yu - 'confucius' relational self and aristotle's political animal

North American Philosophical Publications

Confucius' Relational Self and Aristotle's Political AnimalAuthor(s): Jiyuan YuSource: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Oct., 2005), pp. 281-300Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27745033 .Accessed: 07/07/2011 02:16

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History of Philosophy Quarterly Volume 22, Number 4, October 2005

CONFUCIUS' RELATIONAL SELF AND ARISTOTLE'S POLITICAL ANIMAL

Jiyuan Yu

Confucius,

according to commentators, holds a conception of the rela tional self which is in sharp contrast to the modern Western liberal

conception of the self, and which makes his ethics an alternative model to rights-centered modern ethics. There is not much consensus, however, about what precisely "relational self" means. Numerous different ac counts have been proposed.1 There has also been a major debate about the connection between the relational self and individuality. Some be lieve that relationships exhaust the content of a Confucian self,2 whereas others insist that there remains an individuality that goes beyond the sum of one's relationships. Of those who hold the latter position, there are also different views about what kind of individuality it is.3

Confucius' conception of relational self is usually discussed through a comparison with the dominant liberal conception of self that is char acterized by individual choice and freedom. Little attention has been

paid to Aristotle's thesis that a man is by nature a political animal

(politikon z?on).4 Yet this thesis indicates that a human being es

sentially involves interpersonal relationships, and it appears to be a

counterpart to Confucius' relational understanding of the self. Social nature and interrelationships of individuals constitute an integral part of Aristotle's ethics.

It is a common phenomenon, then, for both Eastern Confucius and Western Aristotle to value human relatedness, and this motivates us to bring them together in this comparative study. Interpretation of

Aristotle's "political animal" thesis has been a subject of controversy. Yet in contrast to Confucius who himself does not articulate the concept of relational self, Aristotle's general approach is relatively clear. We can use it as a mirror to better understand what Confucius' relational self

might mean. In the meantime, we can also ask Aristotle similar ques

281

282 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

tions that have been asked in the discussion of Confucius' relational self, and thereby lead to a fresh look at the "political animal" thesis.

I. Political Animal, Relational Self, and Human Nature

1.1. Political Animal and Human Nature

It is easy to conceive of a Confucian relational self as one that occupies this or that social role and lives within a network of relationships. Ar istotle has a similar idea in mind when explaining what the political animal is: "One cannot live a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is sociable by nature."5 A person lives within a network of relationships, but it would be philosophically meager if the relational self or political animal were to mean merely this.

Aristotle, of course, goes much further. In Politics 1.2, he explicates his "political animal" thesis in association with the thesis that "the state is a creation of nature" (1253a3-4). He justifies both theses on the grounds of a naturalistic and genetic account of the state. Human

community starts with the family, develops through the village, and

eventually leads to the form of the state:

When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in ex istence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully devel

oped, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause or the end of a thing is best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best. Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature apolitical animal. (1252b28-1253a4, emphasis mine)

To understand Aristotle's "political animal" thesis, this passage is es sential. Yet how to understand this condensed text has been a topic of

dispute.6 The key is the concept of nature. The canonical definition of nature (phusis) is "a principle of motion and of stationariness" that each

thing has within itself.7 In this sense, "two sorts ofthing are called na

ture, the form and the matter."8 Form and matter are the constituents of a thing, each of them being an inner principle of motion and also a cause (formal cause or material cause, Physics 192b21-23). Form is more a nature than is matter. The other major sense of nature is the end toward which a thing develops. These two senses are not separate, for the end is the final actualization of the form that exists potentially at the beginning (193b3-12). It is the formal cause that internally directs

CONFUCIUS' RELATIONAL SELF 283

and promotes a thing toward its actualization. The formal cause is also the final cause (192bl3-15).

Nature as the inner principle of motion and nature as end are both

employed in the "political animal" thesis. When Aristotle claims that "A social instinct [horm?, or impulse] is implanted in all men by nature"

(Politics 1253a30), he is using the first sense of nature. Horm? (impulse) is the natural tendency of a thing to attain a specific condition (Physics, 192bl3-23). In Politics 1.2, it is precisely these impulses that serve as the driving force for human beings to form various communities. They propel human beings to join with others in order to be fulfilled or per fected, thus initiating an inevitable process of the creation of a state.

It is Aristotle's belief in Politics 1.2 that human beings have a number of social elements in our innate natural impulses. The first is the desire to have sufficient necessities of life. Family is originally formed for the sake of producing offspring, but it is also for the sake of acquiring the necessities of life. The different functions of male and female comple ment each other and make what belongs to each available to both in common. Furthermore, some neighboring families are motivated to group themselves together to form a village because it is clear that larger and

more complex communities make it easier to survive. It is for the same motivation that the state is formed. The state is the most self-sufficient

community and makes it possible for its members to lead richer lives than are available in the household and village alone.

The second innate element is our gift of speech (logos, Pol. 1253a9-10). Other animals have voices with which to express emotion and give signal, yet it is only human beings who are able to use words and sentences. This gift of speech is not merely a matter of linguistic ability. Aristotle

specifies: "The power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and

inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust" (1253al5 16). Accordingly, the gift of speech amounts to the ability that enables human beings to discriminate moral as well as amoral things, and to elucidate the intelligible content of what we refer to. Indeed, in Greek, logos is "speech" or "language," but is also "reason."

