Что-то там про Сторителлинг

Что-то там проСТОРИТЕЛЛИНГ

Алексей Каптерев@kapterev

История Cлайды Подача

Презентация:

! "

СТОРИТЕЛЛИНГstorytelling, «рассказывание историй»

1.Жанр искусства


2.Иллюстрация кейсами



2.Иллюстрация байками

3.Нарративная структура


Сценарий Картинка Игра

Кино:

# "

ПЕРЕДАТЧИК

ПРИЕМНИКПРИЕМНИКПРИЕМНИКПРИЕМНИКПРИЕМНИКПРИЕМНИКПРИЕМНИК

Чтобы сделать хорошее кино, нужны всего 3 вещи:

хороший сценарий, хороший сценарий и хороший сценарий.

АЛЬФРЕД ХИЧКОК Режиссер

Проблема №1:СКУЧНОСКУЧНО

?НУ И ЧТОВам же платят деньги!

Инвесторы могут быть потрясающими людьми с впечатляющим технологическим бэкграундом, но они к тому же очень занятые люди…

Представьте, что вы произносите речь передумеренно способными девятиклассниками, чье внимание можно удерживать только очень короткое время, и у которых нет ни глубоких знаний, ни интуиции, чтобы понять вашу идею.

ПИТЕР ТИЛЬ Основатель PayPal

!ОЧЕНЬВНИМАНИЕ

легкоПОТЕРЯТЬи все остальное уже не важно

?СКУЧНОСКУЧНОПОЧЕМУ

?МОНОТОННО

После презентации инженера:

Зачем ты тратишь мою жизнь?!

ДЖЕФФ БЕЗОС CEO Amazon.com

В ИСТОРИИ ЕСТЬДИНАМИКА

ИСТОРИЯ ВКЛЮЧАЕТЭМОЦИИ

ИСТОРИЯ ПРОРЫВАЕТСЯ

ЧЕРЕЗ «КЛАТТЕР»

?«ИСТОРИЯ»Что такое

УМЕР МЕЛЬНИК 1-й СЫН 2-й СЫН 3-й СЫН / КОТ РУКАВИЦЫ

КОРОЛЬ КРОЛИК КУРОПАТКА ОПЕРАЦИЯ «МК» «ВОРЫ»

ПРИНЦЕССА ЖНЕЦЫ КОСЦЫ ЛЮДОЕД ЗАМОК

ЛЕВ МЫШЬКОРОЛЬ

3-Й СЫН+ПРИНЦЕССА=$КОТ

iTunes music store presentation

Steve Jobs, 2003

Innovate

The most striking thing about the 17-inch PowerBook, after the screen itself, is how brilliantly Apple managed to shrink the size of the machine built around that big display.

— Walt Mossberg, the Wall Street Journal

Sure, the PowerBook is an unusually wide 15.4 inches, but itis only one inch thick. Yet, it feels solid as a rock. Itis just 10.2 inches deep and weighs only 6.8 pounds.

To get an idea of how sleek those dimensions are, compare the new PowerBook with another brand-new laptop, Dell’s Latitude D800.

This model also boasts a widescreen display, measuring 15.4 inches diagonally. But, even though the Dell has a significantly smaller screen, it looks like a whale next to the 17-inch PowerBook.

Safari

Innovate

RIP MIX BURN

Acquire Manage Listen

700,000

#1 MP3 player

Can anyone top that?

New iPods

10Gb 15Gb 30Gb

2500 songs 3700 songs 7500 songs

Dock, Case, Remote

299 $ 399 $ 499 $

Instant gratification

It’s stealing

1 Vast selection

2 Unlimited CD burning

3 Unlimited MP3 players

4 Unlimited computers

5 Free

6 Unreliable downloads

7 Unreliable encoding

8 No previews

9 No album cover art

10 It’s stealing

No legal alternative

PressPlay

RHAPSODY

PressPlay

“You can play your downloaded songs as long as your membership is active.”

“Only subscribers to the All Access subscription plan at $9.99 per month will get the ability to

burn tracks for an additional fee per track.”

RHAPSODY

SubscriptionsThe wrong path

Buy downloadsJust like LP’s, cassettes & CDs

Own musicBroad set of personal rights

Music StoreMusic downloads done right

1 Vast selection




5 Free

“The Big Five”

The music business is a cruel and shallow money trench, a long plastic hallway where thieves and pimps run free, and good men die like dogs.

There's also a negative side."

"

— Hunter S. Thompson

LandmarkDeals with all Big Five

200,000

Unlimited CD burnsFor personal use

Unlimited iPodsPast, present & future models

Play on 3 MacsWe download to one you do the rest

Use in applicationsSoundtrack of your life

99¢Per song

99¢No subscription fee!

99¢99¢99¢

=

1 Vast selection




5 Free

1 200,000 songs


3 Unlimited iPod players

4 Up to 3 Macs

5 99¢ per song



8 No previews


10 It’s stealing

You never find one song – you find 50 or 60 songs

The download is slow as paralysis, then it just craps out halfway through

After 15 minutes you finally succeed in getting a clean version of the song

You spend an hour to get 4 songs that cost $3.96 from Apple

You’re working for under minimum wage

You’re stealing – it’s best not to mess with Karma



8 No previews


10 It’s stealing

Pristine encoding

AAC at 128 kbps

Free 30-sec previews

Album cover art



8 No previews


10 It’s stealing

6 Fast, reliable downloads

7 Pristine encoding

8 Preview for every song

9 Album cover art

10 Good Karma

1 200,000 songs


3 Unlimited iPods players

4 Up to 3 Macs

5 99¢ per song

Beyond

1-Click

One-click shopping

One-click downloads

BUY SONG

One-click downloads

BUY ALBUM

Search

Browse

Exclusive tracks

U2 Eminem

Bob Dylan Sting

Sheryl Crow …

20+ artists

iTunes Music Store

Demo20 minutes

200,000

Unlimited CD burns

Unlimited iPods

Play on 3 Macs

Pristine encoding

Free 30-sec previews

Album cover art

BUY SONG

One-click downloads

Deliver oceans of bits fast and reliably

Process millions of transactions

Integrate with popular jukebox

Work seamlessly with iPods

1-Click

Only Apple

U.S. OnlyTo start with…

iTunes.com

Freesoftware update

Buy. Mix. iPod.

