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Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 9560

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

KENYA

RURAL ACCESS ROADS PROJECT(LOAN 1305/CREDIT 651-KE)

MAY 10, 1991

Operations Evaluation Department 04

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authori7ation.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (US$1.00=KSh)

1975 US$1.00 7.92KSh1980 7.571981 10.291982 12.731983 13.701984 14.32

ABBREVIATIONS

BOR - Back-to-Office ReportCIDA - Canadian International Development Agency

DANIDA - Danish International Development Agency

EAR - Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office, World BankEEC - European Economic Community

ERR - Economic Rate of Return

ICB - International Competitive Bidding

ILO - International Labor Organization

KfW - Kreditanstalt fur WiederaufbauMRP - Minor Roads Program

M&E - Monitoring and Evaluation

MOF - Ministry of FinanceMOW - Ministry of WorksNORAD - Norwegian Agency for International Development

ODA - Overseas Development Agency

OED - Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank

p.a. - per annumPCR - Project Completion Report

PPAR - Project Performance Audit ReportPR - President's Report

RARP - Rural Access Roads ProgramRMEA - Resident Mission in East Africa, World BankSAR - Staff Appraisal Report

SIDA - Swedish International Development Agency

SR - Supervision Report

TRU - Transportation Projects Department, World Bank

USAID - United States Agency for International Development

FISCAL YEAR OF THE BORROWER

July 1 - June 30

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYTHE WORLD BANK

Washington. D.C. 20433U.S.A.

Office nf DicmtoenmfalOperations Evaluatin

May 10, 1991

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Performance Audit Report on Kenya Rural AccessRoads Project (Loan 1305/Credit 651)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "ProjectPerformance Audit Report on Kenya Rural Access Roads Project (Loan 1305/Credit651-KE)" prepared by the vperations Evaluations Department.

Attachment

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


RURAL ACCESS ROADS PROJECT(Loan 1305/Credit 651-KE)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

Preface .......................................................Basic Data Sheet ..............................................Evaluation Summary ............................................ v

I. INTRODUCTION .................................. ... 1.......

II. THE RURAL ACCESS ROADS PROJECT ..................... 5

A. Inception .......................................... 5B. Further Preparation and Appraisal ................. ... 8C. Project Implementation and Results ..................... 10

III. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS .................................. 15

A. General Findings ....... .................. ..... 15B. Findings Specific to Kenya ........................... 18C. Summary ..................................... .. 23

Apnex 1Labor-based road construction and maintenance in Kenya:Status and prospects in 1990 ............................. 24

Annendix IComments on the draft PPAR ................................ 29

Apvendixc IIComments on the draft PPAR .............. . ..... 31

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance

PROJECT PEREgMANCE AUDIT REPORT


PREFACE

1. This is the Project Performance Audit Reporc (PPAR) on the RuralAccess Roads Project (Loan 1305/Credit 651-KE) of US$8.0 millionequivalent, signed on July 9. 1976 and declared effective on October 7.1976. The Closing Date was extended from June 30. 1981 to December 31,1984. Credit 651-KE (US$4.0 million) was fully disbursed. Loan 1305-KE(US$4.0 million) was 58% disbursed and the balance of US$1.7 million wascancelled. The Transportation Division of the Bank's Eastern and SouthernAfrica Regional Office prepared a Project Completion Report (PCR) which waspublished on June 17, 1986.

2. The Project supported the Bank's earliest effort to introduceefficient labor-based construction and maintenance practices in a Borrowercountry. The 1986 PCR raised a number of broad questions which led OED toconclude that answers could not be given so soon after project completionand that an audit conducted at that time would not have added much to thePCR findings. By June 1990. when the OED Audit mission visited Kenya. fouryears had passed since the publication of the PCR and seventeen years sincethe inception of the Rural Access Roads Program. The Audit missiondiscussed the project with the Kenyan authorities, inspected a large numberof roads, and gratefully acknowledges the assistance and hospitality of theMinistry of Public Works (MOW) staff. OED prepared the PPAR by studyingthe full set of project files, including the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR),the President's Report (PR), the Loan Agreement, the 1986 PCR, transcriptsof the Executive Directors' meeting which considered the project, andpublished material on the economy and the country. Some basic data fromthe PCR are attached for the convenience of the reader.

4. According to standard procedure, OED sent copies of the draftPPAR to the Government and cofinanciers for comments. Replies received asof April 1. 1991 are in the Appendix.

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KENYARURAL ACCESS ROADS PROJECT(LOAN 1305/CREDIT 651-KE)

BASIC DATA SHEET

KEY PROJECT DATA

AppraisalLt&A Expectation Actual

Total Project Cost (US$ million) 10.1 11.7Overrun (%) 15.8Loan/Credit Amount (US$ million)

Loan 1305-KE 4.0 4.0Credit 651-KE 4.0 4.0

Disbursed: Loan 4.0 2.3Credit 4.0 4.0

Canceled (Loan) 1.7Date Physical Components Completed 12/31/81 12/31/84Proportion Completed by Appraisal

Completion Date (%) 100 61Proportion of Time Overrun (%) 75Economic Rate of Return (%) over 12 16

OTHER PROJECT DATA

OriginalU&AA Plan Actual

Government's Loan Application 3/74 7/75Board Approval 7/1/76 7/1/76Loan/Credit Agreement Date 7/9/76 7/9/76Effectiveness Date 10/7/76 10/7/76Closing Date 6/30/81 12/31/84Borrower Republic of KenyaExecuting Agency MOW/MOTCFiscal Year of Borrower July 1 to June 30Follow-on Project Name First Highway Sector ProjectLoan Number Loan 1684-KEAmount US$ million) 90 millionLoan Agreement Date 4/30/79

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KIE


EVALUATION SUMMARY

Background

1. In the late 1960., the had been built to formation levelBank felt that capital-scaize and and 850 km had been graveled.labor-abundant countries would Variation between estimated andbenefit by adopting labor-based actual cost per km was minimal:methods for construction and US$8,200 and US$8,900 respectivelymaintenance of rural (paras 20-21). Maintenanceinfrastructure works (paras 1-4). ogerations (to which the BankResponding to the Bank's project would contribute a fewsuggestion that in building and vehicles) were neglected until themaintaining minor roads Kenya had mid-1980s largely because roadsmuch to gain by substituting were still fairly new and partlyunskilled labor for mechanical because the administrativeequipment. Government prepared the mechanism was not there. StartingUS$80 million Rural Access Roads in the mid-1980s, MOW devotedProgram (RARP) in 1973. The RARP increasing attention toprovoked much interest in the aid maintenance and results arecommunity and Government asked the rewarding (paras 22-23). StaffBank to coordinate all external training did not start as quicklyassistance. The Bank could not as planned because of logisticalcomply with this request for and personnel difficulties. Afterorganizational and staffing 1985. training activities havereasons, but did agree to finance been systematized to an extenta project that would be part of that allows Kenya to offerthe RARP (paras 6-14). Appraisal training in labor-based operationstook place in September 1975, the to other African countries (parasproject was closed in December 24-25). Monitoring and evaluation1984, and a PCR was published in activities have not produced anyJune 1986. substantive results: no

methodology has been endorsed byProject results all donors and Government was

never interested in measuring the2. hysical wor was to impact of the RARP (para 26).build 1.000 km of rural roads Technical assistance wasbetween 1977 and 1979. Startup beneficial in the early years ofwas delayed because of the project. In 1990, labor-basedadministrative difficulties and operations are run by Kenyanslow procurement. Problems were professionals with minimalresolved by 1978, work progressed, expatriate assistance (para 27).and by the closing date 1.590 km

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3. The project helped (MRP) which is the successordemonstrate that labor-based operation of the RARP (para 36).construction methods aretect,nically feasible and Findings and conclusions (parasfinancially cost-effective. 47-50)Completion did take three and ahalf years longer than anticipated 5. Kenyan experiencebut, in the Audit's view, the reinforces the experience fromdelay was neither excessive nor Bank-supported projects in Chad,unreasonable. The original time- Honduras, Malawi, and Benin that,frame was too brief for the if properly planned andintroduction of a construction supervised, labor-basedtechnology with which the country construction programs produce goodhad no previous experience. If quality work at a competitivedue allowance is made for cost.administrative and procurementdelays, results are quite close to 6. Countries most likely toappraisal forecasts - project benefit from large-scalecost: US$11.7 million actual and application of labor-basedUSS10.1 million estimated; construction and maintenanceeconomic rate of return: 16% methods are least likely to affordactual and 12% estimated (para the financial and technical inputs34). required. They must therefore

depend on concessional aid.Sustainability of _roject benefits

7. It is unlikely that a4. The Audit has concluded single donor will be able tothat the project contributed to support an entire labor-basedsome very important achievements: program in a developing country.

This makes donor coordination(a) the country's technical desirable, though complicated. In

and political leadership principle, the Bank would be inis now committed to the the best position to perform ause of labor-based coordinating role but the Bank'sconstruction techniques; organizational structure raises

obstacles.(b) the public at large

favors these techTniques 8. The Audit believes that,both because they if the Bank decides to support newimprove and maintain labor-based projects, it ought toroads and because they establish a unit specificallygenerate jobs; mandated to perform this task.

