when does the length of criminal ...1 galand-carval, ‘th e european court of human rights declares...

78 Intersentia

WHEN DOES THE LENGTH OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS BECOME UNREASONABLE

ACCORDING TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS?

Marc Henzelin* and Héloïse Rordorf**

ABSTRACT

Since the mid-90s the European Court of Human Rights has engaged in a war with excessively lengthy judicial proceedings at the national level, particularly in relation to criminal proceedings. In 2012 alone, the Court rendered 72 judgments regarding the length of criminal proceedings and found a violation of the reasonable time requirement, as enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR, in 62 of those cases. Th e present study will show that the determination of the relevant period, as well as the criteria considered by the Court in deciding whether a reasonable length has been exceeded, are rather clear. Less predictable however is the overall assessment of the circumstances of the case by the Court and in particular the interaction between and the weight given to the various criteria. Th e present study concludes upon a 3–5–7 schematic: a period short of 3 years does not usually infringe Article 6(1) ECHR and aft er 7 years the length of the proceedings is usually considered unreasonable. It is around the 5 years mark that the predictions are the most hazardous and a balance of the criteria in favour of, respectively against, reasonableness must be made.

Keywords: criminal proceedings; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rigths and Fundamental Freedoms; unreasonable length

* Dr Marc Henzelin, LLM, Partner, LALIVE Attorneys-at-Law, Geneva-Zürich, [email protected].** Héloïse Rordorf, LLM, Associate, LALIVE Attorneys-at-Law, Geneva-Zürich, [email protected].

When Does the Length of Criminal Proceedings Become Unreasonable According to the ECtHR?

New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 5, Issue 1, 2014 79

1. INTRODUCTION

In 1996 the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’ or the ‘Court’) allegedly declared a ‘war on unreasonable delays’.1 More than 15 years later, it seems that the ECtHR is still at war with excessively lengthy proceedings, not to speak of the delays relating to fi les on its own docket. In the period from 1959 to 2012 – and increasingly since 1998 following the restructuring of the Court, violations of Article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms2 (‘ECHR’ or the ‘Convention’) concerning the lengths of proceedings were found in 5,037 cases.3 Th is includes 1,478 violations for the period from 2009 to 2012.4

According to the 3rd report of the European Commission for the Effi ciency of Justice (‘CEPEJ’), violations of Article 6(1) ECHR through excessively lengthy proceedings represents the primary reason for European States to be condemned by the ECtHR.5 Th is is also confi rmed by the statistics of the judgments rendered by the Court from the years 1959 to 2012.6 Whilst most of the Court’s decisions regarding the excessive length of proceedings concern civil law cases, the number of criminal cases is far from insignifi cant.7 For example, in the period from January to December 2012 the Court examined the length of criminal proceedings in 72 judgements (without taking into consideration decisions rendered by the Court). In 62 of those 72 cases the Court held that the length of the criminal proceedings was not reasonable.8

1 Galand-Carval, ‘Th e European Court of Human Rights declares war on unreasonable delays’, (1996) St Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic Law Journal 109–126.

2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 1950.

3 ECtHR, Violations by Article and by respondent State (1959–2012), available at: www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_1959_2012_ENG.pdf [last accessed 8 October 2013]; ECtHR, Ten years of the ‘New’ European Court of Human Rights, 1998–2008, Situation and Outlook, Proceedings of the Seminar, 13 October 2008, Strasbourg, at 77.

4 ECtHR, Violations by Article and by respondent State, 2012, available at: www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_2012_ENG.pdf [last accessed 8 October 2013]; Violations by Article and by State, 2011, available at: www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_2011_ENG.pdf [last accessed 8 October 2013]; Violations by Article and by country, 2010, available at: www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_2010_ENG.pdf [last accessed 8 October 2013] and Violations by Article and by Country, 2009, available at: www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_2009_ENG.pdf [last accessed 8 October 2013].

5 European Commission for the Effi ciency of Justice (CEPEJ), European judicial systems, Edition 2010 (data 2008): Effi ciency and quality of justice, (Council of Europe Publishing, 2010) (CEPEJ, Edition 2010 (data 2008): Effi ciency and quality of justice), at 293.

6 ECtHR, Violations by Article and by respondent State (1959–2012), available at: www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_1959_2012_ENG.pdf [last accessed 8 October 2013].

7 E.g., for the year 2008, CEPEJ, Edition 2010 (data 2008): Effi ciency and quality of justice, at 139–140 and for the year 2010, European Commission for the Effi ciency of Justice (CEPEJ), European judicial systems, Edition 2012 (2010 data): Effi ciency and quality of justice, CEPEJ Studies No. 18, (Council of Europe Publishing, 2012), at 172. See also below the table of the ECtHR’s case law for the year 2012.

8 See below the table of the ECtHR’s case law for the year 2012. Only judgements rendered by the Court are included in the table, decisions are excluded.

Marc Henzelin and Héloïse Rordorf

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Th e present article will study the reasonable time requirement enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR looking at the recent case law of the ECtHR in relation to criminal proceedings, with the aim of drawing parameters regarding what is an acceptable length, and under which circumstances. Aft er a short reminder of the international protection which is provided against unreasonable lengths of criminal proceedings (see below section 2), the article will examine how the period of reference is determined and what criteria are taken into consideration by the Court to assess the reasonableness of this period (see below section 3). It will further try to assess whether there are general rules that can be drawn from the ECtHR’s case law, with a focus on the calendar year 2012; in particular, how the Court ponders the various criteria and if it is possible to determine what are the permissible limits to the length of the criminal proceedings (see below section 4).9

2. THE INTERNATIONAL PRO TECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE LENGTHS OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

Th e right of a suspect or an accused in criminal proceedings to be tried within a ‘reasonable time’ is guaranteed by the main international human rights conventions. Specifi cally, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights10 (‘ICCPR’) provides in Article 14(3)(c) that, ‘[i]n the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: … (c) To be tried without undue delay’. Pursuant to Article 6(1) of the ECHR, ‘[i]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law …’. Similar provisions are provided by the American Convention on Human Rights11 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.12 Whilst the formulation diff ers between the latters and the ICCPR, the meaning is the same: the length of the proceedings is considered ‘reasonable’ as long as there has been no ‘undue delay’.13

9 Th e issue of the admissibility of complaints brought before the Court as well as the possible remedies which can be sought are outside the scope of this article and will not be analysed.

10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 December 1966.11 According to Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, ‘Pact of San Jose’, Costa

Rica, 22 November 1969: ‘Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fi scal, or any other nature’.

12 According to Article 7(1)(d) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘Banjul Charter’), 27 June 1981: ‘Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. Th is comprises: … (d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal’.

13 Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, (Oxford University Press, 2005), at 135.



Within the ECHR – the same can be found within the ICCPR regime – the protection provided by Article 6(1) ECHR overlaps, in certain cases, with the right guaranteed in Article 5(3) ECHR.14 In the event of pre-trial detention, both provisions state that a person arrested and detained on a criminal charge is to be tried within a reasonable time. Th e criteria to assess the reasonable time requirement in Article 5(3) ECHR are however diff erent from those incorporated by the same terminology in Article 6(1) ECHR, or at least they have a diff erentiated application as the word ‘reasonable’ in Article 5(3) ECHR is not associated with the length of investigation and trial, but with the length of the detention itself.15 Hence, as soon as the suspect has been released, Article 5(3) no longer applies, and the obligation that the accused be tried within a reasonable time can thereaft er only be based upon Article 6(1) ECHR.16 Moreover, the right granted by Article 5(3) ECHR ceases to apply the day the judgment, even a fi rst instance judgment, has been rendered, as from that day on the individual is either released (in case of acquittal or discharge from further prosecution) or detained ‘aft er a conviction by a competent court’ within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) ECHR.17 Th e right contained within Article 5(3) will not be examined further in this article. However, as will be underlined below in section 3.2.1., the fact that the suspect or the accused remains in detention during the proceedings has a specifi c relevance for the assessment of the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings against the individual under Article 6(1) ECHR, and in some cases may well be a determinative factor.

3. DETERMINATION OF THE RELEVANT PERIOD AND THE CRITERIA TO BE CONSIDER ED IN ANALYSING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE LENGTH OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

As the Court has consistently upheld, the reasonable time guarantee enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR serves to ensure public trust in the administration of justice and to

14 According to Article 5(3) ECHR: ‘Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other offi cer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.’ For Articles 14(3)(c) and 9(3) ICCPR, see Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary, 2nd ed. (N.P. Engel, 2005), ad Article 14 No. 52.

15 Stögmüller v Austria, No. 1602/62, 10 November 1969, at para 5; Van Dijk/van Hoof/van Rijn/Zwaak (eds), Th eory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4th ed. (Intersentia, 2006), at 492; European Commission for the Effi ciency of Justice (CEPEJ), Calvez/Régis, Length of court proceedings in the member states of the Council of Europe based on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (31 July 2012), 2nd ed. (Council of Europe Publishing, 2012), at 8.

16 Van Dijk/van Hoof/van Rijn/Zwaak, supra n 15, at 491–492.17 Gil v Poland, No. 29130/10, 20 December 2011, at para 36; Borisenko v Ukraine, No. 25725/02,

12 January 2012, at para 37; Van Dijk/van Hoof/van Rijn/Zwaak, supra n 15, at 492 which refer in particular to the ‘Wemoff case’ (Wemhoff v Germany, No. 2122/64, 27 June 1968).


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protect parties to proceedings against excessive procedural delays. Especially in criminal matters, it is designed to avoid the person charged with a criminal off ence remaining too long in a state of uncertainty about his fate. Th is guarantee underlines the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise the eff ectiveness and credibility of a national justice system.18

In order to assess whether the reasonable time requirement has been respected, the Court fi rst determines the period to be taken into consideration (see below section 3.1.) before considering the criteria in favour of, respectively against, a fi nding as to the reasonableness of that period (see below section 3.2.).

3.1. RELEVANT PERIOD

3.1.1. Beginning of the period

Th e period to be taken into conside ration in determining the length of criminal proceedings begins with the day on which a person is ‘charged’ (‘accusée’) within the autonomous and substantive meaning given to that term by the Court.19 ‘Charged’ has been defi ned as the ‘offi cial notifi cation given to an individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal off ence’; a defi nition that also corresponds to the test of whether the situation of that individual ‘has been substantially aff ected’.20

Th e Court notes that a person is usually ‘charged’ on the date of arrest, or the date when the person concerned was offi cially notifi ed that he would be prosecuted or otherwise the date when the preliminary investigations were opened.21 Th e ECtHR also considers that the period to be taken into consideration begins on the date the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the case,22 even if his formal capacity at the time was that of a witness.23

In fact, while considering a complaint of violation of the reasonable time requirement provided for by Article 6(1) ECHR, the Court attaches a specifi c

18 Dimitrov and Hamanov v Bulgaria, Nos 48059/06 and 2708/09, 10 May 2011, at para 70 and case law cited; Pimentel Lourenço v Portugal, No. 9223/10, 23 October 2012, at para 32; Ardelean v Romania, No. 28766/04, 30 October 2012, at para 82.

19 Assunção Santos v Portugal, No. 6015/09, 26 June 2012, at para 39; Grigoryan v Armenia, No. 3627/06, 10 July 2012, at para 126.

20 Eckle v Germany, No. 8130/78, 15 July 1982, at para 73; Todorov v Ukraine, No. 16717/05, 12 January 2012, at para 84; Assunção Santos v Portugal, No. 6015/09, 26 June 2012, at para 39; Grigoryev v Russia, No. 22663/06, 23 October 2012, at para 90.

21 Assunção Santos v Portugal, No. 6015/09, 26 June 2012, at para 39; Grigoryan v Armenia, No. 3627/06, 10 July 2012, at para 126; Grigoryev v Russia, No. 22663/06, 23 October 2012, at para 90.

22 Dimitar Vasilev v Bulgaria, No. 10302/05, 10 April 2012, at para 25; Grishin v Russia, No. 14807/08, 24 July 2012, at para 168; Svinarenko and Slyadnev v Russia, Nos 32541/08 and 43441/08, 11 December 2012, at para 74 (referred to the Grand Chamber).

