with mwl crossings

Research Programme

OperationsHuman factors assessment of the risks associated

with MWL crossings

Human Factors Assessment of the Risks Associated with MWL Crossings for RAIL SAFETY AND STANDARDS BOARD

REFERENCE: T269 User Behaviour at User Worked Crossings

DATE: 21st June 2004 WEB ISSUE: 01

Human Engineering Shore House 68 Westbury Hill Westbury-On-Trym Bristol BS9 3AA Tel: +44 (0)117 962 0888 Fax: +44 (0)117 962 9888 www.humaneng.net

21st June 2004

Page ii

T269 User Behaviour at User Worked Crossings

ACRONYM LIST ABCL Automatic Barrier Crossings, Locally Monitored AHB Automatic Half Barrier ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable BTP British Transport Police CCTV Closed Circuit Television FP Footpath Crossing HAZID Hazard Identification HEA Human Error Analysis HSE Health and Safety Executive MSL Miniature Stop Light MWL Miniature Warning Light NR Network Rail PIN Personal Identification Number POS Position of Safety TA Task Analysis UWC User Worked Crossing RSSB Rail Safety and Standards Board

© Copyright 2004 Rail Safety and Standards Board This publication may be reproduced free of charge for research, private study or for internal

circulation within an organisation. This is subject to it being reproduced and referenced accurately and not being used in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as the copyright of Rail Safety and Standards Board and the title of the publication specified accordingly. For any

other use of the material please apply to RSSB's Head of Research and Development for permission. Any additional queries can be directed to [email protected]. This publication can

be accessed via the RSSB website www.rssb.co.uk

21st June 2004

Page iii


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Rail Safety and Standards Board commissioned Human Engineering Limited to carry out research into user behaviour at user worked crossings (UWCs). Three main issues were identified as being of particular interest:

Stream A: Determining when the final decision to cross is made Stream B: The risks associated with miniature warning lights at user worked crossings Stream C: User acceptance of a novel warning device for user worked crossings

These issues were investigated by completing task analyses and human error analyses of the three different crossing types: UWC, UWC with telephone, and UWC with MWL (Miniature Warning Lights), and carrying out extensive on site research to establish the behavioural characteristics of users at these crossings. Observational surveys were used to record user behaviour and questionnaires to determine the opinions, concerns and knowledge of crossing users. One hundred and four UWCs were studied over the research period (twenty-five of these UWCs had miniature warning lights, twenty-three had telephones only, and fifty-six had neither), covering all seven of Great Britain’s rail operating Regions. This represents 2.6% of level crossings in Great Britain overall, 2.3% of all user worked crossings, 1.8% of all user worked crossings with telephones, and 16.7% of all user worked crossings with miniature warning lights. A total of 1968 observational surveys and 736 questionnaires were completed successfully. The quantity of information collected means that it is the largest user worked crossing survey carried out in Great Britain to date. This report presents the work completed for Stream B. The objective was to identify the main source of risk at user worked crossings with miniature warning lights, and focused on three potential problem areas:

• Conspicuity of the red and green lights, • User understanding of the warning lights and/or instructions, • Deliberate crossing misuse (violations).

A review of industry and academic literature was carried out to identify any relevant research being carried out in the UK and overseas. This included a review of investigation reports into accidents at MWL crossings in Great Britain to determine any commonalities in underlying causes. To investigate MWL conspicuity, measurements were taken at the crossings in the field research sample, and physical characteristics were recorded. A number of assessment criteria were developed based on principles of human vision and perception, taking into account existing guidelines for crossing design and layout. Each site was assessed against the criteria identified. Results suggest that MWLs are sufficiently visible to the majority of users. However, conditions are highlighted under which the use of miniature warning lights may be inappropriate. It was found that the MWLs were positioned within the users’ central field of vision, the lights were readable at a distance of 15m and that the instructions were written correctly in the ‘active’ voice. The positioning of MWLs on the approach side and on the far side was assessed. It was found that some users might have difficulty in reading MWLs and crossing instructions when the MWL is positioned on the far side. However, on the approach side, MWLs would not be in the users’ view for the duration of the crossing. A back-to-back MWL may be a potential solution to these problems, and further investigation into this is recommended. The field research provides the basis for investigating user understanding of warning lights and crossing instructions, and the reasons for deliberate crossing misuse. At the twenty-five UWCs with MWLs, 718 observational surveys and 257 questionnaires were completed. The majority of users could understand the meaning of the MWLs and the associated audible alarm where present. However, 50% of the red light violations observed were at crossings with an audible alarm. Further study into users’ understanding of the meaning of audible alarms at level crossings compared with other types of crossing is recommended.

21st June 2004

Page iv


Failing to close the gates was the most commonly observed type of crossing rule violation. There is evidence that keeping gates closed is a key safety feature of these types of level crossings, particularly with first time users. Unfamiliar users may apply an incorrect mental model when the gates/barriers are left in an open/raised position. A suggestion is made to raise awareness of this amongst crossing users or eliminate the need for users to close the gates after use. User perception of risk was found to be the major factor in a user’s decision to cross on red. The majority of users overestimated the length of time between the onset of the warning system and the arrival of a train. Users who would consider crossing on a red light also tended to underestimate the length of time it takes to cross. Providing an indication of the length of warning time would be one way to counteract this. The primary source of risk at MWL crossings was found not to be related to visibility or comprehension of the lights and instructions, but instead to deliberate crossing violations. An underestimation of time taken to cross combined with an overestimation of the time between the onset of the warning system and the arrival of a train was identified as a major cause of these violations.

21st June 2004

Page v


CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 1 1.1 BACKGROUND ...............................................................................................................1 1.2 OBJECTIVES...................................................................................................................1

2. APPROACH................................................................................................................ 2 2.1 OVERVIEW......................................................................................................................2 2.2 DOCUMENT REVIEW .....................................................................................................2 2.3 TASK ANALYSIS AND HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS.......................................................3 2.4 IDENTIFYING CRITERIA FOR ASSESSMENT ...............................................................3 2.5 DATA COLLECTION........................................................................................................3 2.6 DATA ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................3 2.7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................4

3. DOCUMENT REVIEW ................................................................................................ 5 3.1 CURRENT SPECIFICATIONS FOR MWL CROSSINGS .................................................5

Crossing Layout ...............................................................................................................5 MWL Operation ................................................................................................................5 Criteria for the Provision of MWLs....................................................................................6 MWL Positioning ..............................................................................................................7 Associated Signs..............................................................................................................8

3.2 REVIEW OF INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS AT MWL CROSSINGS..............................9 Gate Abuse .................................................................................................................... 10 User Familiarity with the Crossing .................................................................................. 10 Visibility of Warning Lights ............................................................................................. 10 Visibility of Road Markings ............................................................................................. 10 Positioning and Clarity of Signs...................................................................................... 10 User Workload ............................................................................................................... 11

4. TASK ANALYSIS AND HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS ............................................. 12 4.1 TASK ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................... 12 4.2 HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS.......................................................................................... 12

5. IDENTIFYING CRITERIA FOR ASSESSMENT ....................................................... 14 5.1 OVERVIEW.................................................................................................................... 14 5.2 FACTORS AFFECTING THE CONSPICUITY OF MWLS .............................................. 14

User’s Field of View........................................................................................................ 14 Viewing Height ............................................................................................................... 16 Viewing Distance and Angle........................................................................................... 16 MWL Size.......................................................................................................................16 Light Intensity ................................................................................................................. 17 Contrast ......................................................................................................................... 17 Steady vs Flashing Lights .............................................................................................. 17 Environmental Factors ................................................................................................... 17

5.3 FACTORS AFFECTING THE UNDERSTANDING OF LIGHTS AND SIGNS................. 18 Population Stereotypes for Danger Signs....................................................................... 18 Text Size ........................................................................................................................ 18 Clarity of Instructions...................................................................................................... 19

5.4 FACTORS INFLUENCING DELIBERATE CROSSING MISUSE ................................... 19 Warning System Reliability............................................................................................. 19 Perception of Risk .......................................................................................................... 19

5.5 CONSIDERATIONS FOR USERS WITH PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENTS ........................... 21 Elderly Users..................................................................................................................21 Colour-Blindness............................................................................................................ 21

5.6 SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENT CRITERIA .................................................................... 21

21st June 2004

Page vi


6. DATA COLLECTION METHODS ............................................................................. 23 6.1 SITE VISITS................................................................................................................... 23 6.2 PHYSICAL SITE ASSESSMENT ................................................................................... 23 6.3 QUESTIONNAIRES AND OBSERVATION CHECKLISTS............................................. 24 6.4 OBSERVATION AND INTERVIEW METHODS ............................................................. 24

7. DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS .......................................................................... 26 7.1 OVERVIEW.................................................................................................................... 26 7.2 USER SUMMARY.......................................................................................................... 26 7.3 CONSPICUITY OF MINIATURE WARNING LIGHTS AND SIGNS................................ 28

Visibility of the Lights for Pedestrians ............................................................................. 28 Visibility of the Lights for Vehicular Users....................................................................... 29 User Opinions on Visibility of Lights ............................................................................... 29 Readability of Crossing Instructions ............................................................................... 29 Obscuration Problems.................................................................................................... 29 Positioning of MWLs....................................................................................................... 30

7.4 USER UNDERSTANDING OF WARNING LIGHTS AND INSTRUCTIONS ................... 31 Understanding of MWLs and Associated Alarm ............................................................. 31 Understanding of Crossing Instructions.......................................................................... 32

7.5 CROSSING VIOLATIONS.............................................................................................. 34 Adherence to Correct Crossing Procedure..................................................................... 34 Gate Abuse .................................................................................................................... 35 Red-Running .................................................................................................................. 36 Safety Consciousness.................................................................................................... 37 Perception of Risk .......................................................................................................... 38 Waiting Time .................................................................................................................. 38 Sighting Time ................................................................................................................. 38 Estimated vs. Actual Crossing Times ............................................................................. 38 Awareness of Accidents or Near Misses ........................................................................ 39 Perceived Train Speed................................................................................................... 40 Perceived Frequency of Trains....................................................................................... 40

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS......................................................... 41 8.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS............................................................................................. 41

Conspicuity..................................................................................................................... 41 Understanding................................................................................................................ 41 Violations ....................................................................................................................... 42

8.2 IDENTIFYING THE NATURE OF RISK AT MWL CROSSINGS..................................... 44 8.3 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................... 45

9. REFERENCES.......................................................................................................... 47 APPENDIX A............................................................................................................. 50 SUMMARY OF MWL CROSSING INCIDENTS...................................................................... 50 APPENDIX B............................................................................................................. 55 TASK ANALYSIS AND HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS............................................................. 55 PEDESTRIAN TA AND HEA FOR UWCS WITH MWLS........................................................ 56 VEHICLE TA AND HEA FOR UWCS WITH MWLS ............................................................... 59 APPENDIX C............................................................................................................. 65 FIELD RESEARCH TIMETABLE ........................................................................................... 65 SITE VISIT RECORDS .......................................................................................................... 65 APPENDIX D............................................................................................................. 88 DATA COLLECTION FORMS................................................................................................ 88 UWC OBSERVATIONAL SURVEY........................................................................................ 90

21st June 2004

Page vii


APPENDIX E ............................................................................................................. 94 CALCULATION OF VIEWING ANGLES FOR EACH SITE VISITED ..................................... 94 APPENDIX F ............................................................................................................. 98 FIELD RESEARCH RESULTS SUMMARY REPORT ........................................................... 98

21st June 2004

Page 1


1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

1.1.1 There are 8188 level crossings on the Network Rail Infrastructure (HSE annual report on railway safety, 2002/2003). Of these, 155 are user worked crossings with miniature warning lights1. Users are responsible for their own safety when using these crossings. Therefore, recognition of the message the miniature warning lights convey and adherence to this message is crucial if users are to traverse safely.

1.1.2 However, several accidents and incidents have occurred at crossings with this type of warning light and investigations into these incidents have highlighted possible problems with warning device visibility. Consequently, there is a view that the small red/green warning lights are not sufficiently conspicuous to users and/or that their meaning may be misunderstood.

1.2 Objectives

1.2.1 The safety of automatic level crossings and users’ behaviour at automatic crossings has been extensively studied. However, there has been little research into the risks at UWCs with MWLs. It was the intention of this study to assess the nature of the risk at UWCs with MWLs. Two questions were addressed:

• Is conspicuity of warning lights and signs problematic? • Is crossing misuse primarily related to user understanding of, and adherence to,

the correct crossing procedure? 1.2.2 Through identification of possible risk areas it is hoped that appropriate risk mitigation

measures can be selected and implemented to improve the safety of MWL crossings.

1 MWLs are sometimes referred to as miniature stop lights (MSLs), usually when they are employed at footpath crossings.

21st June 2004

Page 2


2. APPROACH

2.1 Overview

2.1.1 This study comprises a review of user worked crossings with miniature warning lights, utilising a methodology which evaluates both the physical characteristics of, and user behaviour at, MWL crossings.

2.1.2 It was designed to provide a clear understanding of the factors which influence the use of MWL crossings, concentrating on three main areas of concern:

• Conspicuity of MWLs and associated signs • User understanding of lights, signs, and crossing procedures • Reasons for the deliberate misuse of crossings (violations).

2.1.3 The overall approach is illustrated in Figure 1 and described briefly in the paragraphs

below. The report is structured accordingly and further details of each stage are given in the relevant Sections.

• Current specifications for MWL crossings

• Accident/ incident reports

• Relevant academic and industry research

• Crossing procedures

• Potential for error

• Influencing factors

• Principles of human vision and perception

• Behavioural issues from TA and HEA

• Special considerations for elderly/ physically impaired users

• Site visits • Physical site

assessment • User

observation • User

questionnaires

• Qualitative and quantitative analysis of data

• Identifying the nature of risk at MWL crossings: – Conspicuity – Understanding – Violations

• Next steps

Figure 1: Overview of Approach

2.2 Document Review

2.2.1 A document review was carried out to define the issues to be considered and investigated during field research. Various academic and industry research reports were reviewed including ergonomics best practice, relevant standards, and national and international studies on warning lights and signs in rail and other transport industries. Current specifications for MWL crossings were investigated to inform the assessment criteria.

2.2.2 A number of investigation reports of incidents and accidents that occurred at level crossings with MWLs were reviewed in order to identify any common factors or trends that may indicate the main causes of misuse. Network Rail provided five formal investigation reports into accidents at the following MWL crossings:

• Llanbrynmair, Midland Region (1999) • Forge Farm, Southern Region (2001)

Document review

Task analysis

and human error

analysis

Identifying criteria for

assessment

Data collection

Data analysis

Conclusions and

next steps

21st June 2004

Page 3


• Shaws, North West Region (2001) • Tisbury Quarry, Southern Region (2002) • Warren House, Midland Region (2003)

2.2.3 Findings from a detailed risk assessment of Moulinearn Level Crossing on Scotland

Region (ERM, 2001) were also taken into account, as were a selection of risk assessment and inspection forms from a number of other MWL crossings that were provided by the Regional Level Crossing managers.

2.2.4 Results from the document review are presented in Section 3.

2.3 Task Analysis and Human Error Analysis

2.3.1 A task analysis (TA) and human error analysis (HEA) were performed to gain a better understanding of the activities involved in the operation of MWL crossings, the types of error that could be made and at what stage of the operation these are likely to occur. The HEA also identified behavioural and physical/environmental factors that could contribute to possible errors.

2.3.2 The TA and HEA are discussed in Section 4.

2.4 Identifying Criteria for Assessment

2.4.1 Assessment criteria were devised to evaluate the conspicuity of MWLs and associated signs, user understanding of their meaning, and adherence to correct crossing procedures. The conspicuity assessment relies on principles of human vision and perception, and also considers particular problems that users with visual or auditory impairments may encounter. Population stereotypes for danger were taken into account when investigating user comprehension of warning devices, and the human error analysis and document review were used to inform the development of a user questionnaire and observational checklist for use during the field research to investigate the behavioural characteristics of users at MWL crossings.

2.4.2 The criteria for assessment are outlined in Section 5.

2.5 Data Collection

2.5.1 Over a two-month period between August and October 2003, field research was carried out at twenty-five UWCs with miniature warning lights, covering all seven of Great Britain’s operating regions. Network Rail’s Regional Level Crossing Managers selected the crossings visited on the basis that they would be busy at the times when field researchers were on site, and also that they would be used by a wide variety of user types.

2.5.2 Two field researchers visited each crossing from 9am-5pm over a period of two days. A site assessment form was filled in at each crossing in which measurements were taken of crossing dimensions and physical characteristics recorded. Data were collected on crossing users via observational survey and user questionnaire.

2.5.3 Data collection methods are discussed in detail in Section 6.

2.6 Data Analysis

2.6.1 Data collected during the field research stage were analysed quantitatively and qualitatively and compared with the assessment criteria developed earlier. The overall objective of the data analysis was to identify the hazards at MWL crossings, focusing on the three main areas of conspicuity, understanding and violations. Results of the data analysis can be found in Section 7.

21st June 2004

Page 4


2.7 Conclusions and Recommendations

2.7.1 The hazards at MWL crossings are discussed in Section 8, and a number of possible risk mitigations and next steps are suggested.

21st June 2004

Page 5


3. DOCUMENT REVIEW

3.1 Current specifications for MWL crossings

Crossing Layout 3.1.1 Vehicular MWL crossings are normally protected by manual gates or lifting barriers. The

gates are closed across the road when the crossing is not in use. When in use, the gates must open away from the railway. If barriers are installed instead of gates, they are normally closed across the road and operate by hydraulic pump action. The same type of protection is provided on both sides of each crossing. A sign describing the correct method of operating the gates/barriers is also displayed on each side of the crossing.

3.1.2 Some UWCs with MWLs have separate pedestrian paths protected by either a stile or self-closing wicket gates. If a footpath crossing is also a bridleway then self-closing wicket gates are used. Again, the same types of protection are provided on both sides of the crossing.

3.1.3 Current standards state that the gates/barriers must be of equal width at both sides of the railway with a minimum width of 3 metres and a maximum of 5 metres (GO/OT0003, 1993). The width of the surface of the footpath crossing should not be less than 1 metre (HSE, 1996). The height of the MWL measured from the carriageway level to the centre of the red light is 1800mm, with the height from the top of the sign to the centre of the red light being 85mm (BRS/SM90, 1977). Therefore, allowing for the height of the carriageway from the ground, the MWL height to be used for assessment purposes is 2000mm. The typical layout of a UWC with MWL is illustrated in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Typical layout of a UWC with MWL and pedestrian path.

MWL Operation 3.1.4 MWLs are commonly mounted on a white board with written instructions relating to the

meaning of the lights. The red light is accompanied by the written words ‘Red’ and ‘STOP’. The green light is similarly accompanied by the written words ‘Green’ and ‘Clear’.

3.1.5 The green light is illuminated when it is safe for road users or pedestrians to cross the railway line (Figure 3). The green light extinguishes and the red light illuminates when a train is approaching the crossing (Figure 4). The change in colour of the lights is operated by a train running over a treadle. The treadles for the strike in points in the up and down direction are situated to give a warning time of at least 40 seconds before the crossing is reached.

‘STOP’ line

MWL

Vehicular user's viewing distance

Direction of travel

Vehicular gate (3m-5m in width) Pedestrian gate (>1m in width)

21st June 2004

Page 6


3.1.6 The red and green lights are illuminated such that they can be seen by the users at their decision point. The distance between the edges of the red and green light lenses is at least 40mm and each lamp is fitted with a hood to prevent glare from sunlight.

Figure 3: An MWL displays green when it is safe to cross

Figure 4: An MWL displays a red light when it is unsafe to cross

Criteria for the Provision of MWLs 3.1.7 MWLs are provided at a number of UWCs, footpath and bridleway crossings in order to

provide extra protection for road users and pedestrians who use the crossing.

3.1.8 The Railway Safety Principles and Guidance on level crossings document (HSE, 1996) outlines a set of criteria/conditions in which MWLs should be provided. The following paragraphs summarise these conditions.

3.1.9 The guidance states that MWLs should be provided at UWC where:

• The minimum warning time of trains cannot be obtained and the number of daily road vehicle users exceeds 100; or

• The provision of a telephone is impractical because it is difficult to provide reliable information concerning the whereabouts of trains, or the information supplied would be so restrictive that it would be likely to cause the user to become unduly impatient and to cross without permission.

21st June 2004

Page 7


3.1.10 The guidance also states that MWLs should be provided at footpath and bridleway

crossings where:

• The crossing is the only access to houses, • The highest attainable train speed exceeds 140 km/h or • The provision of whistle boards is considered inappropriate.

MWL Positioning 3.1.11 MWLs and their associated instructions are generally positioned to the left of vehicular

gates/barriers and between the vehicular and pedestrian crossings, where present.

3.1.12 Railway Safety Principles and Guidance on level crossings, (HSE, 1996) states that at UWCs:

“The MWL should be positioned on the approach side of the crossing facing towards approaching road users” (Figure 5) OR, at footpath and bridleway crossings: “The MWL should be positioned on the far side of the crossing from an approaching user and face inwards towards the railway. A duplicate sign without the red/green lamps is to be provided on the approach side to indicate to users the function and meaning of the lights before he/she leaves the position of safety (POS)” (Figure 6).

Figure 5: MWL is positioned on approach side at vehicular crossings

Figure 6: MWL is positioned on the far side at footpath or bridleway crossings

21st June 2004

Page 8


Associated Signs 3.1.13 An instructional sign on how to use MWL crossings is provided below the warning light.

There are three types of instructions depending on the type of protection provided at the crossings. As illustrated in Figure 7, sign (a) is provided at UWCs with MWLs protected by manual gates, sign (b) is provided at UWCs with MWLS where lifting barriers are used and finally sign (c) is provided at footpath and bridleway crossings and also at pedestrian gates of vehicular crossings.

(a) (b) (c)

Figure 7: The various MWL instruction signs in use on Network Rail infrastructure

3.1.14 In addition to the provision of MWLs, other protective equipment may be provided at the

crossing. This could include a telephone with a direct connection to the local signal box; whistle board (requiring train drivers to sound the horn and located not more than 400 yards away from the crossing); and an audible alarm (at crossings regularly used by unaccompanied partially-sighted or blind people). For example, Moulinearn Level Crossing in Scotland is equipped with an audible alarm and push button controls to raise and lower the barriers. This crossing provides access to a small hamlet with elderly residents, amongst whom there are a number of disabled and partially deaf users (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Moulinearn level crossing, Scotland Region

3.1.15 At UWCs with MWLs where telephones are provided, users are required to contact the

signallers for permission to cross under three specific circumstances: if they have long, low or slow moving vehicles; are accompanied by animals; or if the lights fail. For those locations where a telephone is not provided, users are instructed to ‘proceed with caution’ or ‘beware’.

21st June 2004

Page 9


3.1.16 All current crossing specifications were taken into account during the task and human error analyses, and were useful in the development of assessment criteria.

3.2 Review of Incidents and Accidents at MWL Crossings

3.2.1 The review of investigation reports into recent incidents and accidents at MWL crossings revealed a number of common factors between them. Specific information concerning the behaviour of the users involved in these incidents was sometimes difficult to determine, as interviews with users, carried out by the BTP, were not always available to the investigators. Nevertheless, several environmental and behavioural features are evident in more than one of the reports.

