women's point of view with respect to gw hegel of 19th century german idealism - partial

8/14/2019 Women's Point of View with respect to GW Hegel of 19th century German Idealism - partial

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the whole fallen into the extreme one-sidedness of positive-scient ism on the one hand or the f

,/.- " Miriam Suzanne Pia ..: : - - : : ; : - -T" " 2~

German Idealism

Philosophies in Europe have been written in national languages since the middle of theseventeenth century. Sutton circumscribed 'Europe' and 'European culture'. "Europe in any cultural.sense only came into being with the onset of the Reformation. And for the purposes of philosophy Ipropose to date Europe from the final demise of Christendom, for which one may take the Treaty ofWestphalia of 1648, which marks the end of the religious wars on the Continent- in Britain thecorresponding date would be 1660," (Sutton, p.3).

Claud Sulton has noted a characteristic of the German tradition in philosophy. "[It] has not on

introspective psychologism on the other. Most writers in its different epochs ... give fair weight to theperceptive and the active, the emotional and the intellectual, the individual and the social aspects of thehuman person. The relation of human beings, though the written records note more of the male humanbeings, rather than the female human beings to the world were often emphasised in historical Germanphilosophy.

In its most general sense, German Idealism rests on the assumption that intelligibility pervadesthe world of nature and culture, and that this can be viewed through history and by examining thecurrent state of affairs. (Sulton, 57-G5). Hegel's system is a unique effort to find the concepts thatgovern this rational order. His endeavour grew out the German tradition, especially out of the Kantianaspiration to delineate the categories of the human thought, and to trace the limits of reason. Schellingand Fichte, the other German Idealists works were also rooted in Kant: the former in Kant's Critique ofJudgement, the latter in Immanuel Kant's Critique o(Practical Reasoll. (Sutton, ps.53-57). Apart fromKant, the main influences on Hegel and the other German Idealists were Goethe- as part of the Sturm_und Drang movement in German literature, the Romantic movement in Germany, and the FrenchRevolution in politics. Of these, the women's movements of the time were most closely bound up withRomanticism. Caroline Schlegel, Schelling was, along with both Misters Schlegel and Schelling anactive member of the intellectual Jena Circle. Hegel and Goethe, though themselves not Romantics,were closely involved with the members of this group, both socially and intellectually, (Seyla


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.r :: Miriam Suzanne Pia4708 N College AveIndianapolis, IN 46205-1962 3

Benhabib.tp.Sz). Of the German Idealists, Mr. Schelling was the most Romantic, whereas Mr. Fichte,was the most religious. Between these relative extremes was Hegel, and his thought. Before weaddress Hegel's idealism in itself, let us briefly examine it in relation to Kantian philosophy.

Hegel 's brand of idealism also differed from others. "Subjective idealism, the view that theworld is my ideas or sensations ... Hegel, too hoped to solve ... [problems of self and world] by sometype of idealism, but his idealism is not that of Berkeley, Kant or Fichte. The contrast is pointed by the'fact' that whereas Dr. Johnson thought that kicking a stone refuted idealism, Hegel held that if anythingit confirmed it. Realism, according to Hegel, maintains that physical objects are independent ofoneself. Practical involvement with them - eating them or possessing and using them- both establishesthat thcy are not," (lnwood,p.143). This last sentence is not true. Realism does rely partially uponextrapolation for its argument. This consists of accepting the reality of the world prior to one's ownbirth, and after one has died. The fact that humans effect other beings and things in our/their world Jdoes not mean that those things and beings are not independent of us [or their original existence.Similarly, the reality of places, beings, things etc. that remain beyond my own, or your experientialboundaries is independent of my experiencing them. My subjectivity, or yours for that matter, isconstituted predominantly by personal experience .. However, individuality is also constituted bylimitation- in both form and experience. DilTerentiation is one quality that requires this limitation.This leads us to the principle that there is more to other people and to the world than our own limitedconsciousness. Mortality is another expression of the limitation which thorough individuality demands.This is the line of thought by which the subjectivity of the ego is at once realised. That this subjectivereality, this individualised experience makes up the totality of our uniqueness, but not of the reality ofthe objective world. It is true that each of us depends upon our own subjectivity to experience theworld, yet it is equally obvious that our subjectivity, our lives, have emerged from other people and aredependent upon the world of which are apart- not the other way round. Further, that we can effect

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\other beings and objects in reality does not show their dependence upon our subjectivity for theirconstruction; it reveals, rather, that we, ourselves and the objects of our experience are qualitatively asreal as one another. If this were not the case, the entire world would dissolve and end every timeanyone died. The unique compilation of experience is lost whenever and individual dies, but the realityof which that person (or other life-form for that matter) was a part does not. The greatest discomfortthat this creates, is that it tends to make a very powerful case against the capacity for individuals to

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defined as a 'concrete' mortal expression of the eternal. What was just described might be categorised J

'-~7~ Miriam Suzanne Pia- -, 4

know everything. For philosophers, this has sometimes been, and can be a difficult realisation. The

next question that this brings up is the relation or truth, to the individual. If we take a metaphysicalleap and posit the spiritual realm as the realm of Truth-as-Being, we can interpret every manifestationof life and, for that matter, of inanimate being as a manifestation of Truth as truth. Here the 'truth'means a unique, fully differentiated specific formulation of the Truth/Goddess/God. In other words;each being is a specific instance of the cosmic Truth in a unique set of relations. The diversity of.manifestations is a means by which Truth/Goddess/God/Reality expresses itself in its fullness.Aristotle would have said: Reality actualises all of its potentialities. This formulation keeps the unionwith the Divine/Truth can be actualised by individuals. This results, however, not in individuals who'know everything from an omniscient perspective' but in another expression of the Truth with its ownset of relations to the other Truth from which it has differentiated. This results in 'truth'. A 'truth' is

as a Spiritual Realism. It will not be discussed further in this paper. It is quite distinct from and yetlargely comprehensible in relation with one of Hegel's main metaphysical tenets: "There is no supremebeing beyond; the spirit is not to be found in another world; the infinite spirit has to be found in thecomprehension of this world, in the study of the spirits summoned in the Phenomenology of Geist.'History comprehended' must replace theology," (Kaufmann, p.148).


