why vietnam loves and hates china

8/8/2019 Why Vietnam Loves and Hates China

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Why Vietnam loves and hates ChinaBy Andrew Forbes

For more than 2,000 years, Vietnam'sdevelopment as a nation has been marked byone fixed and immutable factor - the proximity of China. The relationship between the twocountries is in many ways a family affair, with allthe closeness of shared values and bitterness of close rivalries.

No country in Southeast Asia is culturally closer to China than Vietnam, and no other country inthe region has spent so long

fending off Chinese domination, often at a terriblecost in lives, economic development and p oliticalcompromise.

China has been Vietnam's blessing andVietnam's curse. It remains an intrusive culturalgodfather, the giant to the north that is "alwaysthere". Almost a thousand years of Chineseoccupation, between the Han conquest of NamViet in the 2nd century BC and the reassertion of Vietnamese independence as Dai Viet in AD 967,

marked the Vietnamese so deeply that theybecame, in effect, an outpost of Chinesecivilization in Southeast Asia.

While the other countries of Indochina areTheravada Buddhist, sharing cultural links withSouth Asia, Vietnam derived its predominantreligion - a mix of Mahayana Buddhism, Taoismand Confucianism popularly known as tam giao or "Three Religions"- from China. Until theintroduction of romanized quoc ngu script in the

17th century, Vietnamese scholars wrote inChinese characters or in chu nho , a Vietnamesederivative of Chinese characters.

Over the centuries, Vietnam developed as asmaller version of the Middle Kingdom, acentralized, hierarchical state ruled by an all-powerful emperor living in a Forbidden City basedon its namesake in Beijing and administered by a



highly educated Confucian bureaucracy.

Both countries are deeply conscious of thecultural ties that bind them together, and each isstill deeply suspicious of the other. During thelong centuries of Chinese occupation, theVietnamese enthusiastically embraced manyaspects of Chinese civilization, while at the sametime fighting with an extraordinary vigor tomaintain their cultural identity and regain their national independence.

During the Tang Dynasty (6th-9th centuries AD),Vietnamese guerrillas fighting the Chinese sang amartial song that emphasized their separateidentity in the clearest of terms:

F ight to keep our hair long,F ight to keep our teeth black,

F ight to show that the heroic southern country can never be defeated.

For their part, the Chinese recognized theVietnamese as a kindred people, to be offeredthe benefits of higher Chinese civilization and,ultimately, the rare privilege of being absorbedinto the Chinese polity.

On the other hand, as near family, they were tobe punished especially severely if they rejectedChinese standards or rebelled against Chinesecontrol. This was made very clear in aremarkable message sent by the Song Emperor Taizong to King Le Hoan in AD 979, just over adecade after Vietnam first reasserted itsindependence.

Like a stern headmaster, Taizong appealed to LeHoan to see reason and return to the Chinese

fold: "Although your seas have pearls, we willthrow them into the rivers, and though your mountains produce gold, we will throw it into thedust. We do not covet your valuables. You fly andleap like savages, we have horse -drawncarriages. You drink through your noses, we haverice and wine. Let us change your customs. Youcut your hair, we wear hats; when you talk, yousound like birds. We have examinations and



books. Let us teach you the knowledge of theproper laws ... Do you not want to escape fromthe savagery of the outer islands and gaze uponthe house of civilization? Do you want to discardyour garments of leaves and grass and wear flowered robes embroidered with mountains anddragons? Have you understood?"

In fact Le Hoan understood Taizong very welland, like his modern successors, knew exactlywhat he wanted from China - access to its cultureand civilization without coming under its politicalcontrol or jeopardizing Vietnamese freedom inany way. This attitude infuriated Taizong, as itwould generations of Chinese to come.

In 1407, the Ming Empire managed to reassert

Chinese control over its stubbornly independentsouthern neighbor, and Emperor Yongle - nodoubt, to his mind, in the best interests of theVietnamese - imposed a policy of enforcedSinicization. Predictably enough, Vietnamrejected this "kindness" and fought back,expelling the Chinese yet again in 1428.

Yongle was apoplectic when he learned of their rebellion. Vietnam was not just another tributarystate, he insisted, but a former province that had

once enjoyed the benefits of Chinese civilization

Continued 1 2 Why Vietnam loves and hates ChinaBy Andrew Forbes

and yet had wantonly rejected this privilege. In view of this close association -Yongle used the term mi mi or "intimately related" - Vietnam's rebellion wasparticularly heinous and deserved the fiercest of punishments.

China on top Sometimes a strongly sexual imagery creeps into this "intimate relationship", withVietnam, the weaker partner, a victim of

Chinese violation. In AD 248, the Vietnamese heroine Lady Triu, who led apopular uprising against the Chinese occupation, proclaimed: "I want to ri de the



great winds, strike the sharks on the high seas, drive out the invaders, reconquer the nation, burst the bonds of slavery and never bow to become anyone'sconcubine."

Her defiant choice of words was more than just symbolic. Vietnam has long beena source of women for the Chinese sex trade. In Tang times, the Chinese poetYuan Chen wrote appreciatively of "slave girls of Viet, sleek, of buttery flesh",while today the booming market for Vietnamese women in Taiwan infuriates andhumiliates many Vietnamese men.

It's instructive, then, that in his 1987 novel F ired Gold Vietnamese author NguyenHuy Thiep writes, "The most significant characteristics of this country are itssmallness and weakness. She is like a virgin girl raped by Chinese civilization.The girl concurrently enjoys, despises and is humiliated by the rape."

This Chinese belief that Vietnam is not just another nation, but rather a member of the family - almost Chinese, aware of the blessings of Chinese civilization, butsomehow stubbornly refusing, century after century, to become Chinese - haspersisted down to the present day.

During the Second Indochina War, Chinese propaganda stressed that Vietnamand China were "as close as the lips and the teeth". After the US defeat, however,Vietnam once again showed its independence, allying itself with the Soviet Union,in 1978-79, invading neighboring Cambodia and overthrowing China's main ally inSoutheast Asia, the Khmer Rouge.

Once again Chinese fury knew no bounds, and Beijing determined to teach the"ungrateful" Vietnamese a lesson. Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader, openlydenounced the Vietnamese as "the hooligans of the East". According to one Thaidiplomat: "The moment the topic of Vietnam came up, you could see somethingchange in Deng Xiaoping.

"His hatred was just visceral. He spat forcefully into his spittoon and called theVietnamese 'dogs'." Acting on Deng's orders, the Chinese army invaded Vietnam

in 1979, capturing five northern provincial capitals before systematicallydemolishing them and withdrawing to China after administering a symbolic"lesson".

But who taught a lesson to whom? Beijing sought to force Hanoi to withdraw itsfrontline forces from Cambodia, but the Vietnamese didn't engage these forces inthe struggle, choosing instead to confront the Chinese with irregulars andprovincial militia. Casualties were about equal, and China lost considerable face,



as well as international respect, as a result of its invasion.

Over the millennia, actions like this have taugh t the Vietnamese a recurring lessonabout China. It's there, it's big, and it won't go away, so appease it without yieldingwhenever possible, and fight it with every resource available whenever necessary.

Just as Chinese rulers have seen the Vietnamese as ingrates and hooligans, sothe Vietnamese have seen the Chinese as arrogant and aggressive, a power to beemulated at all times, mollified in times of peace, and fiercely resisted in times of war.

In 1946, 1,700 years after Lady Triu's declaration, an other great Vietnamesepatriot, Ho Chi Minh, warned his Viet Minh colleagues in forceful terms againstusing Chinese Nationalist troops in the north as a buffer against the return of theFrench: "You fools! Don't you realize what it means if the Chinese re main? Don't

you remember your history?

"The last time the Chinese came, they stayed a thousand years. The French areforeigners. They are weak. Colonialism is dying. The white man is finished in Asia.But if the Chinese stay now, they will never go. As f or me, I prefer to sniff Frenchshit for five years than to eat Chinese shit for the rest of my life."

Yet Ho was an ardent admirer of Chinese civilization, fluent in Mandarin, a skilledcalligrapher who wrote Chinese poetry, a close friend and colleague of Chineseleaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Ho wasn't as much anti -Chinese as he waspro-Vietnamese. It was his deep understanding of and respect for China thatenabled him to recognize, clearly and definitively, the menace that "a close familyrelationship" with the giant to the north posed, and continues to pose, for Vietnam's independence and freedom.

It's ironic, then, that as the current Vietnamese leadership strive to develop their economy along increasingly capitalist lines while at the same tim e retaining their monopoly on state power, the country they most admire and seek to emulate is, asalways, the one they most fear.

Andrew Forbes is editor of CPA Media as well as a correspondent in its Thailand bureau. He has recently completed National Geographic Traveler: Shanghai , and the above is an excerpt from his forthcoming book A Phoenix Reborn: Travels inNew Vietnam.

