The Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Ghent University, the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and the Research Community ‘Neuroscience in relation to Experimental Psychology’ announce:

NEUROSCIENCE & COGNITION:Consciousness & Cognitive control

December 3-4 2012Flemish Academy of Belgium for Sciences and the Arts (KVAB), Belgium

Mélanie Boly, Victor Lamme, Hakwan Lau, Lionel Naccache, Mathias Pessiglione,

and David BadreDiscussant

Axel Cleeremans

ORGANISED BY:

Practical Information

Conference Venue:Flemish Academy of Belgium for Sciences and the Arts (KVAB)Paleis der AcademiënHertogsstraat 11000 Brussel

How to get there? From the airport: Take the train to Brussels Central Station With the train: Brussels Central Station By car: At your own risk

From Brussels Central Station: o Take a walk (10 minutes) o Take the underground walk way on your right (while staying in front of the main

announcement panel and ticketing offices - not left which is the exit to the city center)o Go straight through the shopping mall "Ravenstein", take the steps at the endo Cross the small street with "Palais des Beaux Arts" at your right, and take the steps at the

endo Cross the street and cross the Parko The academy is opposite the right exit

o Or with the metro ( MIVB ): Metro station Troon o From Central Station: line 1 or 5 to Kunst-Wet, then line 2 or 6.o From Nord station: metro Rogier, line 2 or 6, direction Koning Boudewijn or Simonis

(Leopold II).o From Midi station : line 2 or 6 direction Simonis (Elisabeth)

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Oral presentations

All presentations are held in the Auditorium Albert II of the KVAB. Our six keynote lectures will be 45 minutes with opportunity for a 15-minute discussion.A scientific committee selected 8 submissions for a short oral presentation. These oral presentations will be 15 minutes with opportunity for a 5-minute discussion. All speakers are asked to adhere to these time limits.

Poster sessions

Two poster sessions will be held: Poster session 1: Monday December 3, 17.00-19.00, Atrium KVAB Poster session 2: Tuesday December 4, 12.20-14.20, Atrium KVAB

From page 14 on, you can see which posters are to be mounted in the first and which in the second session. If you are in the first session, please mount your poster immediately after registering (so that early people can already have a look) and remove it before we leave for the conference dinner, so that the people from the second session can mount their posters early on Tuesday morning. The idea is that on both days, posters can be seen all day long. The format for poster preparation is A0 portrait (84.1 cm x 118.9 cm or 33.1 x 46.8 inches). Material to attach the posters to the poster panels will be provided at the venue. Poster numbers mentioned in this program correspond to the poster panel where the poster should be displayed.

Organizing committee:

Eva Van den Bussche (Vrije Universiteit Brussel)Filip Van Opstal (Ghent University)Tom Verguts (Ghent University)Ralf Krampe (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)Bert Reynvoet (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)

Contact:Eva Van den BusscheEva.Van.den.Bussche@vub.ac.beVrije Universiteit BrusselDepartment of PsychologyPleinlaan 2, B-1050 BrusselsBelgiumPhone : +32-(0)2-629 14 82Fax : +32-(0)2-629 24 89

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Program OverviewMonday 3 December 2012

9.00 10.00 Registration and coffee

10.0

010.10 Welcome

10.1

011.10

Keynote Lecture

Victor Lamme: How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness

11.1

011.40 Coffee break

11.4

012.40

Keynote Lecture

Mathias Pessiglione: Subliminal motivation of the human brain

12.4

014.00 Lunch

14.0

015.20 Oral Presentations:

14.0

014.20

Rémi Capa: Long-lasting effects of performance-contingent unconscious and conscious

reward incentives during cued task-switching performance

14.2

014.40

Floris De Lange: How consciousness changes the relative weights of evidence during human

decision making

14.4

015.00 Kobe Desender: Feeling the conflict: Metacognitive influences in masked priming

15.0

015.20 Gethin Hughes: The role of motor prediction in the processing of sensory action-effects

15.2

016.00 Coffee Break

16.0

017.00

Keynote Lecture

David Badre: Fronto-striatal systems supporting abstract rule learning

17.0

019.00 Poster session 1 and reception

19.1

519.30 Walk to the restaurant

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19.3

0Conference Dinner

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Tuesday 4 December 2012

9.30 10.00 Coffee

10.00 11.00Keynote Lecture

Hakwan Lau: How to properly study the functions of consciousness?

11.00 11.20 Coffee Break

11.20 12.20

Keynote Lecture

Lionel Naccache: How far can “conscious posture” influence non conscious cognitive

processes?

12.20 14.20 Poster session 2 and lunch

14.20 15.40 Oral Presentations:

14.20 14.40 Anil Seth: Interoceptive predictive coding, presence, and agency

14.40 15.00 Simon van Gaal: Logical semantic operations in the absence of visual awareness

15.00 15.20 Heiko Reuss: Adaptation to unconscious conflicts in unconscious contexts

15.20 15.40 Tristan Bekinschtein: Losing Consciousness: wakefulness modulation of cognitive control

15.40 16.00 Coffee break

16.00 17.00Keynote Lecture

Mélanie Boly: Brain connectivity in Disorder of Consciousness

17.00 17.30 Conclusions by Axel Cleeremans

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Keynote SpeakersMonday 3 December

10.10-11.10

How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness

Victor Lamme

Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Consciousness has always been defined from introspective and behavioral intuitions. This has gotten us nowhere. What we need is a radical redefinition of what consciousness really is, from a convergence of introspective, behavioral and neural arguments. The criterion for success should be whether such a new definition explains what there is to explain about consciousness, not whether it fits our intuitive notions.From such an approach (Lamme, 2006; 2010), it emerges that it makes sense to acknowledge that we have conscious sensations (in the phenomenal, qualitative sense) without attention, without access, and hence also without thought. In this talk, I will present further arguments that impose such a far reaching conclusion.Our latest experiments show that vision without attention is rich, detailed, precise, integrated, and - most importantly – shows perceptual inference i.e. goes beyond the retinal image towards a perceptual interpretation of that image. Moreover, we show a further dissociation between various forms of cognition (categorization, control) and consciousness, while the association between integration-segregation and conscious experience is strengthened.In sum, there is now overwhelming evidence showing that neural representations outside the focus of attention, and outside the realm of access or thought possess all the key properties of conscious representations, except – of course – reportability. Moreover, these properties do all the explaining towards the phenomenal nature of conscious experience. The absence of access does little to explain that away. The proper conclusion is that we may have conscious sensations even when we don’t know it.

11.40 – 12.40

Subliminal motivation of brain modules

Mathias Pessiglione

Institut du Cerveau et de la Moelle épinière, Hôpital Pitié-Salpêtrière, France

“Eat popcorn” is certainly one of the most famous subliminal messages. It was inserted into a movie and presented so briefly that the audience could not see it. There is no evidence that such subliminal advertising actually works in ecological settings. However, several subliminal motivation effects have been obtained in the lab. For instance, some behavioural experiments suggest that we exert higher effort

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following incentive cues that we do not consciously perceive. Also, we can learn the predictive value of subliminal cues so as to guide our gambling choices. These processes may be not only subliminal but also subpersonal, since one side of our body can be motivated independently from the other. Neuroimaging and pharmacological studies have then identified the limbic basal ganglia and the neuromodulator dopamine as responsible for such subconscious motivation processes. These deep brain structures could therefore be considered as modules representing subconscious motivations that would compete for controlling the behaviour, until they have access to the consciousness space.

16.00 – 17.00

Fronto-striatal systems supporting abstract rule learning

David Badre

Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, USA

People show a remarkable ability to behave flexibly and in a goal-directed way, even in novel situations with which they have little direct experience. Cognitive control of this type partly arises from the representation of abstract rule structures that relate classes of contexts and actions to desired outcomes. This talk will describe a recent line of work investigating how such abstract rules can be learned and implemented in the brain to control behavior. Evidence from behavioral, neuropsychological, and fMRI studies of abstract rule use, novel rule learning, and the transfer of previously learned rules to novel situations will be presented. I will then discuss recent combined computational modeling and fMRI work that proposes a mechanism by which abstract rule learning might arise via nested loops between prefrontal cortex and the striatum. Issues related to implicit versus explicit learning and awareness of the rule structures themselves will be considered.

Tuesday 4 December10.00-11.00

How to properly study the functions of consciousness?

Hakwan Lau

Psychology Department, Columbia University (USA)

The current consensus seems to be that: without perceptual awareness of the relevant visual information some cognitive control functions can be exercised, but perhaps awareness enhances or changes the nature of such functions. However, the relevant empirical studies (including the speaker's very own) are problematic, because when we render stimuli unconscious, we typically greatly reduce the stimulus strength & internal perceptual signal as well. So when we say we're comparing between conscious and unconscious percepts and their respective functions, we do not know if we are just comparing between strong and weak percepts/signals. This potential confound trivializes current

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empirical results: it's not surprising that a big signal can drive cognitive control better than a weak signal, and that a weak signal - so long as it is not truly non-existent - can drive some cognitive control functions weakly. I propose that we try to keep objectively measured signal strength (i.e. perceptual performance) constant and manipulate subjective awareness in isolation, and see how different levels of subjective awareness influences cognitive control. This is hard to achieve but I show preliminary data supporting the possibility of this exciting new approach.

11.20 – 12.20

How far can “conscious posture” influence non conscious cognitive processes?

Lionel Naccache

Paris 6 University & CRICM, Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital, France

For a long time unconscious processing of information, - as studied by experimental cognitive psychology -, was considered as necessarily automatic in the “strong version” of the statement, including the assumption of total impermeability to top down control. Whereas this assumption was discussed early on, the first experimental invalidations of this robust theoretical assumption were produced around the beginning of the 21st century: several studies demonstrated that the processing of a subliminal stimulus, inaccessible to subjective report, was under the influence of many voluntary conscious effects such as endogenous spatial and temporal attention, response selection or inhibition, and task selection. Far from being achieved, this dynamic field of research conveys major issues: 1) which are the “limits” (if any) of this sensitivity of non conscious processing to conscious posture? 2) Is this influence asymmetric, - and therefore diagnostic of conscious processing -, or may it be observed in the reverse direction? On which solid bases could the concept of automaticity be reformulated? Far from answering those questions, I will try to shake them in front of your (conscious?) mind.

16.00 – 17.00

Brain connectivity in Disorder of Consciousness

Mélanie Boly

Coma Science Group, University of Liège, Belgium

During the last decade, functional neuroimaging of disorders of consciousness (e.g., coma, vegetative state and minimally conscious state) has evolved from measuring resting cerebral blood flow or electrical activity to studying functional response to sensory stimuli and to active paradigm asking patients to concentrate on doing a task like playing tennis. While offering new potential diagnostic tools in these patients, these methods also show how difficult it is to clinically differentiate different states of consciousness. Brain connectivity studies aim at evaluating global cerebral function in patients with disorders of consciousness. In the present talk, I will cover results obtained using a range of functional and effective connectivity approaches based on PET, fMRI, high density EEG, and TMS-EEG recordings.

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Experimental work performed in other unconscious states (i.e., anesthesia, generalized seizures, and deep sleep) will also be compared and reviewed. Practical and conceptual implications of these studies

will be discussed in light of recent theories of consciousness.

