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The Bush administration has proposed some very significant revi-sions to American nuclear strategy. These revisions were firstintroduced in the 2002Nuclear Posture Review(NPR), a classified doc-

ument that envisions a "New Triad" military doctrine consisting of

offensive strike systems (nuclear and conventional), defences (active

and passive), and a revitalized defence infrastructure, which would be

bound together by a sophisticated command, control, communica-

tions and intelligence (C3I) system.1This document, while ostensibly a blueprint for the US nuclear

arsenal, provides the basis for a significant transformation of the

wider US military architecture. This point is reiterated by Keith B.

Payne: "Despite its title, the scope was much broader than nuclear

matters. It was a strategic posture review, the Pentagon's first strategic

policy initiative to depart fundamentally from a Cold War-era policy

orientation."2 Nuclear weapons are, however, incorporated as a cen-

tral element of this strategic military posture. This is not merely hypo-

thetical. In fact, these modifications have been further codified in

National Security Presidential Directive 17 (NSPD-17)3, and many arein the process of being implemented in US nuclear war plans and

operational policies. While not a radical departure from previous

administrations, the New Triad does represent the most recent mani-

THE NEW TRIAD, BUNKER BUSTERSAND 'COUNTERPROLIFERATION WARS':

Nuclear Primacy and Its Implications for Canadian

Security Policy

By David S. McDonough


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90 DAVID S. MCDONOUGH

festation of a little noticed trend in post-Cold War US nuclear strate-gy the incorporation of "counterproliferation" as an integral mis-

sion for the US nuclear arsenal.

The rationale for much of these developments is the predomi-

nant US perception of the threat posed by the horizontal prolifera-

tion of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to adversarial or revi-

sionist "rogue states." This threat perception is not limited to

Washington. In fact, many countries including Canada are begin-

ning to recognize that such proliferation will be a critical challenge in

the 21st century. However, it should also be recognized that the cur-

rent administration's plans to increase reliance on nuclear weapons asa response could potentially have detrimental consequences, not only

to the strategic stability among the established nuclear weapon states

(NWSs), but perhaps more importantly, to the strategic stability

between the US and its rogue state adversaries.

The dangers posed by this example of "vertical" nuclear prolif-

eration, which is essentially what the US is pursuing, have not received

much attention in Canada. This is certainly understandable. For the

most part, interest in these issues has declined in the post-Cold War

period, when the threat posed by such arsenals was perceived (falsely)

to have been reduced. Moreover, Canada is not a nuclear power, noris it directly involved in the formulation of US nuclear strategy. As a

"middlepower," and an increasingly marginalized one at that,

Canadian policy has frequently focused on alternative, and often less

strategic, concerns.4

Despite such preoccupations, American nuclear strategy par-

ticularly under this administration is not an issue that should be dis-

missed lightly. Canadian international influence may have indeed

deteriorated in recent years, and our attention has been justifiably

focused on domestic and continental security, but our security inter-

ests are still very much international in scope. American nuclear strat-egy cannot be disassociated from either Canada's long-standing sup-

port for multilateral non-proliferation measures, nor from its prefer-


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THE DILEMMAS OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC PRIMACY 91

ence for international and regional strategic stability. Canadian poli-cy-makers who ignore these developments may inadvertently find

their influence even further limited, at a time when the international

environment has become far less amenable to Canadian security and

interests.

Historical Context

The Bush administration's nuclear strategy, while featuing some

elements that are novel, is not a radical departure from the policies of

previous administrations. Much of the foundation for the New Triad

actually originated as early as the Cold War, when US nuclear planners

were intent on mitigating the importance of a Soviet nuclear deter-

rent.5 "Counterforce" targeting of an opponent's military capabilities

and command and control infrastructure, which are featured quite

prominently in the New Triad's emphasis on counterproliferation mis-

sions, were originally conceived as a necessary component to the US

deterrence of its Soviet adversary. In the post-Cold War period, the

emphasis on targeting of Third World and rogue state adversaries has

only increased the necessity for even more specialized(e.g. counterpro-

liferation-based) counterforce capabilities.A common public misperception is that, during the Cold War,

the US emphasized "countervalue" targets against Soviet cities, for

example and unusablenuclear weapons. It was during this period that

the US had publicly accepted the mutually assured destruction (MAD)

doctrine: if one side decides to initiate an attack, the other side would

have sufficient second-strike nuclear forces to inflict an unacceptable

degree of destruction on the initiator. This doctrine stemmed largely

from the development of a Soviet nuclear deterrent, and later, the

seemingly inevitable development of nuclear parity between the two

superpowers. Indeed, this may be one reason why so many peoplewere surprised by this administration's very explicit emphasis on

counterforce targeting in theNuclear Posture Reviewand its concept of

the New Triad.


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However, this perception of US Cold War nuclear strategy isfalse. In fact, despite an official adherence to MAD, the US had con-

sistently emphasized a mixture of both countervalue andcounterforce

targeting against the Soviet Union. Nuclear counterforce options

against the Soviet nuclear arsenal and later, its political and eco-

nomic foundations were an integral if often unrecognized part of

American nuclear war plans since the Eisenhower administration's

fixation on nuclear overkill during the 1950s.6The Kennedy adminis-

tration did attempt to reject the overkill features of its predecessor,

preferring instead "flexible" nuclear options, based on preemptive

counterforce nuclear capabilities and the ability to withhold attacks onseveral categories of targets (the "no cities" version of counterforce).7

But despite initially accepting the idea of MAD and its need for sec-

ond-strike forces and countervalue targeting, it would continue to

emphasize such potentially destabilizing first strike targeting options.

Subsequent administrations would expand on this proclivity

towards counterforce weapons and flexible targeting. The Nixon

administration emphasized the need to maintain "sufficiency" in

nuclear capabilities, to reinforce the US ability to deter the Soviet

Union, and therefore promulgated Single Integrated Operating Plan 5

(SIOP-5) which featured selective nuclear options, and enshrined theSoviet recovery economy as a central "withhold" option in US nuclear

war plans. Such withhold options would be critical in any American

attempt to achieve intrawar deterrence and war termination during a

protracted nuclear exchange.

Following a Nuclear Targeting Policy Review, the Carter admin-

istration introduced the "countervailing strategy," the goal of which

was to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving any definition of vic-

tory in the event of a nuclear war. The administration's Presidential

Directive 59 (PD-59) codified this doctrine, while the Nuclear

Weapons Employment Policy 80 (NUWEP-80) followed through onthis strategy, by emphasizing a more survivable command, control

and communications system for the United States to allow it to bet-


5/35


ter survive a protracted nuclear war and expanding the target list toinclude political as well as economic and military targets.8

The Reagan administration was particularly attached to this "war-

fighting" role for its nuclear arsenal, to achieve "escalation domi-

nance" or the ability to "contain or defeat the adversary at all levels of

violence with the possible exception of the highest."9 The need for

such a doctrine was particularly acute, given the growth in Soviet

nuclear capabilities and the perceived arrival of nuclear parity. The

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) of October 1981 even

had the goal of "prevailing" in a nuclear war of up to 180 days. To

achieve this goal, there have been six revisions to the nuclear war plan(SIOP-6A to SIOP-6F), and yearly NUWEPs to guide these revisions.

