Document of The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: 26173

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(CPL-35140; SCL-3514A; SCPD-3514S)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 30 MILLION

TO THE

BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA

FOR A

JUDICIAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

June 28, 2003

Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and B.R. of Venezuela Country Management UnitPoverty Reduction and Economic Management, Sector Management UnitLatin America and the Caribbean Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 27, 2003)

Currency Unit = Bolivares (Bs) Bs 1598 = US$ 1.00

US$ 0.00063 = Bs 1.00

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAS Country Assistance StrategyCOPP Organic Code for Criminal ProcedureD.E.M. Dirección Ejecutiva de la MagistraturaICR Implementation Completion ReportICT Information and Communication TechnologyIT Information TechnologyIESA Institute of Advanced Administration Studies JCJURIS 2000

Judicial CouncilIntegrated Case Management System Software

LCR Latin American and the Caribbean RegionLOPNA Law for the Protection of Children and AdolescentsMOP Memorandum of the PresidentNGO Non-Governmental OrganizationOED Operations Evaluation DepartmentPCU Project Coordination UnitQAG Quality Assurance Group

SAR Staff Appraisal ReportSIGECOFTSJ

Intergrated Financial Management SystemSupreme Tribunal of Justice

Vice President: David de FerrantiCountry Manager/Director: Marcelo Giugale

Sector Director: Sector Manager:

Ernesto May Ronald E. Myers

Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Waleed Haider Malik

VENEZUELAJUDICIAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 24. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 45. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 156. Sustainability 167. Bank and Borrower Performance 178. Lessons Learned 199. Partner Comments 2010. Additional Information 22Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 24Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 30Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 32Annex 4. Bank Inputs 33Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 35Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 36Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 37Annex 8. List of Contributors 38

Project ID: P008233 Project Name: VE JUD.INFRA DEVTeam Leader: Waleed Haider Malik TL Unit: LCSPSICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 30, 2003

1. Project Data

Name: VE JUD.INFRA DEV L/C/TF Number: CPL-35140; SCL-3514A; SCPD-3514S

Country/Department: VENEZUELA Region: Latin America and Caribbean Region

Sector/subsector: Law and justice (100%)Theme: Judicial and other dispute resolution mechanisms (P); Legal

institutions for a market economy (P); Access to law and justice (P)

KEY DATESOriginal Revised/Actual

PCD: 10/04/1991 Effective: 03/30/1994 03/30/1994Appraisal: 03/27/1992 MTR:Approval: 08/06/1992 Closing: 12/30/1997 10/31/2002

Borrower/Implementing Agency: BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA /JUDICIAL COUNCIL/DIRECCION EJECUTIVA DE LA MAGISTRATURA OF THE SUPREME TRIBUNAL OF JUSTICE

Other Partners:

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: David de Ferranti Shahid HussainCountry Director: Marcelo Giugale Armeane ChoksiSector Manager: Ronald E. Myers Shahid A. ChaudhryTeam Leader at ICR: Waleed H. Malik Donald R. WinklerICR Primary Author: Hermann Nissenbaum;

Alexandra Habershon

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: S

Sustainability: L

Institutional Development Impact: SU

Bank Performance: S

Borrower Performance: S

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry:

Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:The Judicial Infrastructure Project derived from Government desires for remedying deficiencies in Venezuela’s judicial system. These centered around the need to make the Judiciary more efficient, effective and transparent. When the Project was designed, the judicial system suffered from inefficient and cumbersome management and procedures, case delays, low public credibility and appearances of impropriety and political influence. Its inefficient court administration was reflected in archaic procedures, inadequate control mechanisms, duplication of tasks, poor records management, and weak administrative and logistical support to the judges. Also, inadequate judicial statistics failed to give an accurate picture of the system's problems, let alone enable the introduction of quality control and effective planning. The courts depended on dilapidated facilities, majority of which were rented, an impediment to investment in improvements, many lacking even the most rudimentary equipment and service facilities, without standardized procedures and adequate internal networks or communication. The judiciary also lacked an integral vision of itself as a system and as a service provider. Therefore, in line with the CAS' goals, and to improve the enabling environment for national development, the Government and the Bank agreed to collaborate in pursuing ways of achieving improved efficiency in the allocation of resources within the Judiciary, increased courtroom productivity and efficiency, and reduced private sector costs of dispute resolution.

The Project accordingly was aimed at improving the performance of the judiciary by upgrading its administration and infrastructure, improving case processing and court management, and strengthening the capacity and capabilities of judicial operators (including public defenders) and judges through better sustained training.

3.2 Revised Objective:Project activities have been refined during implementation, in consultation with judges, judicial staff, and NGOs.

3.3 Original Components:The components of the Project included:

-Strengthen Administration of the Judicial System; -Courtroom Administration;-Judicial Training;-Physical Infrastructure.

3.4 Revised Components:None

3.5 Quality at Entry:Quality at entry was not fully satisfactory. This was evident from the fact that legislature approval took about two years after Bank approval. This was also most evident and important in the absence of adequate institutional machinery in the Council for carrying out the Project, and the Council's insufficient preparation for the task. Nor was there a suitable plan ready for the activities to be conducted. To its credit, that apparently was genuine, it shared Government/Bank concern with the fundamental sector problems. However, there is very little evidence of precise, well formulated plans to overcome these, along with firm, authoritative Government commitment for their implementation. Nor do the Project plans reflect any consideration of the concerns or possible involvement of the Venezuelan civil society, despite its long standing, pronounced criticisms of the judicial system. The design of the Project was weak in these

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respects. As one consequence, they led to the deferral of real, meaningful activity until about three years after Loan approval. To be precise, this delay was at least partly attributable to complex, unpredictable country difficulties at the time. As one effect, none of the persons in the Perez administration with whom the Project idea and arrangements were agreed upon, were in office by the time it came to launch it. However, it is judged that, because of insufficient Government readiness for that launch, the tardy and ineffectual start of Project operations probably would have occurred even without these country problems.

These deficiencies are notable on several accounts:

-The SAR indicated that the Project design stemmed from lessons learned from public sector management Projects. It referred to lessons "derived from OED assessments of free-standing technical assistance in Africa and LAC Technical Department evaluations of recently completed public sector management Projects in Chile and Peru." Despite these, however, the Project appears to have been begun on an exceedingly thin basis. In particular as indicated above, the record of the first several years of virtual absence of regional and country knowledge indicates the lack of a satisfactory assessment of the Borrower's capabilities for suitable administration and supervision of development activities.

-The absence of that assessment is particularly striking in view of the circumstances at the time of the Project's creation. Venezuela was declared re-eligible for borrowing from the Bank only somewhat more than five years before the Loan was approved. This followed a 14-year hiatus in lending. Thereafter, except for one relatively open ended pre-investment loan, the Government's renewed experience with the Bank largely was in the form of non-Project assistance. In addition, the Bank fully understood that the public sector institutions were judged to be quite weak, especially in the judicial sector. The Bank also appreciated that its own knowledge about the Venezuelan public sector institutions was slender, as well as somewhat outdated.

- It has been noted that the Project was developed based on previous work done by the Borrower's agencies, such as the Presidential Commission for Reform of the State (COPRE) which provided useful diagnostic information, and on other preparation reports. The overall information base appears to have been limited which affected start up and caused difficulties. There may have been extenuating reasons for moving forward without ample information base, especially considering that President's Memorandum (MOP) labeled it as "the first instance of Bank support for judicial reforms."

- Perhaps because of the resulting information gap, the MOP placed much weight on physical infrastructure improvements. This stress is evident in the assignment of over 42% of estimated Project costs to this component, as well as the Project's title. It was true that the Council's many far flung offices were inefficient and of very poor quality. However, there was an appreciation that institutional, political, and sectoral elements were not fully addressed. These factors indicate that there were obstacles to a fully satisfactory Project preparation. There should have been more extensive, careful planning done to produce far more detailed goal-setting and blueprinting of their envisaged accomplishment. To be sure, this shortfall was, in effect, recognized at the outset. The MOP called for a two-stage Project implementation scheme. Its first two years were to consist of the design of administrative reform and training, demonstration pilots for courtroom automation, courtroom rehabilitation, and studies to prepare a second stage. These were to be followed by a review and a three-year second stage. In point of fact, these provisions turned out to ultimately prepare the way for successful actions and accomplishments. However, this process is judged to have been longer and more costly than might have been needed with the design of a better footing to begin with.

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4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: There were divergences from the schedule of Project activities, with delays occurring at different stages of implementation. Initial difficulties included a lack of adequate data about the Council's institutional conditions, conflicts in reaching a consensus about the scope and design of activities, delays in opening the Special Account, and the weak capacity of the implementing agency. Implementation activities only began in earnest in June 1995 (almost three years after the Loan approval).

Learning from starting difficulties and insights from the NGO Report "Halfway to Reform - the Wold Bank and the Venezuelan Justice System", prepared by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, an innovative participatory process was introduced in the Project, to consult the judiciary on its needs and modernization priorities. In the participatory assessment, 10 percent of the members of the lower court judiciary took part in representing different geographical regions, court levels, jurisdictions, and gender profile. By gender, there were about 51 percent women; by geographic location, all 22 states were represented; by level of court, about 32 percent were superior court judges, 42 percent were first instance court judges, about 26 percent were municipal or parochial court judges; by type of jurisdiction, about 29 percent were penal judges, about 64 percent were civil judges, and the rest were administrative or other judges. In addition to the judges of the lower courts, most Supreme Court Justices, public defenders, executive branch officials, lawyers, NGOs and business representatives took part in the exercise.