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Oral PresentationsMonday 3 December

14.00 – 14.20

Long-lasting effects of performance-contingent unconscious and conscious reward incentives during cued task-switching performance

Rémi L. Capa1,2, Cédric A. Bouquet3, Jean-Claude Dreher4, & André Dufour5

1 University of Liège, Department of Psychology, Cognition & Behavior, Belgium; 2 University of Strasbourg, Department of Psychiatry, INSERM, France; 3 University of Poitiers, CeRCA CNRS, France; 4

University of Lyon 1, CCN Reward and Decision-Making Group CNRS, France; 5 University of Strasbourg, LINC CNRS, France

Few studies using subliminal stimuli have reported short-lived effects on high-order executive control functions. Building on research on unconscious motivation, in which a behavior of perseverance is induced to attain a goal, we hypothesized that subliminal motivation can have long-lasting effects on executive control processes. We investigated the impact of unconscious/conscious monetary reward incentives on evoked potentials and neural activity dynamics during long runs of task switching. At the beginning of each run, a reward (50 cents or 1 cent) was displayed, either subliminally or supraliminally. Participants earned the reward contingent upon their correct responses to each trial of the run. A higher percentage of runs was achieved with higher (conscious and unconscious) than lower rewards, indicating that unconscious high rewards have long-lasting behavioral effects. Event-related potential results indicated that unconscious and conscious rewards influenced preparatory effort in task preparation, as suggested by a greater fronto-central contingent negative variation (CNV) starting at cue-onset. However, a greater parietal P3 associated with better reaction times was observed only under conditions of conscious high reward, suggesting a larger amount of working memory. Together, these results indicate that unconscious and conscious motivations of electrophysiological-related executive control processes have both similarities and differences during task-switching.

14.20 – 14.40

How consciousness changes the relative weights of evidence during human decision making

Floris P. de Lange1*, Simon van Gaal1*, Victor A.F.Lamme2, & Stanislas Dehaene3,4,5,6

1 Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Nijmegen, Netherlands; 2 Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands; 3 Inserm, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Gif sur‐ ‐Yvette, France; 4 Commissarìat à l’Energie Atomique, Neurospin Center, Gif sur Yvette, France; ‐ ‐ 5

Université Paris Sud 11, Orsay, France; ‐ 6 Collège de France, 75005 Paris, France; * These authors contributed equally

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Human decisions are based on accumulating evidence over time for different options. How is this accumulation of evidence affected by the level of awareness of the information? We addressed this question using combined behavioral methods and magneto-encephalography. Participants were required to make decisions by accumulating evidence over a series of visually presented arrow stimuli whose visibility was modulated by masking. Behavioral results showed that participants could accumulate evidence under both high and low visibility. However, a top-down strategic modulation of the flow of incoming evidence was only present for stimuli with high visibility: once enough evidence had been accrued, the impact of new incoming stimuli was reduced. Neural recordings revealed that, while initial perceptual processing was independent of visibility, there was stronger top-down amplification for stimuli with high visibility than low visibility. Furthermore, neural markers of evidence accumulation showed a strategic bias only for highly visible information, speeding up processing and reducing neural computations related to the decision process. Our results indicate that the level of sensory awareness changes decision-making: high visibility leads to important changes in strategical top-down decision making. Our results therefore suggest a potential role of consciousness, in deploying flexible strategies for biasing information acquisition in line with one’s expectations and goals.

14.40 – 15.00

Feeling the conflict: Metacognitive influences in masked priming

Kobe Desender1, & Eva Van den Bussche1

1 Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

In recent years, accumulating evidence suggested that some expressions of cognitive control can be exerted unconsciously. For example, adaptation to unconscious response conflict was found to be possible both blockwise and on a trial-by-trial basis. However, according to some authors, subjects were actually aware of the conflict in all these studies, but on a metacognitive level. For example, if subjects consciously notice that masked incongruent trials are more difficult than masked congruent trials, they can use this metacognitive information to adapt their behavior. Although theoretically plausible, no empirical support for this claim has been provided. Therefore, in a masked priming study we carefully questioned our subjects for different metacognitive variables on each trial. Our results showed that subjects indeed have a different metacognitive awareness of congruent and incongruent trials. They rated congruent trials as more positive, easier and less conflicting than incongruent trials. However, our data seem to suggest that this metacognitive awareness cannot explain cognitive adaptation effects. This would imply that subjects have some metacognitive awareness about the status of masked trials, but this information is not used to adapt behavior.

15.00 – 15.20

The role of motor prediction in the processing of sensory action-effects

Gethin Hughes1,2, Andrea Desantis1,2, & Florian Waszak1,2

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1 Université Paris Descartes, Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris, France ; 2 CNRS (Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, UMR 8158), Paris, France

The selection and control of action has been shown to influence the way in which we perceive the external world. For instance, sensory processing of action-effects has been shown to differ to that of externally triggered stimuli, both with respect to the perceived timing of their occurrence (intentional binding) as well as their intensity (sensory attenuation). These phenomena are normally attributed to forward action models, such that when action prediction is consistent with changes in our environment, our experience of these effects is altered. We systematically investigated the role of temporal prediction, temporal control, identity prediction and motor prediction in previous reports of sensory attenuation and intentional binding. This analysis revealed that the vast majority of studies do not isolate action prediction mechanisms to be the cause of binding or attenuation. We also report data from 2 behavioral experiments on intentional binding and an EEG experiment on sensory attenuation, which suggest that while sensory attenuation is modulated by identity specific motor prediction, intentional binding is not. These findings have important implications for understanding the way in which action shapes our perception of the external world.

Tuesday 4 December

14.20 – 14.40

Interoceptive predictive coding, presence, and agency

Anil Seth1,2, Keisuke Suzuki1,2, & Hugo Critchley1,3

1 Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex; 2 Department of Informatics, University of Sussex; 3 Department of Psychiatry, Brighton and Sussex Medical School

We describe a theoretical model of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying conscious presence, i.e. the subjective sense of reality of the world and of the self. Our model is based on interoceptive prediction error and is informed by predictive models of agency, general models of hierarchical predictive coding and dopaminergic signalling in cortex, the role of the anterior insular cortex in interoception and emotion, and cognitive neuroscience evidence from studies of virtual reality and of psychiatric disorders of presence. The model associates presence with successful suppression by top-down predictions of informative interoceptive signals evoked by visceromotor control signals and, indirectly, by visceral responses to afferent sensory signals. The model is relevant to cognitive control by connecting presence to agency since predicted interoceptive signals will depend on whether afferent sensory signals are determined, by a parallel predictive-coding mechanism, to be self-generated or externally caused. Anatomically, we identify the anterior insular cortex as the locus of key neural comparator mechanisms, with speculative but testable roles for von Economo neurons which have been previously associated with self-consciousness. Our model makes predictions for manipulations of agency and presence relevant to the experience of cognitive control, and offers a new view of emotion as

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interoceptive inference. We describe tests of the model using an integrated experimental setup combining augmented reality, Microsoft Kinect 3D modelling, and physiological monitoring.

14.40 – 15.00

Logical semantic operations in the absence of visual awareness

Simon van Gaal1,2,3,4,5, Julia Meuwese2, Lionel Naccache5, Laurent Cohen5, & Stanislas Dehaene3,4,6,7

1 Radboud University Nijmegen, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Netherlands; 2

University of Amsterdam, Dept of Psychology, Netherlands; 3 Inserm, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Gif‐sur Yvette, France; ‐ 4 Commissarìat à l’Energie Atomique, Neurospin Center, Gif sur Yvette, France‐ ‐ ; 5

Institut du Cerveau et de la Moëlle épinière, Paris, France ; 6 Université Paris Sud 11, Orsay, France‐7 Collège de France, 75005 Paris, France

Accumulating evidence suggests that non-conscious cognition is extremely powerful. Brain-imaging studies have revealed extensive subliminal information processing in many different brain areas, from low-level perceptual regions, to regions in the parietal and temporal cortex, even up to “executive” areas at the highest level of the cortical and cognitive hierarchy, in the prefrontal cortex. Although great progress has been made in characterizing the flow of information triggered by unconscious visual stimuli in isolation, if and how multiple sources of unconscious information are integrated and combined is largely unexplored. I will present a series of behavioral and ERP studies in which we probed the possible flexibility and complexity at which multiple unconscious elements can be logically combined. Therefore, we designed a masked priming paradigm in which subjects were presented with a rapid stream of three words: an adverb (“not”/“very”), an adjective (e.g., “good”/”bad”) and a target noun (e.g., “peace”/”murder”). The first two words could either be masked or not. Subjects indicated whether the consciously presented target noun had a positive or negative valence. Crucially, the nature of the adverb dictated whether the overall three-word sequence was contextually consistent (e.g., very-bad-murder) or inconsistent (e.g., not-bad-murder). Electrophysiological recordings revealed that such logical semantic computations can partly unfold unconsciously (reflected in the N400 ERP component). However, at the same time qualitative neural differences between conscious and unconscious logical semantic operations were observed (on the P600 ERP component).

15.00 – 15.20

Adaptation to unconscious conflicts in unconscious contexts

Heiko Reuss1, Kobe Desender2, Andrea Kiesel1, & Wilfried Kunde1

1 Julius-Maximilians-University, Würzburg; 2 Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

We investigated how context-specific conflict adaptation depends on both awareness of the conflict and awareness of the context, and how timing of conflict and context is crucial. In Experiment 1, we used a priming paradigm in which the visibility of the prime was varied and the format of the target represented a context of either low interference (20% incongruent trials) or high interference (80% incongruent

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trials). By implementing inducing trials and test trials, we controlled for mechanisms of event learning. With visible primes, congruency effects were larger in the low-interference context than in the high-interference context. With masked primes, however, congruency effects were not modulated by the context. In Experiment 2, the format of the prime represented the context. Thus, with masked primes, both conflicting stimulus and context were presented unconsciously. Interestingly, we now found that the context modulated congruency effects independent of prime visibility. Even with masked primes, congruency effects were larger in the low-interference context than in the high-interference context, both in inducing trials and test trials. This indicates that context-specific conflict adaptation processes are able to operate independently of both conflict awareness and context awareness, but that a simultaneous occurrence of context and conflicting stimulus is crucial.

15.20 – 15.40

Losing Consciousness: wakefulness modulation of cognitive control

Tristan Bekinschtein1

1 MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, UK

Understanding states of consciousness and the transitions between conscious and unconscious states has important theoretical and clinical implications. Yet despite the fact that we typically enter a state of unconsciousness every night, remarkably little is known about how we fall asleep lose consciousness while getting sedated. In a series of hd-EEG experiments of people falling asleep or getting sedated with propofol, we explored the limits of perceptual and semantic decisions, inhibitory control, top-down and bottom-up target detection and introspection. We found there is a differential modulation of the cognitive control capacities by wakefulness showing that drowsiness affects faster (earlier in the transition to unconsciousness) inhibitory control and top-down target detection than perceptual and abstract (semantic) decisions. We believe these results may experimentally link the Information Integration Theory of Consciousness and the Global Neuronal Workspace.

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Poster Session I: Monday 3 December 17.00-19.00

[1] Conditional Automaticity in Subliminal Morphosyntactic Priming

Ulrich Ansorge1,2, Bert Reynvoet3, Jessica Hendler2, Lennart Oettl2, & Stefan Evert4

1 Faculty of Psychology, Universität Wien, Austria; 2 Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrueck, Germany; 3 Department of Psychology, University of Leuven, Belgium; 4 Institute of Comparative Linguistics and Literature Studies, Technical University, Darmstadt, Germany

We used a gender-classification task to test the principles of subliminal morphosyntactic priming. In Experiment 1, masked, subliminal feminine or masculine articles were used as primes. They preceded a visible target noun. Subliminal articles either had a morphosyntactically congruent or incongruent gender with the targets. In a gender classification task of the target nouns, subliminal articles primed the responses: Responses were faster in congruent than incongruent conditions (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, we tested whether this congruence effect depended on gender relevance. In line with a relevance dependence, the congruence effect only occurred in a gender-classification task but was absent in another categorical discrimination of the target nouns (Experiment 2). The congruence effect also depended on correct word order. It was diminished when nouns preceded articles (Experiment 3). Finally, the congruence effect was replicated with a larger set of targets but only for masculine targets (Experiment 4). Results are discussed in light of theories of subliminal priming in general and of subliminal syntactic priming in particular.

