WWI WAR GUILT EVIDENCE (Serbia)

Primary Document

Excerpt from “Program of The Narodna Odbrana” (1911) Secondary Source

“Serbian Nationalism and the Great War” by John Etty

Excerpt from Program of The Narodna Odbrana (1911) (The Black Hand)

A secret, patriotic society, the Narodna Odbrana or 'Defense of the People' was founded in Serbia around 1908. Its intent was to strengthen a spirit of nationalism. The following is an excerpt from a description of the society's program published by the Central Committee of the Narodna Odbrana Society.

The annexation [of Bosnia and Herzegovina] was only one of the blows which the enemies of Serbia have aimed at this land. Many blows preceded it, and many will follow it. Work and preparation are necessary so that a new attack may not find Serbia equally unprepared. The object assigned to the work to be done by the people of every class is the preparation for war in all forms of national work, corresponding to the requirements of the present day. This is to be effected through strengthening of the national consciousness, bodily exercises, increase of material and bodily well-being, cultural improvements, etc. A new blow, like that of the annexation, must be met by a new Serbia, in which every Serbian, from child to greybeard, is a rifleman. The old Turks of the South gradually disappear and only a part of our people suffer under their rule. But new Turks come from the North, more fearful and dangerous than the old; stronger in civilization and more advanced economically, our northern enemies come against us. They want to take our freedom and our language from us and to crush us. We can already feel the presages of the struggle which approaches in that quarter. The Serbian people are faced by the question 'to be or not to be?' The Narodna Odbrana does not doubt that in the fight against the enemies with whom we stand face to face, our people will provide a succession of heroes. However, the Narodna Odbrana is not content with this, for it regards the so-called peaceful present-day conditions as war, and demands heroes, too, for this struggle of today which we are carrying on in Serbia and beyond the frontier. In using the word 'people' the Narodna Odbrana means our whole people, not only those in Serbia. It is hoped that the work done by it in Serbia will spur the brothers outside Serbia to take a more energetic share in the work of private initiative, so that the new present-day movement for the creation of a powerful Serbian Narodna Odbrana will go forward in unison in all Serbian territories. The Narodna Odbrana proclaims to the people that Austria is our first and greatest enemy. Just as once the Turks attacked us from the south, so Austria attacks us today from the north. If the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of fighting Austria, she preaches a sacred truth of our national position. For the sake of bread and room, for the sake of the fundamental essentials of culture and trade, the freeing of the conquered Serbian territories and their union with Serbia is necessary to gentlemen, tradesmen, and peasants alike.

THE UNPREDICTABLE PAST

SERBIAN NATIONALISMAND THE GREAT WAR

John Etty questionswhether Serb nationalism

was an irresistible forcethat helped unleash the

First World War.

Historians tend lo blame national-ism for the [¿urupean ills whichled to the outbreak of tbe Great

War in 1914, Tbey arc able to cite manyexamples of German aggression, andcoyly quote Britisb sources to sbovv tbatnationahsm bad even managed to affectour own view of the world. But, tbeyassert, tbe hrand of nationalism wbicb[lid most to undermine international sta-bility by 1914 was Serbian, DoubtlessEmperor Franz Joseph of Austria-Hun-gary would have agreed. Yet was Serbnationalism really so significant?

The Growth of NationalIdentity

Serbian nationalism is, even today, pow-ered by the mytbologised sacrifice oí amedieval army. On 15th June 1389 atKosovo. 30,000 Serbs defended Serbia'sancient empire and were defeated by theOttoman ruler Murad I. Crucially, bow-ever, tbe Serb identity created by tbismemory is a negative one, defined bybatred of tbeir enemies. This kind ofnationalism was easily sustained tbrougb400 years of Turkish rule, Serhs' identitywas defined by religious, economic,social and cultural difference - not justdifferent from their Muslim overlordsbut also distinct from otber Christians,Serbian pig farmers grew rich as neigh-bouring Austria-Hungary expanded, butproximity bigbligbted divergencesbetween Catbolic Cbristianit\' and Ser-

Left; Serb resistance to Ottoman rule,

during a siege of Belgrade in 1456, It was

only in 1815 that Serbia acbieved

independence from the Ottomans.

hian Onbudoxy The Serbian OrthodoxChurch incubated an old Slavonic faitb,a language, an administrative system andan Archbishopric.