The third innate element is our natural moral sense. "It is a charac teristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and

unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state" (1253al7-19).9

All these social elements in our natural impulses are driven to their actualization. In Politics 1.2, Aristotle contends that they can only be actualized in a state. When Aristotle claims that the state is the final

stage or the proper end toward which these impulses move and in which

they seek actualization, he is using the second sense of nature. "For what


each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature" (1252b3-34). It is easy to understand why the desire for the necessities of life can be

fully actualized in the state. It is less clear, and also less discussed, why practical rationality and natural moral senses can only be developed in the state. Why is a state the final stage of the actualization of these social impulses?

Actualization means reaching a state of self-sufficiency. A state comes into being because the state is necessary for a person's life to be self sufficient. This does not only mean that the state provides sufficient life necessities. In the passage under discussion (1252b28-1253a4), Aristotle

says that "the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of living well." "Living well" {eu z?n) is synonymous with eudaimonia (happiness). This remark shows that the existence of the state is necessary for one to achieve eudaimonia. Self-sufficiency is a criterion for happiness in NE, i.7 and it means that "which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing" (1097bl5-16). What can the state offer to make one's life self-sufficient in this sense?

Since "political" (politikon) is etymologically related to polis, the Greek city-state, it is easy to think that "political animal" means that human beings are by nature adapted to live in a Greek polis. There is

not, however, such a straightforward relation. Man is not the only spe cies that is called a "political animal." Aristotle also uses the same title to refer to bees, wasps, ants, cranes, and other gregarious animals.10 He defines "political animal" as "such as have some one common object in view" (History of Animals, 488a8). Animals are "political" as long as

they are involved in cooperative activities that lead to a common end. In this sense, "political" means nothing more than "communal" or "social."

Aristotle also says: "Man is "more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals" (Politics. 1253a8). What makes man "more of a political animal" than other communal animals?

When Aristotle claims that human beings are more political than other gregarious animals, the direct reason he gives for this claim is that "man is the only animal who has the gift of speech [logos]" (1253a9-10). He also claims that "it is a characteristic of man" that he alone has natural moral sense (1253al7-19). Both animals and human beings need life necessities. Hence, if man is more of a political animal than

animals, it must be because of these two kinds of social impulses and their actualization.

Our practical rationality and natural virtue need to be refined and

perfected. For Aristotle, "For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since


armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with

arms, meant to be used by intelligence and excellence, which he may use for the worse ends" (1253a30-36). Intelligence and natural virtue must be perfected by law and justice. Otherwise, a man would lose his

humanity and become "the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony" (1253a36-37).

Where do we find law and justice, then? The answer is in the state.

Justice and virtue are precisely the things that bind a political society together (Politics 1252b37-40). To perfect one's implanted social nature, one must be a member of a political community. In NE, v.l, he claims that justice in its broad sense (which is the complete virtue in relation to others) means "what is lawful" (nomimon). Aristotle admits that there can be and have been defective and unjust laws (cf. NE, 1129b25; Politics

1282a41-bl3). Nevertheless, he believes that "Evidently all lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for the acts laid down by the legislative art are

lawful, and each of these, we say, is just" (NE, 1129bl3-14). All legal systems are "in a sense" (p?s) just because a community regulated by laws is better off than a lawless state, although a society must have a

system of laws based on a proper understanding of human well-being in order to promote the happiness of its citizens.

The state is a natural creation because it is grounded in human social

nature, and is the actualization of it. Correspondingly, man is by nature a political animal, not only because he has natural social desires, but also because a political community is indispensable for the fulfillment of these desires. Aristotle associates the "political animal" thesis with the "state as a natural creature" thesis, because they are established on the same grounds. "Political animal" is, therefore, meant in two senses. In a low sense, a person must live with others in order to secure the necessities of life. This sense is shared with other gregarious animals. In a high sense, one has a social nature that can only be fulfilled in a

community that has law and justice.

1.2. Relationship and Human Nature in Confucius

The familiar textbook view is that Confucius himself does not really have a theory of human nature and that it is Mencius who lays down the psychological foundation for orthodox Confucianism. Yet, Mencius himself suggests that his theory of human nature has been implied in Confucius' thinking. In Mencius's view, there are four inborn roots or

beginnings (duan) to moral behaviors in everyone's natural endowment:

compassion, shame and disgust, compliance and respect, and right and

wrong. When these roots grow and become mature, they turn into the four main Confucian virtues: benevolence (ren), appropriateness (yi),


propriety (li), and wisdom (zhi) (Mencius, 6a/6). Right after his exposi tion of the theory, Mencius states:

The Book of Odes says, heaven produces the teeming masses, and where there is a thing there is a norm. If the people held on to their constant nature, they would be drawn to superior virtue. Confucius commented, "The author of this poem must have had knowledge of the way [dao]. Thus where there is a thing there is a norm, and because the people hold onto their constant nature they are drawn to superior virtue."11

On the strength of this passage, in Confucius' understanding, human

beings possess a constant nature that leads toward virtue. Mencius also quotes another saying: "Confucius said, 'Hold on to it and it will

remain; let go of it and it will disappear. One never knows the time it comes and goes, neither does one know the direction.' It is perhaps to the heart/mind this refers" (Mencius, 6a/8). If Mencius's quotations and comments are credible, Confucius holds the idea that there is an original constant nature for people to preserve and develop. Mencius's theory, as he himself acknowledges, is the legitimate extension or elaboration of this idea.