23 Grigoryan v Armenia, No. 3627/06, 10 July 2012, at para 128.



importance to the applicant’s awareness of the proceedings or the police involvement in order to determine the dies ad quo and hence whether his situation has been ‘substantially aff ected’.24

In determining the same, the fact that assets of the applicant have been seized has been considered by the Court to be determinative. In Pimentel Lourenço v Portugal,25 the Court considered that even if the investigations were opened on a previous date, the date of the fi rst seizure of the suspect’s assets was crucial as it was from that date that ‘les répercussions sur la situation du requérant ont été véritablement ressenties’.26

Conversely, the Court considered that authorizing the interception of the applicant’s telephone did not mean that he was ‘charged’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) ECHR since ‘he was not given any offi cial notifi cation of an allegation that he had committed a criminal off ence, nor can it be said that his situation had been ‘substantially aff ected’’.27

3.1.2. End of the period

Th e period to be taken into consideration ends with the day the charge is fi nally determined or the proceedings are discontinued,28 bearing in mind that, Article 6(1) ECHR covers the whole of proceedings in issue, including appeal proceedings.29

Th e date the applicant becomes aware of the fi nal decision regarding his conviction, acquittal or the dismissal of the proceedings is relevant.30 As to knowledge of the verdict or the reasons for the decision, in a departure from the Vallon case,31 the Court considered in Pop Blaga v Romania32 that the dies ad quem corresponds to the day the applicant had been informed of the verdict, even if the judgment with the reasons for

24 Ustyantsev v Ukraine, No. 3299/05, 12 January 2012, at para 91; O. v Ireland, No. 43838/07, 19 January 2012, at para 17; Kechev v Bulgaria, No. 13364/05, 26 July 2012, at para 47.

25 Pimentel Lourenço v Portugal, No. 9223/10, 23 October 2012, at para 28. See also Assunção Santos v Portugal, No. 6015/09, 26 June 2012, at para 40.

26 Th e wider issue of the applicability of Article 6(1) ECHR to seizure measures is outside the scope of the present study and will not be analysed further.

27 Polz v Austria, No. 24941/08, 25 October 2011, at paras 43–45.28 Grigoryan v Armenia, No. 3627/06, 10 July 2012, at para 126.29 Eckle v Germany, No. 8130/78, 15 July 1982, at para 76; among others, Grigoryev v Russia,

No. 22663/06, 23 October 2012, at para 91.30 Kechev v Bulgaria, No. 13364/05, 26 July 2012, at para 48.31 In its report regarding the Vallon case, the European Commission of Human Rights considered that

the dies ad quem corresponded to the day the applicant was informed of the motivation of the judgement. In this case, there was a one month delay between the pronouncement of the sentence and the draft ing of the fi nal judgment (European Commission of Human rights, No. 9621/81, Vallon v Italy, report of the Commission, 8 May 1984, at paras 68–69 referred to also in Van Dijk/van Hoof/van Rijn/Zwaak, supra n 15, at 606).

32 Pop Blaga, v Romania (decision), No. 37379/02, 10 April 2012, at para 120. In this case, there was a delay of more than two months between the pronouncement of the sentence and the draft ing of the fi nal judgement, the applicant becoming aware of the judgment (and the motivation) only four months later.


84 Intersentia

the decision was draft ed subsequently with the applicant eff ectively becoming aware of those reasons at a later stage. Yet, in Michelioudakis v Greece33 the Court considered the end of the proceedings to be the date the judgment of the Cour de cassation had been fi nalized (‘mis au net’) and certifi ed.

Furthermore, in Eckle v Germany34 the Court found that upon conviction, there was no ‘determination … of any criminal charge’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) ECHR so long as the sentence was not defi nitively fi xed.

Th e Court, however, underlined in Hartman v Slovenia35 that in accordance with its established case law Article 6(1) ECHR does not apply to domestic proceedings for reopening a trial, since someone who applies for his case to be reopened and whose sentence has become fi nal is not ‘someone charged with a criminal off ence’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) ECHR. Th e same principle applies to proceedings following the request for an extraordinary mitigation of sentence, as the Court considers that Article 6(1) ECHR does not apply to proceedings for review of a sentence aft er the decision has become res judicata. Th e Court nonetheless accepted to take into account the period following the quashing of the appeal judgement by way of supervisory review and the remittal of the case to the appeal court for fresh consideration (i.e., aft er the applicant’s conviction became fi nal) in Buldashev v Russia.36

Where proceedings relate to the seizure of assets of the applicant, they are taken into account by the Court. In particular, the Court in Pimentel Lourenço v Portugal37 considered that even if the case was ended by a fi nal decision of the court of appeal confi rming the decision to dismiss the proceedings (‘ordonnance de non-lieu’) which was rendered before the lift ing of the seizure measures, the dies ad quem was fi xed as the date the lift ing was actually ordered.

Moreover, as regards confi scation proceedings, in Crowther v the United Kingdom,38 the Court found that in the context of an undue length complaint under Article 6 of the Convention, criminal proceedings ‘incorporated the applicant’s arrest, charge and trial together with the making and enforcement of a confi scation order’.39 Consequently, the Court held that the criminal proceedings commenced on the date the applicant was fi rst arrested and questioned in connection with the charge. Th ey were terminated when he was denied leave to appeal to the House of Lords against the refusal to grant his application for judicial review of the magistrates’ decision to

33 Michelioudakis v Greece, No. 54447/10, 3 April 2012, at paras 13–14 and 39. In this case, there was a delay of less than one month between the dismissal of the appeal by the court and the date the court’s judgment had been fi nalized and certifi ed. See also Sagropoulos v Greece, No. 61894/08, 3 May 2012, at para 37.

34 Eckle v Germany, No. 8130/78, 15 July 1982, at para 77.35 Hartman v Slovenia, No. 42236/05, 18 October 2012, at para 40.36 Buldashev v Russia, No. 46793/06, 18 October 2011, at para 107.37 Pimentel Lourenço v Portugal, No. 9223/10, 23 October 2012, at paras 28–29.38 Crowther v the United Kingdom, No. 53741/00, 1 February 2005, at para 26.39 Minshall v the United Kingdom, No. 7350/06, 20 December 2011, at para 30.



commit him to prison following non-payment of a confi scation order. In Bullen and Soneji v the United Kingdom,40 the proceedings under review started when the applicants were convicted and became liable to have confi scation orders made against them. Th e conclusion of proceedings was considered to be the point where the Court of Appeal re-imposed the confi scation orders and sentences of imprisonment in default following the order of the House of Lords.41

Finally, it is noteworthy than an accused can raise a claim of violation of the reasonable time requirement with the Court even though the domestic proceedings are still pending and no fi nal decision has yet been rendered.42

3.1.3. Periods to be excluded from the calculation of the length of the procedure

Periods during which the applicant was on the run, or unlawfully at large have been excluded from the length of the procedure.43

Furthermore, only the period during which the ECHR is in force for the respondent State Party is relevant. More than that, the period to be taken into consideration begins only on the day when the recognition by the State of the right of individual petition took eff ect. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time elapsed aft er the entry into force of the ECHR for that State, or the date the right of individual petition took eff ect, the Court considers that account must nevertheless be taken of the state of the proceedings at the commencement of that relevant time.44

Finally, only the periods during which the case was actually pending before the domestic courts are to be taken into account.45 For example, in Buldashev v Russia46 the Court considered that the period from the date the applicant’s conviction became fi nal and there were no proceedings pending, to the date the appeal judgement was quashed by way of a supervisory review with the case remitted to the appeal court for fresh consideration, should not be taken into consideration.

40 Bullen and Soneji v the United Kingdom, No. 3383/06, 8 January 2009, at para 48.41 See also Minshall v the United Kingdom, No. 7350/06, 20 December 2011, at para 31, in which the

applicant was only complaining about the length of the confi scation proceedings.42 Stratégies and Communications and Dumoulin v Belgium, No. 37370/97, 15 July 2002, at

para 42; Riccardi v Romania, No. 3048/04, 3 April 2012, at para 85; Hasdemir v Turkey, No. 44027/09, 22 May 2012, at paras 37–38.

43 Buldashev v Russia, No. 46793/06, 18 October 2011, at para 107; Zandbergs v Latvia, No. 71092/01, 20 December 2011, at para 86; Borisenko v Ukraine, No. 25725/02, 12 January 2012, at para 57.

44 Zandbergs v Latvia, No. 71092/01, 20 December 2011, at para 86; Kryuk v Russia, No. 11769/04, 13 December 2011, at para 55; Solovyevy v Russia, No. 918/02, 24 April 2012, at para 143; Głowacki v Poland, No. 1608/08, 30 October 2012, at para 111.

45 Pop Blaga, v Romania, No. 37379/02, 10 April 2012, at para 118.46 Buldashev v Russia, No. 46793/06, 18 October 2011, at para 107. See also Kryuk v Russia, No. 11769/04,

13 December 2011, at para 56.


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3.2. CRITERIA OF REASONABLENESS/UNREASONABLENESS

According to the ECtHR’s constant case law which has been r eaffi rmed in the Grand Chamber judgements McFarlane v Ireland47 and Idalov v Russia,48 the length of the proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: (1) what is at stake for the applicant, (2) the complexity of the case, (3) the conduct of the applicant and (4) the conduct of the relevant authorities (see below sections 3.2.1. to 3.2.4. Moreover, whilst not expressly mentioned as criteria per se by the Court, the number of domestic jurisdictions before which the proceedings have been pending is also taken into account (see below section 3.2.5).

3.2.1. What is at stake for the applicant: length of custody and length of the state of uncertainty

Th e impact of the proceedings on the suspect or the accused’s life could be considered as the main factor of relevance for the Court.

Th e Court has emphasised that ‘an accused in criminal proceedings should be entitled to have his case conducted with special diligence’.49 Th e Court underlines, in this respect, that in criminal matters, Article 6(1) ECHR is designed to prevent a person who is charged from remaining in a state of uncertainty about the outcome of the proceedings for too long, bearing in mind that this person usually risks criminal conviction.50

Moreover, the fact that the accused may be held in custody throughout the proceedings requires particular diligence on the part of domestic authorities to administer justice expeditiously,51 and a duration which might usually be considered as reasonable by the Court, may well be considered as a violation of Article 6(1) ECHR if the accused has been detained during the proceedings.

3.2.2. Complexity of the case

As a matter of principle, the more complex the case is, the more latitude the State is granted at the o uter limit of reasonable duration for the proceedings.

47 McFarlane v Ireland (Grand Chamber), No. 3133/06, 10 September 2010, at para 140.48 Idalov v Russia (Grand Chamber), No. 5826/03, 22 May 2012, at para 186.49 Grigoryan v Armenia, No. 3627/06, 10 July 2012, at para 129.50 Mc Farlane v Ireland (Grand Chamber), No. 31333/06, 10 September 2010, at para 155; Grigoryan

v Armenia, No. 3627/06, 10 July 2012, at para 129; Yakovlev v Ukraine, No. 18412/05, 26 July 2012, at para 23; Ardelean v Romania, No. 28766/04, 30 October 2012, at para 82.

51 Kryuk v Russia, No. 11769/04, 13 December 2011, at para 67; Borisenko v Ukraine, No. 25725/02, 12 January 2012, at para 58; Todorov v Ukraine, No. 16717/05, 12 January 2012, at para 90; Syngayevskiy v Russia, No. 17628/03, 27 March 2012, at para 93; Sizov v Russia (No. 2), No. 58104/08, 24 July 2012, at para 64.



Th e complexity of the case may be assessed with reference to a number of factors such as: the number of accused or victims, the number of counts/charges or the nature of the charges (seriousness) laid against the accused, the volume of the case fi le and the number of documents, experts or witnesses to be examined, the number of hearings held, the need for cooperation from the authorities of a third State (in particular the need of rogatory commission) and even the number of pages of a judgement rendered.52

Th e Court usually states a position that the complexity of the case, on its own, cannot justify the length of proceedings.53 Yet, in Breinesberger and Wenzelhuemer v Austria,54 in which the Court examined quite surprisingly the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings under the ‘not manifestly ill-founded’ admissibility requirement (pursuant to Article 35(3)(a) ECHR),55 the Court concluded that the length of the proceedings (7 years and 5 months across three levels of jurisdiction) was reasonable, principally on the basis of the complexity of the case.