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would be relevant, as the order of reality as imposed would be effected by the qualities of the perceiver. J

r ' ; ~ ' MiIiam Suzanne Pia." ,~:: i-tj(fdJj(1~ hi~,. ,;.1 ~ . 1}O~... 'J f .. . ;; , - 5f" .:.

Hegel &KantKantian idealism is based in a belief wherein objective reality is only recognised with

reference to a subject. Hence, further discussion of philosophy from Kant proceeds from the Subject.Objective reality is constituted, Kant's system only as 'existing for the subject'. He went on to arguethat objective reality is ordered solely by the perceiver, group of perceivers. Characteristic of a seriesof philosophers who followed after Descartes, Kant devised yet another egocentric philosophy in whichthe independence of the world from the subject was not realised.

These basic axioms, with which the authoress does not, as it happens, agree, lead to asituation in which we should be able to predict some of the characterisitcs which we would be derivedfrom such a starting point. First, rather than finding the order in the world, such philosophers as Kantwould consider the order in experience to be rooted in the subject. The sex/gender of such philosophers

Such a philosophy would probably be intolerant since the perceiver would be simultaneouslyperceiving in a unique way and living in the delusion that 'it must be like this for everyone'. A delusionwhich is perfectly expressed by Kant's Categoricallmperitive which implies that everyone shouldrespond in precisely the same manner given the same circumstances. If taken precisely literally, this isnonsense. It only retains its validity in the 'realm' of the abstract. Although can raise a principle of'adjustments for differences' to the same 'realm'; these two principles will often conflict with oneanother. The second reveals the 'intolerant quality' of the first.

What other qualities, or problems might we expect in any philosophy which positsthe subject, but not the world-except as a derivative of the subject? Such systems would be apt to beblind to the role of nature on the perceiver's behaviour, and to the state of the subject as part of theworld. Hegel, after Kant, did cite the 'pantheistic intuition'; however, from a Realist metaphysics,Hegel's was a 'false pantheism' since what Hegel referred to was actually merely a conjuration of thesubject's rather than the recognition of a truth greater than itself, that is RealitylTruth.

Kant's and Hegel's philosophies do have several of the flaws noted above. Hegel's,and Kant's metaphysics (or epistemologies, if you prefer) are certainly different. As W.H. Walsh

pointed out, "There is plenty of evidence to show that Hegel repeatedly read Kant in particular ... theearly writings, which might be said to constitute a continuing Ausienandesetzung with Kant on moralityand religion, there arc at least three places in [IIegcl's] works as we have them now where Hegel


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Miriam Suzanne Pia,:: +T ' . : f

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undertakes a full review of and criticism of the Kantian philosophy: in the essay Glauben und Wissen

... in the introductory section ... [to the] Logic in the Encyclopaedia oOhe Philosophical Sciences and

.. ~in the posthumously published Lectures 011 the History o(Philosophy. There are also repeatedreferences to and discussions of particularly Kantian doctrines in ... the Science o[Logic," (Walsh,p.96). Walsh's comments are in agreement the synopses of the Hegelian system, and of GermanIdealism made by Sutton. Commentators Kaufmann and Sutton both refer to this area of Hegel'ssystem of thought as the 'realm of shadows' where principles are worked out in abstraction. They claimthat it is in this realm where consciousness is rigorously discliplined, and in so doing they intimate itsconnection with morality on the one hand, and science on the other. Kaufmann has claimed that it is inconsidering opposite concepts such as 'being-nothing' and 'infinite-finite' that the one-sidedness of theseabstractions becomes clear. They are found together in experience where sense experience operates inconjuction with 'abstract consciousness'. This aspect of the Logic then, rejoins the explication ofHegel's dialectical procedure.

Sutton has made an objection to a presumption made by some that, through usingcategories such as 'being' and 'nothing' one can deduce the nature of the Absolute. His objection relatesto the process used by the other German Idealist Fichte, who did make deductions from a few abstractpostulates. Yet, as we find elsewhere in this paper, in the discussion of the dialectic, Hegel's dialecticwas more complex than a mode of deduction.


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Miriam Suzanne Pia7~~~h


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Miriam Suzanne Pia 8"::..~f.,:," .~.