Confucius' ethics presupposes the assumption that there is a natu ral basis in human beings for them to become good. Confucius sets the

conceptual framework of dao~de at the core of his thinking. In the an cient Chinese belief system, each thing is thought to have a de (virtue, in Chinese it is etymologically related to de, "to get") that is derived from Heaven's dao, and if the thing fully develops its de, it embodies in itself Heaven's dao and reaches its perfect state. Human de is the

manifestation of Heaven's dao in human life. Such a conceptual scheme

implies that we must have the root of de in our original nature which is from Heaven. Confucius himself claims that it is his divine mission to restore the dao of Heaven in the human world (Analects 3:24). He names human de "ren" (humanness), and his whole ethics is about how to cultivate "ren." The saying in the Analects that is most directly about human nature is that "men are close to one another by xing ["nature" or "human nature"]. They diverge as a result of repeated practice" (17:2).12 According to the prevailing reading, this remark shows that human nature is neutral and waits to be shaped by practice. However, to borrow a point from Aristotle, practice can make a difference only if a thing has a natural basis to receive it (NE, 1103a20-24). Read in this

way, Confucius can also be taken to imply that, in the common nature that human beings have, there is a part that is the natural basis for us to be virtuous through practice. He says: "Is ren really far away? No sooner do I desire it than it is here" (7:30). This seems to be a positive affirmation that ren has a natural ground in us.


Confucius' teaching unambiguously relates human relationships to

what a human being should be. In the Analects, the achievement of ren

is said to be a process of shiuji (the cultivation of the self). An excellent or virtuous person (junzi) is he who "cultivates himself and thereby achieves reverence" (14:42). To cultivate is to "cultivate virtues" (7:3).13 The roots of a person's virtuous character are said to be filial love and fraternal respect.14 Self- cultivation is a process of expanding these roots to larger communities. "Once the roots are established, the Way will

grow therefrom" (1:2). Family relationships are the source and grounds for the cultivation of the self.

Confucius' key concept ren also points to the significance of relation

ships in a person's becoming good. On the one hand, ren is the quality that makes a man a man (uRen zhe ren ye," literally "to be ren is to be a man.");

15 on the other hand, this term consists of two components in Chinese: "human" and "two," symbolizing the most basic mode of hu man relatedness. It indicates that relationships must be indispensable in achieving humanity. Confucius never believes that one who lives in isolation or seclusion can attain virtues and dao. "I have heard such a claim," Confucius says, "but I have yet to meet such a man" (16:11). He repeatedly claims that cultivation is a process of examining your self inwardly (nei shin).16 Yet this does not mean that cultivation can be independent of human social relationships. The remark of Zheng Zi in Analects 1.3 shows the relation between examining oneself and human relationships: "Every day I examine myself on three counts. In what I have undertaken on another's behalf, have I failed to do my best? In my dealings with my friend have I failed to be trustworthy in what I say? Have I passed on to others anything that I have not tried out myself?" The content of self-examination is loyalty to others, faithfulness to friends, and commitment to learning. All these involve human-relatedness.

With Mencius's theory of human nature, the connection between the relational self and human nature becomes more explicit. The four inborn

roots, which set a human being apart from an animal and define what a human being really is,17 involve interpersonal relationships and presup pose a community. These seeds must grow in order for one to become a good human being. Yet, they can only grow or gain full expression in a society that has norms which regulate human relationships. For Confucius and Mencius, it is the rites or rituals (li)? that is, the entire

body of socially acknowledged behavior patterns, customs, institutions, and life-styles, as best presented in the early Zhou Dynasty.

Hence, Confucius and Mencius pursue a line of thinking similar to that of Aristotle. Being a relational self, just like being a political animal,


means that a person is by nature relational. A community in which hu man relationships are regulated is indispensable for the actualization of the relational nature.

1.3: Human Social Nature and Ethics

Aristotle and Confucius, then, commonly emphasize human social or relational nature. This common emphasis leads to at least three common features in their respective ethics, and these features distinguish both of them from the dominant principle-based modern Western ethics. A detailed discussion of each will take us too far afield, but let me briefly mention them to indicate the implications of the "political animal" thesis and of the "relational self" conception.

First, both respect the fact that each person grows in and is shaped by a social web. Hence both connect ethics with the internalization of social values. For Aristotle, virtues of character or ethical virtues (?thek? arete) are formed out o? ethos (habit or social custom, NE, 1103al7-19). To learn to be virtuous involves a process of habituation (ethismos). For

Confucius, ren is to conform to social rites. Being a good person involves a process of ritualization. Both habituation and ritualization mean the inculcation or internalization of social values as the source of virtue.

Second, given the significance of the politically organized community in the fulfillment of what is human, both Aristotle and Confucius hold that ethics and politics are inseparable. Aristotle claims that the project in the NE regarding happiness and virtue is only part of the "philosophy of human affairs," and it must be completed by the study of legislation and political institutions (1181bll-15), that is, the topic of his Politics. For Confucius, to be a person of ren is to conform to social rites (12.1) and the best politics is the implementation of social rites (12:11). The Chinese term 'politics' is etymologically related to zheng (the correction of one's behavior). Using this relation, Confucius claims: "To govern [zheng] means to rectify [zheng]." Rectification of his personal character is essential for a ruler's leadership.

Third, both Aristotle and Confucius pay much attention to the role of family since family is the basic unit of social relationship. Confu cius' position is well known. The core of social rites lies in two types of

relationships: one is the father-son relationship in the family and the other is the ruler-subject relationship in politics (Analects, 12:11). Filial love and brotherly respect are the roots of ren and dao (Analects 1:2).