Mac only

End of the year

Video & TV ads

15 minutes

AppleMusic.com

UNNOVATIONS POWERBOOK SOFTWARE MUSIC RIP.MIX.BURN

ITUNES IPOD GRAMMY

LISTEN

MANAGE

ACQUIRE

IPOD CAN ANYONE TOP THAT? PRICES

ITUNES 4 THINGS

NAPSTER 5 GOOD THINGS 5 BAD THINGS ITUNES STORE 4+ GOOD THINGS 5 EVEN BETTER THINGS 4 THINGS BETTER STILL

ONLY APPLE TODAY ETC

Платформы Цена

XMindWin, Mac,

LinuxFreemium

MindMeister Flash Freemium

Герой

Цель

Проблема / Слабость

Злодей

Решение

Цена

Мораль

Если вы сделаете Х

то будет Y

иначе будет Z

МОРАЛЬ

The U.S. Army Afghanistan & Iraq

2009

Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan

COIN operations must accomplish three tasks simultaneously:

• Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition.

• Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a supportive disposition.

• Retain supportive individuals.These operations are conducted in an environment where tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgents

• This environment may suggest courses of action aimed at reinforcing or widening seams

Support forInsurgency

NeutralPopulace

Support for HNGovernment

PotentialFractiousness

of Society

• An increase in Coalition funding will influence economic investment and development.

• A strengthened economy will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.


NeutralPopulace


EconomicDevelopment

EconomicInvestment

CoalitionFunding


of Society


NeutralPopulace


Satisfaction withEssential Services

Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential

Services

Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and

Restoring EssentialServices

Time to DevelopEssential Services

EconomicDevelopment

EconomicInvestment

CoalitionFunding


of Society

• An increase in Coalition funding will significantly impact the restoration of essential services.

• Improvements in the provision of essential services will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.


NeutralPopulace




Services




Governance

Time to DevelopGovernance

EconomicDevelopment

EconomicInvestment

AvailableWorkforce

CoalitionFunding

PerceivedSecurity

Insurgent Actsof Violence

PsychologicalOperations

Effectiveness


of Society

External MaterialSupportA government that is established,

recognized, and that maintains a secure environment is in a position to

• Send a positive, credible message of success to the populace.

• Provide an environment that enhances stable employment of the workforce.

• Persuade insurgents and neutrals to consider becoming supporters.


NeutralPopulace




Services




Governance


EconomicDevelopment

EconomicInvestment

AvailableWorkforce

CoalitionFunding

PerceivedSecurity


Total ForceDensity

Host NationForce Density

Coalition ForceDensity

Appropriate Mix ofEffort and Use of Force


Effectiveness

Information

Host NationSecurity Forces

Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces

Impact ofIllegitimate Actions

Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability

to Execute

AppropriateStrategic Emphasis

Understanding andKnowledge of Social

Structures

Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio


of Society

External MaterialSupport

An appropriate force mix, and correct operational tempo, timing, and synchronization will have very significant impacts on

• The restoration of essential services.

• The populace’s perception of security.

• The Government’s and COIN forces’ credibility in their communications efforts with the populace.


NeutralPopulace




Services




Governance


EconomicDevelopment

EconomicInvestment

AvailableWorkforce

CoalitionFunding

PerceivedSecurity


Total ForceDensity





Effectiveness

Information





to Execute



Structures



of Society

The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24



NeutralPopulace




Services




Governance


EconomicDevelopment

EconomicInvestment

AvailableWorkforce

CoalitionFunding

PerceivedSecurity


Total ForceDensity





Effectiveness

Information





to Execute



Structures



of Society


The Basic Information Ops Loop

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 9

Neutral/OnPopulationPopulationActively

SupportingGov’t & SF

Sympathizingw/ Gov’t

the FencePopulation

Sympathizingw/ Insurgents

PopulationActively

SupportingInsurgency

PotentialAttractiveness

of Gov vs.Insurgent Path

RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGovt vs

Insurgents

POPULAR SUPPORT t

Popular Support – Sympathizers and Active Supporters


Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures

Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’t and CF

Strength of Religious

Ideology & Tribal Structures

Cultural Erosion/Displacement

Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Insurgents

Perception of Insurgent Strength and Intent

Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins

Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment

Average Connectedness

of Population

Perceived Security

Fear of Ins. Attack,

Repercussions

Perception of Gov’t Strength and Intent

Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services &

Employment

Visible Gains In Security, Services &

Employment

Expectations for Security, Services &

Employment

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology,

Tribal Structures w/

Gov’t Path



SupportingGov’ t & SF


the FencePopulation


PopulationActively





Insurgents

POPULARSUPPORT

t POPULAR SUPPORT

PerceivedDamages &Use of Force

by Ins.

Perception ofInsurgentStrength &

Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions

PerceivedDamages/Use

of Force byGov t & Coalition

Relative WOMMessage

AmplificationGov vs Ins’t

Perception ofCoalition Intent& Commitment Perception

Of GovtStrength& Intent

Expectations

Services, &Employment

Visible Gains

Services &Employment

Satisfactionw/ Gains in

Security, Services& Employment

for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity

AverageConnectednessof Population

Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,

Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath

StructuresEthnic/TribalRivalry

Strength ofReligious

Ideology &Tribal

Structures Cultural Erosion/Displacement

POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS

Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures


Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics

Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Insurgent expansion: Insurgent factions with havens as base can expand their presence and influence, further increasing their operating base territory. (Permissive population contribution to Havens / Ability to Operate input from separate sector). 2. Alignment of criminal and insurgent interests: Weakly governed / policed territory may support insurgents, terrorists and criminals alike. Often interests align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed terrority and ability to operate

