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W RG MER S GUIDE TO

MIDWAY 4 50

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Avalon Hill Philosophy

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The ame Players Magazine

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b y H ar ol d Totten a nd D on a ld Grecnwood

The Midway Thesis

The most in depth article on MI W Y to datehis is onethat every enthusiast thegameshouldefami/iar with

MIDWAY consti tutes a very dillerent playingn v i r O I l I l l l it a g am e that demands instinc-

w handling of unknowns a nd p L'r kc ti on inr sea operations You ve got to olltguess yourpponcnt at eVL ry turn. A good MIDWAY player

rccognizcd by his a bi li ty t o r ca ct to an y giventuation. Playing t he ga me r eq ui re s a good grasp

the game concepts. an d that is what we intendo discuss.

T hi s a rti cl e has ev olve d s lo wl y o ve r t he p er io d

well over a year. Th e h ar de st t hi ng inre pa ri ng t hi s article was p re pa ri ng t he highlyvisual approach a lo ng w it h t he tex I therc are

mul ti tudL of d ia gr am s w hic h h ad t o be workedut and then reworked. We do n ot p re te nd torcsent a panacea. by any means. T he a dr oi tlayer will f ind e rr or s a nd i mp ro ve me nt s. T hi s iss was intended: tllL y ar e left for you to find an d

eal with as a t act i ca l exerc ise . Th e main idea iso e xp re ss t ac ti ca l a n d s t ra t eg i c concepts _. if yo uan s po t e rr or s o r i mp ro ve me nt s t he n yo u haverasped these concepts. No r have we covered allspects of s trateg y and tactics. as this wouldnv ol w o bs cu re v ar ia ti on s of the main conceptsnd would s imply serve t o m ak e t he a rt ic le lo ng erhan it is which would no t help get theoncepts across.

As far as methodology is concerned. we willrst spcak of tactics. an d then construct ou rrategic discussion in terms of these tactics. This

because t act i cs a re w ry solid concepts. whereasrategy involves more gcneral. and thereforeague concepts.

ACTICS: TH E B ATT L E B OA RD

On e of the most important. an d p er ha ps t hecast understood aspects of MIDWAY is fightinghe air-sea b at tl e s o n t he B at tl e B oa rd . This is th eery crux of tact ics.

tach side has distinct advantages an d disadantages. Th e Japanese have air superiority. ye tey have m or e c ar ri er s to protect . They also

ave a large fleet split into many independentoups. while th e Americans have a small. concenated fleet.

In d is cu ss in g t h e t ac ti ca l situation. we will usenumber of tables an d d iagr am s to set up

ypothetical attacks on som e m od el f le et f or ma

ons. Each diagram will include figures fo raximum/minimum/average losses an d h it s. A lso.

ac h d ia gr am w il l have additional comments an dxa ct d is po si ti on s s o t he re will b e no ambigu it i es .

In setting u p these diagrams. we've used th ethree f ol lo wi ng t a bl es t o d et er mi ne t he f ig ur es

involved. These t ab le s a re bas ica lly an analysis ofth e CRT. and can be helpful when setting upa tt ac ks . T he use of t he se t ab le s will allow us tog et a n o bj ec ti ve view of each fo rmat ion . They arepresented so yo u c an e va l ua te your ow n favoritefleet formation. Th e t ables a re as follows:

Average Hi ts vs. Squadrons Lost

1-3 I-e I-I 2 1 3 1 4-1Hits .1 7 .5 0 13 3 1.67 3.0 4.5Squads 3.50 e.83 3.UO 3.50 e. 5 2.0Lost

Maximum Hits vs. Squadrons Lost

1-3 1-2 I-I 2 1 3-1 4-1

Hits I I 2 3 4 6Squads 4 4 4 4 3 3Lost

Minimum Hits vs. Squadrons Lost

1-3 1-2 I-I e- l 3-1 4-1

Hits 0 0 I 2 3Squads 3 2 2 2 2 JLost

OFFENSIVE TACTICAL CONCEPTS:

AIR-TO-SEA COMBAT

On th e Battle Board the main a t ta c k c o nc e pt

revolves around the sinking o f carriers. Th ec ar rie rs, b y v ir tu e o f t h ei r a ir cr af t an d victoryp oin ts. arc by far th e most va luable p ieces on theb oa rd . U su al ly. th e attacker chooses the m ost

vulnerable carrier as his primary target.Th e best way to attack a carrier is to sand

wich it. This is done by attacking it on bothsides by t or pe do b om be rs an d on top withd i ve b om b er s . A l on g wit h t hi s concept. there ist h e t ec hn iq ue of overloading the defense. Thisis done by carrying ou t secondary attacks onn ea r- by s hi ps a nd /o r o th er carriers in order toforce th e d ef en se t o commit its anti-aircraft fireaway from the main attack. Overloading th edefense places t he d ef en de r on the horns o f adilemma: d ef en d t he fleet an d lose th e carrier. or

PAGE 3defend t he c ar ri er an d lose a good number o fsecondary ships. Failure to place th e defender insuch a d il em m a e i th e r shows an inep t attack. orinsull'icienl attacking material. We will demonstratL th e effects o f th is deci s ion later.

