KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTEMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY. EU AND UKRAINE:

“Neighbour, Partner, Member?” *

Apostolos Nikolaidis**

* This paper is only a part of the dissertation as submitted in order to obtain

the MA in European Politics & Policies. The final study (as submitted) includes also an economic dimension analysis.

** Mr. Apostolos Nikolaidis holds a BA in Political Studies & Diplomacy (University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece), a MA in European Politics & Policies (University of Leuven, Belgium) and follows a MA of Conflict & Sustainable Peace Studies (University of Leuven, Belgium)

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CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3

1. Introduction 4 2. The EU Relations with Ukraine 7 2.1. Evaluation of the Bilateral Relations 8 2.2. An Overview of Ukraine’s Policy towards the EU 10 3. More than Neighbours: The Political Dimension 14 3.1. The strategic importance of Ukraine 15 3.2. Mutual concern on regional security and stability 17 3.3. Ukraine’s security role in the “wider Europe” 21 4. Concluding Remarks 26

BIBLIOGRAPHY 30 WEBSITES 38

LIST OF FIGURES 1.1 Map of Ukraine 4 3.1 Existing and Planned Gas Routes to Europe 24

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The latest Presidential elections in Ukraine brought the country closer to meeting international commitments and standards for democratic elections. It was also seen as a turning point in Ukraine’s political life. Without any doubt the “Orange Revolution” introduced a new impetus towards Ukraine’s European integration. Until recently, Ukraine has not seriously been considered for EU membership. Nevertheless, the whole debate has been re-boosted by these latest Ukrainian evolutions. At the same time, the reaction of the EU was rather mixed: while the Members of the European Parliament recently adopted a declaration calling for stronger support of the country’s EU aspirations, the European Commission keeps referring to cooperation within the European Neighbourhood Policy, which does not grant EU membership. This study attempts to determine and analyse the EU-Ukraine relations under the European Neighbourhood Policy. In order that this research can attain its aim, the research is focused primarily in the political dimension of the bilateral cooperation. In the end, some answers are provided by the analysis on key questions, such as: Does Ukraine actually have any realistic potential way of integration towards the EU? Is Ukraine in any way treated differently than all the other neighbouring countries of the EU? Should Ukraine be treated just as another neighbouring state? Is it an important partner in the European periphery? Or perhaps should it be treated as a potential member of the EU?

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1 Introduction Ukraine is located in the Central East Europe, borders upon Poland, Hungary and Slovakia in the west, through which territories lies the shortest route to the countries of Western and Central Europe. The border of Ukraine with Russia is in the north and east, while in the southwest the country it is contiguous with Moldova and Romania. In the north, Ukraine adjoins Belarus through which territory it is linked with Baltic countries. It is with Romania and Russia that in addition to the land border Ukraine has a sea border too. Ukraine has a wide outlet to the Black Sea and Sea of Azov that link it with Bulgaria, Turkey and Georgia.

Figure 1.1 Map of Ukraine

Although Ukraine has only been independent for few years, it has an exuberant history (that lies beyond this study). On December 1 1991, the referendum on confirmation of “The Bill of Independence Announcement of Ukraine” took place. There was a positive response from 90.3% of the population who took part in the referendum. The elections of the first President of Ukraine were also held and Leonid Kravchuk became the first President of Ukraine. The referendum in Ukraine created a qualitatively new situation with regard to the problem of existence of the USSR. A week after this event, the USSR no longer existed as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality and Ukraine became an independent sovereign state. It was rather quickly recognized by the international community and the EU-Ukraine relations were launched just two weeks after Ukraine’s independence. Without any doubt Ukraine has clearly been rising up the EU agenda (especially after the recent evolutions) and consequently many studies have been prepared on the overall bilateral dialogue. My prime purpose on this paper is neither to make an extensive analysis of the bilateral relations between the EU and Ukraine (from independence until today) nor to assess the overall progress of Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU.