(c) construction and The unit ought to be permanentlymaintenance work is of staffed with professionalsgood quality; and experienced in the design and

(d) given the country's implementation of such programs.employment situation, and it ought to command sufficientthe scope for applying resources to provide a fulllabor-based techniques complement of financial, technicalfor road and irrigation and monitoring assistance toworks is considerable. Member Countries.

Generation of these benefitscontinues to flow in 1990.However, the Bank is notsupporting the Minor Roads Program


KENYA


I. INTRODUCTION

1. In the late 1960s, rapid population growth threatened that manydeveloping countries would soon be confronted with rural-urban migrations.decreased standards of living, and political instability. The scope forindustrial job creation was limited and, at the same time, agriculturaloutput and social facilities in the rural areas had to cater for anincreasing number of people. This would not be easy. Rural areas were notproperly equipped, and what infrastructure did exist could not easilysupport additional numbers. Building roads, irrigation works and othernecessary facilities would be expensive and though local currency was notabundant, foreign exchange was truly scarce since most developing countriesdid not generate enough exports. No matter how large they might be, aidflows could not possibly cover the enoimous cost of purchasing andoperating the mechanical equipment that would be needed to improveinfrastructure. Still, infrastructure had to be built up before ruraleconomies could feed and employ more people.j/

2. Such were the demographic and ecenomic reasons which promptedthe Bank to explore the technical and financial feasibility of "moreappropriate" construction methods. The starting point was a supposition:

Assume a country with a lot of labor and little capital. Assumethat it needs to build and maintain civil works in rural areas.Assume further that construction and maintenance methods mustrely more on unskilled labor and less on mechanical equipment.Can the final product be competitive in terms of cost, speed ofcompletion, technical quality, and public acceptability?

The supposition did not suggest to abolish but merely to re4uce dependenceon equipment. Even so, and despite the potential advantages of labor-basedmethods (employment generation; income distribution; greater reliance ondomestic resources; reduction of foreign exchange expenditure for thepurchase of machinery, spares and fuel), four considerations discouragedtheir adoption:

1/ For a realistic evaluation of the potential of public works to absorbunemployment, construct needed physical facilities, and improve theliving standards of low-income groups, please see Burki, S.J.,Davies, D.G., Hook, R.H., and Thomas, J.W., Public Works Programs in

Developing Cuontries: A Comparativg Analysis (IBRD Staff WorkingPaper No 224, Washington, D.C., 1976).

2

(a) as traditionally practiced, labor-based methods were totefficient; they did not make the best use of workers theyemployed and, consequently, were not financially competitivewith equipment-based methods. To make them competitive muchwould have to be done differently in terms of project planningand management, local manufacture of better tools, adoption ofincentive payment systems, etc. However, all such changes wouldadversely affect established sinecures;

(b) political and technical leaders in many developing countriesfelt offended by the suggestion that they ought to sponsor"backward" methods;

(c) compared with equipment-based methods, labor-based techniqueswere more management-intensive, and the one skill that is reallyscarce in the Third World is management; and

(d) it was easier for developing countries to get aid funds for anequipment-based construction program than for a labor-based one.

3. In 1971, the Bank launched The Study of Labor and CapitalSubstitution in Civil Engineering Construction in order to develop anddisseminate construction and maintenance methods that would be moreappropriate for the resource endowment of Third World countries.Z/ Overa ten-year period, this Study encompassed research, experimentation,physical construction and monitoring of rural works in Asia, Africa. LatinAmerica and the Caribbean./

4. One finding that emerged fairly quickly was that labor-basedmethods may be technically and economically feasible and still not besuccessfully implemented. Efficient large-scale application of suchmethods demands administrative and organizational arrangements enjoying thefull support of a country's technical and political leadership. Suchsupport will materialize only after labor-based techniques had proven to beapplicable to the country's socio-economic environment. This is why"pilot", or "demonstration" projects are so persuasive. Actualconstruction work in a variety of terrain and labor supply conditions

2/ That the Study objectives reflected concerns widely shared in thedevelopment community is evident from the fact that the Study wasfinanced by the Governments of Canada, Denmark, Finland, the FederalRepublic of Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom andthe United States, as well as by the Bank.

/ Technical conclusions from fieldwork were published between January1975 and June 1976 in 26 Memoranda whose topics range fromcomparisons of alternative desigra for wheelbarrows to aggregateproduction. Research and implementation work are described in TheStudy of Labor and CaRital Substitution: Report on the Bank-SponsoredSeminars in Washington. Cologne. Copenhagen. London and Tokyo(Washington, September 1978). The final outcome of the Bank's workhas been summarized in 1bor-based Construction Programs: A Planningand Management Handbook (World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1983).

permits a real-life feasibility test. Equally important, pilot operationshelp create the institutional and management structure for an eventualexpansion to full-scale programs. "Demonstration" projects supported bythe Bank included road and irrigation works in Kenya, Honduras, Chad,Lesotho. Benin.A/ the Dominican Republic. and Malawi./ The object ofthis Audit, the Rural Access Roads Project in Kenya. was the first labor-based demonstration project supported by the Bank.

5. The project was appraised in 1975 and supervised un 11 1984 bythe Bank's Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (EAR). EAR prepareda Project Completion Report (PCR) in 1986. The PCR concluded (para 3.12)that "the Rural Access Roads Program, even though extremely ambitious, hasbeen one of the most successful donor-financed programs in Kenya and one ofthe best organized labor-intensive road construction programs anywhere..."However, the PCR text did raise a number of questions concerning projectresults and their sustainability:

(a) The total length of roads built by the Rural Access RoadsProgram (RARP) -- in which the Bank-supported project was one ofmany elements -- over 10 years was 7.641 km, as against '4,000km originally planned to be built over 8 years. Why theshortfall?

(b) The Bank project was to build 1,000 km over 3 years; it actuallybuilt 1,590 km of formation work and 850 km of graveling over 9years. Were roads built according to specifications? Was thework done satisfactorily?

(c) Training was an important objective of the Bank assistance. Didthe training component materially affect the success of the RARPtraining program?

(d) Thn Bank emphasized RARP monitoring as a means of learning fromexperience. Why was the work done under the Monitoring andEvaluation (M&E) component not used to develop a standard roadselection and evaluation methodology?

(e) Sound health of the workers, plus good tools, are crucial forthe success of labor-based construction work. Why did the PCRdecline to comment on these two aspects?

(f) Accordi,, to the PCR, the RARP was "one of the best organizedlabor-intensive road construction programs anywhere". In thatcase, why didn't the Bank continue to support labor-basedconstruction activities in Kenya?

&./ For a detailed review of IDA-assi3ted labor-based operations inBenin, see the PPAR on Benin - First and Second Feeder Roads Projects(OED Report No. 6105 of March 21, 1986).

/ A full description of the demonstration project is given in Appendix4 (Malawi: Action plan for a labor-based pilot project) of Labor-based Construction Prorams: A Plannina and Management Handbook.op.cit. For a detailed review of IDA-assisted labor based operationsin Malawi, see the PPAR on Malawi -- Fourth Highway Project (OEDReport No. 7568 of December 30, 1988).

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6. PCR review in 1986 led OED to conclude that answers to questionssuch as the above coul-I not have been given so soon after projectcompletion, and that an audit conducted at that time would not have addedmuch to the PCR findings. By June 1990, when the OED Audit mission visitedKenya. four years had passed since the publication of the PCR, andseventeen years since the inception of the Rural Access Roads Prog:am.Thus, the purpose of this Audit was two-fold. First, to verify the PCRfindings. Second, to examine whether labor-based construction methods havenow been firmly adopted in Kenya and, if so, whether the Bank can assist intheir further implementation.

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II. THE RURAL ACCESS ROADS PROJECT

A. INCEPTION

7. In June 1973, upon completion in Washington of negotiations forthe Fifth Highway Project, the Kenya delegation was invited to a meetingwhere Bank staff suggested that a sizable loan could be extended forconstruction of rural roads by labor-based methods. The PermanentSecretary of the Ministry of Works (MOW).§/ who led the Kenya delegation.pointed out that such methods would be difficult to implement, primarilybecause they required much supervisory staff, which Kenya did not have.However, since an externally-financed road construction program couldabsorb many unemployed and underemployed people, he promised that MOW wouldtry to resolve the supervision problem.

8. Between July and December 1973. and with employment-generationas its major objective. MOW investigated the technical, economic andfinancial aspects of a labor-based road construction program. MOW securedthe support of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) which felt that such aprogram, besides generating employment, promised important socio-economicbenefits. Preparatory work by the Kenyan authorities attracted theinterest of Nairobi-based Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)officers who declared that, in principle, Sweden would be prepared toassist a labor-based program supported by the Bank. In February 1974. theKenya Government submitted to the Bank and to SIDA a loan application forthe Rural Access Roads Program (RARP).

9. MOW proposed to implement the RARP over five years. beginning inlate 1974. Some 14,000 km of short segments (8-10 km) of minor andunclassified roads serving rural areas in the country's most populous 22Districts (which accounted for over 80% of the population) would beimproved to all-weather standard. Four construction units would beassigned to each District. An average output of 30 km of road improvementper unit per year was envisaged at an annual unit cost of US$163,415.Social and economic objectives were to raise living standards byencouraging a shift from subsistence to cash economy, by contributing to amore efficient utilization of agricultural land, by increasing employment,and by providing better access to social services. Total estimated costfor the RARP (at the exchange rate of KP1.00-US$2.90 prevailing in January1974) was US$78.9 million. The Loan Application requested financing fromthe Bank and SIDA for a training program for supervisory staff, and for theestablishment and operation of an unspecified number of construction units.The intention was to begin staff training in September 1974 and to bringthe first five construction units into operation in January 1975. This

j/ The Ministry of Works has undergone several organizational changesover the last 15 years. In the late 1970s it was amalgamated withthe Ministry of Transport and Communications and, subsequently, itbecame the Ministry of Public Works. To avoid confusion, the acronymMOW will be used throughout this report.