Aristotle's interest in family is mentioned less in the secondary litera ture. Yet following the "political animal" thesis, Aristotle believes that

family is indispensable for human beings to actualize their humanity. Moral education, according to Aristotle, comes at two levels: the state


and the family. "For as in cities laws and character have force, so in households do the injunctions and the habits of the father" (1180b4-5). "Perhaps one's own good cannot exist without household management, nor without a form of government" (NE, 1142a9-ll).

II. Self and Individuality

Now let us turn to the issue of whether the Confucian relational self is submerged into human relationships, or it still has individuality that cannot be reduced to human relationships. In a sense, the concept "relational self" invites this debate. For on the one hand, relationships and individuation are thought to form a contrast;18 on the other, the notion of self leads to the traditional question of self-identity. In Aris totelian scholarship, there is no corresponding debate about whether a

political animal is individual. Yet since political animal is analogous to relational self, we are led to ask the question whether a political ani mal has individuality and if it has, what kind of individuality it is. By "individual," I follow the normal practice and identify it with "single," "uninstantiable," or "particular."19

"Political animal" figures into Aristotle's notion of self when Aristo tle distinguishes two kinds of self-love. One gratifies the non-rational

part of the soul by pursuing things such as money, honors, or bodily pleasures. This is the bad form of self-love.20 The other kind seeks to

gratify the rational part of the soul and is the noble form of self-love.21 Each type of self-love involves a notion of "self." The self of the base self lover is defined by the appetitive part of the soul, whereas the self of the noble self-lover is identified by his reason.22 Aristotle further claims that a noble self-lover is one who develops a virtuous character. The noble self-lover develops practical wisdom, and practical wisdom is an

indispensable aspect of a developed virtuous character. At 1168b25-6, such a self-lover is one who is always eager to act temperately, justly or in accordance with other moral virtues. Rational actions are said to be noble actions (1169a8-9). The self of the noble self-lover turns out to be his virtuous character.

In his theory of friendship, Aristotle has a well-known thesis that a friend is another self (NE, 1166a32) or a second self (Magna Moralia, 1213a20-26). This is, of course, limited to virtue-based friendship.23 A friend is my second self because we are both virtuous and we are fun

damentally the same in character. For this reason, I can know myself better by looking at my friends. Clearly, in this "second self" theory, the self is also identified with one's virtuous character.

Some commentators question whether Aristotle should have identified self with character.24 This may be due to our usual way of


identifying "self" with "person," and taking Aristotle to be dealing with the metaphysical issue of personal identity. In that case, it is true that one remains the same person even if his character changes, and that a person cannot be reduced to abstract attributes. However, Aristotle

distinguishes between person and self, and his concern is the formation of a moral self which he defines in terms of moral character. We may feel strange about his use of "self," but should follow him in order to understand his point.25

Confucius also appears to have distinguished between person and self. In his view, to achieve ren or virtue, one first of all has aji (self) to overcome (keji, Analects 12:1). One needs to moderate appetitive desires.

Moreover, there is a ji (self) to be cultivated, that is, an original good nature to be developed into a virtuous character. A noble person is he who "cultivates himself and thereby achieves reverence" (14:42). Keji ("to overcome oneself) and shiu ji ("to cultivate oneself") are not two

separate processes, given that the process of forming virtue is also the

process that moderates desires.26 Confucius' usage of ji (self) suggests that he does not identify ji (self) with person. For a person includes both the good nature and the appetitive desires. A virtuous agent must overcome the latter but develop the former. Like Aristotle, Confucius is concerned with moral rather than metaphysical identity of the self.

He is interested in the development of an ethical character rather than what it is that remains the same person over time.

Given this, in asking whether the Confucian relational self or the Aristotelian character-self (or political animal) is an individual, what is at issue should be the moral self. Moreover, we must distinguish between the following two questions. First, is the moral self, constituted by the virtuous character, an individual? Second, is the person or the agent who is characterized by the moral self an individual? Both Confucius and Aristotle answer "no" to the first question, but "yes" to the second

question.

Neither Confucius nor Aristotle thinks that the self is submerged in social relationships. Aristotle's ethics is concerned with one's own eudaimonia. The development of one's nature into being a political ani mal is a significant part of one's eudaimonia. The actualization of one's social nature is not to let go of one's own self. Rather, it is essential for the formation of the self. Similarly, Confucius insists that while human

relationships are indispensable, the self is not just a sum of relation

ships. The goal of self-cultivation is learning to be a virtuous person by acquiring ren. Ren is the character that defines an agent as being virtuous. To become virtuous, one is not merely getting into a network of relationships (indeed, one must have already been thrown into such


a network), but is developing a disposition to treat others in community appropriately. This disposition, although it is developed in practicing ritualized relationships, is itself not relational. Confucius emphasizes a distinction between the self (ji) and others in the cultivation of ren. "The practice of benevolence depends on oneself alone, and not on others"

(Analects 12:1). "Men of antiquity studied to improve themselves; men

today study to impress others" (14:24). A person of ren "helps others to take their stand in so far as he himself wishes to take his stand, and

gets others there in so far as he himself wishes to get there" (6:30).27

Indeed, for Confucius, it is not the case that when these relations

change, character changes. Once a character is formed, it is not only distinct, but it also confers on the agent a strong personality and in

tegrity. "The Master said: The three armies can be deprived of their

commanding officer, but even a common man cannot be deprived of his zhi ["will" or "resolve"]"' (Analects 9:26). It also gives the agent a high degree of moral independence, so that he can live in a different society but still exercise his virtue to influence the new environment.28

What becomes a problem for both Confucius and Aristotle is how a virtuous character can be individual in the sense of being single or

particular. A character is not private or particular, but contains general, predictable, and repeatable values. It can be instantiated many times and identify a certain social group (namely, virtuous people). Both Ar istotle and Confucius are ethical objectivists. They believe that there is an objective good that each human being should achieve, and the content that makes a person a virtuous agent is shared and common. For both, self-actualization is to become a person of a certain type or an ideal human being, rather than becoming a particular individual that is distinct from other human beings.