In turn, this led to an emphasis on decapitation strikes against the

Soviet leadership and military capabilities (e.g. mobile or relocatable

targets) by such hard target kill weapons as the new MX interconti-

nental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the Trident II D-5 sea-launched

ballistic missile (SLBM), and the potential for damage limitation capa-

bilities inherent in such programs as the Strategic Defense Initiative

(SDI).10

The New Triad may advocate new nuclear capabilities, but this

merely reflects the long-standing American fascination with counter-force, as opposed to countervalue weapons. The nuclear capabilities

advocated by the current administration are geared towards counter-

proliferation missions,11 and as such, represent specialized counter-

force weapons for the destruction of an adversary's military forces

(especially those related to chemical and biological capabilities). That

the targets for these counterforce weapons were often non-nuclear

Third World countries is also not a new development, but rather has

its origins with the fall of the Soviet Union, when much of the poli-

cies developed to achieve escalation dominance over the Soviet Union

were shifted to the newly recognized rogue state threat.The post-Cold War period while witnessing the end of the

Soviet Union, the primary rationale for the US nuclear arsenal also


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saw the growing American fixation on rogue states. "Horizontal" pro-liferation to these "states of concern" had replaced the Soviet Union

as the primary strategic threat facing the United States.12This change

in threat calculation was reinforced in two key incidents in the early

post-Cold War period. First, there was the 1990-1991 Gulf War and

the implicit danger of chemical or biological weapons use by Iraq.

This led the US not only to undertake active and passive defences for

its troops, but also to attempt conventional strikes to pre-empt possi-

ble Iraqi use of WMD.13

This was followed by the 1994 Korean nuclear crisis and the pos-

sible acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea. While thedevelopment of a couple of nuclear weapons was considered a real

danger, the possibility that the regime might develop a dozen weapons

made this incident an even more serious crisis this number of

weapons could potentially be sold to other countries or lead to the

nuclearization of other regional countries. Reports even indicate that

the US briefly considered pre-emptive military action against

Pyonyang between 1993 and 1994.14

With the seemingly inevitable horizontal proliferation of WMD,

the Defence Department introduced the Defense

Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI), a new proposal that envisionedusing US military force as a means to address the threat posed by

rogue states and WMD. As pointed out by Secretary of Defense Les

Aspin, the CPI accepts that proliferation could still occur despite the

best efforts of non-proliferation: "At the heart of the Defense

Counterproliferation Initiative, therefore, is a drive to develop new

military capabilities to deal with this new threat."15

While introduced as a conventional doctrine, counterprolifera-

tion would be incorporated as an integral part of American post-Cold

War nuclear planning. Both the 1990 Military Net Assessment and the

Reed Panel recommended the incorporation of Third World targetsinto US nuclear war plans. These recommendations would be formal-

ized in SIOP-93. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) even attempted


7/35


to further reinforce this new counterproliferation role with what hasbeen termed the "Silver Books," classified documents with "plans for

military strikes against WMD facilities in a number of 'rogue'

nations."16This controversial initiative was eventually terminated, but

counterproliferation would be a feature of American nuclear policy

throughout the 1990s. This was made abundantly clear in the process

leading up to the 1994 NPR, when despite Assistant Secretary of

Defense for International Security Policy Ashton Carter's early efforts

to reduce the number of nuclear targets and therefore the nuclear

arsenal, STRATCOM was, by and large, successful in codifying such

expanded mission requirements for the US nuclear force structure.17In the post-Cold War period, the United States has expanded on

its traditional counterforce emphasis on nuclear weapons; the mis-

sions have become more specialized, for purposes of counterprolif-

eration, while the targets are now spread throughout the Third World.

Counterproliferation has, indeed, become a central rationale for both

the existing nuclear force structure, as well the development of new

nuclear capabilities. This has taken place despite public adherence to

negative security assurances, which are assurances to non-nuclear

weapon states (NNWSs) that they would not be targeted by nuclear

weapons, provided that they are not allied to a nuclear power.

The Implementation of the New Triad

The 2002 NPR expanded on many of these historic develop-

ments in its concept of a New Triad. Offensive strike systems, which

include nuclear and conventional weapons, constitute the first leg of

this strategic triad. Conventional weapons would be emphasized in

order to reduce collateral damage and conflict escalation. However, as

the NPR goes on to note, "Nuclear weapons could be employed

against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example,deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities)."18 The strike

element of the New Triad would be supplemented with two other

integral components. The development and deployment of active and


8/35


passive defences would be emphasized, in the event that offensivecapabilities fail to deter an adversary's attack. In addition, both offen-

sive and defensive legs would be enhanced with a responsive defence

and especially nuclear infrastructure.

The NPR also outlines a number of defence policy goals that the

New Triad would help to achieve, including (i) the assuranceof securi-

ty partners and allies, which refers to US positive security assurances

as well as extended deterrence guarantees; (ii) the dissuasionof poten-

tial adversaries from even pursuing threatening (e.g. WMD) capabili-

ties; (iii) the reinforcement of the credibility of US nuclear deterrence;

and (iv) the provision of greater military flexibility in order to defeatadversaries.19 Based on the Bush administration's frequent emphasis

on its pre-emptive/preventive doctrine, enshrined in the 2002

National Security Strategy (NSS) document and demonstrated in the

2003 Iraq War, one can also argue that a hidden goal of the New Triad

is to reinforce the American ability topreemptpotential adversaries.20

New nuclear capabilities are advocated in order to deal with a

number of potential threats and problems. According to the Report to

Congress on the Defeat of Hardened and and Deeply Buried Targets, "struc-

tures ranging from hardened surface bunker complexes to deep tun-

nels" can be used by adversaries to house WMD as well as commandand control facilities, and are therefore seen as a growing danger in

the post-Cold War period.21 The US estimates that there are over

10,000 underground facilities (UGFs) worldwide, many of which con-

stitute hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs), and that this number

will no doubt increase.22

The need to deal with mobile and relocatable targets, which can

be weapon systems armed with WMD, is a second justification for

new capabilities, and places a need to further develop intelligence col-

lection and tracking capabilities. The third justification is the threat

posed by chemical and biological weapons (CBWs). New capabilitiesare necessary to both identify agent production and storage facilities,

and to deny access to, immobilize, neutralize or destroy such agents.


9/35


Lastly, the US also perceives a need to develop new capabilities inorder to improve the accuracy of and, in the event that the US has to

defeat an adversaries capabilities, reduce the collateral damage caused

by its nuclear weapons.

The NPR is a congressionally mandated review of the "policy,

strategy, plans, stockpile, and infrastructure for US nuclear forces,"23

and as such, is only a blueprint for the US nuclear arsenal. One must

therefore examine how this blueprint is operationalized and imple-

mented. The devil is in the details, as they say. In that regard, it is clear

that the New Triad is not some hypothetical concept, but has already

had a very real impact on operational policy in a number of areas.First, the NPR advocates a planned force structure composed of

between 1700-2200 warheads by 2012, which would entail the elimi-

nation of the MX Peacekeeper missile force, a reduction in the num-

ber of Trident II ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the

removal of a number of warheads on the existing ICBM and SLBM

force. This number has since been agreed to and codified by the US

and Russia in the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), bet-

ter known as the Treaty of Moscow. This treaty seems to reflect the

Bush administration's ambiguity towards arms control agreements, as

well as give both countries a great deal of flexibility in implementingthe proposed nuclear weapon reductions. For instance, not only are

verification protocols conspicuously absent from this "anti-arms-con-

trol arms control treaty,"24 but it is also notably silent on warhead

stockpiles, tactical nuclear weapons, the elimination of multiple-war-

head land missiles and the destruction of delivery systems.

Implementation of the NPR's proposed force structure has

already begun; this has reduced the operational nuclear warheads in

the US stockpile to an estimated 5,300, down from an estimated

10,600 in 2002 (and 7,000 as early as a year ago). Only 10 MX missiles

are still on alert, out of a total force of 50 the remaining 10 missileswere deactivated in mid-2005. Four Trident II SSBNs have also been

removed since 2002.25 Furthermore, in 2004, the US announced that


10/35


"almost half" of its total stockpile would be retired by 2012, and even-tually dismantled this would make the total stockpile consist of an

estimated 6,000 warheads. This, it should be noted, is a departure

from both the NPR and previous Bush administration statements,

which had initially wanted a much larger stockpile as part of its

"responsive nuclear force" hedge and "inactive stockpile."