2Ins Strategic Comm/IO & Affiliation w/ Population

Insurgent Capacity,

Priorities & Effectiveness

Ins Targeted Attacks on Progress/

Support for Gov’t

Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding

Territory Not Under Gov’t

ControlIns Provision

of Gov’t & Services

Insurgent Offensives &

Presence (Clear & Hold)

Insurgent Damages & Casualties 1

Funding & Material

Support to Insurgents

Insurgent Terrain

Advantage

Terrain Harshness & Breadth

Illegit Agric Production

Trade & Employment

Narcotics & Criminal

Activity Levels

Likelihood of Crime/ Violence/

Ins Support for Payment

Criminal/ Trafficking

Capability & Coercion

Havens / Ability to Operate

Insurgent Leadership

Training, Skill & Exper

Coordination Among Ins Factions

Outside Support /

Enablement of Ins.

Insurgent Recruiting, Retention, Manpower,

& ISR

Fear of Gov’t / ANSF / Coalition Repercussions


Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics

Ins. StrategicCommun/IO

& Affiliation w/Population

Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services

Ins.Offensives &

Presence(Clear & Hold)

Ins. TargetedAttacks on

Supportfor Gov

Territory NotUnder Gov’t

Control (Afghan & Pakistan)

Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,

Priorities &Effectiveness

Fear ofGov t/ANSF/

CoalitionRepercussions

Ins. Damages& Casualties ’

Ins.Leadership,

Training, Skill& Experience

CoordinationAmong Ins.

Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &

Other CriminalFunding Funding &

Support to InsurgentsMaterial

InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower

& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment

Crime/Violence /Ins. Support

Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels

Criminal/TraffickingCapability &

Coercion

TerrainHarshness& Breadth

InsurgentTerrain

Advantage

IllegitAgricProduction,

Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTSPerceived

Damages &Use of Force

by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage



Of Gov tStrength& Intent

Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal


POPULATIONCONDITIONS& BELIEFS


by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal






the FencePopulation


PopulationActively





Insurgents

POPULARSUPPORT

t


POPULAR SUPPORT

OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS


Infrastructure, Services, & Economy

1

2

Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Agricultural production and markets: Investment and spending enables agricultural production. Production can boost economic activity and trade which feeds back into private sector re-investment. (Public policy and investment in infrastructure, workforce, financial markets, etc helps start / maintain private sector momentum.) 2. Making legit agriculture more attractive: Improved legit agricultural opportunities may make illegit agricultural options less attractive which further increases legit agricultural production, trade, and markets. (Other inputs to decisions related to legit vs illegit from other sectors.)

Private Sector Capital Mgmt, Investment &

Spending

Infr. Services, Econ, Policy & Execution/ Perceived Fairness

Ability to Move People &

Goods Rapidly

Legit Economic Activity, Trade &

Employment

Legit vs Illegit Relative

Economic Opportunity

Fraction of Workforce and Agric.

Legit vs Illegit

Civilian Services (SWET,

Healthcare, Education)

Legit Other Production & Services Non-Agric

Population Basic Needs

Service Levels & Employment

Private Sector Workforce

Skill & Avail

Legit Agric Production

Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment



by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal




by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal



Infrastructure, Services, & Economy

Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit

PopulationBasic Needs

Service Levels& Employment

Legit AgricProductionPrivate Sector

WorkforceSkill & AvailInfrastructure

Dev. Adequacy& Sustainment

Legit vs. IllegitRelative

EconomicOpportunity

CivilianServices(SWET,

Healthcare,Education)

Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon Agric

Private SectorCapital Mgmt., Investment &

Spending

Ability toMove

People& GoodsRapidly

-

Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &

EmploymentInfr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness

INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY




the FencePopulation


PopulationActively





Insurgents

POPULARSUPPORT

t




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage

Illegit AgricProduction,

Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS

OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT

FACTIONS




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage


Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS


FACTIONS


POPULAR SUPPORT



Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts

Feedback Loop Example: Informal learning and mentoring: Formal training and vetting (enabled by institutional capacity) can improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as well…another key loop)

’

’Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments

Gov’t Funding

Adequacy

Gov’t/Contractor Corruption &

Tribal Favoritism

Tax Revenues

Central Gov’t Institutional & Execution

Capacity

Gov’t Training, Mentoring,

Vetting, and Hiring

Gov’t Professionalism, Policy Quality &

Fairness

Overall Gov’t Reach,

Execution, Capacity & Investment

Gov’t Workforce

Skill & Avail

Gov’t Security Policy Quality & Investment

Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal

Structures & Beliefs

Gov’t Integration of Local Tribal Structures

Gov’t / ANSF StratCom/IO

Relative Message Quality

Gov’t vs Ins

Relative Message Impact

Gov’t vs Ins


Recognition/Engagement to

IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

RelativeMessage

Impact Gov’tvs Ins

RelativeMessageQuality

Gov’ ’t vs Ins.

Gov't/ANSFStrategic

IOCommun/

Overall Gov'tReach,

ExecutionCapacity &Investment

Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures

TaxRevenues

Gov't/Contractor

Corruption &Tribal Favoritism

Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality

& Fairness

Gov't TrainingMentoring,Vetting, and

Hiring

Gov'tFunding

Transparencyof Gov’t

Processes &Investments

Adequacy

Central Gov'tInstitutional &

CapacityExecution

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment

OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY

TRIBAL GOVERNANCE








EconomicOpportunity




Private SectorCapital Mgmt.,

Investment &Spending

Ability toMove


-



INFRASTRUCTURE,SERVICES &ECONOMY








EconomicOpportunity






Ability toMove


-





by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal




by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal






the FencePopulation


PopulationActively





Insurgents

POPULARSUPPORT

t

Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage


Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS


FACTIONS




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage


Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS


FACTIONS




POPULAR SUPPORT


Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support

US Domestic Perceived

Cost/Benefit & Support

US Domestic/ Int’l StratComm

& Diplomacy

US Gov’t Support for Operation

Media Sensationalism

Bias

Breadth of Coalition

& Support

Resource Levels (Mil. & Civ. Forces and Levels)

