areas where the Afghan governmentand coalition forces have less control. Drugs are a major source of revenue for theTaliban and other militants. Many different strategies have been attempted, nonesuccessful. Are there other options?

How can the United States and international partners work directly with localcommunities without undermining the national government?

Enhancing governance capacity across the country is difficult given the weakness andcorruption of the central government in Kabul and, at the same time, the highlycentralized design of the state. New approaches should also be linked to elections, whichare scheduled for later this year (they have already been delayed from May to August)9.Security is one factor many politicians are already having trouble campaigning in thecountryside and there is a concern that registration will be obstructed. At the same time,the election process could be used to build up local capacity by enhancing political partytraining and other activities.

How can Afghans and coalition partners support infrastructure and development projects

while combat operations are underway?

While the coalition has made progress on major road projects, security problems nowprevent those roads from being used. Other development programs also have beenhandicapped by over centralization in Kabul, an excessive reliance on foreign experts, alack of trustworthy ministries and governors, and the kidnapping and killing of hundredsof civilian workers.

10Notwithstanding some progress on health, education, the National

Solidarity Program, and womens issues, Afghans are not receiving the assistance thathas been allocated for them. As a result, they see little-to-no improvement in the qualityof their lives, which hurts efforts by the United States and its allies to win their support.11

9 A schedule for the Afghan elections is detailed in Key Dates for the 2009 Presidential and ProvincialCouncil Elections, Civil-Military Fusion Centre draft working paper, February 11, 2009,www.cimicweb.org.10 Recent figures show that more than 400 people died working on USAID funded projects in Afghanistan.11 This was a major finding in an earlier CSIS study on Afghanistan and has grown more severe in the pasttwo years. See Frederick Barton, Karin von Hippel et al,Breaking Point: Measuring Progress inAfghanistan (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2007),http://www.csis.org/breakingpoint.

http://www.cimicweb.org/http://www.csis.org/breakingpointhttp://www.csis.org/breakingpointhttp://www.cimicweb.org/


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Children walk to school in Shimshall, a village in northern Pakistan. Photo by Philipp Frster.

II. Pakistan

On February 18, 2008, after eight years of military rule, Pakistanis elected a democraticgovernment. A year later, the initial euphoria associated with the new government has allbut evaporated, with Pakistanis growing more critical of the governments inability toaddress the dire political, economic, and security challenges facing the country. U.S.-Pakistani relations have suffered from Pakistans failure or unwillingness to stem cross-border violence into Afghanistan and the unpopularity of U.S. airstrikes on Pakistaniterritory. Internal security problems continue in Swat and other areas with seeminglyweak responses by the government.

12

Given divergent U.S. and Pakistani interests, can both countries develop a common

agenda?

Divergent interests between the United States and Pakistan complicate efforts to shiftfrom a quid pro quo model to a real partnership with Pakistani ownership of issues it nowconsiders only the priority of the United States. The United States is primarily concernedwith transnational terrorism and the militant threat emanating from the tribal areas ofPakistan. Pakistan has been overly focused on the perceived external threats from India,

12 Jane Perlez, Pakistan Makes a Taliban Truce, Creating a Haven,New York Times, February 17, 2009,http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/world/asia/17pstan.html.

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though it has recently become more concerned with its own internal insurgency due toincreased extremist violence within Pakistan. The challenge for the internationalcommunity is to help Pakistan develop counterterrorism and counterinsurgency caand assume full responsibility over domestic security.

pacity

ow should the United States target its limited levers of influence?

he United States has significantly less influence over Pakistan than Afghanistan, thed

ill more equipment and training address Pakistans insufficient counterterrorism and

creased militant violence in many parts of the country is a major challenge for the new

r

ty

ent,

ow does the United States deliver assistance and help shape the situation in a region

oalition Support Funds and other security-assistance packages continue to bolsteris in

ith

o what extent should the United States assist Pakistan economically?

akistan today suffers from acute financial, food, and energy crises. The country recentlysecured emergency assistance from the IMF after China, Saudi Arabia, and the United

HTlatter being host to an international force of 65,000 and largely dependent on foreign aifor its budget. Even multi-billion dollar assistance packages are only able to accomplishso much in terms of impact and influence in Pakistan, given the scale and complexity ofthe country. Nevertheless, Pakistan does seek assistance for its budget shortfalls and itsmilitary, and the country also wants a reliable and mature relationship with the UnitedStates.

W

counterinsurgency capacity?

Incivilian-led government. A number of distinct militias operate in Pakistan, includingsectarian groups, Kashmiri mujahideen, Pakistani and Afghan Taliban forces, theHaqqani Network (HQN), the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddun (HiG), al Qaeda, and othecriminal elements. Some of these groups have overlapping agendas and cooperate onoccasion. More than 1,900 Pakistani and expatriate civilians and more than 600 securipersonnel were killed in terrorist-related violence in 2008. The Pakistani securityservices and other investigative bodies lack the necessary doctrine, training, equipmand capacity to prevent and respond to these attacks. More importantly, there is still alack of a dominant political will in Pakistan to address the challenge of terrorists andinsurgents, with many officials preferring to label the problem as a regional one, or aPashtun issue, or even as Americas War.

H

such as FATA, where even the Pakistani government has a limited presence?

CPakistani military counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. The United Statesthe second year of the five year, $750 million FATA initiative. Yet there are importantlimitations to the programs projected impact, and expectations should be modest. In2009, Congress must decide whether to pass the Kerry-Lugar Enhanced Partnership wPakistan Act that would create a framework for U.S. assistance over the next 5-10 years,while increasing the proportion of non-security, development assistance.

T

P



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States could not meet Pakistans needs. The success of the new government and possiblyits effectiveness in other areas hinges on its ability to guide the country through theseproblems.