China and Vietnam



In their three thousand years of interaction, China and Vietnam havebeen through a full range of relationships. Throughout all thesefluctuations the one constant has been that China is always the largerpower, and Vietnam the smaller. Yet China has rarely been able todominate Vietnam, and the relationship is shaped by its asymmetry.The Sino-Vietnamese relationship provides the perfect ground for

developing and exploring the effects of asymmetry on internationalrelations. Womack develops his theory in conjunction with an originalanalysis of the interaction between China and Vietnam from the BronzeAge to the present.

"Some countries are obviously stronger than others. Yet moderntheories of international politics, deriving from Westphalian normativeassumptions of sovereign equality, tend to overlook this fact, treatingasymmetry as a form of abnormal, remediable imbalance. BrantlyWomack, however, based on an up-to-date yet comprehensiveoverview of Sino-Vietnamese relations, develops a theory of international asymmetry with implications far transcending this case.His book will thus interest not only East Asian area specialists but allstudents of contemporary international affairs."-Lowell Dittmer, University of California, Berkeley"The book sets out to make a contribution to International Relationstheory by examining examples of asymmetry in the power relationsbetween China and Vietnam. He shows that, with a different starting-point, asymmetry could lead to a stability and normalcy that goesagainst current IR theories about asymmetric relationships betweennations. The book offers a valuable correction to some current notionsabout asymmetry, in particular the idea that it makes for instability andcould not be the basis for normalcy. By his close analysis of a twothousand year relationship between China and Vietnam, the author notonly shows that the relationship was relatively stable in the past butalso explains why it seems to have found a particular normalcy of itsown today. There is no comparable work at this level of sophistication.I t will be vital reading for all political scientists, especially scholars of international relations, and most historians of Asia."-Wang Gungwu, National University of Singapore"Relations between unequals define contemporary international politics,many of these relationships endure while Great Powers rise and fall,and mismanaged asymmetry has painful consequences for the strongas well as the weak. Largely ignored in the theoretical literature,relations between states of greatly different capabilities receive theattention it deserves in China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry.Brilliantly conceived and elegantly executed, this importantamplification of structural realism is a fascinating dissection of a long



and turbulent relation s

ip a s well."- ¡ illia m S. Turley, Southern ¢ llinoi s Univer sity

"Brantly Wo ma c £ 's book on relation ship between China and Vietna m is an intere sting analy sis of thi s long and complex relation ship. The studyis innovative a s it atte mpt s to analyze the long hi story of relation s between the two countrie s through the u se of a symm etry a s ananalyti cal tool."- ¤ a ms e s Amer

"Wo ma ck 's volu me provide s a major contribution for reader s seeking anup -to -date, clearly pre sented, and sti mulating a ss e ssm ent on how ¢ Rtheory infor ms an under standing of re cent Chine se foreign relation s andvice ver sa."-Robert Sutter, Georgetown Univer sity, Perspectives on Politics

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Vietnam and China in an Era of Economic Uncertainty

Brantly Womack Vietna m and China have mu ch in comm on ( chung). There i s no countrymore sim ilar to China than Vietna m , and there i s no country moresim ilar to Vietna m than China. They share a Siniti c cultural ba ckground,comm uni st partie s that ca me to power in rural (thuo c nong thon)revolution s , and current comm it ment s (lan song doi moi)( China sin ce1978, Vietna m sin ce 1986) to market -ba sed e cono m ic refor ms ( cai cach ). Although the most re cent war of both s tate s wa s with oneanother, combat ended in 1991 and intera ction ha s flouri shed sin ce1999. At pre sent, together with the re st of the world, they both fa ce asharp in crea se in global e cono m ic un certainty. What effe cts will globalun certainty have on the pro spe ct s for ea ch country and on theirrelation ship?



Map o f East Asia a n

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t h ¦ Wester n Paci f ic Clearly, in 200 8 a massive change in the world economy began,requiring that a range of policies and attitudes be rethought. BothVietnam and China will have to adjust their development strategies.Part of the adjustment is likely to include rethinking regional institutionsas well as bilateral relationships.The relationship between China and Vietnam has been normal for adecade, and is likely to remain so. However, it is also an asymmetricrelationship. Each side has a different exposure to the relationship, anda global event such as the current crisis affects each differently.Vietnam¶s economic situation is considerably less stable than China¶s.The opportunities presented by China¶s continued development areattractive to Vietnam, but at the same time both the government andthe population are concerned about increasing dependence on China.This article will first discuss the pre-crisis situation of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship and then the likely scope of the current globaleconomic crisis. Every crisis is unique. The second major part of the

paper will discuss the challenges posed to Vietnam and China by thenew era. Vietnam and China will face some similar challenges, such asthe development of domestic markets and the reorientation of foreigntrade. However, they will also face challenges specific to their individualsituations. For Vietnam the problem of economic adjustment is moreurgent, while for China the problem of sustainable development is moreurgent.The final part concerns the Vietnam-China relationship in the new era.The existing principles and institutions of the relationship provide a



strong foundation for continued cooperation. However, globalturbulence provides a new and uncertain context for the relationship,and because of Vietnam¶s greater exposure to China its anxieties aboutdependence on China are heightened. Given the asymmetry of therelationship, it is important that it is buffered by other relationships aswell as regional and global organizations.T h e Global Eco n omic Crisis The Pre-Cri s i s Situation China and Vietnam formally normalized their relationship in late 1991 ,after the resolution in principle of the Cambodia dispute and the returnof Prince Sihanouk to Phnom Penh. Building momentum andovercoming suspicions took time, but by 1999 both governmentscommitted themselves to ³long-term, stable, future-oriented, goodneighborly, and all-round cooperative relations.´ ( , ,

, ; Láng gi ng h u ngh , h p tác toàn di n, n nh lâudài, h ng t i t ng lai ) . This ³ 16 Word Guideline´ became the mantrato be repeated at every official meeting, but it was not empty talk. I twas assumed that the relationship would be one of increasing mutualbenefit, and that problems and differences could be managed in thatcontext.The first major milestones of normalcy were agreements ondemarcating the land border and a series of discussions on utilization of the Gulf of Tongking. No progress was made on resolving claims to theParacel and Spratly island groups, but the 2002 agreement betweenChina and ASEAN concerning peaceful conduct in the South China Seahelped to limit the conflict potential of this arena. Meanwhile, diplomaticand economic contact increased enormously.

As Figure 1 illustrates, trade with China has outpaced the generallyrapid growth of Vietnam¶s total trade, increasing its share from 6 .1



percent in 1999 to 14 .3 percent in 200 7 , and from one-fourth of Vietnam¶s trade with the rest of ASEAN to two-thirds. Keeping pace withthickening economic relations, exchanges of official visits at all levels,educational exchanges, and tourism have also grown rapidly.However, the relationship between China and Vietnam is asymmetric inevery respect, and asymmetry creates fundamentally different

perspectives on the relationship. Vietnam¶s GDP in 200 7 was threepercent of China¶s. 1 China is the world¶s second largest merchandiseexporter and third largest importer ; Vietnam ranks fiftieth and forty-first, respectively. China and Vietnam have comparable levels of tradeper capita, but for Vietnam trade is twice as important. Vietnam¶s tradeto GDP ratio is 156 , while China¶s is 71 .3. Trade structure is quitedifferent. For Vietnam, agricultural, fuel and mining products are 46 .3percent of total exports ; for China they constitute only 6 .7 percent.Vietnam is a net exporter of oil and coal ; China is also a net exporter of coal. Chinese goods fill Vietnamese markets. China is the chief source

of Vietnam¶s machinery, computers, chemicals, and textiles. Moresurprisingly, China sells three times more fruit and vegetables toVietnam than it buys. These differences in economic capacity andstructure, as well as in global weight, create a general asymmetricframework for the economic relationship.

As Figure 2 illustrates, the disparity between the economies of Chinaand Vietnam is accentuated by an imbalance between imports and

exports. China is easily Vietnam¶s number one source of imports, equalto 79 percent of imports from all of ASEAN, and the latter includes alarge amount of refined oil products from Singapore. While Vietnamexports textiles as well as commodities such as gems and coffee todeveloped countries, most of China¶s purchases are raw materials. Forexample, Vietnam exports 7 0 percent of its rubber to China, but it buystwo-thirds more rubber products from China than it sells. Generallyspeaking, Vietnam relies on China for a very broad range of its imports,twenty percent of its total imports, and sells coal, oil and food products



to China. Vietnam is a perfect external market for Chinese goodsbecause of similar economic conditions and consumer cultures and lowtransportation costs. While Vietnam cannot find a comparably pricedsource for much of what it buys from China, China can get its fuel andtropical products elsewhere. 2 Moreover, Vietnam¶s coal reserves aredwindling. In 20 1 0 domestic demand for coal will approximate total

production, and by 20 15 Vietnam expects to import 2 5 million tons,more than half the amount of current domestic production. But in thefirst six months of 2009 more than half of production was exported²two-thirds of the total to China²and it will be difficult to replace coal¶sforeign exchange earnings. 3 Meanwhile oil output has declined since200 5 . Oil exports in 200 7 were lower than they had been in 2000,though earnings were greater due to price hikes. Thus the trends inbilateral China trade are against Vietnam. I t imports ever more, and inthe absence of a significant change in the composition of its exports, itwill have less to sell.