A p ar ti cu l, lr ly r e st ra in i ng tactic used as acorollary in overloading th e defens, is using 5 ormore squadrons on the s ec on da r y a t ta c k. T hi s ha s

the effect of s tr an gl in g t he d ef en se ( al be it at an

exorbitant loss in aircraft), as th e s hi p u su al ly isforced to concentrate on its attacker o r be sunk.

A final concept is the co rr ect placing o ftorpedo a n d d i ve b om b er s . If at all possible. usct or pe do b om be rs t o is ol ate on e section of th e lee from th e attacked sections.

DEFENSIVE TACTICAL CONCEPTS:

SEA-TO-AIR

Since the a t ta ck i ng c o nc e pt s revolve aroundsinking th e carriers, th e m ai n d ef en si ve concept

naturally revolves a r ou n d p r ot e ct i ng those samevessels.

Both leets have some very good defensivematerial available to them. Th e Japanese havetheir b at tl es hi ps . a nd th e Americans have th eA 11 111 By p r op e r p l ac em e nt in tlte flee formation. t he defender should be able to g et m ax imu m defensive AA coverage. Also. th e placing o fcruisers in th e secondary defense is very important. Th e main idea is to make th e sandw i ch a t t ac k h ar d t o pul l of f.

Whcn yo u are under attack. y ou s ho ul d consider whether or no t a ship is l ik el y t o survive.what ships yo u a re wil li ng to abandon. an d whatships yo u wish to keep. It m ig ht h el p to consultth e Average Hi ts Tabl e t o d et er mi ne t he probabil

it y o f th e ship in question being sunk. Fo rexample. say that a carrier w hi ch c an t ak e f ou r( 4) mor e hits is a tt ac ke d a t 3-1, 2-1. an d I- e in as an dw i ch a tt ac k. By a dd in g t he average h it s f oreach o f these attacks. we find that such anattack's a ve ra ge y ie ld would be 5.17 h it s. w h ic hmeans there is a good c ha nc e t he carrier will besunk. T he a bs ol ut e m in im um number o f hits isthree. so if th e carrier h as r ea di ed planes aboard,

it's a lost cause an d the protecting AA fire wouldbe better ut i li zed e l sewhere. Once having dec idedt he p r ob ab i li t y of a ship being sunk. you m ustdecide whether to a ba nd on t he ship. or to tryan d save it. When it's a reasonable assumptionthat a giv en ship is likely t o b e su nk . t he n use itsf irepower to protect other v es se ls in th e areaw hi ch a re u nd er a tt ac k. However. if possible dono t allow him to get 5-1 attacks, even on adoomed ship as this is tantamount to a freeattack with n o r es ul ti ng aircraft losses. This isespec ia l ly c ruc ial in th e first tw o ai r attacks. as itdetermines at w hat st rengt h the enemy will beable to continue to mount ai r raids.

Finally. do no t divide or oveJextend your fleetf or m at i on . T he very chances o f your survival ar ebased on your a bi li ty t o c on ce nt ra te your firepower.

T H E J A PA N ES E

FLEET FORMATIONS

In an attempt t o ou tl ine a nd i ll us tr at e th etactical o n p ~ sgoverning th e game o f MIDWAY. we will thoroughly examine differenthypot.hetical fleet formations of both s id es f ortheir advantages an d disadvantages.

Obviously. in order to limit t he nu mb er o fformations we will consider. an d fo r th e sake o f

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1101

11111

AH

\2.

D DI

n ZE

2\ 3.502\ 2.00SUNK 0.00I I 3.0012 2.83

\1 3.00I-I 3.002 1 3.50\1 2.00\. \ 1.00

TOTAL 23.83

2 3

O .MAlION NO. 3

noneMikuma MogamiSoryu, Akagi

KirishimaKumano

Kaga, HiryuSuzuyanone

3.001.671.333.00

\5.50

Attacked Defending Ships:by:

D5/A3 Tonen B 3 noneDI2/C3T5/D3TJ/D3

D6/A5TJ/B5D\2/C5T2/D5DI/C7

JAPANESE FLEET FORMATION NO.4Avg.Sqd.

O dd s: L os t

2.503.003.00

\5.33

Those vessels not shown have been successfUllyisolated from the attack.

