> areva np gmbh nrpp-g, 2009-05-27 1 areva np all rights are reserved, see liability notice

> AREVA NP GmbH • NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 1AREVA NP All rights are reserved, see liability notice.


BELENE NPP

SAFETY I&C SYSTEMS BASED

ON TELEPERM XS

BULGARIAN NUCLEAR ENERGY – NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND WORLD ENERGY SAFETY

Varna 27-29.05.09

Speaker: Ognyan Trichkov (MSC) – AREVA NP GmbH Co-Author: Dipl.-Ing. Hartwig Blessing – AREVA NP GmbH


Guideline for the Presentation

1. Requirements by Customer and IAEA

2. Identification of I&C Systems

3. Plant Control Philosophy

4. Overview System Platform Teleperm XS

5. Teleperm XS References


1. Requirements by NEK and IAEACorrelation between Classification Concepts

NEK requires a Safety function classification based on IAEA and International Electro technical Commission (IEC) Nuclear Standard

The correlation between

> Safety classes of fluid-retaining components

> Classes of I&C systems according to IAEA NS-G-1.3

> Classes of I&C systems according to IEC 61513

> Categories of I&C FSE according to IEC 61226

is provided in this table.


1. Requirements by NEK and IAEASafety Philosophy

Safety Philosophy

> Concept of Defense in Depth

> Distribution of I&C Functions

> Availability

Reliability

Maintainability

> Credibility

Integrity - Security

Redundancy and Single Failure

Criterion,

Prevention of Common-Cause

Failures

> Diversity of I&C Systems

> Independence and Separation

Preventive Line of DefenseCompliance of normal operation

Main Line of DefenseControl of design base accidents

Detection and Interception Line of DefenseDetection & interception of deviations from normal operation

Risk Reduction Line of DefenseOff-site emergency response

Operational I&C SystemProcess Automation System (PAS)

Preventive Protection SystemReactor Limitation Control System (RLCS)

Safety Automation System (SAS)

Safety SystemsProtection System with Reactor Trip and ESFAS

I&C Control of beyond design accident Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS)

1s

t L

ine

2n

d L

ine

3rd

Lin

e

4th

Lin

e

Fission Products

Name of Defense Line

I&C Systems which implements the Defense Lines


2. Identification of I&C Systems

The I&C functions are grouped as follows:

> Process information and control functions

> Reactor limitation functions

> Reactor power control functions

> Protection functions

> Automatic backup functions

> Post accident monitoring functions

On the basis of the identification of functions that are required I&C systems are established to perform these functions.

The main systems are:

> Process Information and Control System (PICS)

> Safety Information and Control System (SICS)

> Process Automation System (PAS)

> Safety Automation System (SAS)

> Reactor Limitation and Control System (RLCS)

> Protection System (PS)

> Passive Heat Removal System (PHRA)

> Post Accident Monitoring System (part of SICS)

These I&C systems make up the architecture of the Instrumentation and Control System.


3. Plant Control Philosophy

Instrumentation

Safety Systems

Switchgears

Safety Systems

Control Trip

Core Control Rods

RLCS (TXS) PS (TXS) SAS (SPPA-T2000)

By Siemens

PACS (TXS)

PAS (SPPA-T2000)By Siemens

PHRA (TXS PLD)

Main Control Room (MCR)

OMQDS

1QDS

2Service

Unit

ProcessControl and Information

SICSPICS

PAMSPost Accident

Monitoring System

unclassifiedCategory A Category B Category C

IEC 61226 Safety Functions

Process Control and Information

Remote Shut Down Station

PICSSICS

QDS 1

QDS 2

PAMSPost Accident

Monitoring System

OM

Switchgears

Operational System

Instrumentation

Operational System


3.1 Protection System

> Redundancy: fourfold

> Functional Diversity

> Automatically initiates the reactivity control system (Reactor Trip)

> ESFAS (Engineered Safety Features Actuation System)

initiate and control safety systems that remove heat or otherwise assists in

maintaining the integrity of the three physical barriers to radioactive

release (cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary and containment).

> The Protection System design is carried out redundantly and diversely according to single failure criterion and with consideration of the common course failure.


3.2 Passive Heat Removal Activation System (PHRA)

> Redundancy fourfold

> Hardware diversity

> Open air gates in case of Protection System failure (Power Supply is available)

> Programmable logic control system with a different hardware (TXS PLD)

This picture is taken from the presentation “Experimental Calculation basis parameter for Passive Heat Removal System”, Authors L. Egorova and A. Plakseev of Atomenergoprom, Bulatom Conference 2008


3.3 Reactor Limitation and Control System

> Redundancy fourfold

> Limitation functions for reactor power and other important process parameters

> Support functions in case of actuation of Protection System

> Reactor control functions (twofold redundancy)

> The design is carried out redundantly according to single failure criterion.


3.4 Priority Actuation Control System (PACS)

Solution by AV42 (special type of function modules dealing with all actuator control tasks, especially for priority control, and monitoring for each single actuator)

Organization of priority commands(from high to low)

> Protection System

> Reactor Limitation and Control System

> Safety Automation System

> Process Automation System

> Manual control signals from SICS

To switchgear

Priority control

of module AV42

PAC

RSS MCR CRSEL

AP(SPPA)

OM

Plant bus

PROFIBUS

Front plate

Control tile Control tile

PS RLCS

OPDIS

orS1 R

Bus interface

Simula-tion

Com-mands Safety

classified part

Operational non classified

part


3.5 Supervision and Control Level

> As human machine interface serves the Process Information and Control system (PICS), it is used for process monitoring and operating in all plant situations.

> Safety Information and Control System (SICS) contains 4 safety panels for operating and monitoring of ESFAS functions and the Reactor Protection Panel (RPP) with all indications for messages from the Protection System and the most important messages from RLCS.


4.Overview System Platform Teleperm XS

Tools for Engineering

andMaintenance

Tools for Engineering

andMaintenance

TXSSystem

Software

TXSSystem

Software

TXSSystem

Hardware

TXSSystem

Hardware

TXSSystem

Documentation

TXSSystem

Documentation

Gatewaysand

InterfaceSolutions

Gatewaysand

InterfaceSolutions


TELEPERM XS Qualification and Licensing

Project-SpecificQualification

of Applicationhas to be

performed in each project

Generic SystemQualification

performed onceand maintained

for theTELEPERM XSsystem platformS

eq

ue

nce

of

Qu

alif

ica

tio

n S

tep

s

Concept Review of System Development

SiteTests

FactoryAcceptance Test

Manufacturing TestsHardware Software

Verification of Specification

Integration and System Test

HardwareComponent Type Tests

Software


5.References

TELEPERM XS, SPPA-T2000 and SIMATIC S5/S7

* Chinese Designs have been merged

Plant Units

Plants

Countries

ReactorSupplier*

Implementationsand orders

72

45

17

11


THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

> areva np gmbh nrpp-g, 2009-05-27 1 areva np all rights are reserved, see liability notice

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