within and after the cold war. europe's struggling role and position inside the global security...

8/8/2019 Within and After the Cold War. Europe's Struggling Role and Position Inside the Global Security Matrix

1/22

STUDIAUNIVERSITATISBABEBOLYAI,STUDIAEUROPAEA,LIV,1,2009

WITHINANDAFTERTHECOLDWAR:EUROPESSTRUGGLING

ROLEAND POSITIONINSIDETHEGLOBALSECURITYMATRIX

EmanuelCopila*

Abstract

Alongthe20thcentury,Europelostitspreeminenceininternationalaffairs.Itwasnolongertheepicenteroftheworld,butamereshadowofitsformerself.Thisnew

Europe was most visible after 1945. During the Cold War, the old continent

reachedthethresholdofitsvulnerability,andneededAmericanprotectioninorder

to survive, rebuild itself andprosper.After 1989, Europe suffersfrom security

confusion,especiallywhenitcomestoitsrelationswithAmerica.Iscontemporary

Europe capable of ensuring its securitywithoutWashingtons interventions? Is

thisscenariodesiredbytheUSA,orevenbyalltheEuropeancountries?Howcan

theformeraxismundi redefine itself in termsof security?Theseare themain

questionsthepresentpaperistryingtotakeintoaccount.

Key words: security, geopolitics ColdWar, postColdWar, transatlanticpartnership

WesternEuropeduringthepostwarperiod

AftertheSecondWorldWar,USAand itsEuropeanalliesformed,in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The mostimportanttaskofthenewmilitaryalliancewasthediscouragementofanyaggressivebehavior,especiallytheoneswhocouldcomefromtheUSSR.1Gregory Flynn states that USA insisted more on the economicreconstruction and the political federalization of Europe than on the

*Teachingassistant,WestUniversityofTimioara.Thedocumentation for thisarticlewaspartially facilitatedby anAMPOSDRU scholarship, obtained trough the following grant:Investete n oameni! FONDUL SOCIAL EUROPEAN, Programul Operaional Sectorialpentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 20072013, proiectul STUDIILE DOCTORALEFACTOR MAJOR DE DEZVOLTARE AL CERCETRILOR SOCIOECONOMICE IUMANISTE.Email:[email protected],NATO.Scurtistorie,Bucureti:Silex,1999,p.65;FranoisdeRose,Altreilearzboimondialnuaavutloc.NATO ipacea,Bucureti:Nemira1998,pp.3233;JiiFidler,PetrMare,IstoriaNATO,Iai:InstitutulEuropean,2005,pp.1819.
http://us.mc332.mail.yahoo.com/mc/[email protected]://us.mc332.mail.yahoo.com/mc/[email protected]


2/22

EmanuelCopila6

necessityofamilitaryalliancewith itagainst theUSSR. In the firstyearsafterthewar,Stalinanditscountry,seriouslyaffectedbytheconfrontation,were not perceived as a geopolitical threat.2 Only after the sovietaggressions upon Berlin, the sovietization of Czechoslovakia and thebeginningof theKoreanWar, theAmericansunderstood thenecessityofthis transatlanticpartnership. In response, the soviets created in1955 theWarsaw Treaty, a military partnership between USSR and the EasternEuropecountries(exceptYugoslavia)whichenteredafter1945inthesovietgeopoliticalsphere.3

The SecondWorldWar leftbehind a devastated old continentandshatteredtheambitionwhichaimedtoregainEuropescentralplaceintheworld.ThenewgeopoliticalpolewastheUnitedStatesofAmerica,butitssupremacywascontestedbyStalinandtheUSSR.EvenifthereignofEuropeintheworldaffairswasover,itsgeostrategicimportanceremainedvery high. This continent was, at least for a couple of decades, thegeopoliticalstakeoftheColdWar;beingdisputedbothbytheAmericansand thesoviets, it followed itsculturalanddemocratic instinctandchoseUSAtoallywithinthelongestideologicalconfrontationthattookplaceintheXXst century.

TheColdWar:abriefintroduction

Twomajor theses compete to explain thebeginning of the ColdWar. The traditional thesis blames the Marxist ideology and its sovietcorollary for the origins of the confrontation. Ideas like the globalrevolution and the universal class struggle could only lead to conflict;besides that, the political experience of the soviet leaders, whichpermanentlydealtwithinternalorexternalenemies,wasalsopugnacious.4The competing revisionist thesis affirms that the USSR could not havestartedtheColdWar.StalinsempirewasravagedaftertheSecondWorldWar, loosing almosta thirdof itspopulation alongwithmany resources

2 Gregory Flynn, Statele Unite i aprarea Europei, in Raoul Girardet (ed.), AprareaEuropei,Iai:InstitutulEuropean,2005,pp.122123.3TonyJudt,EpocaPostbelic.OistorieaEuropeidedup1945,Iai:Polirom,2008,pp.143147.AsPaulJohnsonobserved,analyzingtheconditionsthatledtotheappearanceoftheColdWar, the postwar period canbemetaphorically expressed as a peace trough terror.Oistoriealumiimoderne(19202000),Bucureti:Humanitas,2005,pp.422453.4WilfriedLoth,Imprirealumii.IstoriaRzboiuluiRece(19411945),Bucureti:SaeculumI.O.,1997,p.10.


3/22

WithinandaftertheColdWar:EuropesStrugglingRole... 7

andindustries,anditdidntpossessnucleararmament(until1949),liketheUSA did. The American capitalist economy, inherently expansive andoppressive, forced the USSR to enter this confrontation.5 The debatebetween the two theses is still present, because people still (and willalways)havestrongorsoft ideologicalaffinities,whichareapartoftheiraxiological identity.Personally, I inclinemore to the traditional thesis,butwithoutnecessarilyneglectingtherevisionistone.Yes,theUSSRwasdevastatedaftertheSecondWorldWar,andforthisreasonittriedhardlytoconsolidateitsauthorityoverthenewEastEuropeansatellites.Also,oneshould not forget the interpretation that the Tsarist empire gave to itssecurity: expansion. Furthermore, the soviets also possessed, from theirtsaristpredecessors,aninflexibleandaggressivediplomatictradition,andthis allowed them to pursue their interests with harshness, seeking tointimidate their interlocutors by creating an uncompromising andretributiveimage.However,onecannotexclusivelyblametheKremlinfortriggering theColdWar.TheAmerican interests inWesternEuropewerealsoconsiderable,and theWashingtonofficialsalso looked fora securitymatrix almost unavoidable contrasting with the soviet semantic ofsecurity bestfittedtoachievethem.