Note tha t i n o rder to p re se rve the int eg ri ty ofthe f in al f ig ur es i n the Average H it s a n d AverageSquadrons Lost Columns, adjustments had to bem ad e in t he b od y of the columns. For instance,a lt ho ug h t he ave rage loss in a 1-2 a tt ac k w ou ldbe 2.83 squadrons , if the a t tack is carried out byonly 2 SQuadrons the average loss h as b ee n listedas 2 squadrons. Similiarly, three 1 1 attacks couldyield an average of 4 hits. However, the targetis only a 3 box cruiser, the average loss hasb ee n l ist ed so as not t o ex ce ed 3 hi ts. Also, d onot be misled by the SUNK listings. It ispo ssi ble w it h average l uc k t o s in k m any mo retargets than are l is ted on t he cha rt s as SUNK.

Such possible sinkings should also be computed,added to the charts, and weighed careful ly whenplanning your attacks.

Akagi

KirishimaKaga

Kumano

ToneSaryu

Target:

3 12 \\. \SUNK

TOTAL

noneHiryunone

T2/H3T5/F5D6/G5

JA PA NE SE F LE ET FO RM AT ION NO.3Avg.

Allacked Sqd. Avg.by: Defending Ships: Odds .. - L o s - t - - H ~ i t - s

T2/FI none 2\ 2.00 \.67

D6/G I none SUNK 0.00 3.00T3/F3 Mikuma 1\ 3.00 \.33TJ/F3 Kirishima \-2 2.83 .50D24/G3 Mogami, Tone,

Akagi

KirishimaTone

Target:

MikumaMogamiHiryuAkagi

JAPANESE FLEETFOIlMATION NO.1 and NO.2

Avg_Attacked Sqd. Avg.

Target: by: Defending Ships: Odds: Lost Hits

Mogami D5/GI Mogami 21 3.50 1.67Haruna D5/EI Haruna I-I 3.00 1.33Hiryu D5/E3 Hiryu Chikuma 1 2 2.83 .50

TJ/E2 Akagj Kirishima 12 2.83 _50T2/E4 Saryu 1 2 2.00 .50

Tone D4/E5 Tone 2 1 3.50 1.67Suzuya D5/G5 Suzuya 21 3.50 1.67Akagi DI2/TIO SUNK SUNK 00 5.00

T OTAL 2 1. 16 1 2. 84

Mogami D5/GI SUNK SUNK 0.00 3.00Haruna D5/EI Chikuma I-I 3.00 1.33Hiryu D5/E3 Kirishima I-I 3.00 1.33

TJ/E2 Haruna 12 2.83 .50T2/E4 Soryu 12 2.00 .50

Tone, Suzuya D4/E5 SUNK SUNK 2.00 6.00D5/G5

Tone, Mogami.kagi DI2/G33.50 1.67uzuya 21

T5/G2 Hiryu I-I 3.00 1.33T5/G4 Akagi 11 3.00 1.33 2 3

TOTAL 22.33 17.00

y ou r planes th in will result in high casualties.When planes are concent ra ted, as on the Akagit he y have mu ch smaller losses. So, w he n sett in gup your fleet for battle, set it up so that amaximum number of ships can be brought tobear on th e carriers, an d that supporting shipscan protect ' the ships protecting the carriers.

Fleet formation No. 4 is a variation of the

historical box formation that the Japanesea ct ua lly used in t he b at tl e. Th is f or ma ti on witho ut t he f ou r cruisers would b eco me a slaughter.However, the ad dit io na l fi repo wer help s m ak ethis formation more sound than it was in theactual battle. This formation is about as good asNo. I. T he b attle sh ip s on ly cover 2 carriers ea ch,however. In terms of sinkings, No. I and No. 4are about equal.

One way to gauge the damage caused by aformation's firepower is to compare the rat io ofsquads lost/hits. The ratio for the Japaneseformations are:

No.1: 1.78,No.2: 1.31.NO.3: 1.00,No.4: 1.93Now yo u should be able to see the concepts

we discussed earl ie r in the light of practical

example. Naturally, we have no t discussed all thefleet formations that come to mind - simplybecause most of these would no t be wo rt h thetime and trouble. We did discuss the mostobvious, and just perhaps, some of th e b et terformations.

J ~ : : ~ I ~

This allows those devas ta ting American divebombers to sit d ow n on the Akagi hard, whichwill most likely resul t in i t being sunk at low costto the American . This also resul ts in a rather lowAmerican aircraft loss. As yo u can see, spreading

Now take a look at the diagram for Fleetformatio ns No. I and No.2. The basic formationis the four carriers in-line, with BB's and CA's oneither side. You'll also notice that the thinskinned carriers Soryu and Hiryu are placed tothe inside of the formation , making them harderto get at . Th is forces t he American to attack thelesseasily sunk carriers, namely the Kaga and A k giEach battleship is set up for maximum protect ion,covering three carriers each, giving the ryu andHiryu double protection.

