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SARATOGA

Were Generals John Burgoyne andWilliam Howe responsible for the

British defeat at Saratoga?

Viewpoint: Yes. Burgoyne was overly confident, while Howe failed to supportoperations in Upstate New York adequately.

Viewpoint: No. Responsibility for the defeat rests mostly with colonial secre-tary Lord George Germain, who failed to coordinate British armies and whogrievously underestimated American forces.

Many students of the American Revolution (1775-1783) believe that Brit-ain lost the war as early as 1776 and 1777, during which time the Britishmade many blunders that prevented them from crushing the rebellion when itwas weakest. The greatest blunder that the British made during the war wasthe disastrous campaign of 1777 that ended in the defeat of a British army atSaratoga, New York. This defeat proved to be a turning point in the struggle.After Saratoga France openly supported the Americans, thereby turning thewar into a world conflict that ultimately concluded with Britain's defeat. Ananalysis of who was ultimately responsible for this disastrous campaign isinstructive.

The planners of the campaign were Generals John Burgoyne and WilliamHowe, while Lord George Germain, secretary of state for the American colo-nies, approved, tailored, and coordinated overall strategy for their plan. Bur-goyne proposed a strategy that involved a three-pronged assault on Albany,New York: one army under the command of Burgoyne was to move Southfrom Canada through the Lake Champlain corridor, while a second forcecommanded by Colonel Barry St. Leger marched toward Albany from theWest through the Mohawk River valley. At the same time, an army led byGeneral Howe was to move up the Hudson River from New York City to joinBurgoyne at Albany. The larger objective was to isolate New England, seenby British officials as the hotbed of rebellion, from the rest of the states beforeinvading and reconquering the region. Howe also submitted a plan to Ger-main, one that called for him to attack the American capital of Philadelphia.Although the two plans appeared inconsistent, the secretary of stateapproved both of them. Still, the overall British strategy might have worked—if everything went according to plan. Unfortunately for the British, almostnothing went as they planned.

Who was most responsible for its failure—generals in the field or officialsin London? Over the past two centuries British officials and military historianson both sides of the Atlantic have debated this question. Even as the Revolu-tion still raged, politicians and military officers in Britain blamed each other forBurgoyne's defeat at Saratoga. A parliamentary inquiry in 1779 failed to placeblame conclusively. Since then, historians have had no better success inagreeing on the individual(s) most at fault. A few students of the Revolutionhave placed equal blame on all the major planners and participants of thecampaign. Although there was plenty of blame to go around, such a conclu-sion is unsatisfactory. Because Britain's military campaign of 1777 is a water-shed of the American Revolution, and because it reflects general politicalcircumstances in England and military difficulties in America, accurately 267

determining ultimate responsibility for its failure is important if one is to understand why Great Brit-ain, in the end, failed to crush the rebellion. Of course, an element that one must not forget is thecritical role that the American Patriots played in foiling British strategy. Thus, to complicate the issuefurther, one might argue that Britain's 1777 campaign failed not because of poor planning in Londonor improper implementation in America but because of a superior American military strategy. If noth-ing else, though, the British campaign illustrates the difficulty of conducting a war three thousandmiles away from the mother country and the oftentimes pernicious role politics and personal egosplay in planning and implementing military strategy—important lessons from which all policy makerscan benefit.

Viewpoint:Yes. Burgoyne was overlyconfident, while Howe failed tosupport operations in Upstate NewYork adequately.

The British defeat at Saratoga in October1777 marked the turning point of the Revolution-ary War (1775-1783). The capture of Major Gen-eral John Burgoyne's entire army in NorthernNew York greatly lifted the colonists' morale andhelped induce France to enter the war as Amer-ica's ally. With French military and economicassistance, the American colonists continued theirstruggle for independence, while Britain increas-ingly diverted its strength to other areas, as thewar became a global conflict. Burgoyne's surren-der also set off a series of recriminations in Britainthat still echo among historians as they assess whowas responsible for the disaster. There was plentyof blame to go around, and Lord George Ger-main, the British colonial secretary, became anobvious target. Although he failed to coordinateadequately the various British forces taking part inthe 1777 campaign, the secretary of state does notbear the final responsibility for the defeat. Blamefor the military disaster most properly belongs tothe two generals who conducted the operations,Burgoyne and Major General William Howe, theBritish commander in America. Both generalslacked clear strategic objectives and made tacticalblunders while implementing their plans, result-ing in an important American victory of the Revo-lutionary War.