Some of the Main Changes in the Judicial Branch in the Last Few Years

Title V of the 1999 Constitution establishes an assembly of agencies serving judicial functions: the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ), other courts, the Public Ministry, the Public Defender, and investigative and auxiliary agencies, including the penitentiary system. Other parts of the system of justice aim at alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Justices of peace, arbitration, mediation, and conciliation are promoted by the state without prejudice to the formal activities. The administration of justice thus is not a monopoly of the state. Authorities of the indigenous towns can use courts with judicial rules and procedure based on ancestral traditions. In fact, the government is training community-based justices of the peace, promoting measures for dispute settlements in indigenous communities, and has eliminating court fees. The judicial system is to receive a minimum of 2 percent allocation of the national budget. The Constitution also brought about the merging of institutional structures, decentralization of functions, and creation of new institutions. The former Supreme Court of Justice has been reorganized as the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, TSJ, with three additional chambers. Also, the TSJ now administers the lower courts through its Direccion Ejecutiva de la Magistratura (D.E.M.). To increase the participatory and transparent nature of judge selection, open national competitions are now required. These have been held in three states and others are in progress. There is an increased emphasis on professional development and an independent school has been set up to promote the judicial profession. The new Constitution also permits the creation of “judicial circuits” and improvements in the legal processes regarding civil, labor, and mercantile issues, in order to make those processes more public, oral, and quicker. Two new laws include a new criminal procedure code (COPP) and one for the protection of children and adolescents (LOPNA). The Judicial Branch consists of TSJ, other courts, Administrative Office (DEM) and the Public Defender, the Inspector General of Courts and the Judicial School. The TSJ is the highest tribunal in the nation and the director of the judicial branch. It is made up of the Plenary, Constitutional, Political/Administrative, Electoral, Civil, Criminal, and Social Chambers. D.E.M. is the administrative arm of the TSJ. It has the task of administering the public resources to support the lower judicial agencies. Its structure includes provisions for criminal and civil judicial circuits. Judges are promoted by public mechanisms intended to ensure their suitability. They are nominated by a TSJ commission, selected by citizen representatives, and appointed by the TSJ. Tribunals of the Judiciary Discipline are pending, but are not yet established. Temporarily, the judicial discipline process is being managed by the Inspector General of the courts and a commission on Judicial Branch restructuring.

Thereafter, Project implementation progressed satisfactorily, more or less, but activities were temporarily halted due to broad sectoral changes wrought by the new Constitution of 1999. Around the same time, a

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new Criminal Code with oral procedures and other far-reaching changes was introduced. The new Constitution eliminated the Council and installed the Supreme Court, (now the Supreme Tribunal), as the rector institution of the Judiciary through the Executive Directorate of the Judiciary - D.E.M. (Dirección Ejecutiva de la Magistratura) (see Box above). After a somewhat strained transition period, the Supreme Tribunal through D.E.M., became the principal implementing agency and Project activities were fully resumed and progressed apace. Loan extensions until October 31, 2002 were required to fully install the pilot court systems and related changes, and later to replicate these improvements, which were launched in Barquisimeto and Barcelona.

4.2 Outputs by components:Component A. Strengthen Administration of the Judicial Council (now D.E.M.)

Satisfactory. The Judicial Council was created in 1961 as an autonomous entity responsible for the administrative and disciplinary governance of the Judiciary Branch, with jurisdictional matters remaining under the purview of the Supreme Court. During Project design, the need to focus on its institutional capabilities for overcoming organizational and operational shortcomings of justice administration was a clear priority. The Council was then highly bureaucratic and judged to be politicized. It suffered from an overly centralized decision-making process and a large and informal organizational structure. There was little or no economy of scale in its use of resources and workload distribution. The Council was operating in rented facilities in a state of physical decay, with insufficient space for its operational needs. It lacked any modern ICT equipment, was without operational manuals, and the majority of its staff lacked professional qualifications or training. The Council’s dependence on the Executive Branch for budget allocations, which were largely insufficient, deprived the Judiciary of a good measure of desirable autonomy. Its weaknesses hampered the Council’s ability to promote the efficacy of the courts and guarantee the stability and independence of the judges. Overall thus, the Council was perceived by judges and other judicial operators as remote and ineffectual.

As noted, due to the thin information base of Project preparation, it was agreed to first have consultants diagnose the problems underlying the deficiencies in judicial administration and to design a remedial approach. The assessment resulted in the drafting of an Integrated Plan for the Improvement of Justice Administration with two key priorities: "normative centralization" (development of policies, norms, administrative procedures, and operational manuals by the central office for central and regional office level), and "operational de-concentration" (application of policies, norms, administrative procedures and operational manuals at the regional office level under the supervision, managment, and control of the central office). To that end, the decentralization and delegation of the Council’s functions were brought into effect with the creation of regional administrative directorates located in the courthouses of each State, providing services for judges locally. Also, a strategic IT plan and an organizational and management model were developed for the central and regional re-engineering of the Council. The number of its personnel was reduced and new Directorates were structured according to the hierarchy of functions established by the new model, which were staffed with qualified personnel. A new office was acquired for court administration, which was provided with Intranet, facilities and departments of budget and finance, human resources, planning and institutional development, and the required office services were brought under one roof. These new facilities with modern ICT tools and trained staff were inaugurated October 28, 1998. At this occasion, the Government lauded Bank support for helping improve judicial administration and gave a plaque of recognition. Also, in the last two years, an integrated financial management system (SIGECOF) was implemented at the central and regional office levels. The judiciary also published annual reports over the last years with data and statistics about court operations. Annual work plans were institutionalized as part of the budget planning process. A citizen participation office was also set up. Under this component, part of studies resulted in court fee reform, as court fees were discontinued with a

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significant impact on low income users.

When the new Constitution came into effect, it produced numerous legal reforms and new instruments that significantly altered the judicial landscape. A main one concerned the need to separate the administrative and disciplinary functions of judicial governance—identified as a priority in early stakeholder consultations and means of resolving the ongoing power struggle between the Council and the Supreme Court. This was responsible for the elimination of the Council and the creation of the Executive Directorate of the Judiciary (Dirección Ejecutiva de la Magistratura) instead. The D.E.M., under the aegis of the new Supreme Tribunal of Justice became responsible for the administration of the Judiciary Branch, although the ultimate authority as well as responsibility for disciplinary matters remained with the Tribunal. The Project’s relationship to these changes was a symbiotic one.

The Project acted in some cases as a catalyst for change, and in other cases, it responded to the new conditions created by these changes. The new Organic Code for Criminal Procedure (COPP), for instance, which introduced oral hearings for criminal cases, required new organizational, infrastructure, and human resources training for the courts to properly meet the procedural requirements of the Code. The outcomes of the Judicial Council reorganization efforts refer to issues as diverse as: a new normative framework to regulate D.E.M., more professional personnel, more modern facilities, more decentralized system, automated payroll distribution, reducing personnel in accordance to new qualifications criteria (about 150 staff) and reducing organizational hierarchies, etc. Under the same reorganization attempt, an organizational study for the re-engineering of the JC was completed; the organizational and management model for the JC was designed, developed and implemented; a streamlined Office of Institutional Development was created; a job description manual and a human resources manual were created; and Regional Administrative Offices were created to de-concentrate JC functions.

The D.E.M.-TSJ thus inherited responsibility for the Project and as the new administrative support agency of the Judiciary Branch, it has since been responsible, in conjunction with the Supreme Tribunal, for the development of the Judiciary’s strategic, operational, and budgetary plans. The new Constitution, and the public sector upheaval that accompanied it, brought most Project activities to a halt until 2001, necessitating extension to the Loan Agreement until 2002.

In spite of the lack of a concerted plan at outset, as well as internal and inter-institutional strife regarding the scope and priorities of the Project in its development phase, an often precarious political situation and a new Constitution that temporarily halted activities mid stream, Project accomplishments have achieved substantial changes that provide a basis for continued improvements in judicial administration. The Government’s constitutional, policy and institutional changes have also provided footing for improved judicial governance. The consolidation of judicial governance responsibilities within the Supreme Tribunal, formerly at the Judicial Council, and the de-concentration of many regional governance functions have strengthened the autonomy and effectiveness of justice administration. The Project ultimately exceeded initial goals by bringing into effect improvements in administration across the whole Judicial Branch and not solely at the Judicial Council. Overall, these changes provide some potential for strengthening Venezuela’s capacity to provide effective justice services.

The Project has brought about far-reaching changes in strengthening and streamlining judicial governance, and this record shows a mixed but clearly positive scorecard of accomplishments over the total Project period (For example, user satisfaction survey with services provided by DEM, see graph below). However, the institutional capabilities of the Judiciary Branch still fall short of the need to develop national judicial policies effectively. The respective roles and competencies of the Supreme Tribunal and the D.E.M. still need to be clarified. The involvement of judges in the development of institutional and modernization plans

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needs to be given greater impetus. Although considerable improved, the processing of judicial statistics still requires strengthening. Future and ongoing modernization efforts would benefit from leveraging current achievements and consolidating Project activities for the strengthening of judicial governance. Areas of institutional coordination, communication, statistics and regional support services also need to be strengthened further.

W h e n b e i n g a t t e n d e d , h o w f a s t w e r e y o u s e r v e d ?

Very s lowly5 %

Slowly9 %

Quick ly4 9 %

Very qu ick ly3 7 %

Quick l y Very qu ick ly Slowly Very s low ly

Component B. Modernization of Courtroom Administration

Highly Satisfactory. The Project achieved highly commendable strides in improving the structure, management and delivery of judicial services with the successful implementation and replication of a new organizational model for judicial circuits. This was supported by the installation of an integrated case management system software (Juris 2000) in pilot courts and elsewhere. The new Model and the automated system that supports it have also helped in gaining some ground towards redeeming the image of the judiciary with the public by enhancing the accessibility, efficiency and transparency of services at these locations. This component exceeded initial expectations as regards the scope and impact of the activities completed.