In Fleet formation No. I, the Japanese playerdecides t he Akagi cannot be saved and actsaccordingly. Th e Japanese f ormatio n is fairlyt ight kni t here , each car rier be ing well pro tectedfrom torpedo plane attack. However, as yo u cansee the American makes the weight of hispredominant d ivebombers fe lt. This formation isou r p er son al favorite because i t allows a maxim um n um be r of ships to come in to play in thedefense.

Fleet formation No. 2 is identical to fleetformation No. I in all respects e xcep t theJapanese AA fire. Here we presume t ha t th e Japplayer wants desperately to hang onto his carr iers, and has dec ided t ha t t he carrier is defensible. I n doing this, he loses the Mogami Suzuya

and Tone In terms of comparison, formation No.I will give up 10 points, and formation No. 2will yield 9 p oin ts. The Akagi will take 4 hits,

an d there is a 25 chance of sinking the carrier.

Fleet formation No. 3 is a lateral variant ofNo. I , however it has a few drawbacks. The fi rstdrawback is the exposure of the flank carriers.T he secon d d ra wb ac k is the American ability toisolate th ose flanks w it h t or pe do b omber s. Witness th e to rp ed o bombers in row F. This meansthat the ships in row C cannot be brought intothe defense.

making a mathematical analysis of these formations, we must make a number of basic assumptions. Those for the defending Japanese playerbeing:

I. The Japanese have already joined theircar riers with the 4 cruisers that enter 1500, June3rd.

2. The American attacks with all availablecarrier based aircraft T1 5 and D36).

3. There are no readied aircraft on the carriers.4. American fighter superiority or parity.

JAPANESE FLEETFORMATION COMPARISON

FORMATION No. I No.2 No.3 No.4

Max Hits 14 19 18 16Min Hits 09 14 12 09Max Sunk 2CV; 2CV; ICV; 2CV;

3CA 3CA 3CA ICAMin Sunk ICV 3CA 2CA ICVMax Squadrons 25 28 18 27Min Squadrons 14 15 12 17Average Hits 11.84 17.66 15.33 11.83Average Sunk ICV ICV ICV ICV

3CA 2CAAver. Sqds. Lost 21.26 23.16 15.33 22.83

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3 4 5 6 7 8 A B C 0 E F G 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

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American Fleet Formalion A American Fleer Formation 8

E

AMERICAN FLEET FORMATIONDIAGRAM NOTES

FLEET FORMATION A

Avs Sqd. AVI_Target: Atbcked by: Oerendins: Odds: Lost: Hits:

Northamplon TS/G4 Northamplon . 3.00 1.33Atlanta T4/E4 Allanta 1 2 2.83 .50E n t c r p r i ~ T6/E4 Yorktown ~ I 3.50 1.50

O ~ 8 / E 5 None Sunk 0.00 3.00T6fE6 Hornet ~ I 3.50 1.50

Asloria T ~ / E 6 E n l e r p r i ~ 1 2 2.00 .50D / E 8 Astoria \. \ 3.00 J.B

Pensacola TS/C8 Pensacola - 300 133TOla] ~ 0 8 3 11.00FLEET FORMATION B

Pensacola OS B] Pensacola - 3.00 1.J3Atlanta T J A 3 Northampton . ,3.00 1.33

TJ CJ Hornet \ 1 3.00 1.33Enterprise T6 Cl Enlerprise 2 1 3.50 1.67

O12/D1 None Sunk 0.00 3.33T6/EI None Sunk 0.00 0.00

Yorktown D C3 Yorktown . 3.00 1.33D6 D3 Allanta .. 3.00 J.3JT6/E3 Astoria. Minneapolis 11 3.00 1.33

Portland D5/FI Portland ,. \ 3.00 1.33Astoria T4/G3 None 4- 20 0 40 0

TOlal 26.50 18.31

FLEET FORMATION C

Astoria D5 A4 Astoria I' 3.00 1.J3Atlanta T6 AS None Sunk 0.00 2.67

D2/A6 Vincennes 1-2 20 0 .33Northampton Tl / e l None I' l.00 1.33

D5 C Northamplon . 3.00 1.33n J None 2 2.00 1.34

Enterprise T6 CJ Porlland 2 3.50 1.67D9/C4 Minneapolis, Enterprise I' 3.00 1.33T6 C5 Allanla \., 3.00 1.J3

YorktownTJ CS

Yorklown 13.00 1.J3

051C6 Pensacola. Hornet \., 2.83 .50Portland T2/E3 None 2-) 2.00 1.67

D5 E4 None Sunk 0.00 .66n / E 5 None 2] 2.00 1.67

Minneapolis TJ/E5 None 3\ 2.50 3.00Tolal 32.83 21.49

yo u don t , it ma y be wis e to pu t your fighters onCAP. Aga in t ho ug h, t h e decision is no t automatica nd s om e g uesswo rk m us t be involved. Fo r if heholds his f ighters back for CAP on th e n ex t t ur nyou ll have g ai ne d n ot hi ng . Many ponderablesmust go into th e decision.