Coalition StratComm/IO

Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities

Coalition Avg COIN Experienc e & Skill

Duration of Operation

Coalition Knowledge &

Understanding of Social

Structures

Coalition Appropriate Balance of

Effort & Force

Coalition COIN Support

Strategy & Unity

Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan

Coalition Dev. Ops-ANSF Advisory &

Aid

Coalition Dev. Ops-Gov’t Advisory &

Aid

Coalition Dev. Ops- Infrastructure, Services, Econ Advisory & Aid Provide

Humanitarian Relief

Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of

Afghan Methods

Coalition Visibility to Population

Western Affiliation Backlash


WesternAffiliationBacklash

Durationof

Operation

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief

CoalitionDev.Ops-

Infrastructure,Services,

Econ.Advisory

& Aid

US DomesticPerceived

Cost/Benefit& Support

MediaSensationalism

Bias

US Domestic/Int'l Strategic

Commun.& Diplomacy

US Gov'tSupport forOperation

Breadth ofCoalition &

Support

ResourceLevels

(Mil. & Civ.Forces,

Aid Levels)

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO

Duration ofOperation

CoalitionAvg COINExperience

& Skill

CoalitionKnowledge

of SocialStructures

& Underst CoalitionCOIN

SupportStrategy &

Unity

Coalition

Balance ofEffort &Force

Appropriate

CoalitionExecution

PrioritiesCapacity &

Coalition

GovAdvisory

& Aid

Dev. Ops-’t

CoalitionAdjustmentof Approachto Fit Afghan

CoalitionDev. Ops-

Advisory& Aid

ANSF

CoalitionVisibility toPopulation

Coalition/HomelandAcceptance of

Afghan Methods


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

RelativeMessage



Gov’ ’t vs Ins.

Gov't/ANSFStrategic

IOCommun/

Overall Gov'tReach,



TaxRevenues

Gov't/Contractor


Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


& Fairness


Hiring

Gov'tFunding



Adequacy


CapacityExecution

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment

OVERALLGOVERNMENT

CAPACITY

TRIBALGOVERNANCE


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

RelativeMessage



Gov’ ’t vs Ins.

Gov't/ANSFStrategic

IOCommun/

Overall Gov'tReach,



TaxRevenues

Gov't/Contractor


Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


& Fairness


Hiring

Gov'tFunding



Adequacy


CapacityExecution

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment

OVERALLGOVERNMENT

CAPACITY

TRIBALGOVERNANCE








EconomicOpportunity






Ability toMove


-











EconomicOpportunity






Ability toMove


-





by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal




by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal






the FencePopulation


PopulationActively





Insurgents

POPULARSUPPORT

t

Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support

COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES

COALITION DOMESTIC SUPPORT




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage


Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS


FACTIONS




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage


Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS


FACTIONS


POPULAR SUPPORT


TRIBAL GOVERNANCE




ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional

Feedback Loop Examples: 1. ANSF success and informal momentum: ANSF professionalism and skill contributes to

tactical capacity which enables effective operations. Success and experience feeds back into professionalism, skill and morale which further reinforces both leadership & tactical capacity and recruiting / retention.

2. ANSF institutional capacity: Institutional capacity and processes enable manpower, formal training, logistics, planning & budgeting, etc that reinforce informal gains support ANSF capacity over time.

2

1 1

ANSF & Coalition

Damages/ Casualties

ANSF & Manpower

Recruiting & Retention

ANSF Institutional & Execution

Capacity

ANSF Funding

Adequacy

ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security

Force Capacity & focus

ANSF Training & Mentoring

ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity

Targeted Strikes

Counter Narcotics /Crime Ops

Sweep Ops (Clear)

Policing & Security

Ops (Hold)

ANSF Unit Capacity,


ANSF Avg Professionalism, Skill, Discipline

& Morale

ANSF Corruption

& Tribal Favoritism

\

R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness

ANSF Appropriate

Use of Force



Durationof

Operation

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief

CoalitionDev.Ops-


Econ.Advisory

& Aid



MediaSensationalism

Bias


Commun.& Diplomacy



Support

ResourceLevels

(Mil. & Civ.Forces,

Aid Levels)

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO



& Skill

CoalitionKnowledge

of SocialStructures


SupportStrategy &

Unity

Coalition


Appropriate

CoalitionExecution


Coalition

GovAdvisory

& Aid

Dev. Ops-’t


CoalitionDev. Ops-

Advisory& Aid

ANSF



Afghan Methods


Durationof

Operation

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief

CoalitionDev.Ops-


Econ.Advisory

& Aid



MediaSensationalism

Bias


Commun.& Diplomacy



Support

ResourceLevels

(Mil. & Civ.Forces,

Aid Levels)

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO



& Skill

CoalitionKnowledge

of SocialStructures


SupportStrategy &

Unity

Coalition


Appropriate

CoalitionExecution


Coalition

GovAdvisory

& Aid

Dev. Ops-’t


CoalitionDev. Ops-

Advisory& Aid

ANSF



Afghan Methods


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

RelativeMessage



Gov’ ’t vs Ins.

Gov't/ANSFStrategic

IOCommun/

Overall Gov'tReach,



TaxRevenues

Gov't/Contractor


Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


& Fairness


Hiring

Gov'tFunding



Adequacy


CapacityExecution

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment

OVERALLGOVERNMENT

CAPACITY

TRIBALGOVERNANCE


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

RelativeMessage



Gov’ ’t vs Ins.

Gov't/ANSFStrategic

IOCommun/

Overall Gov'tReach,



TaxRevenues

Gov't/Contractor


Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


& Fairness


Hiring

Gov'tFunding



Adequacy


CapacityExecution

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment

OVERALLGOVERNMENT

CAPACITY

TRIBALGOVERNANCE


by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal




by Ins.