PeterCalvocoressisustainsthatthe

sourcesoftheColdWarincludedmanyculturalandideologicalelements,butitwasprimarilyastruggleforpowerandaconsequenceofsomebiasedcalculations.TheprotagonistsUSAandUSSR fearedoneanother. Itstruethattheydidnotagree,evendetestedeachother;butiftheywouldnothavefearedeachother,theColdWarwouldhavenotexisted.6

5 Ibidem, pp. 1216. Joseph Nye Jr. distinguishes a third thesis, complementary to therevisionist one, the postrevisionist thesis. Insisting on the structural level, thepostrevisionistsextractwhattheybelievetobetheinevitablecharacteroftheconfrontation

betweenUSAandUSSRbasedon thenewbipolargeopoliticalconfigurationof theworld.JosephNye,Descifrareaconflictelorinternaionale.Teorie iistorie,Bucureti:Antet,2005p.109.Otherauthors,likeAnneDeighton,ascribetheemergenceoftheColdWartoasetofthreeinterconnected factors: ideology, decisional factors and geostrategical factors. SeeTheColdWarinEurope,19451945:ThreeApproaches,inNgaireWoods(ed.),ExplainingInternationalRelationssince1945,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1999,pp.8187.6PeterCalvocoressi,Rupeirndurile!AldoilearzboimondialsiconfigurareaEuropeipostbelice,Iai:Polirom,,2000,p.155.ForaninstructiveassessmentoftheColdWarproblems,seealsoMartinMcCauley,Rusia,AmericasiRzboiulRece,Iai:Polirom,1999,AndreFontain,IstoriaRzboiuluiRece,Bucureti:EdituraMilitar,1993,orThomasParish,EnciclopediaRzboiului


4/22

EmanuelCopila8

USA feared that Stalin would send his armies further into theWesternEuropeand that the communistparties could came topower incountries like Italy or France; in return, Stalin feared a new westernalliance.7

CalvocoressialsoaffirmedthemajorfeaturesoftheColdWarwereitspseudoideologicalandnucleardimensions, thusmaking itapotentialThirdWorldWar.8Ontheotherhand,KennethWaltzdisagreedregardingthe ideological importance of the Cold War. In his opinion, geopoliticsprevailedover ideology inthisconfrontation.Thetwosuperpowersactedmoreliketraditionalpowerswhentheystruggledtoextendtheirsphereofinfluenceover the states in theThirdWorld.9Basedon theseanalyses, itcan be appreciated that the two major dimensions of the Cold War,ideologyandgeopolitics,werebothvery important inunderstandingthisperiodfromthe20thcentury,thefirstactinglikeajustifyingshapeforthenational interests of the superpowers, projected in the internationalenvironmentmainlyasgeopolitics.

Theoretically and politically, the ColdWarwas apprehendedbyUSAintwosuccessiveways.Thefirstway,nevermaterialized,consistedina limited nuclear war. It was followed by the containment theory10,launchedin1947byGeorgeKennan.11Forhim,

ThepoliticalpersonalityofSovietpowerasweknowittoday(1947,C.E.)isthe product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by thepresentSovietleadersfromthemovementinwhichtheyhadtheirpoliticaloriginandcircumstancesofthepowerwhichtheynowhaveexercisedfor

Rece,Bucureti:UniversEnciclopedic,2002.Themost importantdocumentssignedduringtheColdWararegatheredinAurelPredaMtsaru,Tratatderelaiiinternaionalemoderne i

contemporane.RzboiulRece(vol.III),Bucureti:LuminaLex,2005.7PeterCalvocoressi,op.cit.,pp.155156.8Ibidem,p.156.9KennethWaltz,TeoriaPoliticiiInternaionale,Iai:Polirom,2006,p.235.10AfterStalinsdeathin1953,aperiodofgeopoliticalrelaxationbegantoemergebetweenthe two superpowers. Still, President Eisenhower talked about freedom and EasternEuropesfighttoobtainit;thisleadstotheconclusionthatthecontainmenttheorysessenceremainedunchangeduntiltheEndoftheColdWar,evenifitsnamechangedalmostwitheveryAmericanpresidentandthegeostrategicaldoctrinethatfollowed.11PeterCalvocoressi,EuropadelaBismarcklaGorbaciov,Iai:Polirom,2003,p109.


5/22


nearly three decades in Russia. There canbe few tasks of psychologicalanalysismoredifficultthantotrytotracetheinteractionofthesetwoforcesandtherelativeroleofeachinthedeterminationofofficialSovietconduct.Yet the attemptmustbemade if that conduct is tobe understood andeffectivelycountered.12

WesternEuropeduringtheColdWar

Where was Europe in this geostrategic equation? If during the1940sandthe1950swesternEuropeansfearedamilitaryoutbreakoftheovergrowingtensionsbetweenUSAandUSSR,inthe1960thsand1970thstheystartedtobealsosensibletotheideathatthetwosuperpowerscouldmake economical and political agreements which would disadvantagethem.13DuringtheColdWar,evenintheearlyyearsoftheconfrontation,the European Community became a powerful economic force, but itssecurityagainstthepotentialsovietthreatswasinagreatextentensuredbyUSAtroughNATO.14Beingmilitaryweakerthanitstransatlanticneighbor some authors argue Europe tended to value soft power andinternational organizations more than national capacities and hardpower.15Evenso,onecannotfullystatethatEuropewashelplessincaseofamilitarythreat.In1986,themilitaryforcesofWestGermany,Italy,FranceandtheUnitedKingdomcomprisedoveramillionman,withafurther1.7million inreserves16Inadditiontothat,thesecountriespossessed(andthey still do) a consistent military technology, especially the UnitedKingdomandFrance,whichalsohavenuclearcapacities.17

Frictionsinsidethetransatlanticcommunitywereratherusual,bothbetween Western Europe countries and the USA, but also among theEuropeanpowers.Inthefirstyearsafterthewar,therewereseriousdoubtsregarding the acceptance of FRG (Federal Republic of Germany) inside

12

GeorgeKennan, The sources of soviet conduct, inGearoid oTuathail, SimonDalby,PaulRoutledge,(ed.),Thegeopoliticsreader,NewYork:Routledge,2006,p.78.13KennethWaltz,op.cit.,pp.237238.14RobertKagan,Despreparadissiputere.AmericasiEuropannouaordinemondial, Bucureti:Antet,2005,p.17.15Ibidem,p.33.ThetheoreticaldistinctionbetweenhardandsoftpowerwasintroducedinthefieldofInternationalRelationsbyProfessorJosephNyeJr.16PaulKennedy,Theriseandfallofthegreatpowers.Economicchangeandmilitaryconflictfrom1500to2000,NewYork:Vintage,1987,p.472.17Ibidem,p.472.