For China, trade with Vietnam is much less important than it is forVietnam. In 200 7 Vietnam ranked 22nd in China¶s exports, betweenThailand and Mexico, and 3 8 th in imports, between Mexico andVenezuela. 4 Among Asian partners Vietnam ranked 16 th in exports,behind all of the ³big five´ ASEAN states, and 11 th in imports, behindSingapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand.

While Vietnam¶s trade deficit with China has been large and growing,Figure 3 shows that it has been balanced by its trade surplus with theUnited States. However, the sharp rise in the China imbalance from200 5 has erased the advantage. Vietnam also runs a large surplus withthe EU, but as a result of the current financial crisis, the developedcountry consumer market is down, while Vietnam¶s demand for Chinesegoods continues to grow. In 200 7 the US surplus covered 92 percent of the China deficit. In the first half of 2009 it covered 81 percent.Meanwhile, although the Vietnamese economy is growing, in August2009 its imports were down 2 8 percent, its exports were down 14



percent, and tourism was down 18 percent. 5 The current crisis is thusnot only a domestic problem for Vietnam, it also directly affectseconomic and trade dimensions of its relationship with China. As weshall see, it affects the political relationship as well.Gl oba l Un c ertainty The global economic crisis that has riveted world attention since mid-

200 8 is the most serious systemic economic crisis since the GreatDepression. As a systemic crisis, its chief existential effect is a vastincrease in uncertainty. The two major crises of the post-Cold War era,the collapse of the Russian economy in the 1 990s and the Asianfinancial crisis of 1 99 7 , occurred within a global system that was widelypresumed to be stable and which indeed absorbed the shock. Theeffects of the 200 8 crisis touched off by the United States rocked theworld economy and its effects continue to reverberate.Consider fluctuations in the price of oil. In December 2003, it wasUS$30 per barrel. In July 200 8 it reached US$ 145 per barrel, before

plummeting by December 200 8 to less than US$ 4 0. And oil is only oneindicator of the current fluctuation of asset values.Prediction becomes virtually impossible in a systemic crisis. Even acorrect structural analysis cannot specify when a predicted event willoccur. I t is relatively easy to judge a bridge unsound, but impossible toknow when it will collapse. Moreover, structural change is rarely drivenby one structural element, but rather by the interaction of interdependent factors.The previous global systemic crisis, the Great Depression of the 1 930s,is a poor model for prediction. There were far fewer sovereign actors inthe colonial era. Vietnam was hurt more than France because Francesubordinated Vietnamese interests to its own. Now the 1 92 members of the UN will be making their own decisions. I t is still the case that not allstates are equal, but the clout of state actors has become morecomplex as well. A debtor United States must work with a creditorChina. There were also no functioning regional or global economicorganizations in the 1 930s. Now there are both regional and globalvenues for cooperation on common policies. A more mixed blessing of the present era is the role of the dollar as the global currency. On theone hand, it provides an international standard of exchange that wasmissing in the 1 930s. On the other hand, it might prove an unreliablestandard, and it is notable that the US was the source of the currentcrisis. Lastly, the transportation and communications revolutions havecreated a near-instantaneous capacity for international interaction. Theproblems, processes, and solutions of the present crisis will necessarilybe novel.Thus the key characteristic of the current crisis is not that all suffer( though they do ) , but that all are uncertain about when and how thesuffering will end. The dimensions of the current uncertainty will exert aprofound effect on the planning and priorities of individuals and nations.



In relatively stable times, it is rational to act according to one¶smarginal advantage, to choose the better instead of the merely good.In times of uncertainty, it is rational to be cautious. If future prospectsare uncertain, it becomes more important to secure a solid benefit thanto take a better but riskier option. In general, the developed world hasbeen relatively stable and prosperous during the post-Cold War era, and

it has become habituated to acting according to marginal advantage.The stability and progress of the developed world has also had abroader stabilizing effect on the global economy. Currently thatsituation and its logic are in a period of traumatic transition. We arenow in a new era, one of uncertainty.Uncertainty is not new to Asia. The Asian financial crisis of 1 99 7 was aprofound experience of regional economic uncertainty. AlthoughVietnam and China were not the hardest hit, growth slowed. The Asianfinancial crisis led to greater determination on the part of ASEAN tocoordinate economic policies, and eventually to greater ASEAN-China

and ASEAN +3 cooperation.However, the Asian financial crisis differed in three major ways from thecurrent crisis. First, the Asian financial crisis took place within arelatively stable global environment. Uncertainty was limited to theregion, and it was largely limited to finance and its budgetaryconsequences. Second, recovery plans could be based on familiarpatterns of increasing production and selling to markets in the USA andEurope. Now these markets are undercut by more cautiousconsumption and the danger of tariff wars among nations is high. Forboth China and Vietnam, membership in the WTO played an importantrole in encouraging trade and investment while limiting their tariff andtrade options in responding to the crisis. Third, the developed countries,especially the USA, were rather indifferent to the difficulties of Asiangovernments. I t is unclear whether countries will help each other in thecurrent crisis, but globally they are all in the same stormy waters,though in different boats.Gl oba l Certaintie s The largest nodes in the multi-nodal international economy are theUnited States and Europe, and, as Giovanni Arrighi argues, they arelikely to remain the largest nodes even in an era of uncertainty. 6 Theirshare of the world market and of investment will decline, but they arelarge and wealthy economies, with tremendous advantages in capitaland technology. Even as they try to protect their domestic producers,they will find that they have become dependent on imports that cannotbe sourced internally. To be sure, lower consumer demand, highertransportation costs, and pressures to create jobs at home will reducethe current prominence in the world economy of the USA and Europe,but other than the upper-income segments of the world¶s largest citiesthere are no markets like them, and no comparable concentrations of



financial services. The United States has 22. 5 percent of the world¶sGDP, and the five largest states of Europe together have 16 .7 percent. 7 That said, another major trend in the world economy that is likely tocontinue and even strengthen is the growth of middle-income countriesand the emergence of some low-income countries from destitution. In200 5 middle-income countries accounted for 32 percent of world GDP,

and lower-income countries another 7 percent² together the same asthe USA and the top five European economies combined. China (9. 7 percent ) and India (4 .3 percent ) are of course important individualcomponents, but together they are less than half of the middle-incomeshare. To the extent that middle-income GDP is dependent onproducing for high-income markets it will be influenced by world crisis,but to the extent that it produces for itself it should be relatively betteroff. Assuming that there is more room for growth in middle-incomeconsumer markets they are likely to do relatively better over the nextfive years.

Another global trend that will help some countries and slow others isgrowing pressures on world resources, including energy, materials, andfood. These pressures will be offset somewhat by decreased demandfrom developed countries and in the case of oil by alternative energysources, but the limitations of sources and increasing costs of inputs( labor and technology ) will cause prices to rise. Since the exportvolume of many of these products is generated by middle-incomecountries, this trend should encourage the increase in middle-incomeshare in both absolute and relative terms. However, the specific impactof higher resource prices will be different in each country. The effectsare complicated for China and Vietnam. Vietnam is a resource exporter,but with limited production and reserves and an urgent need to pay forimports. China is a resource importer, but with dollars to pay for them.Related to the increasing price of resources will be increasing problemsof sustainable development. Sustainable development is broader thanthe availability of resources since it also includes the byproducts of production: pollution, water shortage, and social disruption. Populationdensity is as important as level of development in determining theurgency of sustainable development issues, since the populationimmediately surrounding a production site are most exposed to itsenvironmental effects. Beyond the immediate by-products of production,rapid development can exacerbate economic inequalities and insecurity,and can lead to social disruption. China¶s concentration on maximumgrowth during the reform era has made it vulnerable to a broad rangeof sustainability crises, from food and water shortages to social unrest.Vietnam has also pursued maximum growth, but its later start andmore modest achievements have not sharpened the contradictions of sustainability to the same degree.Finally, the number and seriousness of truly transnational and globalissues, such as pandemic disease, terrorism, and so forth, are likely to



increase. These issues can only be effectively addressed throughinternational cooperation. The region¶s experience with SARS in 200 4 was a sobering lesson, and the flickering cases of avian flu are areminder that worse can happen.Ch alle ng es f or Viet n am a n

§

Ch in a i n t h e New Era Simi l aritie s

Both Vietnam and China have set a high priority on maximizingeconomic growth, and a major component of this strategy has been theencouragement of production for developed country markets. As Table1 shows, both rely on markets in USA and Europe for roughly one-thirdof their exports, and trade to these markets has more than kept pacewith their general increase in trade. Moreover, both Vietnam and Chinarely on heavily favorable balances in their developed country trade tocounter deficits in other areas. Considering that the USA and the fivelargest European economies together are 39 percent of the world¶seconomy, it is understandable that they would be major parts of the

export strategies of other countries. Nevertheless, it amounts to a largeexposure to the epicenter of the current global uncertainties.