This component was the last to be implemented, and so deviated from the original plan in order to focus first on the Council headquarters in Caracas. This proved to be advisable in order to ensure effectiveness in the subsequent testing and validating of the pilot courts and the new organizational model and integrated case management system. These were delayed at first over difficulties in reaching consensus about the conceptual framework behind the new organizational model for the courts. This related in particular to the relationship between the automation of procedures through ICT systems and the optimal organizational structure that the courts should adopt under the new model. It was not until May 1998 that an international consulting firm was hired under the Project to undertake the design and implementation of the organizational model and integrated case management system in the pilot courts of Barcelona and Barquisimeto (Lara and Anzoátegui States). The ultimate success attained at the top governance levels was instrumental in defining and implementing the pilot in two cities. It led also to the replication of the pilot court model to five additional criminal circuits and three civil circuits, a replication which had not initially been forecast for the Project. Although also not initially foreseen in the Project design, the Juris 2000 Automated Case Management System was also successfully implemented nationally in several criminal

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courts, another salient success of this component.

The organization of lower courts into judicial circuits has brought substantial improvements in the administration and delivery of judicial services by advancing the decentralization of courthouse administration according to the category and jurisdiction of each circuit, and by promoting communication networks and an esprit de corps among judges in each circuit. The new courthouse management model, moreover, is a radical departure from the traditional conception of courthouse organization in Venezuela, and represents a ground breaking model for efficiency in the management, structure, and delivery of judicial services. Previously, the administrative tasks had been the responsibility of judges, who each required their own staff. By contrast, the new system permits the centralization and standardization of administrative procedures through automated archives, common support services, public information systems, and electronic document management, thus streamlining processes, promoting economies of scale, and enabling judges to focus on their jurisdictional tasks. Judicial document management is automated from start to finish, with unique case identification numbers, the automatic and random allocation of cases to the appropriate judge --an important advance in ensuring the integrity and transparency of the process-- standardized and electronic document formatting, and built-in electronic court calendars for the timely resolution of cases. (For more details on the Juris 2000 system, see Section 10. Additional Information; "Cambios Operativos en Tribunales Piloto, 1999;" and Venezuelan Justice in the Way of Excellenece (Video) rtsp://streaming2/LC/lcvenz.rm " noted in Annex 7.

Overall, activities under this component progressed successfully, even in spite of a hiatus after the constitutional changes of 1999. Other Project-financed activities include the design of a plan for the national replication of the pilot courts based on the evaluation of performance indicators for the pilot courts; the development of infrastructure guidelines for the design of new courthouses according to the requirements of the new organizational model and to ensure the standardization of justice administration services nationally; and the procurement of the requisite ICT equipment, where court houses had minimum court physical infrastructure conditions. Further, the courthouses of Caracas, La Asunción, and Barcelona were equipped with interactive multimedia modules for public access to information about justice services and court cases. Case management information is also available on the Internet through the Supreme Tribunal judicial portal (see www.tsj.gov.ve/).

Both the organizational model and the case management system are now fully operational in eight criminal circuits and three civil circuits, with significantly increased productivity and a reduction in the length of judicial procedures. In Barquisimeto, where the Model was first implemented and has been operational since 1999, all case backlogs have now been eliminated, and in Barcelona, they have been significantly reduced. The pilot courts now operate with fewer administrative staff, the duration of case processing has been reduced by almost 73 percent since 1998, and user surveys conducted since the implementation of the pilot courts rate a 65 percent improvement in the length of time for requests for information, and a 76 percent improvement in the length of time spent when visiting the courts, also since 1998. These figures are all the more significant given that the number of daily user consultations has doubled since implementation. Although the implementation of Juris 2000 in the other courts is more recent and the impact will become clear with time, D.E.M.'s figures currently available show that the length of procedures has been reduced by a 50 percent average in all courts operating with Juris 2000. For example in the pilot courts of Barquesimeto, average duration of criminal cases (procedimiento ordinario) in "tribunales de juicio" is about 60 days compared with about 275 days in Maracay operating without Juris 2000 system. The average duration of criminal case (procedimiento abreviado) in "tribunales de juicio" is about 22 days compared with about 135 days in Maracay operating without Juris 2000 system. In the case of civil matters see table below with some examples.

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According to a D.E.M. survey, 60 percent of users surveyed nationally rate the quality of services as "excellent", a significant improvement even after a relatively short time. Judges and judicial operators in these courts have also received training in the use of the new system, ICT skills and change management. As a result of the creation of the new judicial circuits for the criminal courts and the transition to oral procedures for criminal hearings due to the new Organic Criminal Procedural Code of 1999, the D.E.M. reports that the average time required for case processing has been reduced from between 500 and 900 days, to about 200 days. Public information offices in several courts have helped improve user alienation and perceptions.

This component is deemed to have been successful in attaining significant results, although there were some shortfalls and distinctly different achievements than those originally set out. The objective now is to continue replication of the model and the management system software nationally, particularly in the civil courts where transparency and effectiveness are an essential incentive for local and foreign investments and economic development. This process should be facilitated by the fact that judges in the new centers and in the criminal courts are acculturated to the new system. Additionally, the systems software for Juris 2000 is designed to accommodate up-scaling. D.E.M., therefore, believes that the replication of the software in all judicial circuits should not incur extra costs save for the training of judges and personnel in its use. The authorities also recognized that citizen outreach and information needs to be consistently encouraged and more efforts are needed to inform citizens of the improvements and build confidence, which takes time in society. Under this component, a ground breaking survey of the poor and disadvantaged was also carried out in partnership with the Supreme Tribunal and local NGOs. Its purpose was to assess their needs for access to justice.

Table: Case Processing in Civil Pilot Courts: Before and After Juris 2000* Barquisimeto Ciudad Bolivar Type of Case and Court/

Pilot Location Before After Before After Contrato de Arrendamiento en Tribunal de Municipio Ordinario (Lease Contract Dispute)

242 127 368 180

Cobro de Bolivares en Primera Instancia (Collection of Money Dispute)

790 237 744 242

Prestaciones Sociales en Primera Instancia (Social Benefits Dispute)

785 257 484 229

*Average duration of cases in number of days from filing to disposition. Source: Direcion Ejecutiva de la Magistratura, of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice

Component C. Institutional Strengthening of the Judicial School

Unsatisfactory. Before Project implementation, the Judicial School had been limited to conducting a judicial career entrance level course and a small number of sporadic follow-up courses without a regular training program or a concerted policy regarding the training of aspirant and practicing judges; a deficiency that in no small measure accounted for the quality of human resources in the Judiciary. The Project objective was to convert the Judicial School into a Professional Training and Human Resources Development Center for the Judiciary, to provide continuous training for judges and judicial support staff with an emphasis on quality and service management.

The implementation of this component was impeded by three factors: i) the absence of basic working tools and equipment in the courts at the outset of the Project, which resulted in the need to focus attention and resources on more pressing necessities; ii) the halting of Project activities in 1999, when this component was beginning to be implemented; and iii) a lack of institutional consensus regarding the model that the

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Judicial School should follow before and after the changes of 1999. Given the detrimental effect, which the inferior preparation of judicial operators has had on public confidence in the Judiciary and on the quality of judicial services, the Project’s failure to upgrade their preparation was a major disappointment.

A series of activities were first conducted towards achieving that goal, mainly the development of a strategic plan for the School. A National University was hired in 1998 to develop and implement an academic curriculum for the School, and the Institute of Advanced Administration Studies (IESA) was hired to conduct a study of its organizational and educational needs. These defined a three pronged strategic approach towards strengthening judicial training: (i) Organizational; (ii) Academic Strengthening of the Judicial School, and (iii) the Deconcentration of the Judicial School or the Regionalization of Judicial Training. These studies proved to be fruitless as the activities under this component did not advance beyond their initial assessment.

Training activities conducted under this component included 25 workshops, 10 seminars and 7 courses for judicial support staff in management, computing and juridical procedures, with the participation of approximately 3000 judicial operators. The component also provided some support for training of judges, public defenders, and staff, in oral and transparent procedures in family, labor, and criminal courts. Additionally, the Judicial School was equipped with audio-visual and IT equipment and furnishings. In spite of this well motivated start, progress was halted by several changes of leadership in the management of this component within the PCU, and the differences over the design and organization of judicial training at the School. Other training and knowledge sharing activities promoted as part of this program are noted in Section E, below.

Meanwhile in 1999, changes were accompanied by highly publicized firings and replacements of judges and judicial operators on complaints of corruption and inefficient practices. This was a positive step in the short term and one that further intensified the spotlight on ethics and competence within the Judiciary. But judicial ethics and low public confidence in the system continue to be controversial. There is still a need to formalize and standardize the judicial career law to strengthen independence, for which the Code of Ethics of the Judiciary Branch is still pending approval by the National Assembly. Since the new Constitution, judicial career recruitment, promotion, and disciplinary oversight have been strengthened. Judges are now beginning to be hired through national competitive processes. Since November 2002, 75 such selection processes have been conducted for a total of 486 positions to be filled, for which 270 applicants were selected. In spite of this new normative framework for the selection of judges, the high number of temporary judges continues to be a problem as a legacy of the past regimes (when temporary judges were as many as 90 percent), even after considering some efforts, which have been made since the judicial emergency of 2000. Out of the 1,512 judges nationally, 1,228 (81.2 percent) are temporary. It should be added that all judges, whether temporary or tenured, can be removed from their posts for disciplinary reasons. What distinguishes them is the method of their selection, hence the importance of the national competitive process to ensure the quality and independence of judges. Future activities for strengthening the qualifications and competence of judges should seek to further strengthen the institutional provisions that support the judicial career system, including the promotion of a Judicial Career Law that explicitly provides safeguards to that end.