6/22

EmanuelCopila10

NATO. Although she was finally admitted in 1954, this result did notovercomethesuspicionsandtheprecautionoftheotherEuropeanNATOmemberstowardsit.18

InFrance,PresidentDeGaulleopposedtwotimes,in1961and1967,the United Kingdoms intention to enter the European Community.Hesustainedhisposition claiming thatUK couldoffset thedelicatepoliticalandeconomicalbalancethatwasbeginningtoemergebetweenFranceandGermanyandhewasalsosusceptibletothecloserelationshipbetweentheUK and USA, presuming that the last one would affect Francessovereignty and position inEurope.19DeGaulle also feared theGermaneconomic revival, trying political strategies to temper its unforeseeableneighbor.

TheEuropean securitybecame apressingmatter in the late1970ths,whenUSSRdevelopednewmilitarytechnologiesandstartedthewarin Afghanistan. But in the early 1980, Europes fears towards BrejnevsUSSRwere considerablediminished, alongwith the attraction theSovietUnion exercised formanydecades onEuropean countries like France orItaly.20

ThelastdecadeoftheColdWarwitnessedanintensificationoftheEuropean discontents towards the United States and NATO. The mainmotivesofthisoutcomeweremostlygeopolitical(disagreementsupontheStrategic Defense Initiative, perceived by Europeans as a dangerouswithdrawalof theAmericannuclear shieldwhichprotected them,or theMiddle East conflict)but they entailed serious political and economicalchangesinsidetheECstructure.

Disputes with America thus proved an important element inwideningtheagendaofEuropeanintegration,fromthenarrowconfinesofcommercial and agricultural policy, to the range of economic,monetaryandevenpoliticalaffairsdiscussedamongtheTwelve[ECmembers]inthelate1980s.21

18SylvainKahn,GeopoliticaUniuniiEuropene,Chiinu:Cartier,2008,pp.2829;PeterAlter,Problemagerman iEuropa,Bucureti:Corint,2004,pp.183208.19 Neil Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, New York: PalgraveMacmillan,2006,p.26.20GustaveParmentier, Aliana atlantic i aprarea european, inRaoulGirardet (ed.),AprareaEuropei,Iai:InstitutulEuropean,2005,pp.5153.21WilliamWallace,PiersLudlow,Europe,inAlexDanchev(ed.),FindeSicle.TheMeaningoftheTwentiethCentury,London:TaurisAcademicStudies,1995,p.85.


7/22


Hopeandconfusion.EuropeaftertheColdWar

The clash of the BerlinWall inNovember 1989, followedby theEastern European revolutions, and finally, the dismantling of theUSSRannouncedanewera in the internationalrelations.Liberaloptimismwasthe new trend in political thinking, and authors like Francis Fukuyamarepresentedthevoicesofthemoment.

If theearly twentieth centurysmajorpolitical innovationwas theinventionof the strong statesof totalitarianGermanyorRussia, than thepastfewdecadeshaverevealedatremendousweaknessattheircore.Andthisweakness, somassive and unexpected, suggests that the pessimisticlessons about history that our century supposedly taught us need toberethoughtfromthebeginning.22

Astheyearswentby,early1990soptimismwasslowlybeginningtocrumble.ThedifficultandunexpectedlyprolongedtransitioninEasternEurope led to social disappointment and uncertainties regardingdemocracy.23 Nationalistic tensions were worryingly emerging.Furthermore,realist thinkersandpoliticiansdoubted that therecouldbeanyinternationalagreementovertheliberalprincipleshighlyappreciatedatthemoment.24

For some analysts, reunifiedGermany and theNATO frame thatmadeitpossiblerepresenttheeventthatmarkedtheendoftheColdWar,not thedefeatof theUSSR.Germanywas theepicenterof theColdWar;once reunited, despite the soviet opposition, the political bases of theideological confrontationwere invalidated.25Bringingback together FRGand DRG was not an easy task; it raised social tensions and economic

22FrancisFukuyama,Theendofhistoryandthelastman,NewYork:FreePress,2006,p.12.23RichardSakwa,AnneStevens(ed.),ContemporaryEurope,NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2006,p.234.24

Ibidem,p.235.Forabalancedidealist/realistapproachofpostColdWarEurope,seeFredHalliday,Europeand theInternationalSystem:WarandPeace, inStephenChan,JarrodWiener(ed.),TwentiethCenturyInternationalHistory,London:I.B.Tauris&Co.Ltd.,1999,pp.9192.25 Robert Cooper, Destrmarea Naiunilor, Bucureti: Univer Enciclopedic, 2007, p. 61. Adiachronic analysisof theGermanproblemandof its implications in the eventswhicheventually triggered the end of theColdWar canbe found in IeuanG.John, The Reemergence of the German Question : a United Germany and European Security andStability,inDavidArmstrong,ErikGoldstein,TheEndoftheColdWar,London:FrankCass&Co.,1990,pp.126146.