6

loan application was favorably reviewed in the Bank in April-May 1974, andBank staff recommended that financing be provided both for the constructionof specific roads and for monitoring of the entire program.Z/

10. Bank management did not react speedily either to the LoanApplication, or to the recommendations of its staff. Part of the delay wasdue to multiple, and virtually independent, communication channels betweenBank Headquarters-Government, Bank Headquarters-MOW, Bank Headquarters-Resident Mission in East Africa (RMEA), RMEA-MOW, and RMEA-Government.Exchanges were complicated further by "pipeline" considerations whichaffected the Bank's proposed lending program for Kenya, as well as theobjectives of different lending operations. Specifically, in May 1974Government requested that the Bank provide some US$15 million towards thecost of the RARP. In June 1974, Bank Headquarters were advised by RMEAthat owing to expressions of interest by other donors, MOW was thinking interms of a lesser Bank participation in the RARP which would be offset by acorresponding increase of a proposed Sixth Highway Project to improve themain and secondary highway network. The policy objectives and compositionof the Sixth Highway Project were being debated at the time both within theBank and between the Bank and Government. Consequently, whether the Bank'scontribution to RARP would be under a separate project, or whether it wouldcome under the Sixth Highway Project, was bound to lead to protractedexchanges, especially since the Bank felt that the main and secondarynetworks were already overdeveloped.

11. An additional difficulty which, as events turned out, wouldplague RARP for many years, was aid coordination. In a May 23, 1974 letterto Bank Headquarters, RMEA suggested that Bank participation could comprisethe provision of tcchnical assistance for the administration, coordinationand monitoring of the RARP and a "modest participation" to the actualconstruction. Bank staff at Headquarters felt that the Bank ought to makean important contribution both in technical assistance and in constructionbecause, given the large number donors likely to be involved, it would benecessary to get early agreement on standards, evaluation and organization.This was an opinion fully shared by Government precisely because, asalready noted, the RARP had elicited considerable interest in the aidcommunity. Indispensable for RARP success though it was, donor interestcaused some concern in MOW which believed that careful coordination ofexternal assistance would be advisable. In the early 1970s, Kenya wasbombarded with aid offers, absorptive capacity was being strained, and bothMOW and MOF felt that coordination would be facilitated if the Bank becamethe one channel through which all technical and financial assistance wouldbe processed.

12. This message was transmitted formally to the Bank in May 1975.At a Steering Committee meeting of The Study of Labor and Ca2italSubstitution, the Permanent Secretary of MOW, who attended as an observer,invited the Bank to participate in the further planning and eventualimplementation of the RARP. This request was amplified in a June 17, 1975letter to the Bank from the Chief Engineer (Roads) of the MOW who wrote:

2/ Please see the July 8, 1974 memorandum containing the detailedreview.

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"Let me therefore summarize how we see the role of the Bank:Coordinator of the Programme Appraisal on its own behalf and onbehalf of the interested Donor Agencies; Coordinator of thefinancing aspects associated with Donor contributions. That isto say, individual Donors contribute to a Fund controlled by theBank and the Bank, in consultation with the Ministry of Works,spends the money; Coordinator and supervisor of the followingresearch aspects related to the Rural Access Roads Programme:Appropriate labour-intensive technologies; Impact Study; Lenderof funds for road construction in the event that Donorcontributions are insufficient during one or more years of theProgramme's implementation; and, participant in the running ofthe Programme through the provision of staff which will workwith the Special Projects Branch of the Ministry onadministrative, planning and supervisory capacities to bemutually agreed upon between the Bank and ourselves."

13. The problem was that before it could assume coordinationfunctions on behalf of a Borrower, the Bank needed a mechanism to translateits own policy initiatives into lending operations specifically aimed topursue these initiatives. Over the years, the Bank's "policy side" hasformulated desirable objectives ("Rural Development", "Urban Development","War on Poverty". "Environmental Protection", "Women in Development".etc.). However, no procedures have been worked out so that policyobjectives can be systematically pursued and monitored in the course oflending operations prepared and supervised by the Bank's "operationalside". In the 1970s, the rather complicated steps for the encouragement oflabor-based construction methods had to be incorporated into Bank lending.This required the closest collaboration between the Bank's "policy" and"operational" sides, which did not always see eye to eye.

14. In the case of Kenya, loan processing for the Rural Access RoadsProject was the responsibility of EAR. The EAR Programs Department was infavor of labor-based methods but the EAR Projects Department, whileprepared to experiment, did entertain some rather strong reservations abouttheir feasibility. Thus, the "operational" side was not wholeheartedlybehind the proposed project. On the contrary, the "policy side" was quiteenthusiastic: the Transportation Projects Department (TRU) was extremelykeen to encourage labor-based techniques through The Study of Labor andCadital Substitution, The EAR Programs Deparcment more or less dropped outof the intramural debate after 1974, and the form of Bank assistance to theRARP had to be negotiated between the EAR Projects Department and TRU. andthe modi overandi of the two Departments did not quite mesh. EAR wasconcerned about allocating staff resources to an operation that would notmaximize Regional lending, while TRU wished to pursue long-term researchtasks which could not be expected to expedite project processing.§/Furthermore, and far more important, EAR felt that the Bank should notassume aid coordination tasks, partly because these ought to be undertakenby Government, and partly because the Bank should not coordinate a program

g/ One example is a proposal for the "Development of AppropriateVehicles for Rural Access" that was discussed with Kenyan officialsin March 1976 (cf. the internal Bank note dated April 14, 1976).

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it was not financing in full.P/ In the letter quoted above, the ChiefEngineer (Roads) of the MOW expressed reservations about the EAR position:

"As you know, the Bank successively announced, and successivelycancelled. Appraisal Missions scheduled to come to Kenya in July1974, August 1974. December 1974 and March 1975. Consequently.we are a year behind in financial discussions related to aProgramme for which a number of major Donor Agencies are verymuch in favor. We have recognized that the Bank was preventedfrom sending an Appraisal Mission due to staff shortages. On theother hand, we have also recognized that the scope and magnitudeof the Programme are such that, perhaps, the role of the Bankshould not be seen so much as that of a "fund supplier" but asthat of a "fund coordinator". That is to say, coordinator ofthe contributions made by the different Donor Agencies when theProgramme is underway."

15. In sum, staff constraints, scheduling difficulties, and absenceof a harmonized approach among its different Departments prevented the Bankfrom participating in the refinement of the project outlined in theFebruary 1974 Loan Application.,L/ For its part, TRU agreed tofinance -outside the project financed by EAR -- a technical assistanceteam, the Technology Unit, which began operations in January 197611/ butnever became involved in RARP-wide planning, and continued withexperimental field-work initiated in 1974 by the ILO with Norwegian Agencyfor International Development (NORAD) financing.

B. FURTHER PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL

16. For more than a year, and while donors continued to discusswith Government their possible participation, EAR staffing and schedulingdifficulties prevented appraisal from taking place. By the time theproject was appraised in September 1975, the nature and scope of Bankassistance had undergone successive modifications as different donorsexpressed or withdrew support for different program components.

17. As appraised, the Bank Project was to support selected RARPactivities: 1,000 km to be built between 1977 and 1979; expansion oftraining facilities; establishing a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) entity

2/ For details, please see Kenya: Highways VI -- Pre-appraisal IssuesPaRer, January 6, 1975.

1_/ A revised Loan Application, reflecting cost and productivityestimates from pilot labor-based operations carried out in NyeriDistrict with ODA financing, was submitted in July 1975.

11/ Starting in early 1976 the British Government financed a number ofadditional professionals for the Unit as well as separate, butrelated research by the Transport and Road Research Laboratory.

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for the entire program; and establishing a maintenance system for all RARProads. Actual Bank financing would cover:

(a) equipping and operating 8 construction units for 3 years toproduce 1,000 km of roads;

(b) equipment and training aids for the training expansion program;(c) monitoring and evaluation of the RARP;(d) RARP maintenance vehicles; and(d) technical assistance for training, for the M&E. and for the RARP

in general.

18. Appraisal did not provide a cost estimate for roads to be builtunder the Bank project. Applying the standard cost used in the economicsection of the SAR (US$4,300 per km) and the contingency allowance used forthe RARP overall, yields an estimate of about US$6,600 per km or US$6.6million for 1,000 km. Geometric standards were not indicated and the SARdid not split total cost between embankment formation and graveling; areasonable average proportion would be 2/3 for the former and 1/3 for thelatter.

19. In July 1976, when the Bank's US$8.0 project was approved tosupport the multi-donor RARP, developments up to that point could have beensummarized as follows:

(a) The initiative for the introduction in Kenya of labor-basedmethods originated in June 1973 in the Bank.

(b) MOW had not been immediately in favor of the idea: unlike Indiaor Indonesia, Kenya had no tradition in the systematic use ofunskilled labor in construction and MOW, which had always reliedon equipment-based techniques, had no administrative structureto manage thousands of unskilled laborers.