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The underlining philosophy of this paper is that Ukraine is a new eastern neighbour of the EU that can not be neglected. The whole question can be headed as follows: can Ukraine remain just a neighbour of the EU or are we getting into a new era of strengthened cooperation between the two partners which perhaps in the long-term, and under the appropriate preconditions, can be transformed to a candidate status? I therefore mainly focus on the political dimension of the overall bilateral agenda: namely I attempt to analyze the importance of Ukraine as a political neighbour. The two gravity centers that formulate Ukraine’s policy is on the one hand Russia and on the other the West (primarily the EU). As I argue in the paper, despite Ukraine’s pro-european rhetoric and orientation, the followed foreign policy seems to be two-headed, and like Janus, faces two directions. The “Russia factor” is consequently examined in almost all cases, as it is important for the overall assessment of Ukraine’s political and economic orientation. The first Chapter sets out the basic guidelines of the EU-Ukrainian relations under the spectrum of the European Neighbourhood Policy and highlights mainly the importance of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), the EU Common Strategy of 1999 and the Strategy of Ukraine’s Integration to the EU. My attempt is not to provide a thorough analysis of the EU-Ukrainian relations, but rather to investigate how the two parts cooperate through the neighbourhood initiative and under the current instruments and policies provided by the EU. Ukraine has been called “Europe’s linchpin” and “a strategic pivot in Europe”. The political dimension of my analysis starts by the assumption that Ukraine is more than a neighbour and by pointing the significance of Ukraine for European security. I then focus on regional security and stability and on Ukraine’s security role in the European security. In the end, I hope that it becomes clear that Ukraine is not just a nation-state located at the borders of the EU, but a crucial key player in the European periphery. In the final chapter, I provide some concluding speculations about the prospects of Europeanization in Ukraine. Again this part can not be seen as an extensive analysis on all aspects and the potentials of the bilateral relations. I focus on the current political developments, the way the EU faces Ukraine and on Ukraine’s response. I hope that, in the end, a clear message is provided that the EU cannot afford to lose the opportunity provided by the “Orange Revolution” and the emergence of the latest pro-european orientation.

2 The EU Relations with Ukraine Where is the final point of the European Union’s enlargement to the East? Is it possible to determine this boundary? These questions remain crucial in the European integration process and are not easy to be answered. We simply do not know what will happen tomorrow or ten years from now. Nevertheless,

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we can identify the major guidelines and direction towards European integration. With its historic enlargement on May 1st 2004, the European Union has taken a big step forward in promoting security and prosperity on the European continent. EU enlargement, among other things, means that the external borders of the Union have changed. We have acquired new neighbours and have come closer to old ones. These circumstances have created both opportunities and challenges and the European Neighbourhood Policy is a response to this new situation. (ENP Strategy Paper). Synchronously, EU enlargement raises important questions: the debate that has started even before the latest widening of the EU focuses on how much further can the EU enlarge. Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) clearly allows any geographically based European State to apply for a membership. On the other hand, the European Neighbourhood Policy does not implement membership, rather invites the EU neighbours to share in the peace, stability and prosperity that the European Union enjoys. The major aim of this initiative is to create a ring of friends around the borders of the new enlarged EU. Nevertheless, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the European objectives differ from state to state. Under this approach, the central research question of this study for Ukraine is the following: “Neighbour, Partner, Member?”. In other words, is Ukraine for any specific reason being approached from the EU with a different point of view than the other neighbouring countries? Should the EU perhaps detect the “otherness” of Ukraine within the ENP? And if so, which should be the main approach on the prospective EU-Ukraine relations: a neighbour, a partner, or conceivably a (future) member? This study will attempt to track down these answers by starting with the analysis of the bilateral relations and Ukraine’s response towards the EU.

2.1. Evaluation of the Bilateral Relations EU-Ukraine relations were launched in 1991, just two weeks after Ukraine gained independence. Due to its contractual form of relations with the EU, Ukraine was defined as a part of the so called “third basket” of the European countries that have relations with the EU. The “third basket” is composed by the countries of the former Soviet Union which only have trade agreements hat the EU has established with all third trade partners without any right to become a member of the EU1.

1 “First basket” are the countries that have associated membership in the EU and have

“European Agreements” with the right to join the EU, while “second basket” are the countries of “Stabilization and Association Agreement” from western Balkans, whose right to join the EU is also acknowledged.

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EU relations with Ukraine today are to a large extent based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that was concluded in 1994 and entered into force in March 1998. The PCA forms the legal basis of EU-Ukraine relations, providing for cooperation in a wide range of areas including political dialogue, trade and investment, economic and legislative cooperation, and cultural and scientific cooperation (European Commission, 2004, p. 3). Thus the PCA was a clear signal of the EU supporting Ukraine’s transition to democracy and market economy. The PCA was followed by the Common Strategy of 1999, which remains (more or less) the basic approach of the European Union’s relations with Ukraine. The general vision and the strategic goals of the EU with regard to Ukraine, as expressed in the European Council Common Strategy of 11 December 1999, include the following:

To contribute to the emergence of a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Ukraine, governed by the rule of law and underpinning a stable functioning market economy

To cooperate with Ukraine in the maintenance of stability and security in Europe and the wider world

To increase economic, political and cultural cooperation with Ukraine as well as cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs (European Council, 1999).