3.2.3. Conduct of the applicant

Only delays attributable to the respondent State may justify a fi nding of failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement.56 Th e applicant’s conduct constitutes an objective fact which cannot be attributed to that State and which has to be taken into account when determining whether or not the proceedings lasted longer than a ‘reasonable’ period.57

Th e Court considers in particular that the applicant can contribute to the length of the proceedings through his (numerous) requests for adjournments, or through failing to appear in court.58 However, a suspect or accused cannot be required to cooperate actively with the judicial authorities, nor can he be criticised for having

52 Kowalenko v Poland, No. 26144/05, 26 October 2010, at para 77; Buldashev v Russia, No. 46793/06, 18 October 2011, at para 109; Todorov v Ukraine, No. 16717/05, 12 January 2012, at para 91 (referring in particular to 160 hearings and a 200 pages long judgement); Dementjeva v Latvia (decision), No. 17458/10, 13 March 2012, at para 24; Serrano Contreras v Spain, No. 49183/08, 20 mars 2012, at para 56; Valeriy Kovalenko v Russia, No. 41716/08, 29 May 2012, at para 59. See also Edel, Th e length of civil and criminal proceedings in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, 2nd ed., Human Rights Files, No. 16 (Council of Europe Publishing, 2007), at 39–43 and case law cited.

53 Grigoryev v Russia, No. 22663/06, 23 October 2012, at para 93; Beggs v United Kingdom, No. 25133/06, 6 November 2012, at para 238; Borodin v Russia, No. 41867/04, 6 November 2012, at para 150; Serrano Contreras v Spain, No. 49183/08, 20 mars 2012, at para 56.

54 Breinesberger and Wenzelhuemer v Austria (decision), No. 46601/07, 27 November 2012, at paras 30–33.55 According to Article 35(3)(a) ECHR: ‘Th e Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application

submitted under Article 34 if it considered that: (a) the application is… manifestly ill-founded …’.56 Kryuk v Russia, No. 11769/04, 13 December 2011, at para 61; Serrano Contreras v Spain, No. 49183/08,

20 March 2012, at para 58; Idalov v Russia (Grand Chamber), No. 5826/03, 22 May 2012, at para 186; Sizov v Russia (No. 2), No. 58104/08, 24 July 2012, at para 59; Borodin v Russia, No. 41867/04, 6 November 2012, at para 148.

57 Eckle v Germany, No. 8130/78, 15 July 1982, at para 82; Michelioudakis v Greece, No. 54447/10, 3 April 2012, at para 43.

58 Dolutaş v Turkey, No. 17914/09, 17 January 2012, at paras 29–31; Solovyevy v Russia, No. 918/02, 24 April 2012, at para 148; Idalov v Russia (Grand Chamber), No. 5826/03, 22 May 2012, at para 189. See also Edel, supra n 52, at 52–54 and case law cited.


88 Intersentia

made full use of the remedies available under the domestic law in the defence of his interests.59 Yet, he should defend his interests with diligence, an aspect that may be lacking if he has fi led endless challenges, motions and other requests, and may be clearly lacking where such submissions are ill-founded or formally inadmissible.60

Even though not wilfully brought about by the applicant, delays due to an accused or suspect’s health are also taken into consideration by the Court. In Krakolinig v Austria,61 the Court noted that repeated postponements and stays were caused by the applicant’s ill-health. While he could not be considered responsible, as that was a matter beyond his control, the Court considered that it was the objective reason for the resulting length of the proceedings. As highlighted by the Court, delays due to the health of the accused cannot usually be attributed to the domestic courts and a breach of the reasonable time requirement under Article 6(1) ECHR can only be found when they are attributable. Th e Court observed further that Article 6(1) ECHR did not grant the accused a right to have criminal proceedings terminated on account of his state of health. In this way, even though the proceedings in Krakolining v Austria lasted more than 25 years, they were considered as reasonable by the Court under an analysis of the ‘not manifestly ill-founded’ admissibility requirement.

Finally, and as will be discussed further under section 4 below, the Court’s analysis of the applicant’s conduct is balanced by an assessment for possible delays that are attributable to the authorities. Th e proportion of culpable delays is then considered in light of the overall length of the proceedings. As an example, in Ioannis Karagiannis v Greece,62 the Court recognized that more than seven months of the total length of the proceedings before the national courts was attributable to the applicant. Th e Court did not fi nd however that it was the applicant’s conduct alone which contributed to the length, on the contrary, the Court found that the actual length of the proceedings – approximately 6 years and 2 months, without taking into account the delays attributable to the applicant – remained excessive.

3.2.4. Conduct of the authorities

Th e domestic authorities may also contribute to the length of proceedings in various ways,63 including unusually lengthy investigations,64 delays in relation with the

59 Eckle v Germany, No. 8130/78, 15 July 1982, at para 82; McFarl ane v Ireland (Grand Chamber), No. 31333/06, 10 September 2010, at para 148; Solovyevy v Russia, No. 918/02, 24 April 2012, at para 147; Yakovlev v Ukraine, No. 18412/05, 26 July 2012, at para 25.

60 McFarlane v Ireland (Grand Chamber), No. 31333/06, 10 September 2010, at para 148; Kowalenko v Poland, No. 26144/05, 26 October 2010, at para 80; Idalov v Russia (Grand Chamber), No. 5826/03, 22 May 2012, at para 189.

61 Krakolinig v Austria (decision), No. 33992/07, 10 May 2012, at para 27.62 Ioannis Karagiannis v Greece, No. 66609/09, 3 May 2012, at para 20. See also Grishin v Russia,

No. 14807/08, 24 July 2012, at para 182.63 Edel, supra n 52, at 58 ff and case law cited.64 Pimentel Lourenço v Portugal, No. 9223/10, 23 October 20 12, at para 34.



obtaining of an expert opinion,65 adjournments,66 or stays of proceedings.67 Procedural delays may also occur between the completion of the investigation and the fi rst hearing at the trial court, between the last hearing in the fi rst-instance court and the pronouncement of the judgment or between the pronouncement of the sentence and its review by the appeal court.68

When the Court considers that there have been delays in the proceedings, the burden falls upon the respondent State to provide the Court with reasons justifying the delay.69 If the State fails to provide an acceptable justifi cation, the Court usually considers the national authorities responsible for the delay.

As to the possible causes of delays, repeated remittals of a case for reinvestigation or prolonged failure of the authorities to produce to the domestic courts a case ready for trial are usually explicitly described by the ECtHR as ‘indicative of a serious defi ciency in the operation of the criminal justice machinery’.70 Similarly, repeated quashing and remittal of lower courts’ decisions for re-examination are usually considered to be ‘ordered as a result of errors committed by the latter, which, within one set of proceedings, discloses a defi ciency in the operation of the legal system’.71

Furthermore, a chronic overload of the domestic courts is not an acceptable justifi cation. National authorities cannot seek refuge behind the possible failings of their own domestic law.72 As emphasised by the ECtHR ‘il incombe aux Etats contractants d’organiser leur système judiciaire de telle sorte que leurs juridictions puissent garantir à chacun le droit d’obtenir une décision défi nitive sur une contestation en matière pénale dans un délai raisonnable’.73

It is notable that in this regard, the manner in which a State provides mechanisms to comply with the reasonable time requirement is for the State to decide.74

65 Masár v Slovakia, No. 66882/09, 3 May 2012, at para 24.66 G.O. v Russia, No. 39249/03, 18 October 2011, at para 112.67 Kalle Kangasluoma v Finland, No. 5635/09, 5 February 2011, at para 23.68 Todorov v Ukraine, No. 16717/05, 12 January 2012, at para 92; Solovyevy v Russia, No. 918/02,

24 April 2012, at para 149.69 Zelidis v Greece, No. 59793/08, 3 May 2012, at para 27; Petko Yordanov v Bulgaria, No. 33560/06,

26 July 2012, at para 51; Grigoryev v Russia, No. 22663/06, 23 October 2012, at paras 93–94.70 Kiryakov v Ukraine, No. 26124/03, 12 January 2012, at para 64; Yakovlev v Ukraine, No. 18412/05,

26 July 2012, at para 27.71 Hasko v Turkey, No. 20578/05, 17 January 2012, at para 28; Sizov v Russia (No. 2), No. 58104/08,

24 July 2012, at para 63; E.M.B. v Romania, No. 4488/03, 13 November 2012, at para 35.72 Eckle v Germany, No. 8130/78, 15 July 1982, at para 84; Serrano Contreras v Spain, No. 49183/08,

20 March 2012, at para 57.73 Michelioudakis v Greece, No. 54447/10, 3 April 2012, at para 43. See also Serrano Contreras v Spain,

No. 49183/08, 20 March 2012, at para 57 and Pimentel Lourenço v Portugal, No. 9223/10, 23 October 2012, at para 32.

74 Beggs v Th e United Kingdom, No. 25133/06, 6 November 2012, at para 239; Mikhail Grishin v Russia, No. 14807/08, 24 July 2012, at para 182.


90 Intersentia

Yet, the domestic courts have an obligation to take steps of their own motion if necessary, in order to advance proceedings in criminal cases.75 If a State permits proceedings to last beyond a reasonable time without taking steps to expedite or advance those proceedings, it will be responsible for the resultant delay, especially considering the fact that the State itself is a party to criminal proceedings, being responsible for the prosecution of criminal matters.76

Th e Court considers nonetheless that in giving due weight to the various aspects of a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6(1) ECHR:

‘diffi cult decisions have to be made by the domestic courts in cases where these aspects appear to be in confl ict. In particular, the right to a trial within a reasonable time must be balanced against the need to aff ord to the defence suffi cient time to prepare its case and must not unduly restrict the right of the defence to equality of arms. Th us in assessing whether the length of proceedings was reasonable, particularly in a case where an applicant relies upon the court’s responsibility to take steps to advance the proceedings, this [c]ourt must have regard to the reasons for the delay and the extent to which delay resulted from an eff ort to secure other key rights guaranteed by Article 6.’77

On numerous occasions the Court has considered that even if the State authorities took measures to ensure that the proceedings were not delayed, the main responsibility for the length of the proceedings remained with them. In particular in Kayuda v Ukraine78 (a case in which there was a large number of adjournments of hearings), even though on a number of occasions the domestic courts issued compulsory summonses on the persons failing to appear, the Court noted that there were other eff ective mechanisms to ensure their presence at the domestic hearings. Th ese mechanisms included administrative penalties, a measure that the Ukrainian courts did not apply when the compulsory summonses were ineff ective. Th e Court therefore considered that Ukrainian authorities bore the main responsibility for the protracted length of the proceedings.

Similarly, in Sizov v Russia (No. 2),79 the Court could not discern any indication that the domestic court availed itself of the measures existing under national law to discipline the absent witnesses and procure their attendance, in order to ensure that the case was heard within a reasonable time. Th e Court therefore found that the delay occasioned by the witnesses’ failure to attend hearings and the domestic court’s failure to ensure their attendance was attributable to the State.

75 Beggs v Th e United Kingdom, No. 25133/06, 6 November 2012, at para 239.76 Mc Farlane v Ireland (Grand Chamber), No. 31333/06, 10 September 2010, at para 152; Grishin

v Russia, No. 14807/08, 24 July 2012, at para 182; Beggs v Th e United Kingdom, No. 25133/06, 6 November 2012, at para 239; Svinarenko and Slyadnev v Russia, Nos 32541/08 and 43441/08, 11 December 2012, at para 88 (referred to the Grand Chamber).

77 Beggs v Th e United Kingdom, No. 25133/06, 6 November 2012, at para 240.78 Kayuda v Ukraine, No. 31467/06, 10 November 2011, at para 17. See also G.O. v Russia, No. 39249/03,

18 October 2011, at para 112.79 Sizov v Russia (No. 2), No. 58104/08, 24 July 2012, at para 62.



On the other hand, in its decision Ghiţă v Romania,80 the Court considered that despite the adjournments due to witnesses’ failure to appear (and even though the case was pending before the trial court for examination on the merits for three years), no reproach could be made against the authorities who had used the legal means at their disposal.

Furthermore, in order to fi nd a violation, delays attributable to the domestic authorities must have a ‘signifi cantly adverse eff ect’ on the length of the proceedings. For example, in both Borodin v Russia and Idalov v Russia,81 the Court considered that adjournments owing to the judge’s confl icting schedule or witnesses (or other parties) failing to appear as scheduled did not have such an eff ect.

Finally, it is noteworthy that failure to abide by a time-limit prescribed by domestic law does not in itself contravene Article 6(1) of the Convention.82

3.2.5. Levels of jurisdiction

While ass essing the reasonableness of the length of criminal proceedings brought to it, the Court as a rule also takes into consideration the level and number of jurisdictions involved.

Th us, even though the length of proceedings may be considered reasonable when the case was examined at two or three levels of jurisdiction, it may well be considered unreasonable if only one jurisdiction examined the case or if the case remained at the investigation stage for that same length. For example, in Struc v the Republic of Moldova,83 the Court held that proceedings lasting 3 years and 10 months for three levels of jurisdiction was reasonable. Similarly, in Litwin v Germany84 3 years and 9 months for three levels of jurisdiction was considered reasonable, but contrastingly in Laimos and Kalafatis v Greece,85 the Court considered a length of 3 years 9 months for one level of jurisdiction as not reasonable.