3.2.2 These features are summarised in the table below and described in the paragraphs that follow.

Table 1: MWL accident summary

Features Forge Farm Llanbrynmair Shaws Tisbury Quarry

Warren House

User Type Car Car Car Lorry Lorry

Gender Elderly Female Male Male Male Male

Frequency of Use

Cannot determine Unfamiliar user Unfamiliar

user Unfamiliar

user Familiar user

Protection Barriers Gates Gates Gates Gates Possibly

barriers left open by

previous user

Gates left open by previous user

Gates left open by

previous user Gates closed Gates closed

Evidence of Misuse Evidence of

common misuse

Evidence of common misuse

Evidence of common misuse

Evidence of misuse

Anecdotal evidence of

misuse

Other Info Limited close-up

visibility of warning lights

High level of crossing utilisation

N/A

Stuck on track due to limited

gate clearance

Reversing onto track

Immediate Cause

Motorist failed to obey the instructions displayed

Car driver failed to observe the warning signs

Vehicle driver failed to observe the instructions

Lorry driver failed to contact the signaller

Unauthorised movements onto the crossing

Underlying Cause

1. Lack of familiarity with this type of crossing 2. Barriers left in a raised position

1. Lack of familiarity with this type of crossing 2. Failure of previous user to close the gates

1. Poor discipline at the crossing, gates often left open

Unable to determine due to lack of formal statement and evidence from BTP

1. Difficulty in manoeuvring of vehicle 2. Inadequate assistance from colleague 3. Obscured ‘STOP’ markings

21st June 2004

Page 10


Gate Abuse 3.2.3 From the five accident investigation reports reviewed, four happened at gated crossings

compared to one at a barrier crossing. Instances of gates/barriers being left in an open/raised position are mentioned in all of the reports, and amounts to the most commonly recorded type of crossing misuse at these locations. This is ascribed to users’ perception that closing the gates or barriers after crossing is an inconvenience. Because correct use of a UWC in a vehicle requires five traverses of the railway (four on foot to open and close the gates, and one in the vehicle), this is understandable, particularly if the user feels that the efforts involved in closing the gates after use outweigh the safety benefits for the next user. This issue was investigated further during field research.

3.2.4 Gate abuse was so common at some of the crossings reviewed (e.g., Forge Farm) that train drivers became accustomed to seeing the gates open and failed to respond by applying the brakes, increasing the severity of the impact.

User Familiarity with the Crossing 3.2.5 Out of the five accidents reviewed, at least three involved users who were unfamiliar with

the crossing. It is alleged that, having approached the crossing and on seeing the gates/barriers open, these users had assumed that it was safe to cross and so failed to check the warning lights provided. This suggests that the combination of gates/barriers in an open/raised position and the lack of understanding of MWL crossing procedures can lead to incorrect usage and an increased likelihood of an incident. The expectation that open gates indicate that it is safe to cross may have been compounded by the user’s experience of other types of level crossing – at automatic crossings, barriers are held in a raised position until a train approaches.

3.2.6 There is evidence that user over-familiarity may also influence crossing behaviour. Frequent or regular crossing users, such as the refuse truck driver at Warren House level crossing, may become complacent about crossing risk and therefore be less inclined to use the crossing with caution; in this instance failing to check the lights before reversing back onto the tracks.

Visibility of Warning Lights 3.2.7 The visibility of warning lights was brought into question during the investigation of

accidents at Llanbrynmair and Shaws. It was felt that the MWLs might not stand out enough to be noticed by those who are not expecting or looking for them. A review of the size of the MWLs was one of the recommendations that arose from the investigation into the circumstances of the accident at Shaws Level Crossing to determine whether they give sufficient visibility to crossing users.

3.2.8 It is not possible to identify any human factors that may have contributed to the accident at Forge Farm, involving an elderly female driver, as a formal statement from the user could not be obtained. However, it is possible that deteriorating vision, common in elderly people, may be a factor in this case.

Visibility of Road Markings 3.2.9 The ‘STOP’ markings on the road were found to be fading or contaminated such that they

were not easily visible to the users at Tisbury Quarry, Warren House and Shaws level crossings. These road markings indicate a safe place for drivers to stop and operate the crossing gates/barriers and act as a cue of the proximity of the crossing.

Positioning and Clarity of Signs 3.2.10 Several of the incident reports recommend that instruction signs at the crossings would

benefit from clarification, particularly regarding the types of user they are addressing. The reports into accidents at Tisbury Quarry and Warren House highlighted a lack of consistency in the wording of crossing signs, which led to ambiguity in their interpretation by users who failed to call the signaller as required. At Tisbury Quarry, this was compounded by the fact that the sign instructing drivers of long or slow vehicles to contact the signaller was positioned so that it cannot easily be detected by approaching users.

21st June 2004

Page 11


3.2.11 There is also evidence from risk assessment and inspection forms for other MWL crossings (e.g., Bodsbury and Crofton) to suggest that some users are unsure whether the signs applied to them.

3.2.12 The presence of a national speed limit sign between the initial crossing warning sign and the crossing may have contributed to the accident involving an unfamiliar user at Llanbrynmair level crossing. In this incident, the gates were also left open and the two factors may have confused the user into thinking that it was safe to cross.

User Workload 3.2.13 Complex tasks, such as manoeuvring a large vehicle in a limited space, as was the case

with the accident at Warren House level crossing, increase the user’s mental workload, i.e., the amount of information being processed and the number of decisions to be made. This could distract the users from the requirement to check the warning lights. Such an occurrence is termed a slip, or lapse, of attention, and is a common human error in skill-based performance. The indistinct road markings that remind drivers of the proximity of the crossing may have contributed to the driver’s failure to check the lights.

3.2.14 A full summary of each of the incident reports reviewed can be found at Appendix A.

21st June 2004

Page 12


4. TASK ANALYSIS AND HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS

4.1 Task Analysis

4.1.1 The TA identified that various user groups need to carry out different tasks to traverse a UWC with MWL in safety. Vehicular users of MWL crossings protected by manual gates are required to traverse the railway line(s) five times to complete one crossing and are instructed to check the MWL twice. An approaching vehicular user is required to first check that the MWL shows green before commences a crossing. If the red light is illuminated the user is required to wait until the light changes to green before crossing. In order to cross, users have to traverse once to open both gates, and then walk back again to cross with the vehicle. Before driving over the crossing, the user is instructed to check that the green light still shows. Once the vehicle is over to the other side the user is required to walk back to close the far gate then close the near gates to complete one crossing.

4.1.2 For those crossings that are protected by co-acting lifting barriers, users are required to cross only once, however, they are instructed to check the MWL twice – once before lifting the barriers and once before taking the vehicle across.

4.1.3 Users of footpath and bridleway crossings are required to check the lights once before crossing. Cyclists are only required to dismount where a sign is present at the crossing telling them to do so. Unless instructed by local signs to dismount, a horse rider is to remain mounted while traversing the crossing. The gates at these crossings are normally self-closing or a stile.

4.2 Human Error Analysis

4.2.1 The error analyses were generated with reference to the crossing scenarios described above. The level crossing project team at Human Engineering held a HAZID workshop in which the task analysis was reviewed systematically in terms of the actions required of the user, information, feedback or communication associated with the task and any distractions which may affect the user’s ability to carry out the task correctly. Potential errors and their underlying behavioural, environmental and physical causes were identified. Possible error consequences were also recorded. The principal user errors identified are summarised in the table overleaf.

21st June 2004

Page 13


Table 2: User errors at MWL crossings

Crossing Feature Error description WARNING SIGNS Failure to observe warning signs/warning signs observed too late

INSTRUCTIONS Failure to realise that instructions are appropriate to user Failure to interpret instructions correctly Failure to respond to instructions correctly

MWL Failure to see MWL Failure to read MWL Failure to understand MWL Failure to comply with MWL

ALARM Failure to hear alarm Failure to understand alarm Failure to understand change in tone of alarm if another train is coming

GATES Failure to open gate Failure to open gate fully Failure to close gate after use Failure to secure gate

CROSSING Failure to cross tracks quickly Failure to clear crossing

COMMUNICATIONS Failure to phone signaller when required Failure to provide accurate information to signaller Failure to re-contact signaller upon completion of crossing

4.2.2 The full results of the TA and HEA for vehicular and for pedestrian users can be found at Appendix B.

21st June 2004

Page 14


5. IDENTIFYING CRITERIA FOR ASSESSMENT

5.1 Overview

5.1.1 From the task analysis described in the previous Section it is clear that, in order to traverse safely, a user must be attentive and free from distractions, be able to see and read the warning devices and crossing instructions clearly, and then interpret correctly the message they convey and act upon this.

5.1.2 Therefore, to evaluate the nature of risk at MWL crossings, factors that would influence the following were considered:

• The conspicuity of MWLs and associated signs • User understanding of lights, signs, and crossing procedures • Deliberate misuse of crossings (violations).

5.1.3 These factors are outlined below.

5.2 Factors Affecting the Conspicuity of MWLs

5.2.1 Conspicuity refers to the physical properties of an object that make it stand out from the surrounding environment. The most important property of a conspicuous object is its contrast with the background. When there is greater contrast, objects are more conspicuous. Other properties that determine the conspicuity of an object are its brightness and size.

5.2.2 However, first, an object has to be within the viewer’s field of vision in order to be detected. It is, therefore, important to first ensure that MWLs are located as close to the centre of the visual field as possible and that their size, brightness and contrast are such that they are easily detectable and distinguishable from the surrounding environment.

User’s Field of View 5.2.3 The visual field is the area of visual environment that is registered by the eyes when both

eyes and head are held still. The normal extent of the visual field is approximately 135° in the vertical plane and 200° in the horizontal plane. The visual field is normally divided into central and peripheral regions: the central field extending from the central point (0 degrees) to approximately 30° (at each eye), the peripheral field extending from 30° out to the absolute edge of the field (Henson, 1994).

5.2.4 The eyes can only perform fine visual discriminations such as perception of colour and patterns within the central field, where cones (colour-sensitive cells) densely populate an area on the retina called the fovea. Therefore, in order for level crossing users to recognise and discriminate between red and green lights, the MWL should be positioned within the central field of view, namely, from 0 to 30° to the left and right of the horizontal plane as illustrated in Figure 9.

21st June 2004

Page 15


Figure 9: Useful field of view

5.2.5 People generally focus attention in the same direction as the eyes point. This means that

warnings not located close to the line of sight will not be readily seen. When we sit or stand with our head up, and look ahead, the relaxed line of sight of our eyes will naturally assume a slightly downward gaze of some 10° or 15° from horizontal. Eye movement is comfortable within 15° above or below the horizontal. Weston (1953) observed people at work and found that the downward eye movements extend to 24° - 27°, without head and neck movement. However, the eye can be rotated up to 45° upward or 65° downwards (Automotive Ergonomics). For infrequent tasks, small movements of head and neck are acceptable.

5.2.6 The task of detecting and interpreting the MWLs is not a repetitive task or carried out frequently by the level crossing users (regular users may traverse the crossing a few times a day). Based on these criteria, a slight inclination of the neck to see the lights would be acceptable. MWLs, measured from the ground to the centre of the red light, should not be positioned more than 45° above or 65° below the horizontal line of sight (Figure 10).

Figure 10: User’s line of sight with and without neck movement

21st June 2004

Page 16


Viewing Height 5.2.7 To ensure that the lights can be seen by the majority of the UK population, they should be

positioned at a height comfortably within the field of view of 5th and 95th percentile males and females.

Pedestrian users 5.2.8 For pedestrian users, standing eye height of the 5th percentile British female adults aged

65 – 80 years and that of the 95th percentile British male adults aged 19 – 65 years were used. These are 1375 mm and 1745 mm, respectively (Pheasant, 1996).

Vehicular users2 5.2.9 The current sitting eye height for 5th percentile drivers in cars is 1060mm (Transport

Research Board, 1997). The eye height of truck drivers ranges from 1820mm to 2860mm with an average eye height of 2360mm. For the purpose of this study, the eye height of 5th percentile passenger car drivers and the top range eye height for truck drivers was used to determine whether, at its current standard height of 2000mm (BRS/SM90, 1997), the MWL is positioned within the recommended viewing angle.

Viewing Distance and Angle 5.2.10 An exact viewing distance for MWLs is difficult to determine. Many factors, such as

differences in user behaviour, user height and approach angle all contribute to the variation in viewing distances. The closer the user is to the MWL, the wider the viewing angle. Therefore, it is important to determine whether MWLs are at an acceptable viewing angle when users are at the closest viewing distance practicable.

5.2.11 The Railway Safety Principles and Guidance on level crossings (HSE, 1996) states that, ‘the width of the surface [of the footpath crossing] should not be less than 1 m’ and ‘the width of [the road surface] for user worked crossings should not exceed 5 m’. The narrowest widths of the gates at pedestrian and vehicular crossings visited were used for assessment purposes to determine the viewing angle of the MWLs, in order to identify whether they are within the acceptable range. The measurements for the width of vehicular gates were taken at each site during Human Engineering’s preliminary site visits.

5.2.12 Evidence suggests that vehicular users can identify the warning lights at a further distance if they are positioned to the left of the driver’s visual field (Russell, 1996). This may be due to the fact that, in Britain, most road signs are positioned on the left hand side of the driver and visual search is normally performed from left to right of the visual field.

MWL Size 5.2.13 The size of the red and green lamps was also taken into consideration to ensure that they

are large enough to be read easily when positioned on the approach side or on the far side of the crossing. Our ability to discriminate fine detail is called visual acuity (Kroemer and Grandjean, 1997), a capability that degrades with age. At a standard 10 cm diameter, the red and green lamps are of adequate size to be discerned reliably from viewing distances3 up to 15m. This clearly has implications for crossings with lights positioned on the far side of the crossing, where the distance between gates is greater than 15m.

2 Inclusive of cars and trucks. 3 Calculation of viewing distance The lamp’s visual angle subtended at the eye is 23’ of arc (half of which is 11.5’) (the recommended minimum for reading reliability is between 22’ and 24’) h is one half the lamp height in millimetres d is the distance along the line of sight from the user’s eye to the MWL Since the line of sight and the plane of the lineside sign form a right angle, simple trigonometry can be used:

1. tanA = h/d 2. d = 50/ tan 11.5’ = 14.947m 3. d = 15m

21st June 2004

Page 17


Light Intensity 5.2.14 Visual acuity improves with increased object brightness, reaching a maximum at

illumination levels above 1000lx. Therefore, the brighter a light source, the further the distance from which it can be seen (or the earlier the light can be identified).

5.2.15 The level of illumination is also a critical factor in visual accommodation. This is the ability of the eyes to bring into focus objects at varying distances. The better the luminance contrast of visual targets against their background, the faster, easier and more precise the accommodation.

Contrast 5.2.16 Contrast is a vital factor in visual acuity. Visual acuity increases as the contrast between

the target and its immediate background increases. Visual acuity is greater for dark symbols or text on a light background than for the reverse (a light background decreases pupil size and reduces refractive errors) (Kroemer and Grandjean, 1997).

5.2.17 However, a black background provides better contrast for a light source such as a miniature warning light. A dark surface absorbs more light and, therefore, reflects less than a light surface. The amount of light reflected from the white board of the MWL sign may counteract the luminance intensity of the MWL light, which in turn may reduce the perceived level of the illuminated light.

5.2.18 Provision of black border around the red and green lights would assist in providing a higher contrast while maintaining the readability of the wording on the sign.

Steady vs Flashing Lights 5.2.19 The use of flashing lights at MWL crossings is sometimes proposed to increase the

noticeability of the onset of a red light. However, contrary to popular belief, a flashing light is more difficult to detect initially than a steady one of the same intensity. The perceived magnitude of the flash is determined by the difference in the amount of light received when the bulb is on and off. Nevertheless, once detected, a flashing light is more likely to demand inquiry or be taken notice of than a steady light.

5.2.20 A study by Tenkink and Walraven into the visual enhancement of Dutch open-level railroad crossings was carried out in 1988. The subjects were asked to identify the colour of the signal lights as fast as possible while at the same time performing a tracking task4. It was found that the signal lights could be enhanced significantly by one of the following modifications: a threefold increase in luminance, a larger background screen or a more abrupt transition of the lights. The introduction of flashing lights was not found to be effective in raising the conspicuity of the signal lights.

5.2.21 Moreover, flashing signals of low luminous intensity are weak and in sunny daytime conditions it is not always possible to see them. The output of these signals is restricted due to the fact that they must be able to be battery powered in the event of a power failure (Mortimer, 1991).

Environmental Factors

Sunlight 5.2.22 Sunlight is known to cause problems with the visibility of MWLs. This can result both from

the sun shining directly onto the lights, making it hard for the users to determine which light is illuminated, or from sunlight shining into the user’s eyes, making the lights hard to discern.

4 Tracking tasks are often used in experimental psychology to simulate divided attention and produce a more realistic response to the main target. For example, a car driving-like tracking task was used in this case, in which a cursor had to be kept between two parallel lines.

21st June 2004

Page 18


5.2.23 Light reflects off the surfaces of visual images back to the eye. Hence in bright conditions, the contrast between the warning lights is reduced making it difficult for users to identify which of the two lights is illuminated. The position of the sun in the sky relative to that of the MWLs determines the severity of the reflection. Reflection will be greatest on a clear day when the sun is directly in front of the lights, and low, early or late in the daylight period, depending on which direction the lights face.

5.2.24 Hoods are often installed to mitigate this problem. A hood over the MWL blocks direct light when the sun elevation is more than 45° in the sky. As the sun declines in elevation, direct sunlight begins to reflect off the MWLs. At 30° elevation, half the MWL receives direct sunlight and at 15°, the reflection is greatest. South, east and west facing MWLs are worst affected by sunlight.

Cluttered background 5.2.25 Complex and cluttered backgrounds, such as where bridges, buildings and foliage are

present, can make MWLs less conspicuous to approaching users. Many visual searches are serial, in that items are inspected in turn (Wickens, Gordon and Liu, 1997). Extra objects in the surrounding area increase the amount of information that requires processing, hence users may take longer to detect, perceive and interpret the warning lights when the background is cluttered.

5.2.26 When items are conspicuous, the time required to search for them does not increase with the number of items present (Yantis, 1993; Treisman, 1986). Increasing the conspicuity of warning lights should reduce the time required to search for them.

5.2.27 In a complex or cluttered environment, conspicuity of the light is of critical importance. It is necessary to provide a suitably large and highly contrasted target to ensure that the lights can be detected and perceived easily.

5.3 Factors Affecting the Understanding of Lights and Signs

5.3.1 This section outlines the criteria required to ensure that users can see, read and understand clearly the level crossing procedures. The text signs should be visible to users as early as possible to facilitate detection of the presence of the crossing. Once the users are aware of the signs, text width and size need to be big enough to be legible and readable. The following subsections provide information on the visibility of text, readability and writing style.

Population Stereotypes for Danger Signs 5.3.2 An individual’s perception of a system or an object and how it works can be referred to as

a mental model. A mental model that is similar across large groups of people is defined as a population stereotype. Designing a system or an object for use by a large population requires it to be compatible with the population’s perception and previous knowledge of similar systems (in other words, consistent with their stereotypical expectations).

5.3.3 The use of the colours red and green to mean ‘stop’ and ‘proceed’, respectively, is a conventional practice worldwide in the transport industry. Red and green are used on MWLs with the word ‘STOP’ associated with red and ‘CLEAR’ associated with green. This is in accordance with the research findings and transport standards regarding light signals. Further research into user preferences for warning light colours at level crossings was carried out in Stream C of this project: Investigation into User Acceptance of a Novel Warning Device. Please refer to HEL/RSSB/03921a/RT3 (Human Engineering Limited, 2004) for details.

Text Size 5.3.4 The British Standard (BS4274-68) recommends that, at a luminance of 45 lx and with a

viewing distance of 6m (20ft), an observer with normal acuity should be able to recognise letters whose line width is equal to a visual angle of one minute of arc, equivalent to a visual acuity value of 1 (6/6 in the UK or 20/20 in the USA).

21st June 2004

Page 19


5.3.5 Smith (1979) demonstrated that letter size is proportional to legibility. Doubling letter size from 0.0017 to 0.0035 rad (one minute of arc is about 0.00029 rad) increases legibility from 51% to 94%. Reliable discrimination of written text requires character height to be at least 16 minutes of arc with better legibility as the text size increases. However, this is just a threshold value and the recommended text size is 24 minutes of arc (Krueger, 1980).

5.3.6 The visibility of text depends on the distance from the eye. The visual angle decreases the further away an object is. Therefore, whether the MWLs and associated signs are on the approach side or on the far side determines the visibility and also readability of the text.

Clarity of Instructions 5.3.7 All instructions for use at level crossings should be straightforward and easy to

understand. They should be written in ‘active’ rather than ‘passive’ voice and consistent across the nation to avoid any misunderstandings or confusion that may arise if an individual makes use of several UWCs with MWLs.

5.3.8 A risk assessment of Moulinearn Level Crossing carried out by ERM Risk for Network Rail (2001), suggested that the terms ‘STOP ‘ and ‘CLEAR’ might confuse users as to the actions they are required to take (as the user is required to stop at the crossing anyway). The authors recommend that ‘WAIT’ and ‘PROCEED’ might be more appropriate instead of ‘STOP’ and ‘CLEAR’, respectively. However, the use of ‘STOP’ and ‘CLEAR’ is consistent at all user worked crossings, and unless users demonstrate problems in understanding these terms, changing them is unlikely to confer significant benefit.

5.4 Factors Influencing Deliberate Crossing Misuse

Warning System Reliability 5.4.1 In order to ensure the effectiveness of the MWL, it is important to maximise the reliability of

the system and reduce the frequency of failures as much as possible.

5.4.2 It is well established that frequent false alarms will ultimately result in people ignoring a warning: the “cry wolf” effect, rendering the warning system ineffective (Papastavrou, and Lehto, 1996).

5.4.3 If red warning lights come on or get stuck on without any trains passing over the crossing, this can have a detrimental effect on users’ trust of the MWL. False alarms could reduce the effectiveness of the warning system and potentially increase the incidence of red light violations, resulting in a higher probability of an accident occurring.

Perception of Risk 5.4.4 The expectations of road users, and their resulting behaviours, are based on past

experience and their perception of the risks at the crossing. These are influenced by specific knowledge of that crossing such as: the frequency of trains, train speed, sighting distance and reasons for using the crossing. On infrequently used lines, users may have an expectation that there will be no trains approaching the crossing while they are using it, as this conforms to their experience. They may be less cautious and more likely to adopt risk-taking behaviours (A.D. Little, 2001). Similarly, research shows that users perceive a level crossing to be dangerous if train speed is high, or encounters with trains are frequent and, consequently, they are more likely to take more care when using the crossing.

5.4.5 The provision of MWLs alleviates the effect of these factors on the users’ decision to cross. However, human perception of time is typically inaccurate and users may perceive the warning time to be longer or shorter than the time it takes to traverse the crossing. This can influence their risk-taking behaviour (see 7.5.21).

5.4.6 On crossings with two lines or more, there is an increased risk of collision between crossing users and trains. There is evidence to suggest that, even though drivers stop for the warning signals, when the train has passed they may proceed before the light goes green, especially at level crossings adjacent to stations where the users can see a train stationary at the platform. Users are likely to presume that the red light is associated with

21st June 2004

Page 20


the previous train and could be surprised by the approach of another train in the opposite direction.

5.4.7 Past experience with other crossings such as Automatic Half Barrier (AHB) crossings, where the normal position of barriers is raised, may lead users to apply an incorrect mental model of the procedures involved in the use of UWCs with MWLs. The application of an incorrect mental model may not be rectified if the gates/barriers were left in an open/raised position. In this situation, a user who is used to using AHB crossings may presume that the crossing is safe to use without looking and reading the signs. This is supported by the fact that unfamiliarity is often a feature of accidents at MWL crossings.

21st June 2004

Page 21


5.5 Considerations for Users with Physical Impairments

Elderly Users 5.5.1 Physical and cognitive capabilities tend to deteriorate as people get older. Increasing age

is associated with a decrease in response times, attentional capacity, time-sharing abilities and visual capability including visual acuity and visual accommodation.

5.5.2 Sixteen percent of the UK population consists of persons of 65 years and older (based on estimates made in 2001), 7% of whom are aged 75 and over. 50% of males and 60% of females aged 75 and over are reported to have mobility problems. Because many UWCs and footpath crossings lead to houses, villages and small estates with elderly residents, it is important that the effects of ageing are taken into account when reviewing the effectiveness of MWLs.