Second, following from the NPR's emphasis on HDBTs and

WMD facilities, the Bush administration appears intent on developing

new nuclear capabilities for the destruction of such targets. The US is

studying (i) the development of "bunker busters" or earth penetration

weapons (EPWs) that would be capable, hypothetically, of destroyingHDBTs; and (ii) using nuclear weapons as agent defeat weapons

(ADWs) for the destruction of chemical and biological weapons and

their facilities. These weapons are envisioned to have kinetic earth

penetration capability, as well as a low-yield warhead to minimize fall-

out (or potentially large-yield warheards for deeper facilities). The

Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), which is the Bush admin-

istration's EPW project, is studying possible modifications that would

give an existing US nuclear warhead some degree of earth penetration

capability (beyond the B61-11 kinetic EPW nuclear warhead, which is

only capable of pentrating to a depth of 30 feet).26The development of smaller-yield, minature nuclear weapons of

less than 5 kilotons, which would eventually require nuclear testing, is

still only hypothetical the majority of the funding for the adminis-

tration's nuclear plans has gone to the RNEP project (a modification

of an existing nuclear warhead that does not require testing) rather

than to the Advanced Concepts Initiatives examination of new low-

yield weapon concepts.27 But given the work being done to revitilize

the US nuclear infrastructure, their development remains a distinct

possibility in the near future.

Third, the US is implementing a number of modernization plansfor its nuclear delivery systems. The Minuteman has a $6-billion mod-

ernization program, which would improve the missile's accuracy as


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well as extend its service life. The Air Force has already begun seek-ing conceptual designs for a missile to replace the Minuteman in 2018.

What is more, since the START II Treaty is no longer in force, both

Russia and the US will be maintaining (and perhaps expanding) those

missiles with Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle

(MIRV) technology.

The NPR has placed the fleet of Trident SSBN and its SLBM

force, which represents 48 percent of the existing operational strate-

gic weapons, at the center of the US nuclear deterrent. The retirement

of the MX missile force has only increased its importance, as the

SLBMs have taken over many of the targets previously covered by theMX missile. Not surprisingly, the SLBM's D-5 missile, which has an

already impressive hard-target kill capability, will soon have a much

more lethal accuracy due to the Navy's three year Enhanced

Effectiveness Re-entry program to provide the Mk-4/W76 re-entry

vehicles with GPS-like accuracy. Another modernization program, to

replace the re-entry vehicle's fuze, will lead to re-entry vehicles (des-

ignated Mk-4A/W76-1) with increased lethality. Furthermore, the

Navy has plans for an eventual Trident SSBN replacement, as well as

to develop a new submarine-launched intermediate-range ballistic

missile (SLIRBM) for these submarines (with plans to test this missilein 2005).28

In the long-term, the US is also studying new types of "global

strike" delivery systems for its conventional and nuclear armaments,

such as the Manoeuvrable Non-Nuclear Re-entry Vehicles

(MNNRVs) and/or the Common Aero Vehicles (CAVs). The

MNNRV would rely on manoeuvres and a high re-entry rate to evade

defences, and would allow for precision attacks against HDBTs and

hard surface targets. The CAV would combine high manoeuvrability

and an ability to deliver an assortment of advanced munitions that are

currently only deliverable by aircraft. The possibility that the CAV, andeven the more explicitly non-nuclear MNNRV, would be used for

nuclear strikes cannot be dismissed.29


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Fourth, the emphasis on HDBTs and the destruction of biolog-ical and chemical agents represents another rationale for the incorpo-

ration of non-nuclear rogue states in US nuclear targeting. The NPR

does explicitly mention North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya as

countries that could be involved in immediate, potential and unex-

pected contingencies. Proactive counterproliferation, it should also be

remembered, has become a dominant component of the US national

security strategy. As the 2002 NSS makes clear, "Counterproliferation

must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of

our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any

conflict with WMD-armed adversaries."30This was further elaborat-ed in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the

classified version of which states: "The United States will continue to

make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming

force including potentially nuclear weapons to the use of [weapons of

mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and

friends and allies."31

In response, the Bush administration has placed a renewed

emphasis on "adaptive planning" for the rapid generation of nuclear

war plans32, as well as on "crisis action planning" for limited strike

options against unexpected contingencies; such developments wouldhelp to ensure increased, flexible, and selective nuclear options

against rogue states.33 The Strategic Warfare Planning System

(SWPS) had already undergone a major modernization, which was

finally completed in 2003, and which gave the ability to formulate

limited options within 24 hours. The Bush administration seeks to

expand this capability, and has therefore initiated a new moderniza-

tion plan (SWPS-M, later renamed the Integrated Strategic Planning

and Analysis Network [ISPAN]) that seeks to develop even quicker

and more adaptive nuclear planning through greater reliance on com-

puter models.That being said, the Bush administration also released in October

of 2003 a very traditional SIOP, which emphasized the counterforce


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14/35


missile defence into a command that has traditionally overseen USnuclear policy. As such, it represents a move towards incorporating

defensive systems into the US nuclear posture a goal that was

enshrined in the first- and second-leg of the New Triad. While mis-

sile defence is ostensibly a defensive system, its potential to provide

damage limitation capabilities in support of US nuclear forces, as well

as the need to connect such defensive systems into the US offensive

battle management system, makes its integration in the new STRAT-

COM a very real and, to an extent, logical possibility.

Theatre nuclear planning has not been exempt from these devel-

opments. According to a recent draft of the Doctrine for Joint NuclearOperations, the "Use of nuclear weapons in a theatre requires that

nuclear and conventional plans be integrated to the greatest extent

possible and that careful consideration be given to the potential

impact of nuclear effects on friendly forces." Geographic combatant

commanders are also given the authority to request Presidential

approval for use of nuclear weapons in a wide variety of first-use and

pre-emptive situations, including for use against overwhelming con-

ventional forces; for the purpose of war termination; for pre-emptive

attacks against an adversary's WMD facilities; and even "to demon-

strate US intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adver-sary's use of WMD."38 This doctrine has an expansive view on the

utility of nuclear weapons, and stands in sharp contrast to previous

doctrines, which placed greater emphasis on "nuclear policy con-

straints"39 as opposed to nuclear weapons utility.

Lastly, a critical foundation for the Bush administration's vision

of nuclear weapons is a revitalized nuclear infrastructure. Despite the

Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), which relies on computational

and simulational experimental facilities and "virtual testing/virtual

proto-typing," numerous problems with the current infrastructure are

identified. Not only are improvements deemed necessary, but theadministration seems keen to have a revitalized capability to develop

new warheads and to resume nuclear testing. As the NPR states, there


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is the need for a nuclear weapons complex that will be able to "design,develop, manufacture and certify new warheads in response to new

national requirements; and maintain readiness to resume underground

nuclear testing if required."40

Following from this perspective, the US seems intent on re-estab-

lishing a significant pit production capability. Plutonium pits are a hol-

low shell of plutonium in every nuclear warhead surrounded by

chemical explosives, these "pits" are a necessary trigger component

for a nuclear explosion. In 2003, a plutonium pit was completed the

first new plutonium pit since the closure of the pit facility at Rocky

Flats, Colorado in 1989. This seems to be part of a much larger goal,since the Bush administration has proposed a Modern Pit Facility that

would cost $2-4 billion in construction and up to $300 million in

annual maintenance, and would be capable of producing between 125

and 450 pits annually. The Bush administration is also continuing with

its efforts to reduce the readiness time for nuclear testing, down from

its current 24-36 months to 18 months. The Nevada Test Site is the

focus of the Enhanced Test Readiness program, and has already

received up to $24.9 million in 2004 and $22.5 million in 2005.