Although the Project did not accomplish all the objectives set out under this component, some of that "gap" can be rationalized and perhaps even judged to have been acceptable. That is because of the traumatic political changes, clearly beyond the judiciary's range of remedial measures. It is hard to say that much more was attainable under the circumstances. At the same time, though, successful completion of other Project activities, and the momentum for modernization that has been created within the Judiciary as a result, have brought about strong institutional support for strengthening judicial training and the

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competence and independence of judges, as a necessary and integral part of the performance of the Judiciary, as a whole. This support includes the recognition that judges should receive training consistent with their role as operators and as administrators of the judicial system; that all judicial operators should receive continued training in all aspects of judicial operations, including judicial ethics and change management; that the School should be equipped with the requisite resources and facilities to that end; that the School should establish conventions and partnerships with universities and law schools, to benefit from existing academic resources and high quality instruction; that judicial training should be supported by effective knowledge management and sharing capabilities within Venezuela and internationally; and that performance indicators and evaluation mechanisms should be established to support the quality and effectiveness of training.

Component D. Construction and Rehabilitation of Courthouses

Satisfactory. This component has brought about a significant change in the concepts of justice administration and the delivery of justice services in Venezuela. Prior to Project implementation, 75 percent of courthouses were located in rented facilities, which caused a significant drain on budget resources and an impediment to investment in rehabilitation and modernization. The construction of the new courthouses was undertaken in conjunction with the implementation of the new Organizational Model for the courts (under Component B), resulting in a new conception of the organization and functioning of integrated courthouses (Palacios de Justicia). This component was entirely financed by the Borrower with some technical assistance for judicial infrastructure planning and staff training, funded by the Bank. Given that infrastructure investments are costly and long termed, an infrastructure master plan was prepared with the help of leading international consultants. The infrastructure master planning exercise assessed the availability and condition of courthouses (both government owned and rented) in Caracas, other urban centers and rural areas with the purpose of preparing inventories and obtaining stakeholder feedback. The underlying purpose was to develop a plan that can serve as the basis for improving facilities over the medium and long term that can contribute towards the provision of dignified and adequate space for judiciary operation in Venezuela. Courthouses and judiciary offices were surveyed respect to their readiness for ICT capital investments, introduction of oral procedures in courts, implementation of new court organizational model and case management systems (Juris2000), delivery of insitu training and distance learning, setting up of user information centers, public defender services and library facilities. It also prepared scenarios regarding cost of renting, rehabilitating and constructing courthouses in Caracas, medium size urban centers and small cities, assembled international good practices in courthouses design and prepared prototype models for use in Venezuela.

As it was advisable to focus initial activities on judicial governance, the Council was the first sector institution to be modernized. It was equipped with the requisite physical and technical resources for optimum functioning: a modern building for the central office in Caracas, ICT equipment, structured ICT networks, equipment, and furnishings. Training in the use of the new ICT and the Organizational Model was also provided centrally and regionally to 540 Council staff.

The standard architectural design of the new integrated judicial centers constitutes a blueprint for future justice in Venezuela, defined in the new Constitution as a public service that should be transparent, timely, and accessible. The centers stress public access, have public information offices in the immediate accesses to the building, the administrative support offices are arranged to maximize economies of scale and organizational effectiveness, and the courtrooms are designed to suit the new oral proceedings and public access. The new courthouse design allows all courts and judicial offices in medium size cities to be located in a single building, with centralized and common support services for judges, and with readily accessible and automated public information services. As a result of this component, several new integrated judicial

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centers have been constructed, and the Judiciary Branch has taken on the responsibility for building new centers. This constitutes an important advance since previously they had been the responsibility of the Executive Branch, with the result that construction was slow and frequently unsuited to the particular needs of justice services. Also, under this component, a design for "Alternative Justice Centers" (Sedes Alternativas) for criminal courts was developed, in response to the introduction of the new Criminal Code (Código Órganico Procesal Penal) in 1999, which, among other things, introduced oral procedures for criminal hearings. These are low cost, rapidly constructed (eight months), and highly functional centers that enable the extension of judicial circuit services to the second largest city of a given State. There are now 22 of these "alternative" centers. As a result of this component, the number of courthouses located in rented facilities has been reduced by 25 percent - a figure, which does not take into account the number of facilities that have been built from scratch. Several Judicial Centers and 23 "Alternative Centers" have been constructed under the Project and 7 more are currently under construction. State governments have generally contributed in the advancement of these centers through the provision of land and other resources.

The record of achievements under this component is considered commendable (as also highighted in the TSJ comments on the ICR) because of the inadequate initial Project strategy and operating plan, the Council's lack of readiness for its undertaking, and the disruptive 1999 changes. However, there clearly remains a lot to be done in this area. The current economic situation may affect future plans. The long term goal is to provide better and dignified facilities in each court location, whether through rehabilitation, construction, acquisition, or leasing. The way ahead has been mapped out, and most of the plans for the future courthouse improvements are available. Future plans for Caracas include improvements in facilities for civil, labor and family courts in different parts of the city.

E. Other Project Activities Highly Satisfactory. The Project assisted in the implementation of a number of initiatives related to improving the functioning, equity, and accessibility of justice services. These activities, which were partly funded by the IDF Grant 27327, were administered by the Civil Society Unit of the Supreme Court, in partnership with the lower courts, and with NGO participation. Many of these NGOs were part of the Alianza Social para la Justicia and played a critical role for the Project at initiation, by becoming supporters of Bank efforts, especially when a participatory process was adopted in early 1995.

The Venezuelan Judiciary has taken initiatives in promoting dialogue with, and access to, justice services for indigenous peoples. The 1999 Constitution granted recognition of the traditional indigenous law for the first time in Venezuela. The Project participated in strengthening that recognition, by supporting the organization of national and regional conferences on indigenous law, legal instruments that protect the rights of indigenous peoples in Venezuela, and access to justice in an inter-cultural context.

After the constitutional changes, and the introduction of the Law for the Protection of Children and Adolescents (LOPNA), training seminars were conducted for Public Defenders in metropolitan Caracas, and the States of Miranda, Táchira, Lara, Zulia, Barinas, Sucre, Anzoátegui, and Vargas. A manual outlining the legal framework for the human rights of minors, under national and international law, was published.

Gender Sensitivity Training and knowledge sharing workshops were conducted for justice operators and NGO representatives (in the cities of San Cristóbal, Acarigua, Maracay, Caracas, Tucupita, Porlamar, and Trujillo). The workshops centered on the applications of the Law for the Prevention of Violence against Women and the Family, to raise awareness of this law among justice operators and women’s advocacy groups, and to promote the prevention of, and attention to, gender and family violence.

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Additionally, with the help of the "Development Marketplace award", the "Voices of the Poor for Access to Justice" survey was conducted, to assess the perceptions of the justice system among the residents of the cities of Barquisimeto and Barcelona (the designated cities for the Pilot Courts under this Project). This was the first such survey in Venezuela explicitly to assess the perceptions of individuals living in conditions of poverty and extreme poverty, who typically do not make use of formal justice services. (Another survey in Caracas, in 2000, assessed the perceptions of justice users). The findings of the survey were used to draft policy recommendations to be incorporated into ongoing and future modernization efforts for improving access to justice for the poor, and to contribute to a scant knowledge-base on this subject in the Venezuelan Judiciary. The findings of the survey helped improve user information in citizen information centers and knowledge of judicial stakeholders in pilot court locations. Among the most significant findings of the survey are: there is a reluctance among the poor particularly (but also among the Venezuelans in general) to turn to formal justice channels for assistance in the resolution of disputes, preferring to deal privately with most family or domestic matters, as well as with some criminal matters; the administration of justice and judges are perceived as inefficient and corrupt by the vast majority of respondents, with the exception of the minority of individuals, who have had actual experience with the courts; the judicial system is perceived as biased, in favor of the wealthy; and lawyers’ services are perceived as costly and overly complicated. Since the Project activities were directed towards modernizing judicial infrastructure and administration and not specifically towards promoting citizen access and participation-- although there were attendant benefits in public access and information from these activities-- more needs to be done to address directly the justice needs of the Venezuelan citizens, and of the poor in particular, and to develop mechanisms to increase user access and confidence in the courts.

F. Overall Project Accomplishment

Satisfactory. Given the political upheavel and the ever-changing legal and institutional focus in Venezuela over the years of implementation, it is commendable that the Project was able to accomplish as much as it did against the odds. An across-the-board review of the Project’s accomplishments leads to the conclusion that the Judicial Infrastructure Project warrants a satisfactory rating.

In spite of a slow start, some internal resistance to change, and a difficulty reaching consensus about component objectives, the Project accomplishments exceeded initial expectations in achieving improvements in the administration and delivery of judicial services. The success of the Pilot Courts and the validation and replication of the new Organizational Model and Integrated Case Management System have demonstrated tangible and far reaching changes in the administration of judicial services, greater transparency, public access, and efficiency in court procedures. These gains include the reduction of delays in the processing and publication of case results along with other areas of limited productivity, instilling a service-oriented culture, introducing public access and information facilities, increasing the transparency of procedures, and raising the standards for efficiency and effectiveness with fully automated processes. The new architectural model for integrated judicial centers is a laudable product of the Project, which should serve as Venezuela’s blueprint for the organization and delivery of modern, efficient, and accessible judicial services. Moreover, these gains were achieved despite a tumultuous political environment and considerable changes within the sector. The Project also assisted the Judiciary in forming collaborative ties with civil society organizations and NGOs, further strengthening judicial oversight and public dialogue about Venezuela’s modernization needs and initiatives. Even though NGOs criticized it, many have recognized its impacts and Bank's and government support to exchange citizen focus and participation. (See "Halfway to Reform - the World Bank and the Venezuelan Justice System", Lawyers Committee for Human Rights).

Once the results on the ground became apparent, the Project gained a strong buy-in from judges and

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administrators. The enactment of the necessary laws for the advancement of the Project with the legislative changes of 1999, demonstrated strong support and consensus within the Judiciary, and in particular the Supreme Court’s commitment to seeing the Project goals accomplished. The demonstration effect of the pilot courts and the body of judges and judicial operators - now acculturated to the new judicial circuits model - provide favorable ground indicator for the continued replication of these changes, nationally.