Burgoyne bears the primary responsibilityfor the defeat at Saratoga. His "Thoughts forConducting the War from the Side of Canada"became the basis for British strategy in 1777, withonly slight variation. Similar to what Canadiangovernor Guy Carleton had tried the precedingyear, Burgoyne proposed to lead an army Southfrom Canada to Fort Ticonderoga. After captur-ing this key position, Burgoyne intended to seizeAlbany and "put himself under the command ofSir William Howe," who was in New York Citywith the main British Army in America. Simulta-neous with Burgoyne's advance, a second British

force would move East down the Mohawk Valleyfrom Oswego on Lake Ontario. This maneuverwould divert American troops from Burgoyne'sapproach by threatening Albany from the East.

While "Thoughts" and its subsequent varia-tion had much merit, it also possessed several seri-ous shortcomings. First and foremost, the planlacked a clear objective. It never explained whatBurgoyne would do once he reached Albany andhow this goal would end the American rebellion.The general was to place himself under Howe'scommand, but then what? Would he remain inAlbany or advance toward New York City or possi-bly New England? Also, how would the army beprovisioned, especially as it moved farther awayfrom its Canadian base? Burgoyne never addressedthese issues. Furthermore, the plan required a highdegree of coordination between British forces, butit failed to order Howe to advance up the HudsonRiver to assume command of Burgoyne's force. Infact, Howe had decided to go on the defensive inNew York in 1777 and move against Philadelphia.This strategy again calls into question the primarygoal of Burgoyne's plan as well as Howe's. Finally,while having multiple columns converge onAlbany would force the Americans to divide theirtroops, it might also allow them to defeat the sepa-rate British detachments before they could sup-port each other.

In fairness to Burgoyne, he was not responsi-ble for coordinating British movements by order-ing Howe to advance up the Hudson. This taskbelonged to Germain, and many of his critics,both then and today, have justly criticized him fornot doing so more directly. Still, Germaininformed Howe of Burgoyne's intentions on sev-eral occasions during the spring of 1777. Further-more, on 2 April, Howe agreed to have troopsattack the American forts blocking shipping onthe lower Hudson later in the season. He thenadded that this "corps may afterwards act in favorof the northern army."

Having designed a plan that lacked clear stra-tegic goals, Burgoyne then made tactical mistakesin implementing it. He left Canada in mid Junewith 7,213 combat troops (half of whom wereGerman mercenaries) and approximately 1,100Canadians, Loyalists, and Native Americans. On 6July, Burgoyne forced the Americans to evacuate

268 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Fort Ticonderoga, but he made a critical error infailing to recall his men to Ticonderoga after theypursued the rebels toward Vermont and up LakeChamplain to Skenesboro, New York. Orderingthe troops to return to Ticonderoga would haveallowed them to advance South by way of LakeGeorge. Instead, Burgoyne unwisely ordered hismen to make the more difficult march overland toFort Edward on the Hudson.

This decision to march his army overland wasproblematic because Burgoyne received onlyone-third the number of horses that he hadrequested, and therefore he lacked adequate trans-portation for his forces. He also lacked sufficientwagons and carts, many of which were too poorlyconstructed to withstand Northern New York'srugged terrain. The Americans further com-pounded the British transportation problem byfelling trees across the road, destroying bridges,and damming nearby streams to flood the land.As a result, Burgoyne's advance slowed to a crawl,at times covering only a mile a day.

Why Burgoyne chose to advance overland isdifficult to understand, because in his "Thoughts"he wrote that the Lake George water route wassuperior to an overland march. He had even cor-rectly anticipated the American delaying tactics ifhe moved by land. Burgoyne apparently did notrecall his troops to Ticonderoga because hebelieved that any retreat—even a temporary one tofacilitate the advance—would hurt his army's

morale and encourage the Americans. This con-cern might explain why he issued an order to histroops early in the campaign that stated, "Thisarmy must not retreat." Regardless of his reason-ing, Burgoyne's decision to march to Fort Edwardwas one of the turning points in the campaign. Itgave the Americans time to regroup after their dis-heartening loss of Ticonderoga and dissipated anymomentum that the British had gained.