Of course, one can argue that some improvements need to be

done for the maintenance of the US nuclear stockpiles. However, thesechanges to the US nuclear infrastructure do seem excessive and, it

should be remembered, associated with a policy that envisions new

nuclear capabilities and potentially smaller-yield mini-nukes. As John

Gordon, the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator

for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) points out,

"it may be appropriate to design, develop and produce a small build of

prototype weapons both to exercise key capabilities and to serve as a

'hedge,' to be produced in quantity when deemed necessary."41While

the Spratt-Furse amendment banned research on nuclear warheads of

less than 5 kilotons, the administration has successfully repealed part ofthat law the Warner amendment passed on a 59-38 vote, and permits

research on, but not development of, low-yield nuclear weapons.42


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This is not to say that these developments are irreversible. InNovember of 2004, the US Congress took the unprecedented step of

cutting and/or reorienting funding for many of these programs for

FY2005. Specifically, the request for $27 million for the RNEP proj-

ect has been cut, while the $9 million request for new nuclear weapon

concepts has been re-oriented towards increasing the reliability of

existing nuclear warheads as part of the Reliable Replacement

Warhead (RRW) program. Furthermore, only $7 million will be

released for the construction of a Modern Pit Facility and $22.5 mil-

lion for the reduction of the nuclear test preparation period, as

opposed to the Bush request for $30 million for each respective pro-gram.43

However, it remains to be seen whether this Congressional oppo-

sition will continue. The Bush administration is already pushing

Congress to support a $4 million Department of Energy request for

the RNEP project, alongside $4.5 million of complementary funding

for the Pentagon (and $22.5 million over the next two years). The $9

million for new nuclear weapon concepts may now be a part of RRW,

but there are continuing questions regarding whether this program

will simply be "a back door for the administration to circumvent con-

gressional opposition to new warhead designs for new and destabiliz-ing nuclear strike missions."44 The Bush administration appears,

despite these recent Congressional setbacks, intent on pursuing its

drive for developing new nuclear capabilities during its second term.

Implications for Canadian Security Policy

Canada is a self-professed middlepower, a classification which

denotes a countrys inability to wield much influence when acting

alone, but ability and often interest in working with like-minded pow-

ers on various issues, as a means to multiply its influence. This can beseen in this country's integral role in the development of the United

Nations; as a peacekeeper, in order to eliminate potential American-

Soviet flashpoints; its place in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation



17/35


(NATO); and most recently, as part of its involvement in NATOpeace enforcement activities as well as in various multilateral security

initiatives. Working through multilateral institutions is therefore

Canada's preferred approach for dealing with security issues, as

opposed to acting alone or even working in ad hoc coalitions. Given

that the defence capabilities and, therefore, foreign policy influence of

Canada has eroded in recent years,45 the importance of such institu-

tions has only increased.

However, while Canada may prefer multilateral solutions, geo-

graphical and geopolitical realities must also be accepted.46 This is

especially true for Canada, which occupies a critical and, in the post-9/11 security environment, increasingly ambiguous strategic position

beside the United States. The US interest in working at unilateral solu-

tions for dealing with the threat of terrorist organizations and rogue

states, and of ignoring or dismissing traditional multilateral solutions,

has never been greater. A grand strategy of "primacy," whereby the

US seeks to preserve its "supremacy by politically, economically, and

militarily outdistancing any global challenger," appears to guide the

policies of the current administration.47

The Bush administration's revisions to US nuclear strategy rep-

resent the most explicit manifestation of the post-Cold War empha-sis on unilateral "nuclear counterproliferation" against rogue states.

This requires new strategic strike capabilities and more flexible and

adaptive nuclear war plans, and represents an American attempt to

not only develop specialized capabilities against rogue states, but in

fact to outdistance any potential nuclear adversary. It should be

remembered that dissuasion, explicitly mentioned in the NPR as a

goal of the New Triad's strategic posture, represents the concept of

of fielding a military force so dominating that it prevents adversaries

from contemplating resistance.48This goes to the very heart of the

Bush administration's drive towards strategic primacy. In the words ofPresident George W. Bush, America has, and intends to keep, mili-

tary strengths beyond challenge.49


18/35

The New Triad is therefore a critical component of this highlyambitious grand strategy. With its emphasis on sophisticated strategic

capabilities, spearheaded by offensive nuclear strike systems and

incorporating conventional offensive and defensive capabilities, the

New Triad offers a vision of American strategic dominance or, to put

it squarely in the context of its grand strategy, "nuclear primacy."50

This provides the fundamental guidance for the Bush administration's

force structure and policies. The impact of this development on the

international security environment is uncertain but, in all likelihood,

potentially detrimental in a number of areas: on the non-proliferation

regime; the strategic stability between the established NWSs; and thestrategic instability between the US and its rogue state adversaries. As

such, it touches upon various aspects of Canadian international secu-

rity policy.

First, the Bush administration's revisions to American nuclear

strategy challenges one of the basic precepts of Canadian interna-

tional security policy, namely that multilateral non-proliferation meas-

ures are the foundation for dealing with the threat of WMD prolifer-

ation. Like most middlepowers, Canada has been an ardent supporter

of the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD)

regime, and the norms and institutions underlying this regime, whichare embodied in a number of international treaties, including the

NPT, BTWC, CWC, CTBT and various fissile and missile regimes.51

In contrast, the Bush administration viewing the growing WMD

programs of its adversaries seems highly dismissive of such meas-

ures, preferring instead unilateral or ad hoc means for dealing with

this post-Cold War danger.

As implied throughout this paper, counterproliferation provides

a guiding force for the Bush administration's nuclear strategy, and in

many ways, for its entire national security strategy.52

Counterproliferation is not, however, non-proliferation. To someextent, these are mutually exclusive concepts. The non-proliferation

regime seeks to prevent the proliferation of WMD, while the coun-



19/35


terproliferation doctrine accepts that proliferation will indeed takeplace, and seeks to prepare military forces sufficient for dealing with

such a threat. Of course, counterproliferation can be seen as a neces-

sary and prudent adjunct to non-proliferation, as was the case for

the most part with the Clinton administration. The Bush adminis-

tration seems, however, far less inclined to rely on multilateral non-

proliferation measures, preferring to place its bet on unilateral, proac-

tive counterproliferation. While the Clinton administration's 1999

National Security Strategy detailed a number of multilateral initiatives,

including the NPT and the CTBT, "the Bush document outlined non-

proliferation activities in one paragraph that only mentioned a recentGroup of Eight agreement to assist with weapons disposal in

Russia."53

A good example of the disdain that the current administration

has for multilateral non-proliferation can be seen with its treatment of

the NPT, long regarded as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation

regime. For example, by explicitly targeting NNWSs, the US has effec-

tively ended the negative security assurances that were first given out

by President Carter in 1978. These assurances are commonly consid-

ered an integral if not codified NWS obligation arising out of the

NPT. "They have been viewed by NNWSs as one of their majorrequirements for achieving an adequate balance between their obliga-

tions and those of the nuclear weapons states."54 It is true that the

US, like many NWSs, has not always followed its negative security

pledges. A good example of this is the "calculated ambiguity" doc-

trine, which seeks to give uncertainty on whether the US would

indeed attack a NNWS adversary with nuclear weapons in the event

of retaliation.55 But this ambiguity is dramatically clarified by the

growing incorporation of such states in US nuclear war plans; the US

may still retain a doctrine of public ambiguity, but there is nothing

ambiguous about its operational nuclear plans.Relatedly, by explicitly maintaining the nuclear deterrent for the

foreseeable future, the Bush administration nuclear strategy seems to


20/35

be contrary to the goals enshrined in Article 6 of the NPT, whichstates that

The dismissal of Article 6 is further evident in the apparent need tobegin nuclear testing. This would not only effectively destroy any

chance of resurrecting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and

therefore give China, India and Pakistan a possible excuse to resume

testing themselves, but would also reinforce the impression that the

US has no intention in pursuing what the NPT terms "effective meas-

ures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms raceand to nuclear

disarmament."