8/22

EmanuelCopila12

difficulties thatare stillencountered today.Still, in the firstdayafter thereunification,theGermansexperiencedanintensenationalfeeling:theyfeltthatahistoricinjusticewasfinallyovercameandGermany(FRG)couldnolongerbeblackmailedbytheKremlinauthorities.26PeterCalvocoressi,ontheotherhand,believesthatUSSRdidnotfirmlyopposethereunificationof Germany, as its ideology was supposed to dictate it, for pragmaticreasons:thiswastheonlystrongeconomywillingtofinanciallyassisttheUSSRintheattempttomodernizeitsinfrastructure.27

Inside theEU, reunitedGermanywas ratheruneasy forFrance todealwith.Thetwocountriesreachedacompromise:Germanygaveawayan important part of its economic control to France, which in returnacceptedthenewstateand itsroleasEuropeseconomicengine.Still,thedissonances between the two parts were far to be over. After itsreunification,Germany assigned abig percent of its funds to the newlyincorporated eastern districts, disadvantaging the Unions budget, ameasurewhichcreateddiscontents inParis.Furthermore,France tends tosee the EU as a partnership of nations, while Germany has a moreintegrationist approach to thismatter; France sustains theKeynesianisttheoryofthestatespartiallyandtemporaryinvolvementintheeconomicalprocess,whileGermany tends tovaluemore the freedomof themarkets;FrancewasreluctanttotheeasternenlargementoftheUnion,seeingitasathreat to its cereal market, (France is one of the most important cerealproducer in theEU),whileGermanyencouraged it for itsown industrialreasons.28

TheMaastricht Treaty, signed in 1992,was the next step in thedevelopment of theCommunity,but it faced serious challenges comingfrom two directions: the political turmoil that convulsed Eastern andCentralEurope and thewars emerging in the exYugoslaviaprovinces.29Now, the East European states, released from the soviet domination,claimed their rightful position among the EU members; however, theiracceptance inside the Union was slow (for some too fast) and raised

26TimothyGartonAsh, Istoriaprezentului.Eseuri,schie i relatridinEuropaanilor 90, Iai:Polirom,2002,pp.5863.27PeterCalvocoressi,EuropadelaBismarcklaGorbaciov,Iai:Polirom,2003,pp.211212.28 Robert Gilpin, Economia mondial n secolul XXI. Provocarea capitalismului global, Iai:Polirom,2004,pp.149172.29PeterCalvocoressi,Politicamondialdup1945,Bucureti:ALLFA,2000,p.244.


9/22


numerous institutional and economic problems.On the other hand, theethnic conflicts from former Yugoslavia throwed abad light upon thecommon leadership of the UE30, because the European leaders wereincapable tocontainand stop themby their selvesandneededNATO inordertosucceed.

When writing about the adequate reconfiguration of post1989Europe, Ralf Dahrendorf is concerned that the dangers of constructingEuropeagainstpotentialMuslim,Russian,orevenGermanthreatsarenotcompletely over.31 Irrational passions which fueled the most perniciousformsofnationalismof the20th centuryare stillpresent in theEuropeansocieties,although their intensityhasweakened.This iswhy thenewEUwill always need flexible institutions, healthy economic actors and astrongnormativeframe.32

America,thegeopoliticaltutorofreunitedEurope?RobertKagan,oneofthemostimportantAmericanrealistsfromthe

presentdays,arguesthataftertheColdWar,Europesgeopoliticalrole intheworldwas considerablediminished.Europewasno longer themaingeostrategic stake disputed between Washington and Moscow, and theUSA, the only superpower left in theworld, could actwithout seriouslytaking into account European proposals. This led to resentments andtensions inside the transatlantic partnership, tensions that had a majoroutbreakduringthebeginningofthesecondIraqWar.33Butthesetensionsdidnt emerge only after 1989; during the Cold War there were alsodisagreementsbetweenthetransatlanticpartners.TheUSAaccusedFranceseveraltimesasbeinganoldcolonialpowerinIndochinaandinAlgeria,blamedFranceand theUnitedKingdom for theSuezaffairand imposedWesternGermany to recognize theGermanAmerican relations asbeingmoreimportantthantheFrenchGermanones.Ontheotherhand,FrancesrecurrentandsarcasticironiestowardstheUSAcouldhavebeenavoided.34

30Ibidem,p.244..31RalfDahrendorf,Dupa1989.Moral,revoluiesisocietatecivil,Bucureti:Humanitas,2001,pp.205206.32Ibidem,pp.207209.33RobertKagan,op.cit.,p.102.MoreabouttransatlanticfrictionsregardingtheIraqWarandtheEuropeanhypocrisyintheKosovomatterin1999,pp.102116.34CatherineDurandin,StateleUnite,mareputereeuropean,Chiinu:Cartier,2007,pp.290291.


10/22

EmanuelCopila14

DuringtheColdWar,Americas legitimacywasrecognizedbytheEuropeans. This legitimacy was based on three factors: a commonstrategically threat(USSR),acommon ideologicalthreat(USSR),andastructural legitimacy ensured by geopolitical configuration theconfrontation,meaningthatUSAspowercouldbebalancedbythesovietstogetherwith theEuropeanCommunity,whichhadastrongerdecisionalweight in theworld affairs than it has today.35 Extended, the argumentreaches thepointwhereEuropesactualeconomicstrengthand thepeaceandprosperityitenjoysforoverahalfofcenturyisadirectconsequenceofUSAsmilitaryprotection36.ZbigniewBrezinskialsosharesthisopinion,ashe doubts the political integration and the military capacity of theEuropean Union in the years to come. Despite these shortcomingsregarding its internal functionality Brezinski continues Europesgeopoliticalroleintheworldisinestimable:thiscontinent,democraticandprosperous,representsabridgeheadforAmericaninterestsinEurasia.Inresponse, the USA offers Europe military protection. America shouldnevertheless take advantages from France and Germanys politicalincongruencesinsidetheEUtoenforceitsownviewoverthetransatlanticmilitary and economic partnership.37 Turning back to internal affairs,BrzezinskiarguesthatEuropetriestocompensate itspoliticaldeficienciesby enlarging further into the East.38 This enlargement deepens Europessecurityconfusionandalsoitspoliticalcohesion:fromaninternalpointofview, EUs functionalitywillbe affected, and from an external point ofview,Europe tends to splitbetween thewestern countries,whichdonotalwaysagreewithAmericasgeopoliticalconduit,andtheeasterncountrieswhichembracethisconduitalmostwithoutreserves.39

35RobertKagan,op.cit.,pp.9295.36Ibidem,p.5.37 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Marea tabl de ah. Supremaia American i imperativele salegeostrategice,Bucureti:UniversEnciclopedic,2000,pp.7074.38ZbigniewBrzezinski,TriadaGeostrategic.ConvieuireacuChina,EuropasiRusia,Bucureti:Historia,2006,pp.5787.39CatherineDurandin,op.cit.,pp.272278.