In Aristotle's ethics, a moral character is developed and perfected through social habituation and is informed by social ethos and laws. The content of a virtue is the same for all virtuous agents; indeed, when Aristotle defines virtue as a mean disposition, he specifies that it be "in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it"

(NE 1107al-2). Each virtuous agent is a noble self-lover. The self she

loves, however, is her virtuous character, which is more or less com

monly shared by other virtuous agents. Furthermore, the paradigm friendship is character-based friendship, in which the virtuous agent's genuine concern for his friends is justified on the ground that the friend is another self. This is not because his friend is a particular individual, but because his friend has the traits of character that the virtuous agent possesses and values, the fundamentally same character that defines the virtuous agent as such.29


In Confucius' ethics, the virtuous character (ren) is a quality that is shared by all virtuous agents. There is a human dao that is the em bodiment of the dao of Heaven. The goal of self-cultivation (shiu ji) is to lead one's life in accordance with the dao of Heaven. Ren, the quality that makes a person a person, is not meant to make a person a unique individual, but an ideal person.30

While it is certainly right that a virtuous character is shared and

instantiable, it does not entail that the virtuous agent, the subject of

virtue, is simply a physically discernible neutral medium to embody or instantiate the common virtuous character. The self or the virtuous character is not, as it were, "a ghost in a machine." There are at least the following reasons for granting particularity to a virtuous agent. These reasons are held by both Confucius and Aristotle.

(1) Although the content of virtue is objective, its achievement in volves conscious personal effort. For Confucius, the root of cultivation is filial love, not filial love in general, but the love that one has for one's own

parents. Furthermore, it is precisely because cultivation needs personal effort that only a few can actualize the originally equal potentiality to become a sage. The Analects is full of sayings that exhort us to show our

personal determination and commitment in the pursuit of ren. Confucius also attends to the need of each student as an individual in his teach

ing. On Aristotle's side, although moral virtues are generated in and by social habituation, habituation is not a passive and mechanical process of following norms. It involves one's active engagement, and one is at least partly responsible for one's character (1114b2-3).

(2) The possession of virtue involves personal understanding. Aristotle stresses that to be a virtuous agent, in addition to having a fixed disposi tion, one must have knowledge, must "choose the acts and choose them for their own sakes" (1105a31-32), and take pleasure in it.31 For Confucius, knowing is a necessary quality o? ren, as one who does not possess know

ing cannot be ren (5:18). A man of ren must have his own understanding about what to do. "The gentleman agrees with others without being an echo. The small man echoes without being in agreement."

(3) The possession of virtue must involve personal feeling. For Aris

totle, an agent with this quality is "a true lover of what is noble" (NE, 1179b9). This kind of enjoyment constitutes one's ethical taste. It is a sign of virtue: "The man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and simi

larly in all other cases" (1099al6-20).32 A person who engages in just acts is not necessarily just. It is in light of whether one likes or enjoys doing something, rather than merely what one does, that we determine


whether one truly has a good character. Correspondingly, for Confucius, ren must involve love or benevolence (uren is to love your fellow men,"

Analects, 12:22), and one's actions must be carried out with ease and

enjoyment. A man of ren is one who "finds ren attractive" (4:6) and "is fond of what is appropriate" (12:20). "The man of ren is attracted to ren

because he feels at home with it" (4:2).

(4) The exercise of virtue requires individual discretion. Both Con fucius and Aristotle are moral particularists and hold that a virtuous

agent must bring the general requirements of virtue to bear appropri ately in particular situations. A virtuous agent must critically assess the salient features of the circumstances and determine what is called for. For Aristotle, practical wisdom is concerned with actions we can do

by means of our own agency. While it requires knowledge of the uni versal about what should be done, it focuses on the salient features of

particular situations and circumstances in which each action is taken.33 It is likened to perception, that is, the individual practical sensitivity, a

seeing, of how to act (NE, 1142a23-30). For Confucius, the regulations of social rites are of a general nature. The intellectual aspect of virtue, yi ("appropriateness"), requires adjusting the generality of the social rites and bringing them to bear in particular circumstances. Indeed, "In his

dealing with the world the gentleman is not invariably for and against anything. He is on the side of what is appropriate" (Analects, 4:10).

III. Self and Contemplation

The comparison of Aristotle's political animal with the Confucian re lational self cannot be concluded without introducing Aristotle's other notion of self, the theoretical self. For Aristotle, being a political animal is only one aspect of human nature, and the acquisition of a virtuous character is only a partial actualization of human function. In addition, there is a theoretical self and its actualization. For Confucius, the re lational self is the only self that should be fulfilled. It is worthwhile to

point out this contrast, albeit briefly, so that our comparison of political animal with relational self becomes complete.

For Aristotle, what distinguishes a human being from animals is that he is a rational animal rather than that he is a political animal.

However, being a political animal has a low sense and the high sense. While the high sense (distinguished by the human power of language and moral sense) is peculiar to human beings, the low sense is shared

by the gregarious animals. Being a political animal in the high sense is

certainly part of being a rational animal; yet it is not the whole content of being a rational animal.