Intent

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions



Relative WOMMessage




Expectations


Visible Gains




for Security,

In Security,

PerceivedSecurity



Tribal

w/ Gov’tPath



Ideology &Tribal










EconomicOpportunity






Ability toMove


-











EconomicOpportunity






Ability toMove


-







the FencePopulation


PopulationActively





Insurgents

POPULARSUPPORT

t

ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional


Counter Narcotics/Crime OpsTargeted

StrikesSweep Ops

(Clear)Policing &

Security Ops(Hold)

ANSFAppropriateUse of Force

R.O.L. Policy,Execution &

FairnessPerceived

ANSFPriorities & Effectiveness

Capacity,

TotalSecurityForce

Capacity &Focus

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

ANSFFunding

Adequacy

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity

ANSFTraining &Mentoring

ANSF Avg.Professionalism

& MoraleSkill, Discipline,

ISR / OpenSource Ops

ANSFManpower

RetentionRecruiting &

ANSF UnitLeadership

Capacity& Tactical

ANSF &CoalitionDamages/Casualties

ANSF INSTITUTIONAL

ANSF TACTICAL




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage


Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS


FACTIONS




Ins.Offensives &



Supportfor Gov



Progress/

’t

InsurgentCapacity,


Fear ofGov t/ANSF/



Ins.Leadership,



Factions


OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Ties toNarcotics &




& ISR

Likelihood of

for Payment


Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


Coercion


InsurgentTerrain

Advantage


Trade &Employment

NARCOTICS

INSURGENTS


FACTIONS

COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES POPULATION

CONDITIONS & BELIEFS

POPULAR SUPPORT


TRIBAL GOVERNANCE






WORKING DRAFT – V3

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics Population/Popular SupportInfrastructure, Economy, & ServicesGovernmentAfghanistan Security ForcesInsurgentsCrime and NarcoticsCoalition Forces & ActionsPhysical Environment

Neutral/OnPopulation



Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

CoalitionDev.Ops-


Econ.Advisory

& Aid


Relative WOMMessage

AmplificationGov’t vs Ins


& Skill


& Fairness

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO

Private SectorWorkforce

Skill & Avail

Likelihood of

for Payment

Ties toNarcotics &

Other CriminalFunding

InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures



Hiring

Overall Gov'tReach,



Support

ResourceLevels

(Mil. & Civ.Forces,

Aid Levels)


CoalitionKnowledge& Underst.

of SocialStructures

Coalition‘COIN

Support’Strategy &

Unity


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief

Infr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness

InfrastructureDev. Adequacy& Sustainment


Employment




Spending

Expectationsfor Security,Services, &Employment


Intent

WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of

Coalition Intent& Commitment

RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions


EconomicOpportunity




IllegitAgricProduction,

Trade &Employment

Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


& ISR

Counter- Narcotics/Crime Ops

Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &


Fear ofGov’ t/ANSF/


Ins. Damages& Casualties

Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/

IO


by Ins.


Gov’ ’t vs Ins.Coalition/HomelandAcceptance of

Afghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment

R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairnessANSF

FundingAdequacy

CoalitionDev. Ops-

ANSFAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity


ANSF Avg.ProfessionalismSkill, Discipline,

& Morale

ANSFManpower

Recruiting &Retention

ANSF UnitLeadership& TacticalCapacity

TotalSecurityForce

Capacity &Focus


CoalitionDev. Ops-

Gov’tAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

ANSFCapacity,



PopulationActively



the FencePopulation


PopulationActively


Ethnic/TribalRivalry

CoalitionExecutionCapacity &Priorities







Commun.& Diplomacy


CoalitionAppropriateBalance of

Effort &Force

Gov'tFunding

Adequacy


ExecutionCapacity

Gov't/Contractor


TaxRevenues

OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Policing &Security Ops

(Hold)

TargetedStrikes


FactionsInsurgentTerrain

Advantage


of Force byGov’ t & Coalition

PerceivedSecurity



of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Path

Visible GainsIn Security,Services &

Employment



PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent


TribalStructuresw/ Gov’t

Path

Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t


Coercion

Legit AgricProduction

Ability toMove


Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon-Agric



MediaSensationalism

BiasCultural Erosion/

Displacement

Durationof

Operation

Sweep Ops(Clear)

RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGov’t vs

Insurgents

Funding &Material





Significant Delay=

Significant Delay=


POPULAR SUPPORT

INSURGENTS


NARCOTICS



ANSF TACTICAL

TRIBAL GOVERNANCE


ANSF INSTITUTIONAL



CENTRAL GOV’T


1




Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


Relative WOMMessage



& Fairness Private Workf

Skill &

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures



Hiring

Overall Gov'tReach,



InfrastructureDev Adequacy


Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions

Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &






IO


by Ins.



Afghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

CoalitionDev. Ops-

ANSFAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity



& Morale

ANSFManpower



TotalSecurity

ForceCapacity &

Focus


alitionOps-

ov’tvisoryAid

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

ANSFCapacity,



PopulationActively



the Fence Sw


tngacy


ExecutionCapacity

OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.


(Hold)

TargetedStrikes


Factions






Security Services


Ability toReconcile


sparencyGov’t

cesses &stments


Sweep Ops(Clear)


Insurgents




2

Key Feedback Loop: Securing and Empowering the Population

Fear is a key mechanism for insurgent factions to prevent the population from engaging and actively supporting the Government. Securing populated territory (clear and hold ops) can reduce insurgent ability to target and intimidate the population such that Gov’t sympathizers are willing to be active supporters. x

HUMINT: The population will be more willing to provide intel if they do not fear insurgent repercussions.x

ANA & ANP Development: ANSF recruiting and development is facilitated by the expansion of secure regions. (ANA and ANP leaders, families, facilities, etc less likely to be targeted or overrun.





Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

AppropriateUse of Force

Relative WOMMessage



& Fairness Private SectorWorkforce

Skill & Avail

Likelihood of

for Payment

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures


Trainingoring,g, and

ring

Overall Gov'tReach,


han


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief

Infr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness



Employment







Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions

Legit vsRela

EconoOpport




Illegit AProduc

TradEmploy

N&

Retention,Manpower

& ISR




IO


by Ins.


Gov’ ’t vs Ins.alition/HomelandAcceptance offghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

tionOps-SFsory

Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity


Retention,Manpower

& ISR




IO


by Ins.


Gov’ ’t vs Ins.alition/HomelandAcceptance offghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

tionOps-SFsory

Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity


ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

PopulationActively



the FencePopulation


PopulationActively




Coalitionsibility toopulation


ExecutionCapacity

v't/ractorption &avoritism

TaxRevenues



PerceivedSecurity

AverageConnectedness

of Population



Visible GainsIn Security,Services &Employment






Path



Coercion


Ability toMove





Insurgents

Funding &Material


& Pakistan)


Key Feedback Loop: Government Engagement and Integration of Tribal Governance

Critical for the Government to recognize and make the effort to engage existing tribal structures and Governance if they are to be accepted by the population. Ties to local governance can gain popular support and rapidly expand the Government’s overall capacity and ‘reach’ which further increases their capacity and ability to engage the population.


WORKING DRAFT

Population/Popular SupportInfrastructure, Economy, & ServicesGovernmentAfghanistan Security ForcesInsurgentsCrime and NarcoticsCoalition Forces & ActionsPhysical Environment




Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

CoalitionDev.Ops-


Econ.Advisory

& Aid


Relative WOMMessage



& Skill


& Fairness

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO


Skill & Avail

Likelihood ofActive Ins.Support forPayment

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures



Hiring

Overall Gov'tReach,



Support

ResourceLevels

(MilitaryForces,CivilianForces,

Aid Levels)



of SocialStructures

Coalition‘COIN


Unity


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief

Infr., Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness



Employment



Private SectorCapital

Management,Investment &

Spending



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions


EconomicOpportunity





Trade &Employment

Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


& ISR


Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &






IO


by Ins.



Afghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

CoalitionDev. Ops-

ANSFAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity



& Morale

ANSFManpower



TotalSecurityForce

Capacity &Focus


CoalitionDev. Ops-

Gov’tAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

ANSFCapacity &Priorities


PopulationActively



the FencePopulation


PopulationActively










Commun.& Diplomacy



Effort &Force

Gov'tFunding

Adequacy


ExecutionCapacity

Gov't/Contractor


TaxRevenues

OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.


(Hold)

TargetedStrikes



Advantage



PerceivedSecurity





Employment






Path


Criminal/Trafficking

Capability &Coercion


Ability toMove





MediaSensationalism


Displacement

Durationof

Operation

Sweep Ops(Clear)

RelativePopularSupport/ ToleranceGov’t vs

Insurgents

Funding &Material





Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – SECURITY





Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

CoalitionDev.Ops-


Econ.Advisory

& Aid


Relative WOMMessage



& Skill


& Fairness

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO


Skill & Avail

Likelihood of

for Payment

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures



Hiring

Overall Gov'tReach,



Support

ResourceLevels

(Mil. & Civ.Forces,

Aid Levels)



of SocialStructures

Coalition‘COIN


Unity


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief




Employment




Spending



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions


EconomicOpportunity





Trade &Employment

Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


& ISR


Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &






IO


by Ins.



Afghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

CoalitionDev. Ops-

ANSFAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity



& Morale

ANSFManpower



TotalSecurityForce

Capacity &Focus


CoalitionDev. Ops-

Gov’tAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism



PopulationActively



the FencePopulation


PopulationActively










Commun.& Diplomacy



Effort &Force

Gov'tFunding

Adequacy


ExecutionCapacity

Gov't/Contractor


TaxRevenues

OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.


(Hold)

TargetedStrikes



Advantage



PerceivedSecurity





Employment






Path



Coercion


Ability toMove





MediaSensationalism


Displacement

Durationof

Operation

Sweep Ops(Clear)


Insurgents

Funding &Material






Reconciliation Effectiveness

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – GOVERNANCE

WORKING DRAFT



Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – DEVELOPMENT

WORKING DRAFT





Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

CoalitionDev.Ops-


Econ.Advisory

& Aid


Relative WOMMessage



& Skill


& Fairness

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO


Skill & Avail

Likelihood of

for Payment

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures



Hiring

Overall Gov'tReach,



Support

ResourceLevels

(Mil. & Civ.Forces,

Aid Levels)



of SocialStructures

Coalition‘COIN


Unity


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief




Employment




Spending



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions


EconomicOpportunity





Trade &Employment

Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


& ISR


Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &






IO


by Ins.



Afghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

CoalitionDev. Ops-

ANSFAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity



& Morale

ANSFManpower



TotalSecurityForce

Capacity &Focus


CoalitionDev. Ops-

Gov’tAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism



PopulationActively



the FencePopulation


PopulationActively










Commun.& Diplomacy



Effort &Force

Gov'tFunding

Adequacy


ExecutionCapacity

Gov't/Contractor


TaxRevenues

OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.


(Hold)

TargetedStrikes



Advantage



PerceivedSecurity





Employment






Path



Coercion


Ability toMove





MediaSensationalism


Displacement

Durationof

Operation

Sweep Ops(Clear)


Insurgents

Funding &Material







WORKING DRAFTSignificant Delay=

Significant Delay=

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Claim the Information Initiative




Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

CoalitionDev.Ops-


Econ.Advisory

& Aid


Relative WOMMessage



& Skill


& Fairness

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO


Skill & Avail

Likelihood ofActive Ins.Support forPayment

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures



Hiring

Overall Gov'tReach,



Support

ResourceLevels

(MilitaryForces,CivilianForces,

Aid Levels)



of SocialStructures

Coalition‘COIN


Unity


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief




Employment





Spending



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions


EconomicOpportunity





Trade &Employment

Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels


& ISR


Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &






IO


by Ins.



Afghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

CoalitionDev. Ops-

ANSFAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity



& Morale

ANSFManpower



TotalSecurityForce

Capacity &Focus


CoalitionDev. Ops-

Gov’tAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism



PopulationActively



the FencePopulation


PopulationActively










Commun.& Diplomacy



Effort &Force

Gov'tFunding

Adequacy


ExecutionCapacity

Gov't/Contractor


TaxRevenues

OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.


(Hold)

TargetedStrikes



Advantage



PerceivedSecurity





Employment






Path


Criminal/Trafficking

Capability &Coercion


Ability toMove





MediaSensationalism


Displacement

Durationof

Operation

Sweep Ops(Clear)


Insurgents

Funding &Material





Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message credibility. Message availability is constrained by low “average connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM tends to amplify negative messages more strongly than positive, but also tends to be biased towards current sentiments. “Western affiliation backlash” may undermine Government messages if they are seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an overly Western posture



Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Claim the Information Initiative




Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


Relative WOMMessage




Skill & Avail

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures


iningng,and

g

Overall Gov'tReach,


hn


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief



CiviliaServic(SWE

HealthcEducat



Spending



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions

Leadership,Training, Skill& Experience



IO


by Ins.


Gov’ ’t vs Ins.on/Homelandceptance ofan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

ns-

y

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity


& Morale

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

PopulationActively



the FencePopu

Sympaw/ Insu


THa&

alitionbility toulation


ExecutionCapacity

toron &oritism

TaxRevenues



PerceivedSecurity





Employment






Path


Ability toMove





Insurgents

FunMa

SupInsu





Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


Relative WOMMessage




Skill & Avail

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures


iningng,and

g

Overall Gov'tReach,


hn


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief



CiviliaServic(SWE

HealthcEducat



Spending



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions




IO


by Ins.



Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

ns-

y

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity


& Morale

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

PopulationActively



the FencePopu

Sympaw/ Insu


THa&



ExecutionCapacity

toron &oritism

TaxRevenues



PerceivedSecurity





Employment






Path


Ability toMove





Insurgents

FunMa

SupInsu





Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail


Relative WOMMessage




Skill & Avail

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures


iningng,and

g

Overall Gov'tReach,


hn


IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief



CiviliaServic(SWE

HealthcEducat



Spending



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions




IO


by Ins.



Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment


FundingAdequacy

ns-

y

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity


& Morale

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

PopulationActively



the FencePopu

Sympaw/ Insu


THa&



ExecutionCapacity

toron &oritism

TaxRevenues



PerceivedSecurity





Employment






Path


Ability toMove





Insurgents

FunMa

SupInsu


Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message credibility. Message availability is constrained by low “average connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM tends to amplify negative messages more strongly than positive, but also tends to be biased towards current sentiments. “Western affiliation backlash” may undermine Government messages if they are seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an overly Western posture


Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Population Security





Relative WOMMessage


PrivW

Ski

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures

Gov'ttegration ofocal Tribal

Structures

ecognition/gagement toIntegrate

Tribaltructures&Beliefs

I f S i E


Private SeCapita

ManagemInvestme



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions

Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &


p


IO


by Ins.


Gov’ ’t vs Ins.

tyy

&ent

R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairness


& Morale

pcalty

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism


PopulationActively



the Fence


OutsidSuppor

Enablemof Ins.

gSecurity Ops

(Hold)


Factions



PerceivedSecurity


PotentialAttractivenes

of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Pa


Employment






Path


Ability toMove

People




Insurgents








Relative WOMMessage


PrivW

Ski

Ties toNarcotics &


InsurgentCapacity,



Ideology &Tribal

Structures

Gov'ttegration ofocal Tribal

Structures

ecognition/gagement toIntegrate

Tribaltructures&Beliefs

I f S i E


Private SeCapita

ManagemInvestme



Intent



RelativeMessage


Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions

Ins.Leadership,



Ins.Offensives &


p


IO


by Ins.


Gov’ ’t vs Ins.

tyy

&ent

R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairness


& Morale

pcalty

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism


PopulationActively



the Fence


OutsidSuppor

Enablemof Ins.

gSecurity Ops

(Hold)


Factions



PerceivedSecurity


PotentialAttractivenes

of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Pa


Employment






Path


Ability toMove

People




Insurgents




Population Security: Security is a function of day to day conditions and also perception of ‘who will win’ over longer term: x

Actual damages by both the Insurgents and ANSF / Coalition forces impact perceived security. x

Insurgents rely targeted “attacks on progress” to generate fear and intimidation to limit sympathizers moving towards active supporters. They often threaten or target civilian and security force individuals who are visibly supporting the government – the fear this generates is powerful in slowing or reversing positive momentum.x

In addition to near term security concerns, the population is assessing ‘who will win’ over the long term by comparing perception of Insurgent strength to perception of Government strength and also considering perceived Coalition commitment. (A key input to perceived strength is how much of the population lives in region secured by the Government.) They will hesitate to actively support the government if they feel they will fail, particularly if they have been witness to “clear and leave” operations.

How to win in Al Anbar

How to Win the War in Al Anbar by CPT Trav

This is an American Soldier. We'll call him Joe. Joe wants to win in Al AnbarBut sometimes it seems like other people don't share that idea.

How can Joe win in Al Anbar? By fighting the insurgents?

HI!