The pre-crisis trade pattern therefore accentuates the effects of globaleconomic crisis for both Vietnam and China, and will requirereadjustment of priorities. Although the USA and Europe will remainmajor markets, they will certainly contract. Losses are unavoidable insectors of the economy that have been created specially to serve thesemarkets. Capital losses are felt primarily by foreign investors, but joblosses are a domestic problem. Moreover, these problems areconcentrated in export-oriented localities that have hitherto beenleaders in economic development. The most immediate challengetherefore for both Vietnam and China will be to soften the losses forthose most affected by the crisis.The deeper and more important challenge is to shift externaldevelopment strategy away from producing goods for existing marketstoward developing new markets. I t is important to maintain share inshrinking markets, but it is more important to establish share ingrowing markets. The fastest growing markets in the new era of uncertainty are likely to be in the middle-income countries, including



China itself, and the greatest long-term opportunities will be in thepoorest countries. Both Vietnam and China have special advantages inthese markets because they are themselves developing countries andtherefore are acquainted with the needs of such economies. However,foreign direct investment is not likely to play a leading role inproduction for developing country markets, so governments will have to

be active in encouraging local entrepreneurship and development.The most important challenge of market development will be within thedomestic economies of Vietnam and China. One¶s own market is themost reliable one in a time of global uncertainty. Spreading the nationaleconomic infrastructure and developing domestic consumption arealways major priorities, but they take on new importance in uncertaintimes. Moreover, for both Vietnam and China, the Chinese domesticmarket is the major opportunity in Asia.Global uncertainty has lowered rates of GDP growth in Vietnam andChina, and this creates the temptation to try to maintain the current

growth rates at all costs. Both China and Vietnam have adopted majorstimulus packages² 15 percent and 6 .8 percent of their respectiveGDPs²in order to counter the initial effects of the slowdown. 8 However,the concentration on maximum economic growth is a problematicstrategy in good economic times, and it is more questionable in badtimes. Sustainable development should be even more important in anera of global uncertainty. Unsustainable development creates crises inthe present and future. A slower but more solid pattern of developmentprevents the magnification of uncertainties. As Premier Wen Jiabao hasargued, scientific development must address the problems of socialinequalities and promote social harmony as well as coping with obviousindustrial problems such as pollution.A final common challenge for Vietnam, China, and their neighbors is todevelop and strengthen regional institutions, especially in areas of development, trade, and finance. The weakness and variability of theUS dollar underlines the importance of East Asia providing its owninternational financial stability, and the problems of big internationalservice providers such as A IG and the now defunct Lehman Brothersshows the advisability of locally-based and regionally-based institutions.However, the strength of ASEAN, the most successful regionalinstitution in East Asia, has been based on openness to the rest of theworld rather than the formation of a closed system, and this shouldremain a principle of future institutional development.D ifferen c e s Despite the basic similarities of the situations of Vietnam and China infacing global economic uncertainty, the challenges they face aredifferent in some important respects.Vietnam is a smaller economy, and it is less wealthy than China. Chinahas had the advantage of seven additional years of reform andopenness, and it did not have the disadvantages of war and of lingering



international hostility. The United States normalized relations withChina in 1 97 9, but with Vietnam only in 1 99 5 . Moreover, Vietnamentered the WTO in 200 7 , while China entered in 200 1 .Since Vietnam is a smaller boat riding lower in the water, it has moreurgent difficulties in adjusting to the current crisis. Before the crisisbegan inflation was a problem, peaking at 2 8 percent in August 200 8 .

Deflationary measures adopted in April 200 8 eventually broughtinflation under control, but the collapse of developed country exports( total exports down 2 4 percent year-on-year in January 2009 ) led toopposite policies of fiscal stimulus and damage control. China went thrua similar cycle of inflationary pressures, deflationary policies, andstimulus, but inflation was much milder (5 percent ) and it had a hugetrade surplus. 9 Since 2003 Vietnam has run trade deficits with allASEAN countries except Cambodia and the Philippines, and except forthose two and South Africa, the rest of its surpluses have been withdeveloped countries. 1 0 In June 2009 the IMF estimated Vietnam 2009

GDP growth at 3. 5 percent and judged it to be ³weathering the crisisrelatively well.´ 11 This is in contrast to Thailand, for instance, whichexpects a contraction of 3 percent despite the beginnings of recovery. 1 2 However, the IMF was concerned about the possible fiscallydestabilizing effects of the stimulus package. Clearly Vietnam¶s firstproblem is managing as best it can the problems caused by the currentcrisis.As to market reorientation, Vietnam¶s greatest single opportunity isChina. I ts border with Guangxi and Yunnan give special access tosouthwest China, and it has good maritime access to Guangdong andHainan. But besides these neighboring areas, the vast improvement inChina¶s rail and road transportation in the south greatly facilitateVietnam¶s access. Joint development projects at the major gateways of Lang Son/Pingxiang and Mong Cai/Dongxing offer unique advantages,as do larger projects such as plans to develop the Gulf of Tonkin region.Exports to China have increased. Trade grew by eleven times from1 999 to 200 7 , but the export of petroleum, coal, and other resources isa significant part of the increase. In the first half of 2009 total tradewith China was 16 percent, almost at the level of ASEAN trade (18 .4 percent ) . Exports to China were 7 .5 percent of total exports, about half of exports to US (1 9. 5 percent ) , while China was the source of 23percent of Vietnam¶s imports, almost three times imports from the EUand a billion dollars more than from ASEAN. 1 3 Vietnam¶s challenge in diversifying exports to China is that it is difficultto find products and areas of consumption in which it can competesuccessfully with domestic Chinese producers. However, a moresophisticated and sensitive marketing effort of manufactured productsto China should yield results. Many developed countries tradecommodities with one another when neither has a clear competitiveadvantage. Vietnamese manufacturers could establish brand names and



Africa grew 9 78 percent and 8 38 percent respectively, far outpacing itsgeneral trade growth. 15 Trade growth with other regions was alsoimpressive, however, ranging from 5 00 to 6 00 percent, with theweakest region being Asia. Of course, trade with Asia was increasingfrom a higher base. By moving beyond its immediate neighborhoodsand developing markets and sources throughout the world, China has

reduced its exposure to particular economic fluctuations and hasincreased its opportunities.Both Vietnam and China face the challenges of regional reorganization,but from different vantage points. For China, the problem is a multi-regional one. I t must simultaneously manage its relationships withNortheast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. I ts position as thenew center of the general Asian economy and as its most promisingmarket puts it in the macro-regional leadership position, and capable of voicing important concerns and ideas regarding global structures. Theelectoral victory of the Democratic Party in Japan¶s August 2009

election puts it in a better position to cooperate with China in regionalinitiatives. For Vietnam, the most important regional task is tostrengthen ASEAN, both internally and in ASEAN¶s collectiverelationships with China and India.T h e Viet n am-C h in a Relatio n s h ip i n t h e New Era I t is the good fortune of Vietnam and China that before the current eraof global uncertainty they normalized their relationship using principlesand practices that are quite compatible with the requirements of thenew era. The ³ 16 Word Guideline´ enunciated in February 1 999 is stillquite applicable. More generally, the mutual commitment to the FivePrinciples of Peaceful Coexistence formulated in 1 954 , multipolarity,openness, autonomy, and the peaceful settlement of differences,remain a vital framework for the relationship. More specifically, thesettlement of the land border, the management of Tonkin Gulf differences, and the decision in principle to cooperate in developing theSpratly Islands are important not only because they reduce points of conflict, but also because the successful negotiation of these sensitiveissues provides a pattern for the future.Nevertheless, managing an asymmetric relationship poses specialchallenges for each side. 16 For the larger side, the challenge is toreassure the smaller side that it respects its identity and autonomy.Because the larger side is capable of infringing on the interests of thesmaller side, it must demonstrate that it respects the smaller side¶sautonomy and is willing to negotiate rather than bully. For its part, thesmaller side must convince the larger that it respects the differences incapacities and does not intend to challenge the larger. In a word, thesmaller side must be deferential. But deference does not mean that thelarger side controls the smaller and can dominate the relationship.Quite the opposite. The smaller side can be deferential only if the largerrespects its interests and autonomy. The exchange of deference by the