[2] Mind-Wandering and the Little Voice of Meta-Consciousness

Mikaël Bastian 1, Jonathan W. Schooler 2, & Jérôme Sackur 1

1 Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France ; 2

META-Lab (Memory, Emotions, Thought & Awareness), University of California, Santa Barbara, USA

Research on spontaneous and environment-independent thoughts has impressively grown since a decade and has distinguished between two types of “mindwandering”: “tuning out” and “zoning out”. “Tuning out” is mindwandering with meta-awareness : one knows that one’s mind is wandering. In contrast, “zoning out” is mindwandering without meta-awareness: one experiences mindwandering but lacks metaconsciousness of this phenomenon, as when one does not that one is reading without understanding anything anymore. These two aspects of mindwandering challenge the common intuition that we have a straightforward and permanent access to our thoughts. We suggest that the form of mental contents during mindwandering predicts meta-awareness of the episode. Building on another line of research that has suggested a role for language in self-awareness, we hypothesized that metaconsciousness of an episode of mindwandering might be heightened when its form is verbal. In

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short, verbal thoughts would be more meta-aware than the rest of the thoughts. Using paradigms that described, suppressed or induced inner speech, we show that intra-individual variation in inner speech quantity relates to variation in meta-awareness, in the sense that the more inner speech one has, the more meta-aware one is. Language could therefore be partly responsible for the access to metaconsciousness of one’s mindwandering.

[3] Higher-Order Thoughts in Action: Consciousness as an unconscious redescription process

Bert Timmermans1, Leonhard Schilbach2, Antione Pasquali3,4, & Axel Cleeremans3

1 Univ Hosp Cologne, Neuroimaging Grp, Psychiat & Psychotherapy Clin, D-50937 Cologne, Germany; 2

Max Planck Inst Neurol Res, D-50931 Cologne, Germany; 3 Univ Libre Bruxelles, Consciousness Cognit & Computat Grp, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium; 4 Adam Neurogen, Neurogen Res Unit, F-20240 Solaro, France

Metacognition is usually construed as a conscious, intentional process whereby people reflect upon their own mental activity. Here, we instead suggest that metacognition is but an instance of a larger class of representational redescription processes that we assume occur unconsciously and automatically. From this perspective, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to anticipate the consequences of action or activity on itself, on the world, and on other people through three predictive loops: An inner loop, a perception-action loop, and a self-other (social cognition) loop, which together form a tangled hierarchy. We ask what kinds of mechanisms may subtend this form of enactive metacognition. We extend previous neural network simulations and compare the model with Signal Detection Theory, highlighting that while the latter approach assumes that both Type I (objective) and Type II (subjective, metacognition-based) decisions tap into the same signal at different hierarchical levels, our approach is closer to dual-route models in that it assumes that the redescriptions made possible by the emergence of metarepresentations occur independently and outside of the first-order causal chain. We close by reviewing relevant neurological evidence for the idea that awareness, self-awareness and social cognition involve the same mechanisms.

[4] How memory-related consciousness may help patients with schizophrenia improve their memory reporting accuracy.

Elçin Akdogan1 & Elisabeth Bacon1

1 Inserm u666, dépt de psychiatrie, Hôpitaux Universitaires, BP 426, 67091 STRASBOURG Cedex. France

Understanding cognitive and state of consciousness disturbances is central in understanding the pathophysiology and for developing new therapies in schizophrenia. How consciousness guides behavior comes within the metacognitive approach. Metamemory refers to one’s knowledge about memory including the awareness of one’s cognitive ability and the strategic control of a memory task in progress. The purpose of this study was to further investigate memory and metamemory processes in patients

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with schizophrenia in a more naturalistic situation, and pave the way for meta-cognitive remediation. Patients and their healthy matched controls had to answer general knowledge questions whose answers are all numerical following two conditions: one without any intervention as in a real-life, and two, guided through a metamemory-based control. Participants answered the questions with respect to two predefined intervals, one narrow and one large, and then made a confidence level judgment for both answers, and had afterwards to select one of the two answers. The results show that patients, in spite of their memory deficit in the free report, when they are offered a framework and allowed to rely on their metamemory judgments, are able to improve their memory performance up to the accuracy level of the healthy participants.

[5] Spontaneous and Intentional Social Inferences: Neural evidence of a Common Process

Frank Van Overwalle1, Ning Ma1, Jenny Kestemont1, & Marie Vandekerckhove1

1 Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

Several lines of recent social neuroscientific evidence in our lab seem to contradict extant dual-process models which assume that spontaneous and intentional inferences are guided by different (associative versus symbolic) processes. First, using instructions for spontaneous (“read carefully”) or intentional (“what is the goal / trait of this person?”) inferences between participants, ERP studies documented that the onset of social inferences occurs at about the same time irrespective of instructions. Specifically, the first neural signature was detected after about 200 ms for goal inferences and 600 ms for trait inferences. Second, several recent fMRI studies using the same between-participants design have consistently found on overlap between spontaneous and intentional instructions in core areas of mentalizing, including the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal (mPFC). Collectively, the results suggest that a common spontaneous process produces an initial social inference (e.g., irrespective of instructions), after which intentional thoughts (e.g., after instructions) may invite observers to verify more carefully the material and inference made (which results in additional activation in other brain areas), and to avoid the fundamental attribution bias (which results in reduced activation in the mPFC, reflecting less abstract trait-related inferences if they were not asked for).

[6] Short- and Long-term unconscious logo priming of brands and related words

Gigliola Brintazzoli1, Charlotte Muscarella1, Eric Soetens1, & Eva Van den Bussche1

1 Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

It has often been assumed that unconscious influencing in daily life and advertising is highly unlikely, given the short-lived nature of unconscious priming effects. This study assessed whether real-life stimulus material can elicit short- and long-term unconscious priming. A typical masked priming paradigm was used, with brand logo primes. The stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) was manipulated so

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that the distance between the onset of the prime and the onset of the target was either 350ms, 1000ms or 5000ms. Our results show that unconsciously presented brand logos (e.g. logo of McDonald's) significantly prime their brand names (e.g. "McDonald's") in all SOA conditions. The logos also have the power to prime words associated to the brand (e.g. "hamburger"), but only if the SOA is short (i.e. 350ms). These results indicate that real-life stimuli can unconsciously influence our behaviour, even when prime and target are separated by a 5-second interval. However, the mental representation of words related to the subliminal information seems to vanish quickly as time passes.

[7] Unconscious Goal Activation and the Hijacking of the Executive Function

Hans Marien1, Ruud Custers2, 1, Ran R. Hassin3, & Henk Aarts1

1 Utrecht University, The Netherlands; 2 University College London, United Kingdom; 3 The Hebrew University, Israel

Building on research into unconscious human goal pursuit, and the dynamic nature of our mental and physical world accompanying the pursuit of goals, we examined the idea that an unconsciously activated goal hijacks executive control for its own attainment. This hijacking of the executive function by an unconscious goal should be evidenced by impaired performance on an unrelated task relying on executive control. The results of six experiments showed that subliminal activation of a socializing goal, an idiosyncratic personal goal or an academic goal caused participants to perform worse on unrelated tasks that depend on executive control, such as inhibition of prepotent responses in a memory-probe task and detection of text errors during reading. These effects were unique to executive control; were similar when the goal was consciously given; and were independent of task motivation and perceived inter-goal relatedness between the primed goal and task goal. Furthermore, an unconscious goal hijacked executive control to advance itself more strongly when the goal had personal value. These findings are novel and important, and suggest that executive control processes are hijacked by goals in order to advance themselves without postulating an inner agent that consciously accesses and directs these control processes.

[9] Neglect Syndrome suggests that spatial awareness depends on unspecific attentional resources

Mario Bonato1

1University of Padova, Department of General Psychology, Padova, Italy

It is largely unknown how cognitive resources modulate spatial attention and awareness. Clinical studies performed on right-hemisphere damaged patients suggest that the availability of unspecific attentional resources determines successful access to spatial awareness (Bonato, under review).

In detection tasks, the mere request to monitor a wide range of spatial positions results in worst contralesional performance with respect to when the spatial position to be monitored is only one (Marzi

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et al., 2002). Moreover, brain-damaged patients with subclinical neglect are able to increase their response speed to contralesional targets, from pathologically slow up to a normal level, while performing a detection task (Bartolomeo, 1997). Thirdly, right-hemisphere damaged patients show strikingly decreased awareness for contralesional targets when concurrent tasks have to be performed, regardless of their nature (e.g. visuospatial or Working Memory-related; Bonato et al., 2010; 2012). The ubiquitous variability in performance shown by patients in visuospatial tasks seems to closely depend on the quantity of attentional resources engaged by the task at hand. Beside their clinical implications for neglect assessment, these findings suggest that the availability of (unspecific) cognitive resources is a major determinant for spatial awareness. Insights about the functioning of unimpaired cognitive architectures will be discussed.

References

Bartolomeo, P. (1997). The novelty effect in recovered hemineglect. Cortex, 33, 323-332.

Bonato, M., (under review). Neglect and extinction closely depend on task demands: A review. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.

Bonato, M., Priftis K., Marenzi, R., Umiltà, C. & Zorzi, M. (2010). Increased attentional demands impair contralesional space awareness following stroke. Neuropsychologia, 48, 3934-3940.

Bonato, M., Priftis, K., Marenzi, R., Umiltà, C. & Zorzi, M. (2012). Deficits of contralesional awareness: A case study on what paper-and-pencil tests neglect. Neuropsychology, 26(1), 20-36.

Marzi, C.A., Natale, E., & Anderson, B. (2002) Mapping spatial attention with reaction time inneglect patients. In H.-O. Karnath, A. D. Milner and G. Vallar (Eds.). The cognitive and neural basis of spatial neglect (pp. 275-288). Oxford: University Press.

[10] Attention on subliminal prime: role for unconscious task setting

Sébastien Weibel1, Rémi L. Capa2, Caroline Huron3, & Anne Giersch1

1 INSERM, University Hospital of Strasbourg, France; 2 INSERM, University of Strasbourg, France; 3

INSERM-CEA U562 Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Gif/Yvette, France

Recent studies showed that unconscious stimuli can trigger task sets. We wondered about a possible influence of attention processes on these effects. To address this issue, we modulated exogenous attention with a sound during the task. The subjects’ main task was to make a phonological (2 vs. 3 syllable) or semantic (living vs. not living) decision on a word. The task type was indicated before the word by means of an instruction letter, which was itself preceded by a masked and undetectable priming letter. In a control experiment, subjects were instructed to identify the instruction letter. A neutral sound occurred either with the unconscious prime or with the instruction letter, 83 ms later. We showed that repetition priming (faster letter identification induced by prime/instruction congruency) was not modified by attention modulation. On the contrary, unconscious task set priming (faster execution of the task in case of prime/instruction congruency) was observed only when the sound occurred with the prime. Synchrony between the sound and prime did not change the prime awareness. Hence attention

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did not enhance the processing of the prime itself, but facilitated unconscious task set priming, thus providing an explanation for contradictory findings in the literature.