5.5.3 The speed and precision of visual accommodation and visual acuity decrease with age. According to Krueger and Hessen (1982) these two functions show a marked decrease from about the age of 40.

5.5.4 An elderly individual requires increased illumination to undertake a visual task, hence they are more susceptible to glare and take longer to recover from it. Changes in visual neural mechanisms including a reduction in pupil size, which restricts the amount of light entering the eyes, make visual images and colours appear darker.

5.5.5 Older people have difficulty judging speed, are less sensitive to motion, and have a restricted field of view. Their ability to see objects in the peripheral field of vision is also reduced. These visual deficits may make it more difficult for older users to see an approaching train. Furthermore, older users may react more slowly.

5.5.6 To aid people who have partial loss of sight, audible alarm signals at MWL crossings should produce a sound that exceeds the prevailing ambient noise by at least 15 dbA. For the duration of exposure less than 0.5 hours the sound level must not exceed 110dB (Kroemer and Grandjean, 1997). Peak sensitivity in human hearing is in the range of 3500-4000Hz, so auditory alarms should be in this range5.

Physical Disability 5.5.7 The effect of using walking aids, wheelchairs, or other physical encumbrances, e.g.,

prams, on the crossing duration time was also considered. This should give some indication as to whether the warning time of 20 seconds for footpath crossing is adequate for the elderly and users with reduced physical mobility.

Colour-Blindness 5.5.8 The common form of red-green colour deficiency is inherited and affects one out of every

twelve men and one in 200 women. One of the symptoms of this type of colour vision deficiency is the inability to distinguish between red and green. The words ‘red’ and ‘green’ that are written alongside the appropriate lights cater for colour-blind users, but consideration must be given to whether the text is of adequate size, particularly when MWLs are positioned on the far side of the crossing.

5.6 Summary of Assessment Criteria

5.6.1 The physical, measurable factors discussed above can be simplified into the following assessment criteria:

5 Because field researchers did not take a sound meter on site visits the assumption was made that auditory alarms, where present, met with this recommendation, provided they could be heard clearly and were not masked by other environmental (e.g., traffic) noise.

21st June 2004

Page 22


• Height and position of lights should be comfortably within the field of view of 5th and 95th percentile males and females.

• MWLs should be at an acceptable viewing angle when users are at the closest viewing distance practicable.

• There should be sufficient light intensity for aspects to be seen by all crossing users from their typical decision point.

• Sufficient warning light to background contrast is required (during the day, the contrast between a cluttered background and the warning light may be low, making them less visible.)

• Lights should be large enough so that red and green lights can be easily discriminated by all crossing users from their typical decision point.

• Sun hoods should be fitted and alignment optimised if direct glare from sunlight is considered to be a possibility.

• Simple crossing instructions should be provided: written in an ‘active’ voice and consistent within and between crossing locations.

• Text size on signs should be easily readable when the MWLs and associated instructions are positioned on the approach side and on the far side of the crossing.

5.6.2 Those factors pertaining to behavioural issues were used to inform the development of

user observation checklists and questionnaires to investigate:

• Any reported problems with warning light visibility compared with other types of level crossing warning lights.

• User understanding of what miniature warning lights signify. • User trust in MWLs. • User understanding of crossing instructions. • The effect (on the crossing duration time) of using a walking aid, wheelchair or

other encumbrance. • Environmental factors that may affect the decision to cross. • How users perceive risk at MWL crossings. • Factors that influence user perception of risk.

21st June 2004

Page 23


6. DATA COLLECTION METHODS

6.1 Site Visits

6.1.1 The twenty-five MWL crossings selected by Regional Level Crossing Managers as suitable locations for field research are summarised in the table below.

Table 3: MWL crossings visited

Crossing Name Region Cranbourne Girlings Harts Drove Routes No. 8

East Anglia

Broken Cross Meads Gelynis

Great Western

Creykes Jackie Duffin Wood Philip Lane Scalm Lane

London North Eastern

Back Lane Dovefields Hucknall No. 4 Warren House

Midlands

Barthomley Llanddaniel

North West

Back Settlement Bodsbury Moulinearn

Scotland

Chilham Mill Farnborough North Forge Farm Minster Tisbury Quarry

Southern

6.1.2 Where applicable, authorised users of the selected crossings were notified of the

impending field research and the approximate dates on which researchers would be conducting surveys at their local crossing.

6.2 Physical Site Assessment

6.2.1 Human Engineering technical staff made preliminary site visits to the relevant crossings to obtain physical measurements and complete a site assessment form. The physical layout of each crossing was recorded along with any additional human factors issues observed. Some examples of such issues include:

• Whether the crossing is positioned next to an airfield or busy road, where traffic noise may mask an auditory alarm.

• A station in view of the crossing (users may decide it is safe to cross if they can see trains stopped at platforms).

21st June 2004

Page 24


• Incidents of animals (e.g., dogs, sheep) roaming on the tracks. • Inappropriate use of the crossing equipment (e.g., children at Minster crossing

were seen to play frequently with the pump-action barrier).

6.2.2 Measurements from the completed site assessment forms were used to carry out an assessment of the physical characteristics of MWL crossings based on the criteria outlined in Section 5.

6.2.3 A photographic record was also made of each site. This included depictions of the approach to each side of the crossing, sightlines, and relevant features such as barriers, gates, crossing instructions and warning lights, and general topography and layout.

6.2.4 Completed site record forms containing this information can be found at Appendix C.

6.3 Questionnaires and Observation Checklists

6.3.1 The TA and HEA, together with the findings from the literature review, were used to develop a structured questionnaire and observation checklist (Appendix D) in order to appreciate user understanding of MWLs, perception of risk and usage of MWL crossings. The observation checklist required the following details to be recorded:

• User types, i.e., age, gender, whether they crossed on foot or in a vehicle, etc. • The procedures users follow when operating a level crossing with miniature

warning lights. • Time taken to cross. • Environmental factors that may affect the decision to cross. • Any incidents of crossing misuse.

6.3.2 The user questionnaire sought to identify:

• Reasons for crossing use and frequency of crossing use. • User understanding of MWLs compared with other types of warning light. • User understanding of associated auditory alarms. • How perception of risk affects usage of MWL crossings. • User understanding of crossing procedures and instructions • User trust in the warning devices provided. • Any reported problems with warning light visibility. • Reasons for any deviations from the correct crossing procedure.

6.4 Observation and Interview Methods

6.4.1 Two field researchers from HEL visited each crossing from 9am-5pm (for reasons of consistency, cost and availability of supervision) over a period of two days between September and October 2003. Where possible, it was the intention of researchers to fill in an observation checklist for each user encountered. Where users traversed the crossings in groups, only the actions of the primary user (e.g., the driver of the car, or the adult accompanying children) were recorded. Users were selected for observation and interview based on convenience sampling6.

6.4.2 All field researchers were instructed in how to conduct the user observations and surveys. Clearly, if crossing users are aware that they are being observed, this may cause them to modify their normal behaviour. A ‘halo effect’ is possible, whereby users take unusual

6 In convenience sampling, the selection of subjects for survey is based on easy availability and/or accessibility, i.e., field researchers aimed to observe as many crossing users as possible, and interviewed whoever agreed to take part.

21st June 2004

Page 25


care to act in accordance with crossing instructions, particularly if they suspect that incorrect actions may be recorded and used against them.

6.4.3 Care was taken to minimise this effect. Researchers were told not to wear the issued high-visibility vests, as this may have caused crossing users to assume that researchers were Network Rail personnel, assigned to police the crossings. Instead, they were told to introduce themselves as “market researchers”, when asked. Observation was carried out as discreetly as possible to minimise any influence on crossing behaviour: researchers stood on either side of the crossing and did not approach users for questioning until they had finished crossing and were in a position of safety.

6.4.4 Prior to commencement of the site visits, a Safety Method Statement and briefing pack on the field research were prepared for each researcher, and a workshop was held to ensure that all researchers were aware of safe crossing procedures. All researchers were issued with identification cards containing contact numbers for the Human Engineering project team, should any crossing users encountered require these. For full details of the site visit planning process, please refer to HEL/RSSB/03921a/RT1 (Human Engineering Limited, 2004).

21st June 2004

Page 26


7. DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

7.1 Overview

7.1.1 As well as the physical site assessment record for each crossing, a total of 718 observational surveys and 257 questionnaires were completed successfully at the 25 MWL crossings visited. The number of users observed and questioned at each of the crossings is shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Observations and questionnaires at MWL crossings

Region Crossing Name Observed Users Interviewed UsersCranbourne 11 8 Girlings 37 15 Harts Drove 43 11

East Anglia

Routes No. 8 66 18 Broken Cross 9 2 Meads 20 9 Great Western Gelynis 33 18 Creykes 47 7 Jackie Duffin Wood 1 0 Philip Lane 10 1

London North Eastern

Scalm Lane 22 2 Back Lane 23 9 Dovefields 1 0 Hucknall No. 4 11 4

Midlands

Warren House 20 4 Barthomley 14 7

North West Llanddaniel 15 4 Back Settlement 25 18 Bodsbury 17 4 Scotland Moulinearn 47 6 Chilham Mill 69 34 Farnborough North 87 33 Forge Farm 26 14 Minster 46 23

Southern

Tisbury Quarry 18 6 TOTAL 718 257

7.2 User Summary

7.2.1 The distribution of observations and questionnaires conducted by gender and age group shows a bias towards males and adults. Over 75% of the sample was male. Age distribution is shown in Figure 11.

21st June 2004

Page 27


0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Perc

enta

ge (%

)

20 - 3

5

35 - 5

0

50 - 6

5<2

065

+

Unspe

cified

Figure 11: Age Distribution

7.2.2 Car drivers and pedestrians were by far the most frequently encountered user types.

Work vehicles, such as tractors and trucks were far less common. 3.3% of users were classed as ‘Other’, these included: a JCB digger; fork lift truck; a motorised scooter, and cars or vans towing trailers/animal boxes, (as they would be classified as long vehicles and so should contact the signaller before traversing if directed to do so by the signage at the crossing). Distribution of user types is shown in Figure 12.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Perc

enta

ge (%

)

Car Driv

er

Pedes

trian

Cyclis

t

Truck D

river

Other

Tractor

Driv

er

Motorcy

clist

Horse R

ider

Railway

Staf

f

Unspe

cified

Figure 12: Crossing User Type

7.2.3 Leisure activities and accessing work were the most common reasons for crossing use.

Of the 257 users questioned, half (50.2%) were crossing it for leisure activities and a quarter (26.1%) were using the crossing to access work. This may be a reflection of the times the survey was carried out (09:00 – 17:00), which may not capture many crossing users on their way to and from work.

21st June 2004

Page 28


0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Perc

enta

ge (%

)Le

isure

Acces

s Work

Acces

s Hom

e

Delive

ryOthe

r

Farm W

ork

Railway

Staf

f

Unspe

cified

Figure 13: Reason for Using Crossing

7.2.4 Frequency of crossing use is shown in Table 5 below. Over two-thirds of the sample

classified themselves as frequent users, using the crossing at least once or twice a week.

Table 5: Frequency of Crossing Use

Frequency Number of Users (n=257) Percentage of Respondents

Many times a day 39 15.2 Once or twice a day 75 29.2 Once or twice a week 67 26.1 Every few weeks 25 9.7 Rarely 31 12.1 First time 19 7.4 Unspecified 1 0.4

7.2.5 Findings from the physical crossing assessments and field research relating to the three areas of concern: conspicuity, understanding and violations, are presented below. All data have been normalised, where necessary, to reflect the uneven distribution of user type, gender, age and crossing location.

7.2.6 For a detailed summary of field research results, please refer to Appendix F.

7.3 Conspicuity of Miniature Warning Lights and Signs

Visibility of the Lights for Pedestrians 7.3.1 All MWLs were found to be well within the pedestrian users’ line of sight for 5th percentile

female to 95th percentile male representatives of the UK population.

7.3.2 The maximum horizontal viewing angle for pedestrian users when standing at the closest safe viewing distance for the sites visited ranged from 36° - 40°, when the MWLs are positioned on the approach side. The horizontal viewing angle ranged from 5° - 10° for the two sites where MWLs are on the far side (Back Settlement on Scotland Region and Farnborough North on Southern Region). The minimum horizontal viewing angle for pedestrian users when approaching the crossing, measured at 15m away from the crossing, ranged from 3° - 6° for MWLs positioned both on the approach and far side.

7.3.3 At sites where MWLs are positioned on the approach side, the vertical viewing angles were found to be within the recommended limits (a measurement of 25° upwards was

21st June 2004

Page 29


recorded for 5th percentile British female adults aged 65 – 80 years, and 6° for 95th percentile British male adults aged 19 – 65 years). For footpath and bridleway crossings with MWLs positioned on the far side, the MWLs were found to be within 5° of the line of sight. Details of these calculations can be found at Appendix E.

Visibility of the Lights for Vehicular Users 7.3.4 The MWLs at sites visited were all within the acceptable line of sight for users in both small

vehicles (e.g., cars) and large vehicles (e.g., tractors and trucks).

7.3.5 The maximum horizontal viewing angle varied greatly for users in small vehicles and large vehicles with a range from 28° - 52°, averaging at 33°. The UWCs with MWLs where large viewing angles were recorded were those with barriers where the stop line is closer to the barrier than the barrier’s width. The minimum horizontal viewing angle for vehicular users when approaching the crossing (measured from a distance of 15m) ranged from 8° - 12°.

7.3.6 Users in large vehicles could see the MWLs at a downward angle of up to 17° whereas users in small vehicles could see the MWLs at an upward angle of up to 8°. The range of eye movement required to see the lights from all types of vehicles was considered to be small.

User Opinions on Visibility of Lights 7.3.7 The observational and survey data collected indicated that the visibility of the lights is not

an issue or a causal factor that leads to users crossing on red. None of the 257 users questioned at the UWCs with MWLs stated that they had ever experienced difficulty seeing the lights. However, several users suggested that increasing the size of the lights (especially the red light) would help to improve the safety of the crossings, making them more noticeable to first time users, in particular.

Readability of Crossing Instructions 7.3.8 The character height of text on the MWL sign is 24mm, and 20mm on the associated

instructions. These sizes are legible at 3.44m and 2.86m, respectively, when the visual angle subtended at the eye is the recommended 24 minutes of arc. At 16 minutes of arc (the minimum recommendation), the text can be read at around 5m and 4m, respectively. Assuming that users read the instructions after stopping at the crossing, the signs positioned on the approach side are considered suitably readable for the majority of users. However, the signs on the far side may not be easily readable, particularly for those users with visual impairments. Duplicate signs without the red/green lamps are provided on the approach side of the crossing. However, users with colour vision impairments may have difficulties in differentiating the red and green lights if they cannot read the text written next to the lights themselves.

Obscuration Problems 7.3.9 Observation and photos taken during preliminary site visits have shown that there is a

potential for partial obstruction of the views of MWLs. For example, at Broken Cross, on approach from the north side, the view of the MWL is partly obstructed by the ‘STOP’ and ‘Drivers of large or slow vehicles…’ signs (see Figure 14); and vegetation partly obstructs the view of MWLs and associated signs on the southwest approach of Forge Farm level crossing (see Figure 15). The vegetation creates a feeling of clutter and makes the crossing signs less conspicuous.

7.3.10 Other circumstances under which MWLs may become obscured were also considered. A risk assessment carried out by Human Engineering at Fishbourne Crossing in Southern Region (Human Engineering, 2003) highlighted that trains passing through the crossing may obscure MWLs positioned on the far side. This may lead to problems in the event of a second train approaching the crossing, should users make the decision that it is safe to cross once they have seen the first train pass through and without re-checking the lights. Formal investigations into incidents at Fishbourne indicate that this was the case in at least one fatality at the crossing. This tendency may be compounded by the very poor understanding of a change in alarm tone evidenced in Stream C of this project, Investigation into User Acceptance of a Novel Warning Device (HEL/RSSB/03921a/RT3).

21st June 2004

Page 30


Figure 14: MWL partially obstructed by “Drivers of large or slow vehicles…” sign at Broken Cross

Figure 15: MWL cluttered by foliage at Forge Farm

Positioning of MWLs 7.3.11 It was found that at all but two of the sites visited (Hucknall No.4 and Forge Farm) MWLs

were presented on the left hand side of crossing vehicle gates/barriers where present. This conforms to research on driver behaviour, which suggests that road users (who account for the majority of the user population) typically look for signals and signs to the left of their sight line.

7.3.12 Much more contentious is the issue of whether MWLs should be positioned on the approach side or far side of the crossing. Current guidance states that, at user worked crossings, the MWL should be positioned on the approach side, and at footpath or bridleway crossings, on the far side.

7.3.13 Human visual acuity is such that red and green MWLs, with a standard diameter of 10cm, can be differentiated by the majority of crossing users up to a distance of 15m away. Clearly, this presents problems if MWLs are positioned on the far side of a crossing and the distance across the tracks is greater than 15m.

21st June 2004

Page 31


7.3.14 Other advantages and disadvantages of positioning MWLs on the approach side or on the far side were assessed. Findings are presented in Table 6.

Table 6: Advantages and disadvantages of the different MWL positions

MWL on approach side MWL on far side

Advantage - Users can get close to the lights and instructions without putting themselves at risk. This is particularly important for elderly users and users with impaired vision.

Disadvantage - Users cannot get close to the lights and instruction signs without putting themselves at risk. Elderly users and users with impaired vision may have difficulty in reading crossing instructions and identifying which aspect is showing, especially if the distance across the tracks is greater than 15m.

Advantage – If a train passes it cannot obscure the lights.

Disadvantage – A train going through the crossing can block the view of MWLs.

Advantage - Colour-blind users can read the words associated with the lights more easily.

Disadvantage - Colour-blind users may not be able to read the words associated with the lights.

Advantage - No need for duplicate signs, reducing the clutter at the crossing.

Disadvantage - A duplicate sign is required on the approach side.

Disadvantage - Lights will be out of sight while crossing.

Advantage - MWLs will be in sight at all times while crossing.

Disadvantage - Potential for vehicular users to forget to check the lights the second time.

Advantage - Users in vehicles are less likely to forget to check the lights a second time

Advantage - Instructions are positioned appropriately at the point where users are expected to comply.

Disadvantage - Text cannot be read easily if signs are more than 5 metres away from the user.

7.3.15 On balance, findings suggest that lights positioned on the approach side of crossings are preferable. This was supported by users interviewed for Stream C of this project: Investigation into User Acceptance of a Novel Warning Device (Human Engineering, 2004), who said they thought that approach side lights were safest, followed by lights on both sides of the crossing (back-to-back lights). However, back-to-back lights are not currently installed at any MWL sites in Great Britain.

7.4 User Understanding of Warning Lights and Instructions

Understanding of MWLs and Associated Alarm 7.4.1 Almost all users interviewed, including first time users, understood the meaning of the

MWLs and associated audible alarm to mean ‘Stop’, ‘Train Approaching’ and ‘Danger’ (see Table 7).

Table 7: Understanding of Red MWL

Understanding of the Red MWL (Overall Sample)

Percentage of Respondents (n=257)

Stop 66.9 Train approaching 24.9 Danger 3.9 Proceed with caution 2.7 Not specified 1.6

21st June 2004

Page 32


7.4.2 However, a small number of respondents (7 people) understood the red light to indicate ‘Proceed with Caution’. Initially this interpretation may seem surprising, but could be related to the fact that Proceed with Caution or Cross if Safe to Do So are acceptable responses to a red man indication at a road pedestrian crossing. Further support for this was identified in Stream C of the project: Investigation into User Acceptance of a Novel Warning Device. Please refer to HEL/RSSB/03921a/RT3 for details (Human Engineering, 2004).

7.4.3 First time users (19 respondents in total) are more likely than the overall sample to believe that the red light indicates Proceed with Caution. However, a large proportion of first time users do understand correctly the meaning of the red light, indicating that the meaning of the lights is understandable to those unfamiliar with it. A breakdown of the results for first time users is shown below in Table 8.

Table 8: Understanding of Red MWL by First Time Users

Understanding of the Red MWL (First Time Users)

Percentage of Respondents (n=19)

Stop 63.2 Train approaching 21.1 Danger 5.3 Proceed with caution 5.3 Not specified 5.3

7.4.4 User understanding of an auditory alarm accompanying a red MWL was also good. Nevertheless, although users appear to understand the correct meaning of the warning lights and audible alarm, six users, (who were observed but not questioned), still traversed a level crossing with both warning systems in action.

Table 9: Understanding of Audible Alarm

Understanding of the Audible Alarm Percentage of Respondents (n=19)

Stop 54.5 Train approaching 34.1 Danger 11.4

7.4.5 In addition, evidence from Stream C of this study, Investigation into User Acceptance of a

Novel Warning Device (HEL/RSSB/03921a/RT3, 2004) identified that user understanding of a change in alarm tone to indicate the approach of a second train was very poor. Further research into user understanding of alarm tones is therefore recommended.

Understanding of Crossing Instructions 7.4.6 Although most users (92.6%) described crossing instructions as being in a reasonable

condition and readable, there were some complaints of hidden, faded and vandalised signs. Despite the consensus that signs were in a reasonable condition, only 59.9% of all users questioned could accurately describe the correct crossing procedure. Nevertheless, 83.6% of users were observed to cross in accordance with crossing instructions, so either they could understand the written instructions but could not articulate them, or have learned safe crossing behaviour not from the instructions, but from observing other users on the crossing.

7.4.7 It is interesting to note that although extra signs are often put up at crossings to mitigate risk, the evidence suggests that users do not really pay them close attention or remember the message that they convey, since very few people could actually recall which signs were present at their crossing when asked (see Figure 16). One reason for this could be

21st June 2004

Page 33


that familiar users are likely to have learnt how to use the crossing some time ago and no longer feel the need to pay attention to the signage.

17.9%

10.9% 1.9%

69.3%

< 1 third of signspresent recalled 1-2 thirds of signspresent recalled>2 thirds of signspresent recalledUnrecorded/Unanswered

Figure 16: Signage Recollection

Sources of Ambiguity 7.4.8 A number of potential sources of ambiguity in crossing instructions were identified during

the site visits.

7.4.9 The instructions for use of the crossing were found to be largely straightforward and appropriately written in the ‘active’ rather than the ‘passive’ voice. However, inconsistency was found in the presentation of instructions for drivers of long, slow and low vehicles. The instructions require these users to contact the signaller for permission to cross. These vehicles may take a long time to go over the crossing and there is a higher risk of them getting stuck on the track, especially when the crossing surface is uneven.

7.4.10 Three types of instruction signs referring to the crossing procedure for these vehicles were identified at the crossings visited, shown in Figure 177.

Figure 17: Instruction signs in Standard RT/LS/S/012

7 It should be noted that while the sign depicted at the bottom of Figure 17 is present at a number of crossings currently, its use has been superseded by the sign depicted at top left of the figure and one specifically for persons in charge of animals. The "Drivers of long, low vehicles phone before crossing" sign is only installed at AHBs/ABCLs where there is an additional risk of grounding, but was found at some of the MWL crossings visited, hence its inclusion here.

21st June 2004

Page 34


7.4.11 However, the instructions do not give a clear definition of what is meant by ‘long, slow and low vehicles’. Some drivers may not consider their vehicle to be in this category, especially if it is not subject to special speed restrictions on the road. They may use the crossing without contacting the signaller and potentially put themselves at risk.

7.4.12 In at least one case (Warren House on Midland Region), it was noted that signs were worded differently on each side the crossing8. The sign on the down side of the crossing reads, “Drivers of large or slow vehicles phone before crossing”, whereas the sign on the up side of the crossing reads “Drivers of long low vehicles phone before crossing” (see Figure 18). This discrepancy increases the ambiguity of the instructions and was thought to have contributed to the accident at the crossing on 22nd January 2003.