How can the United States strengthen Pakistans democratically elected civilian

overnment?

g history of military intervention in politics makes civilian authority overational security matters exceedingly complex. The military maintains substantial budget

-

long-standing disputes and current challenges from borderisputes to terrorism to the economy. With the presence of the Awami National Party in

entmutual

ee

liban, and other militias continue toperate in Pakistan and launch cross-border operations. These groups have extended their

ce

ec

series of loosely knit organizations some more accessible forlks than others. Various ad hoc negotiations have taken place at different levels in both

gPakistans lonnand operational autonomy. There is also the issue of controlling the Directorate for InterServices Intelligence (ISI). While Pakistan has recently attempted to reform the ISI, thegovernment remains too weak to hold the ISI, as well as the military, accountable andsubordinate to civilian government policy.

III. Regional Issues

The region is rife withdthe current Pakistani government, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan haveimproved somewhat. Increased exchanges between Afghan and Pakistaniparliamentarians, meetings of Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Afghan PresidHamid Karzai, and a peace jirga have led to greater discussion on issues ofinterest, such as institution building and counterterrorism strategies. Other substantialissues include the dispute over the Afghan-Pakistani border (the Durand line), refugpopulations, and the development of oil and gas pipelines through the region. Greaterprogress will be determined by the satisfactory reduction of India-Pakistan tensions andthe constructive engagement of other neighbors, including Iran and China.

Is there a solution to safe havens in Pakistan?

Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taopresence from the FATA region into settled parts of the North-West Frontier Provin(NWFP) and increasingly in Balochistan. Cooperation and information sharing on bothsides of the border is important, but the key issue is finding ways to contain or eliminatthe threat through extending Pakistani government control and settling lingering domestidisputes, such as those in Balochistan.

Talking to the Taliban?

The Taliban are now ataAfghanistan and Pakistan, and in some third-party countries. President Karzai has calledfor negotiations with the senior Taliban leadership, including Mullah Mohammed Omar.Agreements in Pakistan have yet to bear fruit. If talks are to have value, the UnitedStates and its allies need to determine what their role will be on both sides of the border



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and what type of support they will provide. The international and local stakeholdersinvolved must make important decisions together about the costs and benefits ofnegotiations and agreements, which groups should be dealt with, and what incentivesshould be on offer.

nited States and the international community play in reducingdia-Pakistan tensions?

ve fueled terrorism and an arms race in the region. The tragicvents of November 26, 2008 in Mumbai were a stark reminder of how quickly relations

ork

itically,

al

iplomacy by the United States and its NATO allies could be helpful in encouraging

13

What role could the UIn

Unresolved differences haebetween the nuclear-armed rivals can deteriorate. Prior to these attacks, however,Pakistan and India had made significant progress on a variety of fronts. Recently, thecountries completed the fifth round of the composite dialogue, the strategic framewunder which India and Pakistan discuss important issues such as Siachen, TulbulNavigation Project/Wullar Barrage, Sir Creek, economic and commercial cooperationand friendly exchanges, terrorism and drug trafficking, peace and security, and, cr

Jammu and Kashmir. Further progress may require both states to reduce their traditionresistance to outside assistance a difficult task when both governments are weak.

Can dialogue and coordination with regional actors improve in-country conditions?

What is the appropriate role for neighboring and important regional states? Effectivedstates such as China, Iran, India, Russia, and Saudi Arabia to engage constructively inAfghanistan.

13 Karin von Hippel, Confronting Two Key Challenges in Afghanistan, October 17, 2008,http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=5093.

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2. Assumptions

Certain assumptions have driven U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan sinceSeptember 11, 2001. The United States launched the original Afghanistan mission inorder to root out al Qaeda from its operational base in the country. At the same time, it

was assumed that a modern state could be built in a reasonable timeframe, withoutdedicating full U.S. attention to the task. Allies rallied to support the United States, butmany of these countries had limited public support back home. The decision to go to warin Iraq also distracted the United States. The relationship with Pakistan was one-dimensional, and far too focused on terrorism, former-President Pervez Musharraf, andsupport of the military, without engaging the Pakistani people.

All assumptions need to be reconsidered in order to inform policy recommendations. Thefollowing assumptions emerged from the conference and should anticipate the reality ofthe coming months. These assumptions ground the recommendations in Section 3.

Status of the security mission

1. There has been a growing sense of insecurity felt by ordinary Afghans and Pakistanisover the past two years, which is reflected in low levels of public confidence in theAfghan and Pakistani governments, the United States, and its allies. The Taliban andother insurgents are NOT popular, but the Afghan, Pakistani, and coalitiongovernments have been unable to secure the populations and promote economicdevelopment. Thus, there is still a window to turn things around and increase publicsupport.

2. In 2009, 17,000-30,000 additional U.S. troops will be deployed to Afghanistan, withhalf arriving in time to make a difference this year if they are deployed to the most

insecure areas and focus on counterinsurgency operations.3. The Afghan and Pakistani security forces will marginally improve their capacity to

deal with the challenges, but they will not make the necessary progress in 2009.14

4. Drone attacks will continue to target foreign fighters in Pakistans tribal areas.

14 The Pakistani government does not have sufficient force to defeat the Taliban and foreign fighters basedin the autonomous tribal areas along the Afghan border. Pamela Constable, Islamic Law Instituted InPakistan's Swat Valley, Washington Post, February 17, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/16/AR2009021601063.html.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/16/AR2009021601063.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/16/AR2009021601063.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/16/AR2009021601063.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/16/AR2009021601063.html


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Bundles of supplies descend toward a drop zone in Afghanistan on April 25, 2008, after U.S. Airmendropped them from a C-17 Globemaster III aircraft. DoD photo by Master Sgt. Andy Dunaway, U.S. Air

Force.

The Stakes

1. Afghanistan is no longer the safe haven or base for the al Qaeda network (though theystill maintain a presence) and it is unlikely that a major attack on the United Stateswill come from that country in the near term.Pakistan poses a greater threat in regard to tran2. snational terrorism than doesAfghanistan. The recognition of this threat by a vast majority of Pakistanis is criticalto regional and global safety.Pakistans difficult political tra3. nsition and serious economic crisis will make it anerratic ally.