(c) Donor reaction to the prospect of introducing labor-basedmethods in Kenya was enthusiastic and promised large inflows ofaid. This led MOW and MOF to adopt a flexible attitude,especially since economic growth had started to slow down.,/Creation of employment opportunities became a political as wellas an economic desideratum and, late in 1973, MOW put togetherthe Rural Access Roads Program, tentatively estimated to costabout US$80 million.

(d) Neither the Bank nor any other donor had anticipated a programof this size. On the one hand, the program was impressive but,on the other - and quite apart from technical, organizationaland finan-ing details -- its very size raised two questions.First, how would roads be selected and, second, how would theeffects of the program be monitored.

I,Z/ After a period of steady growth of GDP averaging a remarkable 6.2%per year, the economy began to register far slower rates. GDPincreased by 3.6% in 1974 and by less than 2% in 1975.

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(e) Neither question interested MOW, MOF. or the Kenya Government asa whole. Kenyan attention was centered on the grant funds thatwould be available to create employment and to build roads.Hence, program administration and securing adequate financingbecame MOW's primary concerns.

(f) MOW established the Special Projects Branch to determine basicconstruction techniques and standards. This took care of mostof the administrative and technical aspects but financing was adifferent matter. To begin with, committed external assistanceremained undetermined. Also, MOW was worried that the program'ssocial dimensions might fasciuate the donors unduly. As a majorrecipient of grant aid, MOW would not be in a position to rejectdonor demands for "studies" or "surveys" which MOW regarded aspublic relations exercises. Furthermore, satisfying progressmonitoring and procurement requirements of half a dozen donorswould oblige MOW to devote scarce resources to duplicate tasks.

(g) MOW asked the Bank to act as the coordinator of all financing,monitoring and reporting aspects related to RARP externalassistance. The Bank could not accommodate this request and itsUS$8.0 million project became one of the many externally-financed elements of the RARP.

C. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS

20. The Bank-assisted project supported five activities: physicalwork; maintenance operations; staff training; monitoring and evaluation;and technical assistance. Results are summarized below.

Physical work

21. The intention was to build 1,000 km between 1977 and 1979 in 8Districts.jL/ Roads would be short links (5-10 km) serving low trafficvolumes (up to 30 vpd). Construction would use the alignment of existingtracks, formation would be 4.5 m, of which 4 m would be surfaced with 10-15cm of gravel. Work would be done by hand, except for the transportation ofgravel, which would be done by a combination of tractors and trailers.Labor gangs would be recruited from villages within walking distance fromthe construction site. Each construction unit would employ about 250workers and would be equipped with a full complement of hand-tools as wellas with 6 tractors, 8 trailers, 1 truck, 2 water trailers, 2 water pumpsand 1 Land Rover. The estimated cost of mechanical equipment was aboutUS$106,000 per unit Output for each unit was estimated at 45 km per year.Estimated cost (including physical and price contingencies) was aboutUS$8,200 per km.

,L3/ Embu, Meru, Kirinyaga, Muranga, Kiambu, Nakuru, Kericho and Nandi.

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22. Bank-financed units were scheduled to begin work in January1977. Only one unit (at Kirunyaga District) was established by February1977; the remaining seven began operating over the following two years.with the last one (in Nandi District) beginning work in April 1979. Delayswere due to administrative difficulties, and slow procurement of equipmentand tools. All problems, with the exception of tool procurement, wereresolved by 1978, and works proceeded satisfactorily. Bank-financed unitsbuilt 1,590 km to formation level, and graveled 850 km between 1977 and1984. Graveling operations encountered problems due to poor planning, poorsite organization, failure to open quarries in time, and breakdown oftrailers used for the transport of gravel. Output varied among differentunits: from a low of 12 to a high of 45 km p.a. for formation, and from alow of 3 to a high of 28 km p.a. for graveling. A major reason for lowoutput was the shortage of laborers whenever the minimum wage offered byRARP was not competitive with wages paid for agricultural work.j4/ RARPmanagement took steps to match task rates of individual workers to theincreased wages and this showed up in productivity increases..15/ Totalactual cost per km averaged out at US$8,902, including 18% of overheads.Percentage cost comparisons between appraisal and actual was as follows:

Percentage of TotalDirect Construction Costl6/Apraisal Est. Actual

Permanent Staff -- Wages 16 14Casual Labor -- Wagesi/ 36 56Equipment cost18/ 15 8Tool costi9/ 5 1Construction materials cost 2 5Transport cost 17 13Compaction cost 3Land compensation cost 2 1Site accommodation cost 4 2

Total 100 100

j1/ An illustrative example emerged in May 1980 when the minimum wage wasincreased from KSh7.9 to KSh13.0. Labor shortages in RARP sitesimmediately disappeared and, by September 1981, unit output hadincreased to about 53 km/unit/year. or about 8 km above the target.

1/ In June 1981, average mandays/km were 1,630; in September, they haddropped to 1,456.

16/ For project expenditures (in millions of KSh), please see PCR, Table3.05. PCR, Table 3.06 gives a comparison (in US$ million) betweenappraisal estimates and actual cost for each of the major expenditurecategories of the Bank-financed project.

17/ Increase partly due to the fact that compaction was done by hand.

.L/ With an assumed 5-year life.

L9/ The low percentage for tools reflects limited procurement by RARP.See below under "Findings and Conclusions".

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Maintenance operations

23. Maintenance of completed roads would be the responsibility ofDistrict Engineers assisted by inspectors and overseers. Routinemaintenance would be done by one "contractor" (or "lengthman"), selectedfrom among farmers who had worked on the construction of the road and whowould be living in the vicinity. Each lengthman would be provided withhandtools and would be paid monthly the equivalent of 12 days wages forcasual labor. Payment would be withheld if, in the opinion of the overseerwho would periodically inspect the road, work was not done satisfactorily.

24. Until the mid-1980s, maintenance was hindered by seemingly minorproblems (availability of tools, mobility of overseers, timely payment ofwages) which, however, often manage to bring an entire operation to a halt.Also, since most of the roads had been recently built and since theycarried light traffic, maintenance did not seem a particularly urgentissue. Starting in the mid-1980s, MOW began to give serious attention tothe organizational aspects and a satisfactory rural roads maintenancemechanism has now emerged.

Staff training

25. In the mid-1970s, the MOW Staff Training Department was calledupon to expand its activities so that, apart from the Ministry's normalrequirements, it would cater for skilled manpower needed for the RARP.Ministry-wide training needs were estimated at about 3,450 staff, withabout 1,400 intended for the RARP. The Bank-assisted project would supportRARP-related training for road supervisors, surveyors, storekeepers.equipment operators, mechanics, drivers, etc., and was to be carried outover the 1976-1980 period.

26. The training program did not start as quickly as planned partlybecause of logistical and partly because of personnel difficulties. Afterthese problems were sorted out, the program took promising candidates fromthe locally recruited work force and gave them short courses on labor-basedtechniques at a specially established training facility in Kisii.Candidates progressed through a series of courses interspersed with fieldassignments, to the level of foreman. Separate programs offered training totechnicians seconded to the RARP from the MOW's permanent staff, and therewas an annual seminar conducted especially for engineers. By 1984, a totalof 1,013 RARP staff had been trained and, after 1985, training activitieshad been streamlined and systematized to an extent that allowed Kenya tooffer training in labor-based operations to other African countries.20/

10/ Up to June 1990, the Kisii School has offered training to technicalstaff from Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, Malawi, Sudan, Lesotho, TheGambia, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone.

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Monitoring and evaluation (M&E)

27. From the outset, Bank staff stressed the desirability of amethodology for identification of high priority roads, and evaluation ofthe effect of improved roads upon rural environments. It was an attractiveidea but its feasibility was uncertain; as the PCR says (para 2.09),"numerous suggestions were put forward by Bank staff, reflecting thepresence within the Bank of multiple models for rural road impact."21/MOW was never convinced that M&E would contribute much to RARP success butagreed to participate in a fairly elaborate M&E exercise so as not toantagonize the Bank and the other donors. Kenyan commitment to M&Eremained lukewarm throughout and little use has been made of M&E studiesand data collection efforts (PCR, paras 6.01-6.09). Beyond theexplanations given in the PCR, an intricate aicount of M&E-relatedactivities is given in Assessment of the Socit-Economic Impacts of theKenya Rural Access Roads Programme, (DEVRES, 1IC., Washington, D.C., April1984), Final Report prepared on behalf of USALD. The conclusion on page158 is eloquent with respect to the reasons why the exercise was not assuccessful as had been hoped:

"In the future, socio-economic impact studies should be keptsimple, relevant to the hypotheses being tested, and closelynonitored by an effective management team. Host countryparticipation in management and data analysis, a weak point inthe Kenya RARP study, should be required."