[11] How can we know when we know we know? Towards measuring metacognition

Adam B. Barrett1, & Anil K. Seth1

1 Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science and Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK

A major goal in consciousness science is to discriminate between unconscious and conscious processes. Behaviourally, conscious cognition can be inferred by measuring metacognition, (i.e. knowledge of perception). Metacognition is however difficult to assess consistently. Under popular signal detection theory models for stimulus classification tasks, measures such as confidence-accuracy correlation, and type II d’, are highly sensitive to response biases in both type I (classification) and type II (metacognitive) tasks. Maniscalco and Lau (2011) recently addressed this issue via a new measure: meta-d’. This is the type I d’ that would have led to the observed type II data had the subject used all the type I information. Trivially, meta-d’=d’ irrespective of response bias when type I and II decisions are based on the same Gaussian signal. Here we analyse the theoretical behaviour of meta-d’ under more general scenarios, such as when metacognitive judgments utilize enhanced or degraded versions of the type I signal. We also demonstrate new code that can simulate a specific experiment, enable unbiased estimation of meta-d’, and also estimate the variance of meta-d’ across subjects. Together our results provide support for meta-d’ as a useful, stable measure of metacognition, and new rigorous methodology for its application.

[12] Conscious Experience Beyond Cognitive Control

Carolyn Dicey Jennings1

1 Boston University

At least three forms of conscious experience have been argued to be beyond the reach of cognitive control: gist perception, imagistic consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness. After first showing that the evidence for these three forms of consciousness is inconclusive on the question of whether they exist outside of cognitive control, I here present a fourth form of consciousness that is likely to be more successful: conscious immersion. I understand “conscious immersion” to be conscious engrossment in a task, activity, or process that proceeds via unconscious, involuntary control. Because participants who emerge from these immersed states sometimes claim to have been conscious during those states (despite being unable, in most cases, to describe the content of those states), we should conclude that these immersion experiences are sometimes conscious. Conscious immersion is unlike the other forms in that it is not perceptual in nature. In lacking the structure of perception, it also lacks the direct

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accessibility and reportability that conscious perception enjoys. I nonetheless find that these immersed states are conscious and suggest avenues for more research on the topic.

[13] Perceptual sequence knowledge does not seem to consolidate

Daphné Coomans1, Natacha Deroost1, Eva Van den Bussche1, & Eric Soetens1

1 Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

Past research showed that knowledge acquired in a typical structured serial reaction time task can be consolidated. However, as knowledge in this task consists of perceptual and motor knowledge, it is not known whether both kinds of knowledge are consolidated. In the current experiments, we determined the consolidation of perceptual sequence knowledge. Motor components were minimized by varying the response dimension randomly and by avoiding eye movements, using a circular display with a small visual angle and a short presentation time. Participants had to respond to the identity of a target, presented at one of four locations around a fixation cross. Unknown to the participants, target location changed according to a sequence. To assess learning, the perceptual location sequence turned to random in certain blocks. After participants acquired perceptual sequence knowledge in an initial training session, we assessed whether this knowledge was still present after 1, 4 or 24 hours, using a between subjects design. Results indicated that knowledge was preserved for 1 hour, but declined after 4 and 24 hours. This suggests that perceptual sequence knowledge is temporary, a proposition that fits well in the sequence learning model of Hikosaka et al. (1999).

[14] Does working memory load influence consciousness?

Esther De Loof1, Wim Fias1, & Filip Van Opstal1

1 Ghent University

Are the frontoparietal connections thought to underlie working memory (WM) equal to those hypothesized to trigger consciousness by igniting the global neural workspace? We hypothesize that activating the frontoparietal network by a WM load could either limit the frontoparietal capacity for consciousness or make the ignition mechanism more sensitive.

We probed consciousness through priming while varying WM load in a secondary task. In the main task, participants judged a target number to be smaller/larger than five. The target number was primed by a congruent/incongruent prime number. To manipulate the conscious perception of the primes, the stimulus onset asynchrony between prime and target was varied. Participants indicated their awareness of the prime number on each trial. In a secondary task, WM load was manipulated by letting participants remember zero, two or six letters (i.e., zero, low, and high load conditions).

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First, WM load limits conscious perception: the visibility threshold for prime numbers rises with increasing WM load. Second, WM load tends to facilitate the congruency effect: the prime has a slightly stronger influence on the response to the target when more letters are kept in memory. Both effects shed light on the involvement of prefrontal cortex in WM and consciousness.

[15] Detecting the Neural Signatures of Conscious Processing in Non-Communicative Patients: outperforming clinical diagnoses with a systematic EEG approach?

Jean-Rémi King1,2,3*, Jacobo Sitt1,2*, Frédéric Faugeras2,4, Benjamin Rohaut2,4, Imen El Karoui2,5, Lionel Naccache2,4,6, & Stanislas Dehaene1,7,8

1 INSERM-CEA, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit/CEA/SAC/DSV/DRM/Neurospin Center, 91191, Gif/Yvette, France; 2 INSERM-ICM Research Center, UMRS 975, 75013, Paris, France; 3 Ecole Doctorale Cerveau Cognition Comportement, Université Paris 6, 75005, Paris, France; 4 Departments of Neurophysiology & Neurology , AP-HP, Groupe Hospitalier Pitié-Salpêtrière, 75013, Paris, France; 5 Department of Biology, École Normale Supérieure, 75005, Paris, France; 6 Faculté de Médecine Pitié-Salpêtrière, Université Paris 6, 75013, Paris, France; 7 Collège de France, 75005, Paris, France ; 8 Université Paris 11, 91400, Orsay, France; * These authors contributed equally to this work

Despite their relatively intact arousal, Disorders of Consciousness (DOC) patients present an inability to demonstrate robust intentional behaviors. Science and modern medicine have been challenged to know whether these patients were conscious but unable to communicate or unconscious of their surrounding environment.

We here implemented a series of analyses extracting most of the neural signatures of conscious processing described in the EEG literature, in order to assess their respective validity and efficiency in the clinics. We performed 197 high-density EEG recordings at bedside while Vegetative (VS), Minimally Conscious (MCS) and Conscious patients (CS) were exposed to repeated series of sounds for 30 minutes.

Results demonstrated that although a large proportion of these markers could be used to predict patients’ consciousness states, those focusing on lower frequency ones (delta - alpha) were by far the most discriminatory. Secondly, predictive analyses combining all markers demonstrated successful automatic classifications of patients’ clinical states. Finally, VS patients misclassified as MCS or CS by our algorithm presented twice more chances of conscious recovery (44% of recovery) than correctly classified VS patients (20%). On top of providing the first systematic review of the EEG signatures of conscious processing in a large DOC patient cohort, analyses of misclassified patients’ outcomes thus suggest the possibility of detecting conscious activity independently of behavior and intentions.

[16] Support for a response control deficit in freezing of gait Parkinson patients

Jochen Vandenbossche1, Natacha Deroost1, Eric Soetens1, Peter Zeischka1, & Eric Kerckhofs1

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1 Vrije Universiteit Brussel

We investigated response activation and suppression processes in Parkinson’s disease patients with freezing of gait (FOG). Fourteen freezers, 14 nonfreezers and 14 matched healthy controls performed the attention network task (ANT) and the Stroop task. The former task has more stimulus-response overlap and is expected to elicit stronger irrelevant response activation, requiring more inhibition. Congruency effects were used as a general measure of conflict resolution. Supplementary RT distribution analyses were utilized to calculate conditional accuracy functions (CAFs) and delta plots to measure response activation and suppression processes. In agreement with previous research, freezers showed a general conflict resolution deficit compared to nonfreezers and healthy controls. Moreover, CAFs pointed to a strong initial incorrect response activation in FOG. As expected, conflict resolution impairment was only apparent in the ANT, and not in the Stroop task. These results suggest an imbalance between automatic and controlled processes in FOG, leading to a fundamental breakdown in both motor execution and cognition.

[17] Distinct brain mechanisms for conscious versus subliminal error detection

Lucie Charles1,2,3, Filip van Opstal1,2,3,4, Sébastien Marti1,2,3, & Stanislas Dehaene1,2,3,5

1 INSERM,U992, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, F-91191 Gif/Yvette, France; 2 CEA,DSV/I2BM, NeuroSpin Center, F-91191 Gif/Yvette, France; 3 Univ Paris-Sud, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, F-91191Gif/Yvette, France ; 4 Ghent University, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium ; 5 Collège de France, F-75005 Paris, France

Metacognition, the ability to monitor one’s own cognitive processes, is frequently assumed to be univocally associated with conscious processing. However, some monitoring processes, such as those associated with the evaluation of one’s own performance, may conceivably be sufficiently simple and automatized to be deployed non-consciously. Here, we used simultaneous electro-and magneto-encephalography (EEG/MEG) to investigate how error detection is modulated by perceptual awareness of a masked target digit. The Error-Related Negativity (ERN), an EEG component occurring ~100 ms after an erroneous response, was exclusively observed on conscious trials and showed a step-like increase in amplitude with stimulus visibility. Nevertheless, even in the absence of the ERN, errors were still detected at above-chance levels under subliminal conditions. Error detection on conscious trials originated from the posterior cingulate cortex, while a small response to non-conscious errors was seen in dorsal anterior cingulate. Our findings suggest two distinct brain mechanisms for metacognitive judgements: a conscious all-or-none process of single-trial response evaluation, and a non-conscious statistical assessment of confidence.

[18] Cognitive Control: A Role for Implicit Learning?

Natacha Deroost1, Jochen Vandenbossche1, Peter Zeischka1, Dpahné Coomans1, & Eric Soetens1

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1 Vrije Universiteit Brussel

We investigated the influence of implicit learning on cognitive control. In a sequential Stroop task, participants implicitly learned a sequence placed on the color of the Stroop words. The amount of conflict was manipulated by means of the number of incongruent trials. The results showed that participants who learned the color sequence were no better at resolving conflict than participants who did not undergo sequence training. Accordingly, implicit knowledge did not reduce conflict. At the same time, the amount of conflict had no effect on the amount of learning either. However, conflict had a significant impact on the expression of implicit learning, as most knowledge was expressed under the highest amount of conflict. Task-optimization in the Stroop task was thus accomplished by an increased reliance on implicit sequence knowledge under high conflict. These findings demonstrate that implicit learning processes can be flexibly recruited to support cognitive control functions

[19] Control of the mindfulness states by multiple levels of sensorimotor experience

Sergio S.C. dC Rubin1,2,3

1 LabMet, University of Gent; 2 Schenkman’s Cell and Moleular Biology Lab, University Federal of Sao Paulo; 3 Bolivian Center of Biotechnology Research

The mindfulness state is the consciousness of the embodied mind action in the present time of the experience. The mindfulness can be seen as opposite to the Cartesian state i.e. cogito or mindlessness, which is more often rooted in our daily activity. Loose and recovering of mindfulness during the ontogeny may be linked to specific learning process and its background context. The first-person methodology allows us to recover and have control of mindfulness state by specific multiple levels of sensorimotor experience such as play a musical instrument, intense and/or equilibrium exercises, focused meditation as well as by relax-touch experience. Beyond that, this control of mindfulness states can be extended to daily experience if the practices become habit. Also our observation indicate that the absence of pain in some human swing pierced skin body suspension is due to they have deep control of the dissociation body-mind and reach the mindlessness state. Those spaces of possibilities are of applied interest.