It is clear that the EU since the adaptation of the PCA and the launch of the Common Strategy has deepened and widened the bilateral cooperation. Synchronously, the ENP can be also considered as a strategy towards all EU neighbouring countries (and therefore Ukraine as well) to share in the peace, stability and prosperity that the EU enjoys. However, among all these neighbours, it is only Ukraine (and Moldova2) that seeks EU membership, which does not comply with the ENP guidelines. It is consequently crucial to determine Ukraine’s European aspirations in order to investigate if a realistic strategy for such an orientation exists.

2.2. An Overview of Ukraine’s Policy towards the EU The historical experience of Ukraine as a subordinated territory of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union made its leaders and many of its people eager in 1991 to “return to Europe” (Bojcun, 2001, p. 4). Nevertheless, and despite this eager, Ukraine’s recent foreign policy was not clear for the countries of the West. On the one hand, the multivectorial doctrine has been declared from the beginning of the Ukrainian independence; on the other hand, the European integration has been elected as a strategic direction (Mitrofanova, 2005).

2 Morocco has applied in the past for EU membership but nevertheless is not considered to be

a European state (in geographical terms) and therefore the only European states that seek, in the one way or the other, EU membership under the ENP are Ukraine and Moldova

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As William Wallace argues the Ukrainian government (at least until recently) claims to be seeking future EU membership, but shows little understanding of the importance of the Copenhagen conditions. EU officials have been frustrated by repeated failures to follow through on promises to pursue needed reforms, by widespread corruption within the Ukrainian administration, and by organized cross-border crime. (Wallace, 2003, p. 9). Then again, Ukraine does not seem to launch a strategy for short-term integration to the EU, but rather argues that this will only be achieved after the implementation of all the appropriate reforms, something that definitely requires years. Consequently, Kiev admits that Ukraine’s transition record is not yet impressive enough to negotiate admission. What they want is that Brussels will send an explicit message that Ukraine will be considered eligible for membership once it meets the Copenhagen criteria (Zagorski, 2002, p.9). Therefore, Ukraine proclaims European integration as its strategic foreign policy goal. But what exactly is integration and how does Ukraine conceives it is fundamental. As Lewis argues what is meant by “integration” is sometimes unclear (perhaps deliberately so). Ukraine’s most insistent demand is to be acknowledged as a fully European country, a member of the European family (Lewis 2002, p. 259). In that sense, the new Ukrainian President, Victor Yushchenko, on any occasion has stated that the future of his country lies with Europe. “Our way to the future is the way of a united Europe. We, along with the peoples of Europe, belong to one civilization. Our place is in the European Union”, stated after taking oath as the new President of Ukraine3. For Ukraine, European integration first of all means:

Further political and institutional rapprochement with the EU and evolutional advancement to the ultimate goal of integration of Ukraine to the EU;

Adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to those of the EU and the Council of Europe as a key integration element;

Intensification of relationships of Ukraine with NATO as one of the components of the overall system of European stability and safety4.

As a result, the main guidelines of the strategy of Ukraine’s integration to the European Union include the following:

Approximation of legislation of Ukraine to the legislation of the EU Economical integration and development of the bilateral trade relations Integration to the EU with the context of all-European security Political consolidation and strengthening of democracy Adaptation of the Social Policy of Ukraine to the EU standards Cultural-educational, scientific and technical integration Regional integration of Ukraine

3 Yushchenko’s speech in the Independence Square of Kiev, right after taking oath as the

new President of Ukraine, 23.01.2005 4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, http://www.mfa.gov.ua/eng/diplomacy/

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Sectoral cooperation (Ukrainian Presidency, 1998)

The latest impetus of Ukraine’s European integration is provided by the new rather pragmatic-realistic foreign policy introduced by President Yushchenko. The west-oriented leader of Ukraine, tried, on the first place, to stabilize relations with Russia, in the aftermath of the Ukrainian Presidential elections, as it is for the vital interest of Ukraine to gain (again) Russia’s support5. At the same moment, though, “he has shown the way for his country”: “The borders of Europe now stretch from the coast of Portugal to beyond Kiev. We have chosen Europe: it is not just a question of geography, but a matter of shared spiritual and moral values”, addressed in his speech in the European Parliament6. For many Ukrainian observers this well known two-headed policy leads to contradictions that cannot “liberate” Ukraine from its dependency on Russia. Yet, even before the establishment of this “pro-european boost”, Ukrainian officials argued that there is neither a contradiction nor an incompatibility between the two courses: (1) integration into Europe and (2) good relations with Russia (Khandogiy, 11.03.2003). It seems, though, that the “Russia factor” plays an important role in making the EU cautious in its approach towards Ukraine (Kuzio 2003, p. 6). Thus one can argue that Ukraine does not only stand geographically at the crossroads between the EU and Russia but also in regard to its “way ahead”. The political dimension of the EU-Ukrainian relations that will be further analyzed in the next chapter will also be assessed under this balance, as the Brussels-Kiev path, to some extend, seems to pass through Moscow. 3 More than Neighbours: The Political Dimension “Razom nas bahato! Nas ne podolaty!”: “Together, we are many! We cannot be defeated!” The rhythmic chant spread through the crowd of hundreds of thousands that filled Kiev’s Independent Square on the evening of November 22. The tectonic plates of geopolitics have been shifted Westwards by the “Orange Revolution” (Karatnycky, 2005). The Orange Revolution of Ukraine can be considered, without any doubt, one of the most significant events we have witnessed in a country that seemed to be caught in authoritarian rule7. Many Ukrainian observers have argued that Ukraine reinvented itself as a nation and the Ukrainian society rediscovered itself as a civil society, while