11/22


Contesting the American triumphalism: a descriptive critic of

WashingtonsgenerosityregardingpostwarandpostColdWarEurope

Washington encouraged the centrifugalEuropean tendenciesevenfrom the early days after the 1989 revolutions,Noam Chomsky argues.ClaimingthattheUEshouldintegratethelessdevelopedeasterncountrieswhojustwon theirfreedomagainst theSovietUnion,Americaseemed tobetheindulgentmoral instanceofthefreeworldwhichoffers itssupportto theneedyEasternEurope in those timesofdistress,gaining itsrespectand confidence. For the European Union, the integration of poor andunderdeveloped East European countrieswas, in Chomskys opinion, apoisoned gift.Themajor economic anddemocratic problems of theEastsloweddown,with the passing of the years, the economic capacity andinstitutional functionality of the EU. The eastern enlargement of theEUadvantaged the economical and geopolitical preeminence of the UnitedStateswhichseekstomaintainEuropeinasubordinateposition.EventheMarshallPlanthattheUSAhasalwaysusedtoremindEuropewhatagreatdebt ithastowards itstransatlanticpartnerwasnotasunselfishas itwasbelievedtobe.Thisplan

created the frame for a large quantity of direct private Americancompanies investments in Europe, establishing the basis of themultinational corporations. Business Week described in 1975 themultinationalsastheeconomicalexpressionofthepoliticalframeworkestablishedby thedecision factorsafter thewar, frame insidewhichtheAmerican affairs prospered and extended themselves towards sees ()being initially financed with the Marshalls Plan dollars and shelteredagainst some negative evolutions by the umbrella of the Americanpower40

Chomskys argument, provocative and incisive, is also, to some

extent,debatable.TheUnitedStateshelpedrebuildingWesternEuropenottoeconomicallyexploitit,butmostlybecauseitneededastrongallyintheideological confrontationwith the soviets. Ifnotmoral, (althoughnoonecan deny the consistent culturalbondbetween the old and the newworld) theequationwasastrategicone: it isbettertohaveademocratic

40HowardWachtel,apudNoamChomski,Hegemonie sau supravieuire.America n cutareadominaieiglobale,Bucureti:Antet,2003,p.143.


12/22

EmanuelCopila16

andprosperousEuropeonyoursidethanasoviet,hostileEuropeagainstyou.Ifintheprocessofreconstructingtheoldcontinent,Americasawalsoan economical opportunity, why not use it? After all, this wasnt anasymmetrical,mercantilerelationbetweenacolonialpoweranditshumbleservant, and Europe also profited by it. Beside that, Reagans AmericaspentenormoussumswiththeStrategicDefenseInitiative,aprojectwhichdisquieted the Europeans,but helped put an end to theColdWar. Themassivefinancialloansneededtoputitintopracticecame,ironically,fromGermany andJapan, two stateswho owed to a great extent theUnitedStates their economic power and security.41 In conclusion, America andWestern Europe had a very complex and interdependent relationshipduring theColdWarand,withminorexceptions, supportedoneanotheragainst the USSR. Furthermore, the promises and encouragements theClintonadministrationmadetotheEasternEuropeancountriesafter1989canalsobeseenasanattempttoeconomicallyandpoliticallyguidethemto democracy (sadlywithout serious financial support), and to reinforceNATOsexistentialreason:geopoliticalsecurity.Nobodycouldbesurethatauthoritarianismwasanendedchapter inRussianhistoryand inEasternEurope42andnewthreatswerealsoemergingintheMiddleEast.

The end of the international eclipse: post Cold War Europe

distancingitselffromthetransatlanticsecuritymatrix?

Someauthors,likeTimothyGartonAsh,donotagreewiththeideathatcontemporaryEuropecouldbedefinedasamilitaryprotectorateoftheUSA;fromthiskindofstatements,onecouldunderstandthattheUSAis ruling Europe,which is not the case, even if the strongest EuropeancountriesstillrelyontheUSAwhenitcomestomilitaryactions.43Aftertheconsummation of what John Lewis Gaddis has called The Long Peace,44Europesdependency towards theUnitedStatesno longercorrespondstothenew internationalsituation,characterizedbythereductionofthenuclearrisk,thereunificationofthecontinentandtherediscoveredvigor

41Ghi Ionescu,Oamenidestatntrolumeinterdependent,Bucureti:All,1998,p.309.42G.H.BennetPreediniiamericani,19452004,Bucureti:Editura tiinelorSociale iPolitice,2004,p.318.43ZbigniewBrzezinski:TriadaGeostrategic.ConvieuireacuChina,Europa iRusia,pp.9596.44 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace. Inquires into the History of the Cold War, OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,1987.


13/22


of powers, along with the progress of the European construction.45Besides that, theEuropeans are seen tohave amore conciliating, liberalview over the international relations scene, based on cooperation andnegotiation, while the Americans still tend to see the world as abattleground inwhichtheyhavetodefendtheirmoreandmoredisputedpreeminence.Despitethisopinion,theEUcountrieshadin2003anumberofpeacekeepingtroopsthatwasactuallytentimeslargerthanthenumberofAmericantroopsengagedinsimilarmilitaryactions.46

JeremyRifkingraspsthisdissonanceverywellwhenhewritesthatthe problemwhich Europe has to face is that of living in twoworldssimultaneously:theeverydayworldofrealpoliticandthevisionofabetterworldwhichistocome.47RobertCooper,ontheotherhand,insistsuponthe necessity of double standards when it comes to security, andespecially Europes security. Europe maybe postmodern, reasonable,cooperative and prone to negotiations, but some parts of the world,especiallythepremodernones,characterizedbypoliticalandeconomicalinstability,evenchaos,arenot.Thesolutionresidesinthecooperationwiththemodernworld,aworldofnationstatesandrealpolitikwheretheUSAhas the dominant role in the attempt to contain and hopefullydemocratize thepremodern chaotic states,verydangerous in thenuclearcontext inwhichwe live forahalfofcentury.Furthermore, theprofoundinterdependence of states, cultures and societies, made possible by theglobalization era, can easily be transformed into a relay trough whichpremodern states can export different kinds of threats and politicalinstability.48

To Henry Kissinger, the misunderstandings between the UnitedStates and Europe seem to resemble family fights rather than realconflicts.Whenitcametokeymatters,bothtransatlanticpartnersgenerallyagreed,so thereshouldnotbeanyseriousworry in the futureabout thistopic.49Thisappearstobethemostverisimilarpointofview.Duetotheircommonculturalorigins,EuropeandAmericaarekeentoshare,inaglobal

45JeanMichelGaillard,AnthonyRowley, Istoria continentului european, de la 1850pn lasfritulsecoluluialXXlea,Chiinu:Cartier,2001,pp.605606.46JeremyRifkin,op.cit.,p.251.47Ibidem, p.239.48RobertCooper,op.cit.,pp.8889.49HenryKissinger,Diplomaia,Bucureti:BicAll,2003,p.713.