[20] Electrodermal activity during implicit processing for emotional faces

Thibaut Dondaine1,2,3, Jean-François Houvenaghel1,2, Paul Sauleau1,2, Gabriel Robert1,3, Bruno Millet1,3, Marc Vérin1,2, & Julie Péron1,4

1 Behavior and Basal Ganglia' research unit (EA 4712), University of Rennes 1, Hôpital Pontchaillou, CHU de Rennes, rue Henri Le Guilloux, 35033 Rennes, France; 2 Psychiatry Unit, Hôpital Guillaume Regnier, 108 avenue du Général Leclerc BP 60321 - 35703 Rennes, CEDEX 7; 3 Neurology Unit, Hôpital Pontchaillou, CHU de Rennes, rue Henri Le Guilloux, 35033 Rennes, France; 4 ‘Neuroscience of Emotion and Affective

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Dynamics’ laboratory, Department of Psychology, and Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland

Automaticity can be defined as uncontrolled, unintentional, unconscious, efficient or/and quick behavior. A dynamic blend of these features is possible according to the emotional situation. Electrodermal activity characterizes the treatment of emotional information. In this study, we explored electrodermal activity in the context of an implicit emotional task.

We proposed a two-alternative forced-choice task (‘same’ or ‘different’) with explicit genre/implicit emotion and explicit emotion matching conditions in a sample of 42 healthy participants. During these tasks, electrodermal activity was recorded.

We did not show difference between the rate of electrodermal responses between emotional conditions for the two different tasks (implicit or explicit). For the implicit task, we showed an interaction between responses choice (‘same’ or ‘different’) and emotion (F> 3.30; p<0.001) for both behavioral and electrodermal data. Contrasts revealed a significant difference between ‘same’ and ‘different’ choice only for anger.

In conclusion, we showed an effect of automatic emotional processing correlated with electrodermal activity: when the participant had to make a decision about sex matching, we observed greater electrodermal activity if the faces displayed anger emotional state. This study showed the influence of automatic processing on biologically relevant and physiological responses. This automatic processing of emotions is involved in many situations that require quick and appropriate response.

[21] Involuntary processing of facial emotions studied with ERPs in anxious participants

Wioleta Walentowska1 & Eligiusz Wronka1

1 Psychophysiology Laboratory, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland

There is a common suggestion that trait anxiety can influence the processing of threat-related information even without reaching the level of conscious awareness. To test this hypothesis, ERPs were recorded in response to subliminally presented and backward masked faces (fearful and neutral) and non-faces in the preselected low- and high-anxious individuals. The N170 amplitude was found to be larger when elicited by faces in comparison to non-faces, however it was not found to be emotion-sensitive or modulated by the level of anxiety. Interestingly, early differences between low- and high-anxious individuals appeared within the latency of P1 component irrespective of the stimulus content. At later stages, within the EPN component, stronger negativity specific for fearful faces was recorded exclusively in the low-anxious participants. These findings indicate that anxiety level can modulate early stages of information processing (P1 component), which leads to the anxiety-related differences in involuntary emotional expression detection at later stages (EPN component).

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[22] A matter of matching: how goals and primes affect experiences of self-agency.

Anouk van der Weiden1, Henk Aarts1, & Kirsten I. Ruys2

1 Utrecht University; 2 University of Tilburg

The experience of causing action-outcomes, also referred to as the sense of self-agency, is a pervasive experience that people infer from their actions and the outcomes they produce. Recent research suggests that self-agency inferences arise from an explicit goal-directed process as well as an implicit outcome-priming process. Two experiments examined potential differences between these two processes. In these experiments, participants had the goal to produce an outcome or were primed with the outcome. Next, they performed an action in an agency-ambiguous situation, followed by an outcome that either matched or mismatched the goal or prime. After observing each outcome, participants indicated experienced self-agency over the action-outcome. Results showed that goals and outcome-primes equally enhanced self-agency overmatching outcomes. Furthermore, goals reduce self-agency over mismatching outcomes. However, outcome-primes did not affect self-agency over mismatching outcomes, and even enhanced self-agency over mismatching proximate outcomes. The differences in how goals and primes affect experienced self-agency over mismatching outcomes are explained in terms of cognitive control processes and spreading of activation. Our findings provide novel evidence that self-agency experiences result from two distinct inferential routes, and that goals and primes differentially affect the perception of our own behavior.

[23] Two ways to miss your target in Attentional Blink conditions

Chie Nakatani1 & Cees van Leeuwen1

1 KU Leuven, Belgium

We typically perceive some, but not all of the things that occur in our visual field. Certain events are missed, even when a perceiver is alert, attentive, and knows what to look for. Some of these effects are systematic. Amongst these perceptual blindness phenomena, the Attentional Blink (AB) is probably the one most widely explored. To explain the AB, several neuro-computational models have been proposed. The most recent of these, the Visual Selection and Awareness model (ViSA, Simione et al., in press) predicts the timing of certain task-relevant neural activities, such as the onset of inhibition among adjacent target and non-target items, a fast build-up of activity in visual cortices to sustain target information, and a slower, large-scale activity to consolidate target information in working memory. In particular, ViSA predicts that the onset of consolidation would be delayed in AB compared to non-AB conditions. The onsets of the predicted activities were estimated from human EEG data recordings from an Attentioanl Blink task. The analyses confirmed the model predictions. Moreover, they showed two distinct AB scenarios: failure of sustained target activation versus premature onset of consolidation activity.

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[25] Delta plots reveal the role of response inhibition in lying

Evelyne Debey1, Bruno Verschuere2, Richard Ridderinkhof2, & Jan De Houwer1

1 Ghent University, 2 University of Amsterdam

Previous research has shown that lying is accompanied by longer reaction times than truth telling. Since lying involves withholding the truth, this ‘lie effect’ (lie – truth) may be due to the time-consuming process of response inhibition. We investigated this response inhibition hypothesis on lying using the delta-plot method, in which condition differences are mapped as a function of reaction time. Delta plots prototypically have a positive slope. However, if the conditions differ in the amount of inhibition that is applied, a gradually developing inhibition process makes delta plots level off for slow responses. This leveling-off has shown to be more pronounced in people with better inhibitory control (Ridderinkhof, 2002). In two experiments, we let participants perform a reaction time task in which they alternately lied and told the truth on autobiographical questions. We hypothesized (1) that the delta plot of the lie effect would level off for slow responses and (2) that this leveling-off would be more pronounced in participants with better inhibition skills (i.e., smaller lie effects). The results of both experiments verified these predictions. Our experiments therefore support the hypothesis that response inhibition may be crucially involved in lying. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

[26] Analysis of the unconscious context effects

Goultchira Chakirova1,2

1 Department of Psychiatry, the University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK; 2 The Human Brain Research Foundation

A significant part of perceived information is processed outside of conscious awareness. This includes not only lower level of analysis such as sensory analysis but also complex cognitive processing. Some of the consciously processed information might become unconscious (through some protective psychological defence mechanisms, for example repression or suppression). However, this information does not disappear but rather is stored even if it is believed to be forgotten, and could be retrieved. This storage of information consists of primitive instinctive impulses, desires, emotions and memories that sometimes are too stressful if they are accessed consciously. Such repressed information, however, influences human behaviour and decisions. Moreover, life scenario could be created on the basis of this repressed information. Retrieved life scenario information in four volunteers demonstrated that those scenarios were created during early childhood and were realised later. At least one of those scenarios consisted of the entire life plan including an approximate date of death. This preliminary data indicates a vital importance of understanding of the relationship between conscious and unconscious processing and provided an insight on the degree to which unconscious processes might influence our behaviour and decisions.

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Poster Session II: Tuesday 4 December 12.20-14.20

[27] Sequence learning under different practice schedules in the Serial Reaction Time paradigm

Koen Homblé1 & Natacha Deroost1

1 Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

Both laboratory and field studies on motor learning have demonstrated that the organization of training can have a large influence on the acquisition of procedural skills. In general, using highly variable practice schedules is found to be more advantageous than using more structured training schedules. We investigated whether similar effects also apply for sequential learning in a Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task. Two groups of participants performed an SRT task with the same sequence under either fragmented or blocked practice conditions. Both indirect and direct measurements of implicit and explicit sequential knowledge were administered afterwards. Contrary to our expectations, the blocked practice group showed a larger implicit sequential learning effect as compared to the fragmented practice group. No differences in explicit knowledge were found between conditions. We propose that the use of different processing strategies in the SRT task might explain these results.

[28] Cognitive control, response inhibition and error detection of children with ADHD in the Stop-Signal Task: An event-related potentials study.

Magdalena Senderecka1, Jakub Szewczyk2, Krzysztof Gerc3, Roman Chmylak4, & Anna Grabowska5

1 Cognitive Science Unit, Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland; 2

Psychophysiology Laboratory, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland; 3 The Department of Developmental and Health Psychology, Institute of Applied Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland; 4 NZOZ EEG-GRAF, EEG Laboratory, Cracow, Poland; 5 Nencki Institute of Experimental Biology, Warsaw, Poland

The first aim of the study was to determine whether deficient inhibitory control distinguishes children with a diagnosis of ADHD combined type from normally developing children. The second aim was to investigate error processing in ADHD children. 40 right-handed children aged between 6.9 and 12.3 years participated in the study, with 16 boys and 4 girls in each groups. Participants performed a standard Stop-Signal Task. Relative to controls, the go stimulus reaction time and the stop-signal reaction time were prolonged in ADHD children. They showed reduced P2, enhanced, delayed N2, and reduced P3 component to auditory stop-signal compared with controls in successful stop-signal trials. Additionally, the amplitude of response-locked event-related potentials, containing the ERN-Pe complex, was smaller in ADHD children. These results support the hypothesis of a complex deficit of inhibitory control, conflict monitoring, and error recognition mechanisms in ADHD. Reduced amplitude of the P2 reflects an early

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orienting deficit. Enhanced amplitude and delayed latency of the N2 are associated with inability to activate an urgent inhibitory process. Reduced amplitude of the P3 reflects a deficit in cognitive control operations affecting overall performance monitoring. Finally, reduced amplitude of the ERN-Pe complex is associated with impaired error detection and evaluation.

[29] The neural correlates of stimulus-driven and intentional inhibition: a comparison

Margot A. Schel1,2, Simone Kühn3, Marcel Brass3, Patrick Haggard4, & Eveline A. Crone1,2,5

1 Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, the Netherlands; 2 Leiden Institute for Brain and Cognition (LIBC), the Netherlands; 3 Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium; 4 Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, United Kingdom; 5 Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Response inhibition can be both externally driven, such as when a traffic light turns red, and internally driven, such as when one decides not to take another biscuit from the biscuit box. Until now the concepts of external stimulus-driven inhibition and internal intentional inhibition have never been compared in one study. The present study was set out to compare the neural correlates of these two forms of response inhibition. A group of adults (N=24, aged 18-26) performed two response inhibition tasks while lying in the scanner. Stimulus-driven inhibition was measured by a stop-signal task in which participants had to inhibit an already initiated motor-response when a stop-signal was presented. Intentional inhibition was measured by the marble task, in which participants are instructed to freely decide between acting on and inhibiting a prepotent response triggered by a rolling marble. Results showed that during both stimulus-driven and intentional inhibition a similar neural network, consisting of lateral prefrontal cortex, lateral parietal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex / presupplementary motor area, was recruited. The same neural network was also activated during intentional action. Together these results indicate that the same decision-making network is involved in stimulus-driven inhibition, intentional inhibition, and intentional action.

[30] Modulating effect of COMT genotype on the brain regions underlying proactive control process

Mathieu Jaspar1,2, Julien Grandjean1,2, Eric Salmon1, Pierre Maquet1, & Fabienne Collette1,2

1 Cyclotron Research Centre; 2 Department of Psychology: Cognition and Behavior, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium

Catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) is an important enzyme which degrades catecholamines, such dopamine, notably in the prefrontal cortex [1]. A large number of studies reported an effect on executive functioning of COMT genotype [2], each genotype being associated with a different COMT enzymatic activity [3].