Figure 18: Discrepancies in instructions at Warren House Crossing, Midland Region

7.4.13 There may, therefore, be a need to formalise these signs in order to increase consistency

of presentation both within and between crossings to reduce any potential for confusion.

7.4.14 Another source of potential ambiguity in crossing instructions was identified. At UWCs with MWLs where no telephone is provided, users are instructed to either ‘proceed with caution’ or ‘beware’ if no light is displayed. However, it is not clear what actions users need to perform to accomplish this. Use of these terms may encourage users to cross slowly rather than ‘quickly’ as instructed on another crossing sign.

7.5 Crossing Violations

Adherence to Correct Crossing Procedure 7.5.1 Although the majority of users were observed to follow the correct crossing procedure (see

Figure 19: Percentage of Users Observed to Follow Correct Crossing Procedure), crossing misuse by 12.7% of the sample (91 users) was recorded.

8 Network Rail was made aware of this following the Formal Inquiry into the most recent incident at this crossing.

21st June 2004

Page 35


Yes83.6%

No12.7%

Unspecified3.7%

Figure 19: Percentage of Users Observed to Follow Correct Crossing Procedure

7.5.2 Reasons for which users were recorded as failing to follow the correct procedure included:

• Crossing when a red MWL is showing (12 users) • Failing to close one or both gates (43 users) • Failing to secure gates closed, so they swung open again (2 users) • A driver pulling onto the rail tracks between opening the first and second gate (3

users) • Cyclists failing to dismount (11 users) • Failing to stop at the ‘Stop line’ (2 users) • Failing to phone the signaller when required (1 user) • Failing to check the MWL before crossing (12 users)

7.5.3 The frequency of occurrence of these types of crossing misuse is represented in Figure 20. The “Other” category represents any other misuse not accounted for by the types described above. For example, users at Minster and Farnborough North on Southern Region were seen crossing from platform to platform at the stations adjacent to these crossings by walking down the ramps and via the tracks without using the crossing gate.

0

10

20

30

40

50

Perc

enta

ge (%

)

Didn't C

lose G

ates

Crosse

d on R

ed

Didn't C

heck

MW

L

Didn't D

ismou

ntOthe

r

Stoppe

d on T

racks

Didn't S

top at

Stop

Line

Didn't S

ecure

Gate

s

Didn't P

hone

Figure 20: Types of Crossing Misuse

Gate Abuse 7.5.4 The most common violation (43 users) was a failure to close the gate(s) after use. Mostly,

this could be put down to haste, or laziness, but tailgating by subsequent users was the cause of 7 of these incidents of gate abuse. Car drivers were most frequently observed to leave one or both gates open. However, normalising the data to account for the uneven traffic distribution reveals that tractor drivers were most likely to leave either one or both gates open, followed closely by truck drivers (see Figure 21).

21st June 2004

Page 36


0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Perc

enta

ge (%

)Trac

tor D

river

Turuck

Driv

er

Car Driv

er

Cyclis

t

Pedes

trian

Unspe

cified

Figure 21: Percentage of User Types that Failed to Close the Gate(s)

7.5.5 This is perhaps unsurprising when one considers that these users are most likely to be

transporting goods or equipment that require them to make multiple crossings. Leaving the gates open between crossings saves a considerable amount of time, as it removes the necessity of crossing 5 times (4 times on foot and once in the vehicle). For example, tractor drivers took an average of 106.5 seconds to cross if they took the time to open and close the gates compared with just 10 seconds if both gates had been left open previously (see Table 12).

7.5.6 However, investigations into previous incidents at MWL crossings show that neglecting to close the gates leaves other users, particularly those unfamiliar with the crossing, vulnerable to making the assumption that they are able to traverse safely without checking the lights.

Red-Running 7.5.7 In total, field researchers observed twelve actual occurrences of violations that involved a

user traversing a level crossing when a red warning light was showing. Six of the red-runners were seen at crossings on Southern Region. Male pedestrians and car drivers, aged 20-35 years, were observed to be the most common violators making up 75% of all violations observed. However, normalising the data to account for the uneven distribution of user types shows that the group most likely to traverse a MWL crossing when the red light is showing were male cyclists, aged 20 years or less on the Midland Region.

7.5.8 Interestingly, six of the observed red-running incidents happened at crossings with both MWLs and an audible alarm. This indicates that they were deliberate acts rather than errors due to a failure on the part of the user to see or understand the lights.

7.5.9 Unfortunately, those users who were observed crossing on red declined an interview. However, out of the 257 users who were questioned, 18 admitted that they would consider traversing if the red light was showing. All of these users understood the correct meaning of the warning light (see Table 10).

Table 10: Understanding of Red MWL by Red-Runners

Understanding of the Red MWL by Potential Red-Runners

Percentage of Respondents

(n=18) Stop 61.1 Train approaching 33.3 Danger 5.6

21st June 2004

Page 37


7.5.10 Of the 18 respondents who would consider crossing on red, 66.7% said they trusted the lights to inform them of an approaching train, 27.8% did not trust the lights. This compares with 20.2% overall who said they do not trust the warning devices at the crossing they are using. Reasons given for this mistrust were: the lights have broken in the past, there is insufficient time between the onset of the warning system and the arrival of the train, and ‘the lights may fail, as they are mechanical’. This emphasises the importance of reliability in the novel warning device.

7.5.11 Interestingly, 58% of all users were observed to look left and right down the track for trains when a green light was displayed. This suggests that although users may say they trust the lights, they are unlikely to trust them implicitly as a safeguard when crossing.

7.5.12 The group of users most likely to admit to traversing when a red light is showing is male pedestrians, aged 20 years or less and on the Southern Region.

7.5.13 The fact that males under 20 years were identified as the most likely red runners from the observation and interview data is consistent with other research on driver risk behaviour (e.g., Malek and Hummer, 1982; Rolls et al, 1991; Summala and Mikkola, 1994). The research indicates a clear trend highlighting that the younger the driver, the more likely they are to be involved in safety related incidents on the road, even when mileage across all age groups is normalised. For all types of vehicles, drivers under 20 have the most accidents. One study by Broughton (1988, cited by Thompson and O’Reilly, 1993) showed that the accident rate of drivers aged 17-19 was seven times higher than that of older drivers. The association between age and accidents is not just a factor of experience, but of younger drivers’ general tendency towards risk taking and “sensation seeking” (Groeger and Chapman, 1991), and overconfidence in their abilities.

Safety Consciousness 7.5.14 Field researchers gave each crossing user a rating of safety consciousness, depending on

their observed care and attention when crossing. For example, a user who was seen to check the lights before crossing would have been rated “safety conscious” and users who checked the lights and looked left and right for trains were rated as “very safety conscious”. “Risky” behaviours observed included users crossing without looking at the lights, or failing to dismount from a bicycle. Behaviours rated as “very risky” included users talking on a mobile phone when crossing and failing to check the lights, or running across just as the lights changed9. Table 11 shows that the behaviour of the vast majority of users was considered to be safe.

Table 11: Safety Consciousness Ratings

User Behaviour Rating Percentage of Users, n=706 Very Safety Conscious 17.3 Safety Conscious 48.5 OK 22.3 Risky 7.9 Very Risky 2.4

7.5.15 Further analysis showed that first time users were observed to be more safety conscious than regular users. Their unfamiliarity with the crossing may have made them more likely to read the crossing instructions and adhere to correct procedures.

9 Although researchers were given examples of what constitutes safe and unsafe behaviour, there may be some inconsistencies due to the subjective nature of observation.

21st June 2004

Page 38


Perception of Risk 7.5.16 There is evidence that users’ perception of risk influences their general crossing behaviour

and plays a key role in their decision to cross on red. This relates to the theory of “risk homeostasis” (Wilde, 1994), which states that people have their own acceptable level of risk and will adjust their behaviour accordingly, regardless of any imposed controls (e.g., a red MWL). A number of potential factors were identified in this study that may influence crossing users’ perception of risk:

• Estimated waiting time • Available sighting times • Estimated vs. actual crossing time • Awareness of accidents or near misses at the crossing • Perceived speed of trains through the crossing • Perceived frequency of trains through the crossing

7.5.17 These factors are discussed in more detail below.

Waiting Time 7.5.18 When compared with the overall sample, users that said they would consider crossing

when the red light shows tended to assume that waiting times (the length of time between the onset of the warning device(s) and arrival of a train) would be longer: 91.6 seconds on average compared to an overall sample estimate of 78.7 seconds. The minimum warning time provided by warning lights and audible alarms at MWL crossings is 40 seconds, (20 seconds at footpath MWL crossings)10, but, of course, actual waiting times may vary depending on the speed that the train is travelling and whether there are any signals or stations between the strike-in point and the crossing. A user is more likely to cross when the red light shows or the audible alarm sounds if they anticipate that the wait could be over 90 seconds than if they think they have just 40 seconds to wait until the train passes.

Sighting Time 7.5.19 Potential red-runners also tended to overestimate sighting times, i.e., how long a train

would take to reach the crossing from the point at which it first becomes visible. The average time given by users who would cross on red was 54.5 seconds11; four seconds more than the overall sample average, which was 50.4 seconds12. Of course, the actual sighting times vary between crossings but of the crossings visited the maximum length of time between sighting a train and its arrival at a level crossing was observed to be 46.7 seconds, at Meads crossing on the Great Western Region (sighting distance 2286 yards and 100mph line speed).

Estimated vs. Actual Crossing Times 7.5.20 From the comparison between observed crossing times and users’ estimated crossing

times (from opening the first gate to closing the second gate) in Table 12, it is evident that users generally tend to overestimate the time it takes to cross. However, car and truck drivers tended to underestimate their crossing time.

7.5.21 Analysis shows that as well as overestimating the average waiting time at a crossing, potential red runners underestimate their crossing time. They are, therefore, underestimating the level of risk involved in traversing on red.

10 Health and Safety Executive (1996) Railway Safety Principles and Guidance on Level Crossings 11 Standard deviation 75.4 seconds 12 Standard deviation 57 seconds

21st June 2004

Page 39


Table 12: Users’ Estimation of Crossing Time vs. Actual Crossing Time

User Type Percentage

of Observed

Users

Actual Crossing

Time Range

(seconds)

Average Crossing

Time (seconds)

Average Estimated Crossing

Time (seconds)

Average Estimated Warning Duration

(seconds)

Minimum Warning

Time (seconds)

Pedestrians 33.4% 5 – 60 15.8 20.6 83.1 40 Cyclists 7.8% 4 – 45 13.9 16.9 65.7 40 Horse Riders 0.6% 22 – 40 33.7 n/a n/a 40

Car Drivers13 38.9% 214 – 20015 76 62.4 82.6 40 Motorcyclists 0.6% 10 – 30 18.8 n/a n/a 40 Truck Drivers 6% 5 – 195 65.1 61.3 85.7 40

Tractor Drivers 3.1% 10 – 21016 106.5 120 120 40

Other17 3.3 8 - 135 60.5 69.5 116 40 Not recorded 6.4% n/a n/a n/a n/a 40

Overall 93.6% 2 - 210 44.6 n/a 82.5 40

7.5.22 Overall, more than half of observed users (58.8%) completed their crossing within the minimum warning time provided at MWL crossings. However, up to 80% of vehicular users (cars, trucks and tractors) took longer than the warning time provided. Clearly, because times observed were for a complete crossing (from opening the first gate to closing the second gate), users spend some of this time in a position of safety, e.g., when opening and closing gates. They would therefore have the opportunity to interrupt their crossing safely should the warning devices activate.

7.5.23 The use of walking aids or luggage did not adversely affect the pedestrian users’ crossing time (these users took an average of 13.1 seconds to cross, and 100% crossed within 20 seconds). However, encumbrances such as prams and buggies increased the crossing time slightly to an average of 16.1 seconds. Nevertheless, only one user (with a pram) took over 20 seconds to cross (they took 40 seconds). This illustrates that the majority of pedestrian users with walking aids, luggage and prams can cross safely within the 20 seconds warning time provided at footpath crossings.

7.5.24 Cyclists demonstrated the quickest average crossing time of 13.9 seconds. 17.9% of all cyclists did not dismount while using the crossing. The crossing times recorded showed that mounted cyclists take, on average, 4.6 seconds less to cross than those who dismount, but because of the dangers of falling off (level crossings are often far from level, and rails are slippery and can trap wheels), this is often in contravention of crossing instructions.

Awareness of Accidents or Near Misses 7.5.25 Of those users questioned, those who had experienced, or were aware of, a near miss or

an accident, were more likely to perceive the crossing to be Dangerous or Very Dangerous than those who had not (21.7% compared with 6.9%). Surprisingly, however, only a third of users said that the accident or near miss had affected their crossing behaviour.

13 Includes cars, vans and 4x4s, excludes those with trailers. 14 A car that traversed without stopping at a crossing where a previous user had left gates open. 15 A car driver that opened the first gate, waited for a train to pass before completing crossing. 16 A tractor crossing in conjunction with another tractor and a van. 17 Includes cars or vans towing trailers/animal boxes, a JCB digger and a forklift truck.

21st June 2004

Page 40


Perceived Train Speed 7.5.26 The majority of users (80%) underestimated train speed18. However, user estimates of

train speed do not seem to affect their perception of crossing safety. It was hypothesised that the higher the estimated train speed, the more dangerous users would perceive a level crossing to be. The data revealed that the majority of the users (59%) perceived the crossing to be safe regardless of the estimated train speed.

Perceived Frequency of Trains 7.5.27 There is some evidence that perceived frequency of trains is associated with increased

safety consciousness in users’ observed behaviour. Almost twice as many users were observed to be very safety conscious at crossings where the perceived train frequency was equal to or greater than five per hour (see Figure 22).

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Perc

enta

ge o

f use

rs

Very S

afety

Consc

ious

Safety

Consc

ious

OKRisk

y

Very R

isky

Unreco

rded

Observed Behaviour

Users with the belief 5 ormore trains pass throughthe crossing each hour

Users with the belief 4 orless trains pass throughthe crossing each hour

Figure 22: How Perceived Train Frequency Affects Safety Consciousness

18 It is acknowledged that train speed and permissible line speed is not necessarily the same thing. Trains may not be travelling at line speed through the crossing, which may have had an impact on the accuracy of estimates.

21st June 2004

Page 41


8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Summary of Findings

Conspicuity 8.1.1 Few problems were identified with the conspicuity of miniature warning lights at the

crossings visited. MWLs were found to be positioned well within the functional field of view of most users. Nevertheless, the current size of the lights was found to be adequate only up to a distance of 15m. For crossings where lights are positioned on the far side and where the distance between gates is greater than 15m, larger lights would be required to ensure that they could be read reliably by all users.

8.1.2 None of the users questioned reported any difficulty in seeing the lights at the crossing they were using. However, support for increasing the size of the MWL (especially the red MWL) came from some users who were questioned, who felt that this might make the lights more noticeable to first time users. Stream C of this study is looking into the acceptability of such enlarged warning lights (see HEL/RSSB/03921a/RT3, Human Engineering, 2004 for details).

8.1.3 Users expressed a preference for lights positioned on the approach side of the crossing, although a number suggested that provision of lights on both sides (i.e., back to back lights) would be beneficial. Since back to back lights are not currently installed at any crossings in the UK, further investigation into where their use may be advantageous is recommended.

8.1.4 The readability of text on instructional signs was judged to be adequate for the majority of users. However, it was found that users with visual impairments, particularly colour vision impairments, may have difficulty in discerning which light is displayed if MWLs are positioned on the far side of the crossing. Provision of approach side, or back to back lights would aid these users, since the explanatory text next to the lights could be more easily read if positioned on the approach side of the crossing. Alternatively, consideration should be given to enlarging the text on MWL signs positioned on the far side of crossings.

8.1.5 It is also important that road markings, especially the ‘STOP’ line, are conspicuous to crossing users. Evidence from investigations into incidents at MWL crossings indicates that the markings are of benefit to users in vehicles to indicate the proximity of the crossing and a safe place to stop before opening the gates. They may also be used as an additional cue to the location of the tracks when manoeuvring the vehicle.

8.1.6 Maintenance of foliage and the careful positioning of signs are necessary, both to prevent obscuration of the MWLs and to reduce the amount of environmental clutter to optimise conspicuity.

Summary of recommendations • Consider the use of enlarged warning lights (larger red lights, specifically), and

enlarged text on signs, at crossings where MWLs are positioned on the far side, and where the distance between gates is greater than 15m.

• Investigate circumstances under which the installation of back to back lights may be of benefit.

• Ensure that road markings and ‘STOP’ lines are clearly visible. • Ensure that foliage and clutter are kept to a minimum around the MWLs.

Understanding 8.1.7 The vast majority of all users understood the red warning light and an audible alarm to

mean stop, train approaching or danger. Coupled with the fact that over 80% of users were observed to follow the correct crossing procedure, it can be concluded that, on the whole, understanding of miniature warning lights and accompanying audible alarms is good.

21st June 2004

Page 42


8.1.8 Because difficulties had been encountered with users assuming that it was safe to cross after one train had passed through the crossing, there was a change to HMRI requirements and British Rail introduced a second alarm tone to signify the approach of further trains. However, evidence from Stream C of this study, Investigation into User Acceptance of a Novel Warning Device (HEL/RSSB/03921a/RT3), identified that user understanding of this change in alarm tone is very poor. The ambiguity surrounding a change in alarm tone indicates that this is a deficient design. It may, instead, be better to have just one tone for a hazardous situation. Further research into user understanding of alarm tones is therefore recommended.

8.1.9 Generally, unfamiliar and first time users are likely to be more cautious crossing users than familiar users as people are more observant of external information in novel situations. They are more likely to read the instructions presented and follow them. The clarity of instructions is, therefore, critical for these users. Unclear or ambiguous instructions could potentially result in misinterpretation and unsafe use of the UWCs.

8.1.10 Crossing instructions should clearly and simply state that it is NEVER safe to cross when the red light is showing, or while an alarm is sounding. The message that should be conveyed to users is that it is only safe to cross when the alarm has ceased and a green light shows, or in the absence of any signal, at crossings with telephones, only when instructed to do so by the signaller. At crossings without telephones, users are told to “beware” of trains when crossing (see 7.4.14), but further explanation of what is required to accomplish this may be required.

8.1.11 Potential sources of ambiguity in crossing instructions were identified during the site visits that could lead to unintentional crossing misuse. Although instructions were found to be largely straightforward, and written in the “active” voice, some inconsistencies were identified between signs instructing users of long, slow and low vehicles to contact the signaller. There may, therefore, be a need to formalise the message on these signs in order to increase consistency of presentation both within and between crossings to reduce any potential for confusion. A clear definition of the types of users required to contact the signallers should also be clearly communicated to avoid confusion as to what constitutes a long, slow and low vehicle.

8.1.12 Because evidence suggests that users remember very few of the signs present at crossings, the installation of extra signs as risk mitigation may be ineffective. Instead, local education campaigns to address the importance of correct crossing procedures should be considered.

Summary of recommendations • A wider study into users’ understanding of audible alarms at UWCs with MWLs

compared with other types of crossings and road related audible alarms. • Ensure that crossing instructions are clear, straightforward and consistent. • Signs addressing drivers of long, slow and low vehicles should be more clearly

worded to avoid confusion. • Consider the use of local education campaigns to address crossing safety, rather

than the installation of extra crossing signs.

Violations 8.1.13 Although most users adhered to the correct crossing procedure, crossing misuse by 91

users (12.7% of the sample) was observed.

8.1.14 Gate abuse was the most common type of misuse observed. It is important that this issue is addressed, since evidence from accident investigations indicates that, while this does not increase the perpetrator’s crossing risk, it does export risk to subsequent users. Unfamiliar users especially may assume it is safe to traverse if the gates have been left open. These users may have past experience with other crossing types such as AHBs where this is the case.

21st June 2004

Page 43


8.1.15 The requirement to open and close the gates four times in order to cross in a vehicle is understandably inconvenient. Short journeys or adverse weather conditions can discourage users further from following the correct procedure. Elderly and infirm users, too, may find it cumbersome and difficult to comply. Maintenance of the gates/barriers to make them easy to open and close is, therefore, very important. The provision of gatekeepers at particularly busy crossings (or times of year) could be advantageous where gate abuse is persistent and problematic. However, it is recognised that this has practical, legal and financial implications for Network Rail, and other, better, technological solutions may now be available.

8.1.16 Several suggestions were made by users to upgrade the gates to automatic barriers to eliminate the requirement to open and close them. Since the number of users is comparatively low when compared with AHBs, this is not always a suitable, cost effective, option for UWCs with MWLs. Alternative, cheaper solutions should be sought, e.g., gates that open simultaneously and shut simultaneously.19

8.1.17 Twelve incidents of red running were observed, half of which were at crossings with an audible alarm. This suggests that they were deliberate acts, rather than errors caused by a failure to see, read or understand the lights and crossing instructions. A further 18 respondents stated that they would consider crossing if the red light was showing; all of these users understood the correct meaning of the warning light. The most likely users to consider traversing when a red light is showing are males under 20 years, which is consistent with road traffic research.

8.1.18 Evidence suggests that reasons for red running pertain to users’ perception of risk at the crossing. Those that would consider crossing when the red light shows generally overestimate the length of time between the onset of the warning device(s) and arrival of the train, and underestimate the length of time it takes them to cross. Potential red-runners also typically overestimated sighting times. These users are, therefore, underestimating the level of risk that would be involved in traversing when the red light is showing. Research has also shown that if crossing users are aware of poor sight times, they will respond by traversing more rapidly with heightened vigilance (A.D. Little, 2001).

8.1.19 These findings suggest that human inability to judge speed and time accurately increases the chance of crossing violations. Additional factors, such as age-related risk taking behaviour, and complacency due to familiarity with the crossing, reinforce the likelihood of misuse. An engineering solution19, such as gates with a one-way locking mechanism, would provide protection for red runners. Such gates would prevent users from entering the crossing when the red light is displayed, but would allow users already on the crossing to open the gates at the other side. It is believed that such technology is available, and the feasibility of its installation may be worthy of further investigation. Enforcement of penalties19 for red running and gate abuse may also be an effective deterrent, aided by the use of traffic light cameras.

8.1.20 Interestingly, few users appeared to rely solely on the lights and would also look left and right for trains. Of those questioned, two thirds said they trust the lights to keep them safe, but a surprisingly large proportion do not, either because they believe that all mechanical devices are prone to failure, or because the lights have been broken before. This emphasises the importance of reliability in the warning device. Regardless of whether they trust the lights or not, nearly all users said that they would still look left and right when crossing; very few trust the lights implicitly.

8.1.21 Awareness of, or involvement in, accidents or near misses has a bearing on perception of risk; users who had knowledge or experience of an incident at the crossing were more likely than those who hadn’t to rate the crossing as dangerous or very dangerous. However, only a third of respondents said that this knowledge had an impact on their behaviour. A perceived high frequency of trains (more than 5 per hour), on the other hand,

19 It is planned that forthcoming RSSB projects will consider these issues.

21st June 2004

Page 44


was linked with an increased rating of “very safety conscious” in user behaviour. This is probably because accidents are considered rare occurrences, whereas frequent trains are an everyday hazard for crossing users.

Summary of Recommendations • Ensure proper maintenance of gates to make them easier to open and close. • Consider providing gatekeepers at crossings that have a high frequency of usage

and gate abuse. • Investigate the development of cost effective solutions to gate abuse, e.g., gates

that open and close simultaneously. • Consider the use of gates with a one-way locking mechanism to prevent users

from crossing on red. • Consider the provision of co-acting lifting barriers instead of gates at high usage

locations, giving clear instructions and highlighting the location of the pump lever/operation button20.

• A study into the effectiveness of a well-enforced (or camera-based) penalty system to reduce crossing misuse may be of benefit.

8.2 Identifying the Nature of Risk at MWL Crossings

8.2.1 Although some issues have been identified that might affect the conspicuity and understanding of MWLs and associated signs, evidence suggests that the primary source of risk at MWL crossings is deliberate crossing misuse. In order to reduce the number of crossing violations, it is necessary to address their underlying causes.