Герой

Цель


Злодей

Решение

Цена

Мораль

These are confidential sessions—please refrain from streaming, blogging, or taking pictures

Session 600Timothy HatcherSafari and WebKit Engineer

Debugging UIWebViews and Websites on iOS

What You’ll Learn

•Web Inspector overview• Inspection and tweaking• Performance analysis•Debugging issues

Web Inspector Overview

Navigation Sidebar

• Frames and resources• Extra scripts•Anonymous scripts

Resource Navigator (⌃1)

• Cookies• Local and session storage•Databases and tables•Application cache

Storage Navigator (⌃2)

• Timelines■ Network Requests■ Layout and Rendering■ JavaScript and Events

• JavaScript profiles• CSS selector profiles

Instrument Navigator (⌃3)

• Full text resource search•DOM tree search

Search Navigator (⌃4)

• JavaScript exceptions• Console API errors and warnings•HTML and XML parsing issues•Network errors

Issue Navigator (⌃5)

• Current call stack when paused

Debug Navigator (⌃6)

• Special exception breakpoints• Current resource breakpoints

Breakpoint Navigator (⌃7)

• Current log with JavaScript console• Previous logs on reload

Log Navigator (⌃8)

Navigation Sidebar

Content Browser and Quick Console

Navigation Bar

Navigation Bar

• Sidebar toggle buttons

Navigation Bar

• Sidebar toggle buttons• Back and forward buttons

Navigation Bar

• Sidebar toggle buttons• Back and forward buttons• Content path

Navigation Bar

• Sidebar toggle buttons• Back and forward buttons• Content path• Content view selector

Navigation Bar

• Sidebar toggle buttons• Back and forward buttons• Content path• Content view selector• Selection path

Navigation Bar

• Sidebar toggle buttons• Back and forward buttons• Content path• Content view selector• Selection path•DOM node locator button

Quick Console

Quick Console

•Auto expanding JavaScript console•Object property completion•Debugger controls

Details Sidebar

•MIME-type and resource type• Full URL and components•Query parameters• Request and response headers

Resource Details (⌃⇧1)

• Type, name and value•Attributes•DOM properties• Event listeners

Node Details (⌃⇧2)

• Computed style• Style attribute•HTML attributes• Style rules• Base style rules

Style Details (⌃⇧3)

• Box model■ Position■ Margin■ Border■ Padding■ Content

Appearance Details (⌃⇧4)

•Manifest and frame URLs•Online status

Application Cache Details

• Local variables• Closure variables• Catch variables•With properties•Global variables

Scope Chain Details (⌃⇧5)

Details Sidebar

What You’ll Learn


Inspection and Tweaking

◎◎

✪

◎◎

✱罰⁉

SummaryInspection and Tweaking


• Finally “View Source” for Safari on iOS—and more!


• Finally “View Source” for Safari on iOS—and more!• Tweak without the endless rebuild cycle


• Finally “View Source” for Safari on iOS—and more!• Tweak without the endless rebuild cycle•Hover DOM nodes to highlight the CSS boxes


• Finally “View Source” for Safari on iOS—and more!• Tweak without the endless rebuild cycle•Hover DOM nodes to highlight the CSS boxes•Double-click to edit CSS and DOM nodes

What You’ll Learn


Performance Analysis

SummaryPerformance Analysis


•Always test cell network performance


•Always test cell network performance•Minimize the number of resources and large resources


•Always test cell network performance•Minimize the number of resources and large resources•Minify JavaScript and avoid large libraries


•Always test cell network performance•Minimize the number of resources and large resources•Minify JavaScript and avoid large libraries•Use asynchronous or deferred script loading

What You’ll Learn


Debugging Issues

SummaryDebugging Issues


•No longer is “stringByEvaluatingJavaScriptFromString:” a black box


•No longer is “stringByEvaluatingJavaScriptFromString:” a black box• Call functions instead of passing large scripts


•No longer is “stringByEvaluatingJavaScriptFromString:” a black box• Call functions instead of passing large scripts• Evaluate in the Quick Console using the current scope

What You’ll Learn


More Information

Vicki MurleySafari Technologies [email protected]

Safari Dev Centerhttp://developer.apple.com/safari

Apple Developer Forumshttp://devforums.apple.com

Related Sessions

Optimizing Web Content in UIWebViews and Websites on iOS MarinaTuesday 4:30PM

Delivering Web Content on High Resolution Displays Nob HillWednesday 11:30AM

Advanced Effects with HTML5 Media Technologies MarinaThursday 2:00PM

Labs

Safari and Web Tools Lab Safari & Web LabWednesday 2:00PM

Web Content Optimization Lab Safari & Web LabWednesday 3:15PM

Safari and WebKit Open Lab Safari & Web LabThursday 3:15PM

Summary

Summary

•Web Inspector is now available on Safari for iOS and your iOS app

Summary

•Web Inspector is now available on Safari for iOS and your iOS app• Enable Safari’s developer tools on Mac and iOS

Summary

•Web Inspector is now available on Safari for iOS and your iOS app• Enable Safari’s developer tools on Mac and iOS•Web Inspector has a new streamlined user interface

Summary

•Web Inspector is now available on Safari for iOS and your iOS app• Enable Safari’s developer tools on Mac and iOS•Web Inspector has a new streamlined user interface• Be informed when debugging your site and app’s web content

Герой

Цель


Злодей

Решение

Цена

Мораль

Если вы сделаете Х

то будет Y

иначе будет Z

МОРАЛЬ

Герой

Цель

Проблема

Злодей

Решение

Цена

Мораль

Я сам? Клиент? Клиент клиента?

Чего хочет герой?

Почему он не может без этого жить?

Кто ему мешает?

В чем инсайт?

Какова цена решения?

В чем призыв к действию?

?«ИСТОРИЯ»Что такое

История — путешествие в поисках истины.

ПИТЕР ДАНН Сценарист и писатель

МОТИВАЦИЯ:

ЗАЧЕМ? ПОЧЕМУ?

!ИЗ_ПОД ПАЛКИделатьПРЕЗЕНТАЦИИНЕЛЬЗЯ

?Ч Е Г О Я Х О Ч У

※ ※

?Ч Т О

ИМ Н У Ж Н О

※ ※

ВЫ

ХОТИТЕИМНУЖНО

Вообще говоря, сценаристы должны писать то, что их «зажигает», а не то что кажется им коммерческим сейчас.

ДЭВИД ФРЕНДЛИ Продюсер

License: CC, Attribution, Share Alike | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/

A L E X E I K A P T E R E V

K

www.kapterev.com

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/

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