Burgoyne made yet another damaging mis-take in his use of Indians and propaganda. On 2July he issued a bold and inflammatory proclama-tion declaring that his army came to restore peaceand tranquillity to loyal subjects but that hisIndian allies came to destroy the Crown's enemies.Instead of intimidating the Americans, this threat-ening proclamation only served to enrage them,especially when Burgoyne's Indians killed manycivilians. American propagandists made good useof this "massacre" of innocent noncombatants tomobilize thousands of militiamen. So rather thanmeeting many Loyalists, as Burgoyne had origi-nally expected, he was surprised to find that "Thegreat bulk of the country is undoubtedly with theCongress, in principal and zeal; . . . Wherever theKing's forces point, militia, to the amount of threeor four thousand, assemble in twenty-four hours."

Burgoyne received a vivid example of thispatriotic sentiment in mid August when the Amer-icans aggravated his growing supply problem byimplementing a scorched-earth policy. As the Brit-

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 269

ish Army moved farther South, farmers burnedtheir ripening crops and drove their livestock outof the reach of British troops. To alleviate thisproblem, Burgoyne sent a detachment of 1,200men under Colonel Friedrich Baum to seize alarge quantity of provisions and horses supposedlylocated at Bennington, Vermont. He also chargedthe German officer with enlisting Loyalists anddispersing American militia that were reportedlygathering on the army's flank. However, Bur-goyne made a poor selection in choosing Baum forthis important mission because he was unable tospeak English. Communication problems, amongothers, allowed the American militia on 16 Augustto maul Baum's troops and a second column of642 men sent to reinforce him. The raid on Ben-nington not only cost Burgoyne more than 900soldiers and a large amount of military equipmentbut also prevented him from obtaining badlyneeded provisions. The defeat further encouragedAmerican efforts against Burgoyne and increaseddesertions among his Indian allies.

Burgoyne made his biggest mistake of thecampaign in the weeks after Bennington. Previ-ously, on 17 July, he had received dispatches fromHowe that he was not advancing on Albany. Sixweeks later Burgoyne learned that Colonel BarrySt. Leger's command had returned to Canadaafter unsuccessfully besieging Fort Stanwix in theMohawk River valley. Despite knowing that hewas now alone and facing mounting supply diffi-culties, the British general decided to continueSouth with his weakened army. He later arguedthat his orders did not allow him the latitude todo otherwise. This excuse was an extremely nar-row interpretation of his instructions, however,because they specifically authorized him to "act asexigencies may require." After spending severalweeks accumulating supplies, Burgoyne crossed tothe West side of the Hudson River on 13 Septem-ber for his final advance on Albany. By doing so,however, he placed a major river between himselfand his only escape route.

Already having made several costly errors inhis march South to Albany, Burgoyne continuedthis folly in the face of a growing enemy. As Bur-goyne's army floundered in the wilderness, Amer-ican major general Horatio Gates blocked its pathby entrenching more than seven thousand Ameri-can troops on Bemis Heights near the village ofStillwater. On 19 September the British tried tobreak Gates's line but were thrown back with sixhundred casualties. Burgoyne planned to renewthe attack on 21 September, but Major GeneralHenry Clinton, the British commander in NewYork City, reported that he would attack theAmerican forts on the lower Hudson as soon asreinforcements arrived. Burgoyne therefore can-celed his attack, hoping that Clinton's operation

would compel Gates to send many troops to com-bat the new British threat.

This decision proved to be Burgoyne's lastmajor mistake, as Gates failed to take the Britishbait. Instead, over the next two weeks Gates'sarmy swelled to more than eleven thousand asmilitia continued to stream in. Meanwhile, Bur-goyne's beleaguered troops consumed much oftheir remaining provisions. Finally, on 7*OctoberBurgoyne decided that he could not wait anylonger and made a last, desperate attempt to dis-perse the Americans. Again, the Patriots repelledthe attack and inflicted an additional six hundredcasualties at the Battle of Bemis Heights. Havingsuffered heavy losses and with his supplies nearlyexhausted, Burgoyne attempted to retreat. Bythen it was too late. Gates's army encircled Bur-goyne's weary troops and forced him to surrendernear Saratoga ten days later.

If Burgoyne bears most of the responsibilityfor the defeat, Howe certainly shares part of it.Like his counterpart, Howe lacked clear strategicobjectives and made errors trying to achievethem. Throughout the winter of 1776-1777 andinto the spring, Howe requested massive rein-forcements to continue his operations againstNew England and New York. When he learnedthat these troops were not available, he changedhis focus and concentrated on Philadelphia, thelargest city in the American colonies. Philadel-phia's capture would have great economic andsymbolic value as it was a major seaport and thehome of the Rebel Congress. A British attackmight also force George Washington, the Ameri-can commanding general, to risk his army defend-ing it. Furthermore, Howe had received reportsthat eastern Pennsylvania contained large num-bers of Loyalists, who would welcome the BritishArmy's presence.