Operational limitations

1. The situation is unlikely to improve by doing everything better without shifts inleadership, strategy, and resources.The U.S. government remains ambivalent a2. bout both the nature and advisability ofdeveloping an interagency regional strategy and will not show operational agility inthe near term.

3. More resources, including a civilian surge of about 500 people, will be madeavailable across the U.S. government, but the basic models of operation will need tochange in order to gain substantial benefit.



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4. Pakistan will not eliminate Taliban/al Qaeda sanctuaries or develop a rapid posolution for the governance problems in the tribal regions. The Pakistani governmentis not likely to develop a workable political-m

litical

ilitary strategy and doctrine to deal with

will

t increased force deployments or rules of engagement that are more flexible

unless

. U.S. and allied policy will be driven by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, and regionalecome more engaged.17

. There is an opportunity to change policy and operations in the coming months.to result in a decisive turning point.

ars,ays

counterinsurgency in the near term, or to build the necessary public support.5. Extremism could well spread into other parts of Pakistan as provincial issues are not

addressed and economic pressures increase. Increased U.S. and NATO militaryefforts in southern Afghanistan may generate a spillover into adjacent areas ofPakistan.

6. The NATO allies do not all share U.S. priorities, thus the mission in Afghanistancontinue to be opposed by the publics of some of the top contributing allies.Significanare unlikely.

15

7. The Afghanistan war will become increasingly unpopular in the United Statesa more focused narrative is developed and disseminated, one that has achievablegoals.

16

Greater Clarity

1players will b

23. Significant attention and resources will be dedicated to the upcoming Afghan

elections, but the outcome is not likely4. Significant U.S. and international assistance will be necessary for the next ten ye

but the total will not be as large as current expenditures since two-thirds of todspending goes toward U.S. troops.

15

Craig Whitlock, Afghanistan Appeal May Temper European Allies Ardor for Obama, WashingtonPost, February 6, 2009, A13, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/05/AR2009020503786.html.16 See the recent polling data indicating there is a limited public appetite for a greater U.S. role inAfghanistan: barely more than a third, 34 percent, said the number of U.S. military forces in that countryshould be increased. About as many would opt for a decrease (29 percent) or no change at all (32 percent).Karen DeYoung, More Troops Headed to Afghanistan, Washington Post, February 18, 2009, A1,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/17/AR2009021702411.html.17 Paddy Ashdown, Just the man to bang heads together in Kabul, (London) Times, February 2, 2009,http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article5634470.ece.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/05/AR2009020503786.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/05/AR2009020503786.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/17/AR2009021702411.htmlhttp://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article5634470.ecehttp://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article5634470.ecehttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/17/AR2009021702411.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/05/AR2009020503786.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/05/AR2009020503786.html


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3. Recommendations and Policy Options

The overriding need in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region is for a common purpose that isunderstood and agreed to by all parties, including the leadership of each country, theirpublics, the neighbors, and international players. Without a simple and achievable set of

goals that unite the governments of the region and the alliance, it is difficult to imagine awinning strategy or even minimal success.

Unity of purpose is possible in grave times. Recent polling in Afghanistan has shownthat the vast majority of the population is eager for a safe and predictable future. 18 Theterrorist attack on Mumbai has brought forward a new and higher degree of collaborationamong the intelligence services of India, Pakistan, and the United States.19 Most of theNATO countries support the current strategic reviews, and the deteriorating internationaleconomic crisis may curtail the meddling of some neighboring countries.

It will not be enough to make incremental improvements. Small increases in troops,

improved diplomacy, reduced corruption, and a flush of economic assistance will beinsufficient. The publics of Afghanistan and Pakistan have been losing confidence formore than two years, and it is necessary to make more dramatic changes in order to gaintheir full participation and ownership of the challenges.20

The PCR Project has developed a Five Critical Step Model21 to improve overallresponse to states at risk. These five can also provide the framework for therecommendations section of this report, which includes five necessary steps to achievethe desired outcome in the region.

The Way Forward

Simplify and clarify the overarching goals to develop a sense of common purpose.The people of Afghanistan and Pakistan must believe that their safety and well-being willbe advanced by fighting the insurgents/terrorists and stabilizing the region. Their alliesmust see targets achieved within reasonable periods. The following goals would help todefine the mission:

18 Gary Langer, Frustration With War, Problems in Daily Life Send Afghans' Support for U.S. EffortsTumbling, ABC News, February 9, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/story?id=6787686&page=1.19

Joby Warrick and Karen DeYoung, CIA Helped India, Pakistan Share Secrets in Probe of MumbaiSiege, Washington Post, February 16, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/15/AR2009021501957.html?nav=emailpage.20 See CSIS studies Barton, von Hippel et al,Breaking Point, http://www.csis.org/breakingpoint, a data richreview of progress in Afghanistan that showed a growing concern all over the country regarding securityand the minimal benefits of assistance; and Frederick Barton, Karin von Hippel, and Mehlaqa Samdani, ANew Course for Pakistan, May 2008,http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4488.21 See Publications at the PCR Project blog, http://forums.csis.org/pcrproject/?page_id=266.

http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/story?id=6787686&page=1http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/15/AR2009021501957.html?nav=emailpagehttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/15/AR2009021501957.html?nav=emailpagehttp://www.csis.org/breakingpointhttp://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4488http://forums.csis.org/pcrproject/?page_id=266http://forums.csis.org/pcrproject/?page_id=266http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4488http://www.csis.org/breakingpointhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/15/AR2009021501957.html?nav=emailpagehttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/15/AR2009021501957.html?nav=emailpagehttp://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/story?id=6787686&page=1


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A CH-47 Chinook helicopter flies over Kabul, Afghanistan, June 4, 2007. DoD photo by Cherie A.Thurlby.