14/22

EmanuelCopila18

perspective,similarends,evenifthedebateaboutthemeansofachievingthemisverymuchpresent,andwillprobablyremainsointhedecadestocome.

EuropeansecurityanditscentraldilemmaShouldEuropecreateisownsecurityforceorshouldittrustNATO

fordefensematters,exactlylikeitdidintheyearsoftheColdWar?Thisisthe main question Bruxelles authorities have to answer regarding thesecuritydilemmasof thecontinent.Even if thearmiesof theEUmemberstatesbecomemoreandmoreprofessional50,thereareseveralobstacles theEuropeancountriesencounter intheirattempttoseekmilitaryautonomy.States like theUnitedKingdomor theNetherlands tend tovalueNATOmore thanaseparateEuropeanmilitary force.Europesprojectofaquickreaction force is redundant toNATOs quick reaction force,which is farbetter: in caseofmilitaryemergencies, theNATO troopsareprepared tointervenein5to30days,whiletheEuropeantroopsneedatleast60daysforthiskindofmission.51

FranceandGermany,thefoundingstatesoftheEU,arestrugglingtocreateacommondefenseforceandgiveconsistencytothesecondpillaroftheUnionestablishedbytheMaastrichtTreatyin1991,butFrance,initsGaullistinertia,wantsthisforcetobeNATOindependent,whileGermanytries to find a more consensual approach between an independentEuropeansecurity forceand the transatlanticpartnership.52TheEuropeandefenseisalsoproblematicduetoan internalreason:thetensionbetweennational sovereignty and European integration53,whichwill notbe soeasilytoovercome.

In general, the EU tends to spend about half of the Americandefensebudget.54AlbeittheEuropeanmilitaryforcenumbered,inthefirstyears after 2000, about twomillion soldiers,while theUSAhadonly 1.4

50JeanMichelGaillard,AnthonyRowley,op.cit.,p.623.51Raluca tireanu,Construciainstituional apoliticiidesecuritateaUniuniiEuropene,inCadranPolitic,nr.13,2004.52JeanMichelGaillard,AnthonyRowley,op.cit.,p.619.53Ibidem,p.622.54JeremyRifkin, op. cit., p. 253.Thepercentage refers to theperiod 20002002.After thebeginningof the SecondGulfWar (2003), thedisproportion of securitybudgetsbetweenUSAandEUisverylikelytohavegrown.


15/22


million,theAmericansstillpossessafarcompetitivemilitaryindustrythantheEuropeans.55

AmericanperceptionsregardingtheEuropeansecurity

When it comes to the EU defense, the United States position isambivalent.Therearevoices,likeRobertKagans,thatclaimanincreaseoftheEuropeanmilitarybudget inordertoachieveamorebalancedcostofmilitary actions inside the transatlantic partnership. The strategicvacation of the Europeans is incorrect and expensive for theAmericanpartner.Europeshouldrenounceholdingontoadefensivemilitarypower,likeitdidduringtheColdWarandstartprojectingitsmilitarycapacitiesintheoutsideworld,alongwith theUSA.56 ZbigniewBrezinski shares thisopinionaswell. Afterwriting thattheUnitedStatesand theEuropeanUnionrepresent,together,thehardnucleusofpoliticalstabilityandglobaleconomic welfare, complains about the frequent arguments the twoentitieshaveinthepresentdays,accusingEuropethatismilitarybudgetislowerthanhalfoftheUnitedStatesmilitarybudget.57Furthermore,

Europe is the economicbeneficiary of the stabilizing role, political andmilitary,which theUSA assumed in theMiddleEast (onwhichs petrolEuropeisdependentevenmorethanAmerica)andalsointheFarEast(anareainwhichtheEuropeaneconomicinterestsaregrowing).58

But when France and the United Kingdom initiated, in 1998, a

projectmeanttofirmlystatethemilitarydimensionoftheEU,alongwithitscivilianone59,Americabecamedisquieted.TheEuropeanDefenseandSecurityPolicy, (EDSP), thou it failed to achieve itobjectives in the 1999KosovoWar and needed strongAmericanmilitary support towin,wasperceivedashavingthepotentialtoundermineNATO.60

In November 2000, the state secretary from that time MadelineAlbright formulated the officialposition of theClinton administration in

55Ibidem,pp.253254.56RobertKagan,op.cit.,pp.1924.57ZbigniewBrzezinski,MareaDilem.Adominasauaconduce,Bucureti:Scripta,2005,p.87.58Ibidem,p.88.59JeremyRifkin,op.cit.,p.257.60Ibidem,pp.257258.


16/22

EmanuelCopila20

thismatterbypublishingwhatwascalledthethreeDs.TheEDSPmustnotconducttothedecouplingoftheEuropeandefensefromNATO;thenewmilitary organizationmust not doubleNATOs capacities; and the quickreactionEuropeanforcemustnotdiscriminatetheNATOcountrymembersthatdontbelongtotheEuropeanUnion.61

HenryKissingerwas alsoworried regarding thepossiblemilitaryindependenceoftheEU.Hewrotethatautonomyseemstobetreatedasits distinguishing feature, and cooperation with NATO appears to beconceived as a special case.62 For the former state secretary, the maincontemporary question of the European American relations is thefollowing: will Europes emerging identity leave room for an Atlanticpartnership?63 The transatlantic frictions at the beginning of the newmillennium aremainly a resultofan intergenerational conflictgeneratedbydifferentpolitical experiencesKissingerargues but,just like inhispreviousbook,Diplomacy,he is convinced thatAmerica andEuropewillalwaysbepartnersandaEuropeandefensestrictlyseparatedfromNATOisnonsense64.