8.2.2 There are several reasons why violations occur that are likely to be relevant here. The first is expediency. Users who are in a hurry may decide to cross regardless of the warnings presented, particularly since waiting and sighting times are regularly overestimated. This is particularly true for those users who may use the crossing to access their place of work.

8.2.3 The second reason is custom and accepted practice. If a user routinely crosses on red, or sees other users doing so, they would be more likely to consider this acceptable behaviour in future. The third relates to a perceived lack of adverse consequences. If there is little or no threat of punishment for crossing misuse, it is likely to continue. The fourth, and probably the most important, factor in level crossing misuse is user perception of risk. If users traverse the crossing frequently with few problems, they are likely to consider crossing risk to be low. Perception of risk may also be flawed if users overestimate the warning time available and/or underestimate the time it takes to cross.

8.2.4 To address expediency, custom and practice, and perceived lack of adverse consequences; spot checks at crossings are recommended to challenge any case of misuse. This should be supported by the implementation of an effective deterrent to future violations. The penalty system of fines at other user worked crossings around the country does not seem to be generally effective in discouraging crossing violations, but that is not to say that a well enforced penalty could not be an effective risk control. Several users suggested the use of CCTV cameras to help with detection of repeat offenders but, again, it is important that this is monitored regularly and misuse penalised (and publicised) if it is to be an effective deterrent.21

8.2.5 Adjusting users’ perception of risk at the crossing is more difficult, as even an awareness of accidents and near misses at crossings does not seem to have a significant impact on user behaviour. Risk homeostasis theory explains why this may be so, and indicates that the only effective ways of adjusting user behaviour are to reward good behaviour and punish bad. Rewarding the vast majority of users who cross correctly is impractical, but a

20 The provision of co-acting barriers has other implications for user misunderstanding, and should therefore be subject to a rigorous risk assessment. 21 It is planned that forthcoming RSSB projects will consider this issue.

21st June 2004

Page 45


well-enforced penalty system, as discussed above, with significant penalties, may be effective. Engineering solutions that eliminate the need for five traverses and prevent users from accessing the track when the red light is showing are also likely to confer safety benefits.22

8.3 Summary of Recommendations

8.3.1 A summary of all recommendations, cross-referenced with the section from which they arose, can be found in Table 13 overleaf.

22 It is planned that forthcoming RSSB projects will consider these issues.

21st June 2004

Page 46


Table 13: Summary of Report Recommendations

Nature of Risk Recommendation Cross Reference Consider enlarged warning lights, and enlarged text on signs, at crossings where MWLs are positioned on the far side, and where the distance between gates is greater than 15m.

Paragraph 8.1.1

Investigate circumstances under which the installation of back to back lights may be of benefit. Paragraph 8.1.3

Ensure that road markings and ‘STOP’ lines are clearly visible. Paragraph 8.1.5

Conspicuity

Ensure that foliage and clutter are kept to a minimum around the MWLs. Paragraph 8.1.6

A wider study into users’ understanding of audible alarms at UWCs with MWLs compared with other types of crossings and road related audible alarms

Paragraph 8.1.8

Ensure that crossing instructions are clear, straightforward and consistent. Paragraph 8.1.9

Signs addressing drivers of long, slow and low vehicles should be more clearly worded to avoid confusion.

Paragraph 8.1.11 Understanding

Consider the use of local education campaigns to address crossing safety, rather than the installation of extra crossing signs.

Paragraph 8.1.12

Ensure proper maintenance of gates to make them easier to open and close. Paragraph 8.1.15

Investigate the development of cost effective solutions to gate abuse, e.g., gates that open simultaneously and close simultaneously.

Paragraph 8.1.16

Consider the provision of lifting barriers instead of gates at high usage locations, giving clear instructions and highlighting the location of the pump lever/operation button.

Paragraph 8.1.16

Consider the use of gates with a one-way locking mechanism to prevent users from crossing on red. Paragraph 8.1.19

A study into the effectiveness of a well-enforced (or camera-based) penalty system to reduce crossing misuse may be of benefit.

Paragraph 8.2.4

Violations

Consider providing gatekeepers at crossings that have a particularly high frequency of usage and persistent gate abuse, subject to practical, financial and legal constraints.

Paragraph 8.1.15

21st June 2004

Page 47


9. REFERENCES

1. A.D. Little, 2001. User Worked and Footpath Level Crossings: Risk Review. Report prepared

for Railway Safety.

2. Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1998. Population Trend - the aging UK population. Office of Health Economics.

3. British Rail Standard, BRS/SM90, Issue 1, October 1997. Level Crossing Warning Arrangements: Miniature Red/Green Lights and Associated Instruction Notices.

4. Edworthy, J. & Adams, A., 1996. Warning Design: A Research Perspective. Taylor & Francis.

5. ERM Risk, 2001. Moulinearn Level Crossing: Risk Assessment including Human Factors Analysis. Report prepared for Railtrack Scotland.

6. Groeger, J.A. & Chapman, P.R., 1991. Developing an Understanding of Danger: Contributions of Experience and Age. Behavioural Research in Road Safety 11: Proceedings of a seminar at Manchester University.

7. HSE, 1996. Railway Safety Principles and Guidance, Part 2, Section E, Guidance on level crossings. HSE Books.

8. Human Engineering Limited, 2004. User Behaviour at User Worked Crossings: Stream A – Determining When the Final Decision to Cross is Made. Report prepared for the Rail Safety and Standards Board. (HEL/RSSB/03921a/RT1)

9. Human Engineering Limited, 2004. User Behaviour at User Worked Crossings: Stream C – Investigation into User Acceptance of a Novel Warning Device. Report prepared for the Rail Safety and Standards Board. (HEL/RSSB/03921a/RT3)

10. Human Engineering Limited, 2002. An approach to Addressing Lineside Ergonomics for the Train Driver. Report prepared for Railtrack PLC. (HEL/RT/02690/RT1)

11. Human Engineering Limited, 2003. Human Factors Research Relating to Level Crossings – A Literature Review. Report prepared for Network Rail. (HEL/NR/02820)

12. Human Engineering Limited, 2003. Railway Signal Sighting – Scientific Evidence for Sighting Principles. Report prepared for Railway Safety. (HEL/RS/02793/RT1)

13. Human Engineering Limited, 2003. Human Factors Assessment of Fishbourne Miniature Warning Lights. Report prepared for Network Rail Southern Region. (HEL/NR/03952/RT1)

14. Kroemer, K. H. E. & Grandjean, E., 2000. Fitting the Task to the Human: A Textbook of Occupational Ergonomics. 5th Ed. Taylor and Francis

15. Malek, T.L. & Hummer, J.E. (1994) Driver Age and Highway Safety. Transport Research Record 1059. Michigan: Department of Transport.

16. McIntyre, D., 2002. Colour Blindness Cause and Effects. Dalton Publishing.

17. Mortensen, O.E., 1998. Basic Services for the Elderly Deafblind: Surveys and Statistics. www.deafblindinternational.org/

18. Mortimer, R.G., 1991. Visual Factors in Rail-Highway Grade Crossing Accidents. Visions. Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 35th Annual Meeting, San Francisco, California, September 2-6, 1991. The Human Factors Society, Santa Monica, California, Volume 1.

21st June 2004

Page 48


19. Network Rail, July 2002. Operations Manual Procedure C 5, Issue 01.

20. Network Rail, Midlands Region, 2002. Report of a Formal Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the collision between 2D02 the 07:40 Mansfield to Nottingham and a road vehicle at Warren House Miniature Warning Light level crossing on the 22nd Jaunary 2003.

21. Papastavrou, J.D. & Lehto, M.R., 1996, Improving the effectiveness of warnings by increasing the appropriateness of their information content: some hypotheses about human compliance. Safety Science 21. Elsevier.

22. Peacock, B. & Karwowski, W., 1993. Automotive Ergonomics. Taylor and Francis.

23. Pheasant, S., 1996. Bodyspace: Anthropometry, Ergonomics and the Design of Work. 2nd Ed. Taylor & Francis.

24. Railtrack Company Specification RT/E/S/10031 Issue 01, March 1997. Railtrack Line Specification: Miniature Stop Light Unit.

25. Railtrack Company Specification RT/LS/S/012 Issue 03, June 2002. Inspection and Risk Assessment forms for user-worked, Footpath and Bridleway level crossings.

26. Railtrack Midlands, 1999. Collision between 2J06 09.40 Lincoln Central to Aberystwyth and a car on Llanbrynmair Occupation Crossing on the 19th October 1999.

27. Railtrack North West, 2001. Investigation into the Circumstances surrounding the Collision which occurred between 2F73, 1326 Rochdale to Southport and a road vehicle at Shaws MWL (G) Public level crossing on Thursday, 14th June 2001.

28. Railtrack Southern, 2001. A Formal Investigation Report: Forge Farm: Car struck by Passenger Train: 19 April 2001.

29. Railtrack Southern, 2002. A Formal Investigation Report: Tisbury Quarry LC: Lorry struck by Train: 2 July 2001.

30. Railway Group Standard GO/OT0003, Issue 01, October 2003. Protection at Occupation and Accommodation Level Crossings.

31. Railway Group Standard GO/OT0011, Issue 01, October 2003. Protection at Footpath and Bridleway Level Crossings.

32. Retting, R.A., & Williams, A., 1996. Characteristics of Red Light Violators: Results of a Field Investigation. Journal of Safety Research, Vol. 27, No. 1. Pregamon.

33. Rolls, G.W.P., Hall, R.D., Ingham, R. & McDonald, M. (1991) Accident risk and behavioural patterns of young drivers. AA Foundation for Road Safety research.

34. Russell, E.R, 1996. An Innovative Train-Illuminated Passive Warning Sign For Highway-Railroad Grade Crossings. Paper from the 1996 Semi Sesquicentennial Transportation Conference.

35. Stanton, N., 1994. Human Factors in Alarm Design. Taylor & Francis.

36. Summala H. & Mikkola T. (1994) Fatal accidents among car and truck drivers: effects of fatigue, age and alcohol consumption, Human Factors, 36(2), 315-326.

37. Tenkink, E. & Walraven, J., 1988. Conspicuity of Flashing Warning Lights at Dutch Open-Level Railroad Crossings. Vision in Vehicles – II, Edited by A.G. Gale, M.H. Freeman, C.M. Haslegrave, P. Smith and S.P. Taylor North-Holland, Amsterdam.

21st June 2004

Page 49


38. Thompson, M. & O’Reilly, D., 1993. The Young Driver Project. Crowthorne, Berkshire: Transport Research Laboratory.

39. Weddle, L., 2003. Examining the elderly population – Strategies for the Optometrist.

40. Wilde, G.J.S., 1994. Target Risk. PDE Publications, Canada.

21st June 2004

APPENDIX A Page 50


APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF MWL CROSSING INCIDENTS

21st June 2004

APPENDIX A Page 51


Moulinearn Level Crossing: Risk Assessment Including Human Factors Analysis (ERM, 2001) Moulinearn crossing is a user worked crossing with miniature warning lights and gates activated by push button controls. Additional push button controls were placed in lockfast boxes at either side of the carriageway so that elderly disabled users living in the hamlet served by the level crossing would be able to operate the crossing from their cars, provided they had a key. However, these boxes were unlocked following representations from a local councillor to Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate (HMRI) in 1997. This has led to the majority of users at the crossing using the push button controls in the boxes at the side of the carriageway, provided for disabled users, rather than getting out of the vehicle. Residents observed that cars often cross in convoy and, consequently, individual users often leave the barriers in a raised position. New users might therefore believe it is safe to cross if the barrier is raised, particularly if they are familiar with the operation of automatic crossings. Miniature warning lights are provided at Moulinearn, but their readability on leaving the hamlet can be significantly impaired by the sun shining directly on to them, making it hard to distinguish whether a green or red light is displayed. Furthermore, there was some concern that both regular and unfamiliar users of the crossing may not fully understand the meaning of the warning lights or the associated auditory alarm (which some residents pointed out could be misunderstood as an indication that it is safe to proceed, much like the alarms at pedestrian crossings on roads). Regular users of Moulinearn crossing made a number of recommendations as to how to improve safety. The suggestions included:

• Interlocking the barrier with the MWL so that the barrier could not be in the raised position when a red light was displayed.

• Providing a switch in the signalbox for the signaller to lower the barriers if they were left raised and/or CCTV monitoring of the crossing.

• Making the STOP sign more visible by positioning it on the stop line. • Improving the visibility of the miniature warning lights by making them larger (the

size of traffic lights) and flashing instead of static. • Increasing the volume of the audible alarm and perhaps changing it to a spoken

message, e.g., “train approaching”. • Locking the disabled users’ barrier controls and providing Personal Identification

Numbers (PINs) to residents so non-disabled users are forced to get out of their vehicles to use the correct barrier controls.

A cost benefit analysis showed that restricting the use of the disabled controls was shown to have the greatest benefit to cost ratio, followed very closely by the provision of larger warning lights. Of all the recommendations made in the study, only the provision of a full barrier interlock would reduce the risk to familiar users to ALARP. Formal Investigation into an Accident at Llanbrynmair Occupation Crossing At 14:35 hours on Friday 29th October 1999, a passenger train was approaching Llanbrynmair level crossing in the down direction at 60 mph. The driver sounded the horn at 200 yards from the crossing and observed that the crossing was clear. As the front cab of the unit passed over the crossing it struck a car and came to a stop 300 yards beyond the crossing. The passenger in the car died at the scene of the accident. The car driver suffered relatively minor injuries. Five train passengers and the train driver suffered minor cuts and bruising. The weather was bright and the road condition good. There was no mention, however, of whether the lighting conditions contributed to the accident. The car driver claimed that he was not aware of the crossing signs or warning lights and that the gates were left open. The road signs and MWLs on the approaches to the crossing were found to be in order and clearly visible. However, a national speed limit sign was placed between the initial crossing warning sign and the crossing. It was thought possible that these signs could cause confusion to drivers who are not

21st June 2004

APPENDIX A Page 52


familiar with the location. In addition, the gates are routinely left open at this level crossing, which is a general problem on the Cambrian lines where crossings serve more than one or two houses or farms. A question was raised regarding the suitability of this type of crossing protection at such a highly utilised level crossing. The crossing could be used by up to 50 road vehicles per day with further growth in crossing use predicted. Such high usage by the public, rather than users authorised by Network Rail, raised the concern that the layout of this type of crossing is not included in the Highway Code. The report concluded that the lack of familiarity of the car driver with the road and type of level crossing, coupled with the gates being left open when the user approached the crossing, were the underlying causes of this accident. These conditions led to a failure on the part of the car driver to observe the level crossing warning signs and bring the vehicle to a stop before the level crossing stop line. A number of recommendations were made including:

• Redesign of the crossing equipment to eliminate the requirement for users to open and shut gates or barriers before and after use

• Provision of a positive indication to drivers of approaching trains that the crossing is ‘closed’ to road traffic

• Provision of warning lights for road users, which are similar to those used at AHB crossings

• Possible inclusion of a picture of Red/Green warning light crossing equipment in the Highway Code

• Possible removal of the speed limit sign on the down side of the crossing. Formal Investigation into an Accident at Forge Farm Level Crossing At approximately 11:28 hours on Thursday 19th April 2001, the driver of a passenger train was passing the Whistle Board on the approach to Forge Farm Crossing when he noticed that the right hand barrier of the crossing was in the raised position. When the whole crossing came into view, he realised that the bonnet of a red vehicle was edging onto the tracks. The train driver applied the brake but was unable to stop before striking the vehicle. The train was brought to a stand approx 300 yards beyond the crossing. The elderly female driver of the vehicle involved was seriously injured and taken to hospital. There was no mention of the weather conditions at the time of the incident. Given that an interview with the road user was not available, it is unclear whether the barriers were left in the raised position by the previous user or whether the motorist involved in the accident raised the barriers. However, a review of previous records of incidents and misuse at this level crossing shows that, on 48 occasions, motorists left the barriers in the raised position and there have been 6 near misses with either road vehicles or trespassers. Such common misuse of the crossing led to the train driver’s inaction when he observed that the barriers of the crossing were raised; as the driver stated, this was not an unusual occurrence. The emergency brake was applied when the bonnet of a red car was seen over the crossing. It was concluded that, with barriers in the raised position, the motorist proceeded over the crossing having failed to obey the red warning light displayed. The position of the Red/Green warning lights was reviewed together with that of the sun hood fitted over the lights. It was noted that the downside lights were not sufficiently visible to a motorist who may stop close to the barriers. A recommendation was made to re-align the crossing lights to ensure that users can view them clearly. A review of whether the sighting at the crossing could be increased by the removal of foliage was also recommended. Formal Investigation into an Accident at Shaws Level Crossing At approximately 14:55 hours on Thursday 14th June 2001, a passenger train travelling on the down main line collided with a road motor vehicle that was foul of the line at Shaws level crossing. The train driver was approaching Shaws level crossing at 50 mph when he saw the bonnet of a motor vehicle

21st June 2004

APPENDIX A Page 53


encroach onto the crossing and immediately deployed the emergency brake. The motor vehicle sustained extensive damage. There was minor damage to the train, which did not derail and came to a stand approximately 200 yards beyond the crossing. The road vehicle driver suffered cuts to his head and a fractured collarbone. A female member of the public who was standing at the crossing and witnessed the incident sustained fractures to the pelvis and left wrist. There were no injuries to the train driver or the passengers on board the train. At the time of the incident the sky was overcast but visibility was good. No statement was obtained from the car driver involved in the incident. However, it was believed that he was not a regular user and that this may have been the first occasion he had used Shaws level crossing. A high level of misuse had been recorded at this level crossing, which is situated on a public road, with the gates frequently being left open. It was believed that the previous user had left the gates open when the motor vehicle approached the crossing. The report concluded that the common practice of leaving crossing gates open leads to poor discipline at the crossing and that this was the underlying cause of this accident. The inexperienced user was alleged to have approached the open gates and, assuming that this indicated the crossing was safe, failed to observe the instructions and lights displayed before proceeding. Due to the frequency with which gates are left open at Shaws crossing, the report recommended that a review of the size of the MWLs should be carried out to ascertain whether they are sufficiently visible to crossing users. Road markings were also to be monitored and renewed where applicable. Formal Investigation into an Accident at Tisbury Quarry Level Crossing At approximately 07:55 hours on Monday 2nd July 2001, a passenger train struck the trailer of an articulated lorry that was stopped on Tisbury Quarry crossing. The train sustained considerable damage. The lorry was split in two by the impact, with the trailer unit being thrown approximately 50 yards along the track. The light was displaying green when the lorry went over the crossing, however the driver was having difficulty in negotiating his lorry around the left hand bend of the crossing, during which time the light had turned red. The width of the crossing had been reduced by 4 inches when the original wooden gate had been replaced by a metal gate, making the egress more restricted. It was not clear in the report whether the lorry driver was aware of this problem. However, other articulated vehicle drivers who used the crossing had complained about this issue. The crossing signs instruct drivers of long or slow vehicles to contact the signaller before crossing. The lorry driver, contrary to this requirement, failed to stop and advise the signaller that he wanted to cross and, in negotiating the exit, stopped his lorry foul of the track. He admitted that he did not see the signs instructing him to call the signaller but commented that his vehicle was neither long nor slow as it could travel up to 70 mph on the open road. The report also commented that road markings had all but disappeared due to the deteriorating conditions of the road surface. It was concluded that the driver of the articulated lorry failed to observe the requirement that drivers of long, slow moving vehicles should make contact with the controlling signaller. Failure to contact the signaller meant that the crossing was not protected from the passage of trains. The panel were unable to identify any underlying cause beyond the above immediate cause, as it did not have access to any formal statements or evidence from BTP. A number of recommendations were made including:

• A review of the gates on the level crossing to ensure that the effective width of the level crossing is not less than the width of the crossing surface itself;

• Additional signage should be placed on the crossing gates instructing lorry drivers to contact the signaller to obtain permission before crossing;

• A review of the road beyond the crossing on the down side to explore whether it is possible to improve access to and egress from the level crossing;

• Trees and undergrowth to be cut back to improve the sighting distance of the level crossing.

21st June 2004

APPENDIX A Page 54


Formal Investigation into an Accident at Warren House Level Crossing At approximately 08:00 hrs on Wednesday 22nd January 2003, a passenger train collided with a dustbin lorry, which was reversing partway onto Warren House crossing. The train came to a stand 300-400 yards beyond the crossing. There were no significant injuries to passengers or staff and only moderate damage to the train and lorry. However, the accident could have had more serious consequences if the train had derailed as the crossing is close to a pumping station. No visibility problems were alleged to have contributed to the incident. The dustbin lorry approached Warren House crossing on the down side and, upon seeing that the light was green, crossed over onto Warren House Farm side of the crossing for refuse collection. In order to complete refuse collection work, the driver had to manoeuvre the lorry into position. Due to the limited space available at the farm for the manoeuvre of large vehicles, the dustbin lorry driver reversed back on to the crossing. Due to a faulty catch, the gate on the upside was held open by one of the vehicle occupants. The positions of the crossing users were such that both would have been unable to see that the warning light had subsequently changed to red. The lorry driver admitted to the BTP that he did not check the lights before reversing back on to the crossing. The driver of the train approaching the crossing, at a speed of 55mph on a right hand curve, saw the tail end of the lorry overhanging the line, made an emergency brake application and sounded the horn. Road ‘STOP’ markings are present on the approach to this crossing but these were indistinct on the day of the incident because of mud on the ground. It was also noted that the wording on each crossing sign is slightly different. The sign on the down side of the crossing reads, “Drivers of large or slow vehicles phone before crossing”, whereas the sign on the up side of the crossing reads “Drivers of long low vehicles phone before crossing”. This discrepancy was thought to increase the ambiguity of the instructions. The investigation panel concluded that the lorry driver did not respond appropriately when the warning lights changed to red due to difficulties in manoeuvring the lorry in a limited space. This could, however, have been avoided if the driver and crew of the dustbin lorry were more aware of the situation and had appointed a ‘banksman’: an assistant to help guide the vehicle and to provide an extra pair of eyes and ears where a high risk may be present, to assist the driver during the reversing manoeuvre. A number of recommendations were made including:

• Improving the turning area on the upside of the crossing by moving existing fences so that turning can be carried out without vehicles falling foul of the railway line.

• Cutting back lineside vegetation on the approach to the crossing so that the crossing can be seen from 400 yards away, giving better sighting time for both crossing users and train drivers, to minimise the consequences of a collision.

• Ensuring that all signs are standardised and compliant with the current standards. • Ensuring that the ‘STOP’ markings are durable, resistant to ground contamination

and checked and cleaned at regular intervals. • Network Rail to re-assess Warren House crossing, obtaining more precise

information on the frequency of use, range of users and types of vehicles that use the crossing, and user behaviour. This information will ascertain whether additional equipment is needed to reduce the risks present at the crossing further and determine whether educational campaigns or additional user information are needed to target specific groups of users.

21st June 2004

APPENDIX B Page 55


APPENDIX B TASK ANALYSIS AND HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS

21st June 2004

APPENDIX B Page 56


PEDESTRIAN TA AND HEA FOR UWCS WITH MWLS

No. Task Subtask Human Error Influencing factors - behavioural

Influencing factors - physical/environmental Consequences

1 Cross UWC with MWL safely

1.1 Approach crossing

1.2 Read instructions on sign.

Failure to read instructions.

Poor user vision. User cannot read English. Familiar user applies prior knowledge. User chooses to ignore instructions.

Sign may be unreadable, e.g., due to damage, obstruction, etc. Instructions missing. Poor weather conditions.

User may not follow correct crossing procedure.

Misinterpretation of instructions.

User does not understand instructions fully, e.g., English isn't their first language, poor literacy. Poor user vision.

Parts of sign may be unreadable, e.g., due to damage, obstruction, etc. Some instructions may be missing.


1.3 Respond correctly to instructions

Failure to respond correctly to instruction.