Howe's decision to attack Philadelphia wasstrategically unsound. It committed him to a"war of posts"—seizing key geographic sites butnot necessarily destroying the opposing army.While this strategy might work in a traditionalEuropean war, its validity was uncertain in anideological conflict such as the American rebel-lion. Similarly, Howe could not guarantee thatWashington would defend Philadelphia or thatthis strategy would result in a decisive battle. Justas problematic, Howe's proposed attack wouldhave dispersed British strength as he moved awayfrom Burgoyne's and St. Leger's advances ratherthan toward them. Even if he succeeded in captur-ing the capital, Howe probably could not sendtroops to support Burgoyne because garrisoningPhiladelphia and the surrounding countrysidewould require his entire force. This reality would haveforced Britain to maintain large troop concentra-tions in Philadelphia, New York City, and Can-ada—all too far apart to allow the British generals


to assist each other if needed. Interestingly,Howe suspected that his Philadelphia strategywould not be decisive. As early as 2 April 1777 heinformed Germain that "my hopes of terminatingthe war this year are vanished." Still, he pro-ceeded with the operation.

If moving against Philadelphia was a ques-tionable decision, Howe's method of implement-ing it was even more egregious. His first mistakewas opting to transport his army by sea ratherthan marching it across New Jersey to the Dela-ware River. Not only was the land route muchshorter and more direct, but it also would haveallowed Howe to keep his army between Washing-ton's and Burgoyne's. If the British generalmoved by sea, however, it would have allowedWashington to attack either New York City orBurgoyne's army before Howe could intervene.Howe compounded the mistake by not sailinguntil 23 July. He remained at sea for thirty-twodays before landing at Head of Elk in ChesapeakeBay. Howe initially intended to proceed up theDelaware, but he received intelligence that it washeavily fortified. Once ashore, Howe marchedNortheast and defeated Washington at Brandy-wine Creek on 11 September. He did not takePhiladelphia until 26 September, though. By leav-ing so late in the summer and then requiringanother two months to achieve his objective,Howe had effectively taken himself out of thecampaign for much of the season.

Howe's seaborne move against Philadelphiacaused problems not only for Burgoyne but alsofor Major General Clinton, whom he left in NewYork City with seven thousand British and Loyal-ist troops. Clinton had the important job of keep-ing Washington from recapturing New York Citywhile Howe moved against Philadelphia. OnceHowe was at sea, though, Washington's army faroutnumbered Clinton's forces. Furthermore, withHowe gone, Clinton did not know if Washingtonwould strike him, Burgoyne, or Howe. The lattercompounded Clinton's intelligence problem bynot informing him of the situation near Philadel-phia from late August until early October.

This lack of communication was criticalbecause Howe also charged Clinton with assistingBurgoyne by advancing up the Hudson. Clintonbelieved that he lacked the strength to make thistrip until he could confirm that Washington hadgone to Pennsylvania. Even then, Clinton had towait for additional troops to arrive from Britainbefore he could attack the heavily fortified Ameri-can positions on the Hudson River. Clintonfinally departed on 3 October with his reinforce-ments and stormed Forts Montgomery and Clin-ton three days later. He then dispatched a force tocontinue North, which advanced to withinforty-five miles of Albany.

At this point Howe intervened one last timeby ordering Clinton to send him four thousandtroops. When Clinton received this order on 17October, neither he nor Howe knew that Bur-goyne had surrendered that day. Howe knew thatClinton was mounting a relief effort, though, andmust have realized that his call for reinforcementswould prevent him from continuing. Howe issuedthe order anyway, demonstrating little concern forBurgoyne's army. Clinton therefore abandonedthe captured forts, retreated back down the Hud-son to New York City, and sent Howe the soldiershe had requested. Although Clinton's expeditioncould not have saved Burgoyne at that late date,its failure was symbolic of Howe's faulty planning.

In sum, both Burgoyne and Howe madestrategic and tactical mistakes that resulted in themost decisive American victory of the Revolu-tionary War. Burgoyne never fully developed hisplans, and he moved his army far too slowly. Healso continued his march South even after its suc-cess was unlikely. Howe took himself out of thecampaign by sailing to Philadelphia, and he leftClinton too few troops to assist Burgoyne.Although Germain could have coordinated Brit-ish movements more closely, the generals inAmerica must bear the responsibility for thedefeat at Saratoga. They alone made the decisionsand directed the troops once London officialsestablished broad objectives.