Aristotle subdivides the part of the soul that has reason in two: theo retical and practical. The virtue of practical reason is practical wisdom, while the virtue of theoretical reason is theoretical wisdom and its ex ercise is contemplation. If we put the political animal into this picture, it is clearly related only to practical rationality and practical virtue.

Being a political animal, therefore, is only one part of human function, and its actualization is only a partial actualization.

We mentioned earlier that Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of self

love, each involving a distinct notion of "self," identified respectively with the appetitive part and with reason. Given that there are two kinds of

rationality, the rational self has two parts: a theoretical rational self and the practical rational self. The love of either kind of rationality should be noble self-love. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that Aristotle iden tifies the self with one's character and practical reason. Now, he also identifies the self with theoretical intellect (nous). He says at NE, x.7, 1178a 1-8: "This [nous] would seem, too, to be each man himself, since it is the authoritative and the better part of him. It would be strange, then, if he were to choose not the life of himself but that of something else. . . . Since nous more than anything else is man." The self is a person's theoretical intellect.

Aristotle's identification of the self with nous, like his identification of the self with practical rationality and character, gives rise to contro

versy.34 Furthermore, these two identifications lead many commentators to accuse him of creating a contradiction.35 Some commentators seek to find a way out for Aristotle by giving different interpretations of nous,36 but others think that the tension is simply not solvable.37

Yet, Aristotle is consistent and intelligible as well if we bear in mind that Aristotle distinguishes between the person and the self and that his concern is not with metaphysical identity. A person, whether he is

contemplative or not, has both rational and irrational parts of the soul, and must also have both parts of the rational. Aristotle describes these

parts independently and applies the concept "self" to each of them. He defines one rational self in terms of practical reason, and the other in terms of nous.

Putting Confucius' relational self together with Aristotle's theory, one cannot escape the observation that for Confucius, there is no distinction between a practical self and a theoretical self.

This difference can be traced to their different views of what is characteristic of a human. For Aristotle, human function contains both

practical reason and theoretical reason, and these two parts turn out to have distinct natures. Hence, to some extent, Aristotle's notion of human function itself implies a tension. In contrast, the intellectual aspect of


virtue in Confucius, yi (appropriateness), is not divided into the practical and the theoretical. Yi is about what is appropriate for one to do and to live. It corresponds mainly to Aristotle's practical wisdom. What is

lacking in Confucian ethics is Aristotle's nous, which is distinct from

practical rationality and independent from affection, and is concerned with universal and necessary knowledge. Confucius does not emphasize the theoretical aspect of human intelligence. As a result, while Confu cius' relational self corresponds to Aristotle's political animal, there is no room in Confucian ethics for Aristotle's theoretical self.

This difference leads them to different pictures of self-actualization.

Aristotle, out of two distinct concepts of self, offers two different models of self-actualization. Self-development is not a unified process. Rather, different parts of human function lead to different processes of growth. There is one process for the realization of the practical self, and another for the realization of the theoretical self. Aristotle even concludes the main project of the NE with a hierarchy or ranking of eudaimonia cor

responding to these two models of self-actualization: "This [the life of

nous] is therefore also the happiest. But in a secondary degree the life in accordance with the other kind of excellence [i.e., practical wisdom and moral virtue] is happy" (1178a8-10). This passage has been a source of

continuing debate. Reading it in the context of our current discussion, Aristotle is talking about a ranking of the two models of self-realization. The primary happiness is the actualization of the theoretical self, and the secondary happiness is the actualization of the practical self.

Aristotle maintains that so far as contemplative activity itself is concerned, moral deeds are not only not required, but they are "even hindrances (empodia), at all events to his contemplation" (1178b4-5). This point is further reinforced when Aristotle claims that God, whose life is nothing but contemplative activity, does not possess any moral virtue or vice (1178bl6-7). When they do not conflict, practical wisdom can provide the conditions for theoretical wisdom (1145a8-9); but when

they are in conflict, "We must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, but must, as far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us" (117b32-35).

In contrast, because his concept of self is unified, Confucius presents one single process of the development of self. The cultivation of self is a continuous course in which one's virtuous character keeps deepening and perfecting. For Confucius, however, a process of self-cultivation is one in which one's self grows and deepens. His autobiographic passage shows this clearly:


The Master said, "At fifteen I set my heart on learning; at thirty I took

my stand; at forty I came to be free from doubts; at fifty I understood the Decree of Heaven; at sixty my ear was attuned; at seventy I fol lowed my heart's desire without overstepping the line." (2:4)

What we are presented with here is an agent who realizes that his in ner state or character becomes increasingly polished and profound. The cultivation is endless, as long as one lives. The process itself is unified, and does not involve two different actualized selves. It is the deepening of one's virtuous character only, and does not lead to a fulfilled theoretical self. For the actualization is the unfolding of our original good human

nature, and nous was not there in the first place.

The result is that while Aristotle's ethics contains a theory of con

templation that incorporates practical virtue, Confucius does not have a corresponding dichotomy. In other words, what Aristotle regards as

primary happiness is missing in Confucius. The actualization of the relational self corresponds largely to Aristotle's secondary happiness, that is, the actualization of our nature of being a political animal or our practical self. When Confucius mentions that at the age of fifty he knows "the Decree of Heaven," he shows that his ethics has a transcen dental dimension. We start with Heaven-endowed de (virtue), and our

destiny to fulfill it. This transcendental dimension is fully developed in the Mencius and the Doctrine of the Mean as the Confucian theory of "the unity between man and Heaven." This is the level at which the relational self is fully actualized, and ren is fully possessed. It is not Aristotle's contemplation of eternal truth, and there is also no tension involved between the cultivation of ren and the man/Heaven unity.