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inclusive of embodiment are part of a conscious effort to conquer the mistake of dualism by taking an

alternative approach to the issue. The freedom and activity of this spirit is simultaneously a birthrightof humanity's and sets humanity apart from the rest of nature. In disagreement with Hegel, women aredistant from, and as close to nature as are men. The temptation arises to view one sex as closer tonature than the other when inasmuch as the Other sex (males for we women and females for you men)arises simply because the individual is set apart from the world. From this viewpoint, the opposite sexis perceived more in the manner of the rest of the world and of nature. "In general, sentience is theindividual spirit living in healthy partnership with its corporeity," (Allthropology, Petry's English,p.I G I). Although Hegel regards the pantheistic intuition as normal for a healthy mind, he claimed thatit is the 'unnatural' character of the active human will which is the most spiritual and most sublimeachievement of humanity. The main difficulty with this idea, is that it seems to confound the naturalhuman characteristic of intelligence and the types of goals which emerge from use of this capacity forsomething 'unnatural', Whereas Hegel would argue that free will operates 'independently' from naturallaws, it is here argued that free will alters the application of natural laws through the use of intelligence,but does not act in opposition to natural laws. This is because human beings have emerged from naturein the first place. In the second place, human beings, inclusive of all our various and sundrytechnological devices remain a part of the natural unity of the world in which we live. This unityconsists in everything from our dependence upon the environment for the air we breathe, the food weeat, and etc. to the materials with which we devise all of our technology. At the same time, both asindividuals and as a group, humans of both sexes exhibit free will.

Hegel himself argued that willing takes place in an unresisting medium, (Inwood, p.lS3).When he so claimed, he meant to be referring solely to human cultural phenomenon- and especially toportions of the culture where men were more prevalent than women. However, this itself contrastssharply from the idealisation of 'man's relation to nature'. James Schmidt gave Rosen's view, whichfollows. "As a consequence of the break with the ancient conception of nature and the substitution of aprogram for the domination of nature through a conception of reason modelled on calculation and bestexemplified by Descartes, modem philosophy gains practical mastery at the price of a loss of its ownfoundations. In morality, this same attitude is exhibited as the human drive for self-control, and for thesublimation of interpersonal relations. The individual spirit 'dominating nature' chooses to co-operatewith others, for example. The human group spirit strives to 'dominate nature' in a wide range of ways,


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dominated' is untenable. Hegel also failed to recognise that when there was a conception of 'a program

' .~;:,> \ . . ,Miriam Suzanne Pia

4708 N College "to. Indianapolis, IN 9,. -

including farming. Yet farming is a prime example of the cultivation of nature, and working with

nature. These concepts are not as mutually exclusive as the thinkers in the German tradition believedthem to be. The emergence of needs and goals, such as peaceful social relations between individuals inplace of fighting is closely related to the intelligence and describes a way of acting and willing. Thesegoals do not 'oppose nature' nor do they require the 'domination of nature'. Rather, they requireemphasising other aspects of nature. Group co-operation does include the domination in individuals oftheir 'natural' drives to egocentricity; however, co-operation also expresses and improves the chancesfor individuals and groups of humans to not only survive, but to thrive. This latter effect of what Hegelincorrectly termed 'unnatural will' also describes why the conception of 'nature' as 'in need of being

to dominate nature' his concept of willing as taking place in an unresisting medium falls entirely apart.It is clear that he attempted to maintain both of these ideas, by viewing culture as 'unnatural ' anddistinct from nature, but we have found here that this is not the case.

Michael Inwood has provided a very different criticism of Hegel's conception of action. In hisarticle 'Hegel on Action' he stated that Hegel described only two types of actions. One was action in anentirely unresisting medium, the other was the inter-action of a co-operative endeavour. Hegelclaimed, according to Inwood, that any other type of act was Sisyphean. This was especially so withrespect to acting in a resistant medium- of which the women's movement of the time was a primeexample. Hegel also argued that action is always, or nearly always, about maintaining- an institution ora habit, etc. Inwood objected to this by pointing out that most actions can be described in terms of'maintaining'. What Inwood did not mention was how this relates to the aforementioned puzzle ofsimultaneously having a program 'for the domination of nature' and only acting in an 'unresistingmedium'. Yet Hegel's general description of the progress of spirit is not of the "natural and easy rise ofself consciousness" in the Phel/olllellology. There are two ways of interpreting the movements in thePhellomenology. First, we can view each stage, or 'form' of spirit as the summed up story of ageneration, or generations of people. Within each of these stages the individuals may have 'acted in anunresisting medium', but most periods of history have radicals and other 'nonconforrnists'/subculturesliving in them. Second, we can envisage the phases of spirit as being found both in periods of historyand as a partial description of the spiritual development of individuals. Only if we use the firstinterpretation is there any evidence for 'action in an unresistant medium'. For, if anything, the


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Miliam Suzanne Pia41 "T ..:ollc;;"Indianapolis, IN ,~r -'"::: ,,, 10

Phenomellology o(Spirit always contains at least an element of struggle in the progression through the

phases of spirit. Change and not maintenance, is the feature of action which rousts spirit intoincreasing self-awareness, So, in Inwood's article, we find a troublesome Hegelian account of actionthat clashes with Hegel's description of the process of spirit's progress in the Phenomenology. As it isdescribed in Hegel: A Reinterpretation, "We find a vision of the world, of man, and of history whichemphasises development through conflict, the moving power of the human passions, which producewholly unintended results," (Kaufmann, 161).Let us then continue to criticise Hegel's view and begin the sowing of a new formulation of Spirit'sdevelopment in which nature/culture are found together and in relation.