5 This perhaps explains his first official visit to Moscow where he met with the Russian

President Vladimir Putin, just one day after taking the oath as the new Ukrainian President. We should, though, do not disregard the fact that President Putin has backed Yushchenko’s pro-Kremlin rival Viktor Yanukovych

6 Address by President Yushchenko in the European Parliament, 23.02.2005 7 Contribution from PSE Group vice-president Jan Marinus Wiersma to Session III, EWI

Conference: Ukraine, EU, Russia: Challenges and Opportunities for New Relations, 10.02.2005

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others supported that Homo Sovieticus died peaceful in Ukraine (Nemyria, 2005, p. 33). Unfortunately, although Ukraine has made progress in holding and respecting democratic elections, still lags badly behind in terms of institutionalization of democracy, the creation of genuine civil societies and the achievement of effective reforms (Lieven, 1999, p. 156). The new Ukrainian administration (at least as asserts) wants to make all the appropriate reforms in the country that would provide a European future. “The borders of Europe now stretch from the coast of Portugal to beyond Kiev. We have chosen Europe: it is not just a question of geography, but a matter of shared spiritual and moral values… All reforms will be based on human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings. We aim to implement these changes meticulously and at all levels, doing all this within the European spirit.8” Ukraine has clearly been rising up the EU agenda recently and the debate on the bilateral relations has been symbolized by the latest Presidential elections in Ukraine. Nevertheless, most observers in the West still have little knowledge of thinking in Ukraine about regional security. This chapter will start by pointing the significance of Ukraine for European security and will continue with an attempt to answer some key questions such as: What is exactly Ukraine’s security role in the “wider Europe” and to what extend does this “sketch” a way to Europe? Interwoven to these, under the recent evolutions, what is the balance of power between the EU and Russia that emerges in the Ukrainian periphery?

3.1. The strategic importance of Ukraine Throughout most of the 1990s, the EU was busy completing its single market, getting ready for the single currency and helping the Central and East European applicants with their internal reforms. It paid little attention to Ukraine and its neighbouring countries in the further east, Belarus and Moldova (Wolczuk, 2005). In contrast to the EU, Russia’s behaviour toward Ukraine reflects a stronger awareness of Ukraine’s key geostrategic and economic role (GMF and HBS, 2004). However, with the latest EU enlargement, it has become a matter of urgency for the EU to engage strategically with its new neighbours. In particular, the EU must develop a realistic strategy for Ukraine, its largest new neighbour within Europe. One reason why Ukraine needs greater attention on the part of the EU is geopolitical: Ukraine stands at the crossroad of Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Ukraine borders three, and soon to be four, new EU members (Poland, Slovenia, Hungary- Romania). All four of these are or will soon be NATO members. Consequently, with enlargement, Ukraine’s geostrategic importance becomes an issue that the EU must address.

8 Address by President Yushchenko in the European Parliament, 23.02.2005

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Among the major factors which determine the geostrategic role of Ukraine are the following:

The size and the physical geography of Ukraine: Ukraine covers an area of 233,000 squares miles9,

Its population: a country of almost 50 million people, Its natural resources: Ukraine occupies almost 5% of the world’s

mineral resources, acquiring potential reserves of oil and natural gas (Shcherbak 1998)

Its military might remains (even after denuclearisation) formidable (Wolczuk, 2003, p. 3): It has the continent's second-largest conventional army (Karatnycky, 1995)