The rationale behind Aristotle's hierarchy of happiness is deep-seated enthusiasm for the pursuit of knowledge of things necessary and un

changing. For Aristotle, contemplative activity is best on the grounds that "since not only is intellect the best thing in us, but also the objects of intellect are the best of knowable objects" (1177a21-22). Theoretical

rationality is concerned with "the kind of things whose principles cannot be otherwise" (1139a7), and unchangeable principles are "the highest objects in nature" (t?n timi?tat?n; 1141a20, b4). In contrast, practical rationality is about human affairs, things that admit of variation, but "man is not the best thing in the world" (1141a21). For him, unchang ing things such as the constituent parts of the universe have a far more divine nature (polu theiotera t?nphusin) than human affairs (1141bl-2). Theoretical wisdom is said to be the most precise mode of knowledge (? akiribetat?; 1141al7), whereas practical wisdom is said to be "inferior to wisdom" (1143b33). Aristotle's rank of happiness indicates the superior ity of unchanging objects over changing things, and the superiority of eternal knowledge over contingent truth. Contemplation of eternal truth,


despite its potential tension with practical wisdom and social morality, is the highest and most valuable human activity, and the life character ized by this activity is the best. It is in the pursuit of contemplation that

we find the real manifestation of our rational essence.

In contrast, Confucius puts weight on the harmony among human

beings and the harmony between human beings and the world. Even

though his ideal is the embodiment of Heaven's Dao in a person's life, he is not interested in conducting a theoretical investigation about Heaven, for the sake of knowing Heaven per se. Indeed, he dismisses speculation about non-practical issues as idle curiosity.38 Hence, whereas Aristotle holds not only that a person is a "political animal" by nature, but that a person should pursue eternal and necessary knowledge about the

universe, Confucius focuses on a person as being a "relational self" and

appears to ignore the theoretical nature of being a person.39

State University of New York at Buffalo

NOTES

1. For Tu Wei-Ming, it means the self "was never conceived of as an isolated or isolable entity" (Confucian Thought [Albany: State University of New York

Press], p. 53). For Henry Rosemont, it suggests "the altogether social nature of human life, for the qualities of persons, the kinds of person they are, and the knowledge and attitudes they have are not exhibited in actions, but only in interactions, human interactions" (Rosemont, "Rights-Bearing Individuals and Role-Bearing Persons," in Rules, Rituals, and Responsibilities: Essays Dedicated to Herbert Fingarette, ed. Mary I. Bockover [La Salle, 111.: Open Court, 1991], p. 89; emphasis in the original). Roger T. Ames takes it as the "focus field" model of self ("The Focus-Field Self in Classical Confucianism, in Self as Person in Asian Theory and Practice, ed. R. T. Ames with W. Dissanayake and T. P. Kasulis [Albany: SUNY Press, 1994], p. 173). David Wong lays out two

possibilities. One means that "we begin life embodied as biological organisms and become persons by entering into relationship with others of our kind"; and the other means that "persons need the help of others to develop as agents."

Wong calls the former "the social conception of the person" and the latter "the

developmental sense of relationality." ("Relational and Autonomous Selves," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 31, no. 4 [2004], pp. 420-421).

2. One view holds that, for Confucius, one's relationships, taken collectively, are all that a self is, and one's identity as a person is constituted of nothing more

than the sum of the roles he assumes in various relationships. See, Rosemont,

"Rights-Bearing Individuals," p. 90.


3. Donald Munro relates the Confucian view of individualism to the value of uniqueness and innerlichheit of the German Romantics (Individualism and Holism, ed. D. Munro [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1985], p. 3). Roger T. Ames proposes to distinguish between two senses of "individual": one means one of a kind: "a single, separate, and indivisible

thing that, by virtue of some essential property or properties, qualifies as a member of a class," and the other means uniqueness: "the character of a single and unsubstitutable particular" (Ames, "The Focus-Field Self in Classical Confucianism," p. 194). He concludes that "Confucius has a notion of unique individuality rather than autonomous individuality" (Ames, "The Focus-Field Self in Classical Confucianism," p. 197). David Wong, in order to dispel the view that the self is nothing more than the sum of one's relationships, pointedly argues that there is a plausible sense of individual autonomy that is operative in Confucianism. That sense, differing from the libertarian conception of free agency, means that the virtuous agent possesses a global character or context

invariant character so that he "resides in one's ethical excellence through hard and easy circumstances" ("Relational and Autonomous Selves," p. 426).

4. HA, 488a7-10; NE, 1097b8-ll, 1162al7-19, 1169bl6-20; Pol. 1253a4, 1278b20; EE, 1242a22-27.

5. NE, 1097b9-ll; also, 1169M7-19. The translations of Aristotle are based on the revised Oxford translation of The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

6. For helpful discussions, see David Keyt, "Three Basic Theorems in Aristotle's Politics," in A Companion to Aristotle's Politics, ed. David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 118-141; Fred D. Miller Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 27-45; Richard Kraut, Aristotle: Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2002), pp. 240-253; C. D. C. Reeve, Aristotle: Politics (India napolis: Hackett), Introduction, sec. 7.