Goals:

in both countries that will allow for

ive steps:

at U.S. officials and

Restore a degree of sustainable public safetyfreedom of movement, assembly, and speech.

Increase the sense of direct ownership and responsibility for progress among localcitizens and their leaders.

Secure the support of all key allies and other partners for a three-year militarycommitment and for longer-term economic aid.

hese goals can be achieved by taking the following fT

1. Improve Basic Knowledge of the Region. It is essential thpartners admit to high degrees of uncertainty about critical parts of both countries that

are not fully under national government control. Garrison-like operations have left largeswathes of land in Pakistan and Afghanistan poorly understood, difficult terrain has beenunyielding, myths about the Pashtun and Balochi people persist, and natural connectionsbetween the region and the diaspora are not being made. This is more than simpleintelligence a fundamental broadening of information gathering, using open sources,cell phones, Web 2.0, and other social networking tools, coupled with a broad publiceducation effort about what is happening in the area is needed within the region andamong the allies.



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The following actions would help national and international policymakers make asignificant difference:

Actions:

Expand the contact pool of policymakers to include hundreds of new publicurces that reach beyond capitol-based officials and intelligence professionalsders,

uld be to

utherngion),

.

to

egrated strategyesigned to be carried out in the main by national populations, with external support.

rd shouldled

sointo local communities, and include journalists, civil society and religious leastudents, businessmen and women, teachers, police, and activists.

Invest in interactive exchanges on official and informal levels with a wide-rangeof broad-based civic organizations and media outlets. The goal shodevelop regular two-way exchanges between people and officials.

Draw on the connections and social networks between Karachi (the largestPashtun city in the world), NWFP, Balochistan, troubled areas of soPunjab, the United Arab Emirates (with its significant workforce from the rediaspora populations in the UK, and key provinces in Afghanistan/Pakistan

Convene a U.S. government-wide conference (virtual and in-person attendance)of current and former officials with experience in the region to test ideas andexpand avenues of information. Use this kind of outreach to build a broaderelectronic community of unclassified contacts and opinions.

2. Develop a Coherent Strategy. What is critically needed isan intdOver the past few years there have been too many competing visions, internalcontradictions, individual and disconnected country programs and projects, foreignversus national leadership struggles, and long lists of priorities. The way forwabe anchored in Afghan and Pakistani willingness to satisfy popular demands in troubparts of their countries and to stand up to terrorists and insurgents. All responses to

locally driven calls for help from the international community need to be grounded in arealistic assessment of political will and available resources. Key elements of thestrategy should include:

Strategic Elements:

Ensure that the elected governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan acceptponsibility and design appropriate roles for neighboring and alliance

vernance wherever it is promising,ers,

s. Ine

leadership rescountries that go beyond their current efforts.

Focus the vast majority of the effort (70-80%) in a few provinces (in bothAfghanistan and Pakistan) and seek to build gofrom select ministries to governors, local village, city, and civil society lead

womens groups, and public servants, such as teachers, judges, and police. Build up force levels22 in targeted provinces so that there will be a reassuring

presence of security forces at the district level in current Taliban strongholdAfghanistan, there should be a three-year plan to transfer the leadership in thesplaces to the Afghan National Army and police, with the international capability

22 See RAND study on force levels. Since there is no chance of reaching the prescribed levels nationally(1:50 ratio suggests 300,000-600,000 forces necessary in Afghanistan), make sure that it happens in a fewkey provinces.



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being directed at a rapid response23 and a possible follow-on role for the UnitedNations.

24

Expand public and private discussions with key insurgent groups to determinetheir interest in joining a peaceful political process.

.

population, which comprises

of all efforts must be on the promotion of localadership and responsibility, in every available realm. As the dependence on singular

t everye following

Opportunities

Elevate the rule of law, which continues to be a recurring problem in the region Dedicate a significant effort to the regions under-25more than half of the population.

3. Catalyze Operations. The emphasislefigures and institutions has grown, public confidence has dropped. The early momentumfrom the Grand Loya Jirga process, which brought together numerous parties from allparts of Afghanistan, has been lost and must be restored and expanded, on a regionalbasis when possible. Only by expanding the decision-making and benefits ofprogramming to the universe of prospective leadership throughout the region canprogress take root. This should include local tribes, the Pashtun and Balochi

communities, a full range of Pakistans developing political parties, and partners alevel of the Afghan government.

25Putting local people first can be done in th

way:

Local

Encourage cross border peace jirgas of key communities.t the alliance is in a position to outspend any insurgent forces in the

lp empower them and build their

cashto people and local groups who demonstrate initiative or provide in-

nd national tragedies (assassinations, mass murders, etc.) in

both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Make sure thaemployment of local fighters or allies. 26

Channel assistance through popularly-elected local groups, such as the AwamiNational Party in Pakistans NWFP, to hecapacity.

Advance regional compacts for sharing terrorist information and other keyconcerns. Develop matching grants for community safety programs and expand direct

assistancekind contributions.

Support the establishment of Truth Commissions and special investigations intoofficial corruption a

23 See the recommendation describing helicopters and lift capacity Barton, von Hippel et al,BreakingPoint, 69, http://www.csis.org/breakingpoint, , http://www.csis.org/breakingpoint.24

Imran Khan, An Open LetterFrom PakistanTo President Obama, Forbes, January 29, 2009,http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/29/obama-afghanistan-taliban-opinions-contributors_0129_imran_khan.html.25 Karin von Hippel and Frederick Barton, Getting it Right in Pakistan and Afghanistan, CSISCommentary, January 28, 2009,http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,5226/type,1/.26 In some areasthe Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army pay recruits roughly $100 permonth, while the Taliban have paid $150 or more, quoted in Seth Jones, Going the Distance,Washington Post, February 15, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/13/AR2009021301646.html.