Despite its lack of preparation for reform efforts at the outset, the Council and subsequently D.E.M. carried out change efforts energetically. The change management that evolved was adapted to meet the considerable changes that arose in the sector over the course of the Project. Strengthening and consolidating the central administration, implementing integrated financial management system (SIGECOF), improving social communication, NGO relations, and knowledge sharing - has helped build capacity, considerably during the last few years. Capacity has improved, but more is needed.

The Judicial Infrastructure Project, the first Bank-assisted Project to work directly with a Judicial Council, was also LCR’s first venture into assistance for the justice sector and has led the way for other Projects in Latin America and elsewhere. A highly successful Bank Project (Loan 4270-VE) was also undertaken to modernize Venezuela’s Supreme Court of Justice (subsequently Supreme Tribunal). This Project, which closed on schedule on June 30, 2002, contributed to highly productive synergies in Project implementation between the Supreme Tribunal and the lower courts.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:Technical assistance loans are not normally examined from these standpoints. However, the investment made could produce fiscal savings. The more efficient management procedures introduced may ultimately lead to efficiency gains and improved performance, and in turn - to lower operating costs. At the overall level in Venezuela, constraints to investment are evaluated by institutions such as CONAPRI (Venezuelan Council for Investment Promotion) which is taking the lead in the area of assessment of risks and constraints of the legal and judicial system on country's competitiveness. Judicial reform benefits everyone. For example, it benefits the public sector in enforcing regulations, promoting accountability and democratic principles. It also benefits the private sector by reducing the cost of transations and assuring a secure environment for transactions and property rights. It ultimately benefits the citizens in general through the provision of access to justice, peace promotion, violence reduction, and rights enforcement.

4.4 Financial rate of return:(Ref. Para. 4.3)

4.5 Institutional development impact:Substantial. The Project has helped modernize the Judiciary in pilot locations in ways, which should contribute to its increasing effectiveness over time, and advance further nationwide. With Council's termination, the Project's institutional development goal of strengthening might be seen as a moot question for the ICR to address. However, there are strong grounds for concluding that the governance and administration of Venezuela's lower courts are on better footing now, because of the Project's institutional development contributions. The Project has strengthened the Judiciary’s administrative capacity, utilization of resources, and delivery of services, and has helped establish a sound governance framework for continued development. The Project aided the Judiciary in developing and delivering a new vision of the judicial system in Venezuela, which should show substantial gains over time in increased citizen and private sector confidence. In these respects, the Project made a useful contribution to meeting some of Venezuela’s capacity-building needs. It is too early to say how firmly established these improvements are, or to determine precisely the achieved gains in effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency. Though anecdotal reports and observations have been promising, it is lamentable that little was done to set

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yardsticks in these areas, and to begin to measure progress against them.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:None

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: On conventional portfolio measurements, the implementation record was deficient. It took 8 years to complete rather than the 5 years forecast. Project implementation suffered problems getting off the ground (also see para. 4.1 and 5.3.) including delays in opening the Special Account, which was not operational until 1995; and delays in the Loan becoming effective, in spite of good relations between the Executive and Judicial Branches. Delays in disbursement of local counterpart funds resulted in a slowing of activities from 1996 to '97 (in particular Component D, which was to be funded locally, and which addressed the issue of building courthouses with new ICT systems). By as late as 1998, still only about 15 percent of the Bank’s Loan had been disbursed.

In 1999, a Constituent Assembly was created for drafting the new Constitution. All branches of the public sector were affected by this, including the Judiciary, which was declared under a state of emergency. Judges were subject to removal at any moment. Furthermore, the Judicial Council and the Project were intervened by an Emergency Judicial Commission, as a result of which - the Project implementation was affected. The Project remained in a state of hiatus until the end of 2000, when the Supreme Tribunal created the DEM and ordered full reactivation of the Project. Since Components B and C had been initiated at the end of 1999, these were most severely affected by the halting of Project activities. Component D was also severely affected by these events, not least because of the additional cost of reactivating construction work after a period of inactivity.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:The early delays in Project implementation and strategic planning had been exacerbated by the weaknesses of the Council. A notable one was its failure to adequately delegate decision-making to the Planning Directorate responsible for coordination and communication between the Council and the Supreme Court. Early Project delays resulted from internal disagreements within the Judicial Council and between the latter and the Supreme Court, regarding the scope and goals that judicial modernization activities should achieve. Internal power struggles in the first two years led to a rapid succession of Project administrators and insufficient support to, and delays in, the creation and full operationalization of the PCU, until 1994. These factors contributed to the development of a piecemeal action plans, rather than the integrated approach, identified as essential in early consultations and assessments. Unfamiliarity with multilateral Project procedures further caused delays in decision-making and implementation of action plans; with some procedures that would normally take four months, requiring as much as a year. There were also procurement problems, with a misprocurement in 1999, related to purchase of computer equipment, and a partial Loan cancellation in 2000. The hiring of staff already familiar with Bank procurement procedures, however, significantly facilitated progress in this area. In spite of this apparent setback of the Council's elimination to the Project’s time line, a clear advantage to this change of venue was seen in the Supreme Tribunal’s prior experience with a highly successful Bank funded modernization project (Loan 4270-VE Modernization of the Supreme Court). These improvements paid off with the greater strength of the PCU, the independence it displayed, the absence of audit problems, the PCU's productive interaction with the D.E.M., and the reasonably successful activities with other courts - beyond the pilots and system changes.

The newly constituted D.E.M. was, therefore, in a position to benefit from the lessons learned of the Project's first years and from the lessons and improvements brought about as a result of a highly successful

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Bank funded Supreme Court Modernization Project (Loan 4270-VE). The installation of the Project Coordination Unit within the Supreme Tribunal as a result of these changes (formerly at the Council) was also significant in facilitating institutional coordination. The functioning of the D.E.M. now benefits from having new facilities as its headquarters (see Component D). The proportion of professionally trained staff now stands at 37 per cent, a significant improvement on the Judicial Council's profile, and management staff is now recruited on the basis of competitive public searches. It now operates on the basis of a normative framework and operational manuals.

5.4 Costs and financing:With all the extensions, sequencing of investments, and implementation difficulties, the Project cost estimates were as follows: component A costs were higher, components B costs were closer in line, component C was much lower and component D was substantially higher.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:Likely. Project sustainability is expected. The results achieved on the ground have secured a strong buy-in for modernization at the top and among judges and administrators. The participatory approach of the Project, involving internal and external users, including NGOs and academia, through the use of stakeholder consultations and assessment surveys - has also strengthened the public perception of modernization activities, challenges, and achievements, and thereby promises to sustain public dialogue and momentum for continued advances. As it was noted in the case of the Supreme Court Modernization Project (Loan 4270-VE), the immediate aftermath of the constitutional changes of 1999 generated some problems in institutional coordination and placed considerable strain on the Judiciary to adapt to new institutional structures and legislation. By the end of Project implementation, many of the public and sector benefits of the 1999 changes are apparent, though the D.E.M. – Supreme Tribunal relationship remains somewhat fragile and tense, and the D.E.M.’s own management and practices need more definition. These benefits notwithstanding, it remains questionable whether the volatile political conditions in the country constitute an environment favorable for continued reform activities, whether the authorities will continue to view these activities as a priority, even though the overall demand for judicial modernization remains high. These questions remain uncertain, as the current government has tended to interfere with judicial independence and autonomy. Political forces in the country also suggest possible threats to "the rule of law". As such, positive sustainability prospects cannot be forecast with any degree of certainty.

In spite of the above caveat, there are strong indicators that the modernization of the Judiciary’s administration, infrastructure, and operations appears likely to be sustainable. The new administrative framework, court infrastructure, citizen information centers, and judicial circuits model appear sufficiently well grounded to justify confidence in their continued functioning. As regards future developments on these fronts, however, cautions should be expressed: the modernizing, upgrading measures are costly to fully install and subsequently maintain, and although Venezuela's riches are ample, the immediate economic prospects are worrying. Constant follow-up and support to the judiciary is needed to ensure the sector's improvement gains.

The factors that contribute to the likely sustainability of the project accomplishments include the following: The success of the pilot courts and the replication of the model in several judicial circuits is a strong indication both of the continued viability and adaptability of the system and of the Judiciary’s commitment to national implementation. The architectural plans for most of the remaining courts are already prepared and the replication of the Organizational Model and Automated Case Management System will be greatly facilitated by the previous successful testing and validation of the pilot courts and by the Judiciary’s

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ownership of the Juris 2000 system software. The demonstration effect of these changes and the successful fruition of almost all of the Project objectives have, furthermore, prompted the Judiciary to examine the critical need for improved judicial training and qualifications, a key disappointment in this Project’s accomplishments. The problem of the high number of temporary judges has also served to focus the Judiciary’s attention on the matter.

Another strong impetus for sustainability is that users have become accustomed to the new services and now expect them. Although the modernization activities have brought significant benefits in increased user access and public information, the need for a dedicated strategy to create citizen access mechanisms and public outreach campaigns is now all the more apparent. The success achieved in this respect by the Supreme Tribunal serves as a highly useful in-country example of the institutional gains to be derived from greater public access and confidence. This suggests some reasonable prospects for improvements in this area, in the lower courts.