We might say, that this recognition of the coexistence of nature and culture, and the sense ofculture as a willed cultivation of specific aspects of nature is the realisation of the grounds(foundations) which were noted above as having been lost. This loss, in turn, comes to a particularlyclear consciousness in the work of Kant and Fichtc (6-11, 2-60,92-104). Paralleling this inability oftheoretical reason to obtain clarity about its grounds is the moral nihilism whose cultural manifestationsHegel explores in the Phenomenology's discussion of the self -estrangement wrought by theEnlightenment (193-202). Rosen argues that the crisis visible in Kant and Fichte and made moretangible in the disaster of the French Revolution provides the impetus for a productive renewal of themain themes of classical Greek philosophy which reach their culmination in Plato and Aristotle. ThusHegel's primary response to his age is to be sought.. .on the level of Hegel's theoretical philosophyproper, the Logic," (Schmidt, p.114). These are part of his Encyclopaedia o[Philosophical Sciences.In these later writings Hegel espouses a view of Christianity which simultaneously differs a great dealfrom the theological doctrines of the orthodox Lutheran and Catholic churches and yet recognises andjustifies Christianity. Essentially, Hegel includes Christianity within his system of thought. CharlesTaylor noted, "In any case, it is clear that Hegel is neither a theist in the ordinary sense nor an atheist.Whatever the sincerity of his claims to be an orthodox Lutheran, it is clear that Hegel only accepted aChristianity which had been systematically reinterpreted to be a vehicle of his own philosophy,"(Taylor, p.39).

Part of what makes Hegel's works so interesting is his effort to include everything, all aspectsoflife, in his analyses. This is also a main contributing factor into the complexity of Hegel's thought.In his later works, this is exacerbated by the obscurity of his written style, a difficulty that has plagued


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M'~)AM 5, P IA11

both translators and readers. Walter Kaufmann provided an excellent diagram of Hegel's system in the

form of a circle, which I include here:

.~\.cfl..l.0.# Sittlichkeit8' Moralitatl W

~Art ,Religion ~Philosophy S B .s . ., . . .

Philosophyof Spirit\ Logic: c . Psychology.$ Phenomenology

~ Anthropology,~S ' Philosophyof NatureHegel's system contained within it a philosophy of sex and gender, although it has not often

been recognised as such. This problematises the matter of interpreting Hegel's philosophy, particularlywhen striving for a clear comprehension both of Hegel's meaning and of the value for women andegalitarians of both sexes, of Hegel's system. There are major discussions within Hegel's worksregarding the relation of family to state, esp. in Philosoph v o(Right in which women figure largely-though often in a way, which is anathema to the free women citizens of today, and to the men, who areour co-citizens. Hegel also addresses relations between the sexes in the 'Philosophy of SubjectiveSpirit' Anthropology and also in the Phenomenology o(Spirit.

Hegel himself recognised that his philosophy was only current up to his own time; it was onlyintended to be. The current trends in our society include sexual egalitarianism, and greater freedom forboth sexes in determining our social roles. These tendencies are multinational. If we take another lookat Hegel's philosophy, can we fmd valuable ways to re-evaluate aspects of Hegel's work which can bothallow us to discover new philosophical problems which require solving, and can we find out which of


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Hegel's ideas continue to operate? It is both easy and optimistic to announce the feminisation ofculture- into an egalitarian system, as a progress of the spirit of humanity. A progress in which menhave become more self-aware and ethical in their relations with women, who have also become moreself-aware of themselves (ourselves) as free citizens. Indeed, the concept of motherhood as a matter ofchoice has perhaps existed in the past 'in the dark' as a suppressed issue, but is now in the light of day.Clearly this alters dramatically the relationships of family, of the sexes- both within and beyond the'boundaries' of family, civil society, and state. All of these factors add to the value of re-evaluatingHegel; perhaps his methodology, if nothing else, offers the contemporary readers of both sexes toolsfor a deeper alteration, or for a progressive growth out of his old system. At the very least, it is a greatmovement of the dialectic. Doubtless, many would agree with Fukuyama, that the increase indemocratic states is another clear example of spirit 's progress.

Although the sex/gender theory within Hegel's philosophy is not in and of itself the mostimportant part, it is extremely significant in that it pervades the whole of his system of thought. Thereis some debate as to whether the Phenomenology oLSpirit or the section of the Encyclopaedia oLPhilosophical Sciences is the more important of Hegel's works. "[Both] Taylor and Findlay prefacetheir discussion of the discussion of the system with an account of the Phenomenology arguing thatdespite the subsequent immersion of a discipline termed phenomenology within the Philosophy oLSubjective Spirit, the Phenomenology of 1806 continues to play an important role as prolegomenon tothe system proper," (Schmidt, p.114). I find the debate to be a bit too presumptuous, in that the scopecovered by Hegel's system make him of interest to religious, political, feminist thinkers as well asphilosophers 'proper'. Yet even within the category of philosophers, most have a bent towards one oranother modes of thought in mind when they philosophise. It is this lady's belief that the wholeEncvclopaedia is more important to comprehending Hegel's system, than is the Phenomenology .What is the most significant about Hegel is the axiom that spirit is both progressing (or evolving-though Hegel himself did not think that anything evolved) and that spirit is actual (wirklichkeit) in theworld. The notions of embodiment and of actuality in Hegel's philosophy are the most important dueto their metaphysical and cultural implications. His analysis of individuality, and of the individual inrelation to the universal of a culture (a noteworthy limitation by Hegel of ,universal') is fascinating andunder-appreciated. That this is the medium of uniting the subjective and the objective in spirit reallyre-vitalises existentialist notions and sets existentialism into a different relation to metaphysics (these


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modes operate effectively regardless of whether spirit, matter or mind are taken as the ontologicalground of being). For reasons which become clear through the dissertation, I think that theEncyclopaedia, with the emphasis on 'Absolute Spirit', and the sections relating to the construction and

operation of universal feeling soul in union with spirit as individuality are the most important featuresof Hegel's philosophy.