http://www.csis.org/breakingpointhttp://www.csis.org/breakingpointhttp://www.forbes.com/2009/01/29/obama-afghanistan-taliban-opinions-contributors_0129_imran_khan.htmlhttp://www.forbes.com/2009/01/29/obama-afghanistan-taliban-opinions-contributors_0129_imran_khan.htmlhttp://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,5226/type,1/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/13/AR2009021301646.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/13/AR2009021301646.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/13/AR2009021301646.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/13/AR2009021301646.htmlhttp://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,5226/type,1/http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/29/obama-afghanistan-taliban-opinions-contributors_0129_imran_khan.htmlhttp://www.forbes.com/2009/01/29/obama-afghanistan-taliban-opinions-contributors_0129_imran_khan.htmlhttp://www.csis.org/breakingpointhttp://www.csis.org/breakingpoint


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4. Measure Progress Independently. The overarching goal is to increase the stability othe region and the safety of the local people so that there will be fewer threats, and theycan begin the difficult task of rebuilding

f

their countries. Accordingly, the situation in the

gregion will need to get to the point where citizens have a fighting chance of making it ontheir own. Key questions should be: What are the tipping points? Are we better off doin

more or less? What is a certain objective worth in terms of resources and opportunitycost? To be credible, there will need to be clearly stated goals, some baseline measures,independent data collection, accountability, and transparent reporting. The following area few fair measures to consider for the coming three years:

Fair Measures

In the next year, the alliance must shrink the operating space of the insurgents inboth Afghanistan and Pakistan, and secure more of Afghanistans South and East

trict level. The protection of local leaders must also be improved.

e who

ould be

dn in each country. How can a single FM

radio station in the Swat valley so dominate the psyche of an entire region? Much more

at the dis

Polling numbers that reflect public confidence in the entire enterprise shouldimprove in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in alliance countries.

27

Assistance programs should be able to show vastly larger numbers of peoplhave received direct assistance. The trials, timeliness, and the activity level of the justice system sh

significantly increased and improved.

5. Fully Engage the Public. The restoration of civil order depends on the belief ancommitment of the vast majority of the populatio

must be done to engage and mobilize the people. This will require new levels of trustthat have been eroded by years of violence, corruption, double-dealing, and a lack oftransparency. Initial communications steps should include the following:

Communications Steps:

Massive national campaigns of revulsion against terrorist attacks on civilians,which would include locally-produced television ads, radio programs, Internet

t message alerts, and other promotions that feature the innocent

punity, and corruption. Constitutions

ave been violated, political leaders assassinated, treasuries and programs ransacked, andnor

and cell phone texvictims and steps that can be taken by local groups.

Youth-oriented programs that increase their community roles and broaden theirexposure to social progress in the region.

The trust deficit in the region has unfortunately been built on years of violence andintimidation, weak to non-existent rule of law, im

hcrime tolerated. Judges have not met their obligations and police have not been paidprotected. This must change for average people to have any hope of a peaceful future.All parties who seek a peaceful resolution to the regions many challenges must weigh

27 Frederick Barton, Measuring Progress in International State Building and Reconstruction, A Paper forthe Aspen European Strategy Forum, August 20, 2008, http://forums.csis.org/pcrproject//wp-content/uploads/2009/02/barton_mop_august2008.pdf.

http://forums.csis.org/pcrproject//wp-content/uploads/2009/02/barton_mop_august2008.pdfhttp://forums.csis.org/pcrproject//wp-content/uploads/2009/02/barton_mop_august2008.pdfhttp://forums.csis.org/pcrproject//wp-content/uploads/2009/02/barton_mop_august2008.pdfhttp://forums.csis.org/pcrproject//wp-content/uploads/2009/02/barton_mop_august2008.pdf


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their own limitations, the risks and opportunities of the situation, and the direct andunintended consequences of action and inaction.

The people and governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan need to become full partners inis new policy and approach. The ultimate goal is to empower national actors to

e off-rs in

th

strengthen governance and fight extremism and corruption on their own terms. Bothcountries are too big and too complex to allow their development and security to bshored. Pakistanis and Afghans need to be fully in the lead, with international partnean integrated, supporting role. Only then will joint efforts translate into peace andsecurity.



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Acknowledgments

The conference,Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Brink, and this report would not havebeen possible without the support of our donors as well as the assistance of manyindividuals who generously contributed their time and expertise. The PCR Project team

would like to thank its own staff as well as the moderators, speakers, working groupleaders, and rapporteurs listed below. Special thanks to Joseph McMillan, our invaluablepartner at the National Defense University, and Ambassador Teresita Schaffer and LtColRobert Scott at CSIS for helping to conceive and organize the conference. The PCRProject would like to extend a special thanks to the Open Society Institute, thePloughshares Fund, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for their generoussupport.

The authors are responsible for the content and judgments in this report, which should notbe construed to represent opinions of CSIS or any of the persons listed here.

Staff

CSIS

Justine FleischnerShannon HaydenKatherine KoleskiCAPT Jeffrey Maclay,

USNKarina MarshallDaniel PorterTeresita Schaffer

LtCol Robert Scott, USMCDavid SokolowRebecca WexlerHeather Winn

NDU

Andrew BurtPatrick CroninGerald FaberJoseph McMillan

ModeratorsAnthony CordesmanJoseph McMillanTeresita SchafferKarin von Hippel

Speakers

Jonah BlankRichard BoucherJohn DisterCharles Michael Johnson,

Jr.David KilcullenJames KunderRobert LambStephen Lennon

Polly NayakCol. David O. Smith (ret.),U.S. Army

Mark Webber

Working Group Leaders

R. Stephen BrentBeth ColeGlenn CowanAudrey CroninEvelyn Farkas

Col. Jeffrey Hemler (ret.),USMC

Timothy D. HoytJerry HymanElisabeth Kvitashvili

CAPT Jeffrey Maclay,USN

Charles NorthCol. Scott Taylor, U.S.