A couple of notes on t he A me ri ca n f ig ht er shere is important. In ~ case where th e Americansends ou t a st ri ke a nd d eci de s to C AP o ve r hisow n fleet - presumably spotted by the Japanesewh o will be sending ou t t he ir o wn strike - he

should fly his fighters from Midway if he iswithin 14 zones. This will generally result in

FIGHTERS

e ff ec ti ve l oa d that the American def ense m usthandle, sinking on e carr ier and ser iously damaginganother. At this p oi nt , t he damage done to th eAmerican fleet is no t by an y means overwhelming, however, it does s of te n u p th e fleetfor a s ec on d st ri ke, whi ch in this case couldeas ily be disastrous,

Fleet formation C is similar to the Japane se

formation No.3. Again, this formation allows th eJ ap an es e p la ye r to spread his forces ou t an dd am ag e m an y ships. Th e formation is an improvement, however slight, over formation B - as itallows bet ter pro tec t ion fo r th e carriers, an d th ehits are more dispersed among th e fleet. However,formation A is still clearly superior.

T hi s e nd s ou r discussion of tactical concepts inth e air-to-sea element. We remind y ou t ha t we ar es im pl y t ry in g to illustrate th e principles discussedearlier - no t get i nt o specifics. That is wh y wedi d no t d is cu ss f ol lo w up strikes, th e otherJapanese fleets, variations on the main theme,an d other obscurities. We a re s ol el y interested inconcepts - concepts which we will eventuallyapply to t h e s tr at eg ic a sp ec t of th e game.

Th e tactical role of fighters is interesting inthat it is often mishandled. F ig ht er s c an be ofdecisive importance in protecting th e fleet. Th eJ ap an es e p la ye r h as t he initial fighter superiority,F ~ 8 to F ~ 6 T h e f ig ht er s that will later get into.th e act will even th e score, F 3 ~to F32. However,in t hi s i nt er im stage th e combat between th eopposing fighters c an c ha ng e t he balance.

Fighters have tw o main roles, escort andCombat Air Patrol (CAP). Th e deci s ions made inw he th er t o escort or to put up a CAP a re rea llynot easy, and must be predicated on what yo uthink he l l do. If you prefer to pla y it safe, yo u

will a lw ay s s en d your fighters ou t on escort.However, in a case where he sends in a strike an d

Fleet Formation A B C~ l a x i m u mHits 12 ~ I 25Minimum Hits 08 15 17Maximum Sunk ICY 2CY IC Y

ICA 2CAICL ICL

Minimum Sunk ICY IC Y IC AIC L

Max Squadrons Lost 25 32 43Min Squadrons Lost 14 17 25Average Hits 949 1631 20.65Average Sunk ICY ICY IC Y

ICA ICAICL ICL

Aver. Squadrons L0st 20.83 26.5 32.83

AMERICAN FLEETFORMATION COMPARISON

AMERICAN FLEET FORMATIONS

At f ir st g la nc e, t he A me ri ca n is at a disadvanage. He does no t have the combined force of aarge f leet , nor does he have a predominance in

a ir powe r. He does have some counterbalancingfactors in his favor, however, including a muchbetter search capab il i ty, knowledge of t he J ap anese player s in ten tions , .and a centralized fleet.Also, although he has fewer car r ie r s, he also hasfewer ships t o d ef en d.

The assumptions I am making for the American fle et formations are quite similar to thosemade ear li er for th e Japanese. T h e a ss um pt io nsare:

I. The Amerc ian fleet is kept in on e body.2. T he J ap an es e atta ck s with all a va il abl e

carrier based aircraft (T31 an d D28).3. There are no readied aircraft on th e carriers.4. Japanese fighter superiority or parity.Th e first formation is a b ox t yp e, w it h th e AA

CL Allallta in th e open corner. This allows th e

Atlanta to cover all three carriers. Th e Hornetand Yorktowll are protected by s eve n s hi ps ,whereas th e Ellterprise only e nj oy s t he coverageof six ships. He re the Japanese offensive tacticsmust differ from the Americans, due to thecomposition of his striking force. T he J ap an es ehave an abundance of torpedo bombers, a factorwhich subtly changes th e ability of a formationto stand up in combat. A formation which workswell for the Japanese can be d is as tr ou s f or th eAmericans. A variation on formation A would beto place th e Parrland at G-5. This w ou ld m ak ethe J ap an es e s hi ft t he a tt ac k t o th e Hornet bu tit would also p re ven t t he Japanese f ro m e ff ectively prevent ing the A tlallia s AA fire support. Itwould also involve a torpedo plane attack on

the YorktowlI which, if pressed with sufficientweight, would be able to d iv er t e no ug h f i re po we rto allow a good attack on the Hamel