Ukraine occupies a key position among the countries of Wider Europe. It is located strategically between the Euro-Atlantic community, Russia and the Caucasus, and it forms an integral part of the increasingly significant Black Sea region. As Moroney analyzes Brzezinski and Huntington have advanced rather two different schools of thought regarding Ukraine’s role and place in Europe. Brzezinski is a great supporter of the West’s strategic engagement with Ukraine as an independent state. Huntington, on the other hand, argues that the Iron Curtain has been replaced by a new line, a new security order based on civilizations (the well known “clash of civilizations”10). Huntington labels Ukraine as non-Western, culturally divided and situated on the “break” between the Christian and Orthodox world (Moroney, 2002, pp. 61-2). Alternatively, as the former Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Zlenko argues there were and probably remain some stereotypes concerning Ukraine. The most indicative are the following:

The Ukrainians had lived under a communist regime for too long to be able to associate themselves with European democratic values,

Ukraine was a zone of special vital interests to Russia, so attempts to break this connection would ultimately infuriate Moscow,

Ukraine was too bulky to integrate painlessly into the EU. Some people placed Ukraine in another civilization altogether, arguing that Ukrainian culture was incompatible with Western European traditions (Zlenko, 2002, p. 22).

3.2 Mutual concern on regional security and stability

On 1 December 1991, Ukraine rejoined Europe as a sovereign nation-state (Luciuk, 1993, p. 27). An independent Ukraine signaled the emergence of the right to devise its own security policy. Since then, Ukraine has become a significant new actor on the European security scene (Albright and Appatov, 1999, p. 3).

9 By comparison, France and Spain, respectively, occupy 212,900 and 195,900 square miles. 10 See Huntington, S. (2002) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

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During this time Kiev has tried to 'return to Europe' and has actively pursued policies with an aim to being seen as a European and opposed to a Eurasian state. Despite this attempt by Ukraine, and the proclamations that Kiev is the linchpin of Europe's security, it remains on the periphery of Europe (Sanders, 2000). Providing an answer in key questions, such as, where does Ukraine fit in the new European security architecture, and what will be Ukraine’s contribution in the formulation of the European security, is crucial. Nevertheless, it seems that these questions are bound with the contemporary Ukrainian-Russian relations (Kennedy, 1999, p.218). Without any doubt, Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU depends on its cooperation with Russia, and the EU cannot ignore Russia’s interests, building its strategy regarding Ukraine (Sushko, 2003). Relations with Russia are particularly important among Ukraine’s security challenges. Thus, maintaining normal and friendly relations with Russia is a key goal (Koval, 1999, p. 137). “Ukraine regards its relations with Russia as one of the top priorities, and its strategic policy course on integration in European and Euro-atlantic structures has to be complemented by vigorous efforts to develop comprehensive cooperation with Russia in all possible spheres. However, these processes can not replace each other, they have their own merits and benefits and should develop in parallel not impeding one another”11. Ukraine’s foreign policy, like Janus12, faces two directions (Yakonenko, 1998a, p. 25). This double-headed foreign policy orientation can be identified by any unbiased observer: The government traditionally specializes in wearing a Europe-friendly face, while the people exhibit an aloof, largely disinterested, skeptical, pro-Russian, or, at best, marginally prowestern countenance (Molchanov, 2003, p. 21). As Rahr argues Ukraine is situated between two gravity centers: Russia and the West. From the West, Kyiv expects financial assistance for the country’s reform process and inclusion in the Western security zone. Moreover, Kyiv needs Western assistance to promote the modernization of its armed forces, and leverage to sustain sovereignty against subtle Russian pressure (Nation, 2000, p. 36). From Moscow, Kyiv expects full recognition of Ukraine’s state sovereignty but also close economic cooperation on a mutually beneficial basis (Rahr, 1999, p. 128). One can therefore identify two such fundamental realities for Ukraine: Russia and the West, where each has a range of interests that involves Ukraine. For the West (mainly NATO and the EU) these interests include nuclear

11 Speech by Borys Tarasyuk, Former Foreign Minister of Ukraine at the Statesmen's Forum

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 06.07.1998 12 Janus is the Roman god of gates and doors (ianua), beginnings and endings, and hence

represented with a double-faced head, each looking in opposite directions.