This change in US emphasis will likely have a detrimental impact

on Canada's stated goal of dealing with horizontal WMD prolifera-

tion in a multilateral framework. While both Canada and the UnitedStates do indeed share similar threat perception, their respective views

on the means for dealing with that threat may only widen in the

future. The impact that this will have on the Canada-US strategic rela-

tionship is unknown. However, one should not be optimistic on this

front. There is a distinct possibility that the recent bilateral acrimony

evident during Canada's refusal to join the US coalition of the will-

ing to undertake regime change in Iraq, and its refusal to formally

approve US plans for national missile defence may not be foreign

policy aberrations, but rather an ominous prelude for things to come.

Second, the Bush administration's nuclear strategy may have anuncertain, but potentially detrimental impact on strategic nuclear sta-

bility among the great powers, particularly among such established


Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue

negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating

to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and

to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and

complete disarmament under strict and effective interna-

tional control.56


21/35


NWSs as the United States, Russia and China. Stability between thesepowers is an important prerequisite for an international system based

on multilateral cooperation and normative institution-building, and is

therefore very much in the Canadian national interest. To put it sim-

ply, when such stability is lacking, the possibility for a middlepower

like Canada to be ignored, and even stepped on, is substantially

increased.

The argument that the New Triad will have a detrimental impact

on the strategic stability between the established nuclear powers fol-

lows closely on criticisms of missile defence. According to such criti-

cism, missile defence will lead to both Russia and China initiatingcountermeasures to compensate for any US missile shield, and raise

the spectre of a renewed and cascading arms race.57The New Triad's

incorporation of offensive and defensive systems increases the

strength of such an argument, since the nuclear policy planners of

both countries will have to take into account the threat posed by US

counterforce capabilities, as well as the damage limitation capabilities

inherent in missile defence, on their respective arsenals. For example,

earth-penetrating counterforce weapons that are meant to hit the

HDBTs and mobile and relocatable targets in rogue states would also

be ideal weapons for first-strike counterforce attacks against Chinaand Russia.

On one hand, China has long maintained a "minimum deter-

rent"58 against US forces, composed of a small number of liquid-

fuelled ICBMs that, given their lack of mobility and small numbers,

would be very vulnerable to a US first-strike. China is suspected of

having only 18 ICBMs (the DF-15) that are capable of reaching the

continental United States (CONUS).59 While it does have an addi-

tional 12 ICBM-classified missiles (the DF-4), this delivery system is

generally not considered capable of reaching CONUS. Not surpris-

ingly, the Chinese nuclear deterrent, an integral component of anyfeasible Chinese military attack on US-allied Taiwan, has been under-

going a modernization program. This could potentially see its nuclear


22/35

forces expanded to include up to 100 ICBMs capable of hitting theUnited States (based on the DF-31 and DF-31A missile), as well as

improved accuracy, lighter warheads, a more robust C3I system and

new solid-fueled and potentially MIRVed ICBMs. This modernization

program, which would exist irrespective of US nuclear developments,

will likely accelerate as a result of the growing emphasis on American

counterforce capabilities.60

On the other hand, Russia has a declining number of strategic war-

heads,61 and would be very keen to maintain its deterrent in the face of

the growing sophisitication of the US strategic arsenal. This would

necessitate a robust command and control infrastructure that would bemore capable of surviving a US decapitation strike evident in the

development of the key leadership and nuclear command system facil-

ities deep in the Yamantau and Kosvinsky mountains62 and in the

development of advanced weapon systems that would be better capa-

ble of mitigating any US damage limitation capability. Russia has

already indicated that it would maintain its inventory of MIRVed

ICBMs, and has recently announced progress in the development of

the Bukavu SLBM and the mobile Topol-M ICBM, the latter of which

is a hypersonic and manoeuverable ballistic missile that would be "capa-

ble of penetrating any missile defense system that could conceivably bedeveloped in the next several decades."63 One could also conceivably

expect a renewed "launch on warning" posture for the Russian strategic

arsenal, in order to better prevent a US first-strike capability.64

That being said, strategic stability between these powers is based

on a more substantive footing than during the Cold War.65

Modifications to their arsenals may be necessary, to better secure the

viability of their respective nuclear deterrents, but a renewed arms

race is by no means a certainty. However, the Bush administration's

fixation on strategic primacy provides a problematic environment for

the pursuit of such strategic nuclear capabilities. While primacists mayassume that other countries would acquiesce to perpetual US pre-emi-

nence, it is more than likely that one will see increased balancing



23/35


behavior on the part of both Russia and China. As noted by Posenand Ross, "States coalesce against hegemons rather than rally around

them."66 This increases the possibility that the US relationship with

both countries will deteriorate, perhaps to the point of featuring stark

adversarial characteristics. If so, the potential for arms races and

strategic instability will undoubtedly increase.67

Third, there is also the potential for the deterioration of strategic

regional stability between the US and its rogue state adversaries. In

sharp contrast to the stability commonly associated with the estab-

lished NWSs, the relationships between the United States and various

rogue states are rarely if ever characterized as stable, even at the bestof times. It is also fair to say that these adversarial relationships have

only increased with the current administration. As the 2002National

Security Strategymakes clear, "We must be prepared to stop rogue states

and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use

weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies

and friends."68 The US invasion of Iraq, and its continuing tensions

with Iran, Syria and North Korea, are indicative of this fundamental

instability.

Strategic instability therefore provides a necessary and, potential-

ly, worrisome context for the New Triad's emphasis on new nuclearcapabilities for counterproliferation missions against these states. As

mentioned earlier, the stated goals of the Bush administration's New

Triad include making the US deterrent more credible against these

adversaries, and increasing the US ability to dissuade hostile states

from even pursuing WMD programs. This creates an impression that

strategic stability between the United States and its adversaries will be

enhanced. Unfortunately, this impression is also misleading. Nuclear

targeting of rogue states armed only with suspected chemical and bio-

logical weapons, rather than deterring or dissuading them from pur-

suing such programs, may simply make WMD, and especially anuclear deterrent, even more tempting. As Scott Sagan makes clear, a

strong reason (and the dominant explanation) for the acquisition of


24/35

nuclear weapons is the need to increase national security against for-eign threats.69 One can equally apply this rationale for the acquisition

of various kinds of CBWs.

Relatedly, the Bush administration's nuclear strategy also envi-

sions the need to defeat rogue states armed with WMD. Given the

possibility that the US attempt to deter and dissuade such states from

even acquiring WMD will have the opposite impact, to actually abet

the horizontal proliferation of WMD, the need to defeat such states

may become something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Unfortunately,

the New Triad may also give the US a false sense of security in its abil-

ity to deal with the WMD of rogue states, and increase the temptationfor it to undertake regime change campaigns against these states. This

represents a vision, not of reinforced strategic stability among these

the US and its potential adversaries, but rather of US-led "counter-

proliferation wars." For example, the US may believe that its more

credible nuclear capabilities can be translated to the intrawar deter-

rence of a rogue state's WMD capabilities (e.g. in the midst of a

regime change campaign). Alternatively, such weapons could be seen

as a feasible means to retaliate in the event that WMD are employed

by its adversaries, or even as a means to pre-empt such capabilities.70

As such, the New Triad is a means to eliminate the possibility, how-ever remote, that the US might itself be deterred from intervening

against a rogue state due to the latter's WMD capabilities.71

Does this mean that US nuclear developments, accelerated under

the Bush administration, will automatically lead to strategic instabili-

ty? Fortunately, no it is possible that such blatant nuclear primacy

may lead to a rogue state being deterred from ever brandishing and

employing their weapons and even dissuaded from seeking such

asymmetrical counters. However, this outcome cannot be guaranteed,

and it is equally possible (and in this authors opinion, more likely)

that strategic instability between the US and these countries will con-tinue to deteriorate.72 Of course, one should not overstate the impact

that these nuclear developments will have on the threat perception of



25/35


rogue states the existing power imbalance between the US and itsrogue state adversaries is more than sufficient to justify WMD deter-

rent capability. But the New Triad, with its emphasis on damage lim-

itation and specialized counterforce capabilities (the necessary ingre-

dients for a pre-emptive, first-strike posture), may lead already inse-

cure rogue states to adopt ever more destabilizing employment strate-

gies for their own WMD deterrents. The possibility for conflicts

which could escalate and feature the use of WMD, by rogue states

and/or the US, should not be discounted.