These factors, with some additional assistance from local and international sources, suggest that it should be feasible for the Judiciary to mitigate the risks and maintain these improvements. Moreover, strong public demand for judicial improvements is likely to remain in force, as well as increased presence of civic groups in the sector. Although it is not possible to garner a complete picture of the prospects for sustainability, this review concludes that those prospects must be judged closer to "likely" than a negative rating. The fact the Judiciary has successfully weathered the forces of change in the sector and the political uncertainties of the last years suggests that the accomplishments achieved thus far will not be undone and that the capacity for building on them is reasonably firmly in place. Uncertain political and economic conditions in the future may have a bearing on Project sustainability.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:The D.E.M. / Supreme Tribunal, with expressed Government approval, have already drafted plans for a program to extend this Project's activities towards goals agreed with the Bank, and have requested Bank financing for it, as the authorities have already been obtaining Government funds to sustain the Project after the Bank Loan closed. The future program consists of components that would address the greatest needs for improving the overall performance of justice administration. These are: A. Improving access to justice, with a particular emphasis on the needs of the poor; B. Extension of modernization in courts, to achieve greater efficiency, quality, and transparency in judicial services; C. Strengthening the independence and competence of judges and judicial operators; D. Strengthening judicial governance and administration; and E. Strengthening reform support, further monitoring, and evaluation systems.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.1 Lending: Deficient. There were numerous obstacles in the preparation of the Project (see section 3.5). These included limited information and background on the country context (as Venezuela was a relatively new borrower) and sector. Apparently as a consequence, the Project scheme and implementation plan were too general and left to precise development as the activity progressed as highlighted in the MOP. This was unfortunate for one of--if not the first-- Bank ventures in the sector.

This weak base was compounded by other factors. One was the Judicial Council's lack of readiness for carrying out the Project. Indeed, it is doubtful that it fully grasped what was involved. This reflects poorly on the Bank's orientation and "tool kit" for the prospective executing agency. It is little wonder that such problems as the opening of the Special Account, were so burdensome. Also, there is little evidence of the Council's "buy-in" into the Project scheme and appreciation of the need for a Project team ready and able to

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go from the start. Moreover, the institutional setting for the Project (notably the troubling relationship with the then Supreme Court) was not adequately factored in. There was criticism from Venezuelan NGOs about the lack of any opportunity for their participation in the creation and design of the Project. This deficiency was subsequently addressed and efforts were made to amend it.

7.2 Supervision: Satisfactory. A QAG review (Quality of Supervision-RSA 3, 1999) judged the Project's supervision highly satisfactory. It noted that: " The design of the Project was very open, leaving a heavy burden on supervision, which had to give the final shape to the Project in accordance with the circumstances. The supervision team met this challenge quite well. The Project suffered initially from delays in the enactment of legislation. Once the legislation was enacted however, it was implemented efficiently. The way the supervision interacted with the stakeholders in the different stages of the Project created a model for this kind of operation."

This review concurs in that conclusion and the "Highly Satisfactory" rating. In addition to the factors which the QAG panel cited, it warrants noting the presence of a strong Bank-led participatory approach throughout Loan execution. This was very intensive and quite resource-costly, but it paid off considerably. It appears to have been critical in persuading the Council judges and others who contributed to their actions to move in the right directions towards their numerous worthwhile accomplishments. In this review's opinion, that input and the Bank task manager's dedication to it, together with the important advice he imparted gave the Venezuelan officials in the process, were particularly valuable.

In a significant way incidentally, the aforementioned participatory approach was matched by an equally significant "openness" on the Bank's part: leaving this poorly founded, slow disbursing Loan alive for the hopes of yet reaching, successful ends. It would not have been difficult to have justified its termination throughout its life, or rejecting the requests for extending its Closing Dates. Far sighted judgments ruled against these, fortunately, and produced good results, demonstrating good Bank supervision and management vision.

7.3 Overall Bank performance: Satisfactory. The deficiencies detailed in the "Quality at Entry" section (paras. 3.5 and 7.1) were quite harmful, even taking into account the upgrading of Bank standards and practices for such operations during the 1990's since the Project was designed. However, these deficiencies are considered to have been more than overcome by the improvements in the Bank's performance during Project execution, and their consequent benefits. (e.g. highly satisfactory QAG's supervision rating) Also, NGO concerns were successfully incorporated by the Bank, through participatory consultations with stakeholders. On balance, therefore, the Bank's overall performance is rated "Satisfactory."

Borrower7.4 Preparation:Satisfactory. Considering its apparent absence of comprehensive guidance, the borrower did everything possible to ensure adequate preparation.

7.5 Government implementation performance:Satisfactory. Counterpart financing was generally not a problem, which is unusual for Bank Projects in Venezuela. The Executive Branch respected the Judiciary’s autonomy. Even throughout rocky periods, the Government did not interfere with operations.

7.6 Implementing Agency: Satisfactory. The implementing agency worked fairly collaboratively with local and foreign consultants,

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probably to a higher level than "normal," given that Venezuela is frequently not considered to have been a successful user of technical assistance. It also performed well in organizing the tasks, and supervising work planning and execution. It did not perform as well in launching monitoring/evaluation functions and carrying out several communications.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:Satisfactory on balance (ref. paras. 7.4 - 7.5)

8. Lessons Learned

a. For judicial reform(i) It is important to maintain an integrated perspective of justice administration, as a whole, and of the Project, and to perceive the Judiciary as a system of interrelated services. For example, in the case of criminal justice, the penal courts, the police, and Public Prosecutors need to be understood as part of the same system in order for justice administration to be truly effective. With the introduction of the new Organic Criminal Procedural Code, for example, disproportionate attention was given to judges, and not enough to the other agencies, which resulted in numerous teething problems in the Judiciary’s acculturation to the new Code, and eventually to a partial reform of the Code. This lack of coordination also affected training and public information programs. In view of this and other sector observations, mechanisms that promote inter and intra-institutional coordination should be encouraged. (ii) The Judiciary Branch of any country encompasses a broad and complex set of circumstances, which are difficult to undertake in their totality in any Project. Projects should, therefore, be highly explicit in their stated goals and activities, but should have flexibility to accommodate unforeseen situations.

(iii) The judiciary projects should generally consult and involve user groups along with other stakeholders in project design and implementation.

b. For reform-oriented efforts in general(i) It was not a good idea to exclude Bank contribution from the physical infrastructure component of the Project's financing plan. This fortunately did not prove to have very serious adverse consequences, but should have been handled better. The exclusion may have appeared to have been an attractive measure during the design of the Project, and for its processing within the Bank. This may have been done to stave off possible criticisms for advancing a "bricks and mortar" scheme, as well as to restrict the size of the loan, for an oil-rich borrower. These possible concerns, however, were short sighted and minor in the actual Project experience. The absence of suitable and dignified facilities for court functions was, at the very outset, and still remains, a decade later, a major obstacle to the judiciary's hopes of adequately serving Venezuela's needs. It retarded organizational changes, adequate internal communication improvements, and the IT system's substantial upgrading. Fortunately, the Bank was permitted and able to provide useful counsel in various forms, to help reduce these problems, but this role could have been stronger. This would have been possible even without Bank funding. The Project arrangements should, as a minimum, have called for the Bank's consultation or approval of the component's strategy, operating plan, budget, and procurement scheme.

(ii) The termination of the Judicial Council laid to rest one of Latin America's oldest (perhaps even its very oldest) sector institution charged with managing its lower courts. The Project experience was not designed to fundamentally affect the Council's role independent of Executive Branch direction as well as at arms' length from the judiciary's rector institution, the Supreme Court. Similarly, its actual operations did not directly bear on these aspects. Nonetheless, it was eliminated for reasons, which suggest some lessons for

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judicial development. One is that such institutions cannot function properly under the segmented direction of different political parties. Another is that, like many other large governmental agencies, they need relatively permanent, full-time executive management to be effective and efficient. Perhaps most important, and most fatal in Venezuela's case, they cannot do their tasks without a clear, well accepted and enforced, relationship vis-a-vis the Supreme Court.

(iii) Good collaboration, learning, patience and fortitude among Bank and borrower teams can remedy the shortcomings of ineffective Project design. The latter and the initial dismal track record caused many to believe that the operation would always be a "Problem Project." But instead, quite salutary results were achieved. Why? Because both sides expended efforts to mount a much more effective Project operation, and sustained it long enough to overcome the initial problems, even under adverse political circumstances. This was abetted by solid top management support.

(iv) It is important to publicize the Project, but not before tangible results have been achieved. When Project activities are disseminated, the objectives must be clearly spelled out so, as to avoid creating false expectations.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:Following is the English translation of a letter from the President of Supreme Tribunal of Justice. The original Spanish text is also attached.

República Bolivariana de VenezuelaSupreme Tribunal of Justice

Office of the President

Caracas, June 25, 2003

Mr. Marcelo GiugaleDirector, Country Department forColombia, Ecuador and VenezuelaLatin America and the Caribbean RegionThe World BankWashington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Giugale:

I am pleased to take this opportunity to send you our comments, as requested by the Bank, on the Infrastructure Support for the Judicial Branch Project; a project that was executed in its last stage by this institution, through the Executive Directorate of the Judicature, with the support of the World Bank. The objective of these comments is to highlight some points that could be included in the Implementation Completion Report (ICR).

Despite some delays, obstacles and semi-stoppages at the beginning of the agreement and in the execution of certain activities, we can state with sufficient certainty that the Project helped achieve important progress in the strengthening of the Judicial Branch in Venezuela, and that the same contributed considerably to the modernization of the administration of justice in our country. The aforementioned achievements are particularly remarkable in the case of the pilot courts and alternate justice headquarters in

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several jurisdictions of the country.

These accomplishments are of sufficient importance given the particular situation of Venezuela and the prevailing circumstances throughout the execution of the Project, among which we can point out the delays in the initial implementation, the constitutional reforms of 1999, whereby the institutionality of the Judicial Branch was substantially modified, and the subsequent dissolution of the Council of the Judicature. Despite the aforementioned changes, the implementation of the Project proceeded along and its execution was consolidated under the management of the new Supreme Tribunal of Justice, and through the implementation of a participatory methodology, thus overcoming the initial obstacles in such a way that it even surpassed the initial expectations. In view that this is one of the first Bank projects in the judicial sector, its results demonstrate that it was successfully completed.