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disarmament of Ukraine (already accomplished), maintenance of regional stability, prevention of any local conflicts and creation of a counterbalance to Russia’s “new imperialism”. For Russia, the interests include maintaining regional stability and security through political subordination of Ukraine, the desire to dominate Eastern and Central Europe (where Ukraine is the key element), maintenance of stable markets for Russian products in Ukraine and the preservation of cultural ties (Koval, 1999, p 139). For Russia the CIS is a means of preserving or even improving its position and influence in the other former republics. Ukraine on the other hand, although a founder of the CIS, sees the Commonwealth as an organization of equal members. Consequently, Russia regards Ukraine as a major obstacle to its strategy in the “near abroad”. As Rainow argues Russia tends to interpret the “strategic partnership” as a special relationship involving common foreign and defense policy, whereas Ukraine as a guarantee of equality and good-neighborliness (Rainow, 1999, pp. 51-2). On the other hand, it has been argued that the West was keen to make Ukraine stay in the CIS, because out of all the CIS countries it was only Ukraine that was able to counterbalance the Russian dominance in the post-soviet area. In that sense, as long as Ukraine remains in the CIS, Russia will not succeed in creating an anti-NATO block of CIS-states against the West (Rahr, 1998, p. 7). Consequently, seen from Moscow the Western CIS is part of its own near neighbourhood, over which it expects to retain political influence. Europe’s “eastern policy”, therefore, will have to be negotiated with Moscow – or maneuvered round Moscow (Wallace, 2004, p. 4). It has been even argued that the border zones between Russia and Europe, including Ukraine, will likely feature quite a bit of friction (Lunch, 2004, p. 113). With the latest EU enlargement the EU borders have moved closer to Russia and created new “non-EU Europe” in Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine. The EU needs a solid and permanent security relationship with Russia and the new neighbourhood on a range of areas of mutual interest (Lynch, 2003, p. 95). In shaping the partnership and neihbourly relations in Europe as a whole the EU assumes a key role. It is the only political actor in the region which has the resources and instruments to stabilize the European continent (Kempe, 1998, p. 7). Bukkvoll argues that Western policy towards Ukraine developed during three stages: first, a period of neglect, second, a period of annoyance and finally, a period of growing appreciation (Bukkvoll, 1997, p. 71). Within the latter period, the EU has provided the ground for closer bilateral cooperation with the ENP Action Plan. This includes (among other aspects) possibilities for closer co-operation in the area of foreign and security policy, including

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European Security Defence policy, particularly with regard to Transnistria13. The way in which the conflict in Transdniestria (in Moldova) is managed will be a test case for EU-Ukraine relations (WEU Report, 14.06.2005, p. 14). It is vital for the EU to become a real strategic actor in its neighbourhood with civilian/military activities across the political/strategic spectrum backed up by its economic “soft power”. Only in this manner will the EU be able to extend the zone of stability in its periphery (Batt, Lynch, Missiroli, Ortega and Triantaphyllou, 2003, p.124). Thus it seems that the current neighbourhood instrument of the EU does not fit exactly on the conditions that emerge in the so called “wider Europe”.

3.3. Ukraine’s security role in the “wider Europe” It is beyond doubt that Ukraine's stability is of great interest to European security. From a geopolitical perspective, the existence of a country between Central Europe and Russia (with a population of 52 million and a territory 10 per cent larger than France), has major implications for Europe's security. As Van Ham argues a democratic Ukraine can make an important contribution to the establishment of a viable European security architecture (Van Ham, 1994). A stable and democratic Ukraine is very much in Western interests because the country serves as an important geopolitical buffer between Russia and Central Europe (Larrabee 2002). In April 1996 Javier Solana, as a Secretary General of NATO at that time, stated that Ukraine “has an absolutely unique role to play in securing stability on the continent”. And then again, as the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, he has stated: “Ukraine's geographical position has often been called challenging. But wise leaders turn challenges into opportunities… We have a strong interest in Ukraine becoming a modern and successful country with a genuine democratic system under the rule of law”14. The reasons why Ukraine has come to be considered such an important country for the future of European security can be categorized as followed:

Ukrainian independence was seen as a defining feature of the future European security architecture,

Ukraine remains a crucial determinant in the formation of the future Russia,

It is considered a potential candidate for serious ethnic conflict and separatism (Bukkvoll, 1997, p.1)

The latest EU enlargement signaled an increased awareness of interdependence mainly between EU and Russia and secondarily between EU and Ukraine in the broader security fields of terrorism, environmental

13 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ukraine/intro/memo05_106.htm 14 Article by Javier Solana on the occasion of the inauguration of the new President of

Ukraine: The Promising Road Ahead for Ukraine and the EU, Weekly Mirror, 22.01.2005