As can be seen with this admittedly brief analysis, the Bush

administration's emphasis on nuclear primacy, as an integral part ofits wider goal for grand strategic primacy, provides for an uncertain

and potentially dangerous international security environment. This

should be a concern for Canada, as it affects not only our support for

the non-proliferation regime, but our vital interest in a cooperative

international security environment. It is not necessarily in Canada's

interest that the 21st century be defined by unilateral American strate-

gic dominance, the gradual deterioration in relations between the

established nuclear powers, and periodic US-led counterproliferation

wars, which may even feature the use of WMD.

Unfortunately, Canada's ability to have any real impact on thesedevelopments is minimal. To put it simply, vertical nuclear prolifera-

tion by the United States may be of concern for the international

community including Canada but this community is largely impo-

tent to discourage such developments. As a marginal middlepower,

with a long history of free-riding on our Southern neighbour, it would

be hubris to think that this country's arguments and policies would

have any impact in the corridors of Washington. That being said, the

divergence of interest on means for dealing with rogue states can also

be seen as an opportunity to improve and supplement multilateral

non-proliferation measures. While one can be critical of its currentpolicies, the US does have cause for concern over the utility of the

non-proliferation regime; the ability of this regime to stop determined


26/35

proliferators can certainly be questioned. Fortunately, Canada doesseem to have partially recognized this reality, as evident in its belated

decision to take part in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It is

true that such an arrangement may not be perfect, and may require

some compromises on Canada's part. However, the potential role for

an innovative middlepower should not, and must not, be underesti-

mated.

Conclusion

The nuclear strategy of the Bush administration is centered on a

New Triad that envisions new nuclear and conventional counterforce

capabilities for flexible and selective "global strikes" against rogue

states, supplemented with active defences for purposes of damage

limitation. By incorporating and expanding on the policies of its pred-

ecessors, the Bush administration has indeed made some significant

revisions to American nuclear strategy, and placed it squarely as an

integral component of its wider vision for strategic primacy.

The impact that these revisions will have on Canada is a little

more ambiguous. It is true that these revisions affect, and should be

a concern for this country. But they do so in a primarily indirect way by having an impact on strategic stability and the international secu-

rity environment, and therefore, on Canadian national interests.

Perhaps more importantly, it remains to be seen what a middlepower

like Canada can do to mitigate these policies. These changes are large-

ly the result of a shift in US perception of what constitutes strategic

threats, and Canada should not fool itself that arguments to the con-

trary will have an even minimal impact on this threat perception.

Despite such limitations, it would be prudent for Canada to

renew its emphasis on dealing with the threat posed by the horizontal

proliferation of WMD for Canada's own security interests; to showthe United States that its neighbour is indeed serious about this threat;

and as a means of eliminating the rationale for continued US empha-

sis on nuclear weapons. It is true that Canada's ability to deal with US



27/35


vertical proliferation is minimal to non-existent. However, continuingefforts to deal with horizontal proliferation could conceivably reduce

a central rationale for the expansion of the US nuclear arsenal.

Notes:

1 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington DC: Department of

Defense, January 8, 2002) (hereinafter theNuclear Posture Review). Excerpts of this document

are available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm.

2 Keith B. Payne, "The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight," The Washington

Quarterly, vol. 28, n. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 135-151.

3 NSPD-17 has also been codified under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 4 (HSPD-

4). While the classified document has yet to be released, the public version (National Strategy

t o Combat Weapons o f Mass Destruc tion) can be found at

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-wmd/pdf.

4 This has been a constant critique of Canadian international security policy in the 1990s,

which has, under the leadership of Lloyd Axworthy, often focused on issues of "soft power"

while ignoring or dismissing traditional "hard power" concerns. For good examples of these

kinds of critiques, see Fen O. Hampson and Dean F. Oliver, "Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical

Assessment of the Axworthy Doctrine," International Journal, vol. 53, n. 3 (Summer 1998), pp.

379-406; Kim Richard Nossal, "Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of 'Good International

Citizenship' in Canadian Foreign Policy," International Journal, vol. 54, n. 1 (Winter 1998-99),pp. 88-105. For an interesting defence of the Axworthy Doctrine, see Joe Jockel and Joel

Sokolsky, "Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence

Policy," International Journal, vol. 56, n. 1 (Winter 2000-01), pp. 1-18.

5 This argument can be found in David S. McDonough, "Nuclear Superiority or Mutually

Assured Deterrence: The Development of the US Nuclear Deterrent," International Journal,

vol. 60, n. 3 (Summer 2005). pp. 811-823.

6 See David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American

Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security, vol. 7, n. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3-71 and Marc

Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-

1954," International Security, vol. 13, n. 3 (Winter 1988/89).

7 See Fred Kaplan, "JFK's First-Strike Plan",Atlantic Monthly, vol. 288, n. 3 (October 2001).

For an interesting critique on the flexibility, if not the pre-emptive basis, of Kennedy's

nuclear strategy, see Francis J. Gavin, "The Myth of Flexible Response: American Strategy in

Europe during the 1960s," International History Review, n. 23 (December 2001), pp. 847-875.


28/35

8

This strategy, while also featuring weapons development, placed the primary importance onthe need to develop a sophisticated and robust C3 capability. See Walter Slocombe "The

Countervailing Strategy," International Security, vol. 5, n. 4 (Spring 1981), pp. 18-27.

9 Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984),

p. 131. Escalation dominance has its intellectual roots in the work of Herman Kahn at Rand

in the 1950s, specifically his idea of the escalation ladder and the need to control and domi-

nate the escalation process.

10 See Desmond Ball and Robert C. Toth, "Revising the SIOP: Taking War-Fighting to

Dangerous Extremes," International Security, vol. 14, n. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 65-92. For a good

look at the threat of decapitation, see John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," Foreign

Policy, n. 45 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 18-28.

11 For instance, both counterproliferation and the New Triad focus on shallow buried targets,

advanced energetic materials (i.e. extreme heat, chemical reaction or thermobaric effects),

hard and deeply buried targets, special operations forces, and capabilities against mobile mis-

siles. For further information on counterproliferation, see Center for Counterproliferation

Research (CCR), The Counterproliferation Imperative: Meeting Tomorrow's Challenges, CCR Report

(Washington, DC: National Defense University, November 2001), Chp. 5.

12 See Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy

(New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).

13 See Barry R. Schneider, Future war and counterproliferation: US military responses to NBC prolif-

eration threats (Westport, Conn.; London: Praeger, 1999). For more on the threat posed by

Iraq's WMD capabilities during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, see Avigdor Haselkorn, The

Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence (New Haven and London: Yale

University Press, 1999) and Amatzia Baram, "An Analysis of Iraqi WMD Strategy," The

Nonproliferation Review, vol. 8, n. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 25-39.

14 For a detailed account of the 1994 North Korea crisis, see Michael J. Mazarr,North Korea

and the Bomb: A Case Study in Non-proliferation(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).

15While no White House factsheet was presented on the CPI, Les Aspin's remarks has been

posted on the Federation of American Scientists' website, at http://www.fas.org/irp/off-

docs/pdd18.htm.