Inspired by poetry idealising tbeOrtbodox Serbian peasant lifestyle andglorifying the Battle of Kosovo, and bol-stered by Russian assistance, Serbiasecured independence from Turkey by1815. Under Milos Obrenovic, an armywas created, and the Serbian OrthodoxChurch regained independence. Serbia'sschool system taugbt Serbian literature,language and history. However, the for-mulation nf tbe 'Nacertanije' (Prü-gramme) by Ilija Garasanin (later Minis-ter of Internal Affairs) was the maindevelopment in Serbian nationalism.Though concerned about upsettingthem, tbis secret document identifiedTurkey and Austria-Hungar}" as obstaclesto Serbian greatness and detailed, inorder of ease of acquisition, the annexa-tion i»f all Serhian-speaking regions.Altbougb implementation was delayed

by domestic disruption, sucb expansion-ist aspirations were significant, liehirc1890, Nikolai Pasic (future Prime Minis-ter) referred to tbe Nacertanije \vben beexplained 'tbe Serbs strive lor tbe unili-cation of all Serb tribes on tbe basis ottradition, meniorv' and the bistorica! pastof the Serb race."

Balkan Warfare

Pan-Slavism strengthened Serbiannationalism. After bumilialing defeat inthe Crimean War, Russian benevolentsocieties sent money and good wishes toBalkan Slavs, and dreamed of restoringConstantinople as capital of an Ortbo-dox empire. Membersbip of tbis Slavicbrotberbuod inspired (occasionally ill-founded) confidence. Despite an army ol90,000 men by 1871, Serbian militaryprowess was insufficient to acbieve herrather less modest foreign policy aims.After uprisings in Bosnia-Herzegovina,Serbia declared war on Turkey in July1876. imagining tbat a wider revoltwould ensue, but (even assisted by 700Russian volunteer officers) sbe failed todefeat Turkey. Tbe Great Powers' atten-tion was thus drawn to the EasternQuestion, and Serbia found bersclf (geo-grapbically, at least, since she wasexcluded from tbe subsequent Congressof Berlin) central to European diploma-cy. More importantly. Austria-Hungaryand Russia botb recognised Serbia'saggression and modified tbeir policies.

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THE UNPREDICTABLE PAST

By tbe time Russia declared war onTurkey in April 1877 it had transferredits hopes for Balkan influence to Bulgar-ia, which was enlarged by the Treaty ofSan Stefano.

Austria's new policy towards Serbiawas ambiguous at first. Serbian indepen-dence, territorial gains from theOttoman Empire after the Congress ofBerlin, and its elevation from a principal-ity to a kingdom under Milan Obrenovicin 1882, were negated by inereased Aus-trian influence in the Balkans. An Austri-an contractor began building railwaylinks between Belgrade and Austria, andbilateral trade agreements were signed.Despite Serbia's protests, hy I9Ü5 84 percent of Serbian exports were going toAustria-Hungary. Control of Bosnia-Herzegovina would have given Serbiasignificantly increased territory and anAdriatic coastline, but tbe Congress ofBerlin banded administration and mili-tary occupation rights to Austria-Hun-gary, To compensate, in 1881 Austria-Hungary sanctioned Serbian expansionto the soutb-west on condition that it didnot agitate among the Habshurg Serbs.Thus, in November 1885, concernedabout Bulgaria's unification with EasternRiimclia (and aware tbat Russia, angry« itb Bulgaria's Prince Alexander, wouldnot figbt in defence). Serbia declared«•ar on Bulgaria. Tbis attempt to exploitthe situation backfired on Serbia. Russiaremained neutral, but tbe war onlyended when Austria-Hungarv' threatenedto inter\ene to stop Bulgarian expansion.

I n this imperialist age, Serbiannationalists were distracted by tbed)'nastic drama at bome. AlexanderObrenovic (crowned 1889) and his mar-riage to Queen Draga, his mother's ser-vant, became an embarrassment lor Ser-bia, Wbat fatally worsened tbe situation,as Obrenovic sbifted towards Austria-Hungary, was bis proposed military fund-ing cut. In June 1903 the royal couplewere cornered in their bedroom andmurdered by nationalist army officers ledby Dragutin Dimitrijevic, Tbe reign ofSerbia's new king, Peter Karadjordjevic,brought further deterioration of Ottomancontrol, massive army investment and apro-Bussian stance. However, Russianprotection did immediately allow abraver Serbian foreign policy since Rus-sia, wbose foreign policy priorities layeastwards, avoided Balkan conflict.

Serbia could not postpone her aims,

Right: The Archduke Franz Ferdinand

meets local dignitaries on 28 June 1914, a

fateful day in European history.

bowever. and sougbt independence fromAustria-Hungary, Tbe 1904 Treaty ofSofia, witb Bulgaria, formed an anti-Aus-trian Balkan customs union. Austria-Hungary reacted angrily to Serbia'sattempts to break tbeir trading relation-sbip, imposing an embargo v\bicb lastedfor six years and became known as tbe'Pig War", since pork uas Serbia's mainexport. Austria, expecting quick victory,undoubtedly wanted to crusb Serbianeconomic independence and boped for awider reduction of Serbian influence.but tbe Pig War benefited Serhia. Herfarmers found new markets and thearmy purchased more reliable Frencbheavy artillery rather than y\ustro-Hun-garian Skoda guns. By 1911, only 30 percent of Serbian exports went to Austria-f-lungary, Austrian attitudes bardenedand. with Russia introverted after 1905,tbe Dual Monarcby sougbt to reduceSerbian strength.