We shall now go a bit further into detail about several of Hegel's works. Hegel'sPhenomenology o[Spirit contained Hegel's insistence that philosophy should be scientific, yetexemplifies the opposite. That philosophy can be excellent even when it is not scientific. Suttondescribed the Phenomenology as a highly personal, autobiographical account of Hegel's own spiritualpilgrimage. It was a journey, "from a dissatisfaction with Christianity, Kantian morality andrevolutionary enthusiasm, to a rather new kind of rationalism arising out of and tinged with religion,"(Sulton, p.G5-G). For Kaufmann, what is most significant about the Phenomenology is that itconstitutes "a study of the forms in which spirit manifests itself'. In both, the objective manifestationof spirit is implied. Hegel felt that the world of the divine- of spirit was found in the comprehension ofthe reason of the world. Hegel's view was that he had examined and explicated this progressionthrough various forms of male spirit, and in doing so had accomplished a philosophical and religiousendeavour. This becomes quite clear in his later works, wherein he makes explicit the structure of'Absolute Spirit'. One neglected aspect this reveals it that Hegel's philosophy reflects the Christiantheological problem in that it failed to significantly, or interestingly address the matter of the progressof female spirit; neither the Phenomenology, nor Christianity develop this. Hegel did do a strike avicious blow against women when he argued against the spiritual development of women in hisPhilosophvo[Right.

As such, this project aims to make another step towards the development of egalitarianphilosophies that respect: the differences betwixt the sexes, and similarities amongst women and menthat transcend gender. The following includes sections that cover: philosophy and feminism, whereinfeminist theory is both criticised and explicated. Then, the significance of embodiment in Hegelianphilosophy and an examination of the famous 'Lordship and Bondage' section of the Phenomenologyare made. In the latter, Hegel's model of the origin of self-consciousness is refuted, and the creation of,at least, the beginnings of a model for emergent self-consciousness in women is created, as well as theseeds of an alternative model for emergent self-consciousness in men. Their follows a 'bits n Pieces'


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14section where additional specific problems in Hegel's philosophy are addressed. The dissertation endswith a section on women's history. Because so many of us have only learnt history 'through the eyes ofmen', some sense of Hegel's era from the point of view of the women who lived in that time (and who

were interested in bettering themselves and their situation) requires that it be included."Hegel's system is a circle which he recognised will have to be gone over and rectified again

by subsequent philosophers. As for the individual enquirer, [he or she] can I believe, enter the circle atanyone of the points on the circumference, according to one's personal interests or the social concernsof the age; but once bitten by the spirit of philosophy one is constrained to go all round it. .. I t wasHegel's merit to see that. .. these manifestations of the spirit are tied together, the individual with the

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social, the contemplative with the active," (Sutton, p.69).


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Philosophy and Feminism

Women who practice philosophy or engage with a canon of male philosophers seek effectiveways of approaching the subject matter. Many of the attitudes which women take towards texts areenvisaged as forms of feminist thinking. Some of these ways are, or were, more encouraged by themen in philosophy. One of these ways has been labelled 'liberal feminism.' This consists mainly ofwomen reading the texts 'as men' wherein 'men' means human being, rather than 'male'. It is the mostinnocuous; some would say- ineffectual, way for women to engage with the canon. It is a method,which does not rock the boat. It is a means women and men can use without having to actual face up toissues of sex and gender. Another way of viewing it is to claim that our contemporary beliefs are somuch more significant than those espoused in the canon, that there is no need to justify our own ideas,nor to refute the bad ideas, or customs of the past. In her article, 'Martha Nussbaum and UnreasonablePhilosophy', Joanna Kerr argues vehemently against this way of reading the philosophical canon. TIleauthoress) of this dissertation has come to agree that 'liberal feminism' is not an acceptable means ofengaging with the philosophical canon.

One major reason why other ways of reading philosophy are necessary is that 'liberalfeminism' actually perpetuates sexist structures by idleness. Another is that ways of living described inphilosophies cannot actually be simply 'lived the same way by men and by women'. Primarily, in anysystem, such as Hegel's, where the men are urged to live in a way that relies upon women living insubjugation cease to exist as possibilities in a society where both women and men are free. Hence, toeven attempt to work with such models, is not only bad for the women readers, but is also bad for themen- especially for those happy with the current movements towards freedom for both the sexes.There are two main ways of handling this. TIle first is to dismiss those aspects of the canon with whichone does not agree, and to leave it entirely at that. This is a method employed, quite possibly, by thevast majority of readers. The second is to address the issues directly, and to enjoy the work ofre-evaluation. Kerr argues essentially that whenever women 'work along traditional lines' in philosophy,the 'tradition' coerces women into writing in and working with a conceptual structure which is anti-feminist, and anti-woman. This means that women philosophers are being coerced into working astheir own enemies: a misogynist project. Kerr explains that this effectively perverts the egalitarianideals of 'liberal feminism'. This manifests as a claim that women have to imitate male voices in order


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to get heard, read, and respected. That males are not required to 'imitate women', but that women arerequired to 'imitate men' makes explicit that a sexist double standard is at work. She also points outthat for women to 'posit [themselves/ourselves] into another's defining structure is to perpetuate the