smaller side and recognition of autonomy by the larger side makespossible normal asymmetric negotiation. A normal bilateral relationshipis beneficial to China as well as to Vietnam. While it might seem thatthe larger side could get more from the relationship by simply bullyingthe smaller side rather than compromising, in fact the smaller side isquite capable of resisting the larger. No country has a longer history of

patriotic resistance than Vietnam. If a hostile stalemate developsbetween the two, then both sides lose the opportunities of mutuallybeneficial relations.Despite the general commitment to normalcy, there have been tensionsbetween China¶s tendency toward complacent self-assertion andVietnam¶s anxieties concerning its vulnerability to China. Despite theofficial settlement of the land border by a 5 0- 5 0 assignment of disputedterritory, there has been an undercurrent of patriotic disapproval inVietnam of yielding any Vietnamese land to China. Incidents in theTonkin Gulf and South China Sea do not now lead to the public

confrontations that occurred even in the 1 990s, but they are watchedclosely as signs of possible encroachment. More seriously, moves byChina in 200 7 to enforce its claim to sole sovereignty of the Paracel andSpratly Islands led to rare public demonstrations in Hanoi and Ho ChiMinh City. 17 Similarly China¶s development of a submarine base inHainan stirred Hanoi to contract in April 2009 for six Russiansubmarines at an estimated cost of $ 1 .8 billion.18 These tensions in therelationship are magnified in the international media and by anti-regimeactivists among the overseas Vietnamese, but they do express acommon uneasiness about vulnerability to China and a suspicion aboutChina¶s motives.Trade with China has been an acutely mixed blessing for Vietnam eversince it resumed in 1 990. 1 9 On the one hand, much desired consumergoods began to flood in, accompanied by important producer goodssuch as insecticides and tools. On the other hand, the competition fromChinese products was devastating for Vietnamese industry. This led toimport bans on Chinese products in 1 992, but smuggling was soprevalent that the bans were ineffective. Having the Chinese superstorenext door is good for shopping but bad for the neighborhood store.Global uncertainty has made more difficult the management of bilateralasymmetric relationships. The best example in 2009 was the hotlydisputed decision to allow a Chinese company, Chalco, to develop abauxite mine in Vietnam¶s Central Highlands. 20 The world¶s third largestbauxite deposits are located there, and Vietnam is hoping to attractUS$15 billion in investment by 202 5 . In 200 7 Vietnam reachedagreements with Alcoa and Chalco concerning 20- 4 0 percent jointventures on mining and processing projects, but there was public outcry.General Giap, now 9 7 years old, wrote a letter of protest to thePolitburo, and many others questioned the move.



Ge n eral Giap Environmental problems included disruption in the Central Highlands,

with large-scale surface mining and electric power and toxic byproductsfrom the processing of bauxite. But the China-invested project wasparticularly targeted, with claims that thousands of Chinese workerswould be brought in to do jobs that unemployed Vietnamese could do,and that Chinese presence would be a security threat. In April thegovernment announced that the current project under contract withChalco would continue, but that it would postpone the decisionconcerning foreign investment in bauxite mining and processing. Other

projects would require additional environmental and economicassessments.Vietnam is hardly the only country facing dilemmas concerning Chineseinvestment in resources. The United States prevented the sale of Unocal to China National Offshore Oil Company ( CNOOC) in 200 5 , andAustralia is wrestling with questions of how much Chinese investmentto allow in its natural resources. But for Vietnam these concerns areamplified by the disparity between it and its larger neighbor.The dilemma that the Vietnamese government faces in the bauxiteproject points to the basic dilemma of asymmetric relations made moreacute by global uncertainty. On the one hand, Vietnam is in need of investment and trade. Chalco is the world¶s third largest aluminumproducer and China currently imports three-fourths of its alumina. Thedevelopment of a major new resource is an opportunity that can¶t beignored, and China is a natural partner. On the other hand, the fact thatChina is growing so fast and the idea of China as threat is so ingrainedin national consciousness creates a fear that rises in proportion to theopportunity. Just as the opportunity would benefit some more thanothers in Vietnam, the fear can be exploited by interested groups to



claim the flag of true patriotism. Vietnam has proved itself capable of going it alone. In February 2009 it opened the $2. 5 billion Dong Quatoil refinery, a project that had been abandoned because of projectionsof unprofitability by three different groups of major internationalpartners since construction began in 1 99 5 . However, uncertainty raisesthe cost of stubbornness as well as its incentive. If the world economy

were more stable Vietnam would neither be so desperate nor soanxious. Uncertainty increases the interest in opportunity but at thesame time extends the horizons of doubt and fear.Just as the tensions of bilateral asymmetric relationships areheightened by international uncertainty, they can be buffered bymultilateral regional and global institutions. If Vietnam had notsucceeded in joining the WTO before the current crisis it would be moreanxious and fearful in its relationship with China. I ronically, its factorsimilarity to China attracted investment from companies wanting todiversify their political exposure. Multilateral agreements and

institutions provide a web of common international expectations thatreduce concerns about fluctuation in bilateral relations.The most important multilateral organization buffering the Sino-Vietnamese relationship is ASEAN and, more broadly, to ASEAN +3.Only one-fourth of ASEAN trade is within ASEAN, and, as a consensusorganization, it is more impressive for the regional atmosphere itcreates than for the policies it adopts. But over time it has transformedboth the regional political environment of Southeast Asia and theregion¶s external image. 21 The admission of Vietnam into ASEAN in1 99 5 had two important bilateral effects. I t prodded the United Statesinto finally recognizing Vietnam, and it gave Vietnam the confidence topursue closer relations with China. Rather than balancing against China,regional security ( and normalization with the United States ) enabledVietnam to feel less isolated and therefore less at risk in an asymmetricbilateral relationship, especially one that was similar to that of its fellowASEAN members.ASEAN¶s soft-line, consensual approach prompts predictions of itsdemise whenever Southeast Asia faces major crises. But unlike adefensive alliance such as NATO, its function is not to counter anidentified external threat, but rather to facilitate a regional adjustmentto new situations. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1 97 9 led tothe alignment of ASEAN in an anti-Vietnamese entente, with Thailanddesignated as the front-line member. ASEAN seemed fragmented in itspolicy as the Cambodian stalemate moved into endgame in the secondhalf of the 1 98 0s, but by the mid- 1 990s it took the bold move of becoming a truly regional organization by admitting Vietnam, Cambodia,Laos, and Myanmar. ASEAN¶s efforts at economic coordination had beenweak before the Asian financial crisis, but beginning with the SixthASEAN Summit in Hanoi in December 1 99 8 members re-committedthemselves to an ASEAN free trade area ( AFTA) , and, perhaps more



importantly, took a more active role in developing regional relationswith Japan, China, and Korea ( ASEAN +3) . The most spectacular resultof these explorations was the ASEAN-China free trade area ( ACFTA orCAFTA) announced in 2002 and targeted for full operation in 20 1 0- 15 and currently on schedule. The economic progress was complementedon the political and security side by the ³Declaration on the Conduct of

Parties in the South China Sea´ signed in 2002 and China¶s accession tothe ASEAN Treaty of Amity ( as the first non-ASEAN member ) in 2003. 22 Vietnam¶s participation in the ASEAN initiatives helped reassure Chinaof Vietnam¶s deference and also provided Vietnam with a regionalumbrella for its own bilateral policies.How will ASEAN respond to the current crisis ? With the momentum of ASEAN and more broadly Asian economic integration since 2002, theleast likely response would be the demise of ASEAN. Even in theunlikely event of protectionism in the developed world, ASEAN and EastAsia will probably be cooperative and inclusive in their response.