4. FINDING OF THE COURT AS REGARDS THE LENGTH OF TH E PROCEEDINGS

4.1. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE C ASE

On the basis of the individual criteria mentioned above, the Court makes an overall assessment of the circumstances of the case. Th e Court establishes that reasonable

80 Ghiţă v Romania (decision), No. 18817/04, 25 September 2012, at para 36.81 Idalov v Russia (Grand Chamber), No. 5826103, 22 May 2012, at para 190; Borodin v Russia,

No. 41867104, 6 November 2012, at para 152.82 Mitkus v Latvia, No. 7259/03, 2 October 2012, at para 88.83 Struc v the Republic of Moldova, No. 40131/09, 4 December 2012, at paras 75–80.84 Litwin v Germany, No. 29090/06, 3 November 2011, at para 51.85 Laimos and Kalafatis v Greece, No. 45658/09, 17 April 2012, at paras 7–13.


92 Intersentia

time is exceeded if, upon such a global assessment, it fi nds that the overall length of the proceedings is excessive in relation to: the complexity of the case, or the number of levels of jurisdiction involved, or upon fi nding that the accused was in custody, or that long periods of inactivity were attributable to the authorities. Conversely it may consider, in some cases, that there has been no violation of Article 6(1) ECHR, due to the overall duration of the proceedings, the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant or the fact that it was examined at a certain number of levels of jurisdiction, even if some of the delays were attributable to the authorities.

In several cases, instead of setting out a detailed written assessment of the circumstances of the case, the Court uses a standard formula such as

‘[t]he Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 §1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case … Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a diff erent conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject and the overall length of the proceedings, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the ‘reasonable time’ requirement’.86

Th e Court usually then refers to the Pélissier and Sassi case87, the Frydlender case88 (the latter relating to length of administrative proceedings) or to the case law rendered concerning the respondent State.89

As appears from the table below of the ECtHR’s case law for 2012, the cases where the Court used this standard formula considering the length of the proceedings to be not reasonable varied from 3 years 9 months (in Laimos & Kalafatis v Greece90) to 16 years 4 months (in Głowacki v Poland91). In view of the signifi cantly diff ering lengths of proceedings involved, it is diffi cult to fi nd a reason for the use of this standard formulation. One can wonder whether this could correspond to a certain ras le bol of the Court toward certain States and the number of proceedings brought against those States, for example Turkey or Greece. Th is is particularly apparent for Greece since in Micheloudakis v Greece the Court decided, in view of the chronic and

86 E.g., C. v Ireland, No. 24643/08, 1 March 2012, at paras 24–25; Seta v Greece and Germany, No. 30287/09, 3 May 2012, at paras 18–19; Ademovič v Turkey, No. 28523/03, 5 June 2012, at para 58; Chyżyński v Poland, No. 32287/09, 24 July 2012, at paras 48–49; Głowacki v Poland, No. 1608/08, 30 October 2012, at para 117.

87 Pélissier and Sassi v France, No. 25444/94, 25 March 1999.88 Frydlender v France, No. 30979/96, 27 June 2000.89 E.g., C. v Ireland, No. 24643/08, 1 March 2012, at paras 24–25; Seta v Greece and Germany,

No. 30287/09, 3 May 2012, at paras 18–19; Ademovič v Turkey, No. 28523/03, 5 June 2012, at para 58; Chyżyński v Poland, No. 32287/09, 24 July 2012, at paras 48–49; Głowacki v Poland, No. 1608/08, 30 October 2012, at para 117.

90 Laimos and Kalafatis v Greece, No. 45658/09, 17 April 2012, at paras 7–13.91 Głowacki v Poland, No. 1608/08, 30 October 2012, at paras 110–119.



persistent problem of lengthy proceedings in Greece, to apply the pilot-judgment procedure.92

In the same way the Court has sometimes, without referencing the circumstances of the case in its assessment, determined that the case was manifestly ill-founded and had to be rejected in accordance with Article 35(3)(a) and (4) ECHR summarily determining that the length of the proceedings was clearly reasonable. In Litwin v Germany,93 concerning a length similar to that established in Laimos & Kalafatis v Greece (3 years 9 months) the Court references the Pélissier and Sassi case and rules that ‘having regard to the criteria established in its case law … considers that the overall length of the proceedings can be regarded as reasonable’. A complaint was similarly found to be manifestly ill-founded without an express assessment of the circumstances in Trymbach v Ukraine, where the length of the proceedings was 2 years and 1 month.94 In Gabrea and others v Romania, the same fi nding was conveyed where the length of the proceedings was 2 years and 6 months.95

4.2. SOME FIGURES ON ACCEPTABLE AND NON-ACCEPTABLE LENGTHS

Although the Court is reluctant to establish defi nitive rules, arguing that every case must be considered on its own merits, in an analysis and comparison of the ECHR’s case law up to 31 July 2011 regarding the length of civil, criminal and administrative proceedings, the CEPEJ highlighted that:

– a total duration of up to 2 years per level of jurisdiction in non-complex cases is generally regarded as reasonable. When proceedings have lasted more than 2 years, the Court examines the case closely to determine whether the domestic authorities have shown due diligence in the process;

– in priority cases (e.g., cases in which the applicant is in custody), the Court may depart from the general approach, and fi nd violation even if the case lasted less than 2 years;

– in complex cases, the Court may allow a longer time, but it pays special attention to periods of inactivity (i.e., the conduct of the authorities) which are clearly excessive. However, this longer period permitted is rarely more than 5 years and almost never more than 8 years in total duration;

– the only cases in which the Court does not fi nd a violation in spite of manifestly excessive duration of proceedings are cases in which the applicant’s behaviour contributed to the delay.96

92 Michelioudakis v Greece, No. 54447/10, 3 April 2012, at paras 55 ff .93 Litwin v Germany, No. 29090/06, 3 November 2011, at para 51.94 Trymbach v Ukraine, No. 44385/02,12 January 2012, at para 49.95 Gabrea and others v Romania (decision), No. 51157/10, 7 February 2012, at para 32.96 Calvez/Régis, supra n 15, at 5 and 12.


94 Intersentia

As regards criminal proceedings, the considerations of the CEPEJ can be refi ned, particularly in light of the Court’s case law in 2012 (see table below). With reference to the parameters identifi ed by the CEPEJ and these more recent cases, the following conclusions can be drawn:

– less than 3 years: Proceedings lasting 3 years or less are generally considered to be reasonable and

any complaint regarding such length is usually rejected by the Court as ‘manifestly ill-founded’ and therefore not admissible97;

– between 3 and 5 years: Except in cases where there are signifi cant delays attributable to the authorities

and/or the accused is in custody,98 lengths of less than 5 years for more than one level of jurisdiction are usually considered as reasonable99;

– more than 5 years: On the other hand, lengths of more than 5 years are rarely considered as reasonable,

save where it is considered that the authorities demonstrated suffi cient diligence in handling the proceedings, the applicant was responsible for delays, the case was particularly complex or it has been examined at several levels of jurisdiction100;

97 See in particular Tryumbach v Ukraine, No. 44385/02, 12 January 2012 (2 years 1 month); J.M. v Denmark, No. 34421/09, 13 November 2012 (1 year 4 months).

98 Th e length of the proceedings has not been considered reasonable in: Jusuf v Greece, No. 4767/09, 10 January 2012 (4 years 9 months for 2 levels of jurisdiction – delays attributable to the authorities); Zafi rov v Greece, No. 25221/09, 6 March 2012 (4 years 7 months for 2 levels of jurisdiction – delays attributable to the authorities); Syngayevskiy v Russia, No. 17628/03, 27 March 2012 (3 years 8 months for 2 levels of jurisdiction – delays attributable to the domestic authorities and applicant in custody); Masár v Slovakia, No. 66882/09, 3 May 2012 (4 years 5 months for pre-trial proceedings – delays attributable to the domestic authorities); Sizov v Russia (No. 2), No. 58104/08, 24 July 2012 (4 years 10 months for 2 levels of jurisdiction – delays attributable to the domestic authorities and applicant in custody).

99 Th e length of the proceedings has been considered reasonable in: Ustyantsev v Ukraine, No. 3299/05, 12 January 2012 (3 years 6 months and 3 years 9 months for 3, respectively 2 levels of jurisdiction); Timoshin v Russia, No. 41643/04, 7 February 2012 (3 years 5 months for 2 levels of jurisdiction); Idalov v Russia (Grand Chamber), No. 5826/03, 22 May 2012 (4 years 11 months for 2 levels of jurisdiction); Valeriy Kovalenko v Russia, No. 41716/08, 29 May 2012 (3 years 6 months for 2 levels of jurisdiction); Mitkus v Latvia, No. 7259/03, 2 October 2012 (3 years 4 months for 3 levels of jurisdiction); Struc v the Republic of Moldova, No. 40131/09, 4 December 2012 (3 years 10 months for 3 levels of jurisdiction).

100 See below the table of the case law of the Court for the year 2012, in particular the length of the proceedings has not been considered reasonable in: Kiryakov v Ukraine, No. 26124/03, 12 January 2012 (5 years 5 months for 3 levels of jurisdiction); Dimitar Vasilev v Bulgaria, No. 10302/05, 10 April 2012 (5 years 6 months for 2 levels of jurisdiction); Lambadaris v Greece, No. 47112/09, 17 April 2012 (5 years 9 months for 2 levels of jurisdiction); Solovyevy v Russia, No. 918/02, 24 April 2012 (5 years for 2 levels of jurisdiction); Mahmut Öz v Turkey, No. 6840/08, 3 July 2012 (over 5 years – still pending – for 2 levels of jurisdiction); Grigoryan v Armenia, No. 3627/06, 10 July 2012 (5 years and 3 months – and possibly still pending overs 7 years later – for investigation stage); Kechev v Bulgaria, No. 13364/05, 26 July 2012 (over 5 years and 3 years 4 months both for preliminary investigation); Pimentel Lourenço v Portugal, No. 9223/10, 23 October 2012 (5 years 4 months for 2 levels of jurisdiction). See however the following cases in which the length of the proceedings has



– more than 7 years: Finally, in nearly every case when the proceedings have lasted more than 7 years

the Court considered that the length of the proceedings was excessive, at least for the year 2012.

It is however interesting to mention four decisions, not judgments, surprisingly rendered under the analysis of the ‘not manifestly ill-founded’ admissibility requirement by the Court in which proceedings lasting more than 7 years have been declared reasonable. In the fi rst one, Dementjeva v Latvia,101 whilst the proceedings had lasted for 8 years and 5 months (across three levels of jurisdiction) and a delay of 18 months was attributable to the authorities, the Court considered that the delays of the proceedings were mainly due to the applicant and therefore the length had to be considered reasonable. In the second case, Breinesberger and Wenzelhuemer v Austria,102 the Court recognized that proceedings lasting more than 7 years and 5 months (across three levels of jurisdiction) were reasonable, in view of the considerable complexity of the case. Th e proceedings in Ivanovas v Latvia103 lasted 7 years and 3 months and were also considered reasonable in view of the particular complexity of the case and the fact that the applicant had already served his sentence and that cross-border criminal co-operation was ‘complicated and time-consuming’ (in casu the appellate proceedings in Latvia continued aft er the applicant had been expelled to Lithuania). Finally, in Krakolinig v Austria,104 the Court found that the length of the proceedings which lasted more than 25 years was reasonable since this length was ascribable to the applicant’s state of health.

5. CONCLUSION

Determining in abstract what is a reasonable length of criminal procedure under the Court’s case law is quite a challenge, taking into account the wide diversity of cases and circumstances. From a purely academic perspective, a perfect conclusion is impossible.

However, an overall review of the case law from a single year shows at least a rather clear trend allowing defi nition of the beginning and the end of the period to be considered for calculation. Th e criteria applied to in assessing the reasonable length of proceedings are also well established.

been considered reasonable: Horych v Poland, No. 13621/08, 17 April 2012 (5 years 6 months for 2 levels of jurisdiction); Ghiţă v Romania (decision), No. 18817/04, 25 September 2012 (6 years 5 months for 3 levels of jurisdiction and 2 cycles of proceedings); Borodin v Russia, No. 41867104, 6 November 2012 (5 years 3 months for 2 levels of jurisdiction).