Fleet formation B is a demons t rat ion tha t fleetformations that work for on e side don t alwayswor k for t he o th er . Why is this? Fo r on e thing,the Japanese have greater ov er al l AA fi re powern t he f or m of their batt leships. A n ot h er f ac to r is

he abundance of torpedo b om ber s: m or e t ha nwice that of t he A me ri ca n c on ti ng en t. T hi s

d ic ta te s d if f er e nt tactics, both offensively an ddefensively. Formation B shows th e in-linemethdd used in Japanese format ion No. I. However, t he J ap an es e attacker does n o t c o nc e nt ra t ehis divebombers on a single carrier, as theAmericans did. Instead, the Japanese can use his

abundance of t or pe do b om be rs t o t hr ea te n tw ocarriers at the same time. This increases th e

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SURFACE COMBAT:

FIGHTER YS. FIGHTER RESULTS

American ai r superiority. Another importantusage of f igh te rs can be found in t he d ef en se ofMidway from reduction (see Appendix - sectionMidlVay. question 5l.

In regards to t ac ti cs . t he f ol l ow in g t ab le shouldbe u se d as a guideline:

T he p ro ba bi li ti es for th e American s withdrawing from surface combat are r on th e firstturn. 56 ; by t he s ec on d, 707r by the third, an d807r by th e fourth. Note that t he p ro ba bi li ty f ora gil ell turn is always 33 , bu t t he a bo ve figuresdeal wi th probabi l i ti e s over an e xt en de d n um be rof tu rns . Surface combat can be t he e as y r ou te t odefeat in o ne t ur n f or t hc A mc ri ca n, so he shouldavoid it if at all possible.

S TR ATE GY: T H E MIDDLE GAME

In the actual battle, the m id d le g am eth e t im e p er io d in which all f ou r J ap an es e C V swere sunk, and it w as a lso th e time when tYurklO\Vn received i ts f at al wounds. Fo r th e sof discussion we will l oo sel y d ef in e t he mi ddlegame as the time when th e Second Alago) Fe nt er s ( 05 00 , J un e 4) to the arrival of th e MBody Yalr/alo et al ) at 1700 on June 4,ending sometime on June 5th, depending largon Japanese s t ra tegy.

Th e big q ues tio n tha t now looms on th

horizon wi th the ad vent of the Second Fleetwhen to i nv ad e M id wa y. Ou r general a dv ic ethis matter is to keep y ou r o pt io ns o pe n. w

easily duplicate the stunning blows of 4 Ju1942. Because the Japanese player needs the

addit iona l f i repower of t he l at er CruDiv 7 , haing dose to th e far e dg e a nd joining th e cruion 1500 is advisable, although not the ocourse of action. Th e Japanese p layer ma y wto proceed towards Midway as quickly as possiin order to k ee p t he A mer ica n of f balance,he is taking a very b ig r isk that he will be ablestrike th e American fleet an d es ca pe b ef or eA me ri ca n ca n p ay hi m bac k in kind.

M ea nw hi le t he A m er i ca ns aren t exactly sitton their collective cans. Th e American hasrather clear Lut d ec is io n, t o either head forconfrontation with th e Japanese fleet early,hang around Midway an d let th e IJ l comehim. Th e second option will d el ay t he big battuntil t he m id dl e of th e game. Th e f ir st can crea really wild game, so we ll discuss i ts c onquences first.

L et s a ss um e t he J ap an es e pl ay er has decidto play it safe and unite the CVSF and theCruDiv 7. If th e American steams, without delto the west (left side of the board). he willw i th in s tr ik in g range of t he C VS F at 1 70 0, i f

knows t h e g en er al whereabouts of th e fleetcan discover its exact posi tion o n the 1700 tuIf the American finds the CVSF bej JI e 15(either th e I 10 0 or 1300 turn) he may op t fo suicide mission in which he launches allaircraft a t e xt re me range, making recovery impsible. This strike if well placed, could mdi sa st er f or t he J ap an es e player. H ow ev er , i f t h