Among the various achievements of the project, the following are of particular importance:

• The introduction of a new organizational model and the computerized Juris 2000 system, to support efficiency and transparency in the management of the courts, as well as the automation of judicial processes.• Implementation of oral judicial processes.• New architectural design of judicial headquarters, which guarantees greater functionality and access to justice to the general public.• Support for the judicial function, through the remodeling of court headquarters and the construction of new headquarters, greater transparency in judicial processes and, consequently, strengthening of the trust of users.• Significant support and active participation of NGOs involved in the court system, in the implementation of the Project and in the implementation of activities, seminars and fora related to gender equity, protection of children and adolescents (LOPNA), intercultural law and administration of justice for indigenous peoples, and the survey “Voices of the poor for access to justice,” among others.

Today the Venezuelan Judicial Branch has the technical and logistical tools that are an indispensable basis for the establishment of a modern, effective, and efficient Judicial Branch, capable of meeting the requirements of a democracy. The successes achieved, however, allow room for improvements in some aspects in which the Project had a more moderate impact: We need to consolidate the progress achieved in the area of training and in strengthening the mechanisms supporting the judicial career. Greater efforts aimed at improving the access to justice are also required. The success achieved in the modernization of the courts and in the viability of the pilot courts emphasizes the need for replicating this progress at the national level.

We have reviewed the draft ICR. We are in agreement with the content and the conclusions of the same, and we appreciate the comments made concerning our achievements and accomplishments.

In view of the progress made, we want to thank the Bank for the technical and financial support it provided during the implementation of the Infrastructure Support for the Judicial Branch Project. The efforts made by your institution have been highly beneficial and productive.

Finally, I wish to state that we remain firm in our commitment to continue with the modernization process and institutional improvements in the Judicial Branch, as well as in extending its impact to other courts in the country. We hope to continue and strengthen our ties with the Bank through a new Project, already under preparation, whose objectives will be strengthening the access to justice, transparency, and

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the judicial career. As always, we hope to obtain the necessary technical and financial support from the Bank for this project. These objectives respond to our desire to comply with the mandate assigned to the Supreme Tribunal of Justice by the new Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and, jointly, to contribute to our economic and social development.

Please accept my highest esteem and consideration.

Sincerely,(signed) Dr. Iván Rincón Urdaneta

President

ComentariosICR.pdf

(b) Cofinanciers:

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):U.S. Federal Courts, and NGOs helped advance project objective and the refinement of activities.

10. Additional Information

JURIS 2000: Organizational Model and Management System for the Courts

Juris 2000 promotes the centralization of the functions of the courts, such as archives, public information, and the creation and distribution of case documents, through the creation of judicial support offices that provide services for judges collectively in integrated judicial centers. They replace previously costly and inefficient working methods, in which each courthouse performed these functions individually with their own staff. The new model also promotes transparency and access to justice, through centralized access to public information.

Juris 2000 supports judges and judicial operators in the management of cases and enables citizens to access information about individual cases, in a user-friendly and up-to-date manner. Other features of the system include:

1. Liberates judges from administrative tasks, leaving these to specialized support offices responsible for archiving, notification, public information and case management. Judges are thus able to focus on jurisdictional tasks. 2. Centralizes administrative tasks in common support offices, achieving significant economies of scale in justice administration.3. Standardizes courthouse management. All courts operate in the same system, using the same electronic formats and language, thus streamlining procedures and enhancing transparency and security.4. Incorporates management indicators, enabling the evaluation of judges and the performance of the courts, ensuring a better service for citizens.5. Incorporates the format of all documents produced at every stage of the court process, including built-in calendars and alarms to ensure timely processing. 6. The allocation of cases to judges is automated, guaranteeing transparency in the selection of a competent judge in each case. 7. The system includes a record of every case, allowing the parties to a case and their representative access

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to information about every action and procedure undertaken in each case. 8. The system generates management reports and statistics, enabling an up-to-date assessment of the performance of every court, as well as access to national legislation and jurisprudence. 9. The system enables access, via Internet or intranet, to up-to-date information on legislation, cases in process in every court, and their corresponding jurisprudence.

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome / Impact Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix

Projected in last PSR1

Actual/Latest Estimate

A.INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL (NOW D.E.M.)

a. Reorganize the Judicial Council (JC). [now D.E.M.] a. - New normative framework regulates the

functioning of the D.E.M.

- New manuals regulate the functioning of the D.E.M. Offices.

- The D.E.M. now operates in a more modern facility.

- There are 23 administrative offices for judicial governance (one in each State), a more decentralized system.

- An Operations and Budget Plan is executed annually and revised as necessary.

- Judicial governance now has a six-year Strategic Plan.

- Payroll distribution is automated and the payroll system creates annual budget reports.

- Central restructuring of the JC has been completed; organizational hierarchies reduced from seven to four levels; procedures automated; it operates with fewer administrative staff and more professional staff.

- Reduction in personnel by 40 percent according to new qualifications criteria (260 central staff and 96 regional.)

B.MODERNIZATION OF JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION a.Design, implement and evaluate alternative models of courtroom organization.

b.Equip courts with adequate reference materials, IT equipment, furnishings, and other resources necessary for optimum functioning.

a. - Justice administration is now more modern, efficient and transparent in several cities: judicial organization and the conception of the justice system has adapted to the new Constitution (incl. oral procedures, transparency, and timely resolution), the new organic Law for the Protection of Children and Adolescents and the new Organic Criminal Procedural Code.

b. - Juris 2000 is now operational in several criminal circuit courts and civil circuit courts.

- ICT equipment installed in several courts nationally. Computer networks established in over 20 judicial centers.

- Pilot courts in Barcelona and Barqusimeto have new furnishings and equipment.

- Automated access to legal information is now possible nationally.

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c.Train judges and other support staff in the use of the new technologies.

- Judges and support staff of several criminal circuit courts and civil circuit courts have been trained in the functioning and use of the Automated Decision and Documentation Management System.

- Management courses have been conducted for the Judges and staff of criminal circuit courts and civil circuit courts.

- Improvements and new installations completed in several cities.

C.INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF THE JUDICIAL SCHOOL

a.Equip Judicial School with adequate equipment and furnishings.

b.Determine the training needs of Judiciary Branch personnel.

c.Develop curricular and instructional plans to meet the training needs and cater for ongoing personnel strengthening in the Judiciary Branch.

d.Develop training strategies.

e.Support Human Resources in judicial career development.

f. Develop strategic alliances or academic exchange agreements.

a. - ICT equipment and adequate furnishings installed and functioning in the Judicial School, including Intranet and Internet.

b. - Diagnostic study of the training needs of Judiciary Branch personnel and academic goals of the Judicial School completed.

c. - Conducted workshops, seminars and courses for judicial support staff in management, computing and juridical procedures.

d. - Organizational Model for the Judicial School designed and implementation initiated.

e.- Design and preparation of administrative and academic procedures manuals for the Judicial School.

f. - Not completed

D.CONSTRUCTION, REHABILITATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF COURTS

a.Develop plans for the construction and rehabilitation of judicial centers nationally.

b.Rehabilitate existing buildings to enable the proper functioning of courthouses/judicial centers.

a. - Development of plans for the rehabilitation and construction of judicial centers completed.

b. - Rehabilitation of several courthouses

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c. Construction of new buildings for the functioning of judicial centers.

c. - Construction of several judicial centers (Palacios de Justicia) and construction of 22 "alternative judicial centers"

Output Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix

Projected in last PSR1

Actual/Latest Estimate

A.INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL

a. Reorganize the Judicial Council (JC).

b. Create an annual operations and budget plan.

a.- Organizational study for the re-engineering of the JC completed.

- Normative guidelines for functioning of JC established for the management, governance and administration of the judiciary branch.

- Design, development and implementation of the Organizational and Management Model for the JC.

- Creation of a streamlined Office of Institutional Development (formerly Planning Office.)

- Implementation of automated procedures including payroll management.

- Creation of a job description manual with salary scales.

- Creation of Human Resources Manual for recruitment and hiring, job placement, and remuneration, training and evaluation.

- Restructuring according to new Organizational and Management Model for the strengthening of functions of Internal Oversight, Juridical Consulting, Maintenance, Procurement and Acquisitions, Technical Human Resources operations, Judicial School and Regional Administrative Offices.

- Regional Administrative Directors selected through national selection trials.

- Design and development of management indicators at central and regional levels.

- Deconcentration of the JC functions with creation of Regional Administrative Offices (one in every region).

b. - Development of an annual operations and budgeting plan and software

- Creation of three integrated regional management divisions for Administrative, Human Resources Management and Judicial Services functions.

- Consolidation of regional plans by the

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c. Train JC staff for the effective and efficient discharge of their duties.

d. Procure appropriate ICT and office support equipment for the optimum functioning of the JC.

e. Create a Project Implementation Unit with requisite equipment and qualified personnel.

Institutional Planning and Development Office in Caracas.

c.- Incorporation of ICT equipment for the automation of procedures, support functions and strengthening of information for decision and policy making.

d. - Installation of ICT equipment, wiring and software with intranet (LAN) and Internet systems in Central and all 23 Regional Administrative Units.

- Development of Strategic ICT Master Plan for JC and the Judiciary Branch (first phase completed.)

- Training and Technical Assistance Program developed for Judicial Career management and IT staff to strengthen case management procedures and database development.

- Development of training programs in ICT skills for JC staff at central and regional levels.

- Creation of dedicated JC offices with distribution of space according to new organizational requirements.

- Modern office materials installed in Central Caracas Office.

e.- Project Unit established in 1998 for the implementation of the Project.

B.MODERNIZATION OF JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION a.Design, implement, and evaluate alternative models of courtroom organization.

b.Equip courts with adequate reference materials, IT equipment, furnishings, and other resources necessary for optimum functioning.

a.- Design, development and implementation of the new Organizational Model for the pilot courts of Barcelona and Anzoátegui.

- Design, develop and implement of new Integrated Decision and Documentation Management System (Juris 2000)

- Creation of organizational and operational Manuals and CD-ROM for the Organizational Model and Juris 2000.