21/ The following documents in the file illustrate the absence of aconsensus within the Bank as to how an impact study ought tolaunched, who should run it, and what results should be expected:Monitoring System for Kenya Roads (October 9, 1974) -- comments on aproposed methodology; Kenya: Rural Access Roads Program (July 16.1975) -- comments on financing of "parallel investments"; Kenya:Rural Access Roads Program -- Proposed Loan (April 26, 1976) --comments on a proposal to develop a methodology, together with theassociated date gathering and evaluation procedures, for themeasurement of the social and economic impact of infrastructuralimprovements in general and of low-class roads in particular --estimated cost US$3.1 million over five-years; Kenya: Proposed RuralAccess Roads Project -- Notes on Negotiations (May 19, 1976) --rejection of the socio-economic impact study mentioned above; Kenya -

- Rural Access Roads Review Meeting, June 12-22 (May 31. 1979) -- onrecruitment of a development economist to head the Impact Study;Supervision Report -- Annex 2 (April 1980) -- on the 3-year delay ofthe Impact Study; Kenya: Rural Access Roads Project -- TechnicalAssistance Component (October 22, 1982) -- on the evaluationmethodology of rural access roads; the RARP impact study results; theanalysis of interim data by the Ministry of Transport andCommunications.

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Technical assistance and Kenyanization

28. At the beginning of the RARP, there was a large presence ofexpatriate engineers, provided by different donors.22/ This wasnecessary and beneficial. The number of initially available Kenyanengineers was small in absolute terms, and few of them were willing to workin activities not perceived as helpful to a career in an equipment-orientedorganization such as MOW. As time went on though, more Kenyan engineersjoi-ned the civil service, and RARP's popular appeal and high visibility ledthem to conclude there would be personal rewards for those managing theprogram. In 1990, labor-based operations are run by Kenyan professionals.Expatriate assistance, though still present, is modest.

2/ Their number reached a maximum of 19 in 1979 and then graduallydeclined, as the number of Kenyan engineers assigned to the RARPincreased.

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III. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. GENERAL FINDINGS

29. Combined with findings from Benin - First and Second FeederRoads Projects23/ and Malawi - Fourth Highway Project24/, the RuralAccess Roads Program has yielded lessons which might be useful in thedesign of future Bank-supported labor-based construction programs.

Choice of Technology

30. Evaluation of any construction method depends on weightsassigned to factors such as technical quality of the finished product,total cost of each method, annual volume of output, benefits of directinvestments made in the rural environment, training benefits, methods ofconfronting labor supply variations, and ease with which maintenanceoperations can be mounted at the end of the construction phase. Differentindividuals assign different weights to each factor, and no generallyacceptable answers can be forthcoming. Even so, experience with labor-based work done so far suggests the following.

31. Cost comparisons among different combinations of labor andequipment were not done systematically in Kenya. Discussions with Kenyanstaff and experience from Benin,2/ where detailed comparisons were donein January 1982, lead to the following conclusions:

(a) During the first one or two years after a program is launched,construction cost per km is likely to be higher for labor-basedthan for equipment-based units but the differences will notsubstantial (between 3% excluding costs of technical assistanceand 13% including them).

(b) As technical assistance is phased out, cost per km for thelabor-based units will be reduced.

(c) Equipment repair costs will increase as machines age.(d) In sum, operating costs for equipment-based units will increase

while those for labor-based ones will remain constant, or evendecrease as technical assistance inputs are reduced.Z/

2_3/ OED Report No. 6105 of March 21, 1986.

g/ OED Report No. 7568 of December 30, 1988.

1./ Benin - First and Second Feeder Roads Projects (OED Report No. 6105of March 21, 1986).

g_/ Please see Comparison of Hand-laid and Machine-laid Road Surfaces(World Bank, Study of Labor and Capital Substitution in CivilEngineering Construction: Technical Memorandum No. 5, Washington,D.C., 1976), which discusses quality and cost comparison of the two

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32. The main lesson is that cost differences will not be greatenough to tilt the balance decisively in favor of one or another mix oflabor and equipment. Also, all cost comparisons done so far are based onwork executed by force account. No work has been done on work executed bycontractors. The presumption is strong (but no hard evidence is available)that such work will be cheaper.27/

33. In general, mechanised maintenance units cannot easily competewith labor-based units in cost per km because of depreciation charges forequipment that is not fully utilized. Besides, labor-based units leavebehind, in the immediate vicinity of the improved road, laborers familiarwith what needs to be done for the road to be kept up. These laborers arefar better prepared to perform a good maintenance job on a facility thatthey consider as "their" road, than workers who had not taken part in theroad's construction.

34. In terms of technical quality, and specifically in terms ofquality of the running surface of earth roads, labor-based units producegood results that could be even better if support conditions could beimproved.

(a) Assistance from the central supply organization (particularlywith respect to hand-tools) is crucial but not consistentlyforthcoming.

(b) Experienced mechanics make a great difference in theproductivity of labor-based graveling operations. Similarly,experienced drivers and equipment operators are indispensable. Alarge percentage of the down-time is often due to the indif-ference of operators concerning the state of the equipmententrusted to their care.

(c) Labor supply is a factor of primary importance.L8/ Thetheoretical model of a construction unit which hires and firesworkers as it moves along does not always apply. Occasionalshortage of manpower will affect adversely the operation of

surfacing methods on a road project in India. The machine-laidsurface was technically superior. Densities of asphaltic concretewere similar for the two methods. The cost of the hand-laid surfacewas considerably lower.

2./ For one possible approach to develop small local contractorsspecially geared to undertake the construction and maintenance ofrural infrastructure works by labor-based methods, please seeAnteproyecto para la Creacion de Pequenos Contratistas Locales(Ministry of Communications, Public Works and Transport; Tegucigalpa,Honduras, 1980).

28/ For a practical approach concerning site-specific calculations oflabor supply, please see Labour Intensive Construction Unit Survey(Ministry of Works, Maseru, 1977). For a more detailed treatment oflabor supply issues, please see Vaidya, K.G., Kenya Labour SupplyStudy: Final Reort (Ministry of Overseas Development, London, 1979).

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labor-based units and there is no single formula to ensure thatlabor requirements are fully met.

(d) The commitment of local authorities to help recruit laborers isfrequently the most important conditior for adequate staffingbut, on its own, will seldom guarantee hat the full manpowercomplement will be found.

(e) Punctual _amaent of wagel is a factor that cannot be emphasizedenough; incentive payment methods is a close second.

(f) A disciplined and experienced field supervisory staff is a basicprecondition and although staff quality will frequently varyfrom unit to unit, the effect of experience is invariablydemonstrated by increasing outputs.2g/

Technical assistance

35. Much of the success of Bank-supported labor-based activities hasbeen due to expatriate technical assistance provided at early stages of theprograms concerned. Lessons summarized below reflect long collaborationamong technical assistance staff, Governments, and the Bank Group.

Terms of Reference - Too much precision is unnecessary ininstructions to experienced technical assistance staff. It is notwise to specify both the objectives to be achieved and the detailedmethod for achieving them. The latter should be left to thediscretion of individual experts.

Priorities - It is not unusual for a host country to expect thattechnical assistance staff will plan and execute physical work and,at the same time, conduct staff training. In attempting to do both,expatriate staff will not do full justice to either because goodengineers will not necessarily be good teachers. And vice versa.

Staff Oualifications - No Government can assess on the basis ofcurricula vitae personal qualities (such as manners and maturity)which are as important as technical expertise. Before retainingexpatriate staff to work with local personnel. Governments mightconsider conducting interviews to ensure that the right kind ofperson is being hired.

Government contributions -- Apart from counterpart funds, theseinclude housing, office accommodation, transport, etc. Delays inproviding resources and facilities will affect adversely theperformance of technical assistance staff.

Counterpart staff -- In all countries, the tendency is tooverestimate the availability of such staff. Furthermore, poor

gg/ For a broad treatment of staff training, including estimates ofresource requirements, trainers, teaching materials, syllabi, etc.,please see Rural Access Roads Programme: The Role of the Ministry ofWorks Training Department (Ministry of Works, Nairobi, 1976).

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performance of counterparts is seldom anticipated and no proceduresare available for the replacement of non-performers.

Project supervision and monitoring -- Labor-based programs aresupervised by different staff members of different donor agencies.Each individual has different ideas concerning priorities, problemsand achievements. Communication would be facilitated if minimumrequirements for supervision missions and monitoring procedures areagreed ir detail between the Government and donors before any labor-based operations begin.

B. FINDINGS SPECIFIC TO KENYA

36. The Rural Access Roads Project helped demonstrate that labor-based construction methods are technically feasible and financially cost-effective in Kenya. These met7iods are now routinely applied. Kenyan staffnot only plan and supervise works but also provide training for techniciansfrom other African countries. Project completion did take three and a halfyears longer than anticipated but, in the Audit's view, the delay wasneither excessive nor unreasonable. The original time-frame was too brieffor the introduction of a construction technology with which the countryhad no previous experience. If due allowance is made for administrativeand procurement delays, appraisal forecasts are quite close to actuals:actual project cost was US$11.7 million (vs. US$10.1 million estimated);re-evaluated economic rate of return was 16% (vs. 12% estimated).

37. It is difficult to establish the extent to which the Bank-financed project contributed either to institution-building, or to thesocial and developmental targets of the RARP. Indeed, it is even harder todetermine the precise extent to which targets listed in the original(February 1974) RARP description have been met:

(a) Provide all-weather access between high-potential farming areasand market centers;

(b) Provide employment to the people in whose areas the programwould be implemented;

(c) Encourage shifts in land use by promoting productiondiversification towards cash crops and livestock activities;

(d) Bring more people out of the "subsistence" and into the "market"economy;

(e) Improve the quality of rural life by making available theservices available at designated growth centers; and

(f) Foster greater economic, geographic and social integrationbetween rural areas and their corresponding urban and ruralcenters.