7. Physics, ii.l, 192bl4. Cf. also 192a22-23.

8. Physics, ii.2, 194all.

9. David Keyt thinks that Aristotle is wrong here on the ground that a moral sense cannot be inborn, but can only be possessed by a fully virtuous agent (Keyt, "Three Basic Theorems in Aristotle's Politics," p. 134). This criticism cannot hold if Aristotle means natural virtue. In NE, 1144b7-10, Aristotle believes that human beings possess natural dispositions.

10. Pol. 1253a7-9; HA, 487b33-488al0.

11. Unless otherwise indicated, the translation of the Book of Mencius is based on D. C. Lau, Mencius (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1984).

12. Unless otherwise indicated, the translation of the Analects is based on D. C. Lau, Confucius: The Analects (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1983).

13. Shiuji is also called shiu sheng (to cultivate personal life). Indeed, self cultivation is the project of Confucianism: "From the Son of Heaven down to


the common people, all must regard cultivation of personal life as the root or foundation" (The Great Learning, in W-T. Chan, The Source Book in Chinese Philosophy [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963], p. 87). The object of shiuji or shiu sheng is to nurture virtues. Doctrine of the Mean (chap. 20) quotes Confucius as saying that "He who knows wisdom, ren, and courage knows how to shiu sheng."

14. The most important contents of the Mencian four roots are also filial love and fraternal respect (Mencius, 4a/27).

15. The Doctrine of the Mean, p. 20, and Mencius 7a/16.

16. Analects,4:l7; 5:27; 12:4.

17. Mencius, 2a/6, 4b/19, 6a/8.

18. For instance, Carol Gilligan writes: "The males tend to have difficulty with relationships, while females tend to have problems with individuation." Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 8.

19. This normal use, however, is un-Aristotelian. Aristotle distinguishes between individual and particular. The word "individual" is from the Latin Individuum, which is a literal translation of the Greek term atomon (literally, indivisible). When Aristotle employs atomon, it refers not only to things such as "Socrates" or "this horse," but also to infima species (e.g., vii.8, 1034a5-8).

?nfima species is universal in the sense of being predicated of many subjects, but is also individual in the sense of being indivisible into further kinds of the same nature. Hence, in Aristotle, all particulars are individuals (indivisibles), but not vice versa. What is opposed to the universal (katholou) is particular (kath hekaston), and they are distinguished on the ground of predictability (DI. 7, 17a39-40). A particular is not predicable of anything further, and is not repeatable.

20. "It is just, therefore, that men who are lovers of self in this way are

reproached for being so" (1168b22-23). 21. NE, 1168b32-33; 1166al7-18.

22. Aristotle repeatedly claims that reason is the man himself (NE, 1168b35, 1169al-2).

23. "The friendship of people who are good and alike in virtue" (NE, 1156b6, 1164al2, 1165b8-9, EE, 1241al0, 1242b36).

24. Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 498, n. 33. Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 250.

25. Joel Kupperman does believe that character approximates the nature of self. See his Character (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 44.

26. Aristotle distinguishes two types of self-love. Confucius has the cor

responding idea that "The gentleman understands what is moral. The small man understands what is profitable" (4:16).


27. See also Analects, 1:8, 9:25, 15:21, 15:23.

28. Analects, 9:14; cf. 4:1, 4:2.

29. This issue has been raised by Jennifer Whiting, who claims that, ac

cording to Aristotle's "other self" doctrine, friends are impersonal: "Since she [the virtuous agent] values that sort of character in itself, she will value that character not only in herself but also in others." J. E. Whiting, "Impersonal Friends," The Monist, vol. 74 (1991), p. 11.

30. In Confucian scholarship, Herbert Fingarette remarks: "Since the chun tzu" \junzi, the noble person]'s will is thus ideally the medium by which, and through which, the tao is allowed and enabled to work and to be actualized, the

T of the chun tzu, as purely personal, has become, as it were, transparent. It is

a generative space-time locus of will without personal content." H. Fingarette, "The Problem of the Self in the Analects," Philosophy East and West, vol. 29, no. 2 (April 1979), p. 136. From here, Fingarette leads to the conclusion that Confucius holds a selfless theory. That, I think, goes too far.

31. NE, 1099al6-2; 1104b3-13; 11109bl-5; 1113a31-33; 1120a26-27; 1172a20-23.

32. AT?,1104b3-13; 1109bl-5; 1113a31-33; 1120a26-27; 1172a20-23.

33. NE, 1141bl4-15, 1142al4, 1142a21.

34. Urmson, Aristotle's Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 125. Bos tock, Aristotle's Ethics, p. 196.

35. Maclntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1985, 2nd edition), p. 158.

36. Broadie, Ethics With Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 436-437, n. 56; Reeve, Practices of Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 133-137.

37. Bostock, Aristotle's Ethics, p. 197.

38. Analects, 7:21; 11:12; 6:22; 3:12.

39. I wish to thank David Wong and Robin Wang for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Article Contentsp. 281p. 282p. 283p. 284p. 285p. 286p. 287p. 288p. 289p. 290p. 291p. 292p. 293p. 294p. 295p. 296p. 297p. 298p. 299p. 300

Issue Table of ContentsHistory of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Oct., 2005), pp. 281-373Volume InformationFront MatterConfucius' Relational Self and Aristotle's Political Animal [pp. 281-300]Free Will and Free Action in Anselm of Canterbury [pp. 301-318]Two Theories of Retributive Punishment: Immanuel Kant and Thomas Aquinas [pp. 319-338]Berkeley's Corpuscular Philosophy of Time [pp. 339-356]Cultivating Habits of Reason: Peirce and the Logica Utens versus Logica Docens Distinction [pp. 357-372]Back Matter

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