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In an event-related fMRI study, a modified form of the Stroop task was administered to three groups of 15 young adults according to their COMT val158met genotype (VV, VM and MM). Based on the theory of dual mechanisms of control [4], the Stroop task has been built to induce proactive or reactive control processes according to the task context.

Behavioral results did not show significant group differences for reaction times. However, fMRI results revealed that proactive control is specifically associated with increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex in MM and VM groups by comparison to VV, but also with increased activity in the middle frontal gyrus in the VV and VM groups by comparison to MM.

These observations, paralleling to the higher cortical dopamine level in MM individuals, confirms our expectation of a COMT Val158Met genotype modulation of the brain regions underlying proactive control, especially in frontal areas as suggested by Braver & al. [4].

References

[1] Männistö, P.T., & Kaakkola, S. (1999), ‘Catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT): Biochemistry, molecular biology, pharmacology, and clinical efficacy of the new selective COMT inhibitors’, Pharmacological Reviews, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 593-628.

[2] Barnett, J. H., Jones, P.B., Robbins, T. W., & Muller, U. (2007), ‘Effects of the cathecol-O-methyltransferase Val158Met polymorphism on executive function: a meta-analysis of the Wiscosin Card Sort Test in schizophrenia and healthy control’, vol. 12, no.5, pp. 502-509.

[3] Weinshilboum, R. M., Otterness, D. M., & Szumlanski, C. L. (1999), ‘Methylation pharmacogenetics: cathecol O-methyltransferase, thiopurine methyltransferase, and histamine N-methytransferase’, Annual Review of Pharmacology and Toxicology, vol. 39, pp. 19-52.

[4] Braver TS, Gray JR, Burgess GC (2007) Explaining the many varieties of working memory variation: Dual mechanisms of cognitive control. In: Conway ARA, Jarrold C, Kane MJ, Miyake A, Towse JN, editors. Variation in working memory. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 76-106.

[31] Psycholinguistic approaches of speech control

Sarah Brohé1, Véronique Delvaux1, Kathy Huet1, Myriam Piccaluga1, & Bernard Harmegnies1

1 University of Mons, Belgium

While the acquisition of a second language has been extensively examined in the literature, many questions remain open with respect to the cognitive processes involved in phonetic learning. Our research project deals with the factors influencing the control of perception and production of foreign sounds by individuals. The acquisition of new ways of speech control is submitted to manipulable, extrinsic factors but also to intrinsic ones whose knowledge is relatively poor. Precisely, we aim at highlighting the cognitive processes contributing to the control of speech perception and production, namely attention and memory, using classical psycholinguistic tasks. As an example, in a previous study we addressed the effect of orienting attention (by providing information about the cues that were relevant for distinguishing the sounds and by giving feedback after each response) on the processing of

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unfamiliar speech sounds in a categorization task. Ultimately, our research program is designed to provide insights into controversial issues: the role of attention in learning, the potential role of feedback in regulating behavior and the relevance of implicitversus explicit methods in phonetic training.

[32] An Evolutionary Based Mathematical Model for Consciousness

Suketu Patel1

1 Baruch College: Zicklin School of Business

In order to develop a general theory of consciousness we must focus and analyze the most significant event in human history. This is the great leap that led anatomically modern humans to behave behaviorally modern. The major artifacts that contribute to the development of a theory of consciousness and also exhibit modern behavior is the Lebombo1 and Ishango2 bones. These both demonstrate modern behavior through complex mental capabilities such as rudiments of counting and time keeping. The importance of an understanding of infinite enumeration is that it also implies that humans have the potential capability to implement an infinite succession of steps when creating tools.

In addition to explaining the complexity of our behavioral tendencies, this paper will also present how enumeration also lends itself to the pivotal concept of how and why we possess a theory of mind. Acquiring a theory of mind ability took millions of years of evolution through the hominid linage. I believe the most dominating facet of this evolutionary period is that social groups become increasingly complex. In order to maintain social groups, similar notions of morality were necessary between group members. These group dynamics necessitated that the nervous system evolve to increase the amount of available information for an individual to be aware. By applying Block's distinction3 of access and phenomenal consciousness to the physical structure of the brain, we can infer that the evolutionary direction took hominid development from the formally dominant phenomenal consciousness pathways toward the prevailing access-consciousness pathways.

This analysis of the components of consciousness ultimately leads to a conceptual understanding of qualia and subjective experience. The historically hypothesized fundamental nature of subjective experience becomes logically evident as a quale is interpreted and evaluated through the survival needs, desires, and limitations of an individual to then ultimately compute a valence. The fundamental nature of any experience is it's valence and whether it is beneficial, detrimental or in fact neutral to the biological or artificial system. Even though the true valence of a quale is subjectively unique, it can still be very accurately guessed by a 3rd person through a shared theory of mind.

The latter part of this paper discusses the cognitive model in respect to developing artificially intelligent systems and their metaphysical implications on free will and rationality. Since the fervid goal is to one day recreate human intelligence on a artificial substrate, a mathematically based consideration of consciousness will allow us to effectively discover the potential challenges that are necessary overcome.

References

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1 Williams, Scott W. (2005). "The Oldest Mathematical Object is in Swaziland". Mathematicians of the African Diaspora. SUNY Buffalo mathematics department. http://www.math.buffalo.edu/mad/Ancient-Africa/lebombo.html

2 J. Bogoshi, K. Naidoo and J. Webb, The oldest mathematical artifact, Math. Gazette, 71:458 (1987) 294.

3 Block, N. (1995). ON A CONFUSION ABOUT A FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 227-287.

[33] Neural correlates of individual differences in self control

Anja Waegeman1, Carolyn H. Declerck1, Christophe Boone1, Ruth Seurinck2, Wim Van Hecke3, & Paul M. Parizel3

1 University Antwerp, Management Department, Prinsstraat 13, B-2000 Antwerp; 2 University Ghent, Department of Data-Analysis, H. Dunantlaan 1, B-9000 Ghent; 3 University Hospital Antwerp, Wilrijkstraat 10, B-2650 Edegem

Effective self control is known to have much predictive value correlating withpsychological health, well-being, career choices, leadership abilities and success, while self control failure characterizes many clinical and personality disorders. Using event related fMRI (n = 41) we investigated individual differences in inter-situational self control in two different experimental tasks that engage two commonly studied aspects of self control: the ability to control impulses in a time discounting task and the ability to adapt behaviour to a changing environment in a probabilistic reversal learning task. Based on cognitive control theory and research, we hypothesize (1) that cognitive control across both tasks is associated with activation in a lateral neural network (e.g. inferior frontal gyrus and nucleus caudatus) and (2) that this network is more active in individuals with high self control compared to low self controlled individuals for whom behaviour is driven by brain regions involved in reward processing (e.g. medial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum). By focusing on the joint activation pattern of two different tasks in individuals with high and low self control abilities, we are able to draw conclusions regarding the generalizability of self control as a stable individual trait and as an inter-situational construct.

[34] Reward-based learning of unconscious sequences during crowding

Anne Atas1, Nathan Faivre2, Axel Cleeremans1, & Sid Kouider2

1 Consciousness, Cognition, and Computation Group (CO3); Université Libre de Bruxelles; 2 Laboratoire de Sciences Cogntives et Psycholinguistique (LSCP); Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris

Can we learn complex information without awareness? During the last fifty years, this important issue in neuroscience has been extensively investigated. However, most of empirical data suggests that learning is accompanied by awareness. This lack of evidence for unconscious learning might reflect the systematic use of visible stimuli during the learning phase. In the present study, we overcome this problem by testing whether sequence learning can take place when each stimuli within a sequence cannot be

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perceived consciously. We used gaze contingent crowding to ensure that each visual event can be presented for a long duration while remaining invisible. Our task involved discriminating between two subliminal sequences based on a corresponding outcome: one sequence was always associated with a monetary reward and the other with a monetary punishment. Our results revealed a significant facilitation of responses times for the reward sequence in comparison with punish sequence, whereas awareness tests indicated no awareness of the sequence of stimuli. Our results thus demonstrate, for the first time, that sequence learning can take place completely unconsciously. These findings also suggest that the serial structure of unconscious information can not only be processed but also lead to long-lasting traces in the brain.

[35] Mindwandering heightens accessibility of negative cognitions in at-risk individuals

Igor Marchetti1, Ernst H.W. Koster1, & Rudi De Raedt1

1 Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium

Mindwandering (MW) is defined as a shift of attention away from a primary task toward internal information and consistently associated with both positive and negative outcomes. Among the latter, negative mood and negative cognitions have been reported, but the mechanisms through which this happens are still unclear. We put forward that MW could either directly enhance negative thinking or indirectly heighten the accessibility of negative thoughts. We measured in our sample (n = 79) emotional thoughts during the Sustained Attention on Response Task (SART) which induces MW, and the accessibility of negative cognitions by means of the Scrambled Sentences Task (SST) after the task. We also measured both depressive symptoms and rumination. Results show that, only in individuals with significant levels of depression, MW during SART predicts higher accessibility of negative thoughts after the task, rather than negative thinking during the task. This effect was not due to mood changes and rumination was associated with MW-related negative thinking. These findings contribute to our understanding of the underlying mechanisms of MW and may shed light on the relationship between task-involvement and affect.

[36] Stress related diminishment of cognitive control in Non-Suicidal Self-Injury.

Ingrid Van Camp1 & Mattias Desmet1

1 Department of Psychoanalysis and Clinical Consulting, Ghent University, Belgium

The Social Problem Solving Skills Task (SPST; Nock, 2006) assesses a person’s choice of an optimal response to a stressful situation and their actual response. Twenty five self-harming subjects with a history of at least one traumatic event were assessed and compared with a large control group. Results show that both groups perform equally well in choosing an optimal problem solution, which suggests an intact mentalization capacity. Self-harmers did differ significantly from controls in their most likely actual

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response: self-harmers tend to vent emotions as opposed to non-self-harmers whose response approaches the optimal problem solution.

This suggests the occurrence of a regression to a lower level of mentalization, which is a well-documented phenomenon supported by neurocognitive research. Extreme arousal at the time of a traumatic event produces lasting neurobiological changes. (1) Changes in the neural arousal mechanisms cause the arousal system to be easily triggered by later relatively mild emotional stimuli. (2) Triggering of the arousal system causes a neurochemical switch from conscious, declarative memory, mediated by the hippocampus, to the activation of the amygdala thereby provoking the expression of emotional responses.

These findings confirm the validity of the SPST as a test of mentalization quality and regression probability.

[37] CNV, LRP, and ERN/PE effects in the differentiation-of-deception paradigm

Kristina Suchotzki1, Bruno Verschuere2, Fren Smulders3, Ewout Meijer3, & Geert Crombez1

1 Ghent University; 2 University of Amsterdam; 3 Maastricht University

The Differentiation-of-Deception paradigm is unique in that the experimental (lie) and control (truth) condition only differ in the crucial variable: Deception. We extended the paradigm to gain insight in the cognitive mechanisms of deception using event-related components: the Contingent Negative Variation (CNV), the Lateralized Readiness Potential (LRP) and error-related components, i.e., the Error-Related Negativity (ERN) and the Error Positivity (Pe). Twenty participants committed a mock crime and gave speeded yes/no responses to crime and control questions using left and right button presses. A question was presented (e.g., Did you steal a…) for 2000 ms, followed by a truth (T) or lie (L) cue. The cue was replaced after 1500 ms by a keyword (e.g., wallet), allowing participants to respond. The CNV was measured during the cue-keyword interval, the LRP during the keyword-response interval, and the ERN and Pe after (correct) responses. Results revealed an enlarged frontal CNV after the lie cue, which could probably be interpreted as anticipation of higher cognitive workload. The stimulus-locked LRP and the ERN did not differ between both conditions. A larger Pe was found after lie responses compared to truth responses, which may indicate a conscious conflict between the lie response and the known truth.