Comparison between such socio-economic objectives and actual results wouldhave been instructive, and that was the idea behind the "Impact Studies"proposed by the Bank and other donors at the inception phase. Inretrospect, it is obvious that such a comparison would be methodologicallydifficult, and prohibitively expensive. Data are not available for a

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rigorous analysis but the Audit feels that even if such an analysis hadbeen possible, it would not have added much to the general impression thatthe RARP has helped, though in an unquantifiable way, a large number ofpeople living in rural areas. Whether this help could have been deliveredmore cost-effectively must remain an open question.

38. The June 1990 Audit Mission travelled all over Kenya, inspectedinnumerable roads improved under the RARP, and spoke with MOW officers.with casual laborers, with farmers, and with tradesmen. The Audit hasconcluded that the Bank-assisted project has contributed to some veryimportant achievements:

(a) the country's technical and political leadership is nowcommitted to the use of labor-based construction techniques;

(b) the public at large favors these techniques both because theyimprove and maintain roads and because they generate jobs;

(c) construction and maintenance work is of good quality; and(d) given the country's employment situation, the scope for applying

labor-based techniques for road and irrigation works isconsiderable.

Having contributed to the generation of these benefits, the Bank-supportedproject was closed in 1984. Benefits continue to flow in 1990 but the Bankdid not support the Minor Roads Program (MRP)20/ which, since 1986, hasbeen carrying on from where the RARP left off.

39. The appartat reason why the Bank withheld further support forlabor-based operatiors was Government's insistence that such support oughtto be extended on ..A credit terms, while the Bank insisted that it oughtto be in the form of a loan. In the Audit's opinion, the real reason wasthat the Bank -- which continued to lack a mechanism to support newinitiatives, such cs the systematic use of casual labor in civilconstruction -- regarded continuing participation in labor-based activitiesas too demanding in .rms of supervision, and not rewarding enough in termsof lending volume. te noted above under "Inception", imperfect integrationbetween EAR and TRU in 1975 prevented the Bank from undertaking the overallcoordination of RARP, <',en though Government persistently asked for it. Asa result, and although t.ie Bank did initiate the introduction of labor-based techniques in Ke.ya, the actual support it extended through the RuralAccess Roads Project was no more, and no different, than what was extendedby half a dozen other donors. Some of these donors subsequently complainedthat the Bank did not assume a leadership role which, they felt, would havebenefitted the RARP.21/

20/ For a summary description of current activities under the Minor Roadsprogram, please see Annex 1, Labor-based road construction andmaintenance in Kenya: Status and prospects in 1990.

31/ This is openly acknowledged in the PCR which says: "Some of the otherdonors feel that the Bank could have taken more of a leading roleduring project implementation" (para 5.07).

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40. In the Audit's opinion, the rigidity exhibited by both theGovernment and the Bank in 1985, when financing details for the MRP werebeing debated, has not helped the expansion of sound labor-based operationsin Kenya. In 1990, rise of unemployment and underemployment, urban centerdeterioration (largeiy due to massive rural-urban migration), and generalmacroeconomic difficulties,2/ prompted the establishment of aPresidential Commission on Employment which attaches the highest urgency tojob creation in rural areas. The absence of the Bank from ongoing MRPlabor-based construction and maintenance activities (which, the Auditfeels, will sooner or later become an integral part of the activitiessponsored by the Presidential Commission), ought to be regretted for threereasons. First, because donor coordination remains problematic. Second,because financing remains erratic. Third, because certain operationalaspects, where Bank presence would have been beneficial, remain unresolved.

Donor coordination

41. For more than fifteen years. a variety of donor agencies havebeen providing financial and technical assistance to RARP and MRP butcoordination is still elusive. Since 1978, MOW has conducted annual"Review Meetings" attended by representatives of all aid agenciescontributing to RARP/MRP. Study of the summary reports prepared by the ILO(which has been entrusted with secretarial duties) led the Audit toconclude that these meetings had more to do with public relations than withany determined attempt to coordinate independent activities. Thisimpression was fortified during discussions with MOW officials who, whileinsisting on anonymity, flatly stated that the Review Meetings weredeliberately intended to make aid agency representatives "feel good aboutthe Program and have a good time in Kenya." In 1990, different donorscontinue to finance different MRP units in different districts, and littleprogress has been made in establishing even a common mechanism forprocurement.23/

Finances

42. Over the past few years, Government has been strapped for moneyand paying for labor-based work is problematic. The few resources thatTreasury can make available are allocated from year to year and are subjectto abrupt reductions even after commitments have been made. Most of thefunds must therefore come from abropd, and under concessionary terms.Traditionally, foreign aid flows are not centralized in Kenya. In theory.Treasury coordinates external assistance but, in practice, each Ministryhas its own contacts in the aid community and MOW staff spend an inordinate

22/ Sobering details are given in paras 57-59 and in Tables 1 and 2 ofKenya Policy Framework Paper, 1990 to 1992 (April 3, 1990).

2_/ Procurement of the relatively simple equipment needed (tractors,trailers, bicycles, four-wheel drive vehicles) follows no centrallylaid down procedure but depends on what each donor is prepared to

offer.

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amount of time lobbying donor agencies. In the process, they have to makeconcessions: they must agree they need technical assistance staff when theydo not, and they must show interest in sociological dimensions they reallyare quite indifferent to.AA/ Under the circumstances, it is unrealisticto expect that MOW staff will have much energy left for long-term worksplanning and staff development.

ODerationS

43. In the early 1970s, the Study of Labor and Capital Substitutionshowed that labor-based construction methods can compete in financial termswith equipment-based methods as long as labor productivity is such that fora daily wage of US$1.00-2.00 laborers will deliver between 2 and 3 cubicmeters of excavation per day. The Study also determined that for suchproductivity to be possible laborers must be in relatively good health, andthat they must have good tools. The 1990 daily wage in Kenya is US$1.50 soone condition is satisfied. On the other hand, the Audit discovered thatthe quality of tools is atrocious and that the health status of workers isfar from enviable.

44. In many sites visited by the Audit mission, workers werebringing their own tools because none were provided. The explanation liesin procurement difficulties dating back to 1977. At that time, the MOWTechnology Unit prepared model specifications for every conceivable type ofhandtool.1/ Procurement of the large number of items required for theRARP alerted a variety of entrepreneurs to the benefits of securing acontract and delivering tools that would =R match the specifications.Entrepreneurs who failed to secure a contract succeeded in blocking allprocurement. A Bank Supervision Report dated December 22, 1977. noted thatwork progress was impeded because of shortage of hand tools, that fullyoperational units would have to lay off their casual labor, and that otherunits were ready to start but could not because there were no tools. Sofar as the Audit could make out, handtool procurement has not improved muchsince 1977.

24/ In the course of site visits, MOW staff persistently pointed at womenworkers and suggested that their presence be noted in the AuditReport. The Audit Mission responded that it is just as bad for men asit is for women to work like animals for US$1.50 a day, and thatlabor-based activities are tolerable only as long as more decent workis not available. MOW staff replied that this was exactly their ownopinion but, for reasons they could not understand, representativesof certain donor agencies always wanted to see more women digging.For an effective treatment of the purely human aspects of labor-basedconstruction schemes, please see Chen, M., and Ghuznavi, R., Women inFood-for-Work: The Bangladesh Experience (World Food Program. Rome,1977).

25/ These specifications have been incorporated in Appendix C: Notes onHandtools and Light Equipment of Labor-based Construction Programs: APractical Guide for Planning and Management (Oxford University Press,1983).

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45. Equally disturbing is the health status of the workers. Thetopic was explored in the middle 1970s2J/ and the unsurprisingconclusion was that casual laborers were not in perfect health. One of thefindings of the Study of Labor and Capital Substitution was that iron pillsroutinely delivered to laborevs reduced the impact of anemia uponproductivity. A second finding was that it makes economic sense for themanagement of labor-based construction site to offer to the workers anutritious beverage (costing a few US cents). since most of them arrive towork without any breakfast. A third finding was that laborers arefrequently injured on the job (especially when they wear no shoes), thatinfection sets in quickly and that, consequently, some rudimentary first-aid facilities are indispensable.2Z/ The Audit mission could notconduct medical tests but did infer, from the rosters kept in each site,that anywhere from 10 to 15% of the laborers did not report to work becausethey suffered from malaria and other illnesses. Systematic questioningrevealed that few workers had had anything to eat before reporting forwork. Finally, no site was equipped with anything resembling a first-aidkit.

46. Major Audit findings on the Rural Access Roads Project are asfollows:

(a) Physical targets of the RARP have been met and work quality isgood.

(b) Kenyanization is virtually complete and MOW has amassedexperience with labor-based operations that it freely shareswith other African countries.

(c) Impact of the RARP upon the rural areas where it has beenimplemented is unknown. No agreement has been reached betweenGovernment and donors as to precisely what such programs are toaccomplish, except road building and employment generation.Government is not interested in monitoring of long-termdevelopmental changes, agricultural cropping patterns, regionalgrowth, etc.

26/ Please see Karyadi, D., and Basta, S.S., Nutrition and Health ofIndonesian Construction Workers: Endurance and Anemia (IBRD StaffWorking Paper No. 152, Washington, D.C., 1973). Specifically forhealth aspects in Kenya. see Latham, L., Latham, M., and Basta, S.S.The Nutritional and Economic Implications of Ascaris Infection inKenya (IBRD Staff Working Paper No. 271, Washington, D.C., 1977).This rigorous investigation of medical and ergonomic aspects wasconducted as part of the Bank's Study of Labor and CapitalSubstitution in Civil Engineering Construction.