- Preparation of video material "Venezuelan Justice in the Way of Excellence", Caracas, August 2002

b.- To equip pilot courts in Barcelona and Barqusimeto and the judicial center of La Guaira with new furnishings and equipment.

-Automate access to legal information nationally.

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c.Train judges and other support staff in the use of the new technologies.

d. Renovation and partial rehabilitation of the courts.

- Train judges and support staff of the eight criminal circuit courts and the three civil circuit courts in the functioning and use of the Automated Decision and Documentation Management System.

- Conduct change management courses for the Judges and staff of the eight criminal circuit courts and three civil circuit courts.

- Conduct alternative dispute resolution courses for the jurisdictional staff of the eight criminal circuit courts and three civil circuit courts.

- To make improvements and new installations in 22 “alternative judicial centers” and at the Law Courts of La Asunción.

C.INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF THE JUDICIAL SCHOOL

a.Equip Judicial School with adequate equipment and furnishings.

b.Determine the training needs of Judiciary Branch personnel.

c.Develop curricular and instructional plans to meet the training needs and cater for ongoing personnel strengthening in the Judiciary Branch.

d.Develop training strategies.

e.Support Human Resources in judicial career development.

a. - Install ICT and A/V equipment and adequate furnishings in the School.

b. - Study of training needs of Judiciary Branch personnel and academic goals of the Judicial School completed.

c. - Design and implement Organizational Model for the Judicial School.

- Design and preparation of administrative and academic procedures manuals for the Judicial School.

- Design and begin to implement entry-level curriculum for the Judicial Career

d. - Strengthen of academic, administrative, and information (library) resources to support the implementation of the new course offerings.

e. - Train judges and operators.

- Conduct workshop seminars for judges to develop strategies for improving the performance of judges in the administration of justice.

- Hold workshops, seminars, and courses for judicial support staff in management, computing and juridical procedures.

- Prepare proposal for the regionalization of

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f.Develop strategic alliances or academic exchange agreements.

judicial training and for the creation of integrated training centers.

- Change selection of judges to include public searches with qualified selection committee.

f. - Knowledge sharing activities (workshops, conferences) for judges and Judicial School administrative staff with judicial schools and branches in the region.

D.CONSTRUCTION, REHABILITATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF COURTS

a.Develop plans for the construction and rehabilitation of judicial centers nationally.

b.Rehabilitate existing buildings to enable the proper functioning of courthouses/judicial centers.

c. Construction of new buildings for the functioning of judicial centers.

a. - Inventory of installation conditions and develop plans for the rehabilitation of judicial centers completed.

- Construct headquarters for the Judicial Council; equipped with modern facilities and equipment

b. - Rehabilitation of courthouses/judicial centers and “alternative judicial centers”.

c. - Construction of judicial centers and “alternative judicial centers” for criminal courts.

1 End of project

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)AppraisalEstimate

Actual/Latest Estimate

Percentage of Appraisal

Component US$ million US$ millionI. Judicial Administration 5.30 8.00 150.94II. Courtroom Administration 19.70 18.34 93.09III. Judicial Training 5.30 3.00 56.6IV. Physical Infrastructure 25.40 52.00 204.72Project Implementation Unit 2.60 3.00 115.38

Total Baseline Cost 58.30 84.34 Price Contingencies 1.70

Total Project Costs 60.00 84.34Total Financing Required 60.00 84.34

Note: Applicable construction costs estimated.

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category ICBProcurement

NCB Method

1

Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.40 25.40(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

2. Goods 11.70 3.80 2.40 0.00 17.90(11.70) (3.80) (1.60) (0.00) (17.10)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 13.90 0.00 13.90(0.00) (0.00) (12.90) (0.00) (12.90)

4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.80 2.80(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Total 11.70 3.80 16.30 28.20 60.00(11.70) (3.80) (14.50) (0.00) (30.00)

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category ICBProcurement

NCB Method

1

Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 52.00 52.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

2. Goods 4.95 1.14 3.92 0.00 10.01(4.76) (0.46) (3.41) (0.00) (8.63)

3. Services 3.28 1.00 12.76 0.00 17.04(2.15) (0.90) (11.52) (0.00) (14.57)

4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 5.29 0.00 5.29(0.00) (0.00) (4.30) (0.00) (4.30)

Total 8.23 2.14 21.97 52.00 84.34

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(6.91) (1.36) (19.23) (0.00) (27.50)

1/ Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies.2/ Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff

of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.

Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent)

Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest EstimatePercentage of Appraisal

Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF.I. Judicial Administration 4.30 1.00 7.00 1.00 162.8 100.0II. Courtroom Administration

17.70 2.00 15.00 3.34 84.7 167.0

III. Judicial Training 4.30 1.00 1.50 1.50 34.9 150.0IV. Physical Infrastructure 0.00 24.00 0.00 52.00 0.0 216.7Prioject Implementation Unit

2.00 0.60 2.00 1.00 100.0 166.7

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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits

N.A.

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle Performance Rating No. of Persons and Specialty

(e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.)Month/Year Count Specialty

ImplementationProgress

DevelopmentObjective

Identification/Preparation*1991-1992 5 CONSULTANT (3); PUBLIC

SECTOR SPECIALIST (2)

Appraisal/Negotiation1992 6 PUBLIC SECTOR

SPECIALIST (2); CONSULTANTS (4)

Supervision1993/1994 3 PUBLIC SECTOR

SPECIALIST (1), CONSULTANT (2)

S S

1995/1996 4 CONSULTANT (2); PUBLIC SECTOR SPEC. (2)

S S

1997/1998 3 TASK MANAGR (1); PUBLIC SECTOR SPEC. (1); OPERATIONS ANALYST (1)

S S

06/18/1999 4 TASK MANAGER (1); CONSULTANT (2); OPERATIONS SPECIALIST (1)

S S

06/06/2000 2 PUBLIC SECTOR SPECIALIST (1); OPERATIONS OFFICER (1)

S S

05/04/2001 3 TASK MANAGER (1); LEAD ECONOMIST (1); COUNTRY DIRECTOR (1)

S S

03/04/2002 3 TASK MANAGER (1); PSM SPECIALIST (1); RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE (1)

S S

ICR03/03/2003 2 TASK MANAGER (1);

OPERATIONS SPECIALIST (1)

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest EstimateNo. Staff weeks US$ ('000)

Identification/Preparation* 81.7 149.7Appraisal/Negotiation 48.2 83.1Supervision 265.0 533.6ICR 5.0 34.8

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Total 399.9 801.2

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

RatingMacro policies H SU M N NASector Policies H SU M N NAPhysical H SU M N NAFinancial H SU M N NAInstitutional Development H SU M N NAEnvironmental H SU M N NA

SocialPoverty Reduction H SU M N NAGender H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

Stakeholder participation, informationPrivate sector development H SU M N NAPublic sector management H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

Lending HS S U HUSupervision HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

6.2 Borrower performance Rating

Preparation HS S U HUGovernment implementation performance HS S U HUImplementation agency performance HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

--Report No. 10635-VE: Staff Appraisal Report, Venezuela – Judicial Infrastructure Project, July 15, 1992 and other World Bank documents, reports, and inputs (in Project files);--"Halfway to Reform - the World Bank and the Venezuelan justice system", 1996, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and Venezuelan program for Human Rights Education and Action;--Annual Reports of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and former Consejo de la Judicatura (in Project-files);--Modernization Plans, NGOs Reports, surveys and studies (in Project files);--CD Rom on “Modernizacion del Poder Judicial de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela”;--Proyecto de Modernizacion del Poder Judicial, May 26, 2003, Comite Tecnico de Modernizacion; and Annexes by Andrea Brizuela, Erika Contreras, Mariagreli D'Alvano, Helene de Garay, Laura Louza, Ana Milena Orrego, Norma Perez, Carlos Ponce Silen, Jacqueline Richter, Carmen Luisa Roche, Karol Tamma, Laura Teran, Maria Alejandra Vasquez.--Cumbre Iberoamericana de Presidentes de Cortes y Tribunales Supremos de Justicia, 1998, Consejo de la Judicatura, Venezuela;--Chronograma Abreviada de Desarollo del Proyecto, 2003, Maria Novoa, Venezuela;--Cambios Operativos en Tribunales Piloto, 1999, Consejo de la Judicatura, Venezuela (Operational

Changes in Pilot Courts) CambiosOperativos.pdf;--Judicial Modernization in Venezuela: Challenges and Priorities, 2002, TSJ and D.E.M.

VEJudicialChallenges.pdf;--Venezuelan Justice in the Way of Excellenece - video: rtsp://streaming2/LC/lcvenz.rm--Other electronic IRIS files for the Project.

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Additional Annex 9. List of Contributors

Marcelo Giugale, Country Director, LCC6AErnesto May, Sector Director, LCSPRRonald Myers, Sector Manager, LCSPSVicente Fretes-Cibils, Lead Economist, LCC6AConnie Luff, Senior Operations Officer, LCCICWaleed Malik, Task Manager, LCSPSFelipe Saez, Resident Representative, LCCVEDavid Varela, Resident Representative, LCCVERichard Messick, PREM (Peer Reviewer)Lubomira Beardsley, LEGLREduardo Wallentin, Senior Country Officer, LCC1CLinn Hammergen LCSPSLisa Bhansali LCSPSNina Ohman, LCSPSSharon Spriggs, LCSPSPilar Mengod, LCCVEAna Pereda, LCCVERuxandra Burdescu, LCSPSCandido Perez Contreras, General Manager, TSJRicardo Jimenez, Director, DEM-TSJLaura Louza, Manager, DEM-TSJAdriana Lander, Manager, TSJHon.Judge Peter Messitte, US District CourtRussel Wheeler, Administrative Office of Federal US CourtsMaria Novoa, ConsultantMireya Carpio, ConsultantLigia Carvajal, ConsultantEnrique Allié, ConsultantBirgit Lindsnas, Danish Center for Human RightsLisbeth Arne Pedersen, Danish Center for Human Rights

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