Self-styled as a unifying force forBalkan nationalism, Serbia had assistedMacedonian freedom-fighters, but in1908 Austria-Hungary derailed Serbianexpansion plans by annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina, Although the timing wasdetermined by the Young Turk revolutionand Russian weakness, removing apotential Serbian ally was also an impor-tant motivation. Austria actually consid-ered waging a pre-emptive war againstSerbia after the annexation. Ironically,Archduke Franz Ferdinand disapprovedand Serbia escaped baving learned a cru-cial lesson.

The Balkan states, realising that theCreat Powers were unwilling to involvethemselves in the Eastern Question, per-ceived their individual weakness aftertbe annexation crisis, Tbis understand-ing, coupled witb nationalistic fury attbe outrage committed against fellowSlavs, bad significant effects. Firstnationalist groups - like NarodnaOdbrana {National Defence) and Ujed-injenje ili Smrt (Unification or Deatb -created by Dimitrijevic) were formed inBosnia and Serbia. Motivated hy batredof Austria-Hungary, these groups trainedspies, agitated ior reform and circulatedanti-Austrian propaganda. Secondly, Serbiaand Bulgaria agreed to attack Turkey ForSerbia, tbis was an opportunity for belated

revenge for tbe Battle of Kosovo. Whenltal\' occupied Tripoli in late summer1911 and Turkey declared war inSeptember (Europe was again distracted hyMorocco), Serbia and Bulgaria actedagainst Turkey, Tbey signed a treaty inMarcb 1912, with Russia's Tsar NicholasII arbitrating. Montenegro and Creecejoined two days before war was declaredin October 1912, Tbc Balkan Leaguerapidly liberated Macedonia and mucb ofTbrace in a savage war, pusbing Turkeyback as far as Adrianople. before dividingMacedonia unequally between them.

Towards Armageddon

The Treaty of London, May 1913, leftproblems unresolved, Serhia was againdenied an Adriatic coastline hy Austria-Hungary's diplomacy, and an indepen-dent Albania was created. Nacertanijeaims thwarted, Serbia looked soutb-eastand came into conflict witb Bulgariaover tbe remaining spoils. Tbe BalkanLeague bad been formed hastily and thedivision of captured Turkish territory hadnot been agreed. Wbile Bulgarian troopshore tbe brunt of tbe fighting. Serbiaand Greece occupied much of the con-quered land. Turkey encouraged dis-agreement, and the Second Balkan Warbroke out in Jiuie 1913 when Bulgariaattacked Serbia before berself beingdefeated hy tbe unlikely coalition ofCreece, Serhia, Turkey and Romania.

The Balkan Wars saw Serbia increasein size by 82 per cent and 1.5 millionnew Slavs. Her army fought impressively,and now almost justified the gloriousmemory of 1389. The critical conse-quence of these wars was the effect onSerb-Habsburg relations. Angered byAustrian intervention at tbe London

HISTORY REVIIW M\M H 2OO'> 41

THE UNPREDICTABLE PAST

negotiations and emboldened by vietoryover the old enemy, Serbia hecameinereasingly aggressive. The achievementof a Greater Serhia invohcd liberatingthe nine million Serbs, Croats andSlovenes of tbe .Austria-HungarianEmpire. Serh nationalists laimchctl acampaign for the acquisition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serhs within .Austria-I lungar\' hegan agitating. Unsurprisingly,.•\iistria-Hungar\'s attitude changed aher191.-Î. Serbia bad long been an irritation,but the hoost of Serbia's recent vietoriesled Austria again to consider preventivewar. Serbia's army now numbered 400,000regulars and reservists, an e.xpansion tbatupset the assumptions of the SehlieffenPlan, so Kaiser Wilhelm 11 reassured Aus-tria-Hungar)'of German support.

Crushing Serbia was not now as sim-ple as Wilhelm imagined, however. Rus-sias army reforms outlined a 40 per centmanpower increase by 1912, and herrecovery from the humiliations of 1905;ind 1908 made ber a dangerous enemysince she was now eager to defend herSlav ally. The international repercussionsfrom tbe next Balkan war bad becomeimmense. Sueb a eonflict migbt baveheen avoided, however, but for a muchless obvious complication.