Familiar user applies prior knowledge. User chooses to ignore instructions. User distracted, e.g., by other people. User does not understand instructions fully, e.g., English isn't their first language, poor literacy.

Lack of clear definition in crossing instructions.


1.4 Check MWL Failure to see MWL. Poor user vision. MWL obscured, e.g., by foliage. Poor maintenance. Poor MWL positioning.


21st June 2004

APPENDIX B Page 57




Failure to read MWL. User chooses to ignore MWL. Impaired user vision. User distracted, e.g., using mobile phone.

Obscured by foliage, dirt. Light / glare obscures aspect. Poor alignment.


Failure to understand MWL.

User misinterprets red to mean proceed with caution.



Red MWL scenario 1.5 Comply with red

MWL.

Failure to comply with red MWL.

User chooses to ignore red MWL, e.g., due to time pressure or low perception of risk. User misinterprets red MWL to mean proceed with caution.

Long sighting distance available.

User does not follow correct crossing procedure.

Listen for alarm (if present)

Failure to hear alarm. Poor user hearing. Environmental noise.Poor alarm maintenance.Poor alarm positioning.


Failure to understand alarm.

User misinterprets change in tone to mean proceed with caution.



Failure to understand change in tone of alarm if another train is coming.

User misinterprets change in tone to mean proceed with caution. User misinterprets alarm to mean go.



Green MWL scenario 1.6 Cross the track(s)

1.6.1

Open first gate. Failure to open gate. User is not physically strong enough to open/move the

Poor maintenance of gate, e.g., bolt rusty.

User unable to complete crossing.

21st June 2004

APPENDIX B Page 58




gate.

1.6.2

Close first gate. Failure to close gate. User chooses not to close gate. User does not understand instruction. User is forgetful. Other user following behind.

Lack of clear definition in crossing instructions. Poor weather conditions.

Subsequent user may fail to close gate.

Failure to secure gate properly.

User distracted, e.g., by other people /horse. User in a hurry. User not strong enough.

Poor maintenance of gate, e.g., bolt rusty. Poor weather conditions.

Gate may swing open.

1.6.3

Cross quickly. Failure to cross track(s) quickly.

User disability. User does not understand instruction. User distracted, e.g., by other people.

Lack of clear definition in crossing instructions. Uneven crossing surface.

User may not cross in warning time provided.

1.6.4

Open second gate. Failure to open gate. User is not physically strong enough to open/move the gate.


User unable to complete crossing.

1.6.5

Close second gate. Failure to close gate. User chooses not to close gate. User does not understand instruction. User is forgetful. Other user following behind.




User distracted, e.g., by other people. User in a hurry. User not strong enough.



1.7 Continue on way

21st June 2004

APPENDIX B Page 59


VEHICLE TA AND HEA FOR UWCS WITH MWLS



1 Safely cross UWC with MWL

1.1 See crossing warning signs

Failure to observe warning signs/warning signs observed too late.

User distracted by other traffic or other people within the car. Poor user vision.

Dark conditions. Poor maintenance of signs. Poor crossing design.

User may approach crossing at speed and be unable to stop in time.

1.2 Stop at the gate

1.2.1 See gate. Failure to observe gate/gate observed too late.

User distracted by other traffic or other people within the car. Poor user vision.

May be difficult to detect in the dark. Poor maintenance, e.g., gate obscured from view by foliage or missing. May have been left open by previous user.

User may collide with gate.

1.2.2 Stop car. Driver stops too late. User distracted, e.g., by other traffic or other people within the car. User misjudges speed.

Poor weather conditions. Poor road surface conditions. Poor brake maintenance.

Vehicle obstructs gate. User may collide with gate.

1.3 Read instructions on sign.

Failure to read instructions.

Poor user vision. User cannot read English. Familiar user applies prior knowledge. User chooses to ignore instructions.

Sign may be unreadable, e.g., due to damage, obstruction, etc. Instructions missing. Poor weather conditions.


Failure to realise instructions are appropriate to them.

User may not understand terms, e.g., 'long, slow and low vehicle'.



21st June 2004

APPENDIX B Page 60




Misinterpretation of instructions.

User does not understand instructions fully, e.g., English is not their first language, poor literacy. Poor user vision.

Parts of sign may be unreadable, e.g. , due to damage, obstruction, etc. Some instructions may be missing.


1.4 Respond to appropriate instructions

Failure to respond to appropriate instructions.

User does not understand terms, e.g., 'long, slow and low vehicle'.



Failure to respond correctly to appropriate instructions.

Familiar user applies prior knowledge.User chooses to ignore instructions.User distracted by other vehicles or other people within the car.User does not understand instructions fully, e.g., language, poor literacy.



If long, low, slow , heavy vehicle, or with livestock, phone signaller - see task analysis for telephone crossing 1.5 Check MWL Failure to see MWL. Poor user vision. MWL obscured, e.g., by foliage.

Poor maintenance. Poor MWL positioning.


Failure to read MWL. User chooses to ignore MWL. Poor user vision. Preconception overrides vision. User distracted, e.g., using mobile phone. User tailgating another user.







21st June 2004

APPENDIX B Page 61




Red MWL scenario 1.6 Comply with red

MWL Failure to comply with

red MWL. User chooses to ignore red MWL, e.g., due to time pressure or low perception of risk User misinterprets red MWL to mean proceed with caution.

Long sighting distance available.

User does not follow correct crossing procedure.

Listen for alarm (if present)

Failure to hear alarm. Poor user hearing. Environmental noise. Poor alarm maintenance. Poor alarm positioning.


Failure to understand alarm.

User misinterprets change in tone to mean proceed with caution.



Failure to understand change in tone of alarm (if another train is coming).

User misinterprets change in tone to mean proceed with caution. User misinterprets alarm to mean go.



Green MWL scenario 1.7 Cross track(s)

1.7.1 Open first gate. Failure to open gate. User is not physically strong enough to open/move the gate.


User cannot complete crossing.

Failure to open gate fully.

User in a hurry. User is not strong enough to move gate.

Poor maintenance of gate, e.g., hinge rusty. Obstruction.

User may not be able to drive vehicle through crossing.

21st June 2004

APPENDIX B Page 62




1.7.2 Secure open gate. Failure to secure open gate.

User in a hurry. User does not feel that securing the open gate is necessary/User chooses not to secure the gate open. User does not check gate is properly secured.


Gate may swing closed.

1.7.3 Cross quickly on foot. Failure to cross track(s) quickly.

User disability. User does not understand instruction. User distracted, e.g., by other people or dog.



1.7.4 Open second gate. Failure to open gate. User is not physically strong enough to open/move the gate.


User cannot complete crossing.

Failure to open gate fullly.

User in a hurry. User is not strong enough to move gate.

Poor maintenance of gate, e.g., hinge rusty. Obstruction.

User may not be able to drive vehicle through crossing.

1.7.5 Secure open gate. Failure to secure open gate.

User in a hurry. User does not feel that securing open the gate is necessary/User chooses not to secure open the gate. User does not check gate is properly secured.


Gate may swing closed.





1.7.7 Re-enter vehicle.

21st June 2004

APPENDIX B Page 63




1.7.8 Re-check MWL. Failure to see MWL. Poor user vision. MWL obscured, e.g., by foliage. Poor maintenance. Poor MWL positioning.


Failure to read MWL. User chooses to ignore MWL / User forgets to check again or feels that it is unnecessary. Impaired user vision. User distracted, e.g., using mobile phone.







1.7.9 Drive quickly across track(s).

Failure to drive across track(s) quickly.

User distracted, e.g., other people in the car. User does not understand instruction. Over cautious driver.

Problem with vehicle. Lack of clear definition in crossing instructions. Uneven crossing surface. Poor weather conditions.


1.8 Close Gates Failure to close gates.

User chooses not to close gate. User does not understand instruction. User is forgetful. Other user following behind.


Subsequent user may fail to close gates.

1.8.1 Stop and exit car. 1.8.2 Cross quickly on foot. Failure to cross

track(s) quickly. User disability. User does not understand instruction. User distracted, e.g., by other people.



1.8.3 Close first gate. Failure to close gate. User is not physically strong enough to close/move the



21st June 2004

APPENDIX B Page 64




gate.


User distracted, e.g., by other people or dog. User in a hurry. User not strong enough.







1.8.5 Close second gate. Failure to close gate. User is not physically strong enough to close/move the gate.




User distracted, e.g., by other people. User in a hurry. User not strong enough.



1.9 Continue on way 1.9.1 Re-enter vehicle. 1.9.2 Start ignition. 1.9.3 Drive on.

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 65


APPENDIX C FIELD RESEARCH TIMETABLE

SITE VISIT RECORDS

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 66


Table 14: An Overview of UWC with MWL Sites Visited

Day Date Time Region LC Name OS Grid Reference Area

Tuesday 14/10/2003 9:00 - 17:00 East Anglia Cranbourne TL382107 Hertford Wednesday 15/10/2003 9:00 - 17:00 East Anglia Cranbourne TL382107 Hertford Tuesday 16/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 East Anglia Girlings TG264083 Norwich Wednesday 17/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 East Anglia Girlings TG264083 Norwich Thursday 18/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 East Anglia Harts Drove TL274963 Whittlesey Monday 22/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 East Anglia Harts Drove TL274963 Whittlesey Wednesday 08/10/2003 9:00 - 17:00 East Anglia Routes No 8 TM216415 Ipswich Thursday 09/10/2003 9:00 - 17:00 East Anglia Routes No 8 TM216415 Ipswich Monday 06/10/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Great Western Broken Cross SO737166 Gloucester Tuesday 07/10/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Great Western Broken Cross SO737166 Gloucester Wednesday 01/10/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Great Western Gelynis ST130816 Radyr Thursday 02/10/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Great Western Gelynis ST130816 Radyr Wednesday 24/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Great Western Meads ST314351 Bridgwater Thursday 25/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Great Western Meads ST314351 Bridgwater Wednesday 17/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 LNE Creykes SE712190 Goole Thursday 18/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 LNE Creykes SE712190 Goole Thursday 02/10/2003 9:00 - 17:00 LNE Jackie Duffin Wood SE637244 Carlton Monday 22/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 LNE Philip Lane SE544316 Selby Tuesday 23/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 LNE Philip Lane SE544316 Selby Wednesday 24/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 LNE Scalm Lane SE557315 Selby Thursday 25/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 LNE Scalm Lane SE557315 Selby Monday 29/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Midlands Back Lane SK442285 Derby / Nottingham Tuesday 30/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Midlands Back Lane SK442285 Derby / Nottingham Wednesday 10/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Midlands Dovefields SK146311 Nr. Burton-on-Trent Thursday 11/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Midlands Dovefields SK146311 Nr. Burton-on-Trent Wednesday 17/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Midlands Hucknall No.4 SK545484 Nottingham Thursday 18/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Midlands Hucknall No.4 SK545484 Nottingham Monday 15/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Midlands Warren House SK514544 Nottingham

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 67


Day Date Time Region LC Name OS Grid Reference Area

Tuesday 16/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Midlands Warren House SK514544 Nottingham Monday 08/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 North West Barthomley SJ763540 Crewe Tuesday 09/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 North West Barthomley SJ763540 Crewe Monday 22/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 North West Llanddaniel SH501719 Anglesey Tuesday 23/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 North West Llanddaniel SH501719 Anglesey Friday 12/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Scotland Back Settlement NO708709 Laurencekirk Tuesday 16/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Scotland Back Settlement NO708709 Laurencekirk Friday 19/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Scotland Bodsberry NS968163 Carstairs Monday 22/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Scotland Bodsberry NS968163 Carstairs Tuesday 30/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Scotland Moulinearn NN969547 Pitlochry Wednesday 01/10/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Scotland Moulinearn NN969547 Pitlochry Monday 29/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Southern Chilham Mill TR076535 Chilham Tuesday 30/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Southern Chilham Mill TR076535 Chilham Wednesday 24/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Southern Farnborough North SU877566 Frimley Green Thursday 25/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Southern Farnborough North SU877566 Frimley Green Tuesday 23/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Southern Forge Farm TQ532352 Eridge Green Wednesday 24/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Southern Forge Farm TQ532352 Eridge Green Thursday 02/10/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Southern Minster TR310641 Minster Friday 03/10/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Southern Minster TR310641 Minster Thursday 18/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Southern Tisbury Quarry ST964296 Tisbury Friday 19/09/2003 9:00 - 17:00 Southern Tisbury Quarry ST964296 Tisbury

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 68


Crossing Name Backlane OS Grid Ref SK442285 Region Midlands HEL Ref MD 7

Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWLs Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 21.8 Width of Crossing, (yds): 6.5 Angle to Tracks, (º): 60 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up 1132 Up-Dn 770 Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up 1132 Dn-Dn 770 Line Speed, (mph): 50 Violations Observed: 9 Number of Users Observed: 23 Number of Users Questioned: 9 Frequent User Age Group: 20 - 35 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian 12 Cyclist 9.2 Car 56.3 Tractor 62 Other 22

Approach from the South side

Track View Left from the South side

Track View Right from the South side

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 69


Crossing Name Back Settlement OS Grid Ref NO708709

Region Scotland HEL Ref Sc 13

Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 12 Width of Crossing, (yds): 1.1 Angle to Tracks, (º): 90 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up 440 Up-Dn 460 Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up 440 Dn-Dn 460 Line Speed, (mph): 100 Violations Observed: 0 Number of Users Observed: 25 Number of Users Questioned: 18 Frequent User Age Group: 20 - 35 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian 12.9 Cyclist n/a Car n/a Tractor n/a Other n/a

Crossing Approach Track View Left Track View Right

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 70


Crossing Name Barthomley OS Grid Ref SJ763540

Region North West HEL Ref NW 12

Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 7 Width of Crossing, (yds): 4.4 Angle to Tracks, (º): 90 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up n/a Up-Dn n/a Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up n/a Dn-Dn n/a Line Speed, (mph): 50 Violations Observed: 0 Number of Users Observed: 14 Number of Users Questioned: 7 Frequent User Age Group: 35 - 50 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian - Cyclist - Car - Tractor n/a Other n/a

Approach from the North side

Track View Left from the North side

Track View Right from the North side

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 71


Crossing Name Bodsbury OS Grid Ref NS968163

Region Scotland HEL Ref Sc 8

Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): ~ 7.66 Width of Crossing, (yds): ~ 5.14 Angle to Tracks, (º): 90 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up 245 Up-Dn 190 Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up 234 Dn-Dn 469 Line Speed, (mph): 95 Violations Observed: 0 Number of Users Observed: 17 Number of Users Questioned: 4 Frequent User Age Group: 20 - 35 Average Crossing Time (secs): Pedestrian n/a Cyclist n/a Car 60 Tractor n/a Other 32.5

Crossing Approach Crossing Approach Train Approach

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 72


Crossing Name Broken Cross OS Grid Ref SO737166

Region Great Western HEL Ref GW 12

Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 10.7 Width of Crossing, (yds): 5.5 Angle to Tracks, (º): 90 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up n/a Up-Dn n/a Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up n/a Dn-Dn n/a Line Speed, (mph): n/a Violations Observed: 1 Number of Users Observed: 9 Number of Users Questioned: 2 Frequent User Age Group: 50 - 65 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian 10 Cyclist n/a Car 65 Tractor 48.3 Other 43.3



Track View Left

Track View Right

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 73


Crossing Name Chilham Mill OS Grid Ref TR076535

Region Southern HEL Ref Sth 7

Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 10.9 Width of Crossing, (yds): 4.1 Angle to Tracks, (º): 45 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up n/a Up-Dn n/a Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up n/a Dn-Dn n/a Line Speed, (mph): n/a Violations Observed: 8 Number of Users Observed: 69 Number of Users Questioned: 34 Frequent User Age Group: 20 - 35 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian 26.4 Cyclist n/a Car 126.7 Tractor n/a Other 135

Approach from the NW side

Track View Left from the NW side

Track View Right from the NW side

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 74


Crossing Name Cranbourne OS Grid Ref TL382107

Region East Anglia HEL Ref EA 7

Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 11.8 Width of Crossing, (yds): 3.9 Angle to Tracks, (º): 80 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up 60 Up-Dn 40 Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up 150 Dn-Dn 250 Line Speed, (mph): 60 Violations Observed: 0 Number of Users Observed: 11 Number of Users Questioned: 8 Frequent User Age Group: 35 - 50 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian 11.8 Cyclist n/a Car 72.5 Tractor n/a Other 11


21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 75


Crossing Name Creykes OS Grid Ref SE712190

Region London North East HEL Ref LNE 7

Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWLs Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 10.5 Width of Crossing, (yds): 4.9 Angle to Tracks, (º): 80 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up n/a Up-Dn n/a Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up n/a Dn-Dn n/a Line Speed, (mph): 70 Violations Observed: 14 Number of Users Observed: 47 Number of Users Questioned: 7 Frequent User Age Group: 20 - 35 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian - Cyclist n/a Car - Tractor - Other -


21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 76


Crossing Name Dovefields OS Grid Ref SK146311

Region Midlands HEL Ref MD 8

Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 21.8 Width of Crossing, (yds): 4.4 Angle to Tracks, (º): 60 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up 700 Up-Dn 1000 Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up 700 Dn-Dn 1000 Line Speed, (mph): 70 Violations Observed: 0 Number of Users Observed: 1 Number of Users Questioned: 0 Frequent User Age Group: 20 - 35 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian n/a Cyclist n/a Car - Tractor n/a Other n/a

Approach from the West side

Track View Left from the West side

Track View Right from the West side

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 77


Crossing Name Farnborough North OS Grid Ref SU877566


Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 10.9 Width of Crossing, (yds): 4.4 Angle to Tracks, (º): 45 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up n/a Up-Dn n/a Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up n/a Dn-Dn n/a Line Speed, (mph): n/a Violations Observed: 16 Number of Users Observed: 87 Number of Users Questioned: 33 Frequent User Age Group: <20 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian 13.4 Cyclist 9.5 Car 180 Tractor n/a Other 8



Track View Left from the North side

Track View Right from the North side

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 78


Crossing Name Forge Farm OS Grid Ref TQ532352


Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 13.6 Width of Crossing, (yds): 4.4 Angle to Tracks, (º): 90 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up n/a Up-Dn n/a Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up n/a Dn-Dn n/a Line Speed, (mph): n/a Violations Observed: 1 Number of Users Observed: 26 Number of Users Questioned: 14 Frequent User Age Group: 35 - 50 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian 17 Cyclist n/a Car 48.8 Tractor n/a Other 15

Approach from the NE side

Track View Left from the SW side

Track View Right from the SW side

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 79


Crossing Name Gelynis OS Grid Ref ST130816

Region Great Western HEL Ref GW13

Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 12.3 Width of Crossing, (yds): 4.4 Angle to Tracks, (º): 90 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up 350 Up-Dn 350 Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up 250 Dn-Dn 350 Line Speed, (mph): 65 Violations Observed: 1 Number of Users Observed: 33 Number of Users Questioned: 18 Frequent User Age Group: <20 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian 14.2 Cyclist 11.4 Car 47.1 Tractor n/a Other n/a

Approach from the East side


Track View Left

Track View Right

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 80


Crossing Name Girlings OS Grid Ref TG264083


Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 12 Width of Crossing, (yds): 3.9 Angle to Tracks, (º): 90 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up n/a Up- Dn n/a Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up n/a Dn-Dn n/a Line Speed, (mph): 60 Violations Observed: 2 Number of Users Observed: 37 Number of Users Questioned: 15 Frequent User Age Group: 50 - 65 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian - Cyclist - Car - Tractor n/a Other -


21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 81


Crossing Name Harts Drove OS Grid Ref TL274963


Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 13.4 Width of Crossing, (yds): 3.9 Angle to Tracks, (º): 90 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up n/a Up-Dn n/a Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up n/a Dn-Dn n/a Line Speed, (mph): 75 Violations Observed: 3 Number of Users Observed: 43 Number of Users Questioned: 11 Frequent User Age Group: 35 - 50 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian - Cyclist n/a Car 65 Tractor n/a Other 67


21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 82


Crossing Name Hucknall No. 4 OS Grid Ref SK545484

Region Midlands HEL Ref MD 12

Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 14.2 Width of Crossing, (yds): 5.5 Angle to Tracks, (º): 70 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up n/a Up-Dn n/a Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up n/a Dn-Dn n/a Line Speed, (mph): n/a Violations Observed: 4 Number of Users Observed: 11 Number of Users Questioned: 4 Frequent User Age Group: 35 - 50 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian 25.4 Cyclist 10 Car 29 Tractor n/a Other n/a

Approach from the East side



21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 83


Crossing Name Jacky Duffin Wood OS Grid Ref SE637244

Region London North East HEL Ref LNE 8

Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 10.9 Width of Crossing, (yds): 4.8 Angle to Tracks, (º): 90 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up n/a Up-Dn n/a Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up n/a Dn-Dn n/a Line Speed, (mph) Up/Dn: 55/45 Violations Observed: 0 Number of Users Observed: 1 Number of Users Questioned: 0 Frequent User Age Group: 35 - 50 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian n/a Cyclist n/a Car 180 Tractor n/a Other n/a


21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 84


Crossing Name Llanddaniel OS Grid Ref SH501719

Region North West HEL Ref NW 13

Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): ~ 10.94 Width of Crossing, (yds): ~ 3.28 Angle to Tracks, (º): 90 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up n/a Up-Dn n/a Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up n/a Dn-Dn n/a Line Speed, (mph): 75 Violations Observed: 1 Number of Users Observed: 15 Number of Users Questioned: 4 Frequent User Age Group: 35 - 50 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian 14.7 Cyclist n/a Car 44.8 Tractor n/a Other 39.7

Approach from The North Side Approach from the South Side Track View Left from the South Side Track View Right from the South Side

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 85


Crossing Name Meads OS Grid Ref ST314351

Region Great Western HEL Ref GW 7

Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 8.7 Width of Crossing, (yds): 4.4 Angle to Tracks, (º): 90 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up 600 Up-Dn 2286 Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up 600 Dn-Dn 196 Line Speed, (mph): 100 Violations Observed: 2 Number of Users Observed: 20 Number of Users Questioned: 9 Frequent User Age Group: 20 - 65 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian 15.3 Cyclist n/a Car 43.3 Tractor 80 Other 55

Crossing Approach

MWL and Gates

UWC Surface

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 86


Crossing Name Minster OS Grid Ref TR310641


Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWL Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 11.2 Width of Crossing, (yds): 4.6 Angle to Tracks, (º): 90 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up n/a Up-Dn n/a Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up n/a Dn-Dn n/a Line Speed, (mph): n/a Violations Observed: 8 Number of Users Observed: 46 Number of Users Questioned: 23 Frequent User Age Group: 20 - 35 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian 19.7 Cyclist 22.5 Car 98.2 Tractor n/a Other 76.7


Track View Right from the South side

Track View Left from the South side

21st June 2004

APPENDIX C Page 87


Crossing Name Warren House OS Grid Ref SK514544 Region Midlands HEL Ref MD 13

Crossing Information Type of Crossing: UWC with MWLs Distance Across Tracks, (yds): 8.7 Width of Crossing, (yds): 5.5 Angle to Tracks, (º): 70 Sighting Distance, (side 1), (yds): Up-Up 200 Up-Dn 480 Sighting Distance, (side 2), (yds): Dn-Up 120 Dn-Dn 102 Line Speed, (mph): 70 Violations Observed: 7 Number of Users Observed: 20 Number of Users Questioned: 4 Frequent User Age Group: 20 - 35 Average Crossing Time, (secs): Pedestrian 11.25 Cyclist n/a Car 30.6 Tractor 20 Other n/a




21st June 2004

APPENDIX D Page 88


APPENDIX D DATA COLLECTION FORMS

21st June 2004

APPENDIX D Page 89


Crossing OS Ref HEL Ref No.