Considering the common economic problems of dollar exchange rateuncertainty, disruptions in employment and foreign investment,weakening of developed country consumer markets and the need todevelop domestic consumer bases, a variety of new initiatives might beanticipated. On the foreign exchange and investment front, the ChiangMai currency swap facility was raised from $ 8 0 billion to $ 1 20 billion inFebruary 2009, and further efforts to buffer local currencies andinternational projects against third-party currency fluctuations can beexpected. One might expect grander international infrastructureprojects, especially ones that open up interiors or promise employmentand new consumers. With regard to ASEAN-China relations, it might beexpected that ASEAN will do more to encourage exports to China andChinese investment in ASEAN. All of these activities are likely toenhance interest in the East Asia Summit, an ASEAN initiative begun in200 5 , and the possibilities of a future East Asia Community.Co n clusio n In times of uncertainty the prudent strategy is to avoid risk. In thecurrent era of global economic uncertainty negative effects areinevitable for both Vietnam and China because of the structure of theirexternal trade. Nevertheless, Vietnam and China are not the cause of the current global instability, and if they rise to the challenges of thecurrent crisis they will soon recover and prosper.Beyond the immediate problems of inflation and industrial dislocation,Vietnam faces the challenge of redirecting its development efforts moretowards its domestic markets and middle income states. The mostaccessible and promising market is China, and China also provides amodel of how to expand trade opportunities elsewhere.China is well positioned for the current crisis. I t has already expandedits external and domestic markets and its finances are reasonablystrong. China will benefit from earlier prudent strategies. I ts major



challenge is to prevent future crises by emphasizing sustainabledevelopment.Fortunately for both countries, the Vietnam-China relationship is normal.This is especially vital for Vietnam, since China presents its greatestexternal opportunity. The relationship is also important for China, sincenormalcy is the foundation of mutual benefit. However, uncertainty

heightens the sense of risk for the smaller country in an asymmetricrelationship. Both global and regional institutions are important forbuffering bilateral relationships. For China and Vietnam, ASEAN andASEAN¶s broader regional initiatives are likely to provide a usefulframework for stabilizing bilateral interactions and supporting greaterintegration.

i s and author of. Brant l y@gmai l .c om Re c ommended c itation: Brant l y Woma ck, "Vietnam and China in an Eraof E c onomi c Un c ertainty , " The A s ia-Pa c ifi c Journa l , Vo l . 36-2-09 ,

September 7 , 2009. Notes 1 In purchasing power parity ( PPP) . In current dollars two percent. WTOCountry Profi l e s April 2009.2 Coal is a somewhat of an exception. Vietnam supplies one-third of China¶s total coal imports, and two-thirds of its anthracite ( hard coal ) imports.3 Vietnam News Agency, ³Coal industry ups output to 4 3 million tons,´ 23 July 2009.4 China Stati s ti c a l Yearboo k 2008 , Chart 17 -8 , ³Value of Imports andExports by Country.´ 5 The first eight months of 2009 compared to the same period previousyear.6 See Mark Selden, ³China¶s Way Forward ? Historical and ContemporaryPerspectives on Hegemony and the World Economy in Crisis,´ The A s ia-Pa c ifi c Journa l .7 International Comparison Project 200 5 , Gl oba l Pur c ha s ing Power Paritie s and Rea l Expenditure s ( Washington: World Bank, 200 8) .8 Le Thi Thuy Van, ³The Global Crisis and Vietnam¶s Policy Responses,´ Ea s t A s ian Po l i c y ( April-June 2009 ) , pp. 6 3- 74 , p. 71 .9 Ross Garnaut, ³China¶s Place in a World of Crisis,´ in Ross Garnaut,Ligang Song and Wing Thye Woo ( eds ) , China¶ s New P l a c e in a Wor l d of Cri s i s ( Canberra: Australian National University E-Press, 2009 ) , pp. 1 -14 .1 0 Calculated from data supplied by General Statistics Office of Vietnam.11 IMF, ³Vietnam - Informal Mid-Year Consultative Group Meeting,´ Buon Ma Thuot, June 8 -9, 2009.1 2 F inan c ia l Time s , ³Thai Economy Emerges from Recession,´ August 2 4 ,2009.



1 3 General Statistical Office of Vietnam, ³ Imports and exports bycountry group, country and territory in first 6 months, 2009.´

14 Selden, ibid.15 Calculated from China Stati s ti c a l Yearboo k 1 999, 2002, 200 7 .16 Brantly Womack, ³Recognition, Deference, and Respect: Generalizing

the Lessons of an Asymmetric Asian Order,´ Journa l of Ameri c an Ea s t A s ian Re l ation s 16 : 1 -2 ( Spring 2009 ) , pp. 1 05 -118 .

17 In November 200 7 China set up a county-level administrative unit inHainan with responsibilities for its territories in the South China Sea.There was a demonstration in Hanoi on December 9, prompting a publicremonstrance from China, which was followed by a seconddemonstration on December 15 .18 ³Vietnam Reportedly Set to Buy Russian Kilo Class Subs,´ D efen s eIndu s try D ai l y , April 2 8 2009.1 9 Brantly Womack and Gu Xiaosong, ³Border Cooperation Between

China and Vietnam in the 1 990s.´ A s ian Sur v ey 4 0: 6 ( December 2000 ) ,pp. 1 04 2- 1 058 .20 The case is summarized in ³Bauxite Bashers,´ The E c onomi s t ( April23, 2009 ) .21 Alice Ba, (Re)Negotiating Ea s t and Southea s t A s ia: Region , Regiona l i s m , and the A ss oc iation of Southea s t A s ian Nation s ( Stanford:Stanford University Press, 2009 ) .22 China set a powerful example. Among many others, the EU and theUS signed in July 2009.

Introduction

In the first three millennia of their relationship, China and Vietnam have beenthrough almost every conceivable pattern of interaction among neighbors. Even inthe past fifty years, the relationship has swung from intimate friendship toimplacable enmity, and at each extreme the Sino -Vietnamese relationship becamethe defining relationship for different phases of Southeast Asian regional politicsand a major element of global international relations. Although the success of normalization since 1991 has taken the relationship out of world headlines, the

stability of relations between China and Vietnam remains an essential part o f thefoundation of international order in Asia.

The one constant in relations between China and Vietnam since the unification of the Chinese empire in 221 BC has been that China is always much the larger partner.Regardless of whether the relationship was hostile, friendly, or in between, it has

been asymmetric. China has always been a much more important presence for Vietnam than Vietnam has been for China, and Vietnam has had a more acute senseof the risks and opportunities offered by the relationship. Given the great disparity



between China and Vietnam, one might expect that either Vietnam would besubservient to China or that China would annex Vietnam. In fact, however, eventhough Vietnam was formally a part of China for a millennium it was never fully³domesticated,´ and for most of the last tho usand years the relationship has been anegotiated one. The Sino-Vietnamese relationship therefore presents an interestingcase of a long-term asymmetric relationship that has moved through a full gamut of

possible variations. Moreover, the asymmetry of the relationship can be used toexplain its restlessness as well as the methods that both sides have used to defineand to manage it.

Asymmetry provides the analytic focus for the book. I argue that asymmetry ismore than just an obvious fact about the relationship between China and Vietnam; ithas always been its most important structural factor. The disparity in capacity in anasymmetric relationship does not lead inevitably to the stronger side dominating theweaker side, as the case of Vietnam shows. If greater size and strength implied thatChina could easily dominate Vietnam, Vietnam would not exist today as an

independent state. But Vietnam¶s existence next to China has not been an easy one.A great disparity, especially between neighboring states, a lways means that theweaker side will be more attentive to the relationship than vice versa because

proportionally it is more exposed to its risks and opportunities. It is easy for misunderstandings to arise because the relationship means different things to eachside. In times of crisis, the misunderstandings of each side are more likely to lead toa vicious circle than to mutual correction. Therefore asymmetric relations aredifficult to manage.

I stress the theory of asymmetric relations in this book because most international

relations theory overlooks the matters highlighted here. Since nations are sovereignentities and Western international relations theory arose from the competition of roughly equal powers in Europe and then concentrated on great power conflicts, it isnot surprising that relations of disparity are usually treated as temporarydisequilibria. 1 It is assumed that either the weaker state will balance its vulnerability

by means of alliances with other states or it will be subject to th e hegemony of thestronger state. But in fact there exist many long-term asymmetric relationships, andthe stronger cannot always impose its will on the weaker. If an asymmetricrelationship cannot be ³solved´ through force, then it must be managed by bothsides. China and Vietnam provide a broad spectrum of experiences in managing anasymmetric relationship, and their recent management of normalization has beenquite effective. Asymmetry provides a useful approach to understanding their relationship, and the Sino-Vietnamese case provides a rich case study for a generaltheory of asymmetry.

It is beyond the scope of this book to provide a sweeping analysis of contemporaryworld politics, but the salience of asymmetry reaches far beyond the case of Chinaand Vietnam and even beyond similar bilateral situations. The post ±Cold War worldof the lone superpower is a world of asymmetric, non-competitive relations, and in



general international relations theory turns a blind eye to the problems of managingand sustaining such relations. The grand boxing match between the United Statesand the Soviet Union is over, and the key problem of international relations hasshifted to the sustainability of leadership. Rather than speculating on the nextchallenger, international relations theory should attend to the problems of thesustainable leadership of the strong and the factors influencing the compliance of

the weak. We live now in a world not of competitive great powers, nor one of master and slaves, but in a world of asymmetry.

