welfare’regimes’in’anageof austerity’ · 2013-05-20 · compeng ’conjectures’...
TRANSCRIPT
Welfare Regimes in an Age of Austerity
Wil Arts Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Development of the Welfare State
• At the end of the 19th century the first signs of the welfare state in statu nascendi could be observed.
• The 1950s and 1960s were called the golden age of the welfare state.
• From the 1970s and 1980s followed a period of retrenchment and resilience, dubbed the silver age.
New Challenges for the Welfare State
• GlobalizaMon • Great Recession • Societal TransformaMon
• Labour Market TransiMons
• Demographic TransiMon
• InternaMonal MigraMon
Research QuesMon
• Will the welfare state go through sMll further regress combined with a persisMng resilience of its insMtuMons and, if so, end up in a ‘bronze’ age?
• Or will these developments sooner conjure up a new opportunity to reconfigure and relegiMmize social policy?
History MaYers
Q1: Why will the present and the future welfare state resemble the old one?
A1: EverlasMng social problems.
A2: Welfare state specific insMtuMonal soluMons.
Q2: Why will today’s and tomorrow’s insMtuMonal soluMons resemble the old ones? A: Because of insMtuMonal inerMa, path dependence and lock-‐in effects.
Driving Forces behind Welfare State Development
I: Large, impersonal, economic and technological forces. 1. ModernizaMon of society. 2. Logic of industrialism. 3. Needs of advanced capitalism. II: Ideology and poli9cs. 4. Struggles over poliMcs and social class. 5. Social organizaMon of producMon. 6. Structure or interest of the state or polity.
Welfare Regimes
• There is no such thing as ‘the’ welfare state. • Welfare states come in different shapes and sizes and vary substanMally in their poliMcal orientaMons and insMtuMonal outcomes.
• Welfare states are, however, not unique but come in types (worlds, families, models).
• Of the various classificaMons, Esping-‐Andersen’s (1990) typology has been the most influenMal.
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1)
• Orien&ng statement: Not only history maYers but also poli1cs.
• History: Historical legacy of regime insMtuMonalizaMon.
• Poli1cs: DistribuMon of power between interest groups, power mobilizaMon, labour movement, coaliMon formaMon.
• Hypothesis: Welfare states with similar paYerns of resource mobilizaMon, dominant ideologies, and poliMcal coaliMons will have a relaMvely similar insMtuMonal matrix.
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (2)
• World 1: Liberal, Anglo-‐Saxon welfare states.
• World 2: Conserva1ve, ConMnental European welfare states.
• World 3: Social-‐Democra1c , Nordic welfare states.
Research QuesMon (rephrased)
• Will some worlds of welfare capitalism face different challenges to different degrees in different Mmes?
• Will some of them respond to these challenges by further welfare regress, whereas others respond by expanding or rather stagnate?
• Can we observe a certain recalibraMon of welfare state types?
Refinements of the Typology (1)
Q1: Should we disMnguish addiMonal regime types and, if so, which ones?
A1: Definitely yes (CriMcs). 4) Rudimentary, Mediterranean. 5) Radical, AnMpodean. 6) Confucian, East-‐Asian. 7) Post-‐Communist, East-‐European. 8) Budding, South American. A2: No (Esping-‐Andersen).
Refinements of the Typology (2)
Q2: How resilient have the regime types been in the past decades?
A: Rather robust.
Q3: Have adjustments of the typology taken place? A: Yes. As well with regard to the theoreMcal perspecMve as the indicators.
TheoreMcal PerspecMve
• Originally a poliMcal-‐economic power resources approach (ideology and party poliMcs).
• Now also a funcMonalist-‐sociological social risks perspecMve (shared problems).
• Originally as principal analyMcal axis the public-‐private mix of state and market.
• Now the welfare mix that also includes the family.
Consequences
Q: Does this theoreMcal change have empirical consequences for the typology?
A1: It does not have implicaMons for the clustering. If anything it helps to clarify and consolidate Esping-‐Andersen’s threefold typology. A2: There is, however, a dual transformaMon taking place in all worlds of welfare capitalism.
Provisional Conclusion
• It is unlikely that all worlds of welfare capitalism will react in the same way to the common challenges.
• It is likely that different insMtuMonal matrices and policy legacies will strongly influence the kind of reacMon.
CompeMng Conjectures
Covergence hypothesis: Economic globalizaMon and integraMon on the one hand and the financial and sovereign debt crisis on the other will force all welfare states to converge and retrench. Divergence hypothesis: The exisMng varieMes in welfare capitalism are preserved and even increased. Prolifera&on of hybrids hypothesis: Not only welfare regimes but also welfare states will respond differently to the challenges.