Type Region Date

Y / N

Y / N

Orientation of MWL

sec Y / N

cm cm

cm cm

Distance across tracks

Width of crossing

Est. Line speed

UWC Assessment Form

Angle of approach to tracks

Weather

Est. sighting dist - LeftSide 1 - N / S / E / W - Right

Est. sighting dist - LeftSide 2 - N / S / E / W - RightY / N

(Light / Med / Heavy)

Is Decision-point clearly marked

Is Decision-point lineside of gate

Est. usage

Is Decision-point in a POS 2m at > 100mph 1.25m at < 100mph 'on or near' at < 3m

Any potential sources of distraction (e.g. motorway or aircraft noise etc)

Are all aspects of the crossing in good working order (gates, signs etc damaged or obscured by foliage) - If not, then please describe condition

Approx orientation of line (e.g. north -south)

Miniature Warning Light (MWL) if present

angled up / angle down / towards road

- On approach side (facing away from tracks)

a. Distance from centre of road at stop line (Point 1) to location of barrier or gate of crossing (Point 2)

Length of warning period (from the time the red light shows to the time the train arrives)

- Far side facing across tracks)

Hood Shape & Dimensions

Position of MWL

Any other notes on crossing & general environment

Are waiting vehicles obstructing other traffic - If yes, please describe circumstances and estimate risk

b. Distance from centre of stop line (or position where gate is fully open) to the point on the stop line that is aligned with MWL.

c. Height of the MWL sign from ground level measure to the top of sign (cm)

d. Diagonal distance from centre of road at blocked line (or position where gate is fully open) to MWL post

Is there auditory alarm for the duration of the red light?

Description of backdrop to MWL (e.g. sky, trees etc)

Diagram 1: layout of measurements required

Point 1b

Point 2MWL c

Centre of the road at stop line or where vehicle drivers stop

ad

Direction of travel

21st June 2004

APPENDIX D Page 90


UWC OBSERVATIONAL SURVEY

Note for surveyors – Where possible, try to be discreet in your observation (i.e. do not make it obvious to the user that you are recording their behaviour)

User Description 1. Gender: Male Female 2. Age: < 20 20-35 35-50 50-65 65+ 3. Type: Driver: Car Tractor

Truck Motorcycle Other Pedestrian Horse Rider Cyclist Railway staff

3.1 Accompanying user: Adults 1 2 3 4+

Children 1 2 3 4+ Notes(e.g. carrying child, prams, walking stick, luggage)

Dogs No. Leash: On Off Livestock (describe type & approx number)

Crossing Procedure 4. How long did the user take to cross (Time from point 2m from near rail until 2m from far rail

(Total time for all crossings if vehicle user crossing multiple times to open/close gates))

5. On approach gate/barrier was … Open Closed (If closed continue to 6)

5.1 Did the user… Proceed with caution Continue straight over 5.2 Did the user close the gates after crossing Yes No

6. Did the user cross in accordance with the instructions Yes No 6.1 If no, describe crossing technique (e.g. didn’t look, ignored red light etc)

7. Could you determine the final crossing decision point Yes No

7.1 If no, was it because…. the user appeared to cross without looking the decision point could not be determined 7.2 If yes, please describe (If in vehicle – e.g. whilst opening gates, after opening gates,

in car before crossing. Or if on foot: - e.g. while passing through gates, before stepping onto tracks)

8. Would you describe the users general behaviour/ crossing procedure as: Very Safety Conscious Safety conscious OK Risky Very Risky

Date:Crossing Name

HEL Ref

Time:

User No.

21st June 2004

APPENDIX D Page 91


UWC User Questionnaire Note for researchers – It is very important to emphasise the anonymity of this questionnaire (i.e. we are not from BTP, or RSSB etc). State that we are interested in how they really use the crossing, not in how they think it should be used. We are not trying to catch people out, but rather are trying to improve the crossing for both the user and for Network Rail. 1. How often do you use this crossing Many times a day

Once or twice a day Once or twice a week Every few weeks Rarely 1st time

2. Why were you using the crossing

Access work Delivery Railway staff Other Access home Leisure Farm work

3. Would you describe this crossing as… Very Safe Safe

OK Dangerous Very Dangerous

4. Have you used any other types of level crossing a. If yes, please describe which type

b. If yes, which type of crossing do you feel is the most dangerous, and why

5. Have you experienced, or are you aware of, any near misses or accidents on this

crossing

a. If yes, how has this affected your behaviour / use of the crossing

Date:CrossingName

HEL Ref

Time:

User No.

21st June 2004

APPENDIX D Page 92


6. Please estimate the average speed of trains on these tracks <20mph 20 – 40mph 40 – 60mph 60 – 80mph 80 - 110mph 7. Please estimate how many trains pass this crossing per hour 1 or less

2 – 4 5 – 7 8 – 10 >10

8. If a train were visible in the distance, approximately how long would it take to reach the

crossing

a. If a train were visible, would you still cross

9. Can you describe the signs and warning devices associated with the crossing

Stop sign Stop, Look, Listen Telephone MWL Penalty notices Overhead wires MWL instructions Instructions for Close gate Others (list) large vehicles reminder

a. Can you describe the correct procedure for crossing

b. Do you think the instructions are reasonable (i.e. are they too long, too short,

confusing etc), and how could they be improved

10. Estimate how long you think it takes to cross the tracks?

11. From which point do you make your final decision to cross (describe the approx point on the

ground, or distance from the tracks)

21st June 2004

APPENDIX D Page 93


(For crossings with MWL only) 12. What do you interpret the red light to mean (e.g. train approaching, proceed with caution, stop etc)

13. What do you take the auditory alarm to mean

14. Estimate how long it takes between the warning sirens &/or red light appearing, and the

arrival of a train

15. Do you check the lights before crossing

a. If not, why not (i.e. too hard to see, rely on looking down the tracks, train noise etc)

16. Would you still cross if a red light was showing (If so, why)

17. Do you trust the warning devices at this crossing (if not, why not)

(For vehicle users, or pedestrians where there is no self-closing pedestrian gate) 18. Do you ever find the gates left open Always

Usually Occasionally Never

19. Do you shut the gates Always

Usually Occasionally Never

20. If you suspected a problem with the crossing what would you do (e.g. lights not working, gates

broken etc)

21. Can you suggest any way in which safety and/or ease of use of the crossing could be

improved

Thank you for your time

21st June 2004

APPENDIX E Page 94


APPENDIX E CALCULATION OF VIEWING ANGLES FOR EACH SITE VISITED

21st June 2004

APPENDIX E Page 95


Calculation of the Minimum and Maximum Horizontal Viewing Angle for Vehicular and Pedestrian Users

No. Region LC Name OS Grid Reference Min. Viewing Distance in mm (MWL to the closest safe sighting distance)

Max. Viewing Distance in mm

Width of gate in mm Lateral distance between eye and

MWL in mm

Max. Viewing Angle (degrees)

Min. Viewing Angle (degrees)

Vehicular Pedestrian Vehicular Pedestrian Vehicular Pedestrian Vehicular Pedestrian Vehicular Pedestrian

1 East Anglia Cranbourne TL382107 4000 1000 15000 3600 1000 2125 825 27.98 39.52 8.06 3.15 2 East Anglia Girlings TG264083 4000 n/a 15000 3600 n/a 2125 n/a 27.98 n/a 8.06 n/a 3 East Anglia Harts Drove TL274963 4000 1000 15000 3600 1000 2125 825 27.98 39.52 8.06 3.15 4 East Anglia Routes No 8 TM216415 4000 n/a 15000 3500 n/a 2075 n/a 27.42 n/a 7.88 n/a 5 Great Western Broken Cross SO737166 5000 900 15000 5000 900 2825 775 29.47 40.73 10.67 2.96 6 Great Western Gelynis ST130816 4000 1400 15000 4000 1400 2325 1025 30.17 36.21 8.81 3.91 7 Great Western Meads ST314351 5500 1000 15000 5500 1000 3075 825 29.21 39.52 11.58 3.15 8 LNE Creykes SE712190 4500 n/a 15000 4500 n/a 2575 n/a 29.78 n/a 9.74 n/a 9 LNE Jackie Duffin Wood SE637244 4400 1000 15000 4400 1000 2525 825 29.85 39.52 9.56 3.15 10 LNE Philip Lane SE544316 4600 n/a 15000 4600 n/a 2625 n/a 29.71 n/a 9.93 n/a 11 LNE Scalm Lane SE557315 4900 n/a 15000 4900 n/a 2775 n/a 29.52 n/a 10.48 n/a 12 Midlands Back Lane SK442285 1500 1000 15000 6000 1000 3325 825 65.72 39.52 12.5 3.15 13 Midlands Dovefields SK146311 4000 1000 15000 4000 1000 2325 825 30.17 39.52 8.81 3.15 14 Midlands Hucknall No.4 SK545484 2200 1000 15000 5000 1000 2825 825 52.09 39.52 10.66 3.15 15 Midlands Warren House SK514544 4500 1000 15000 4500 1000 2575 825 29.78 39.52 9.74 3.15 16 North West Barthomley SJ763540 4000 1000 15000 4000 1000 2325 825 30.17 39.52 8.81 3.15 17 North West Llanddaniel SH501719 n/a n/a 15000 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 18 Scotland Back Settlement NO708709 n/a 9500 15000 n/a 2700 n/a 1675 n/a 10 n/a 6.37 19 Scotland Bodsbury NS968163 4700 1000 15000 4700 1000 2675 825 29.65 39.52 10.11 3.15 20 Scotland Moulinearn NN969541 2400 1100 15000 3700 1100 2175 875 42.18 38.5 8.25 3.34 21 Southern Chilham Mill TR076535 4000 1200 15000 3800 1200 2225 925 29.09 37.63 8.44 3.51 22 Southern Farnborough North SU877566 12000 11400 15000 4000 1400 3725 1025 17.25 5.14 13.95 3.91 23 Scotland Forge Farm TQ532352 4000 1000 15000 4000 1000 2325 825 30.17 39.52 8.81 3.15 24 Southern Minster TR310641 2000 1100 15000 4200 1100 2425 875 50.49 38.50 9.18 3.34 25 Southern Tisbury Quarry ST964296 n/a n/a 15000 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Average 4281.82 2088.9 15000 4322.73 1155.6 2550 902.8 32.99 35.64 9.64 3.44

21st June 2004

APPENDIX E Page 96


Calculation of the Vertical Viewing Angle for Pedestrian Users

No. Region LC Name OS Grid Reference

Viewing Distance (Diagonal

distance from user to MWL)

MWL Height (at

the positon of red light)

5th % UK 65 - 80

female eye height (VA1)

95th % UK 19 - 65 male eye height

(VA2)

Vertical Viewing Angle (degrees)

VA1 VA2 1 East Anglia Cranbourne TL382107 1296.39 1915 1375 1745 22.61 7.47 2 East Anglia Girlings TG264083 n/a 1915 1375 1745 n/a n/a 3 East Anglia Harts Drove TL274963 1296.39 1915 1375 1745 22.61 7.47 4 East Anglia Routes No 8 TM216415 n/a 1915 1375 1745 n/a n/a 5 Great Western Broken Cross SO737166 1187. 7 1915 1375 1745 24.45 8.15 6 Great Western Gelynis ST130816 1735.12 1915 1375 1745 17.29 5.6 7 Great Western Meads ST314351 1296.39 1915 1375 1745 22.61 7.47 8 LNE Creykes SE712190 n/a 1915 1375 1745 n/a n/a 9 LNE Jackie Duffin Wood SE637244 1296.39 1915 1375 1745 22.61 7.47 10 LNE Philip Lane SE544316 n/a 1915 1375 1745 n/a n/a 11 LNE Scalm Lane SE557315 n/a 1915 1375 1745 n/a n/a 12 Midlands Back Lane SK442285 1296.39 1915 1375 1745 22.61 7.47 13 Midlands Dovefields SK146311 1296.39 1915 1375 1745 22.61 7.47 14 Midlands Hucknall No.4 SK545484 1296.39 1915 1375 1745 22.61 7.47 15 Midlands Warren House SK514544 1296.39 1915 1375 1745 22.61 7.47 16 North West Barthomley SJ763540 1296.39 1915 1375 1745 22.61 7.47 17 North West Llanddaniel SH501719 n/a 1915 1375 1745 n/a n/a 18 Scotland Back Settlement NO708709 9646.53 1915 1375 1745 3.2 1.01 19 Scotland Bodsbury NS968163 1296.39 1915 1375 1745 22.61 7.47 20 Scotland Moulinearn NN969541 1405.57 1915 1375 1745 21.02 6.9 21 Southern Chilham Mill TR076535 1515.13 1915 1375 1745 19.62 6.40 22 Southern Farnborough North SU877566 11445.99 1915 1375 1745 2.7 0.85 23 Scotland Forge Farm TQ532352 1296.39 1915 1375 1745 22.61 7.47 24 Southern Minster TR310641 1405.57 1915 1375 1745 21.02 6.9 25 Southern Tisbury Quarry ST964296 n/a 1915 1375 1745 n/a n/a Average 2366.77 1915 1375 1745 19.89 6.55

21st June 2004

APPENDIX E Page 97


Calculation of the Vertical Viewing Angle for Vehicular Users

No. Region LC Name OS Grid Reference Viewing Distance (Diagonal distance from user to MWL)

MWL Height (at the positon

of red light)

The lower value of eye height for vehicle design in mm

The upper value of eye height for trucks design in mm

Vertical Viewing Angle (degrees)

(VA3) (VA4) VA3 VA4 1 East Anglia Cranbourne TL382107 4529.42 1915 1060 2860 10.69 11.78 2 East Anglia Girlings TG264083 4529.42 1915 1060 2860 10.69 11.78 3 East Anglia Harts Drove TL274963 4529.42 1915 1060 2860 10.69 11.78 4 East Anglia Routes No 8 TM216415 4506.18 1915 1060 2860 10.74 11.84 5 Great Western Broken Cross SO737166 5742.88 1915 1060 2860 8.47 9.34 6 Great Western Gelynis ST130816 4626.62 1915 1060 2860 10.47 11.54 7 Great Western Meads ST314351 6301.24 1915 1060 2860 7.73 8.53 8 LNE Creykes SE712190 5184.65 1915 1060 2860 9.36 10.33 9 LNE Jackie Duffin Wood SE637244 5073.03 1915 1060 2860 9.57 10.55

10 LNE Philip Lane SE544316 5296.28 1915 1060 2860 9.17 10.12 11 LNE Scalm Lane SE557315 5631.22 1915 1060 2860 8.63 9.53 12 Midlands Back Lane SK442285 3647.69 1915 1060 2860 13.19 14.52 13 Midlands Dovefields SK146311 4626.62 1915 1060 2860 10.47 11.54 14 Midlands Hucknall No.4 SK545484 3580.59 1915 1060 2860 13.43 14.78 15 Midlands Warren House SK514544 5184.65 1915 1060 2860 9.36 10.33 16 North West Barthomley SJ763540 4626.62 1915 1060 2860 10.47 11.54 17 North West Llanddaniel SH501719 n/a 1915 1060 2860 n/a n/a 18 Scotland Back Settlement NO708709 n/a 1915 1060 2860 n/a n/a 19 Scotland Bodsbury NS968163 5407.92 1915 1060 2860 8.98 9.91 20 Scotland Moulinearn NN969541 3238.92 1915 1060 2860 14.79 16.27 21 Southern Chilham Mill TR076535 4577.19 1915 1060 2860 10.58 11.67 22 Southern Farnborough North SU877566 12564.86 1915 1060 2860 3.89 4.30 23 Scotland Forge Farm TQ532352 4626.62 1915 1060 2860 10.47 11.54 24 Southern Minster TR310641 3143.35 1915 1060 2860 15.22 16.73 25 Southern Tisbury Quarry ST964296 n/a 1915 1060 2860 n/a n/a Average 5053.43 1915 1060 2860 10.32 11.38

21st June 2004

Page 98

T269 User Behaviour at User Worked Crossings Issue: 01

APPENDIX F FIELD RESEARCH RESULTS SUMMARY REPORT

21st June 2004

Page 99


DETAILED SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM FIELD RESEARCH User Age and Gender The majority of users observed at the MWL UWCs were male; the age group with the largest representation was 20 – 35 year olds. Of the overall user sample 75.3% were male, 23% were female. (The gender of the remaining 1.7% was not recorded). Two thirds (66.7%) of users were aged between twenty and fifty years old, (of which 36.2% ranged between 20 – 35 and 30.5% were 35 – 50). 20.2% of users were aged over fifty years, (of which 14.8% ranged between 50 – 65 and 5.4% over 65). Just 7.5% of all users were under twenty years and 5.6% of users could not have their age determined. These numbers are consistent with the average number of adults in the UK representing each age group (figures from the 2001 UK Census). However, the number of children (under 16 years) is not represented fully. This is due to the fact that, when one or more users traverse a crossing at one time, only the behaviour of the primary user (i.e. the adult) was recorded.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Perc

enta

ge (%

)

20 - 3

5

35 - 5

0

50 - 6

5<2

065

+

Unspe

cified

Figure F1: Age Distribution User Categorisation and Crossing Time Car drivers and pedestrians were the most frequently encountered user types. Various types of crossing user were observed; these were recorded and categorised into nine groups. The largest group of users was the car drivers, making up 38.9% overall. This user group took, on average, 76 seconds to complete a full crossing (i.e. opening both gates, crossing in their vehicle and then closing both gates). The range of times observed was from two to two hundred seconds. The next largest group was pedestrians who made up a third (33.3%) of all observations. The average time taken to cross in this way was 14.4 seconds, with times recorded ranging from five to sixty seconds. The longest pedestrian crossing occurred when the user was walking three dogs, all of which were off their leads. The delay was caused by the user attending to the dogs and trying to ensure they did not wander down the tracks. 28.9% of car drivers completed their crossing in 40 seconds or under, the remainder (71.1%) took over 40 seconds (the minimum warning time provided at vehicular UWCs with MWL). 90% of pedestrians took 20 seconds or under to complete their crossing, 10% took over 20 seconds (the minimum warning time provided at footpath UWCs with MWL).

21st June 2004

Page 100


0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Perc

enta

ge (%

)

Car Driv

er

Pedes

trian

Cyclis

t

Truck D

river

Other

Tractor

Driv

er

Motorcy

clist

Horse R

ider

Railway

Staf

f

Unspe

cified

Figure F2: Crossing User Type Cyclists demonstrated the quickest crossing times although they were less well represented in the sample; 7.8% were cyclists with an average crossing time of 13.9 seconds, (from a range of four to forty-five seconds) and just 0.6% were motorcyclists who took, on average, 18.8 seconds to cross (from a range of ten to thirty seconds). 84.3% of cyclists took 20 seconds or under to complete their crossing (15.7% took over 20 seconds) and all motorcyclists took 40 seconds or under to complete their crossing. Users in trucks and tractors made up 6% and 3.1% of those observed, with average crossing times of 65.1 and 106.5 seconds, respectively. The crossing times ranged from 5 to 195 seconds for the trucks. The longest time taken was that of a driver who stopped too close to the gate and was therefore unable to close it, they then had to return to their vehicle and move it forward before being able to complete a full crossing procedure. For the users in tractors, the range was ten to two hundred and ten seconds; the shortest time was that of a tractor crossing when the gates were open on approach to the crossing and left open on departure. The longest crossing time was that of a tractor crossing in conjunction with another tractor and a van. 31.3% of truck drivers and 18.8% of tractor drivers took 40 seconds or under to complete their crossing, meaning that 68.8% and 81.2% of truck and tractor drivers, respectively, took longer than 40 seconds to complete their crossing. Four users traversing the MWL crossings were horse riders; they made up 0.6% of the total sample and took, on average, 33.7 seconds to cross, with times ranging from twenty-one to forty seconds. One user (0.1%) was a railway staff member and took ten seconds to cross; they crossed on foot. 100% of horse riders and railway staff (pedestrian) took the minimum time or under to complete their crossing, 40 and 20 seconds respectively. 3.3% of users were classed as ‘Other’, this included: a JCB digger; fork lift truck; a motorised scooter, and cars or vans towing trailers/animal boxes, (as they would be classified as long vehicles and so should contact the signaller before traversing if directed to do so by the signage at the crossing). These ‘Other’ users took on average 60.5 seconds to complete a full crossing with a range of eight to one hundred and thirty-five seconds. The shortest time of eight seconds was recorded for a user with a motorised scooter. 6.4% of users did not have a method of traversing recorded.

21st June 2004

Page 101


0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Tim

e (s

)

Tractor

Driv

er

Car Driv

er

Truck D

river

Other

Horse R

ider

Motorcy

clist

Pedes

trian

Cyclist

Railway

Staff

Unspe

cified

Figure F3: Average Crossing Time A large range of crossing times was recorded. The overall average time for a user to traverse a crossing was 44.6 seconds, with the times recorded ranging from two seconds to two hundred and ten seconds. The shortest time of two seconds was observed for two motorists in vans (category ‘Car’) at Moulinearn crossing in Scotland. This crossing has barriers that are operated by a push button, which means that drivers do not have to leave their car and only cross the railway line(s) once. Low crossing times were consistently recorded at this crossing. The general behaviour of the two van drivers was described as ‘Risky’ by the field researchers, this is likely due to the speed at which they crossed. The longest time taken was by the driver of a tractor crossing in conjunction with another tractor and a van. Despite their ‘tail-gating’ crossing method, their general behaviour was described as ‘Safety Conscious’, as they were observed to check the MWLs before crossing. Overall, 58.8% of the sample completed their crossing within their minimum relevant warning time (20 seconds for pedestrians and cyclists, 40 seconds for other user types) and 41.2% took over the minimum warning time.

0102030405060708090

100

Perc

enta

ge (%

)

Horse R

ider

Motorcy

clist

Railway

Staff

Pedes

trian

Cyclis

t

Truck D

river

Car Driv

er

Tractor

Driv

er

Crossed Within Warning Time ProvidedCrossed Above Warning Time Provided

Figure F4: Percentage of Users that Crossed Within the Minimum Warning Time Provided by

the MWL

When users estimated the length of time it takes them to traverse the crossing the majority overestimated, when compared to observed crossing times. Pedestrians, cyclists, tractors and ‘Other’ users all overestimated the length of time it takes for them to complete a full crossing. Pedestrians overestimated by 46%, stating an average time of 21.2 seconds, when in actual fact it

21st June 2004

Page 102


took, on average, 14.5 seconds. Tractor drivers overestimated by 20%, cyclists by 16% and ‘Other’ users overestimated by approximately 31%. Drivers of cars and trucks underestimated their crossing time by 13% and 8% respectively. It is these users that are most at risk should they choose to ignore, or fail to see, the MWL as they are likely to allow too little time to reach a point of safety. The comparison of actual average times and average estimated times is shown graphically below.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Tim

e (s

)

Tractor

Driv

er

Car Driv

er

Truck D

river

Other

Pedes

trian

Cyclis

t

Actual Time Estimated Time

Figure F5: Actual Verses Estimated Crossing Times It is interesting to note that the frequency of crossing use is not a factor in the underestimations of crossing times in car drivers. It is, however, a factor in truck drivers. Those that use the crossing once a day, or more frequently, are less likely to underestimate their crossing time than those that use the crossing either rarely or are first time users. These results are shown graphically in Figure F6.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Num

ber o

f Peo

ple

per 1

00

Once a

Day

+Rare

ly

First T

ime

Figure F6: Normalised Data for the Number of Truck Drivers that Underestimate their Crossing Time

21st June 2004

Page 103


UWC Usage and Risk Perception Leisure activities and accessing work were the most common reasons for crossing use. Of the 257 users questioned at UWCs with MWLs, half (50.2%) were crossing it for leisure activities and a quarter (26.1%) were using the crossing to access work. This may be a reflection of the times the survey was carried out (09:00 – 17:00), which may not capture many crossing users on their way to and from work.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Perc

enta

ge (%

)

Once a

Day

+

1 to 2

Times

/Wk

Every

Few W

ks

Rarely

First ti

me

Unspe

cified

Figure F7: Frequency of Leisure Users Of those users that traversed the crossing as part of a leisure activity, almost a third (32.6%) do so once or twice a week and over a quarter (27.2%) use it more than once a day. 5.4% were first time users, 15.5% said that they rarely use it and 18.6% said that they use the crossing every few weeks. 0.7% of users didn’t specify their frequency of use.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Perc

enta

ge (%

)

Leisu

re

Acces

s Work

Acces

s Hom

e

Delive

ryOthe

r

Farm W

ork

Railway

Staf

f

Unspe

cified

Figure F8: Reason for Using Crossing

Sixteen percent of users were travelling via the crossing to gain access to their home; of these 73.2% use the crossing once or twice a day or more frequently. 19.5% of the overall sample said they use the crossing once or twice a week and 7.3% were first time users. It would be expected that those using a crossing to access their home would be well represented within the high frequency categories, since they use the crossing to go to work, return home and to carry out daily activities. 3.1% of users were traversing the crossing to deliver something, e.g. post. A further 3.1% of the

21st June 2004

Page 104


overall sample used the crossing for other reasons, e.g., Minster crossing on Southern Region was used to access the train station platform and Farnborough North crossing on Southern Region was used to gain access to college. Railway staff represented 0.4% of the sample, while 0.3% of all users questioned did not specify their purpose for using the level crossing.