In 1911 Dragutin Dimitrijevie re-formed Ujedinjenje ili Smrt as the 'Black1 land . Its members, regicidal army col-leagues from 1903, mistrusted NikolaiPasic and parliamentary government.More sinister than their predecessors ortheir Bosnian coimtcrparts, tbe BlackI land emhe/yled Serbian army funds, tak-ing advantage of Dimitrijevic's position asarmy Intelligenee ehief to supply informa-tion and weapons to Serh, Croat andBosnian students inside Austria-Hungaiy Itwas the Black Hand who guidetl GavrilloFrincip and his accomplices towards theirtarget in Sarajevo in June 1914.

The Events of 1914

None of the Bosnian-Serh assassinscited Slav nationalism as a motive lor theassassination of Archduke Franz Ferdi-nand - only unhappiness with the I lahs-hurgs. Yet dedicated Serbian nationalistslike Dimitrijevie bad more sopbisticatedmotives. Their popularity among Bosnianstudents depended upon tbe negativeaspects of Austrian occupation, however,and it would have dealt a severe hlow to

hopes for a Greater Serbia if Austriancontrol bad grown more sympathetic.The Archduke, Emperor I ranz Joseph'snephev\; advocated 'trialisni". He intend-ed to dilute the inlluence of the 1 lungar-ian element hy adding a Slavic compo-nent to create a Triple Monarchy.Clearly, sueh a reorganisation would ren-der Serbia's claim to be liberating theSla\'s from the oppressi\e rule of theAustro-Hungarian Empire redundant.

Wben Franz Ferdinand was shot hyGavrillo Princip on 2Stb June 1914, Aus-tria-Hungary seized the opportunity topunish Serbia. Austrias July 23rd ultima-tum was deliherately unpalatahle. Aus-tria-Hungar)' knew nothing ol tbe BlaekHand and did not establisb tbe assassins'guilt. The 4H-hour time limit was inten-tiimally too short to allow discussion,and Austria was more concerned withseeuring a German 'hiank cheque' thanmourning its heir. Serbia was no moreconcerned to avoid war, however. Ser-bia's army mobilised even before thereply to the ultimatum was completed.

rbe assassination crisis was justanotber incident involving Austria-Hun-gar}' and Serbia. The stakes were higherthis time, bowever. Glimhdown wasunimaginable for Serbia. Thougb he onlyrejeeted one of tbe terms, Nikolai Pasicdid not contemplate agreeing unre-servedly once he reeeived Russian back-ing. Tbe bumiliation would have undoneall tbe progress towards the goals of tbeNaeertanije achieved since 1903. Austriasougbt the excuse to punish Serbia forcountless impudences and eould notigntire the assassination of the heir.More important, Austria needed to proveher Great Power credentials hy dealingdecisively with Serbia. Crucially, bowev-er, defeat hy Serhia in 1914 would desta-bilise the empire. Slav nationalism trou-bled Austria-Hungary and the need forvietor\' over Serbia superseded otherconcerns. The potential gains blindedhoth countries to tbe possible effects oftheir tlispute. Yet neither side wanted aworld war. Tbe First World War beganbecause in so obsessively pursuing theaim of crushing Serbia, Austria fatallymisinterpreted Germany's intentions.Gavrillo Princip was wracked witb guiltat the knowledge of tbe sullcring whichthe assassination of Franz Ferdinandunleashed. He comforted himself withthe helief that the war would have bro-ken out anyway. He was right.

Timeline

1389 15 JuneThe Battle of Kosovo

1804 The Serbian revolution,

1814-15 Serbia defeats the OttomanEmpire and becomes anindependent Prineipalily witha parliament and a Constitution

1844 Uija Garasanin writes hisNaeertanije Programme

1876 Serhia is defeated by theOttoman Empire

1877-78 Russo-Turkish War

1878 Treaty of San Stefano

Congress of Berlin

1882 Kingdom of Serbia isproclaimed under King MilanObre no vie

1885 Serbia is defeated by Bulgaria

1903 King and Queen of Serbiamurdered hy army off'ieers,Peter Karadjordjex ic assumespower

1906 The Pig War

1908 Austria-I Iungar)' annexedBosnia-Fler/egovina

1911 Formation of tbe Black Hand

1912-13 First and Second Balkan Wars

1914 28tb JuneAssassination of ArchdukeFranz Ferdinand by aBosnian-Serb in Sarajevo

23rd JulyAustrian Ultimatum

28tb JulyAustria declared war on Serbia

1 " LI r I 11 c H V a cl i II g

\

M. Glenny, TTie Balkans (Granta, 2000}

H.W Koch (ed). The Origins of the

First World War (Macmillan, 1984)

TJudah, The Serbs (Yale Nota Bene,

2000)

J. joli, Europe Since 1870 (Penguin,

1990)

A.J. RTaylor, The Struggle for Mastery

in Europe (Oxford, 1971)

N. Ferguson. /9/4:Why the world

went to war (Penguin. 2005) ^m

John Etty teaches History at Caistor

Grammar School in Lincolnshire.

42 MARCH 2009 HISTORY REVIEW