ArmyAlex ThierCaroline WadhamsAndrew WinnerTheodore Wright

Rapporteurs

Katherine CampbellColin CookmanStephanie GilbertNicholas HamiseviczLt. Isaac Harris, USNAndrew JaynesDavid KastenSahar KhanMichael KofmanAdam Mausner

Thomas PattersonAzita RanjbarMehlaqa SamdaniAdam SeitzDaniel SimonsSarah SorouiJeremy White


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Appendix A: Conference Agenda

Afghanistan and Pakistan on the BrinkNovember 21, 2008

8:00-8:30am Breakfast and Registration

8:30-8:35am Opening Remarks: Dr. Karin von Hippel, senior fellow andcodirector, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, CSIS

8:35-9:20am Keynote #1: Mr. James Kunder, Acting Deputy Administrator,U.S. Agency for International Development

Chair: Dr. Karin von Hippel, senior fellow and codirector,Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, CSIS

9:20-10:45am Session #1: Breaking the Cycle: Establishing Long-term

Partnerships and Constructing a Regional Approach

9:20-10:20am Panel Discussion

Ms. Polly Nayak, Independent Consultant, former SouthAsia Issue Manager for the Central Intelligence Agency

and the intelligence community

Colonel David O. Smith (ret.), U.S. Army; Senior DefenseIntelligence Officer for Pakistan, Defense Intelligence

Agency; formerly Country Director for Pakistan in the

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Dr. Jonah Blank, Chief Policy Advisor for South Asia,Central Asia and Archipelagic Southeast Asia, Majority

staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Moderator: Dr. Karin von Hippel, senior fellow andcodirector, PCR Project, CSIS

10:20-10:45am Working Group Discussion

10:45am-12:00pm Session #2: Eliminating Safe Havens: Crafting a Successful

Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Strategy

10:45-11:45am Panel Discussion

Dr. David Kilcullen, special adviser for counterinsurgencyto the United States Secretary of State

Mr. Robert Lamb, University of Maryland, co-manager andauthor of the final report for the Ungoverned Areas Project



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under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for

Policy

Mr. Stephen Lennon, Asia/Middle East Team Leader,Office of Transition Initiatives, U.S. Agency for

International Development

Moderator: Dr. Anthony Cordesman, holder of the ArleighA. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS

11:45am-12:00pm Working Group Discussion

12:00-1:15pm Lunch

12:30-1:15pm Keynote #2: Ambassador Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary,Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Department of State

Chair: Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, Director, South AsiaProgram, CSIS

1:15-2:55pm Session #3: Reversing the Trends: Next Steps

1:15-2:30pm Panel Discussion

Mr. Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director-InternationalCounterterrorism & Afghanistan/Pakistan-Related Issues,

International Affairs and Trade Team, Government

Accountability Office

Mr. John Dister, Deputy National Intelligence Officer forSouth Asia

Mr. Mark Webber, Special Assistant to the President andSenior Director for National Security Affairs for South and

Central Asia, National Security Council

Moderator: Mr. Joe McMillan, Acting Director ofResearch, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National

Defense University

2:30-2:55pm Working Group Discussion

2:55-3:00pm Closing Remarks: Mr. Joe McMillan, Acting Director ofResearch, Institute for National Strategic Studies, NationalDefense University

3:00-3:30pm Reception



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Appendix B: Conference Participants

U.S. Government Participation atAfghanistan and Pakistan on the BrinkNovember 21, 2008

Executive Branch AgenciesDepartment of DefenseDepartment of StateDepartment of TreasuryU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentOffice of the Director of National IntelligenceCentral Intelligence AgencyDefense Intelligence Agency

Executive Office of the PresidentNational Security Council

Office of the Vice PresidentOffice of Management and BudgetOffice of the U.S. Trade Representative

CongressU.S. House of RepresentativesU.S. SenateCongressional Budget OfficeCongressional Research ServiceGovernment Accountability Office

Attendance160 U.S. government44 Think tanks, universities, contractors, consultants, and former government

officials204 Total



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Further Reading

Richard L. Armitage and Lee H. Hamilton, senior reviewers, The Next Chapter: TheUnited States and Pakistan, Pakistan Policy Working Group, September 2008,http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/09_pakistan_cohen/09_p

akistan_cohen.pdf.

Frederick Barton, Derek Chollet, Mark Irvine, Bradley Larson, and Karin von Hippel,ASteep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States (Washington,DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008),http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4123/.

Frederick Barton, Karin von Hippel, Seema Patel, and Steven Ross,Breaking Point:Measuring Progress in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, 2007), http://www.csis.org/breakingpoint.

Frederick Barton and Morgan Courtney,In the Balance: Measuring Progress in

Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,2005),http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=2580.

Frederick Barton, Mehlaqa Samdani, and Karin von Hippel, A New Course for Pakistan:PCR Project Research Visit, PCR Project Special Briefing, May 14, 2008,http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4488.

Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban (NewYork: Penguin Press, 2006), http://www.amazon.com/Punishment-Virtue-Inside-Afghanistan-Taliban/dp/0143112066/ref=ed_oe_p

Craig Cohen,A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan (Washington,DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007),http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4147.

Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,2004), http://www.amazon.com/Idea-Pakistan-Stephen-P-Cohen/dp/081571503X/ref=ed_oe_p

Anthony Cordesman, Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan SecurityForces, Working Draft, January 6, 2009,http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090106_ansf.pdf.

Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made inConstructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a SustainableMaintenance Program Are Needed, Report to Congressional Committees, July2008, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08689.pdf.

Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional ActionMay Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/09_pakistan_cohen/09_pakistan_cohen.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/09_pakistan_cohen/09_pakistan_cohen.pdfhttp://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4123/http://www.csis.org/breakingpointhttp://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=2580http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4488http://www.amazon.com/Punishment-Virtue-Inside-Afghanistan-Taliban/dp/0143112066/ref=ed_oe_phttp://www.amazon.com/Punishment-Virtue-Inside-Afghanistan-Taliban/dp/0143112066/ref=ed_oe_phttp://www.amazon.com/Punishment-Virtue-Inside-Afghanistan-Taliban/dp/0143112066/ref=ed_oe_phttp://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4147http://www.amazon.com/Idea-Pakistan-Stephen-P-Cohen/dp/081571503X/ref=ed_oe_phttp://www.amazon.com/Idea-Pakistan-Stephen-P-Cohen/dp/081571503X/ref=ed_oe_phttp://www.amazon.com/Idea-Pakistan-Stephen-P-Cohen/dp/081571503X/ref=ed_oe_phttp://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090106_ansf.pdfhttp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08689.pdfhttp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08689.pdfhttp://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090106_ansf.pdfhttp://www.amazon.com/Idea-Pakistan-Stephen-P-Cohen/dp/081571503X/ref=ed_oe_phttp://www.amazon.com/Idea-Pakistan-Stephen-P-Cohen/dp/081571503X/ref=ed_oe_phttp://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4147http://www.amazon.com/Punishment-Virtue-Inside-Afghanistan-Taliban/dp/0143112066/ref=ed_oe_phttp://www.amazon.com/Punishment-Virtue-Inside-Afghanistan-Taliban/dp/0143112066/ref=ed_oe_phttp://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4488http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=2580http://www.csis.org/breakingpointhttp://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4123/http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/09_pakistan_cohen/09_pakistan_cohen.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/09_pakistan_cohen/09_pakistan_cohen.pdf


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Capable Afghan National Security Forces, Report to Congressional Committees,June 2008, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08661.pdf.

Government Accountability Office, Combating Terrorism: The United States LacksComprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven inPakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Report to Congressional

Requesters, April 2008, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622

Government Accountability Office, Increased Oversight and Accountability OverPakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds Needed, Report toCongressional Requesters, June 2008, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08806.pdf

Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque And Military (Washington, DC: CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, 2005), http://www.amazon.com/Pakistan-Between-Military-Husain-Haqqani/dp/0870032143.

Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, No Sign until the Burst of Fire:Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier. International Security 32 4

(Spring 2008): 41-77, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3204_pp041-077_Johnson_Mason.pdf.

James L. Jones and Thomas R. Pickering, co-chairs, Afghanistan Study Group Report:Revitalizing Our Efforts, Rethinking Our Strategies, Center for the Study of thePresidency, January 30, 2008,http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/Afghan_Study_Group_final.pdf.

Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, CRSReport for Congress, January 16, 2009,http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf.

K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, CRS Report for Congress, November 10,2008, http://opencrs.com/document/RL33498.

K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman, Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress,November 21, 2008, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/113202.pdf.

Robert D. Lamb, "Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens, Final Report of theUngoverned Areas Project, prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary ofDefense for Policy, January 2008,http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/display.php?id=306

James R. Locher III et al, Forging a New Shield, Project on National Security Reform,November 2008,http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20forging%20a%20new%20shield.pdf.

Daniel Markey, Securing Pakistans Tribal Belt(Washington, DC: Council on ForeignRelations, 2008),http://www.cfr.org/publication/16763/securing_pakistans_tribal_belt.html.

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08661.pdfhttp://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08806.pdfhttp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08806.pdfhttp://www.amazon.com/Pakistan-Between-Military-Husain-Haqqani/dp/0870032143http://www.amazon.com/Pakistan-Between-Military-Husain-Haqqani/dp/0870032143http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3204_pp041-077_Johnson_Mason.pdfhttp://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3204_pp041-077_Johnson_Mason.pdfhttp://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/Afghan_Study_Group_final.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdfhttp://opencrs.com/document/RL33498http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/113202.pdfhttp://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/display.php?id=306http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/display.php?id=306http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20forging%20a%20new%20shield.pdfhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/16763/securing_pakistans_tribal_belt.htmlhttp://www.cfr.org/publication/16763/securing_pakistans_tribal_belt.htmlhttp://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20forging%20a%20new%20shield.pdfhttp://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/display.php?id=306http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/113202.pdfhttp://opencrs.com/document/RL33498http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdfhttp://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/Afghan_Study_Group_final.pdfhttp://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3204_pp041-077_Johnson_Mason.pdfhttp://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3204_pp041-077_Johnson_Mason.pdfhttp://www.amazon.com/Pakistan-Between-Military-Husain-Haqqani/dp/0870032143http://www.amazon.com/Pakistan-Between-Military-Husain-Haqqani/dp/0870032143http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08806.pdfhttp://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08661.pdf


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Michael F. Martin and K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistans Capital Crisis: Implications forU.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress, November 21, 2008,http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/113214.pdf.

Joseph McMillan, Energy Security in South Asia: Can Interdependence BreedStability? Strategic Forum, September 2008,

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF232/SF232.pdf.

Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (New York:Oxford University Press USA, 2008), http://www.amazon.com/Crossed-Swords-Pakistan-Army-Within/dp/0195476603.

Polly Nayak, The Impact of Pakistan's and Bangladesh's National Strategies on U.S.Interests, in Strategic Asia 200809: Challenges and Choices, ed. Ashley J.Tellis, Mercy Kuo, and Andrew Marble (Washington, DC: The National Bureauof Asian Research, 2008), http://forums.csis.org/pcrproject/?p=733.

Ahmed Rashid,Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation

building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Viking Penguin,2008) http://www.amazon.com/Descent-into-Chaos-Building-Afghanistan/dp/0670019704.

Robert R. Scott, A Battalions Employment of The Elements of National Power,Small Wars Journal, February 5, 2008,http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/02/a-battalions-employment-of-the.php.

United States Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24, December 2006,http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf

United States Army, Stability Operations, Field Manual 3-07, October 2008,

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf

Karin von Hippel, Confronting Two Key Challenges: A PCR Project Research Visit,PCR Project Special Briefing, October 17, 2008,http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,5093/.