Japanese pu t up fighter co ve r ( an d yo u lf ighte r escor t ) you re going to be in a lo t ofw a te r. S en di ng t he f ig ht er s along will help insyour success, bu t will d en ud e y ou r o wn fleetfighter protection. Usually an opponentbecome wise to s uc h t ac ti cs after he s been stuonce or twice, so it ma y pay to give hi m fake attack by s ee mi ng t o prepare operatio

such as this, when in reality yo u ar e launchinothing. It s often good idea to dothroughout the. game, as some opponents h av eextremely bad habit of p uttin g up a CAP anying of f a ny r ea di ed a ir cr af t w he n t he y see writ ing devious p lans on your operations she keeps hi m of f balance, an d can pa yo ff in rd iv id en ds w h en you attack NEXT turn (if yfind him), as he will no t be able to pu t upaircraft. When your opponent doesn t know wto e xp ec t, y ou have a slight advantage in beable to call t he s ho ts , if only for a turn or twR em e mb e r, f am i li ar it y breeds contempt,tr yi ng t he same m aneuv er t oo o fte n versussame opponent is just inviting trouble. Eitway, night sets in an d th e Japanese neet usua

fades of f into th e darkness, as t he m id dl e gaprepares to enter u po n t he scene.

6

6 9 6

6

Fo r t he A mer ic an p laye r, evasive t ac ti cs a rebasically si mpl e be cause t he J ap an es e s ear ch is

limited to three areas pe r t ur n. However, if theJ ap an es e p la ye r is caught in a corner, hecannot p os si bl y e sc ap e t he A me ri ca n s ea rc h. Bytrying to end y o ur m o ve me n t in th e center of anarea yo u keep th e m ax im um n um be r of escapeo p ti o ns o p en , which usually is very important.

T he J ap an es e pl ayer , d es pi te a predominanceof force, is in a s t ra teg ica l ly in fer ior posi t ion du eto th e horrendous dispersion of his forces. Hise nt ir e n ee t is split i nt o f ou r g r ou ps , t h ei r h is to rical d es ig na ti on s b ei ng t h e Carrier S l ri k in g r or ce ,Cruiser Divisiun 7 (CruDiv7), th e Second rteel,and the Maill Body.

Th e Carrier Stri ki ng For ce (C VSF hereafter)

enters t he bo ar d on th e first t ur n. T he C VS F hasth e heavy burden of destroying t he A me ri ca nF le et a nd r ed uc in g Midway in preparation f or t heinvasion. However, if yo u e xa mi ne t hi s neet interms of ou r ear l i er tact i ca l d i scuss ion , yo u willfind that a well pl ac ed A me ri ca n s tr ik e c ou ld

Arter having discussed tadics in ddail , wecome to t he m or e di ffi cult discussion of games t ra tegy. S t rategy in M ID WAY deals m ai nl y w it hmaneuver on t he S ea rc h B oa rd , hopefully culminating in a tadicai battle on t he Bat tl e Board.Alth.ough you know th e enemy s strengths an dobjectives, yo u have no idea IVllere he is o r w ha this rled dispositions will be. Yo u also o ften d onot know whether o r not yo u will be discovereda n d a t ta c ke d .

Th e big problem in discussing sound strategicideas fo r MIDWAY is t ha t b ot h p la ye rs m ay t ak eequally risky chances, on e pl ay er g et ti ng aw aywith it and the other being caught. So what is ano b vi o us b l un d er for on e may be th e saving ionfo r another. Therefore , we will immedia te ly po intou t that we will discuss possibil i t ies an d actions(and the r i sks invo lved), butwecannot guaranteethat th e ideas we present will allVays work. Theydo work given th e proper c i rcumstances, which Iwil l a lso attempt to discuss.

On e of th e most important aspects o f th estrategic play in MIDWAY is t he p ro pe r use oft he s ea rc h procedure a nd m ov em en t i nt en de d t oavoid d iscovery. We would suggest tw o helpfulmodifications to the M ID WAY s ea rc h board.D ra wi ng t he a ir r an ge from Midway ( 7 z on es ) onth e board in magic marker helps by instantlyi nf or mi ng t he J ap an es e p la ye r as to w he n h e l l beable to s tr ik e t he island. Th e other modificationis to coat th e board with Con-Tact or someother dear p la st ic c ov er in g w hi ch a ll ow s on e tomark in movements and enemy dispositions usinga g rease pencil (water soluble) or a visual aidspen made fo r marking acetates. This allowsplayers to m a rk s ea rc he s, m o ve m en t s, a nd e ne mydispositions without having a confusing clutter ofcounters r em ai ni ng o n t he board.

It is amazing that so many players maneuverwithout any real knowledge or concept of evasivetactics. Your very positioning in a given aread ic ta te s y o ur abil ity to escape d et ec ti on . T hed ia gr am b el ow i nd ic at es t he number of differentareas that are accessible from a given sea zone:

STRATEGY: TH E OPENING MOYES

3 1

5.5

2 1

53

1-2 I-I

3 4.55 4.5

1-3

5.5

DeLAtt.