101 Dementjeva v Latvia (decision), No. 17458/10, 13 March 2012.102 Breinesberger and Wenzelhuemer v Austria (decision), No. 46601/07, 27 November 2012.103 Ivanovas v Latvia (decision), No. 25769/02, 4 December 2012.104 Krakolinig v Austria (decision), No. 33992/07, 10 May 2012.


96 Intersentia

Th e criteria ‘against’ reasonableness are the fact that: (1) the accused/suspect was held in custody during the proceedings, (2) the case is not complex, (3) no or only minor delays are attributable to the applicant conduct, (4) the case has been pending at the investigation stage or before only one level of jurisdiction and (5) delays are attributable to the national authorities. Conversely, the criteria ‘in favour’ of reasonableness are the fact that: (1) the accused/suspect was not held in custody during the proceedings, (2) the case is complex, (3) delays are attributable to the applicant’s conduct, (4) the case has been pending before several levels of jurisdiction and (5) no or only minor delays are attributable to the national authorities. Logically, the longer the proceedings lasted the more criteria in favour of reasonableness should be fulfi lled for the Court to fi nd with the State.

Yet, the prioritisation and weight given to the diff ering criteria vary from case to case. In fact, the fi nding of the Court looks sometimes hardly logical and Cartesian, as it rarely gives detailed reasons on how the criteria interact. Moreover, the Court decides quite surprisingly on certain cases when analysing the ‘manifestly ill-founded’ admissibility requirement, while those cases are obviously not ‘manifestly ill-founded’. Th is tendency seems set to have continued in 2013, as illustrated by the decisions Dobaj v Slovenia105 (in which the proceedings lasted 6 years and 2 months across four levels of jurisdiction) and Krawczak v Poland106 (in which the proceedings lasted 6 years and 9 months across three levels of jurisdiction).

In sum we conclude on a 3–5–7 schematic: below 3 years, the length of the procedure is deemed reasonable; above 7 years, the length of the procedure has been, in the large majority of cases, considered as unreasonable, at least in 2012.

Th e threshold between reasonable and unreasonable thus hinges around 5 years. Th is is where the diff erent criteria interact in a diffi cult puzzle and where predicting an outcome seems the most hazardous.

Determining the reasonableness of criminal procedure’s length is not an exact science. At least the present analysis and its 3–5–7 conclusion may help those practitioners who want some answers to their questions on what is, theoretically, an acceptable length of criminal proceedings and under which circumstances. Like a rugby scrum, if it is sometimes easy to defi ne the lines at the beginning of the action, the game quickly makes things blurred. But without the lines, there is no game at all.

105 Dobaj v Slovenia (decision), No. 30157/08, 5 March 2013.106 Krawczak v Poland (decision), No. 10697/11, 15 January 2013.



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mpl

ex (n

umbe

r of a

ccus

ed).

No

singl

e jud

icia

l dec

ision

has

bee

n ta

ken

on th

e mer

its o

f the

case

. Th e

onl

y jud

icia

l de

cisio

ns d

eliv

ered

in th

ese p

roce

edin

gs e

stab

lishe

d th

at th

e cri

min

al in

vest

igat

ion

by th

e pr

osec

utor

had

bee

n m

arre

d by

bre

ache

s of e

ssen

tial p

roce

dura

l rig

hts a

nd

the

case

was

ther

efor

e to

be

refe

rred

bac

k to

the

pros

ecut

or. Y

et, i

t too

k m

ore

than

2

year

s to

esta

blish

that

the

inve

stig

atio

n w

as m

arre

d, fo

r rea

sons

that

cou

ld h

ave

been

esta

blish

ed a

s ear

ly a

s the

fi rs

t hea

ring

s in

the c

ase.

Not

reas

onab

le

J.M. v

Den

mar

kN

o. 3

4421

/09

13 N

ovem

ber 2

012

1 ye

ar 4

mon

ths

Th e m

atte

r did

not

disc

lose

any a

ppea

ranc

e of v

iola

tion

of A

rtic

le 6

and

was

reje

cted

in

acc

orda

nce w

ith A

rtic

le 3

5(4)

.Re

ason

able

104

Th is

tabl

e on

ly in

clud

es th

e ju

dgm

ents

– a

nd n

ot th

e de

cisio

ns –

rend

ered

by

the

Cou

rt d

urin

g th

e ye

ar 2

012,

in w

hich

the

Cou

rt e

xam

ined

vio

latio

ns o

f the

re

ason

able

tim

e req

uire

men

t ens

hrin

ed in

Art

icle

6(1

) EC

HR

in re

latio

n w

ith th

e len

gth

of cr

imin

al p

roce

edin

gs.


98 Intersentia

Cas

e104

Tota

l len

gth

Leve

ls of

ju

risd

ictio

nM

otiv

atio

nRe

sult

Begg

s v th

e Uni

ted

King

dom

No.

251

33/0

66

Nov

embe

r 201

2

10 y

ears

3

mon

ths

proc

eedi

ngs

on ap

peal

on

ly

Th e

proc

eedi

ngs w

ere

part

icul

arly

com

plex

(sev

eral

gro

unds

of a

ppea

l wer

e lo

dged

co

veri

ng d

iver

se a

nd c

ompl

ex m

atte

rs, e

xten

sive

case

fi le

, the

app

eal h

eari

ng it

self

took

8 d

ays a

nd th

e det

aile

d ju

dgm

ent h

ande

d do

wn

was

128

pag

es lo

ng).

Wha

t was

at s

take

for

the

appl

ican

t was

of i

mpo

rtan

ce, n

amel

y a

conv

ictio

n fo

r a

serio

us cr

imin

al o

ff enc

e and

sent

ence

of l

ife im

priso

nmen

t with

a su

bsta

ntia

l tar

iff .

A su

bsta

ntia

l pro

port

ion

of th

e del

ay w

as at

trib

utab

le to

the a

pplic

ant’s

own

cond

uct.

Furt

her

dela

ys w

ere

incu

rred

thr

ough

no

faul

t of

eith

er p

arty

as

a re

sult

of

clar

ifi ca

tions

of p

oint

s of l

aw.

Th e

dom

estic

cou

rts w

ere

aliv

e to

the

issue

of d

elay

and

they

wer

e pr

epar

ed to

take

st

eps

to e

xped

ite t

he p

roce

edin

gs. H

owev

er, t

here

wer

e pe

riods

of i

nact

ivity

and

fa

ilure

of

the

judi

cial

aut

horit

ies

duri

ng t

hese

per

iods

to

take

ste

ps t

o pr

ogre

ss

mat

ters

of t

heir

own

mot

ion.

Not

reas

onab

le

Boro

din

v Rus

siaN

o. 4

1867

/04

6 N

ovem

ber 2

012

5 ye

ars 3

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Th e

proc

eedi

ngs

wer

e of

a c

erta

in c

ompl

exity

(num

ber

of d

efen

dant

s, au

thor

ities

’ ta

sk o

f col

lect

ing

and

exam

inin

g su

bsta

ntia

l for

ensic

evid

ence

).Co

nsid

erab

le de

lays w

ere a

ttrib

utab

le to

the a

pplic

ant (

in p

artic

ular

the a

djou

rnm

ents)

.Th

e au

thor

ities

dem

onst

rate

d su

ffi ci

ent d

ilige

nce

in h

andl

ing

the

proc

eedi

ngs (

the

inve

stig

atio

n an

d ap

peal

stag

es la

sted

appr

oxim

atel

y 9

mon

ths e

ach,

the h

eari

ngs a

t th

e tr

ial

stag

e w

ere

held

reg

ular

ly a

nd t

he a

djou

rnm

ents

attr

ibut

able

to

the

auth

oriti

es d

id n

ot h

ave a

sign

ifi ca

ntly

adve

rse e

ff ect

on

the l

engt

h of

the p

roce

edin

gs

as a

who

le).

Reas

onab

le

Gło

wack

i v P

olan

dN

o. 16

08/0

830

Oct

ober

201

2

16 y

ears

4

mon

ths

1 le

vel

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Arde

lean

v Ro

man

iaN

o. 2

8766

/030

Oct

ober

201

2

7 ye

ars 8

mon

ths

3 le

vels

Th e c

ase w

as n

ot p

artic

ular

ly co

mpl

ex.

Th e fi

rst i

nsta

nce d

ecisi

on w

as re

nder

ed 5

yea

rs a

ft er t

he a

pplic

ant w

as aw

are o

f the

ex

isten

ce o

f the

pro

ceed

ings

. Th i

s len

gth

was

exc

essiv

e ev

en if

som

e ad

jour

nmen

ts

wer

e attr

ibut

able

to th

e app

lican

t and

the c

laim

ant.

Th er

e wer

e del

ays a

nd q

uite

leng

thy

perio

ds o

f ina

ctiv

ity.

Even

if th

e pha

se p

oste

rior t

o th

e fi rs

t ins

tanc

e jud

gem

ent,

i.e.,

2 ye

ars a

nd 8

mon

ths

for 2

leve

ls of

juri

sdic

tion

did

appe

ar re

ason

able

, the

ove

rall

leng

th w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le



Cas

e104

Tota

l len

gth

Leve

ls of

ju

risd

ictio

nM

otiv

atio

nRe

sult

Grig

orye

v v R

ussia

No.

226

63/0

623

Oct

ober

201

2

8 ye

ars 2

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Th e c

ase w

as ra

ther

com

plex

.Th

ere w

ere d

elay

s attr

ibut

able

to th

e aut

horit

ies (

in p

artic

ular

a p

erio

d of

1 y

ear a

nd

1 m

onth

for t

he tr

ial c

ourt

to sc

hedu

le th

e fi rs

t hea

ring

and

ano

ther

9 m

onth

s del

ay).

Six

diff e

rent

jud

ges

had

exam

ined

the

cas

e an

d th

e co

-def

enda

nts’

case

s w

ere

ultim

atel

y se

para

ted

from

the a

pplic

ant’s

case

.Th

e de

lay

resu

lting

from

the

appl

ican

t’s o

wn

cond

uct w

as ra

ther

lim

ited

com

pare

d to

the o

vera

ll le

ngth

of t

he p

roce

edin

gs

Not

reas

onab

le

Pim

ente

l Lou

renç

o v P

ortu

gal

No.

922

3/10

23 O

ctob

er 2

012

5 ye

ars 4

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Th e

case

pre

sent

ed s

ome

com

plex

ity (

char

acte

r ec

onom

ic a

nd fi

nanc

ial,

need

of

actio

ns w

ith fo

reig

n au

thor

ities

).Th

e co

mpl

exity

did

not

jus

tify

the

inve

stig

ativ

e au

thor

ities

nee

ding

mor

e th

an

4 ye

ars t

o co

nclu

de th

e inv

estig

atio

n.

Not

reas

onab

le

Har

tman

v Sl

oven

iaN

o. 4

2236

/05

18 O

ctob

er 2

012

8 ye

ars 6

mon

ths

4 le

vels

Th e

case

was

com

plex

(na

ture

of t

he o

ff enc

e, nu

mbe

r of

acc

used

and

am

ount

of

evid

ence

to b

e con

sider

ed).

Whi

le th

e fi r

st in

stan

ce c

ourt

took

2 y

ears

and

3 m

onth

s to

deliv

er a

judg

men

t and

th

e app

eal c

ourt

7 m

onth

s, th

e pro

ceed

ings

bef

ore t

he su

prem

e cou

rt w

ere p

endi

ng

for a

lmos

t 4 ye

ars.

Alth

ough

ackn

owle

dgin

g th

e sub

stan

tive s

ize o

f the

case

-fi le

and

th

e num

erou

s leg

al is

sues

that

had

ari

sen,

del

iber

atin

g on

the m

atte

r for

3 y

ears

and

8

mon

ths w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Jurij

s Dm

itrije

vs

v Lat

via

No.

374

67/0

42

Oct

ober

201

2

6 ye

ars 2

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Mitk

us v

Latv

iaN

o. 7

259/

03

2 O

ctob

er 2

012

3 ye

ars 4

mon

ths

3 le

vels

Taki

ng in

to a

ccou

nt a

ll th

e re

leva

nt fa

ctua

l and

lega

l ele

men

ts o

f the

cas

e na

mel

y;

the c

ompl

exity

of t

he ca

se, t

he d

elay

s cau

sed

by th

e atte

mpt

s to

ensu

re th

e atte

ndan

ce

of a

witn

ess,

and

the o

vera

ll sp

eed

with

whi

ch th

e cas

e was

dec

ided

by

the s

upre

me

cour

t an

d th

e se

nate

of

the

supr

eme

cour

t, th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs

was

re

ason

able

.Th

e co

mpl

aint

was

the

refo

re c

onsid

ered

man

ifest

ly i

ll-fo

unde

d an

d re

ject

ed i

n ac

cord

ance

with

Art

icle

35(

3)(a

) and

(4).