The book is intended to be a contribution to the general theory of internationalrelations as well as to the understanding of China and Vietnam, but I give greater

priority to ³the case´ rather than to the theory. This is a deliberate methodo logicaldecision. As John Gerring has argued, case studies are especially appropriate whenexploring new causal mechanisms. 2 I would argue more broadly that the ³case´ isthe reality to which the theory is secondary. In international relations theory,³realism´ is often contrasted to ³idealism,´ but surely a more basic and appropriate

meaning of ³realism´ is to give priority to reality rather than to theory. The philosopher Alfred North Whitehead defined the Fallacy of Misplaced Concretenessas ³neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is consideredmerely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought.´ 3 In effect, the conceptis taken as the concrete reality, and actual reality is reduced to a mere appendage of data. Misplaced Concreteness may well be the cardinal sin of modern social science.It is certainly pandemic in international relations theory, where a seriousconsideration of the complexities of real political situations is often dismissed asmere ³area studies.´ Like the Greek god Anteus who was sustained by touching hisMother Earth, theory is challenged and rejuvenated by planting its feet in thick

reality.I have decided to attempt a comprehensive analysis of interactions between China

and Vietnam rather than a narrower analysis of foreign relations for two reasons.First, the most appropriate method for a new approach to a topic is to include allrelevant phenomena. It might be more convenient to limit the scope of study, but alimited scope would assume the irrelevance of factors beyond its domain of attention. Second, although questions of war and peace provide the strongestillustration of asymmetric relations, asymmetry affects the full range of externalactivities. Its influence can be seen in border trade, national development policy,ideology, and so forth. Attention to a broad spectrum of relationships, especially inthe current period of normalization, will facilitate both a well -rounded view of theeffects of asymmetry and also a better understanding of methods of managingasymmetric relations.

The greatest challenge of a comprehensive analysis is brevity. It is difficult towrite less than one knows about a subject, and it is a high art to present a broad andcomplex reality in as few words as possible. Inevitably simplification occurs, and Iacknowledge in advance to the experts reading this book that topics of considerable



richness and controversy are reduced to a few sentences. This may be particularly problematic in the chapters dealing with history. But I would also like to present achallenge to the experts. It is easy to correct simplifications by expanding the textand the research. A more interesting question might be, what would be a better simplification? To the extent that scholarship ha s a broader audience than thescholars themselves, simplification is a necessary and honorable task. Moreover,

brevity sharpens basic issues and judgments, and scholarly progress can be madeeven if further research and more sophisticated articulations are required. Thetexture of life and of history is infinitely fine and complex, but it does not precludethe possibility of discerning shapes and patterns in its fabric.

This book has been written with audiences in Vietnam and China in mind as wellas audiences in third countries. It inevitably differs from official interpretations of the relationship in each country, and it is written from the point of view of anobserver in a third country. However, the ideas embodied in this book occurred tome as I interacted with friends and institutions in both China and Vietnam, and my

intent is to be respectful of the interests, intelligence, and dignity of all concerned.Available resources and my language competencies have restricted my researchmaterials to Western language materials (English, German, and French)supplemented by Chinese and Vietnamese materials. I am sure that this has led toobvious mistakes and oversights from the point of view of Chinese and Vietnamesespecialists, and I apologize and request their criticisms and corrections. This book ismy attempt to learn from my current experience of China and Vietnam as well asfrom the lessons of the past.

The Book in Bri ef

The book has a general overview, two major parts, and a conclusion, subdividedinto a total of eleven chapters. The underlying reason for its structure is that it is firstnecessary to consider the general conditions affecting the relationship beforeanalyzing its development over time. It concludes with reflections on the variationsin the relationship and the implications of these for the deep structure of asymmetry.

Chapter 1 introduces the relative situations of China and Vietnam, asymmetrytheory, and the variety of relationships that China and Vietnam have held in their long history. It is a microcosm of the book. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 comprise the first of the book¶s two major parts, ³Basic Structure,´ which considers the preconditions tounderstanding the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. Chapter 2 presents the basic

parameters of China¶s external posture. It argues that there are five parameters ± size, centricity, sufficiency of natural resources, the challenge of renewableresources, and history ± that set a durable context for all of China¶s externalrelations, including its relations with Vietnam. Each of these parameters occurs togreater and lesser extents in other countries as well, but together they give China aunique and self-centered vantage point in external relations. Chapter 3 addresses the

parameters of Vietnam¶s external posture. In contrast to China, Vietnam has never



considered itself to be the center of its world, a basic fact that gives its externalrelations a quite different cast. Vietnam¶s parameters are geography, an identity thatcombines both nationalism and cosmopolitanism, resource imbalance, the challengeof integration and diversity, and history.

The preceding pair of chapters sets the stage for the analysis of an asymmetric

relationship, but before the specifics of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship areexplored it is worthwhile to consider in Chapter 4 the general structuralcharacteristics of asymmetry. Asymmetric relationships must be analyzed in termsof their two sub-relations, that of the stronger to the weaker and that of the weaker to the stronger. The position of the stronger is influenced by the fact that therelationship is less important to itself, and therefore it is less attentive. The weaker side is vulnerable to the greater capacity of the stronger side, and therefore it is moreattentive. Characteristic patterns of misperception can develop in which the stronger side makes errors of inattention while the weaker makes errors of overattention, andthese misperceptions can amplify one another into a crisis. Asymmetric

relationships can be successfully managed, however. The two fundamentaltechniques are to remove issues from contention by neutralizing them and to controlthe vicious circle of misperceptions by relying on the common sense of anestablished relationship and by using diplomatic rit ual to acknowledge mutualrespect and mutual benefit in the relationship. Meanwhile the tensions inherent inthe bilateral relationship can be buffered and reframed by being part of a larger

pattern of multilateral relations.

The six chapters of the book¶s second part, ³The Relational Dynamic,´ present thehistory of Sino-Vietnamese relations from the beginning to the present. Each

chapter combines the narration of a phase of the relationship with reflections on theasymmetric structure of that phase. Chapter 5 begins with the emergence of a siniticzone of culture and conflict before the establishment of imperial China with the QinDynasty in 221 BC. At this time China was not yet China, and Vietnam was not yetVietnam, and yet the scale of what was emerging in Chinese territory affected what

became Vietnam. Vietnam was drawn into northern-oriented zones of influence andeventually became part of China during the Han Dynasty. Vietnam remained part of China for the next thousand years, but its own sense of identity emerged in conflictwith consolidation. On the one hand, many fundamental aspects of Vietnam¶s socialand material culture were set during this time. On the other, the memories of resistance to Chinese control and the emergence of local leaders l ed to Vietnam¶sindependence in AD 968. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of two types of asymmetric relations, amorphous asymmetry and internal asymmetry, which areillustrated by the early history of China and Vietnam.

Chapter 6 covers the relations between China and Vietnam as unequal traditionalempires, a period of nine centuries from 968 to encroachments by the West

beginning with the Opium War in China in 1840. International relations betweenChina and Vietnam began with the Song Dynasty¶s acknowledgment of Vietnamese



autonomy, but there was considerable development in the identities of both partiesas well as in the management of the relationship. The watershed of the relationshipwas the ultimately unsuccessful Ming occupation of Vietnam from 1407 to 1427,after which a stable coexistence was established in the framework of the tributesystem. The role-based asymmetry of this era guaranteed the autonomy of Vietnamas well as Vietnam¶s deference to China, but did so in a patriarchal framework o f

inequality that limited the utility of the relationship. Role -based asymmetry provided a process for controlling a limited relationship, but it did not provide avenue for exploring and expanding mutually beneficial contacts.

The coming of the West in the modern era led to the collapse of both the Chineseand the Vietnamese empires and created crisis situations in both countries fromwhich fraternal revolutionary movements eventually arose. Chapter 7 covers the

period in which, for the first time since China was unified in 221 BC, Vietnam faceda greater threat than China, and China was not the center of its world. China andVietnam shifted from an unequal face -to-face relationship to a shoulder-to-shoulder

relationship of common threat and shared suffe ring. This situation of distractedasymmetry in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship was complemented by one of disjunctive asymmetry between both countries and the West.

Chapter 8 covers the period from the founding of the People¶s Republic of Chinain 1949 to the reunification of Vietnam in 1976. The relationship was driven byChina¶s support for Vietnam¶s national liberation efforts, but it underwent a major change in the mid-1960s under the influence of the American war in Vietnam, theSino-Soviet split, and China¶s internal turmoil during the Cultural Revolution.Because Vietnam was dependent on Chinese aid, the differences remained

unarticulated. The major contrast between the dependent asymmetry of China andVietnam and the dependence of the Saigon gov ernment on the United States wasthat China respected the autonomy of Vietnam¶s decision making whereas theUnited States subordinated the Saigon government to the requirements of itscontainment policy.

Chapter 9 treats the decline of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship from the 1970s tonormalization in 1991. The response of both countries to the novel situation of victory in Indochina provides, unfortunately for them, an excellent illustration of thevicious circle of misperceptions in asymmetric relations. The situation was renderedmore complex by the role of Cambodia, but the dynamic of misperception betweenVietnam and the Khmer Rouge was also deeply affected by asymmetry. The second

part of the chapter covers the happier story of the undermining of s talemate in thelate 1980s and finally the emergence of normalization in 1990 ±91. Vietnam¶s daringdiplomatic move in 1985 of announcing a unilateral withdrawal from Cambodia by1990 shows the frustrations and eventual success of persistent and imaginative smallcountry diplomacy in a hostile environment. In general, though, the period of hostileasymmetry provided a lesson in the consequences of the mismanagement of relations, a ³teacher by negative example´ that set the sober tone for normalization.