27/ A sa. 'sfactory arrangement was developed in the Bank-supported laborbased operations in the Sategui-Deressia Project in Chad during thelate 1970s. One thousand five hundred workers, none of them wearingshoes, were building a canal embankment. Cuts were frequent and oneelderly worker was appointed paramedic. He was equipped with acanvas bag containing iodine, pei4xide. sulfa and bandages and hespent the day patrolling the site from end to end.

23

(d) Further application of labor-based construction and maintenanceprograms depends on erratic financing from Treasury and donors.Financing needs are considerable and ad-hoc financing is themajor issue.3_/

(e) The Bank declined to provide further support because ofdisagreements with the Government over terms of repayment. Thiswas wrong. Labor-based construction methods have an enormousscope throughout the Third World and, by continuing itsassistance to Kenya, the Bank would have drawn lessons useful toother Member Countries.

(f) Government allowed the Bank to pull out. This was wrong too.Financing becomes easier when the Bank participates in a givenprogram because other donor agencies feel more at ease.

C. SUMMARY

47. Kenyan experience reinforces the experience from Bank-supportedprojects in Chad, Honduras. Malawi, and Benin that, if properly planned andsupervised, labor-based construction programs produce good quality work ata competitive cost.

48. Countries most likely to benefit from large-scale application oflabor-based construction and maintenance methods are least likely to affordthe financial and technical inputs required. They must therefore depend onconcessional aid.

49. It is unlikely that a single donor will be able to support anentire labor-based program in a developing country. This makes donorcoordination desirable, though complicated. In principle, the Bank wouldbe in the best position to perform a coordinating role but the Bank'sorganizational structure raises obstacles.

50. The Audit believes that, if the Bank decides to support newlabor-based projects, it ought to establish a unit specifically mandated toperform this task. The unit ought to be permanently staffed withprofessionals experienced in the design and implementation of suchprograms, and it ought to command sufficient resources to provide a fullcomplement of financial, technical and monitoring assistance to MemberCountries.

3P/ Please see "Financial requirements for future maintenance" in Annex1: Labor-based road construction and miintenance in Kenya: Status andprospects in 1990.

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Annex 1

LABOR-BASED ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE IN KENYA:STATUS AND PROSPECTS IN 1990

The Rural Access Roads Program and the Minor Roads Program

1. The RARP was launched in November 1974 when roadwork started in4 districts (South Nyanza, Kwale, West Pokot, Nyeri) and by 1989 had beenexpanded to cover 27 Districts. Between 1974 and 1989. the RARP built atotal of 8,046 km, which works out to about 300 km per District. Althoughconstruction or graveling work under the RARP continues in the districts ofNyandarua, Baringo, Kwale, Elgeyo Marakwet and Trans Nzoia. RARP operationshave now been fully incorporated into the activities of a successor program-- the Minor Roads Program (MRP) -- launched by MOW in 1984.

2. This was a logical transition. The RARP was primarily aconstruction program. By the early 1980s, maintenance of completed roadsbecame a major issue and, in 1984, the MOW conceived the MRP as a roadimprovement program that would emphasize maintenance using labor-basedmethods and would also encompass maintenance of roads built under the RARP.The concept attracted strong support from the aid agencies of Canada.Denmark, the EEC, the Netherlands, Norway. Sweden and Switzerland and, in1990. MRP construction and maintenance operations are underway in 28Districts. Subject to the reservations noted in the following pages. theAudit has concluded that the MRP has sound objectives and a matureadministrative structure.

MRP: Status and prospects

3. The MRP organization comes under the MOW Special Projects Branchwhich encompasses among its duties the promotion of labor-based maintenancemethods for low-traffic roads. This creates certain jurisdictionalproblems because MRP improves and maintains roads which, in theory, have tobe maintained by the MOW Maintenance Branch. a service that hastraditionally relied on equipment-based methods. Although two parallelroad maintenance organizations have been created both at the Headquartersand the District levels, the Audit feels that this is not a badsolution.2./ In the long-run, the MOW envisages, correctly in the

29/ Over time, inexperienced or careless equipment operators smoothingwith graders the running surface of earth roads invariably pushmaterial to the sides. Little attention is given to drainage and.eventually, many earth roads begin to resemble canals which, in therainy season, turn into small rivers. Labor-based maintenance ofearth roads, on the contrary, devotes much attention both to proper

25

Audit's opinion, that MOW District Works Officers will be in charge of twoseparate road maintenance sections: one for equipment-based and a secondfor labor-based operations.

4. The MRP has ambitious targets: the 1986-1991 planned output is4,500 km. By June 1989. 1.628 km of earth roads had been improved and 622km graveled. Like the RARP, the MRP has no trouble with formation worksbut is encountering difficulties with graveling.AQ/ The MRP is a muchlarger employer than the RARP. In 1990, it employs about 22,000 people(about 20,500 casual laborers and 1.500 permanent staff).Al/

5. MRP emphasis on maintenance is shown in the allocation oflaborers to major activities:Ag/

L of total labor force Number of laborersper km of output

Road Improvements 52 15.9Periodic maintenanceA3/ 19 10.4Routine maintenance 29 0.4

6. Earth road improvement involves the initial rehabilitation of atrack to the MOW "Earth Road Standard" (i.e., 4.5 m running surface plus1.5 m x 2 shoulders). About 800 km are done every year with an averageDistrict Unit output of about 28 km. Graveling involves surfacing with 10-15 cm of material borrowed from nearby quarries. About 450 km are doneevery year with an average District Unit output of about 15 km. The MOW.faced with equipment procurement and mechanical problems in its forceaccount graveling operations has begun to turn increasing volumes of workto private contractors, with reportedly satisfactory results.A4/

cambering of the running surface and to correct drainage. As aresult, even the most casual inspection suffices to reveal whichearth roads have been maintained by hand, which by equipment, andwhich method is preferable.

A/ Tractors and trailers are delivered with considerable delays and themechanical problems with hitching devices (which plagued the RARPgraveling operations) have not been resolved.

41/ At its peak (1983/84), the RARP employed a total of 13,052 casuallaborers.

AZ/ Source: Ministry of Public Works: Rural Access Roads Programme andMinor Roads Programme -- Progress Report No. 9 (November 1989) p.38 .

A3/ Reshaping, regraveling and repairs to structures.

AA/ Even so, the backlog of graveling has been increasing. Part of theexplanation is that original plans assumed that 50% of road lengthimprovements would require graveling; the percentage has subsequentlybeen raised to 81% and then to 97%.

26

Periodic mainatenance involves reshaping, regraveling and repairs tostructures. About 450 km are regraveled every year. 3/4 done by forceaccount and 1/4 by contracts. Routine maintenance employs about 5,500laborers (called "contractors") and about 600 headmen. Average length percontractor is 1.5 km.

7. Productivity rates can be summarized as follows:

Mandays per kmActual4/ Estimate446/

Earth road improvement 1449J7/ 1256Graveling 1401-A/ 1556

Total 2850 2797

8. MRP indicative costs per km are as follows:

Improvement Per. Maint. Rout. Maipt.

Cost/km in KShs 253,000 95.000 2.900

% breakdown by major expenditure item

Casual Wages 33 55 78Staff Wages and Expenses 19 4 3Construction materials 11 12 7Tools 2 3 3Transport costs 16 17 7Equipment purchase 9 -- -

Other 10 10 2

4/ Source: RARP and MRP -- Progress Report No.9 (November 1989).

46/ Source: MRP Master Implementation Plan (December 1986).

AZ/ The range extends from 922 to 2493 mandays. Part of the difference isdue to the relative efficiency of different units and part to thewidely different characteristics of each District where work wasdone. The highest figure (2493 mandays per km) was registered inElgeyo Marakwet where the terrain was steep and thickly forested,with high rainfall, and where full rebuilding of a road was required.

4p/ The range extended from 827 to 2941 mandays per km, with the higherfigures coming from Districts where opening of quarries andstockpiling of material turned out to be particularly difficult.Interestingly enough, actual tractordays per km of road graveled (22with a range of 13-59) were considerably below estimates (62tractordLays), mostly because haul distances turned out to be lowerthan anticipated.

27

Staffing

9. In early 1990, MRP was almost completely Kenyanized. NairobiHeadquarters had a total staff of 6 Engineers and field strength figureswere as follows:

Engineers/Supervisors 39Senior Inspectors 1Inspectors 34Foremen 5Road Overseers 235Drivers 135Plant operators 200Motor Vehicle Mechanics 79Carpenters 15Masons 23

Staff training

10. Every year, between six and ten MRP staff undergo long-termtraining, in Kenya and abroad. The MRP has a training school at Kisii with133 permanent staff (ranging from Resident Instructors to SubordinateStaff) and about 100 casual employees (ranging from store clerks to grasscutters). The Kisii School offers a variety of courses in roadconstruction and maintenance (maintenance courses; engineer courses;overseer courses; inspector courses; graveling courses* etc.); inmechanical training; and in administration. Trainees from other Africancountries are regularly accommodated in the school's training program.