Reas

onab

le


100 Intersentia

Cas

e104

Tota

l len

gth

Leve

ls of

ju

risd

ictio

nM

otiv

atio

nRe

sult

Tark

an Y

avaş

v Tu

rkey

No.

582

10/0

818

Sep

tem

ber 2

012

10 y

ears

1 m

onth

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Dur

muş

and

Ta

nşan

cık

v Tur

key

No.

546

25/0

931

July

201

2

12 y

ears

5

mon

ths

(stil

l pen

ding

)

2 le

vels

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Kech

ev v

Bulg

aria

No.

133

64/0

526

July

201

2

over

5 y

ears

/ 3

year

s 4 m

onth

spr

elim

inar

y in

vest

igat

ion

Firs

t set

of p

roce

edin

gs: W

hile

the c

harg

es ra

ised

agai

nst t

he ap

plic

ant h

ad a

cert

ain

fact

ual a

nd le

gal c

ompl

exity

, it s

eem

s no

t to

have

had

a d

ecisi

ve in

cide

nce

on th

e pr

ocee

ding

s, w

hich

was

mar

ked

by n

umer

ous p

erio

ds o

f ina

ctiv

ity.

Th e a

pplic

ant d

id n

ot p

reve

nt th

e eff e

ctiv

e man

agem

ent o

f the

pro

ceed

ings

.Se

cond

set

of

proc

eedi

ngs:

Th er

e w

ere

long

per

iods

of

inac

tivity

and

del

ays

not

attr

ibut

able

to th

e app

lican

t.

Not

reas

onab

le

(bot

h pr

ocee

ding

s)

Yako

vlev

v U

krai

neN

o. 1

8412

/05

26 Ju

ly 2

012

6 ye

ars 4

mon

ths

1 le

vel

A g

reat

dea

l was

at st

ake f

or th

e app

lican

t as h

e was

in a

stat

e of u

ncer

tain

ty as

to h

is le

gal

posit

ion

and

his

futu

re t

hrou

ghou

t th

e w

hole

per

iod

and,

fur

ther

mor

e, re

mai

ned

subj

ect t

o an

und

erta

king

not

to le

ave h

is pl

ace o

f res

iden

ce.

Th e c

ase w

as n

ot p

artic

ular

ly co

mpl

ex (o

ne cr

imin

al ch

arge

onl

y, al

thou

gh in

volv

ing

seve

ral p

erso

ns).

Th e

appl

ican

t mer

ely

exer

cise

d hi

s pro

cedu

ral r

ight

s and

the

dela

ys a

ttrib

utab

le to

hi

m w

ere i

nsig

nifi c

ant.

Repe

ated

rem

ittal

s of t

he ca

se fo

r re-

inve

stig

atio

n (in

par

ticul

ar m

ore t

han

3 yea

rs aft

er

the

case

was

sent

for t

rial)

and

prol

onge

d fa

ilure

of t

he a

utho

ritie

s to

prod

uce

to th

e co

urt a

case

read

y for

tria

l. Eve

ntua

lly, t

he ch

arge

agai

nst t

he ap

plic

ant w

as d

ropp

ed b

y th

e inv

estig

ativ

e aut

horit

ies t

hem

selv

es, w

ithou

t goi

ng th

roug

h ju

dici

al re

view

.

Not

reas

onab

le

Petk

o Yo

rdan

ov

v Bul

gari

aN

o. 3

3560

/06

26 Ju

ly 2

012

6 ye

ars 3

mon

ths

3 le

vels

Th e c

ase w

as n

ot co

mpl

ex.

No

dela

y w

as at

trib

utab

le to

the a

pplic

ant e

xcep

t the

adj

ourn

men

t of o

ne h

eari

ng.

Th er

e w

ere

dela

ys

attr

ibut

able

to

th

e au

thor

ities

du

ring

th

e pr

elim

inar

y in

vest

igat

ions

. Th e

re w

as an

unj

ustifi

ed

dela

y of 3

year

s and

6 m

onth

s, du

ring

whi

ch

no a

ctiv

ities

had

bee

n un

dert

aken

.

Not

reas

onab

le



Cas

e104

Tota

l len

gth

Leve

ls of

ju

risd

ictio

nM

otiv

atio

nRe

sult

Gri

shin

v Ru

ssia

No.

1480

7/08

24 Ju

ly 2

012

6 ye

ars

10 m

onth

s2

leve

lsTh

e ca

se w

as v

ery

com

plex

(num

ber

of c

ount

s, ac

cuse

d, v

ictim

s an

d w

itnes

ses

– m

any

of w

hom

resid

ed fa

r aw

ay fr

om th

e pl

ace

the

tria

l was

hel

d, a

s wel

l as e

xper

t re

port

s, na

ture

of t

he ch

arge

s).Ev

en t

houg

h th

ere

clea

rly w

ere

dela

ys f

or w

hich

the

app

lican

t, as

wel

l as

his

co-d

efen

dant

s, w

ere

resp

onsib

le, t

here

wer

e sig

nifi c

ant

dela

ys a

ttrib

utab

le t

o th

e St

ate

duri

ng t

he p

erio

d w

hen

the

case

was

pen

ding

bef

ore

the

tria

l cou

rt fo

r th

e se

cond

and

the t

hird

tim

e am

ount

ing a

t lea

st to

abou

t 1 ye

ar, a

nd d

urin

g tha

t per

iod,

th

e app

lican

t was

det

aine

d on

rem

and.

Not

reas

onab

le

Sizo

v v R

ussia

(No.

2)N

o. 5

8104

/08

24 Ju

ly 2

012

4 ye

ars

10 m

onth

s2

leve

lsTh

e pr

ocee

ding

s w

ere

of a

cer

tain

com

plex

ity (

scop

e of

the

cha

rges

, num

ber

of

defe

ndan

ts).

Apa

rt fr

om a

n ad

jour

nmen

t of t

he p

roce

edin

gs fo

r 5 m

onth

s (a

dela

y w

hich

can

not

be co

nsid

ered

sign

ifi ca

nt) d

ue to

the a

pplic

ant’s

illn

ess,

the a

pplic

ant h

imse

lf di

d no

t co

ntrib

ute

to t

he l

engt

h of

the

pro

ceed

ings

. Th

ey w

ere

dela

ys o

ccas

ione

d by

w

itnes

ses’

failu

re to

atte

nd h

eari

ng an

d tri

al co

urt’s

failu

re to

ensu

re th

eir a

ttend

ance

.Th

e app

eal c

ourt

s qua

shed

the a

pplic

ant’s

conv

ictio

n tw

ice.

As a

resu

lt, th

e app

lican

t ha

d to

stan

d tr

ial t

hree

tim

es.

Th e a

pplic

ant w

as h

eld

in cu

stod

y pen

ding

tria

l and

appe

al p

roce

edin

gs ag

ains

t him

.

Not

reas

onab

le

Hay

retti

n D

emir

v Tur

key

No.

209

1/07

24 Ju

ly 2

012

13 y

ears

10

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Sarp

Kur

ay v

Turk

eyN

o. 2

3280

/09

24 Ju

ly 2

012

15 y

ears

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

D.M

.T. a

nd D

.K.I.

v B

ulga

ria

No.

294

76/0

624

July

201

2

6 ye

ars 2

mon

ths

3 le

vels

Th e c

ase h

ad a

cert

ain

com

plex

ity (c

harg

es).

Even

if so

me d

elay

s wer

e attr

ibut

able

to th

e app

lican

t, th

e mai

n de

lays

(rem

ittal

s of

the c

ase)

, i.e.

, 2 y

ears

and

6 m

onth

s, w

ere a

ttrib

utab

le to

the a

utho

ritie

s.Th

e app

lican

t was

susp

ende

d of

his

func

tions

dur

ing t

he p

roce

edin

gs an

d he

was

not

pe

rmitt

ed to

und

erta

ke a

rem

uner

ated

act

ivity

exce

pt in

two

limite

d ar

eas.

Not

reas

onab

le


102 Intersentia

Cas

e104

Tota

l len

gth

Leve

ls of

ju

risd

ictio

nM

otiv

atio

nRe

sult

Chyż

yńsk

i v P

olan

dN

o. 3

2287

/09

24 Ju

ly 2

012

11 y

ears

8

mon

ths

(stil

l pen

ding

)

2 le

vels

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Grig

orya

n v A

rmen

iaN

o. 3

627/

0610

July

201

2

5 ye

ars 3

mon

ths

(pos

sibly

still

pe

ndin

g ov

er

7 ye

ars l

ater

)

inve

stig

atio

n st

age

Muc

h w

as a

t sta

ke fo

r the

app

lican

t as h

e su

ff ere

d fe

elin

gs o

f unc

erta

inty

abo

ut h

is fu

ture

for

a pr

otra

cted

per

iod

of ti

me,

bear

ing

in m

ind

that

he

risk

ed a

cri

min

al

conv

ictio

n.Th

e ca

se w

as n

ot o

f par

ticul

ar c

ompl

exity

(the

fact

that

it in

volv

ed th

ree

accu

sed

is in

itse

lf no

t suffi

cie

nt to

mak

e suc

h an

ass

umpt

ion)

.It

is no

t cle

ar if

any

inve

stig

ativ

e mea

sure

s wer

e car

ried

out f

or 10

mon

ths,

i.e.,

until

th

e da

te o

n w

hich

the

pro

ceed

ings

wer

e su

spen

ded.

Fur

ther

mor

e, no

thin

g in

the

ca

se fi

le s

ugge

sts

that

any

inv

estig

ativ

e m

easu

res

wer

e ca

rrie

d ou

t fo

llow

ing

the

susp

ensio

n of

the p

roce

edin

gs, t

hat i

s for

at le

ast a

4 y

ears

per

iod.

Not

reas

onab

le

Mah

mut

Öz v

Tur

key

No.

684

0/08

3 Ju

ly 2

012

over

5 y

ears

(stil

l pen

ding

)2

leve

lsH

avin

g re

gard

s to

its

cas

e la

w, t

he C

ourt

con

sider

ed t

hat

the

leng

th o

f th

e pr

ocee

ding

s was

exce

ssiv

e.N

ot re

ason

able

Ass

unçã

o Sa

ntos

v P

ortu

gal

No.

601

5/09

26 Ju

ne 2

012

8 ye

ars 6

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Cons

tant

in F

lore

a v R

oman

iaN

o. 2

1534

/05

19 Ju

ne 2

012

8 ye

ars 5

mon

ths

3 le

vels

Th er

e w

ere

vario

us d

elay

s –

in r

elat

ion

to th

e iss

ue o

f jur

isdic

tion

and

num

erou

s re

ferr

als o

f the

case

bet

wee

n ju

risd

ictio

ns –

not

attr

ibut

able

to th

e app

lican

t.N

ot re

ason

able

Adem

ovič

v Tur

key

No.

285

23/0

35Ju

ne 2

012

10 y

ears

7

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le



Cas

e104

Tota

l len

gth

Leve

ls of

ju

risd

ictio

nM

otiv

atio

nRe

sult

Vale

riy K

oval

enko

v R

ussia

No.

417

16/0

829

May

201

2

3 ye

ars 6

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Th e c

ase w

as p

artic

ular

ly co

mpl

ex (n

umbe

r and

nat

ure o

f cou

nts,

num

ber o

f vic

tims,

witn

esse

s and

expe

rt ex

amin

atio

ns).

Th e c

ondu

ct o

f the

appl

ican

t did

not

pro

long

the p

roce

edin

gs. Y

et it

took

him

nea

rly

1 ye

ar to

stud

y th

e cas

e fi le

.H

avin

g re

gard

to th

e ext

ensiv

e inv

estig

atio

n w

hich

the c

ase n

eces

sitat

ed, t

he le

ngth

of

the

inve

stig

atio

n, i.

e., 1

yea

r 6 m

onth

s, w

as n

ot e

xces

sive.

Furt

her t

here

was

no

signi

fi can

t del

ay d

urin

g the

iden

tifi e

d pe

riod

of ap

prox

imat

ely 1

year

, whi

ch in

itse

lf do

es n

ot a

ppea

r exc

essiv

e, fo

r cou

rt p

roce

edin

gs to

hav

e be

en c

ompl

eted

at 2

leve

ls of

juri

sdic

tion.