Chapter 10 covers the process of normalization from 1991 to 1999 and the era of relative calm that emerged from normalization. I call this the era of matureasymmetry because the acceptance of the necessity of a negotiated relationship is

based on the frustrations of the preceding period of hostility. Normalization is not premised on friendship but rather on the mutual desire for peace and the real possibility of continued hostility. As confidence builds, the initial cold caution is

gradually replaced by the attractive opportunities opened by peace. Eventually theweight of the relationship shifts from the defense by peaceful means of conflictinginterests to the development of common interests, and the era of normalcy begins.

Normalcy remains an asymmetric relationship, but it does not imply thesubordination of the smaller to the larger state; rather, it signals theinstitutionalization of a pattern of management that is based on the autonomy of thesmaller state and yet its deference to the capacities of the larger.

Chapter 11 begins by pulling together the variety of asymmetries experienced byChina and Vietnam and generalizing them into a picture of possible variations, using

the experiences of other states as well. Table 11.1, ³Varieties of Sino -VietnameseAsymmetry,´ pulls together all of the modalities experienced in the Sino -Vietnamese relationship and links them to analogous relationships elsewhere. Thechapter then proceeds to questions of the deep structure of asymmetric relations andthe roles of identity, context, and leadership in sustaining and changing relationships.Finally, we return to China and Vietnam and consider the possible challenges thatnormalcy there might face.

For the convenience of multilingual readers, the appendix provides a glossary of people, places, and important terms in English, Chinese characters and pinyin, and

Vietnamese. Occasionally translations are provided in the text in the followingformat [pinyin, Chinese characters, Vietnamese]. The reason for these linguisticcross-references is that while Chinese and Vietnamese often share the samelinguistic roots (and in traditional Vietnamese texts, most of the same characters),the pronunciation is sufficiently different to be confusing to readers with a stronger

base in one language or the other. When Vietnamese names and words are used inthe text and not as translations, diacritic marks are omitted because they areconfusing to non-Vietnamese speakers, and in any case non -Vietnamese speakerswould have little hope of pronouncing the words correctly. Similarly, polysyllabicVietnamese words and names are run together (for example, Vietnam rather thanViet Nam), although in standard Vietnamese syllables are always separated.

I

General Overview



In November 1991 the General Secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party Do Muoiand Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam Vo Van Kiet visited Beijingat the invitation of Chinese Communist Party Secretary Jiang Zemin and ChinesePremier Li Peng, and a Joint Communiqué was signed on November 10 establishingnormal relations between China and Vietnam, ending twelve years of hostility. Inone sense this marked the re-establishment of relations, since China had been the

first country to extend diplomatic recognition to Ho Chi Minh¶s government andhad been its major supporter during its struggles against the French, the Saigongovernment, and the Americans. But neither China nor Vietnam viewed thenormalization of 1991 as a return to the alliance of 1950 ±1975. Despite the fact thatnormalization concluded a decade of bitter hostility in which neither side hadtriumphed, admitted defeat, or apologized, the era of normalization was immediatelyaccepted by the participants and by external observers as a robu st and long-termrelationship. Normalization was expected to be a new era of peaceful but not closerelations, and from 1999 it has exceeded those expectations by moving fromcautious normalization to more integrated normalcy. Why?

The shorter the question, the longer the answer. This book attempts to present aholistic view of China and Vietnam in their relationship, and this chapter is in partan introduction to the subject and in part a microcosm of the book. It will first of allattempt to capture the overall shape, complexities, and tensions of the two countries¶attitudes toward one another. Then the contemporary disparity between them will besketched, outlining the asymmetry of capacities between China and Vietnam. Next,the problems posed by ³normal´ asymmetry for contemporary international relationstheory will be discussed. The chapter concludes with a narration of the major phasesof the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, ending with the present era of normalcy.

R ela tion al Attitud es: The R ock a nd t he Gi a nt

The relationship of China and Vietnam is not one relationship but two: therelationship of China to Vietnam and the relationship of Vietnam to China. Thesetwo sub-relationships are not simply the same game viewed from the perspective of one or the other player. Each player is playing a different game. Each player interprets the behavior of the other in terms of its own game. As a result each player is often surprised by the actions of the other, and each has a critical opinion of theother. However, since 1999 both sides have been confident that a stronger relationship is advantageous.

For China, Vietnam has been the southern boundary stone of its grand notions of itself. In periods of hostility China has kicked this rock and found it hard anddifficult to move. Again and again the power of China has broken on the rock of Vietnam, and although Vietnam has suffered more from these encounters thanChina has, China has found it necessary to withdraw and thus to acknowledge thatChina was smaller than it had hoped to be. In times of peace, China accepts thelimits that the existence of Vietnam imposes on its sense of regional importance and



enjoys the relatively minor advantages of a mutually beneficial relationship. But inneither war nor peace does China regard Vietnam as an equal.

Vietnam does not normally intrude on China¶s consciousness as either a major threat or a major opportunity. Vietnam achieves major importance in China¶s eyesonly when it appears to be linked to global forces such as imp erialism, world

revolution, or Soviet ³social imperialism.´ But when China treats Vietnam as anicon or a proxy of these global forces it tends to be frustrated by the outcome. SoVietnam remains a minor mystery to China, one that is often explained privat ely byreferences to the duplicity and inconstancy of the Vietnamese character. TheChinese have said of Vietnam that ³anyone with milk is her mother.´

Vietnam views China as the inscrutable northern giant. Even at peace the giant isfeared because the fateful decision of war or peace is largely in the giant¶s hand.Flushed with victory and allied with the Soviet Union, Vietnam cast off its wartimedeference to China in the late 1970s, and it suffered grievously in consequence.

With such a neighbor, Vietnam is caught in a standing dilemma. It needs peace withChina more than China needs peace with it, but if it allows China to push it around,to move the boundary stone, its loses its national substance and autonomy. ThusVietnam tends to desire peace and yet to be fearful of uncontrolled contact, and to

be allergic to any gesture on China¶s part that impugns Vietnam¶s sovereignty.

Vietnam¶s estimate of China is complex. On the one hand, corresponding toVietnam¶s high level of concern and suspiciousness about Chinese behavior, Chinais viewed as almost diabolically clever in manipulating and pushing Vietnam. Onthe other hand, China is derided as a global force. 1 Vietnam would rather model itsstock markets after New York or Tokyo than after Shanghai or Shenzhen. Theexistence of a world more attractive and more powerful than China, one in whichChina is itself a small player, is important to Vietnam¶s general sense of security.Peace with China offers a favorable environment for Vietnam¶s development andsome opportunities for trade, but Vietnam tends to downplay the salience of Chinain its future even though they both pursue similar development strategies.

Of course, these sketches are only caricatures of views common in both countries;different people have different opinions, and views change over time. But suchviews of the other country are not the result of isolation, ignorance, or mistakes. It iscertainly not the case that one side is right and the other is wrong, although this isthe implicit assumption made by each side. The perspectives are each founded in

basic facts: Vietnam is not China¶s equal, and China is threatening to Vietnamwhether or not it intends to be. Nevertheless, there is something dysfunctional here.Regardless of how much their interests coincide or differ, these two perspectiveswill tend to cause the misinterpretation by each country of the other¶s actions andintentions, adding to friction in peaceful times and increasing the possibility of confrontation that neither side desires. The divergent perspectives are part of thereality of an asymmetric relationship.



The other reality of the relationship is that despite the disparities of capacities andresulting differences of perspective, neither side can eliminate the othe r. China¶sgreater power does not imply that it can control Vietnam, as it discovered mostrecently during the hostilities that lasted from1979 to 1991. Likewise, there is noconceivable self-strengthening program or alliance that would make Vietnam theequal of China. Not only are China and Vietnam fated to coexist, but they have done

so and will do so within an asymmetric relationship. Although Vietnam cannot do toChina what China can do to Vietnam, their asymmetric relationship, like manysimilar relationships around the world, is remarkably stable.

C h in a a nd Vi etn am in C o mpa ri son

http://assets.cambridge.org/052185/3206/excerpt/0521853206_excerpt.htm

To the constant frustration of the Vietnamese, external observers are struck with thesimilarities of China and Vietnam. In general, there is no country more similar toChina than Vietnam, and there is no country more similar to Vietnam than China. In

part the appearance of similarity is due to a shared sinitic civilization, but it hasother important roots as well.

why vietnam loves and hates china

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