[false myth] of inferiority.' In her article, Stella Sandford cites two other women philosophers whohave found Hegel's errors with respect to women to have pervaded his system through his philosophyof sex and gender. "Mills main point in her critique of Hegel is that his treatment of women limited[limited women and limited] 'his philosophy so that he cannot the universality that he [sought)'(1995 :87). Finally Hodge argues convincingly that liberal feminist readings of Hegel's PhenomenologyorSpirit which argue that women can be included in Hegel's notion of citizenship, for example if onlyhis prejudices can be overcome." (Sandford, p. 80). This is specifically followed up in the followingsection of this paper. "Hegel, Hodge argues, sacrificed internal consistency to produce falsejustifications for the exclusion of women, and she concludes that 'it is Hegel, and political theory, notwomen who are the enemy of the progress of reason and history in the world, since it is [Hegel andmisogynist political theories] who, against reason and justice [denied the reality of] reason [in womenand denied] justice ... to women' (1987: p.155-6), "(Sandford, p.80). This is explained in more detailwhen the goals of the women's movement of the turn of the eighteenth century, and how aware Hegelwas of this, are covered in the final section of this dissertation. Women and men who really respectboth the sexes (regardless of whether they are called feminist, or pro-feminist, or not) realise that this isunacceptable as a solution. As philosophy is about reality and truth, women's aspirations to greatnessat the philosophicalleve\ need and deserve to be articulated. This demands that: male-man-as-Other bethcorised, that values of the 'subcultures' of women and men be recognised and evaluated, that currentlyused theories of the canon be subjected to ruthless examination in order to determine whichphilosophers and parts or philosophies have the best ideas for modern students of both sexes to study.The good news is that this is exciting work. The bad news is that it requires a lot of work, and itrequires that (esp. men) need to learn to read old works a bit differently.

Proponents of 'liberal feminism' may dismay. To really sort out how women as equals effectsthe philosophical systems written in the past means that men, and women have to think about women alot more. It is easier to write directly off the surface of the tradition. Philosophically however, it resultsin extreme distortion of both the canonical writers and of the writings of contemporary philosophers.


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Man (as a male) is a very warped image of woman indeed. Likewise, woman as a human being, a man,

but who is not male is abstract at best, twisted at its worst.Bringing Hegel into perspective, particularly for a mixed audience, demands ascertaining

characteristics of the society for both women and men. In Feminism and Methodology Joan Kelly-Gadol has faced this issue. "Women's history has a dual goal: to restore women to history and torestore our history to women ... But there is another aspect of women's history that needs to beconsidered: it's theoretical significance ... women's history has re-vitalised theory, for it has shaken theconceptual foundations of historical study. It has done this by making problematical 3 of the basicconcerns of historical thought: 1) periodisation, 2) the categories of social analysis, and 3) theories ofsocial change.

"... A notion which is basic to feminist consciousness ... that the relation of the sexes is a socialand not a natural one," (Joan Kelly-Gadol, p 15-16). She notes that periodisation in women's history isan effort to understand women's lives as participants in a coexistent history with men. Due to thecomplexities of the relations of the sexes, including social institutions and the effects of changes inmen's lives on women and vice versa, this alters our sense and interpretation of historical narratives. Inorder to understand Hegel's thought- for the time in which he wrote, and to be clear on Hegel'scontemporary significance- we need to have both sexes in historical and cultural context. In respectfulcriticism of this type of feminism, it is my belief that the relations between the sees are a combinationof natural and 'unnatural' i.e. socially constructed.

Orthodox academic feminists are like their philosophical counterparts, not free from error. Inresearching for this paper, severe ignorance was found in the guise of inaccurate presumptions within

feminist works. Also, there was at least one question that went unasked. Most of the feminist writerswho were used for this research were wrong about a most basic tenet of their project. Patriarchy is notuniversal. Matriarchy does exist in real life, and has been recorded as part of the history of, at least, theIroquoian Confederacy in North America. This culture continues to exist today, though it isunfortunately a minority, and has been matriarchal for at least five centuries. This culture only became'suppressed' over the past two hundred years. This culture is called matriarchal for several reasons.The society is matrilineal. All the land of the tribes and families is the property of the women of thetribe. Women hold all of the hereditary titles. Women select all the male chiefs of the tribe. The rolesof men function as duties and positions delegated by women. Even the decision of whether or not to


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send male warriors into war was made by the women of the tribe. Gender roles in both these societies,

and in European societies were rather strict. Since the women delegated many tasks to the men, mendid often also function as independent sub-groups much of the time. In a council meeting, for example,unless women relatives chose to be present, the men ran the government of the tribe amongstthemselves- except when regulations had to be voted upon, by both the women and men of the tribe.This brings up the unasked question: is an egalitarian society possible with either matrilineal orpatrilineal systems 'of naming and genealogy? Unfortunately this question cannot be answered here

Simone DeBeauvoir was one of several important philosophers who mistakenly perpetuatedthe myth of 'universal patriarchy' due partly to their ignorance of cultures such as that of the NativeAmerican Iroquois. In this respect she was both as brilliant and as wrong as many of her malecounterparts. Several European feminists wrongly deduced that farming and cattle holding erodedmatriarchal social structures. However, the Iroquoian peoples had relied upon farming more thanhunting for centuries. What has had the strongest effect on the matriarchal system was that the culturalpressures upon the nations from the surrounding USA. Financial constraints were the main argumentset forth by Handsome Lake that a family should have both partners and women should not divorcetheir husbands (throw them out permanently) whenever they wanted, but only under somewhat severecircumstances. The settlers, with their European patriarchal systems and attitudes effected theIroquoian culture- if only by effecting how the settlers dealt with the natives. In spite of this, theIroquois have continued to exist and to have a matriarchal and matrilineal society, (Parker 011 theIroquois, Parker).