-MICHAEL P. GABRIEL,KUTZTOWN UNIVERSITY

Viewpoint:No. Responsibility for the defeatrests mostly with colonial secretaryLord George Germain, who failed tocoordinate British armies and whogrievously underestimatedAmerican forces.

British secretary of state for the coloniesLord George Germain viewed 1777 with opti-mism and a sure confidence that, if militaryaffairs were conducted properly, this year wouldbe the one in which Great Britain achieved finalvictory in the American Revolution (1775-1783). It had become a running joke in Britainthat 1777 would be "the year of the hangman," adouble entendre reference to the resemblance ofthe number seven to a gallows pole, and the beliefthat the American rebels would all be swingingfrom nooses before the year was out. Germainwas determined to bring this conclusion aboutand made no secret of what he would do with the


Rebels and their leaders when Britain won thewar, as he believed it most assuredly would.

The massive military campaign he had orga-nized the previous year against the ContinentalArmy had produced impressive results and, hebelieved, brought the American rebellion to itsknees. British forces under General WilliamHowe had captured New York City, one of thelargest cities in the colonies, and in spite of dar-

ing attacks by American general George Wash-ington at Trenton (26 December 1776) andPrinceton (3 January 1777), still brought muchof New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania undertheir control as well. Further North, events hadbegun well for the British but did not finish thatway. A British army under Guy Carleton hadpushed South from Canada and penetrated deepinto the Champlain valley, nearly succeeding in


I YET DO NOT DESPONDThe following two missives illustrate the level ol miscom-municalion between British military commanders in NorthAmerica and Crown officials in London. While GeneralJohn Burgoyne realized his peril in Upstate New York,Secretary of State for the Colonies Lord George Germaindid not:

General John Burgoyne (Camp nearSaratoga) to Lord George Germain, 20August 1777.

The consequences of this affair [the Bat-tle of Bennington], my Lord, have little effectupon the strength or spirits of the army; butthe prospect of the campaign in otherrespects is far less prosperous than when Ilast wrote.. . . The great bulk of the countryis undoubtedly with the Congress, in princi-ple and in zeal; and their measures are exe-cuted with a secrecy and dispatch that arenot to be equalled. . . . Another most embar-rassing circumstance is the want of commu-nication with Sir William Howe; of themessengers I have sent, I know of two beinghanged, and am ignorant whether any of therest arrived. The same fate has probablyattended those dispatched by Sir WilliamHowe, for only one letter is come to hand,informing me that his attention is for Penn-sylvania; that Washington has detached Sul-livan, with 2500 men, to Albany. . . . Had I alatitude in my orders, I should think it my dutyto wait in this position, or perhaps as far backas Fort Edward, where my communicationwith Lake George would be perfectly secure,till some event happened to assist my move-ment forward; but my orders being positiveto "force a junction with Sir William Howe," Iapprehend I am not at liberty to remain inac-tive longer than shall be necessary to collecttwenty-five days provision, and to receive thereinforcement of the additional companies,the German drafts and recruits now (andunfortunately only now) on Lake Champlain.The waiting the arrival of this reinforcementis of indispensable necessity, because fromthe hour I pass the Hudson River and pro-

ceed towards Albany, all safety of communi-cation ceases. I must expect a large body ofthe enemy from my left will take the postbehind me. . . . When I wrote more confi-dently, I little foresaw that I was to be left topursue my way through such a tract of coun-try and hosts of foes, without any co-opera-tion from New York. . . . I yet do notdespond. Should I succeed in forcing myway to Albany, and find that country in astate to subsist my army, I shall think nomore of a retreat, but at the worst fortifythere and await Sir W. Howe's operations.

Germain to William Knox, undersecre-tary of state for the colonies, 29 September1777.

I am sorry to find that Burgoyne's cam-paign is so totally ruined; the best wish I canform is that he may have returned to Ticon-deroga without much loss. His private letterto me, being dated the 20th of August, con-tains nothing material about the affair nearBennington but military reasoning about theproprietary of the attack; but what alarms memost is that he thinks his orders to go toAlbany to force a junction with Sir WilliamHowe are so positive that he must attempt atall events the obeying them, tho1 at the sametime he acquaints me that Sir William Howehas sent him word that he has gone to Phila-delphia, and indeed nothing that Sir Williamsays could give him reason to hope that anyeffort would be made in his favor.