Thegeneration inofficeat the turnof themillenium inalmostallthe countriesofWesternEurope respresented centerleftparties thathadtheirformativeexperiencesinsometypeofantiAmericanprotest.EvenintheUnitedStates,manyintheforeignpolicyestablishmentoftheClintonAdministration had grown upwith the conviction thatAmerica had norighttoprojectitspowerabroaduntilitfaceduptoandovercameitsowndomesticshortcomingsor, if itdid, that itshoulddosoonlyonbehalfofcauses other than its own interests. (...) While the founding generationtreated the Atlantic Alliance as a point of departure for a union ofdemocracies, theprotestgenerationviewstheAtlanticAllianceasarelicoftheColdWar,ifnotanobstacleinovercomingit.65

AlthoughKissingers analysis is,without doubt, a profound andpertinentone,thefactthatthegeopoliticalcircumstancesattheendoftheSecondWorldWarwereverydifferentcompared to thepresentsituation

61Ibidem,p.258.62HenryKissinger,DoesAmericaneedaforeignpolicy?Towardadiplomacyforthe21stcentury,London:Simon&Schuster,2002,p.58.63Ibidem,p.48.64Ibidem,p.49.65Ibidem,pp.4142.


17/22


should not be forgotten. The United States and Europe wereincommensurabledifferent,their leadersandtheirpoliticalexperiencesaswell. Further, Kissinger states that without the American regulatorypresence,theWesternEuropeancountrieswouldreenterthenationalisticpath that almostdestroyed them two times in the firsthalf of theXXthcentury; this time, notby war,butby an exhausting national rivalrywhichwilleventuallyleadtotheunderminingoftheEuropeanproject.66

It istruethat20thcenturyEuropewasravagedbytwoworldwarsandafter the second itwas economically rebuildbyAmerica,whichalsoensureditssecurity;itisalsotruethatduringtheColdWar,atleastinitsfirstphases,Europeprobablycouldnothavesucceededinmaintainingitsgeopolitical independenceby itself.Finally,onemustrecognizethat,evenin the present days, the European security is dependent on theUnitedStates military capacity,but Kissingers intention to maintain and evenreinforcethepaternalrolethatUSAexercisedoverthelastfiftyyearsuponEuropeishighlyquestionable.Theinternationalspecterchangedalotafterthe Cold Wars end and the newborn European identity can only beaffirmed by temporarily lack of consent and occasional oppositionstowardsitstransatlantictutor.

Concludingremarks

TheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization,thoudisregardedbysomeafter1991asanalliance lookingforamission,willprobablyremainforthe years to come Europes security matrix, despite the occasionaltransatlantic disagreements. In the future, these disagreements couldcontinue in theMiddleEast,wherebothEU and theUnited Stateshavemajor economical interests and occur in Chinas case, also a strongAmerican commercial partner receiving more and more direct externalinvestments fromEurope.Japan, still a faithfulAmerican ally in the FarEast and a serious European economic competitor, is another potentialfactorofdistressinsideNATO.

Europesstrategicequationmust,undernocircumstances,excludethe Russian Federation. Thou military weaker than the ex USSR, itseconomicstrength isgrowing,largelydue to thesteadilyrisingpricesof

66Ibidem,p.54.


18/22

EmanuelCopila22

oil and natural gas.67, and Europes dependency on Russian naturalresources isworrying. In time,Russiaspride and resentmentswillmostcertainly improve itsmilitary capacities;combinedwith itsunpredictablegeopolitics,oscillatingbetweenSouthEasternAsiaandtheOccident68,thiswillsurelycauseconcernsamongtheNATOmemberstates.

The recent independence of the exSerbian province Kosovo isanother potential source of disagreement inside NATO, but this eventcouldalso impact theEuropeanUnion.CatherineDurandinesdistinctionbetween the Eastern European countries, which support almostunconditional American interests and the Western European countries,whosometimesoppose those interests,couldbe, in thiscase, invalidated,butfrictionswillsurelyrouseinsidetheUE,eveniftheywontbediffusedon theEastWestaxis. IndependentKosovocouldhaveunpleasanteffectson NATO as well. For instance, the vast majority of the new state isMuslim.Thecrimeanddrugnetworksoperatingherearenolongerasecretfor many years and some of these networks are being sponsored bymilitant Islamic groups in theMiddle East. The questions are: isNATOcapableofdealingwithaEuropeanstatethathasthepotentialofbecomingaterroristnurseryintheyearstocome?

Inthenearfuture,eveniftheEUwilltakeafederalturn,remainondifferent levels of economic and political development or become aconfederated Europe without a nucleus69, its security will remaindependent on theUnited Statesmilitary force. Europe needs to find itsown, separate geopolitical identity, no doubt about it,but thismustbedone progressively andwithoutmisbalancing theAtlantic partnership.70For Timothy Garton Ash, Europe contains two antagonistic forces:

67MilanN.Vego,Russiaandthereturnofgeopolitics,inJointForceQuarterly,nr.45,2007,p.8.ThepresenteconomiccrisisisaffectingRussiatoagreatextentloweringthepriceofhydrocarbonsbutthisdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatRussiaisfacinganinsurmountable

problem.After thepassingof thecrisis, its internationalpositionwillsurelybe improved,unless of course green politicswill start playing a key role in foreign and economicpoliciesaroundtheworld.68Ibidem,p.8.69HenryKissinger,op.cit.,p.55.70 For Barry Buzan andOleWever, the EU is clearly a great power,but its globalpresence is for now inconsistent, stronger on issues like international trade,monetarymatters,and theenvironment thanonmosthighpolitics [powerpolitics,C.E.]questions.RegionsandPowers.TheStructureofInternationalSecurity,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003,p.374.


19/22


eurogaullism, faithful to theEuropeofnationsvisionandprone toaconfederate approach of the European construction71, andeuroatlanticism, which insists upon the necessity of a substantialeconomical and military connection with the USA. Great Britain, alongwith theCentral andEasternEurope are the strongest supportersof thisdirection72,whilethemainexponentofeurogaullismis,ofcourse,France.For Garton Ash, this struggle will eventually decide the future of theOccident.73 Ifthisfuture istobe, forEurope,safeandprosperous, itstilldepends onwhatwillbecome of the transatlantic alliance. Any seriousjudgment regarding thejustwayEuropewillgoondepends, ()on theassessment of the trajectory, themotives and the interests of theUnitedStates.74

Bibliography:

1. Alter,Peter(2004),Problemagerman iEuropa,Bucureti:Corint2. Bennet,G.H.,(2004),Preedintiiamericani,19452004,Bucureti:Editura

tiintelorSocialesiPolitice3. Brezinski,Zbigniew, (2000),Marea tablde ah.SupremaiaAmerican i

imperativelesalegeostrategice,Bucureti:UniversEnciclopedic4. Brezinski, Zbigniew, (2005), Marea Dilem. A domina sau a conduce,

Bucureti:Scripta5. Brezinski,Zbigniew, (2006),TriadaGeostrategic.Convieuirea cuChina,

Europa iRusia,Bucureti:Historia6. Buzan,Barry;Wever,Ole,(2003),RegionsandPowers.TheStructureof

International Security,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress7. Calvocoressi, Peter, (2000), Politica mondial dup 1945, Bucureti:

ALLFA8. Calvocoressi, Peter, (2000),Rupei rndurile!Al doilea rzboimondial i

configurareaEuropeipostbelice,Iai:Polirom9. Calvocoressi, Peter, (2003), Europa de la Bismarck la Gorbaciov, Iai:

Polirom

71TimothyGartonAsh,Lumea liber.America,Europa iviitorulsurprinztoralOccidentului,Bucureti:Incitatus,2006,pp.6569.72Ibidem,pp.8291.73Ibidem,p.59.74Ibidem,p.94.


20/22

EmanuelCopila24

10.Chomski,Noam,(2003),Hegemoniesausupravieuire.Americaincutareadominaieiglobale,Bucureti:Antet

11.Cooper, Robert, (2007), Destrmarea Naiunilor, Bucureti: UniversEnciclopedic

12.Dahrendorf,Ralph,(2001),Dup1989.Moral,revoluiesisocietatecivil,Bucureti:Humanitas

13.Deighton Anne, (1999), The Cold War in Europe, 19451945: ThreeApproaches, inNgaireWoods (ed.),Explaining InternationalRelationssince1945,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress

14.Durandin, Catherine, (2007), Statele Unite, mare putere europeanChiinu:Cartier

15.Fidler,Jii;Mare,Petr(2005),IstoriaNATO,Iai:InstitutulEuropean16.Flynn,Gregory,(2005),StateleUnitesiaprareaEuropei,inGirardet,

Raoul,(ed.),AprareaEuropei,Iai:InstitutulEuropean,pp.12013117.Fontain, Andre, (1993), Istoria Rzboiului Rece, Bucureti: Editura

Militar18.FranoisdeRose,(1998),Altreilearzboimondialnuaavutloc.NATO i

pacea,Bucureti:Nemira19.FredHalliday, (1999),Europeandthe InternationalSystem:Warand

Peace, in Stephen Chan, Jarrod Wiener (ed.), Twentieth CenturyInternationalHistory,London:I.B.Tauris&Co.Ltd.

20.Fukuyama,Francis.,(2006),Theendofhistoryandthelastman,NewYork:FreePress

21.Gailard, Jean Michel; Rowley, Anthony., (2001), Istoria continentuluieuropean,dela1850pnalasfritulsecoluluialXXlea,Chiinu:Cartier

22.GartonAsh,Timothy, (2002), Istoriaprezentului.Eseuri, schie i relataridinEuropaanilor 90,Iai:Polirom

23.GartonAsh, Timothy, (2006), Lumea libera.America, Europa si viitorulsurprinztoral Occidentului,Bucureti:Incitatus

24.Gilpin, Robert, (2004), Economia mondial n secolul XXI. Provocareacapitalismuluiglobal,Iai:Polirom

25. Ieuan,G.John,(1990),TheReemergenceoftheGermanQuestion:aUnited Germany and European Security and Stability, in DavidArmstrong,ErikGoldstein,TheEndoftheColdWar,London:FrankCass&Co.

26. Ionescu, Ghi, (1998), Oameni de stat ntro lume interdependenta,Bucureti:All


21/22


27.JohnLewisGaddis,(1987),TheLongPeace.InquiresintotheHistoryoftheColdWar,OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork

28.Johnson,Paul, (2005),O istorie a lumiimoderne (19202000),Bucureti:Humanitas

29.Judt,Tony(2008),EpocaPostbelic.O istorieaEuropeidedup1945,Iai:Polirom

30.Kagan,Robert,(2005),Despreparadis iputere.AmericasiEuropannouaordinemondiala,Bucureti:Antet

31.Kahn,Sylvain(2008),GeopoliticaUniuniiEuropene,Chiinu:Cartier32.Kennan,George, (2006),ThesourcesofSovietConduct, inTuathail,

Gearoid; Dalby, Simon; Routledge, Paul, (ed.), The geopolitics reader,NewYork:Routledge,pp.7881

33.Kennedy, Paul, (1987), The rise and fall of the great powers. Economicchangeandmilitaryconflictfrom1500to2000,NewYork:Vintage

34.Kissinger,Henry, (2002),DoesAmerica need aforeignpolicy? Toward adiplomacyforthe21stcentury,London:SimonandSchuster

35.Kissinger,Henry,(2003),Diplomaia,Bucureti:BicAll36.Loth, Wilfried, (1997), Imprirea lumii. Istoria Rzboiului Rece (1941

1945),Bucureti:SaeculumI.O.37.McCauley,Martin,(1999),Rusia,AmericasiRzboiulRece,Iai:Polirom38.Nugent,Neil,(2006),TheGovernmentandpoliticsoftheEuropeanUnion,

NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan39.Nye,Joseph (2005),Descifrareaconflictelor internaionale.Teorie i istorie,

Bucureti:Antet40.Parish,Thomas (2002),EnciclopediaRzboiuluiRece,Bucureti:Univers

Enciclopedic41.Parmentier,Gustave,(2005),Alianaatlantic iaprareaeuropean,

in Girardet,Raoul,(ed.),AparreaEuropei,Iai:InstitutulEuropean,pp.4766

42.Preda,Eugen,(1999), NATO.Scurtistorie,Bucureti:Silex43.PredaMtsaru,Aurel, (2005),Tratatde relaii internaionalemoderne i

contemporane. RzboiulRece(vol.III),Bucureti:LuminaLex44.Sakwa,Richard;Stevens,Anne,(ed.),(2006),ContemporaryEurope,New

York:PalgraveMacmillan45.tireanu, Raluca, (2004), Construcia institutional a politicii de

securitateaUniuniiEuropene,inCadranPolitic,nr.13,(unpaged)


22/22

within and after the cold war. europe's struggling role and position inside the global security...

Documents