[38] Personalized Cognitive Training in Unipolar and Bipolar Disorder: A study of cognitive functioning

Marek Preiss1 & Evelyn Shatil2,3

1 Prague Psychiatric Center, University of New York in Prague; 2 Department of Psychology and the Center for Psychobiological Research, the Max Stern Academic College of Emek Yezreel, Israel; 3 CogniFit Ltd, Yoqneam Ilit, Israel

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Cognitive deficits, especially in executive control, attention and memory persist during remission, and some types of cognitive deficits represent fundamentals trait characteristics. Eight week interventional home-based study investigated the effects of CogniFit cognitive training on cognitive performance and everyday cognition in individuals with depressive disorders. Participants were assigned to either the cognitive training group or control group. Participants were instructed to complete a 20-30 minute session three times a week for the duration of eight weeks (24 total sessions). Thirty five (18 in the computer training group and 17 in the control group) completed the study. The cognitive training group, reported significantly lowered depression levels on the BDI-II (F=6.60, p=0.015 and Cohen's d= 0.89) and improved memory on the EMQ (F=4.119, F=0.051 and Cohen's d=0.70). In addition this group also improved on the Global executive score, Shifting and Divided attention (F=9.463, 6.12, 5.854; p=0.006, 0.020; 0.023 and Cohen's d=1.29, 0.92, 0.91 respectively). Within-group differences show that the cognitive training group, but not the control group, improved on all measures but one, of executive control and attention. Computerized cognitive remediation training improved objectively measured executive control and attention as well as subjectively measured everyday functioning and mood in depressed patients.

[39] Chunking in rapid serial visual presentation: consequences for visual awareness

Maria Falikman1,2 & Vyacheslav Stepanov3

1 Center for Cognitive Studies, Dept. of Linguistics, and Dept. of Psychology, Lomonosov Moscow State University; 2 Cognitive Research Lab, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia; 3 UsabilityLab Inc., Moscow, Russia

Visual events that occur beyond awareness due to the lack of attention (or, at least, do not enter conscious report) can become conscious, when they form a part of a larger whole. This is true for various modifications of the phenomenon known as a word superiority effect (WSE), first described by J.M. Cattell more than a century ago and rediscovered by cognitive psychologists in 1960-es. In our experiments, we studied WSE in a variety of attentional paradigms, including a dual-task rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) paradigm with letter-by-letter presentation of Russian words. We have demonstrated that the lack of visual awareness known as an attentional blink, normally observed in this paradigm, disappears for target letter stimuli embedded in words. Using word and nonword strings with instructions "to read words" and "to identify letters", we have also demonstrated that this effect is due to the controlled strategy of word reading rather than to the automatic word processing. Finally, by introducing an extra probe stimulus in letter strings containing words, we have also shown that the attentional blink does not completely disappear but rather shifts towards the end of a to-be-read word as a functional "unit" of visual information processing.

[40] Traits are represented in the medial Prefrontal Cortex: An fMRI adaptation study

Ning Ma1, Kris Baetens1, Marie Vandekerckhove1, Jenny Kestemont1, & Frank Van Overwalle1

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1 Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

Neuroimaging studies on trait inference about the self and others have found a network of brain areas, the critical part of which appears to be medial PreFrontal Cortex (mPFC). In this study, we investigated whether the mPFC plays an essential role in the neural encoding and representation of traits. To localize the neural representation of traits, we used fMRI-adaptation, which is a rapid suppression of neuronal responses upon repeated presentation of the same underlying stimulus, in this case, the implied trait. Participants had to infer an agent’s (social) trait from brief trait-implying behavioral descriptions. In each trial, the critical (target) sentence was preceded by a sentence (prime) that implied the same trait, the opposite trait, or no trait at all. The results revealed robust suppression of activation in the ventral mPFC in all three target conditions compared to their respective primes, and nowhere else in the brain. Crucially, this adaptation effect was graded: strongest after being primed with a similar trait, moderate after an opposite trait and weakest after a trait-irrelevant prime. In line with previous research on fMRI adaptation, we interpret these findings as indicating that trait concepts are not only processed, but also encoded and represented in the ventral mPFC.

[41] Sleep deprivation selectively disrupts cognitive control in the Stroop task.

Wim Gevers1, Gaetane Deliens2, Sophie Hofmann3, Wim Notebaert1, & Philippe Peigneux2

1 Unescog, Cognitive Neurosciences Unit, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) ,Bruxelles, BE; 2 UR2NF, Neuropsychology and Functional Neuroimaging Research Unit, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) ,Bruxelles, BE; 3 Université Libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, BE; 4 Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University ,Ghent, BE

Sleep deprivation (SD) markedly impacts prefrontal cortex, a brain area known as an essential component in executive functions and cognitive control. In the paradigmatic Stroop task, participants must name the ink colour of written colour words, eventually leading to interference when meaning and ink colour are discrepant. However, besides overall increased RT, prior studies failed to show SD- related‐ changes in Stroop interference (e.g. Cain et al., 2011). Here, we investigated this issue taking sequence effects into account. Indeed, it is known that congruency effects are weaker after incongruent than after congruent trials, a sequential modulation effect explained by top-down, increased cognitive control after the detection of conflict. Alternatively, bottom-up repetition effects of stimulus and response features have been proposed. Notebaert et al. (2006) demonstrated that both bottom up and top down‐ ‐ modulations can operate in parallel but that top down control needs time and cognitive resources to‐ build up. We used this paradigm to investigate the influence of SD on bottom up and top-down‐ processes in the Stroop task. We demonstrate that SD impacts on top- down but not bottom-up modulations of congruency effects in the Stroop task, hence reflecting the inability of sleep deprived‐ subjects to raise cognitive resources needed for increased cognitive control after conflict detection.

[42] Memory repression can be triggered unconsciously.

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Alexandre Salvador1, Fabien Vinckier2, & Raphaël Gaillard1.

1 Centre de Psychiatrie et Neurosciences, INSERM U894, Paris ; Institut du Cerveau et de la Moelle, INSERM U610, Paris

In 2001, Anderson argued that people can exert cognitive control to prevent unwanted declarative memories from entering awareness, which results in a long lasting deterioration of recall. This process relies on a conscious effort, and is associated with increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.

Meanwhile, the view that cognitive control requires consciousness is being challenged. Recent findings show that non consciously perceived stimuli can activate complex cognitive functions, such as task switching, response inhibition or orienting of attention.

Our study questioned whether the scope of unconsciously triggered cognitive control processes could be further extended to memory repression.

After initial learning of 24 word pairs, we trained 30 subjects to repress or to allow the recall of the second word when presented with the first, in response to an arbitrary geometric cue. We then subliminally presented the geometric cues while asking subjects to perform an unrelated task on the first word (gender determination). We then measured recall performance.

Results indicate that a cue associated with the memory repression task set but non consciously perceived deteriorated performance on future recall, compared to baseline.

We therefore extend the scope of unconsciously triggered cognitive control processes to memory repression.

[43] Progression of auditory discrimination based on EEG decoding predicts awakening from coma

Athina Tzovara1, Andrea Rossetti2, Lucas Spierer3, Jeremy Grivel4, Micah Murray2, Mauro Oddo6, & Marzia De Lucia1

1 Center for Biomedical Imaging, Department of Radiology, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and University of Lausanne, Switzerland; 2 Department of Clinical Neurosciences, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and University of Lausanne, Switzerland; 3 Department of Medicine, University of Fribourg, Switzerland; 4 Psychiatry Department, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and University of Lausanne, Switzerland; 5 Adult Intensive Care Medicine, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and University of Lausanne, Switzerland

In comatose patients neural evidence of mismatch negativity (MMN) has been associated with their chance of survival. Because auditory discrimination has been typically assessed at various delays after coma onset, it is still unclear whether this impairment depends on the time of the recording. Here, we studied 30 post-anoxic comatose patients resuscitated from cardiac arrest and five healthy, age-matched controls. Using a MMN paradigm, we performed two electroencephalography (EEG) recordings: the first

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within 24 hours after coma onset and under mild therapeutic hypothermia, and the second after one day and under normo-thermic conditions. We analyzed EEG responses based on a multivariate decoding algorithm that automatically quantifies neural discrimination at the single-patient level. Results showed high average decoding accuracy in discriminating sounds both for control subjects and comatose patients. Importantly, accurate decoding was largely independent of patients’ chance of surviving. However, the progression of auditory discrimination between the first and second recordings was informative of patients’ chance of surviving. A deterioration of auditory discrimination was observed in all non-survivors. We show evidence of intact auditory processing even in comatose patients who do not survive and that progression of sound discrimination over time is informative of patients’ chance of surviving.

[44] Alertness and shielding effects of language on task switching: dopamine and goal activation contributions.

Hichem Slama1,2,3, José Morais2, Sarah Bourgognon1, & Philippe Peigneux1

1 UR2NF - Neuropsychology and Functional Neuroimaging Research Unit, Faculty of Psychology; 2

UNESCOG - Cognitive Neurosciences Research Unit, Faculty of Psychology; 3 Department of Clinical and Cognitive Neuropsychology, Erasme Hospital Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

The impact of verbal mediation on task switching1,2 has been recently studied using verbal activation (VA) or verbal interference (VI) procedures3 5‐ . In this study, twenty participants were tested in both VA (repeating aloud the cue) and VI (articulatory suppression), and in long (LPT) and short preparation time (SPT) baseline conditions. A new cued sorting task was used that reduces the memory load of stimulus‐response mappings, and targets the task goal. Proactive interference mechanisms were studied using neutral and interfering transitions in switch trials. Eye blink rates (EBR) were recorded as markers of dopamine activity6. Results indicated that both VA and VI had a general positive effect on speed. VA also affected accuracy switch costs (ASC) with fewer errors in switch trials compared to LPT and VI. Greater ASC were also observed in LPT compared to SPT reflecting an increase in goal neglect with time. Higher EBR were correlated with reduced ASC when proactive interference was present. Together, those results suggest two roles of language in task switching. First, a shielding role against proactive interference, correlated with dopamine activity, and affecting task goal activation. Second, a general alertness function observed in both VA and VI.

References

1. Vandierendonck A, Liefooghe B, Verbruggen F. Task switching: interplay of reconfiguration and interference control. Psychol Bull;136:601 626.‐

2. Kiesel A, Wendt M, Jost K, et al. Control and Interference in Task Switching A Review. Psychological Bulletin 2010;136:849‐ ‐874.

3. Kirkham AJ, Breeze JM, MarGreek Small Letter Iota With Tonos Beffa P. The impact of verbal instructions on goal directed‐ ‐ behaviour. Acta Psychol 2012;Vol.139:pp.

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4. Saeki E, Saito S. Verbal representation in task order control: An examination with transition and task cues in random task switching. Memory & Cognition 2009;Vol.37:pp.

5. Kray J, Eber J, Karbach J. Verbal self instructions in task switching: a compensatory tool for action control deficits in childhood‐ ‐ and old age? Dev Sci 2008;11:223 236.‐

6. Dreisbach G, Muller J, Goschke T, et al. Dopamine and cognitive control: the influence of spontaneous eyeblink rate and dopamine gene polymorphisms on perseveration and distractibility. Behav Neurosci 2005;119:483 490.‐

[45] Can task instructions overcome automatic Stroop processing of conscious and subliminal stimuli ?