Table F1: Perceived Safety of Crossing

Perceived Safety of Crossing Reason for Crossing Use Very Safe / Safe OK Very Dangerous /

Dangerous Leisure 85.9 9.4 4.7 Access Work / Home 63.7 18.6 17.7

Leisure users tended to perceive the UWC as safer than those who use the crossing out of necessity, e.g., to access work or home. Of those users that traverse the crossing for leisure purposes, 85.9% perceived the crossing to be ‘Very Safe’ or ‘Safe’. Just 4.7% perceived the crossing they used as ‘Dangerous’ or ‘Very Dangerous’ and 9.4% thought it to be ‘OK’. Of those that have to use the crossing out of necessity, in particular those who use it to access work or their home, a higher proportion felt the crossing to be ‘Dangerous’ or ‘Very Dangerous’ (17.7%) and 18.6% perceived the crossing to be ‘OK’. Just under two thirds of users who cross a MWL UWC out of necessity perceived the crossing they used to be ‘Safe’ or ‘Very Safe’. Those that use the crossing out of necessity rather than for leisure activities perceived the crossing to be more dangerous and felt themselves to be at higher risk of accidents. However, no statistically significant correlation was identified between users’ reason for crossing use and their perception of how safe the crossing is (r = 0.26). Overall, there is a tendency to view crossings as safe. First time users were judged to be more safety conscious than users who traverse the crossing more frequently. When rated on their behaviour, crossing users were placed into five categories, Very Safety Conscious, Safety Conscious, OK, Risky and Very Risky. First time users were judged to be almost 10% more safety conscious than the overall sample with 73.7% being rated in the Safety Conscious/Very Safety Conscious categories compared to 65.8% from the overall population of MWL UWC users. This may be due to first time users being more cautious; they are more likely to read the crossing instructions, to look properly, adhere to the red miniature warning light and cross quickly. More frequent users may have a tendency to become complacent, as they feel confident when using the crossing. None of the first time users was observed to be Risky or Very Risky in their crossing behaviour, whereas 9.7% of the overall sample was perceived in this way. Interestingly, those that use the crossing many times a day were rated on average with 62.5% in the Safety Conscious/Very Safety Conscious categories. Only 2.6% were perceived to be Risky or Very Risky in their crossing procedure.

21st June 2004

Page 105


User Estimates of Line Speeds Actual line speeds were compared to user estimates. These estimates of line speeds were put into five categories; <20 mph, ‘20 – 40 mph’, ‘40 – 60 mph’, ‘60 – 80 mph’ and ‘80 – 110 mph’. Network Rail provided actual line speeds for most crossings. Unfortunately, current risk assessments do not require this information to be recorded and data for all crossings on the Southern and North West Regions, plus two other crossings: Broken Cross on the Great Western Region, and Hucknall No. 4 on the Midland Region, was not provided. Users generally underestimated line speeds. If a person did not accurately estimate the line speed they were more likely to underestimate than overestimate; 80% of inaccurate estimates were underestimations. Clearly these people are at greater risk than those who think the trains are travelling faster than they actually are. At seven of the twenty-five MWL crossings, 50% or more users underestimated the line speed. The seven crossings at which over 50% of the users underestimated were all in a rural area. Only one was a footpath crossing, the remainder were either vehicular crossings or both vehicular and pedestrian crossings. All of the seven crossings were frequently used with a minimum of 10 users observed over a two-day observational period (09:00 – 17:00). Through normalising the data it was found that gender does not influence whether a person will underestimate line speed or not. However, age and frequency of crossing use do influence the likelihood of a user underestimating line speed. This is illustrated in the table and graphs below. Table F2: Normalised Data for the Gender of Users that Would Underestimate the Line Speed

Gender Number of People per 100

Male 23.9 Female 23.0

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Num

ber o

f Peo

ple

per 1

00

<20 20 - 35 35 - 50 50 - 65 65+

Figure F9: Normalised Data for the Age Group of Users that Would Underestimate the Line

Speed

21st June 2004

Page 106


0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Num

ber o

f Peo

ple

per 1

00

Once aDay+

1 to 2Times/Wk

Every FewWks

Rarely First Time

Figure F10: Normalised Data for the Frequency of Users that Would Underestimate the Line Speed

User Understanding of MWLs and Audible Alarms The majority of users understand a red MWL to indicate Stop. 66.9% of users who were using a MWL crossing understood the red light to indicate Stop, 24.9% interpret the red light to mean Train Approaching; and 3.9% understood the red light to mean Danger. A small number of users (7 people) understood the red light to indicate Proceed with Caution. Despite the fact that 95.7% of the overall sample understood the red warning light to mean Stop, Train Approaching and Danger, 7% stated that they would consider crossing if a red warning light was showing. Overall, 71.6% stated that they would not cross when a red MWL was showing.

010203040506070

Perc

enta

ge (%

)

Stop

Train A

pproa

ching

Dange

r

Procee

d with

Cau

tion

Unspe

cified

Figure F11: Understanding of Red Miniature Warning Light

63.2% of all first time users understood the red MWL to mean Stop, indicating that the meaning of the lights is understandable to those unfamiliar with it. Other first time users understood the red warning light to indicate Train approaching (21.1%) Proceed with Caution (5.3%) and Danger (5.3%), 5.3% did not specify.

21st June 2004

Page 107


The majority of users understand the audible alarm to mean Stop. Six of the twenty-five miniature warning light crossings have an audible alarm associated with the red warning light. These crossings are Girlings, Routes No.8, Meads, Hucknall No. 4, Moulinearn and Back Lane. 54.5% of users interviewed understood the audible alarm to mean Stop, 34.1% understood it to mean Train Approaching and 11.4% understood it to mean Danger. Although the users appear to understand the correct meaning of the warning lights and audible alarm, six users, (who were observed but not questioned), still traversed a level crossing with both warning systems in action.

Stop54.5%

Train Approachin

g34.1%

Danger11.4%

Figure F12: Understanding of Audible Alarm

Users were of the general opinion that UWC crossing instructions are “reasonable” with 92.6% of users stating this, whilst 5.4% believed that they are not. In this group, there were complaints of hidden, faded and vandalised signs, amongst others. Despite this consensus, only 59.9% of all users questioned could accurately describe the correct crossing procedure; 37.7% could not; the remaining 2.3% did not comment or their comments were not recorded. Over two thirds (69.3%) of those questioned could recall less than a third of all signs present. 17.9% could recall between one and two thirds, 10.9% remembered over two thirds of signs, 1.9% of users did not answer, or their comments were not recorded (represented in Figure F13 below). This is perhaps unsurprising for a couple of reasons. Firstly, quantity and visibility of signs varies dramatically from UWC to UWC, and perhaps the users questioned may recall more with additional time and concentration. Secondly, familiar users are likely to have learnt how to cross safely some time ago and rarely pay attention to the signage when crossing.

17.9%

10.9% 1.9%

69.3%

< 1 third of signspresent recalled 1-2 thirds of signspresent recalled>2 thirds of signspresent recalledUnrecorded/Unanswered

Figure F13: Signage Recollection

Users overestimate the length of time it takes for a train to reach the crossing from the onset of the warning system. When asked how long it takes for the train to reach the crossing, from the point of red light/alarm onset, the average length of time estimated was 78.8 seconds, (with a range of five to 450 seconds). The actual minimum warning time of either the warning light or the audible alarm is forty seconds, (or twenty at a footpath crossing with MWLs). Anticipation that the wait could be much longer is a likely cause of a user crossing when the red light shows or the audible alarm sounds. If a user thinks they have almost 80 seconds to traverse a crossing they are more likely to attempt it than if they think they have just 40, (or twenty) seconds.

21st June 2004

Page 108


Users overestimate the length of time it takes for a train to reach the crossing from the first sighting. When asked how long it takes for the train to reach the crossing, from the first point at which the train is visible, the average length of time estimated was 50.4 seconds. The times varied from crossing to crossing due to the differences in sighting distances. For approximately 60% of the crossings there were no data available from Network Rail for the actual sighting distances and/or the line speeds, (as they have no requirement to record them). For those crossings for which data were available, one did not have any users and so estimations were not given. Of the remainder, 87.5% overestimated the length of time it would take for a train to reach them. For example, at one crossing, Cranbourne, on the East Anglia Region, the average estimated time was 56.3 seconds; the actual waiting time is a maximum of 8.5 seconds and a minimum of 2.1 seconds, based on data provided by Network Rail. Those that overestimate the length of time before the train reaches their crossing are most at risk as they are more likely to attempt to traverse the crossing despite being able to see a train approaching. Of course, it is at those crossings at which there is a short sighting distance, a high line speed, or both, that MWLs are generally installed to protect crossing users. 20.2% of the sample stated they do not trust the warning devices (warning lights and audible alarm) at the UWCs. Surprisingly, 63.5% of this group still felt that the crossing itself was Very Safe/Safe, just 17.3% felt that the crossing was Dangerous/Very Dangerous and 19.2% felt that it was OK. However, when comparing these percentages to the overall sample averages, the number of users who felt the crossings to be safe was more than 10% lower. Just 13.6% of the overall sample perceived their level crossing as OK and 10.9% perceived their crossing to be Dangerous/Very Dangerous. Of those that felt the crossing to be Dangerous/Very Dangerous, 53.6% had either experienced or were aware of a near miss or accident that had occurred at the crossing they were using. 46.4% of users did not specify. It is understandable that, if someone is aware of, or has experienced, an accident or near miss, their perception of risk at that crossing will increase. Whether the occurrences at the MWL crossings are real accidents or whether they are simply urban myths is not known. User Adherence to Correct Crossing Procedures The majority of users were observed to follow the correct crossing procedure. Of all users at Miniature Warning Light level crossings, 83.6% were observed to follow the correct crossing procedure. The procedures followed by 3.7% were not specified/unrecorded, leaving 12.7% of all users failing to follow the correct procedure.

Yes83.6%

No12.7%

Unspecified3.7%

Figure F14: Percentage that Follow Correct Crossing Procedure There are several reasons why a person would be recorded as failing to follow correct procedure:

• Crossing when a red MWL is showing • Failing to close one or both gates • A driver pulling onto the rail tracks between opening the first and second gate • Failing to stop at the ‘Stop line’ • Failing to secure the gates when crossing • Cyclists failing to dismount when crossing

21st June 2004

Page 109


• Failing to phone the signaller when required • Failing to check the MWL before crossing

Failing to close the gate(s) was the most common violation of the correct crossing procedure. Of those that did not follow the correct procedure, 47.7% failed to close one or both gates. Several (7 users, 8.1%) users were recorded as having left the gates open for the subsequent user(s) traversing the crossing. Although they did not follow the procedure properly, they did not simply leave the gates open out of laziness or because they were in a rush. However, leaving the gates open could mean that the next user would not look at the MWL, making the assumption that they are able to traverse safely. Other types of incorrect crossing procedure occurred with equal frequency. Users that did not check the miniature warning light prior to crossing, and users that traversed the crossing when the MWL was showing red, made up 12.8% and 13.9% respectively. Cyclists that did not dismount made up 11.6% and users that drove their vehicle onto the tracks between opening the first and second gate, 3.5%. 2.3% did not stop prior to the crossing to check the lights and the same number did not secure the gates open when crossing or did not open them fully/properly. 1.2% failed to use the phone when required and 4.7% were classed as having failed to follow the correct crossing procedure due to other reasons. One user did not have their type of violation recorded; the remaining users either accessed a train station platform via the tracks without using the gate or went through the crossing when another user was opening the gates.

0

10

20

30

40

50

Perc

enta

ge (%

)

Didn't C

lose G

ates

Crosse

d on R

ed

Didn't C

heck

MW

L

Didn't D

ismou

ntOthe

r

Stoppe

d on T

racks

Didn't S

top

Didn't S

ecure

Gate

s

Didn't P

hone

Figure F15: Types of Incorrect Crossing Procedure Car drivers were the largest user category to leave open the gate(s). 6.1% of all users observed at MWL crossings left the gates open; forty-four people in total. Of these, 54.5% were drivers of cars; this large number is perhaps due to the length of time it takes a driver to complete a crossing properly. They have to cross the actual railway line(s) five times, two of which are to close the gates behind them. Other user types that left open the gate(s) were evenly distributed. 15.9% of those that left open the gates were pedestrians; this is surprising, as it confers no real benefit. Most pedestrian gates at crossings are either kissing gates or gates that swing shut automatically. 11.4% were truck drivers; cyclists and tractor drivers totalled 6.8% each. 4.7% of those that failed to close the gates did not have their method of traversing recorded.

21st June 2004

Page 110


0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Perc

enta

ge (%

)

Car Driv

er

Pedes

trian

Truck D

river

Cyclis

t

Tractor

Driv

er

Unspe

cified

Figure F16: User Type of those that Failed to Close Gate(s) The group of users most likely to leave one or both gates open was tractor drivers, with 13.6% leaving the gates open when traversing. The next largest group was truck drivers with 11.6%. 8.6% of all car drivers, 5.4% of all cyclists and 2.9% of all pedestrians left one or both of the gates open when traversing. The remaining 4.3% did not have their method of traversing recorded.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Perc

enta

ge (%

)

Tractor

Driv

er

Truck D

river

Car Driv

er

Cyclis

t

Pedes

trian

Unspe

cified

Figure F17: Percentage of User Types that Failed to Close the Gate(s) Unsurprisingly, it is tractor and truck drivers that are most likely to leave open the gate(s) at a crossing. These users are most likely to be transporting goods or equipment that require them to make multiple crossings. To save themselves time, they leave open the gates between crossings. Indeed, they do save time; to complete a full crossing, tractor drivers took an average of 106.5 seconds compared to just 10 seconds if both gates had been left open previously. Not all users are honest when reporting their crossing procedure. 96.9% of all users said that they check the MWL before making their decision to cross. However, 12.7% of users were recorded as completing their crossing without stopping or without looking at the lights or the track. This discrepancy in the figures may be due to the reluctance of people to admit that they do not adhere to instructions; even when in a real life situation they are observed doing otherwise. Alternatively, they may have looked without moving their heads and therefore were not recorded as doing so.

21st June 2004

Page 111


Other Potential Crossing Violations The majority of users would not consider ignoring a red MWL. 71.6% of all users questioned at a MWL crossing would not consider crossing if the red light was showing. 21.4% did not specify, or their answer was not recorded, leaving 7% of all users who would consider crossing if the miniature warning light was red. All users that might cross on red understand the meaning of the MWL. Of those that would consider crossing on red, 61.1% indicated that they understood the light to mean Stop, 33.3% understood the light to mean Train Approaching and 5.6% understood it to mean Danger. Of these users, 66.7% trust the lights to inform them of an approaching train, 27.8% do not trust the lights. It is perhaps understandable that a user who does not trust the lights, even though they understand their meaning, would be more likely to ignore them and trust their own judgement. However, it is unclear why those that trust the lights would still consider crossing when the red light shows. Perhaps they are in a rush or feel that they have time to cross, even though the red light is showing. One pedestrian, who was questioned at Farnborough North crossing on the Southern Region, stated that, from their position at the crossing, they had a sighting distance of approximately 325 yards and so would consider crossing on a red light if no train was visible. However, from this study it has been found that pedestrians, on average, take 14.5 seconds to traverse a crossing and reach a point of safety. With a 325 yard sighting distance, a train would have to be travelling at just 50mph to reach the crossing in 13.3 seconds. This means that if a user began to cross while the light was red (even if they could not see a train approaching), they may not have time to reach a point of safety. Of the users who admitted that they would traverse a crossing when a red light was showing, the most likely group to do so are male pedestrians, aged under 20 on the Southern Region (regardless of whether or not they trust the lights). The following graphs show the breakdown of these findings:

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

Num

ber o

f Use

rs p

er 1

00

Male

Female

Figure F18: Normalised Data for the Gender of Users that would Cross when the Red Light was

Showing

21st June 2004

Page 112


0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

Num

ber o

f Use

rs p

er 1

00

Pedes

trian

Truck D

river

Cyclis

t

Car Driv

er

Figure F19: Normalised Data for the User Type that would Cross when the Red Light was Showing

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Num

ber o

f Use

rs p

er 1

00

Southe

rn

Midlan

d

Great W

ester

n

Scotla

nd

Figure F20: Normalised Data for the Regional Distribution of Users that would Cross when the Red Light was Showing

21st June 2004

Page 113


0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Num

ber o

f Use

rs p

er 1

00

<20

35-50

20-35

50-65

Figure F21: Normalised Data for the Age Group of Users that would Cross when the Red Light

was Showing On average, users that would consider crossing on a red light overestimate the length of time it takes from the onset of a warning signal to the arrival of a train: 91.6 seconds on average (with a range of 5 to 300 seconds) compared to an overall sample estimate of 78.7 seconds. Overestimation could be a factor in their decision to ignore a red warning light. If a user thought that they had over a minute and a half to cross before the arrival of the train they may think they had time to traverse. Users that would consider crossing on a red light overestimate the length of time between first sighting a train and its arrival at the crossing. When asked how long the waiting time is between sighting a train in the distance and it reaching the crossing, the average time given by users who would cross on red was 54.5 seconds (from a range of 2 to 300 seconds), four seconds more than the overall sample average, which was 50.4 seconds. The actual waiting time for a user varies between crossings but of the crossings visited the maximum length of time between sighting a train and it’s arrival at a level crossing was observed to be 46.7 seconds, at Meads crossing on the Great Western Region (sighting distance 2286 yards and 100mph line speed). Users that would consider crossing on a red light underestimate the length of time it takes them to traverse the crossing. When asked to estimate the length of time it takes them to complete a full crossing (i.e. opening both gates, crossing in their vehicle and then closing both gates) car drivers estimated on average that it would take them 40 seconds; in actual fact the average time was 76 seconds. Truck drivers underestimated by 5.1 seconds, their estimate was 60 seconds in comparison to the average traversing time of 65.1 seconds. Cyclists estimated that it took them 10 seconds to cross; their actual average was 13.9 seconds. The users that did not have their traversing method specified estimated a time of four seconds, it is unclear whether or not this is an accurate estimation as their method is not recorded and so an accurate comparison cannot be made. Pedestrians were the only user group to overestimate the length of time it took them to traverse the crossing, they gave an average estimated time of 31.1 seconds when they take, on average, 15.8 seconds.

21st June 2004

Page 114


Crossing Violations In total, field researchers observed twelve actual occurrences of violations that involved a user traversing a level crossing when a red warning light was showing. There were seven crossings at which these incidents occurred, listed in the table below.

Table F3: Crossings at which violations were observed

Region Name Alarm Method Time to Cross (s)

Pedestrian 10 Minster N Pedestrian 15 Car 180 Chilham Mill N Car 200 Pedestrian 15

Southern

Farnborough North N Bicycle 10

Back Lane Y Bicycle 35 Pedestrian 10

Midland Hucknall No. 4 Y

Pedestrian 120 Car 60 East Anglia Routes 8 Y Car 165

Great Western Meads Y Truck 60 User types who crossed on red, and the time it took them to complete a full crossing (i.e., for vehicles, opening both gates, crossing in their vehicle and then closing both gates, for pedestrians, opening and closing the first gate, crossing the tracks and then opening and closing the second gate) are also listed. The time shown for several of the users is sometimes above 40 or 20 seconds (the minimum time between the onset of a warning signal and the arrival of a train for a vehicular and footpath crossing, respectively). The car and truck drivers completed some, or all, of their crossing when the red MWL was showing, e.g., closing both gates when the MWL was showing red. The pedestrian who was recorded as taking 120 seconds to complete their crossing used the following procedure; they opened the first gate when the red MWL was showing, waited between the closed gate and the track while the train passed and then completed their crossing before the MWL had returned to green. The majority of crossing violations occurred on the Southern Region. Of the twelve violations, 50% occurred on the Southern Region, 25% occurred on the Midland Region, 17% on the East Anglia Region and 8% on the Great Western Region. This reflects the number of people who admitted that they might cross if the lights were on red; the majority of these were on the Southern Region. Of those that occurred at crossings with both a miniature warning light and an audible alarm, 3 (50%) were on the Midland Region, 2 (34%) on the East Anglia Region and 1 (16%) on the Great Western Region. None of the crossings visited on the Southern Region had an audible alarm.

21st June 2004

Page 115


Southern50%

East Anglia17%

Midlands25%

Great Western

8%

Figure F22: Regional Distribution of Users that Crossed When MML was red All those that crossed when a red warning light was showing were male and the age group with the largest representation was 20 – 35 year olds. The gender reflects those that stated they would consider ignoring a red warning light, of which 83.3% were male. The majority (42%) were in the 20 – 35 year age range, a quarter were in the <20 age group and the same number in the 35 – 50 age group. 8% did not have their age specified. The majority of red light violations (42%) were committed by pedestrians, followed by car drivers (33%), cyclists (17%) and truck drivers (8%). These user type figures also reflect the number of people who admitted they might cross when a red warning light was showing. Normalising the data revealed that the most likely group of users to traverse a MWL crossing when the red light is showing are male cyclists, aged under 20 on the Midland Region. The following graphs show the breakdown of these findings.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Num

ber o

f Peo

ple

per 1

00

<20 20 - 35 35 - 50

Figure F23: Normalised Data for the Age Group of Users that Crossed when the Red Light was

Showing

21st June 2004

Page 116


0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

Num

ber o

f Peo

ple

Per 1

00

Cyclist Truck Driver Pedestrian Car Driver

Figure F24: Normalised Data for the User Type that Crossed when the Red Light was Showing

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Num

ber o

f Peo

ple

per 1

00

Midland Southern Great Western East Anglia

Figure F25: Normalised Data for the Regional Distribution of Users that Crossed when the Red

Light was Showing Those users that crossed when a red MWL was showing declined to answer any questions. As a result, it is difficult to establish whether the users were aware of the warning devices, whether they could see the lights and understand their meaning (and, where present, hear and understand the audible alarm). However, because 100% of all users questioned had no problems seeing the lights at these crossings, one may infer that visibility of lights was not a problem. Similarly, the understanding of both the lights and the audible alarm was not an issue at 5 of the 7 crossings. At the other two, Minster and Chilham Mill on the Southern Region, 17.4% and 3% of users, respectively, stated that they understood the red MWL to indicate Proceed with Caution.

Rail Safety & Standards Board Registered Office: Evergreen House 160 Euston Road London NW1 2DX. Registered in England and Wales No. 04655675.

Rail Safety & Standards Board is a not-for-profit company limited by guarantee.

Rail Safety and Standards Board Evergreen House 160 Euston Road London NW1 2DX

Reception Telephone +44 (0)20 7904 7777 Facsimile +44 (0)20 7904 7791

www.rssb.co.uk

with mwl crossings

Documents