Financial requirements for future maintenance

11. Upon completion of the MRP in 1991, the total length of roads tobe maintained by labor-intensive methods will be:

(Estimated costs in 1989 KShs)

Jngth in km Routine Maintenance Periodic Maintenance49/

Costfkm Total cost/

RARP 8.100 4,300 34.8 million 100.000MRP 4.500 5.200 23.4 million 160,000

A9/ Regraveling of MRP roads will be more expensive than that of RARProads because they require about 60% more gravel. The regravelingcycle, which varies depending on traffic volume and rainfall. may beas short as once every 4 years and as long as once every 12 years.

29 Appendix IPage 1 of 2

Conments on the draft PPAR

RAR/tR Programme,P.C. BOX 900;63,0YBAS1.

4th Varch, 1991

Mr. Graham Donaldson,Operations Evaluation Department,9ORLD BANK.

RE: KENYA: RURAL ACCESS ROADS PROJECT.

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT RYPORT.

I would like to express my appreciation for the opportunity

to comment on the project performance Audit report from

my experience in Kwale and Kilifi Districts.

In general the report is interesting to read and cross

reference + foot notes make it easy to follow.

COTMEnTS/SUGGESTED CORRECTIONS.

Page IV Project Operation.

The Minor roads Programme concentrates on improvement of

existing roads to maintenable standards and maintains

both the rural access and Minor roads.

8. If the Bank establishes such a unit, it would be in a

better position not only to get involved as a Donor but

also to act as a Co-ordinator of other Donors. This isdurrently done by ILO but it is felt that the bank would

be more respected by other donars.

(Refer page 10 para. g of this report to see MOW view on

the same).

Appendix IPage 2 of 2

30

Page 16

C M32 tries to go round this problem by approving roads

that pass through areas of high population density

and by keeping casual wages for road works at slightly

higher levels than those of the agricultural sector. This

process involves liaising with other government ministries

(Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Finance).

jLe_18

Para. 37 Some of the targets that have clearly been

met out of the original ones are a, b, e, and f.

J.G. AMBXKUD.M.I. ENGINEERKWALE,ILIFI DISTRICTS.

31Comments on the draft PPAR Appendix II

Page 1 of 4

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE( BUREAU INTERNATIONAL DU TRAVAIL

OFICINA INTERNACIONAL DEL TRABAJO

4 o' fe des Mor Ilor-.CH-.'' CEN 'E 22Tologrammes N-P-AB GENEVETePx 41504' Ic: nFoc-smoe (22) P83 Mr. Graham Donaldson, Chief

T c' '22) 799 Agriculture, Infrastructure and HumanResources DivisionOperations Evaluation Department

Ref BIT/;_o TF 45-227-2-a-15-1 The World BankVo re r,' 1818 H Street N.W.

Washington D.C. 20433USA

Dear Mr. Donaldson,

I refer to your letter regarding the PPAR on the Kenya Rural Access Roads Project(RARP) and we are happy to provide you with our comments given our long involvement withthis programme.

First some general comments:

The report is generally well written and contains the essential elements of the RARP. Itis strong and, with a few notable exceptions, accurate on the early years of the RARP. Itbecomes less precise towards the latter half of the World Bank's involvement and seemsconsiderably less than well informed of the progress since 1983.

We appreciate that the World Bank has not been actively involved in the RARP, or itssuccessor the Minor Roads Programme (MRP) since 1983. Consequently, there willautomatically be errors due tc. lack of current information. Thus, for example, the statement that"Monitoring and Evaluation activities have not produced any substantive results" appears toanyone who knows the programme nonsense and one's immediate reaction is to look again atthe cover-le'ter to see if we are really talking of the same programme.

The report naturally concentrates on the involvement of the World Bank in thisprogramme. However, unlike many other joint donor funded projects this one has had not onlythe financial support of other donors, but also a strong technical input from them. Their role hasbeen much more than financiers. In this regard it is worth putting the World Bank's involvementinto focus. The total cost of the RARP was some $50 Million. The World Bank's contributionwas $8 million. Between 1977 and 1983 it financed 8 of the 42 units of the RARP. Certainlya significant input into the programme but not the major one.

The report is keen to give the World Bank credit for initiating the RARP. Many

A2pendix IIPage 2 of 4

32

organisations and individuals have wished to take credit for such a successful programme andthere is certainly no harm in the World Bank wishing to join the club. Statements regarding theWorld Bank's pre-eminent role in initiation of the RARP bear closer scrutiny than the claimsof many others. The World Bank certainly were particularly helpful to the ministry in thedevelopment of the programme proposals. However, by the time that funds were actuallyavailable for the first World Bank RARP unit in Kirinyaga in 1977, the programme had alreadybeen running for over 2 years. The British and the Dutch already had provided funds for 5units, in the case of the former since 1974.

In general the theme that permeates the report is regret. Regret that first the World Bankdid not take on the role of coordination of the RARP as they were asked to. Regret also thatthey were not involved in the follow up programme - the Minor Roads Programme (MRP). Bothapparently c4used by divisions in the World Bank. We also feel it was a loss for the World Banknot to have been involved. Certainly they could have benefited enormously from a closerinvolvement in the RARP and the MRP.

The authors of the PPAR however wish to draw a different conclusion. They wish to showthat because the World Bank did not coordinate the programme and because they are notinvolved in the MRP this has resulted in less than optimal situation for the two programmes.

Para. 40 talks of the 3 problems where the World Bank's involvement would have beenbeneficial. What in fact are these problems?

"Coordination" - The authors wish us to believe that this is a problem. Para 41 in truejournalistic style quotes "anonymous sources" to substantiate the claim.that donor coordinationis still elusive. Frankly, and I know that this is a view shared by the other eonors in the MRP,the coordination of both the RARP and the MRP is seen as exemplary and one many wouldhope to be able to emulate elsewhere. I realise that it does not fit in with the authors thesis butit happens to be true.

"Financing remains erratic" - on what evidence is this statement made? Again, to the bestof our knowledge this is just not true.

"Certain operational aspects remain unresolved" - which ones? Again we have a gratuitousstatement with no supporting evidence. Unless, of course, they refer to the lack of Monitoringand Evaluation. The authors here seem to think that because the complex and expensive systemthat was set up in the late '70s and early '80s did not work that there is no M&E in theprogramme. In fact, a detailed and very effective system does exist which, like many otherfacets of the programme, is being used as a model for other projects.

We therefore would heartily agree with the statement on the bottom of pg. 19 that "thesupport that it (the Bank) extended was no more and no different than that was extended by halfa dozen other donors". It is unfortunate that this is clearly seen as a negative statement by theauthors. To have been involved in the development of a programme which is a model forlabour-based road works and is now used as a training ground for the growing number ofcountries who are turning to LB is a very positive thing. It is sad that the authors then feel itnecessary to falsely denigrate those aspects of the programme that they feel the World Bank-11-ld h- ' h-d -n ff -t inn if th h-d b n mnr- in-olved

Appendix IIPage 3 of 4

33

Some other points: We are a bit surprised that certain statements have been allowed toremain in a document of this nature. We have already referred to para 41. Footnote 34 on pg.21 is equally strange with its reference to people working like animals. On which constructionsites have the authors been? On pg. 22 the authors infer that 10 to 15% of the workers wereabsent because of illness. From this inference they conclude that "the health status of workersis disturbing" - hardly a very scientific analysis!

A point of detail on the objective of the MRP which the report states is a maintenanceprogramme. It is in fact a rehabilitation programme. The intention certainly is that by putting4500 kms. back into good condition it will be easier to set up a proper maintenance system.

What then are the real lessons for the World Bank of the RARP and the MRP. We wouldsuggest that they are the following:

1. Through effective donor cc .rdination it is possible to provide support to the govern-ment in the execution of a nationwide programme of this nature.

2. The effective partnership between government and donors on the RARP and theMRP has resulted in the definition ind resolution of the major problems inimplementing a large labour based programme.

3. Programmes such as this should not be used as vehicles for academic research(which was rather the case in the late 70s). Rather they can provide the means todevelop more effective systems of monitoring, selection and evaluation which meetthe criteria of being both simple and effective.

4. The success of such a programme is very dependent on the reaction of the beneficia-ries. In the case of the RARP, whilst there may have been reluctance on the part ofthe Engineers, the politicians quickly saw the benefits of such a programme andindeed question, were raised in parliament about the less than total coverage of thecountry by the irogramme.

5. The long term direct impact of such a programme is in labour based maintenance.This aspect is only now being fully addressed.

6. An effective programme in one sector (roads) can lead to the establishment ofsimilar programmes in other sectors as is now being developed in Kenya.

We hope you find these comments useful.

Yours sincerely,

Geoff EdmdsInfrastructure and Rural Works BranchEmployment and Development Department

pendix IIP4ge 4 of 4

34

cc Mr. Carl Than - SIDAMs. Cindy Clapp-Wincek - Agency for International DevelopmentMr. P. Marres - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The NetherlandsMr. W.P. Wambura - Ministry of Transport & Communications, NairobiMr. Samson Akute - Ministry of Public Works, NairobiMr. Paul Peter - SDC, BerneSir Crispin Teckell - ODA, LondonMs. M. Catley-Carson, CIDAMr. Vott - NORADMr. Bjorn Olsen - DANIDAMr. Lars Karlsson - SIDAMr. David Stiedl, ILO, NairobiMr. Idar Johanesen, NORAD

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