Th e

com

plai

nt w

as m

anife

stly

ill-

foun

ded

and

reje

cted

in

acco

rdan

ce w

ith

Art

icle

35(

3)(a

) and

4.

Reas

onab

le

Idal

ov v

Russ

iaN

o. 5

826/

0322

May

201

2

4 ye

ars

11 m

onth

s2

leve

lsTh

e pr

ocee

ding

s in

volv

ed a

cer

tain

deg

ree

of c

ompl

exity

(na

ture

of c

harg

es a

nd

num

ber o

f def

enda

nts).

Th er

e wer

e del

ays a

ttrib

utab

le to

the a

pplic

ant –

adj

ourn

men

ts.

Th e

auth

oriti

es d

emon

stra

ted

suffi

cien

t dili

genc

e in

han

dlin

g th

e pr

ocee

ding

s (th

e in

vest

igat

ion

stag

e w

as c

ompl

eted

in 1

yea

r and

8 m

onth

s, tr

ial h

eari

ngs w

ere

held

re

gula

rly a

nd t

he a

djou

rnm

ents

did

not

hav

e a

signi

fi can

tly a

dver

se e

ff ect

on

the

leng

th o

f the

pro

ceed

ings

, the

appe

al p

roce

edin

gs la

sted

appr

oxim

atel

y 6

mon

ths).

Reas

onab

le

Has

dem

ir v T

urke

yN

o. 4

4027

/09

22 M

ay 2

012

12 y

ears

(stil

l pen

ding

)2

leve

lsH

avin

g re

gard

s to

its

cas

e la

w, t

he C

ourt

con

sider

ed t

hat

the

leng

th o

f th

e pr

ocee

ding

s was

exce

ssiv

e.N

ot re

ason

able

Sagr

opou

los v

Gre

ece

No.

618

94/0

83

May

201

2

7 ye

ars

11 m

onth

s3

leve

lsTh

ere w

as a

dela

y of

1 y

ear a

nd 8

mon

ths n

ot at

trib

utab

le to

the a

utho

ritie

s.Th

ere w

as a

n un

just

ifi ed

per

iod

of in

activ

ity (1

yea

r and

5 m

onth

s bet

wee

n th

e end

of

inve

stig

atio

n an

d fi r

st h

eari

ng b

efor

e the

trib

unal

of fi

rst i

nsta

nce)

attr

ibut

able

to

the a

utho

ritie

s.

Not

reas

onab

le

Seta

v G

reec

e and

G

erm

any

No.

302

87/0

93

May

201

2

9 ye

ars 9

mon

ths

(stil

l pen

ding

)3

leve

lsH

avin

g re

gard

s to

its

cas

e la

w, t

he C

ourt

con

sider

ed t

hat

the

leng

th o

f th

e pr

ocee

ding

s was

exce

ssiv

e.N

ot re

ason

able


104 Intersentia

Cas

e104

Tota

l len

gth

Leve

ls of

ju

risd

ictio

nM

otiv

atio

nRe

sult

Ioan

nis K

arag

iann

is v G

reec

eN

o. 6

6609

/09

3 M

ay 2

012

6 ye

ars 9

mon

ths

3 le

vels

Th er

e wer

e rep

eate

d pr

oced

ural

del

ays.

Mor

e tha

n 7 m

onth

s of t

he to

tal l

engt

h of

the

proc

eedi

ngs b

efor

e the

cour

ts w

as at

trib

utab

le to

the a

pplic

ant.

How

ever

, it w

as n

ot

the

appl

ican

t’s c

ondu

ct a

lone

whi

ch c

ontr

ibut

ed t

o th

e pr

olon

ged

leng

th o

f th

e pr

ocee

ding

s. O

n th

e co

ntra

ry, t

he a

ctua

l len

gth

of th

e pr

ocee

ding

s with

out t

akin

g in

to a

ccou

nt th

e app

lican

t’s d

elay

, was

exce

ssiv

e.

Not

reas

onab

le

Mas

ár v

Slov

akia

No.

668

82/0

93

May

201

2

4 ye

ars 5

mon

ths

pre-

tria

l pr

ocee

ding

sTh

ey w

ere

dela

ys a

ttrib

utab

le to

the

auth

oriti

es (i

n pa

rtic

ular

nea

rly 1

4 m

onth

s to

obta

in a

sec

ond

expe

rt o

pini

on a

nd a

noth

er 5

mon

ths

elap

sed

befo

re th

e re

leva

nt

docu

men

ts w

ere t

rans

ferr

ed to

the a

utho

ritie

s). A

t tha

t tim

e the

crim

inal

proc

eedi

ngs

agai

nst t

he ap

plic

ant h

ad a

lread

y la

sted

alm

ost 3

yea

rs at

pre

-tri

al st

age.

Not

reas

onab

le

Zelid

is v G

reec

eN

o. 5

9793

/08

3 M

ay 2

012

6 ye

ars 5

mon

ths

3 le

vels

Th er

e w

as a

per

iod

of m

ore

than

3 y

ears

bet

wee

n th

e ap

plic

ant’s

arr

est

and

the

publ

icat

ion

of th

e fi r

st in

stan

ce ju

dgm

ent w

ithou

t the

Sta

te g

ivin

g an

y ex

plan

atio

n fo

r thi

s len

gth.

Not

reas

onab

le

Solo

vyev

y v R

ussia

No.

918/

0224

Apr

il 20

12

5 ye

ars

2 le

vels

A d

elay

(14

mon

ths a

t lea

st) w

as at

trib

utab

le to

the a

pplic

ants

.Su

bsta

ntia

l un

just

ifi ed

per

iods

of

inac

tivity

or

dela

y (a

mon

g ot

hers

1 y

ear

and

5 m

onth

s; 6

mon

ths;

3 m

onth

s) w

ere a

ttrib

utab

le to

the a

utho

ritie

s.Th

e ov

eral

l per

iod,

less

the

perio

d at

trib

utab

le to

the

appl

ican

t, le

ft th

e au

thor

ities

ac

coun

tabl

e for

a pe

riod

of ap

prox

imat

ely

4 ye

ars.

Not

reas

onab

le

Hor

ych

v Pol

and

No.

136

21/0

817

Apr

il 20

12

5 ye

ars 6

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Th e c

ase w

as co

mpl

ex (c

harg

es).

Th e i

nves

tigat

ion

(11

mon

ths),

the fi

rst-i

nsta

nce p

roce

edin

gs (3

year

s and

6 m

onth

s)

and

the

appe

llate

pro

ceed

ings

(1 y

ear)

wer

e te

rmin

ated

with

out u

ndue

del

ay a

nd

coul

d no

t be c

onsid

ered

exce

ssiv

e.Th

e app

licat

ion

was

inad

miss

ible

as b

eing

man

ifest

ly il

l-fou

nded

.

Reas

onab

le

Hat

ziio

anni

dis

v Gre

ece

No.

519

06/0

917

Apr

il 20

12

8 ye

ars

3 le

vels

It to

ok 3

year

s fro

m th

e app

lican

t’s ar

rest

unt

il he

was

sent

for t

rial

, with

out t

he St

ate

prov

idin

g an

y re

leva

nt ex

plan

atio

n fo

r thi

s del

ay.

Not

reas

onab

le



Cas

e104

Tota

l len

gth

Leve

ls of

ju

risd

ictio

nM

otiv

atio

nRe

sult

Lam

bada

ris v

Gre

ece

No.

471

12/0

917

Apr

il 20

12

5 ye

ars 9

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Çata

l v T

urke

yN

o. 2

6808

/08

17 A

pril

2012

15 y

ears

(s

till p

endi

ng)

2 le

vels

Hav

ing

exam

ined

all

the

mat

eria

l sub

mitt

ed to

it, t

he C

ourt

con

sider

ed t

hat t

he

leng

th o

f the

crim

inal

pro

ceed

ings

has

bee

n ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Mitr

elis v

Gre

ece

No.

456

02/0

917

Apr

il 20

12

8 ye

ars 9

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Laim

os &

Kal

afat

is v G

reec

eN

o. 4

5658

/09

17 A

pril

2012

3 ye

ars 9

mon

ths

1 le

vel

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Petr

idou

-Kat

akal

idou

v G

reec

eN

o. 3

463/

0917

Apr

il 20

12

7 ye

ars 2

mon

ths

3 le

vels

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Dim

itar V

asile

v v B

ulga

ria

No.

103

02/0

510

Apr

il 20

12

5 ye

ars 6

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Th e c

ase w

as n

ot p

artic

ular

ly co

mpl

ex (a

lthou

gh it

invo

lved

thre

e def

enda

nts).

Th e

dela

y at

trib

utab

le th

e ap

plic

ant (

four

hea

ring

s wer

e ad

jour

ned)

did

not

app

ear

signi

fi can

t.Th

ey w

ere

num

ber

of d

elay

s at

the

judi

cial

sta

ge, w

hich

wer

e at

trib

utab

le t

o th

e au

thor

ities

(in

part

icul

ar a

del

ay o

f abo

ut 1

yea

r bec

ause

of t

he re

mitt

al o

f the

cas

e an

d re

peat

ed a

djou

rnm

ents)

.

Not

reas

onab

le

Mich

eliou

daki

s v G

reec

eN

o. 5

4447

/10

3 A

pril

2012

7 ye

ars 1

mon

th

3 le

vels

Th e c

ase r

aise

d no

com

plex

fact

ual o

r leg

al is

sues

.Th

e ove

rall

leng

th o

f the

pro

ceed

ings

(mor

e tha

n 7 y

ears

) was

exce

ssiv

e, ev

en if

som

e of

the a

djou

rnm

ents

wer

e not

attr

ibut

able

to th

e aut

horit

ies.

Not

reas

onab

le


106 Intersentia

Cas

e104

Tota

l len

gth

Leve

ls of

ju

risd

ictio

nM

otiv

atio

nRe

sult

Ricc

ardi

v Ro

man

iaN

o. 3

048/

043

Apr

il 20

12

9 ye

ars

(stil

l pen

ding

)1

leve

lTh

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs

was

exc

essiv

e an

d co

uld

not

be j

ustifi

ed

by t

he

com

plex

ity o

f the

case

and

the a

djou

rnm

ents

requ

este

d by

the a

pplic

ant a

lone

.Th

ere w

ere r

epea

ted

proc

edur

al d

elay

s.

Not

reas

onab

le

Syng

ayev

skiy

v Ru

ssia

No.

176

28/0

327

Mar

ch 2

012

3 ye

ars 8

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Th e c

ase w

as o

f som

e com

plex

ity (n

atur

e of t

he c

harg

es, n

umbe

r of d

efen

dant

s and

w

itnes

ses).

Th er

e wer

e con

sider

able

per

iods

of i

nact

ivity

attr

ibut

able

to th

e aut

horit

ies.

Th e

leng

th o

f the

inve

stig

atio

n (5

mon

ths)

was

not

exc

essiv

e. H

owev

er th

ere

was

a

dela

y of

1 y

ear

and

8 m

onth

s be

twee

n th

e en

d of

the

inv

estig

atio

n an

d th

e co

mm

ence

men

t of

tri

al a

nd d

elay

s in

the

exa

min

atio

n of

the

app

lican

t’s a

ppea

l at

trib

utab

le to

the a

utho

ritie

s.Th

e app

lican

t was

hel

d in

cust

ody

duri

ng th

e ent

ire p

erio

d.

Not

reas

onab

le

Serr

ano

Cont

rera

s v S

pain

No.

491

83/0

820

Mar

ch 2

012

11 y

ears

1 m

onth

3 le

vels

Th e c

ase w

as o

f a ce

rtai

n co

mpl

exity

(num

ber o

f doc

umen

ts to

be e

xam

ined

, num

ber

of d

efen

dant

s, ro

gato

ry co

mm

issio

ns).Th

e ch

roni

c ove

rload

of a

cour

t can

not j

ustif

y th

e exc

essiv

e len

gth

of th

e pro

ceed

ings

.Th

ere w

ere u

njus

tifi e

d pe

riods

of i

nact

ivity

.N

o re

proa

ch co

uld

be m

ade t

o th

e app

lican

t.

Not

reas

onab

le

Aysu

v Tu

rkey

No.

440

21/0

713

Mar

ch 2

012

9 ye

ars 7

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Zafi r

ov v

Gre

ece

No.