16 British American Security Information Council (BASIC), "Nuclear Futures: Proliferation

of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy," BASIC Research Report(February

1998), p. 15. Silver Books stands for Silver or Strategic Installation List of Vulnerability

Effects and Results. While this project was terminated, a Silver Book was developed for

European Command, and one was in development for Pacific Command. See Hans



29/35


Kristensen, "Targets of Opportunity," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, vol. 53, n. 5(September/October 1997), pp. 22-28.

17 For more on the disproportionate role and influence of STRATCOM in the formulation

of US nuclear forces, see Hans Kristensen, The Matrix of Deterrence: US Strategic Command Force

Structure Studies(Berkely, CA: The Nautilus Institute, May 2001), pp. 1-23. This report details

numerous STRATCOM studies such as the Phoenix Study, the Sun City Study and the Sun

City Extended Study that heavily influenced the US government's nuclear policies through-

out the 1990s.

18Nuclear Posture Review, pp. 12-13.

19Nuclear Posture Review, pp. 12-14.

20 See Roger Speed and Michael May, "Dangerous Doctrine," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

vol. 61, n. 2 (March/April 2005), pp. 38-49.

21 Department of Energy and Department of Defense, Report to Congress on the Defeat of

Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets(Washington DC: Department of Energy and Defense, July

2001), p. 8. The Report identifies two types of facilities: (i) the shallow "cut and cover"

design, which would have a concrete structural overburden of less than 10 feet of thickness

to protect tactical facilities; and (ii) the much harder facilities with strategic functions, which

could have a concrete overburden equivalent to 70 to 300 feet, redundant ventilation, power,

and communications systems, and sophisticated camouflage, concealment, and deception

techniques. A slightly modified HDBT classification scheme is outlined in Michael A. Levi,

"Fire in the Hold: Nuclear and Non-nuclear Options for Counter-Proliferation," Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace Working Paper, 31 (November 2002).

22This figure is from Defense Science Board Task Force on Underground Facilities, which

is quoted in Nuclear Posture Review, p. 46. The NPR goes on to note that, according to the

Defense Intelligence Agency, 1,400 of these UGFs are known or suspected of housing

strategic facilities, many of which are deep underground.

23 Kurt Guthe, "The Nuclear Posture Review: How Is the 'New Triad' New?" Center for

Strategic and Budgetary Assessements (2002), p. 1. The NPR became a a congressional

requirement due to Section 1041 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2001 (Public Law 106-398), October 30, 2000.

24 Philippe Lagasse, "The SORT Debate: Implications for Canada," IRPP Working Paper

Series, No. 2003-01 (October 2003).

25 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "US nuclear forces, 2005," Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists, vol. 61, n. 1 (January/February 2005), pp. 73-75.


30/35

26

The RNEP project is officially a Phase 6.2/6.2A feasibility and cost study, intended toexamine the possibility of increasing the earth penetration capability of the B61 and B63

nuclear bomb. However, the Bush administration's FY2005 request did specify a five year

plan that went into cost estimates for Phase 6.3 on development engineering, and Phase 6.4

on production engineering. See Jonathan Medalia, "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Budget

Request and Plan, FY2005-FY2009," CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report to Congress

(January 10, 2005,) available at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32347.pdf.

27 For example, in the FY 2005 budget request, the Bush administration asked for $27.6 mil-

lion for the RNEP program, and an additional $9 million for the study of new nuclear

weapon concepts. See Karin Yourish with Matthew Johnson, "Proposed Energy Department

Budget Would Boost Funds for Nuclear Weapons,"Arms Contr ol Today(March 2004).

28 For these developments, see Norris and Kristensen, "US nuclear forces, 2005" and Robert

S. Norris, Hans M. Kristensen, and Christopher E. Paine,Nuclear Insecurity: A Critique of the

Bush Administration's Nuclear Weapons Policies(National Resources Defense Council, September

2004), pp. 9-15.

29 See Western States Legal Foundation (WSLF), "The Shape of Things to Come: The

Nuclear Posture Review, Missile Defense, and the Dangers of a New Arms Race," WSLF

Report (April 2002) and WSLF, "The Military Space Plan, Conventional ICBMs, and the

Common Aero Vehicle: Overlooked Threats of Weapons Delivered Through or From

Space," WSLF Information Bulletin(Fall 2002). Both weapon systems seem to be based on the

Reagan administration's research on a nuclear Manoeuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MARV).

30

The National Security Strategy of the United States(September 2002), p. 14. This document canbe found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.

31 See Nicholas Kralev, "Bush Approves Nuclear Response," The Washington Times, January 31,

2003.

32This can be differentiated from "deliberative planning," which emphasizes large pre-exist-

ing nuclear war plans in the form of the Single Integrated Operating Plans. These plans will

still continue, in the form of OPLAN 8044, but with a more rapid production time.

33 Crisis action planning has been codified in CONPLAN 8022-02, which is a pre-emptive

"global strike" contingency plan against unexpected imminent threats, such as in Iran and

North Korea, involving precision kinetic (conventional and nuclear) and non-kinetic effects.

Under this plan, nuclear weapons would be given a prompt strike capability (minutes tohours) against targets not included in the pre-existing nuclear plans, in order to destroy an

enemy's launch of a nuclear strike or to destroy a critical HDBT. See Hans Kristensen,

"Nuclear Mission Creep: The Impact of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation on US



31/35


Nuclear Policy and Planning," Presentation to The Program on Science and Global Security,Princeton University (May 11, 2005), available at http://www.nukestrat.com and William

Arkin, "Not Just a Last Resort?" Washington Post, May 15, 2005, p. B01.

34 Norris and al.,Nuclear Insecurity, pp. 1-8.

35The name was formally changed at a conference in 2003, though OPLAN 8044 has been

used throughout the 1990s to refer to the SIOP's implementation plan. It remains to be seen

whether this name change will become permanent. See Hans Kristensen, "US Changes Name

of Nuclear War Plan," Nuclear Brief (December 21, 2004), available on The Nuclear

Information Project website, available at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/stratcom/siopname.

htm. Interestingly, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Richard B. Myers has recently

used the term "strategic deterrence response plan" to describe the US nuclear war plan this

has a strong resemblance to the unsuccessful proposal by former STRATCOM commander

General George Lee Butler to use the term "National Strategic Response Force" See General

Richard B. Myers, "Written Posture Statement to SASC, HASC amd HAC-D," (February 16

and 17, 2005), at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/Testimony_Myers0216-1705.pdf.

36 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Future of Strategic

Strike Forces(Washington DC: Defense Science Board, February 2004), pp. 5-13.

37 The US attempt at operationalizing "global strike" can be seen in Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumsfeld's approval of a top secret "Interim Global Strike Alert Order," which in

turn led to CONPLAN 8022-02 and the incorporation of nuclear weapons in this pre-emp-

tive contingency plan. See footnote 33.

38Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Joint Pub 3-12 (Final Coordination

[2] draft, March 15, 2005) p. III-2, available at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/JCS_JP3-

12_05draft.pdf.

39 See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Joint Pub 3-12 (Washington

D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 15, 1995), p. III-2. It remains to be seen whether the

new document gives any greater authority to the combatant commanders in terms of release

authority. As the old document notes, "Each commander with a nuclear planning capability

identifies and requests authorization to strike any targets necessary to accomplish the mis-

sion." (p. III-4).

40Nuclear Posture Review, p. 30.

41 John A. Gordon, Statement to the Senate Committee on Armed Services (February 14,

2002), available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/congressional/2002/2002-02-14-TESTI

MONY-US_Armed_Services_NPR.pdf.


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42

Christine Kucia, "Congress approves research on new nuclear weapons," Arms ControlToday(June 2003).

43 Wade Boese, "Congress Axes Funding for New Nukes,"Arms Control Today(December

2004).