Sources: John Burgoyne, A State of the Expeditionfrom Canada as Laid before the House of Com-mons, and Verified by Evidence: With a Collection ofAuthentic Documents, and an Addition of Many Cir-cumstances Which Were Prevented From Appear-ing before the House by the Prorogation ofParliament (London: J. Almon, 1780), pp. xxv-xxvi;Great Britain Historical Manuscripts Commission,Report on Manuscripts in Various Collections, vol-ume 6, The Manuscripts of Miss M. Eyre Matcham,Captain H. V. Knox, Cornwallis Wykeham-Martin(Dublin: Falconer for His Majesty's Stationery Office.1909). p. 140.

severing New England from the Mid-Atlanticcolonies before Rebel resistance and bad weatherforced him to turn back. Carleton ended upretreating all the way back into Canada, pursuedby a motley collection of militia and Continen-tals that, Germain believed, should never havebeen able to defeat a British army. Germain didnot hold a high opinion of Carleton (a sentimentthat was warmly reciprocated by Carleton) andbelieved that only poor planning and Carleton'sfailure to follow up successes had stopped theBritish campaign. Germain was dismissive ofRebel resistance in the wilderness of UpstateNew York, believing them capable of nothingmore than delaying and harassing British forces.

The fact that these "delays" by Continentaland militia forces, along with the rugged terrainand early arrival of winter this far North, hadprevented a successful conclusion to the cam-paign did not sway his opinion. He believedthat a larger British army under a more capablecommander would easily accomplish whatCarleton had failed to do. Thus, he was alreadyenvisioning a decisive stroke in this region whenGeneral John Burgoyne approached him withhis own scheme for winning the war quickly inthe same area.

Burgoyne had served in America since 1775and had been with Carleton during the recentfailed offensive in the Champlain valley. Hespoke disparagingly of what he believed wereCarleton's many mistakes during the 1776 cam-paign and confidently informed officials in Lon-don that he could accomplish what Carleton hadnot. He asserted that he could easily penetratethe New York wilderness, recapture Fort Ticon-deroga, and then push on and take Albany. Bur-goyne stated that while this goal was beingaccomplished, Howe would move North up theHudson River valley with his army from NewYork City and effect a junction with Burgoyne atAlbany. He then stressed his belief regarding thecritical importance to the Rebels of the Cham-plain valley-Hudson River line and the disas-trous consequences that would befall the Rebelcause should the British succeed in seizing andholding this vital area. British control of theregion would destroy the American rebelliononce and for all, Burgoyne argued, and Germainshared this sentiment.

Not everyone was convinced of the efficacyof this plan, including General Howe, the com-mander of British forces in America who was tobe the southern pincer of Burgoyne's offensive.Between November 1776 and April 1777, Howesubmitted four separate campaign plans to Ger-main, the first three arriving while Burgoyne wasstill in London and arguing for his own scheme.Howe's plans varied in their details, but all ofthem rejected the importance of an invasion

from Canada in favor of a campaign against Phil-adelphia. Howe argued that there was nothingworth taking in Upstate New York, whichseemed to explain why few Rebel forces were sta-tioned there. But Philadelphia was the Americancapital, Howe argued, and, hence, Washingtonwould have to deploy the bulk of his army todefend it. This response would provide the Brit-ish with the opportunity to defeat the main Con-tinental Army and take the Rebel capital as well.While Howe had no illusions that the mere lossof one city or one battle, no matter how impor-tant, would end the war, he believed it would sodemoralize the Americans that the British couldfollow up with a diplomatic initiative offeringamnesty and generous terms for peace. Brokenand demoralized, the Americans would jump atthe chance for a way out of their predicamentand would quickly come to terms.

Germain believed Howe to be a good com-mander; indeed, he had appointed Howe to hiscurrent post. Germain also liked the idea ofgoing for Philadelphia, but he despaired over theleniency that Howe was showing to the Rebelsand intended to show once again. Germainbelieved that a policy of amnesty and concilia-tion would encourage other revolts throughoutthe empire. Instead, he emphatically argued thathis commanders should ruthlessly crush therebellion by destroying the Continental Armyand state militias, not merely chastising themand then offering them peace. Burgoyne wasmuch more sympathetic to Germain's view thanHowe was, as he had nothing but contempt forthe Americans and their military. This sharedbelief in a conqueror's peace did much to winfavor for Burgoyne's plan over Howe's, andhence, Germain gave his full support to Bur-goyne. At this point Germain made a series ofmistakes that would lead to confusion, an unco-ordinated campaign, and ultimately, the mostcostly British defeat of the war.