This renews the question: what constitutes a truly egalitarian society- one that is neitherpatriarchal nor matriarchal? To what extent do rights and privileges involve presumptions of sex?How much of what is known as feminism and egalitarianism actually about freeing both the sexes fromtoo rigid roles based upon sex? This final question emerged when research revealed that even in amatriarchal society 'women are women and men are men'. Gender roles, relating to sexual differenceand expectations influenced the division of labour within the Iroquois society as much as it did inEurope. For both peoples, the effect of the prevalence of birth control has the potential to alter thesex/gender roles.

These are very intriguing questions, which can hopefully be answered. However, it is notpossible to address them all here.


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Hegel's Dialectical Method & The Question of ScienceDialectic as a method has been revered and used by philosophers since ancient

Greece. It emerged, according to Diogenes LaertiusIX.5, from the Eleatic philosopher Zeno.Zeno considered paradoxes to be fundamental to philosophical development. This methodcontinued to flourish and retained its reknown with Plato. One school of Neoplatonismderived a triadic system that described: unity (mone), going out of oneself (prohodos), andretum into oneself (epistrophe). These methods were used into the Middle Ages- at whichtime dialectic was one of the liberal arts.

These means of comprehending a world which extends well beyond theboundaries of mathematics and of 'mathematical logic' rernerged in Germany around the timeof the French Revolution. For the educated rationalist, of in the 'Enlightenment culture' the'pure (mathematical) rational version of reason' does really help in comprehending life and yetis insufficient to handle and to solve many of life's problematics. This fact led, at the tum ofthe nineteenth-century, to a cultural condition in which some 'intellectuals' abandoned thisrational form of reason. Disillusioned by its limitations, they turned to an adoration of art as ameans to find and express truth in conjunction with self-consciously valuing passions andemotions over reason-as-Kantian-rationality. An altemative mode for those educated in anddisappointed by Kantian rationality was to embrace, once again, dialectical method with aview to redefining reason.

Although Kant had involved synthesis in his four triads of categories, it wasthe zealous German idealist Fichte who resusitated a form of the dialectic- rather the Eleaticstyle, as the three-step of "thesis, antithesis, synthesis". Kaufman pointed out that Schellingadopted Fichte's form of dialectic, but Hegel did not, (Kaufmann, p154). Hegel did useanother form of dialectic. In the Phenomenology, this is characterised by the passage of spiritthrough self-estrangement and 'Unhappy Consciousness', which express the Neoplatonic styleof dialectic mentioned above. Hegelian dialectic does not simply fuse opposites into asynthesis. Rather it is the movement of dialectic which causes what appears to be opposites tobe comprehended at another level and in a different relation to each other than previously.This is what makes Hegel's philosophy more than a 'philosophy of the understanding'. R.G.Mure and others have explained this distinction in other ways. Hegel's notion of reason is


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more than 'Kantian rationality', Part of what dialectic and this altered meaning of reasoninvolves is that understanding and 'pure' rationality have not faded away but have ceased to[unction as the categories through which life or reality can be grasped,

In his article, 'Kant as Seen By Hegel', Walsh claimed: "Hegel's obsession with theproduction and reconciliation of opposites, which underlies his whole conception of dialecticalthinking and manifests itself in every part of his philosophy, would without doubt have struckKant as far-fetched," (Walsh,p. 99). The problem of these opposites, of the dialectic, as itrelates to the philosophy of sex and gender within Hegel's system, and beyond is expressed inHegel's description of the relation offamily and state. For in these discussions Hegelsimultaneously validates and values women as family members and as members of society,yet Hegel also fought against women becoming members of both the state and of civil society;Hegel even opposed women's education- except for domestic education. Hegel associatedAntigone with the state, and recognised women as carriers of divine law when they governedby familial law; in other words, when and only when they were monarchs or the equivalent of

monarchs. These are merely brief samples of how the contradictory quality of Hegel'sdialectic manifests in his system as an element of his philosophy of sex and gender.

Walter Kaufmann brought up the question of the relation of Hegel's dialectic toHegel's own claim that philosophy be scientific. "The fact that Hegel himself never used thedialectic to predict anything, and actually spurned the very idea that it could be used that way,suggests plainly that Hegel's dialectic never was conceived as what we should call a scientificmethod .. .In other words, Hegel's dialectic is a method of exposition, not a method ofdiscovery," (Kaufmann, p. 161). One problem here is that Kaufmann imposed a concept ofscience which is really confined to that of the natural sciences, wherein prediction is anecessary quality. A science ca, however, be a systematic ordering of information withouthaving to be predictive. Taxonomy is one example of this other type of science. Taxonomicalinformation can be applied in such a way as to make certain specific predicitons, but theinformation can only be so used when it is applied in the reverse. First comes the science ofdiscovering, compiling, ordering and analysing taxonomical information. Then, and onlythen, can a new discovery be explained by, or categorised according to the accumulatedtaxonomy. Only by reference to a developed body of taxonomical science can predicitons be


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Hegel & Embodiment

Whereas philosophers such as Leibniz devalued sense-experience, Hegel includedembodiment and sensation as requisite for people (consciousness) to acquire knowledge. "Theknowledge in which Hegel was interested was [is] essentially embodied, and sensation could not bedismissed without forgetting embodiment," (Walsh, pI 07). This makes it clear that the relation of sex,as integral to embodiment, is also relevant to self - consciousness. This is explicitly relevant for bothsexes; hence, this legitimates both feminist re-evaluations of Hegelian philosophy with a view tocreating female oriented formulations and it also serves tojustify some feminist philosophers'

\arguments against 'liberal feminism' and against the limitation of feminist philosophies to 'extensions ofmale oriented concepts to women'.