44 Daryl G. Kimball, "Replacement Nuclear Warheads? Buyer Beware,"Arms Control Today

(May 2005). Also see Wade Boese, "US Weighing Nuclear Stockpile Changes,"Arms Control

Today(May 2005) and William J. Broad, "US Redesigning Atomic Weapons,"New York Times

February 27, 2005.

45 For a good overview, see Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the

World(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2003). Numerous reports from academics and non-

governmental organizations reiterate this point. For a good overview, see Barry Cooper,Mercedes Stephenson and Ray Szeto, "Canada's Military Posture: An examination of Recent

Civilian Reports," The Fraser Institute Critical Issues Bulletins(January 2004), available at

http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/publications/pdf/cooper_CanadaMilitaryPosture_jan04.pdf

46This argument is reiterated in Ko Colinj, "Weapons of mass destruction: A medium-power

concern," International Journal, vol. 59, n. 2 (Spring 2004).

47 Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,"

International Security, vol. 21, n. 3 (Winter 1996/1997), p. 32. A blueprint for such a grand strat-

egy was first brought to light in 1992, with the leak of then Undersecretary of Defense for

Policy Paul Wolfowitz's controversial Defense Policy Guidance (1994-1999). For further

information on this document, see Patrick E. Tyler, "US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No

Rivals Develop,"New York Times, March 7, 1992. For a good discussion on the writing of this

controversial document, see James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet

(New York: Viking, 2004).

48 Carl Kaysen, John D. Steinbruner, Martin B. Malin, "Behind the Prospect of War with Iraq:

The New US National Security Strategy," Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Public Interest

Report, vol. 55, n. 5 (September/October 2002), pp. 3-4, available at:

http://www.fas.org/faspir/2002/v55n5/v55n5.pdf

49 George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United

States Military Academy," Office of the Press Secretary, June 1, 2002.

50This does not mean that the non-nuclear elements are not an integral component of the

New Triad. However, such components are featured in what is formally a review of the US

nuclear posture, and are seen in a context that has traditionally been dominated by US strate-

gic nuclear weapons capabilities. For these reasons, and despite its wider strategic nature, this

author has chosen to use the term "nuclear primacy."



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51

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC);Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Other

non-proliferation agreements include the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), the Australia Group, on chemical and biological

materials, as well as the most recent Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

52 See Jason D. Ellis, "The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and US National Security," The

Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, n. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 115-133.

53 Christine Kucia, "Counterproliferation at Core of New Security Strategy,"Arms Control

Today(October 2002). Other treaties mentioned in the 1999 document include the BTWC

and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreements. It should also be noted that

the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction does outline these multilat-

eral non-proliferation measures (though with the conspicuous absence of the CTBT).

54 George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, "Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon

States," The Nonproliferation Review(Fall 1993), p. 11. Such assurances are commonly seen as

being a necessary condition for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to relinquish their nuclear

weapons in 1994, and for the NNWSs to support the 1995 NPT Review Conference. Also

see George Bunn, "The Legal Status of US Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear

Weapon States," The Nonproliferation Review(Spring-Summer 1997), pp. 1-17.

55 Calculated ambiguity was coined by former Secreatry of State James A. Baker, who used

it to describe US policy during the 1990-91 Gulf War. As Baker writes, "I purposely left the

impression that the use of chemical or biological agents by Iraq could invite tactical nuclear

retaliation." Quoted in William Arkin, "Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the GulfWar," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 16, n. 4 (Autumn 1996), 3-18. Also see Scott D. Sagan,

"The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter

Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks," International Security, vol. 24, n. 4 (Spring 2000),

pp. 85-115.

56 Article 6, The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (July 1, 1968), at

http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html.

57 For a good example of the critique on missile defence, see Ernie Regehr, Canada and

Ballistic Missile Defence, Report of the Simons Centre for Peace and Disarmament Studies

(December 2003). Also see the contrasting arguments by Fergusson and Ross in this volume.

58

According to one author, minimum deterrence has shifted towards a more robust "limit-ed deterrence" strategic concept. See Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking':

The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, vol. 20, n. 2 (Winter 1995/96),

pp. 5-42.


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While it does have an additional 12 ICBM-classified missile (the DF-4), this delivery sys-tem is generally not considered capable of reaching CONUS. For a recent sober assessment

of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, see Jeffrey Lewis, "The Ambiguous Arsenal," Bulletin of the

Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, n. 3 (May/June 2005), pp. 52-59.

60 The NPR does also explicitly point to China as a country that could be involved in an

immediate or potential contingency. The immediate contingency is regarding a military con-

frontation over the status of Taiwan. The potential contingency consists of plausible but not

immediate dangers, which can include "the emergence of a new, hostile military coalition

against the United States or its allies." See Nuclear Posture Review, pp. 16-17. For more on the

impact that the NPR has had on China, see Joanne Tompkins, "How US Strategic Policy is

Changing China's Nuclear Plans,"Arms Contr ol Today(January-February 2003).

61 For more information on the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal, see Robert S. Norris and

Hans Kristensen, "Russian nuclear forces, 2005," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, n. 2

(March/April 2005), pp. 70-72.

62The Yamantau facility is a leadership relocation facility, while the Kosvinsky facility hous-

es the Russian nuclear command system. As such, it is a critical link to the 'Dead Hand' com-

munications network for semi-automatic retaliation in the event of a decapitating strike. See

Bruce G. Blair, "We Keep Buiding Nukes for All the Wrong Reasons," Washington Post, May

25, 2003, available at http://www.cdi.org/blair/new-nukes.cfm.

63 Nikolai Sokov, "Military Exercises In Russia: Naval Deterrence Failures Compensated By

Strategic Rocket Success," Center for Non-Proliferation Studies Research Story(February 24, 2004),

available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040224.htm. It should be noted that in the 2004exercise that featured both weapon systems, the Bukavu SLBM failed to launch.

64 For more on the Russian 'launch on warning' nuclear posture, see Bruce G. Blair, Global

Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995). Also see

Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War(Washington DC: Brookings Institution,

1993).

65 See Frank P. Harvey, "The future of strategic stability and nuclear deterrence," International

Journal, vol. 58, n. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 321-346.

66 Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy," p. 43.

67 For this argument, see David S. McDonough, "The 'New Triad' of the Bush administra-

tion: Counterproliferation and escalation dominance in US nuclear strategy," International

Journal, vol. 59, n. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 613-634.

68National Security Strategy of the United States, p. 14.


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See Scott Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of aBomb," International Security, vol. 21, n. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 54-86. While Sagan does

accept the importance of what he terms the 'security model' for nuclear proliferation, he also

accepts the role of domestic politics and norms as explanatory variables.

70This author takes a more sanguine view on the possibility that nuclear weapons would be

used as part of a first-strike pre-emptive attack against a rogue state. A 'commitment trap'

may have been created on nuclear pre-emption. However, one should also recognize that

such a trap is based on public communication of such threats, and such pronouncements, on

the issue of nuclear as opposed to conventional pre-emption, has not been a feature of the

Bush administration. For more on the commitment trap, see Sagan, "The Commitment

Trap," pp. 85-115. Of course, while not part of the official US doctrine, nuclear pre-emptive

strikes appear to have been incorporated into operational planning, as seen in the crisis action

planning and prompt strike capability of CONPLAN 8022-02.

71 The fear of a rogue state deterrent, and the need to counter such a deterrent with

enhanced nuclear capabilities, has be raised by a number of prominent analysts. See Colin S.

Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (New York: Lynne Rienner, 1999) and Keith B. Payne, The

Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Kentucky: The University Press of

Kentucky, 2001). Interestingly, both authors are prominent members of the National

Institute of Public Policy, and were involved in writing the influential document, Rationale and

Requirements for US Nuclear Forces. This document is acknowledged to have heavily informed

the 2002 NPR, and many of its authors, including Keith Payne, would go on to hold posi-

tions in the Bush administrations Pentagon.

72 For the opposite perspective, see Payne, "The Nuclear Posture Review," pp. 135-151.

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