Imen El Karoui1,2,3, Kalliopi Christoforidis1, & Lionel Naccache1,4,5

1 ICM Research Center, INSERM/UPMC UMRS 975, 75013, Paris, France; 2 Department of Biology, École Normale Supérieure, 75005, Paris, France; 3 Ecole Doctorale Cerveau Cognition Comportement, Université Paris 6, 75005, Paris, France; 4 Assistance Publique Hôpitaux de Paris, Groupe Hospitalier PitiéSalpêtrière, 75013, Paris, France; 5 Faculté de Médecine PitiéSalpêtrière, Université Paris 6, 75013, Paris, France

The present study investigates whether a behavioral strategy established on conscious stimuli can be applied to nonconscious stimuli. We derived our experimental paradigm from the task used by Merikle et al (1995, Consciousness & Cognition). In this paradigm, subjects are asked to respond to the color of a green or blue string of ampersands. Preceding this target, the word “GREEN” or “BLUE” is presented either consciously or nonconsciously. Trials are organized in conscious and nonconscious blocks. In each block, 80% of the trials are incongruent. Critically, we added rare nonconscious trials inside conscious blocks. We also included one conscious and one nonconscious control blocks, in which the proportion of incongruent trials is 50%. We will present behavioral and EEG data, using this paradigm. We are currently analyzing these data, but preliminary analyses indicate that subjects show a reverse Stroop effect on conscious trials and a highly reduced Stroop effect on nonconscious trials embedded in conscious blocks compare to the unconscious control block. Interestingly, the Stroop effect was reduced in nonconscious blocks only when they were presented after conscious blocks, suggesting that subjects can strategically adapt to the frequency of incongruent trials when the word is visible, but that they can apply this strategy to subsequent trials.

[46] Conflicting Stimuli and Their Impact on Processing Strategies in Artificial Grammar Learning

Ivan Ivanchei1 & Nadezda Moroshkina1

1 Department of Psychology, St. Petersburg State University, Russia

The interaction of conscious and unconscious processing in artificial grammar learning was investigated. The main research question was how the conflict between implicitly learned dependencies in stimuli affects their classification. The experiment consisted of two phases. In the first phase participants memorized letter strings generated by a finite state grammar. All grammatical strings had also an

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additional subtle feature: the letters' lengthiness was increased. In the second phase participants classified the new strings as grammatical or not. For the first group of participants, all grammatical strings had the increased lengthiness, and all nongrammatical had not. For the second group, grammaticality and lengthiness did not correlate. The results of the experiment showed that participants implicitly learned to classify the new stimuli according to both grammar and lengthiness. Participants of the two groups demonstrated similar level of classification accuracy, but their strategies were different. Participants of the second group were not aware of the contradiction between grammaticality and lengthiness, but changed their strategy to a more analytical one. It was evident from the lower Yesrate and, as a consequence, lower level of false alarms. This result suggests that conflicts in implicit knowledge enhance conscious control of the task performance.

[47] Using the Spatial Tapping task to explore the relations between attention and executive control

Mariama Dione1, Laurent Ott1, & Yvonne Delevoye-Turrell1

1 University Lille Nord de France; 2 URECA EA 1059, rue du Barreau BP 60149, 59653 Villeneuve d’Ascq Cedex, France

Executive functions are usually assessed using complex planning tasks. Although these tasks are largely used for clinical assessment, there are known to suffer of validity problems. The objective of this study was to propose Spatial Tapping as a novel task to observe and measure executive functions. Following the theoretical assumptions of Cools (2006) and Miyake (2000), we propose that executive control is under the influence of two mutually opponent computations, i.e. cognitive stability (that requires maintaining a cognitive representation in WM) and cognitive flexibility (that requires shifting attention from a current mental state to the next). In the present study, we propose a simple task in which we manipulated the tempo of task execution. By analysing the spatio-temporal properties of error distribution, we demonstrate that participants (N=31) maintain attention on the current target in slow tempi, but shift attention quickly from a current action to the next for fast tempi, in order to keep synchronized to a sequence of tones. In a second task (N=41), in order to confirm that the previous results are related to the attentional abilities of 'maintaining & shifting', we used abrupt onsets to facilitate/distract attention performances in the Spatial Tapping task.

[48] Global mismatch negativity does not require awareness of stimulus regularity

Alexandre Simonin1, Athina Tzovara2, Andrea Rossetti1, Micah Murray2, Mauro Oddo3, & Marzia De Lucia2

1 Department of Clinical Neurosciences, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and University of Lausanne, Switzerland; 2 Center for Biomedical Imaging, Department of Radiology, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and University of Lausanne, Switzerland; 3 Adult Intensive Care Medicine, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and University of Lausanne, Switzerland

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Auditory evoked potentials (AEPs) are informative of intact brain functions of comatose patients. One marker is provided by the differential AEPs responses to standard and deviant sounds in mismatch negativity (MMN) paradigms. A rich literature interprets this effect as a preattentive and unconscious processing of the incoming stimuli. By contrast, MMN effect induced by the identical repetition of groups of sounds (global MMN) has been reported only when subjects were aware of the regularity. Here we test this hypothesis in five postanoxic comatose patients who underwent therapeutic hypotermia. We recorded AEPs while delivering groups of five sounds. They included either four identical sounds and one different in duration or five identical sounds. Each of these group of sounds was used either as standard or as deviant stimuli in a way that we could test the global MMN while controlling for the local MMN. We carried out a single-trial topographic analysis which quantifies the differential responses between two experimental conditions at single patient level. Three patients show the global irregularity effect despite unconscious and despite their hypotermic condition. These results suggest that active maintenance of perceptual representation do not require consciousness and that comatose patients can discriminate complex patterns of sounds.

[49] Cognitive control and number comparison : An fMRI-guided TMS study

Michael Andres1, Charlotte Desmet1, Filip Van Opstal1, Marcel Brass1, & Wim Fias1

1 Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University

Number comparison is known to recruit the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) but also frontal regions associated to cognitive control, such as the inferior frontal junction (IFJ). It is unclear, however, whether these regions are necessary to perform comparison tasks and whether their role is selective for numbers. We used fMRI to reveal the parieto-frontal networks involved in number processing and cognitive control, as measured by a Stroop task. Results showed overlapping activations in the left IFJ, SMA and IPS, with number-related activations extending more anteriorly in IPS than control-related activations. The same participants were then asked to select the largest of two numbers or the most dangerous of two animals while rTMS was used to create virtual lesions of left IFJ or IPS. Preliminary results (N=6) showed that, when compared to a control site, rTMS over IPS slowed down responses irrespective of stimulus category. Although our fMRI results converge with others to underline the involvement of IFJ in number comparison, our results failed to evidence a deficit after rTMS over this region. We propose that IFJ codes the rules that underlie stimulus-response associations during number comparison, but that its integrity is required only when these rules need to be updated.

[50] Training subjective experience in binocular rivalry

Michał Wierzchoń1, Bert Windey2, Krzysztof Gociewicz1, Marcin Koculak1, & Axel Cleeremans2

1 Jagiellonian University, Institute of Psychology, Consciousness Research Lab; 2 Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Consciousness, Cognition and Computation Group

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Here, we explore the possibility of intentional training of subjective experience in binocular rivalry (BR). In this paradigm, a different stimulus is presented to each eye, leading to the suppression of one of both stimuli. Typically, which stimulus is seen or suppressed varies over time in a regular manner (i.e. regular switches between percepts are observed every few seconds). However, early studies suggest that instructions can influence the perceptual transitions in BR, resulting in changes of subjective experiences of stimuli. In the present study, we further investigated this finding, asking whether it is possible to learn to control our perceptual experience in BR. To test this research question, we asked participants to control their perception, trying to focus on one of the possible percepts for the whole block of the task. We trained participants for 20 blocks, 1 minute each, counterbalancing the stimuli that should be perceived by participants. As a result of training, we expected participants to report proportionally longer perception of the image that they are required to focused on. The results are under analysis and will be discussed in context of the Radical Plasticity Thesis predictions (Cleeremans, 2011).

[51] Placebo-suggestion modulates conflict adaptation in the Stroop Task

Pedro M. Saldanha Da Gama1, Hichem Slama2, Emilie A.Y. Caspar1, Wim Gevers3, & Axel Cleeremans1

1 Research Unit in Consciousness, Cognition and Computation Group (CO3), Department of Psychology, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium; 2 Research Unit in Cognitive Neurosciences (UNESCOG) and Neuropsychology and Functional Neuroimaging Research Unit (UR2NF), Department of Psychology, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium; 3 Research Unit in Cognitive Neurosciences (UNESCOG), Department of Psychology, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

Expectation manipulations such as suggestion, placebo and post-hypnotic suggestion have been shown to bias several cognitive processes (pain, visual awareness and emotions). Here we demonstrate that a mixed placebo-suggestion is able to create expectations that have a profound impact on conflict adaptation assessed by objective measures. Two groups were exposed to a placebo-suggestion to induce either positive or negative expectations about the properties of a sham “brain wave” machine while performing a Stroop task. The experimental design associated a placebo (the equipment and procedure) to a suggestion (verbal and written persuasive information). The machine was described as either enhancing (positive group) or impairing (negative group) participants’ ability to perceive colors. In the baseline condition, participants completed the Stroop task without the equipment. We found a double interaction between Stroop conditions, suggestion and group. Planned comparisons indicated that the suggestion only influenced accuracy in the incongruent conditions. Participants committed fewer errors compared to baseline when under the positive suggestion but more errors when under the negative suggestion. Furthermore, participants’ intra-individual variability was influenced by suggestion and group. This study thus demonstrates that expectations induced by a placebo-suggestion can modulate cognitive conflict.

[52] Timing, Sequencing, and Cognitive Control in Complex Movement Coordination

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Ralf Krampe1, Nici Wenderoth1, Ann Lavrysen1, & Stephan Swinnen1

1 KU Leuven, Belgium

80 young (20--35 yrs) and older (54-67 yrs) professional musicians and age-matched novices (20 in each group) performed unimanual tapping tasks, which either required low-level timing (isochronous tapping of identical target intervals), rhythmic sequencing (performance of a rhythm consisting of multiple target intervals) or switching between different rhythmic sequences. Data was collected during two fMRI scan sessions with (for novices) six laboratory training sessions in between. In general professional musicians outperformed novices with effects of expertise increasing with task complexity. Age-effects were pronounced in novices and in tasks requiring sequencing or cognitive control. Besides well-documented motor networks active in all groups, we found that novices heavily relied on parieto-prefrontal networks (Left post IPS, Right IPL, R+L Lateral PFC) for sequencing and switching tasks, evidencing high levels of cognitive control. In contrast, expert musicians showed no (young musicians) or less activation (older musicians) of prefrontal regions or IPS in these tasks. Instead, musicians showed pronounced activation in the primary sensorimotor cortex. Acquisition and maintenance of high-level motor control apparently amounts to a gradual release from domain-general cognitive control through optimizing task-specific "lower-level" functions.

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Sponsorship

This conference is organized with the financial support of:

The Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts (http://www.kvab.be/) VISITBRUSSELS (http://visitbrussels.be)1

The Research Community ‘Neuroscience in relation to Experimental Psychology’ sponsored by the Research Foundation Flanders (http://www.fwo.be/)

1 Only the organizers of NEUROCOG’12 are responsible for all communications or publications with regards to the conference. VISITBRUSSELS is not responsible for the use that can be made of the information in these communications or publications.

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