252

21/0

96

Mar

ch 2

012

4 ye

ars 7

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Th e

proc

eedi

ngs b

efor

e th

e co

urt o

f app

eal l

aste

d m

ore

than

3 y

ears

and

2 m

onth

s. Th

e per

iod

of 2

yea

rs a

nd 6

mon

ths f

rom

the d

ate t

he ap

plic

ant l

odge

d hi

s app

eal t

o th

e da

te t

he c

ase

was

ini

tially

set

for

hea

ring

was

exc

essiv

e an

d co

mpl

etel

y at

trib

utab

le to

the a

utho

ritie

s.

Not

reas

onab

le

Niz

amet

tin G

ezer

v T

urke

yN

o. 16

155/

046

Mar

ch 2

012

7 ye

ars

11 m

onth

s1

leve

lH

avin

g re

gard

s to

its

cas

e la

w, t

he C

ourt

con

sider

ed t

hat

the

leng

th o

f th

e pr

ocee

ding

s was

exce

ssiv

e.N

ot re

ason

able



Cas

e104

Tota

l len

gth

Leve

ls of

ju

risd

ictio

nM

otiv

atio

nRe

sult

C. v

Irel

and

No.

246

43/0

81

Mar

ch 2

012

11 y

ears

4

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Dim

itar I

vano

v v B

ulga

ria

No.

194

18/0

714

Feb

ruar

y 20

12

12 y

ears

2 le

vels

Th e c

ase w

as n

ot p

artic

ular

ly co

mpl

ex.

Th e a

utho

ritie

s wer

e res

pons

ible

for a

larg

e par

t of t

he d

elay

as a

resu

lt of

thei

r bei

ng

inac

tive

for

a pe

riod

of 9

yea

rs w

hen

the

case

rem

aine

d do

rman

t at t

he p

re-t

rial

st

age.

Not

reas

onab

le

Soul

ioti

v Gre

ece

No.

414

47/0

87

Febr

uary

201

2

8 ye

ars 9

mon

ths

3 le

vels

Even

if t

he d

elay

s at

trib

utab

le t

o th

e ap

plic

ant (

requ

ests

for

adjo

urnm

ents)

wer

e de

duct

ed fo

r the

ove

rall

leng

th o

f the

pro

ceed

ings

, it r

emai

ned

exce

ssiv

e.N

ot re

ason

able

Vasil

ev R

adev

v G

reec

eN

o. 2

3211

/08

7 Fe

brua

ry 2

012

7 ye

ars 1

mon

th

(stil

l pen

ding

)3

leve

lsTh

e pro

ceed

ings

bef

ore t

he co

urt o

f app

eal h

ad la

sted

at le

ast 4

yea

rs.

Not

reas

onab

le

Tim

oshi

n v R

ussia

No.

416

43/0

47

Febr

uary

201

2

3 ye

ars 5

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Th e c

ase w

as n

ot co

mpl

ex (c

once

rned

a sin

gle i

ncid

ent).

Whi

le th

e to

tal l

engt

h of

the

inve

stig

atio

n (a

ppro

xim

atel

y 18

mon

ths)

coul

d ap

pear

so

mew

hat e

xces

sive i

n a r

elat

ivel

y sim

ple c

ase,

it w

as n

ot su

ffi ci

ent b

y its

elf t

o con

clude

th

at th

e aut

horit

ies f

aile

d to

cond

uct t

he p

roce

edin

gs in

an

expe

ditio

us m

anne

r.A

larg

e nu

mbe

r of

hea

ring

s ha

d to

be

adjo

urne

d be

caus

e of

the

app

lican

t or

his

coun

sel’s

failu

re to

atte

nd.

Th er

e was

no

unju

stifi

able

del

ay in

the a

ctio

ns o

f the

auth

oriti

es.

Th e a

pplic

ant w

as n

ot in

det

entio

n fo

r the

mos

t par

t of t

he p

roce

edin

gs.

Reas

onab

le

Nak

onec

hnyy

v U

krai

neN

o. 1

7262

/07

26 Ja

nuar

y 20

12

10 y

ears

6

mon

ths

(stil

l pen

ding

)

3 le

vels

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Med

eni U

ğur v

Tur

key

No.

496

51/0

624

Janu

ary

2012

over

6 y

ears

(s

till p

endi

ng)

2 le

vels

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le


108 Intersentia

Cas

e104

Tota

l len

gth

Leve

ls of

ju

risd

ictio

nM

otiv

atio

nRe

sult

O. v

Irel

and

No.

438

38/0

719

Janu

ary

2012

13 y

ears

7

mon

ths

1 le

vel

Hav

ing

rega

rds

to i

ts c

ase

law,

the

Cou

rt c

onsid

ered

tha

t th

e le

ngth

of

the

proc

eedi

ngs w

as ex

cess

ive.

Not

reas

onab

le

Dol

utaş

v Tu

rkey

No.

179

14/0

917

Janu

ary

2012

13 y

ears

(stil

l pen

ding

)2

leve

lsTh

e ap

plic

ant c

ontr

ibut

ed to

a p

rolo

ngat

ion

of th

e pr

ocee

ding

s by

6 ye

ars t

hrou

gh

his o

wn

failu

re to

appe

ar b

efor

e the

cour

t.Th

e re

mai

ning

per

iod

(7 y

ears

bef

ore

2 le

vels

of ju

risd

ictio

n) c

ould

not

how

ever

be

expl

aine

d so

lely

by t

he d

elay

ing c

ondu

ct o

f app

lican

t, co

mpl

exity

of t

he p

roce

edin

gs

or n

umbe

r of t

he a

ccus

ed in

volv

ed.

Th er

e w

ere

unne

cess

ary

dela

ys in

the

pro

ceed

ings

(num

ber

of a

djou

rnm

ents

and

in

terv

als b

etw

een

hear

ings

), fo

r whi

ch th

e aut

horit

ies w

ere r

espo

nsib

le.

Not

reas

onab

le

Has

ko v

Turk

eyN

o. 2

0578

/051

7 Ja

nuar

y 20

12

11 y

ears

2

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Th e

cour

t of c

assa

tion

quas

hed

the

judg

men

t of t

he fi

rst-i

nsta

nce

cour

t on

thre

e se

para

te o

ccas

ions

.N

ot re

ason

able

Todo

rov v

Ukr

aine

No.

1671

7/05

12 Ja

nuar

y 20

12

6 ye

ars 7

mon

ths

2 le

vels

For t

he en

tire p

erio

d of

the p

roce

edin

gs th

e app

lican

t was

hel

d in

cust

ody.

Th e p

roce

edin

gs w

ere o

f par

ticul

ar c

ompl

exity

(num

ber o

f cha

rges

and

indi

vidu

als

invo

lved

).Th

e tri

al co

urt h

eld

over

160 h

eari

ngs w

ithin

a 3-

year

term

and

prod

uced

a ju

dgm

ent

of so

me 2

00 p

ages

long

.Th

ese

circ

umst

ance

s wer

e no

t suffi

cie

nt to

just

ify th

e en

tire

dela

y of

ove

r 6 y

ears

in

the r

esol

utio

n of

the a

pplic

ant’s

case

, par

ticul

arly

as h

e was

per

sona

lly im

plic

ated

in

only

two

coun

ts o

f cri

min

al a

ctiv

ity.

Th er

e w

ere

seve

ral u

nexp

lain

ed d

elay

s in

the

pro

ceed

ings

(9

mon

ths,

5 m

onth

s, 6

mon

ths a

nd o

ver 1

yea

r).

Not

reas

onab

le

Kiry

akov

v U

krai

neN

o. 2

6124

/03

12 Ja

nuar

y 20

12

5 ye

ars 5

mon

ths

3 le

vels

Th e

case

was

tran

sferr

ed b

ack

and

fort

h be

twee

n th

e in

vest

igat

ive

auth

oriti

es a

nd

the

fi rst-

inst

ance

cou

rt o

n fo

ur o

ccas

ions

and

eve

ntua

lly th

e ch

arge

s wer

e dr

oppe

d an

d th

e app

lican

t acq

uitte

d.Th

ere w

ere r

estr

ictio

ns o

n th

e app

lican

t’s li

bert

y in

conn

ectio

n w

ith th

e fac

t tha

t he

rem

aine

d on

an

unde

rtak

ing

not t

o ab

scon

d.

Not

reas

onab

le



Cas

e104

Tota

l len

gth

Leve

ls of

ju

risd

ictio

nM

otiv

atio

nRe

sult

Usty

antse

v v U

krai

neN

o. 3

299/

0512

Janu

ary

2012

3 ye

ars 6

mon

ths/

3

year

s 9 m

onth

s3

leve

ls/2

leve

lsTh

e ove

rall

leng

th o

f the

pro

ceed

ings

was

not

exce

ssiv

e.Th

e co

mpl

aint

was

man

ifest

ly i

ll–fo

unde

d an

d re

ject

ed i

n ac

cord

ance

with

A

rtic

le 3

5(3)

(a) a

nd (4

).

Reas

onab

le

Bori

senk

o v U

krai

neN

o. 2

5725

/02

12 Ja

nuar

y 20

12

7 ye

ars 5

mon

ths

(per

iods

dur

ing

whi

ch th

e ap

plic

ant w

as o

n ru

n ex

clud

ed)

3 le

vels

Th e a

pplic

ant w

as k

ept i

n cu

stod

y.Th

e pr

ocee

ding

s wer

e of

a c

erta

in c

ompl

exity

(cha

rges

, num

ber o

f def

enda

nts)

and

re

quire

d th

e col

lect

ion

of v

olum

inou

s evi

denc

e.Th

ere w

as a

tight

sche

dule

of h

eari

ngs b

efor

e tri

al co

urt.

How

ever

, nea

rly tw

o-th

irds

of th

ese

hear

ings

wer

e ev

entu

ally

adj

ourn

ed fo

r var

ious

reas

ons n

ot a

ttrib

utab

le to

th

e app

lican

t.N

o in

vest

igat

ive

activ

ities

wer

e ca

rrie

d ou

t in

the

case

for

1 ye

ar a

nd 8

mon

ths.

Ano

ther

sepa

rate

and

sign

ifi ca

nt d

elay

(1 y

ear a

nd 2

mon

ths)

was

obs

erve

d.

Not

reas

onab

le

Trym

bach

v U

krai

neN

o. 4

4385

/02

12 Ja

nuar

y 20

12

2 ye

ars 1

mon

th

2 le

vels

Th e

leng

th o

f the

pro

ceed

ings

was

not

so

exce

ssiv

e as

to r

aise

an

argu

able

cla

im

unde

r Art

icle

6. Th

e co

mpl

aint

was

man

ifest

ly il

l-fou

nded

and r

ejec

ted i

n ac

cord

ance

w

ith A

rtic

le 3

5(3)

(a) a

nd (4

).

Reas

onab

le

Jusu

f v G

reec

eN

o. 4

767/

0910

Janu

ary

2012

4 ye

ars 9

mon

ths

2 le

vels

Th e

proc

eedi

ngs b

efor

e th

e co

urt o

f app

eal l

aste

d m

ore

than

3 y

ears

and

8 m

onth

s, w

hich

was

exce

ssiv

e. In

par

ticul

ar, a

per

iod

of 2

year

s and

9 m

onth

s tha

t lap

sed

from

th

e da

te th

e ap

plic

ant l

odge

d hi

s app

eal a

nd th

e da

te th

e ca

se w

as in

itial

ly s

et fo

r he

arin

g w

as ex

cess

ive a

nd at

trib

utab

le to

the a

utho

ritie

s.

Not

reas

onab

le

Get

imis

v Gre

ece

No.

580

40/0

910

Janu

ary

2012

7 ye

ars 4

mon

ths

(stil

l pen

ding

)2

leve

lsTh

e ca

se w

as c

ompl

ex (c

harg

es a

gain

st 1

8 pe

rson

s, nu

mbe

r of w

itnes

ses a

nd la

rge

volu

me o

f doc

umen

ts).

A n

umbe

r of d

elay

s bef

ore t

he co

urt o

f app

eal,

whe

re th

e cas

e was

curr

ently

pen

ding

fo

r mor

e tha

n 4

year

s, w

ere a

t lea

st in

par

t attr

ibut

able

to th

e aut

horit

ies.

Not

reas

onab

le

Shah

anov

v Bu

lgar

iaN

o. 16

391/

0510

Janu

ary

2012

9 ye

ars

2 le

vels

Th e m

ost s

igni

fi can

t del

ays w

ere d

ue to

the r

epea

ted

adjo

urnm

ent o

f the

tria

l and

the

rem

ittal

of t

he c

ase

(the

maj

ority

of t

hem

due

to

reas

ons

beyo

nd t

he a

pplic

ant’s

co

ntro

l).

Not

reas

onab

le