Howe outranked Burgoyne, and thereforeBurgoyne had no authority to order Howe tocoordinate his efforts with the advance from Can-ada. Only Germain could issue such orders. Inaddition, once Burgoyne moved his army Southinto the New York wilderness, he would be essen-tially isolated from all communication withHowe. How then was he to coordinate his move-ments? Again, only Germain had the authority toorder Howe to comply, and only Germain wouldbe able to insure that Howe's movements workedin conjunction with Burgoyne's. On 3 April 1777Burgoyne sailed for Canada, confident that Ger-main had ordered Howe to comply with the planand blissfully unaware that the campaign wasalready coming apart.

Although Germain had approved Bur-goyne's plan over Howe's, he was nevertheless


eager to placate Howe, who he knew wasoffended that a subordinate's plan of operationshad been accepted over his own. Howe also hadpowerful political connections, and Germainfeared that a direct confrontation with himmight damage his political standing in White-hall. Therefore, Germain attempted to placate allsides by also approving Howe's latest scheme forcapturing Philadelphia. Germain believed thatAmerican resistance was weak and Tory senti-ment on the rise in America; therefore, Bur-goyne's army could function independently, atleast for a time, because of the low level of resis-tance he expected Burgoyne would meet. Even ifthis result was not the case, Germain reasonedthat if Howe moved swiftly, he would be able todefeat Washington and take Philadelphia in thespring, or by the summer at the latest, and thenstill have time to move his army Northward tosupport Burgoyne's advance on Albany. Yet,nowhere in his initial instructions did Germainexplicitly order Howe to do so, or even clearlyexplain what was expected of him in terms ofsupporting Burgoyne's invasion from Canada.

On 18 May 1777, with Burgoyne already inCanada and readying his invasion force, a fourthplan of operations arrived in London fromHowe. Having never been explicitly ordered tosupport Burgoyne, Howe had evidently decidedto conduct his own campaign without regard forwhat Burgoyne did or did not do. He notifiedGermain that he would not be able to get hisarmy under way until late in the summer insteadof spring as originally forecast. Howe stated hewould leave a small force in New York Cityunder General Henry Clinton, who was sched-uled to arrive in July, with authorization to oper-ate North up the Hudson River valley if hedeemed it prudent, but made no mention of Bur-goyne. After the defeat at Saratoga, and asrecriminations abounded, Clinton stated that hehad been left with a skeletal force barely capableof holding the city, much less conducting offen-sive operations in support of Burgoyne's army.Since Howe's forces would not be able to starttheir campaign until midsummer, it was clearthat it would be virtually impossible for Howe towrap up his campaign quickly and shift his forcesNorthward to support Burgoyne. Indeed, Howemade no mention of even trying to do so in hismessage to Germain.

It was not until he received this last messagefrom Howe, and some would argue not eventhen, that Germain realized Burgoyne wouldreceive no support whatsoever from Howe andthat the two armies would be conducting sepa-rate campaigns instead of acting in concert withone another. Germain immediately wrote backto Howe: "His Majesty does not hesitate toapprove the alterations which you propose, trust-

ing however that whatever you may meditate itwill be executed in time for you to cooperatewith the army ordered to proceed from Canada."It was the closest that Germain ever came toordering Howe to support Burgoyne, and yetthis last missive, even given the vagaries of eighteenth-century formality, was still not a direct order, andis indicative of the passive-aggressive approachthat Germain used with Howe even when clear,concise, and direct orders needed to be sent toclarify that Howe was to coordinate his cam-paign with Burgoyne. As it turned out, it provedtoo late for any of that as by the time Germain'spolitely worded missive arrived in New York,Howe had already sailed for Philadelphia alongwith his army.

In the end, the British waged two distinctlyseparate campaigns in 1777. Howe's attack onPhiladelphia went well for the British, as hedefeated Washington at the Battle of the Brandy-wine on 11 September 1777 and swiftly movedto occupy the city. Yet, this victory did not havethe expected effect on American morale thatHowe had originally presumed. American resis-tance did not collapse, and Tory sentiment inPennsylvania turned out to be much weaker thaneither he or Germain had originally thought.After repulsing a counterattack by Washington atthe Battle of Germantown on 4 October 1777,Howe made no effort to continue his campaignfrom Philadelphia or send his army (or even a siz-able contingent of it) North to support Bur-goyne's drive from Canada.