Findings (1)
Study & Characteris9cs
Korpi & Palme (2003)
Cases: 18 OECD countries
Period: 1975-‐1995
Dep. Var.: benefit replacement rates (sickness, work accident, unemployment)
Results
• Retrenchment.
• GlobalizaMon and posMndustrial developments have had impact on retrenchment.
• Both regime type and parMsan government composiMon have had an impact on major cuts.
Findings (2)
Study & Characteris9cs
Ki?el & Obinger (2003)
Cases: 21 OECD countries
Period: 1982-‐1997
Dep. Var.: social expenditures
Results • No large scale roll-‐back of
the welfare state. • Social spending dynamics
have been driven by rising dependency raMos as reflected in rising unemployment and populaMon aging.
• PoliMcal variables contribute liYle to explaining welfare state dynamics.
Findings (3)
Study & Characteris9cs
Allan & Scruggs (2004)
Cases: 18 OECD countries
Period: 1975-‐1999
Dep. Var.: benefit replacement rates (sickness, unemployment)
Results
• Welfare state retrenchment.
• ParMsan government composiMon has a considerable impact on generosity.
• Pre-‐exisMng welfare state insMtuMons do not necessarily consMtute major barriers to change.
Findings (4)
Study & Characteris9cs Starke, Obinger & Castles (2008)
Cases: 18-‐21 OECD countries.
Period: 1980-‐early 2000s.
Dep. Var.: benefit replacement rates; revenu paYerns; expenditures; decommodificaMon.
Results
• Evidence of moderate welfare state convergence.
• No evidence for a race to the boYom.
Findings (5)
Study & Characteris9cs Achterberg & Yerkes (2009)
Cases: 16 OECD countries
Period: 1970-‐2005
Dep. Var.: benefit replacement rates (unemployment, disability, old age); social expenditures.
Results
• Convergence hypothesis corroborated.
• Convergence to the middle instead of to the boYom.
• GlobalizaMon and EuropeanizaMon have a considerable impact on convergence.
Findings (6)
Study & Characteris9cs
Schmi? & Starke (2011)
Cases: 21 OECD countries.
Period: 1980-‐2005
Dep. Var.: social expenditures.
Results • Strong evidence of
convergence across all categories of social expenditure when condiMonal factors are taken into account.
• The speed of convergence is highly driven by globalizaMon and Euroean Union membership and shaped by exisMng welfare state insMtuMons.
Findings (7)
Study & Characteris9cs
Starke, Kaasch, van Hooren (2011)
Cases: 4 OECD countries.
Period: 1970-‐2010.
Dep. Var.: policy measures.
Results • No drasMc policy turn. • No clear cross-‐naMonal
paYern. • InteracMon between regime
type and exisMng welfare state insMtuMons on the one hand and parMsan composiMon of government on the other explain most of the specific social policy responses.
Findings (8)
Study & Characteris9cs
Vis, van Kersbergen & Hylands (2011)
Cases: 6 OECD countries.
Period: 2007-‐2011.
Dep. Var.: social and economic policy measures.
Results
• First phase: emergency capital injecMons in the banking sector.
• Second phase: keynesian demand management and labour market protecMon; expansion social programmes.
• Third phase: restoraMon of balanced budgets.
Findings (9)
Study & Characteris9cs
Vrooman (2013)
Cases: 17 OECD countries.
Period: 1990-‐1995; 2008-‐2010.
Dep. Var.: 10 insMtuMonal social security and labour market indicators.
Results
• Consistency and persistence of regime differences.
• Some convergence between the corporaMst and social-‐democraMc European countries.
Conclusion (1)
• Some studies show indicaMons of substanMal welfare state retrenchment, whereas others show no large scale roll-‐back of the welfare state at all and even in some cases expansion can be observed.
• Some studies see signs of convergence, while others to the contrary observe a strong variaMon in responses to the challenges.
Conclusion (2)
• Some studies detect a strong resilience of insMtuMonal matrices (regimes), whereas others conclude that pre-‐exisMng welfare state insMtuMons do not necessarily consMtute major barriers to change.
• Some studies noMce an increasing weakening of ideology in terms of parMsan poliMcs, whereas others find remaining strong effects of ideology in the form of parMsan poliMcs.
Conclusion (3)
• The results of the studies depend to a large degree on the welfare states studied, the dependent variables chosen, and the differences on focus on specific domains and dimensions of the welfare state.
Discussion
• What we need is a systemaMc meta-‐analysis of studies that test hypotheses about the impact of external and internal challenges on welfare regimes and welfare states instead of the impressionisMc way I have proceeded in my talk.
• It would be worthwile to make an inventory of the criMcal factors in the current classificaMon of welfare regimes and invesMgate what new factors related to new risks should be added and whether this leads to modificaMons of the classificaMons.