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dangers, regional instability and international crime (Gower, 2002, p. 56). Partnership with Ukraine (and the other ENP countries) will help prevent economic imbalances from becoming a threat to the security of the European continent (Hill and Smith, 2000, p.229). Ukraine asserts to be ready for active co-operation with both NATO and the EU: it maintains rather fruitful relations of distinctive partnership with the Alliance and tries to develop strategic partner relations with the EU. In the security domain, Ukraine may be not only a consumer but a real contributor, especially in the sphere of strategic transport, space, intelligence, peacekeeping, law enforcement, and elimination of aftermath of natural and technological disasters (Polyakov and Sungurovskiy, 2001, p. 25). It has already been analyzed, the crucial place that Ukraine occupies in Europe, juxtaposing between the West and Russia (Yakovenko, 1998b p.8). Ukraine is, in addition, a key political actor in the wider Black Sea Region. Given the geostrategic position of this region, as a natural link between Europe and Asia, and between Central Asia and the Middle East, it constitutes a vital trade link as well as an important area of transit that can not be neglected by the EU (Valinakis, 1999, p. 1). In the light of its geopolitical situation, rich natural resources, scientific, technical and intellectual potential, Ukraine can become an influential regional state, capable of playing a significant role in providing political and economic stability in Europe. (Potekhin, 1999, p.154). It has become, as Potekhin argues, clear that the European geopolitical space is interlinked with the role of Ukraine. Ukraine is a lynchpin of European security, as it can be a security guarantor in promoting peace and stability in its near neighbourhood and act as a mediator to frozen conflict in the region (mainly Moldova/Transnistria and Georgia/Abkhazia). Furthermore, it can contribute considerably to international peacekeeping, for example police missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina15. As Balmaceda argues Ukraine’s dependence on Russian energy imports has clear negative implications for Ukraine’s domestic political situation, its foreign relationships, and its ability to play a leading role in Central and Eastern Europe (Balmaceda, 2004). Yet at the same time, the EU does not deny Ukraine’s important geopolitical position between the EU and Russia and its function as a transit country bringing Russian gas and oil supplies to the EU, as was confirmed in the Wider Europe – New Neighbours document, issued on March 11, 2003 (Verpoest, 2004, p. 8). To illustrate this, it is estimated

15 Key policy recommendations to the EU and Ukraine: Ukraine’s Future within the Newly

Enlarged Europe, p. 4, signed by Bertelsmann Foundation, Center for European and International Studies, EastWest Institute, EuroRegio Ukraine, International Renaissance Foundation and Open Society Institute

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that over 90% of Russian gas exports to Europe transits via Ukraine16. This means that Ukraine is the gateway for some 25% of total European gas supplies (Fueg, 2001, p. 4).

Figure 3.1 Existing and Planned Gas Routes to Europe

To world energy markets, Ukraine plays a significant role as an intermediary connecting Russia, the world's largest natural gas producer, with growing European markets. Also, as gas exports from Turkmenistan to Europe and Russia grow, Ukraine serves as the largest market for this natural gas. Nevertheless, the EU has to address major issues interrelated with its relations with Ukraine. For example, the contradictory policy that Russia follows: on the one hand, to expand cooperation with NATO and the EU and at the same time to consider similar moves by Ukraine as threatening to Russia’s interests and security can only be seen as diplomatically unsustainable (ISSS, 2004, p. 128). The key question over the coming decade will be the borderline of the EU with Russia (Piket, 2004). In the meantime, Ukraine will stand in between and will continue to proclaim a European future. Indubitably the importance of Ukraine in this peripheral agenda will augment and consequently it is for the overall interest of the EU to engage more actively with Ukraine and thus to attempt to build a secure Europe and to struggle for a better world17. Thus in security and political terms it is without doubt that further engagement is required. 4 Concluding Remarks

16 With the exception of Finland and Poland - including gas being delivered through the Yamal system 17 As Javier Solana presents the European Security Strategy: a Secure Europe in a Better World

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In this last part of the study I will mainly examine and provide some concluding speculations about the prospects of Europeanization in Ukraine under the spectrum of the previous analyzed chapters. In other words I will investigate the extend to which Ukraine’s ambitions for closer partnership with the EU are, on the one hand, feasible and on the other, desired by the EU. Ukraine’s newly elected President, with the occasion of his address in the Council of Europe (January 2005), declared that “Ten years ago the desire of the Ukrainians to be a part of the European space brought our country to the Council of Europe (…) the Orange Revolution is the nationwide confirmation of that intention (…) my objective is to see Ukraine in the European Union”18. As has been analyzed before, the ENP does not offer the prospect of EU membership. At the same time, though, accession has been the EU’s most successful foreign policy tool, helping Central and Eastern Europe along the path of economic and political transition. Ukraine argues that –unlike Morocco or Israel, which are also included in the ENP- it is a European state and as such is entitled to a “membership perspective” (Wolczuk, 2005, p. 4). The ENP, though, is the current framework for the EU’s relations with its neighbours, is the result of consensus within the EU, as the majority of the Member States prefer this policy towards the “eastern dimension” (Solonenko, 2005, p.9). The principle of EU membership for Ukraine is rarely contested. Ukraine is undeniably a “European” state in both geographic and cultural terms. The process of transition to democracy, provided it continues, will show that Ukraine shares the democratic values of the EU states. For those reasons, many foreign policy experts take the view that Ukraine could join the EU in around 2015. However, political opinions still diverge among those who advocate a cautious approach to Ukrainian expectations and those in favour of immediately sending strong signals of political rapprochement between Ukraine and the EU. Hence there is still no official timetable for Ukraine’s accession to the EU (WEU Report, 14.06.2005, p.14). In Ukraine’s case, the question is not limited to “geographical” and “culturological” discussions on whether or not Ukraine is a part of Europe. Rather, the question is whether Ukraine has a realistic chance of claiming membership of the EU in the foreseeable future, what real steps are being made towards it, and what alternative there may be, if any, to the membership vs. exclusion dichotomy (Pidluska, 2002, p. 183). The Neighbours initiative, in spite of deepening and widening of EU-Ukraine cooperation shows little dynamism of the EU’s part. This is due to EU’s unwillingness to acknowledge Ukraine as a potential member and the