Yet, far to the North, Burgoyne's army wasblindly stumbling its way Southward, convincedthat Howe was moving up from New York Cityin support. It was not until 3 August 1777 thatBurgoyne, now far past the point of turningback, received information that Howe hadmoved against Philadelphia instead of Albany asintended in his original plan. Deciding that hehad no other recourse, he continued on toAlbany with the hope that Howe would moveup in support once he captured Philadelphia.

On 19 September 1777, while Howe wasapproaching the outskirts of Philadelphia, Bur-goyne's army ran into and was defeated by a pow-erful American force two hundred miles away atthe Battle of Freeman's Farm. Burgoyneattempted to fight through the Americans byflanking their position and was again defeated atthe Battle of Bemis Heights on 7 October 1777.With Rebel militia now swarming over his linesof communication to Canada, and no help com-ing from New York City, Burgoyne attempted towithdraw. When his forces reached Saratoga inOctober 1777, they were trapped and out of sup-plies. Burgoyne was forced to surrender hisentire army in one of the worst defeats in Britishmilitary history.


To be sure, both Burgoyne and Howe shareblame for the British defeat at Saratoga. Bur-goyne's plan was complicated and depended to agreat degree on coordinating the movements ofdifferent armies separated by great distance andunable to communicate with one another effec-tively. Howe never made any effort to supportBurgoyne and purposely chose to interpret hisinstructions from Germain in a way that suitedhis own ideas rather than the overall plan ofBurgoyne. Yet, ultimately the blame must restwith Germain.

Germain grievously underestimated thestrength of American forces and their willing-ness to continue the war. Instead of attemptingto use the slight advantage Britain had won in1776 to work toward a negotiated settlementwith the Americans, he sought to achieve a totalvictory by pursuing a risky and complicated mil-itary scheme. He failed to appreciate the seriousproblems that an army might encounter in thewilderness of Upstate New York if it was notproperly supported. Having heard out the rivalcommanders on their views regarding theproper course of action for the 1777 campaign,Germain should have chosen one plan and stuckto it. Instead, he chose to avoid confrontation,failed to make a clear choice, and utterly failed tofulfill his obligation of strategically melding themovements of the British armies in Americainto a coordinated campaign. Even though Ger-main knew that Howe did not like having tocomply with Burgoyne's plan, Germain took nosteps to insure that Howe would do so. Evenwhen it was apparent that Howe was essentiallyignoring the overall strategic concept for thecampaign, Germain could still not bring himselfto directly order Howe to support Burgoyne.The result was a disaster for the British military.Thus, in many ways, Germain lost the campaignof 1777 for the British before the operation hadeven commenced.

-ROBERT B. BRUCE, SAM HOUSTON

STATE UNIVERSITY

References

George Athan Billias, "John Burgoyne: Ambi-tious General," in George Washington's Oppo-nents: British Generals and Admirals, editedby Billias (New York: Morrow, 1969), pp.142-192.

Harrison Bird, March to Saratoga: General Bur-goyne and the American Campaign, 1777(New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

Jane Clark, "Responsibility for the Failure of theBurgoyne Campaign," American HistoricalReview, 35 (April 1930): 542-549.

Joseph P. Cullen, "Saratoga," American HistoryIllustrated, 10 (April 1975): 3-50.

Ira D. Gruber, The Howe Brothers and the Ameri-can Revolution (New York: Atheneum,1972).

Don Higginbotham, The War of American Inde-pendence: Military Attitudes, Policies, andPractice, 1763-1789 (New York: Macmillan,1971).

History Section of the General Staff, ed., A His-tory of the Organization, Development and Ser-vices of the Military and Naval Forces ofCanada From the Peace of Paris in 1763, to thePresent Time, 3 volumes (Ottawa, 1919-1920).

Maldwyn A. Jones, "William Howe: Conven-tional Strategist," in George Washington'sOpponents: British Generals and Admirals,edited by Billias (New York: Morrow,1969), pp. 39-72.

Richard M. Ketchum, Saratoga: Turning Point ofAmerica's Revolutionary War (New York:Holt, 1997).

Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1964).

Max M. Mintz, The Generals of Saratoga: JohnBurgoyne & Horatio Gates (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1990).

Hoffman Nickerson, The Turning Point of theRevolution, or, Burgoyne in America, 2 vol-umes (Boston & New York: HoughtonMifflin, 1928).

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Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, 2volumes, edited by John Richard Alden(New York: Macmillan, 1952).

William B. Willcox, "Too Many Cooks: BritishPlanning before Saratoga," Journal of BritishStudies, 2 (1962): 56-90.

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