Since embodiment includes individuality as well as sex and is required by Hegelianphilosophy as a "necessary presumption", some re-evaluation of how concepts such as citizenship, civilsociety can be applied to both women and to men whilst also retaining difference on both thetheoretical and practical levels is necessary, There has been quite some feminist discussion ofembodiment. Embodiment has been treated as an extraordinarily helpful concept, especially forcreating developmental accounts of self-consciousness, Embodiment has been found to be a potentargument against dualism, as well as a refutation against the schools of philosophy that renouncedsense experience in the first instance, In the twentieth century some of these types of philosophies(such as that of Leibniz) have been used to argue against the relevance of sexual difference as a partialmeans of arguing against feminist critiques of philosophy and revision of the philosophical canon.

Although G.W.F. Hegel would not have used the notion of embodiment in order to advance asocial, cultural and political egalitarianism (equality of the sexes in theory and practice), many writers,including the author of this work, do include embodiment as a philosophically necessary axiom foregalitarian philosophies. Corporeality is not only important for an egalitarian project; Hegel wascorrect to view sensory experience as a legitimate means to knowledge. Further embodimentincorporates individuality, which itself involves the union of subjective and objective spirit- of vitalimportance to Hegel's philosophy.Hegel does recognise the logical operations and reasoning which occurs or is formulated without thesenses. These he describes as abstract; freedom in its 'pure' state is abstract. However, for Hegel, the


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actual freedom is an embodied activity of will by which the subjectivity of the individual isexternalised and objectified.

These conceptions: of embodiment, offreedom, and individuality are woven together byInwood when he states, "Hegel believes that action as opposed to knowledge or contemplation, isespecially connected with self-consciousness. At the most primitive level, action arises out self-centreddesires ... By contrast, the expression of the cognitive altitude is non-egocentric .. .In action I bothrequire and confirm my awareness of [myself as an embodied entity] (Inwood, p142). In hisAnthropology, Hegel united the abstractness of 'will and intelligence' through free action. This henoted as being the 1110Stpiritual behaviour, and as the expression of individuality. Hegel called thisawakeness; for "Objective Spirit' this is action, esp. in civil society and in the state. When this is thecase the philosophical questions regarding the tremendous difference between oneself and the world israised.

In contrast, Hegel discusses the sleeping spirit and especially the sleeping and/or feeling soul.Here undifferentiation is the pivotal quality. The unity, be it of mother and baby, man and woman, andfamily, Hegel argues, is in opposition to individuality. This can, Hegel has argued, also transpire withthe world. Although Hegel goes so far as to analyse extrasensory phenomena and divination asoccurences within feeling soul's immediacy, this concept has also been described by Nietzsche as thenon-differentiation of the Greek and the world as frenzied Dionysian rite in his Birth of Tragedy.Hegel called the 'sleeping state' or the unhealthy activities of the feeling soul, severed from spirit.When the feeling soul is connected with Spirit, the awake individual is active. Unlike Hegel, I do notbelieve that family life necessitates the destruction of nor the submergence of the individual of either

sex. Whether this simply expresses the spirit of late z o " century American (or at least Englishspeaking industrialised) feminine culture or whether other philosophers would have agreed with thisauthor cannot at the moment be ascertained. One might speculate that this is yet another progression ofspirit.


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culture this would become a test for survival. This is generally what adulthood entails, to varying

degrees. For Hegel's original model, however I think that either adult individuals of both sexes couldsurvive on their own, or that adults tended to remain in co-operative groups, at least part of the time.Hegel's model retains the status of one possibility, although an unlikely one.

For women there is less reason to suspect that the presence ofa stranger of the same sex, inthe same state of maturity would lead to combat. Perhaps this is simply caused by observation: thatamongst mammals, adult females often congregate into groups. This is not only true in herd animals.This tendency to co-operate with one another socially means that fights between females are usuallytriggered by risks to their young or limited resources.

Whilst adult male mammals (including humans) tend often to compete within their own se forreproductive opportunities, adult female mammals tend to guard their resources for their own and theiroffspring's survival. Reproductive opportunities tend to present themselves, if not even to imposethemselves in the lives of females. The presence of other females can both improve circumstances-greater ease in hunting when females share looking after young, additional protection from otherpredators, and even protection of young, and each other from the odd dangerous male. Of course,limited resources could under certain circumstances worsen conditions. The presence of multiplefemales in nature, and in culture has virtually no effect upon the reproductive opportunities ofindividuals; the point being that this is not really a factor in natural female-female social relationswhereas it is a major factor in male-male relations.

Relations between the sexes appear different through the eyes of women than from theviewpoint of men. The combination of the active forces of sexual attraction, reproductive potentiality,

and (when it exists) maternal relations combine with difference in size to make male and femaleresponses to members of the other sex distinctive from their responses to members of the same sex.Each of the sexes also has its own way of relating to members of the same sex. To this extent, I agreewith Hegel on this point.

Let us briefly address the notion of 'natural mutual recognition' between the sexes. Malescan, but do not always, constitute a threat to female self-consciousness. Adult males, aside fromstanding out as a strong contrast to normality; i.e., they are Other, tend to cause moments of distress orsubjugation. There is an irony of the relations between the sexes, which makes man somehow

women's point of view with respect to gw hegel of 19th century german idealism - partial

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