Caroline Wadhams, Brian Katulis, Lawrence Korb, and Colin Cookman, Partnership forProgress: Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan andthe Region, Center for American Progress, November 2008,http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/11/pdf/pakistan.pdf.

Joshua T. White, Pakistans Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in

Pakistans North-West Frontier(Arlington, VA: Center on Faith & InternationalAffairs, 2008), http://pakistanstudies-aips.org/English/PDF/Islamist%20Frontier%20(summary).pdf.

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Biographies

Frederick Barton is a senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program andcodirector of its Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project. He is currently on the WorldEconomic Forums Global Agenda Council on Humanitarian Assistance, was a member

of the Presidential Transition Agency Review Team on Development Assistance, and wasthe chair of the Obama for President Subgroup on Post-Conflict Reconstruction. He wasalso a member of the CSIS Commission on Smart Power, cochair of a the WorkingGroup on Stabilization and Reconstruction at the U.S. Institute of Peace, cochair of theWorking Group on Reconstruction and Development at the Princeton Project on NationalSecurity, and an expert adviser to the Iraq Study Group and the Task Force on the UnitedNations. An active contributor to public discussions through the press, panels, andspeeches, and at congressional and international hearings, Barton was also a visitinglecturer at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University for five years, where hewas the Frederick H. Schultz Professor of Economic Policy and lecturer on public andinternational affairs. His work is informed by 12 years of experience in nearly 30 global

hot spots, including serving as UN deputy high commissioner for refugees in Geneva(19992001) and as the first director of the Office of Transition Initiatives at the U.S.Agency for International Development (19941999). A graduate of Harvard College(1971), Barton earned his M.B.A. from Boston University (1982), with an emphasis onpublic management, and received an honorary doctorate of humane letters from WheatonCollege of Massachusetts (2001).

Karin von Hippel is a senior fellow in the CSIS International Security Program andcodirector of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project. She is currently on the WorldEconomic Forums Global Agenda Council on Fragile States and has direct experience inover two dozen conflict zones. Previously, she was a senior research fellow at the Centre

for Defence Studies, Kings College London, and spent several years working for theUnited Nations and the European Union in Somalia and Kosovo. In 2004 and 2005, sheparticipated in two major studies for the UNone on UN peacekeeping and the secondon the UN humanitarian system. Also in 2004, she was part of a small team funded byUSAID to investigate the development potential of Somali remittances. In 2002, sheadvised the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on the role ofdevelopment cooperation in discovering the root causes of terrorism. She directed aproject on European counterterrorist reforms funded by the MacArthur Foundation andedited the volumeEurope Confronts Terrorism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). She was amember of Project Unicorn, a counterterrorism police advisory panel in London.Additional publications includeDemocracy by Force (Cambridge, 2000), which was

short-listed for the Westminster Medal in Military History. She received her Ph.D. ininternational relations from the London School of Economics, her M.St. from OxfordUniversity, and her B.A. from Yale University.



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Mark Irvine is a research assistant with the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project,where he works on a range of U.S. foreign policy issues. He is currently involved inprojects examining U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, governmentcapabilities for addressing fragile states, and counterterrorism strategy. He coauthored thestudy,A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States (CSIS Press,

2008), identifying legislative and executive branch obstacles to improved stabilizationand reconstruction operations. Mr. Irvine received a B.A. from Boston College ininternational studies with a focus on security studies and economic relations.

Thomas Patterson is an intern with The Washington Quarterly at CSIS, where he doesresearch on global strategic changes and their public-policy implications. He also hasworked as a reporter and editor for newspapers in New Hampshire and Virginia. Hereceived an M.A. from The University of Texas at Austin in Asian Studies, with a focuson Islamic Studies and the modern history and politics of Pakistan, and a B.A. fromWashington and Lee University in history.

Mehlaqa Samdani is a consultant and advisor to the PCR Project on Pakistan. Shepreviously managed political development projects in Pakistan where she trained womenin rural Punjab to contest local council elections. She has also been actively involvedwith track-two peace initiatives between India and Pakistan. Prior to her work with CSIS,she was a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations with the U.S. ForeignPolicy and Women program. She also has extensive experience with development andhumanitarian work in various conflict settings. Samdani is a graduate of the FletcherSchool of Law and Diplomacy and has an undergraduate degree from the University ofDenver.



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About CSIS

At a time of new global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and policy solutions todecisionmakers in government, international institutions, the private sector, and civil

society. A bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, DC, CSISconducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the futureand anticipate change.

Founded in 1962 by David M. Abshire andAdmiral Arleigh Burke, at the height of theCold War, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways for America to sustain its prominence andprosperity as a force for good in the world.

Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the worlds preeminent internationalpolicy institutions, with more than 220 full-time staffand a large network ofaffiliatedscholars focused on defense and security, regional stability, andtransnational

challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economicintegration.

Former U.S. senatorSam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999,andJohn J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since April2000.

About the PCR Project

The Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Project at CSIS develops innovative strategies to

speed, enhance, and strengthen international conflict response. Established in 2001, thePCR Project is seen as a leading global source for authoritative analysis, evaluation, andrecommendations for fragile states and post-conflict reconstruction.

The Project focuses on the full spectrum of conflict-related concerns, from early warningand conflict prevention to rebuilding shattered societies. It incorporates the four essentialpillars of reconstruction: security and public safety, justice and reconciliation, governanceand participation, and economic and social progress. PCR Project staff collaboratesclosely with U.S. congressional and executive branch decisionmakersas well as localcommunities and international partners.

The PCR Project has conductedpath-breaking studies on Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan,Sudan, Sri Lanka, and special challenges - such as youth in conflict. The PCR Projectblog (www.pcrproject.com) is a source of regular commentary and analysis.

The project is codirected by Frederick Barton andKarin von Hippel. Contact Mark Irvine([email protected]; 202-741-3941) for more information.
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