18 Address by Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine, 25 January 2005, during the first part

of the ordinary session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 24-28 January 2005

18

considerable discrepancy between Ukraine’s rhetoric of integration and the lack of progress of reform (Vahl, 2003, p. 12). As Wolczuk argues the Ukrainian political elite remains the key driving force for EU membership. Society remains simultaneously divided and ambivalent about foreign policy in general and although it is largely supportive of Ukraine’s EU’s membership, the elites do not face societal pressure for pursuing this particular foreign policy option (Wolczuk, 2004, p. 27). With the recent evolutions, though, the EU seems that will find it difficult to continue with its current policy of “welcoming Ukraine’s European aspirations” without acknowledging Ukraine as a candidate, especially under the pro-European reformist President Yushchenko (Gromadzki, Sushko, Vahl, Wolczuk and Wolczuk, 2004, p. 6). At this time neither the EU nor Ukraine are politically ready to make a definitive decision on eventual membership of Ukraine in the Union. Nevertheless, the EU’s current strategy towards Ukraine seems to be less dynamic than the appropriate one which could reach the demands of both sides. As a result what is important is that the EU presents a convincing strategy towards Ukraine which:

Clearly shows the Ukrainians that the doors for Ukraine are open and what will come out of the EU-Ukrainian relations in future depends primarily on the Ukrainians themselves

Provides all the appropriate support in Ukraine in consolidating the gains of the “Orange Revolution”, so that Ukraine will be transformed in the near future to a more open, transparent and democratic state and society (Wojciech, 2004, p. 4).

Ukraine should also make use of the political window of opportunity that exists today. Ukraine should understand ENP as a long-term process and use the Action Plan as an instrument towards further cooperation and integration that could eventually pave the way to direct entry into the Union19. European integration and rapprochement with the EU are vitally important for Ukraine for two sets of reasons: i) movement towards Europe stimulates domestic reform -Ukraine needs European integration to succeed in its transition- and ii) comprises a central vector of Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation –in order to shape relations vis-à-vis Russia (Pavliuk, 2001, p.12). Conversely, as Wolczuk argues the mere prospect of membership, even though a necessary condition, is not sufficient to ensure the Europeanization of Ukraine (Wolczuk, 2004, p. 27). The “Russia factor”, as analyzed throughout the study, is crucial for Ukraine’s “way ahead” and differentiates it from the rest CEECs. From the previous chapters it has become clear that the geopolitical importance and the economic partnership are crucial for the overall structure

19 Key policy recommendations to the EU and Ukraine: Ukraine’s Future within the Newly

Enlarged Europe, p. 3

19

of the bilateral relations between the EU and Ukraine. Ukraine is not just another nation-state in the neighbourhood of the EU. The geostrategic position of this country and the mutual concern on regional security can serve as a platform for further engagement. Ukraine can absolutely add new elements in the European security agenda and improve the overall external influence of the Union worldwide. In the meantime, the EU should strengthen its bilateral trade relations mainly through Foreign Direct Investments and by providing all the necessary support for reforms in Ukraine. The benefits of Ukraine’s accession in the WTO would provide a clear impetus in the “wider Europe” and therefore the EU clearly needs to promote Ukraine’s orientation for integration into the global system. The EU needs to continue its “widening and deepening” process taking into account the “European interest” and, at the same time, the Member State’s interests. Thus the strategy towards Ukraine is interconnected with the current evolutions within the Union and the problematic situation that reemerge at various times. Nevertheless, the EU has a window of opportunity in the aftermath of the “Orange Revolution” and it seems that by insisting on the ENP platform may squander it. The EU cannot afford to lose this unique prospect that emerged in its “near abroad”, as there is almost nothing to lose and everything to gain from engaging with Ukraine.

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–Olexander Razumkov