This table gives th e average number o f squadrons lost in a given battle. I c it e t he example of 7fighters attacking 10 fighters used by the battlemanual. Here th e defend ing player may strip of fup to three ( 3) s qu ad ro ns f or d ef en si ve use.However, th is raises the odds to I-I . By strippingof f only two. the defender still increases hisdefensive firepower while keeping the fighter

odds at 1-2.T hi s s ho ws wh y it can be of advantage to the

J ap an es e p la ye r to CA P h is p la ne s. T he a tt ac kwould be 2 6- 28 ( 1- 2) . and thus give th e edge tothe Japanese .

Surface combat is on e thi ng t he A mer ican player MUST avo id at all costs . If he gets into it,he must get ou t as soon as possible. unless he hasc ha nc ed u po n a l on e c ru is er. U su al ly it happensthat an ai r strike wil l be involved_ compoundingth e Amer ican t roubles .

However, if th e U.S. player uses proper tacticsin surface combat, he can r ed uc e t he initial threatof the Japanese ba t tl ewagons : while rolling on thebattle b oa rd w it hd ra wa l in o rd er to with drawf rom sur face combat.

When t he J ap an es e se t up, they wil l u sual lyconcentrate their ships toward t he c en te r. Th eAmerican should th en place his carriers in th e

ex t re me c or ne rs in o rd er t o de lay t he possibilityof an early bombardment f rom th e BB s.

On the first move, th e Ja p player will move allbu t his carr ier s forward . Th e U.S. p la ye r s ho ul d1101 move f or ward on t he first battle b oa rd t u rn .This keeps hi m ou t of BB r an ge . He should thenroll fo r wi thdrawal.

On the next move both players will moveforward, a ll ow in g t he A me ri ca n to get a shot athis pursuers, an d effectively negating the Japaneserange a dv an ta ge . T h e Ja p BB s will fire at thecarriers and the CA s will trade shots. At thispoint t he A mer ic an s ho ul d again t ry t he bat tl eboard withdrawal option.

If t he A me ri ca n s attempt at night remainsunsuccessfu l. then his doom will be sealed in aturn or t wo . Tac ti ca ll y, th e o pt im um o dd s fo rt he s ur fa ce combat is 3 1 o r b et te r. as 3 1 willy ie ld an ave rage of 3.5 hits. Another p oi nt h er e is

that 4 1 an d 5 1 results indude automaticsinking. If yo u t re at t he SUNK result on th e CR Tas 10 hits (the maximum for any ship in th eg am el . t he n 4-1 yields 5.1 hits an d 5 1 yields 7. 8hits - enough to sink j us t a b ou t anything.

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i lo pe l il at yo u l an take it l ar ly. Til l earliestssibll timl is 0700 on Jun , 5t h. II Iheanl se player combines with till Second FkL l

d Main Body 10 invade, th e invasion shouldn at Nigh t, June 5. Tilis allows till Japaneseatlack under cover or darkness. a raclor which

l gl lll rally insure till sakty o r Ihl I ago an dsuccess o r till Midway invasion. It alSll g iv l sJapanese a bL llL r deknsive poslure, despilL a

inite loss in victory points du e 10 till dday,Th e middll g a me u su al ly t ur ns i nt o a g am e Il ~ l l dmouse. a s e ac h p la ye r s ee ks discover

ti ler, w ili k at the same liml remainingdden. Usually this is th e p er io d in which thl

tactical battles a re r ou g il t.Midway r e du ct i on p ut s a n o l h n b ur de n o n th eanese player. His carrins nll t ilead into a

own area and bomb Midway once, twice, orybe ew n tilree ti mes i r he uses 10 0 l i t ik rorce

has bad luck. This givl s l il e American thLvantage I k n ow i ng t he J ap an es l player s inIL nns , Til l qu il k esl way to r ed uc e Midway is by

strike at ~ I o dd s ( ir previous comb t ha s no tt a large number o r aircraft I: at kas t halving

r el at iv e rortiricat ion strength o r th e isl lndd l l o w n ~an easy rollow up s tr ik e w it h hall

nlllnlwr o r pl 1es IIsed prL viously, bu t stillacking at ~ I There s also a 3Y , ch nlcL th embing will no t need to bt repeated a seconde, r il l slow way is batileship bombardment,ich can be risky ir the American has any air

neh left 10 speak 01 . Silould both a ir I le et s bedly cr i rpkd littiL is lost by bat tksh ip bom-

bardment. Howevcr, t hey ma y be put to betteruse trying 10 , ngage till American in surfacecombat.

Th e J ap an es e p la ye r m ay a ls c wish to mix upilis fleet in o rd er to strengtilen hi s carrier rorce.On e such combination 1 01 rear rang ing th ings is:

CVFS 4CV:4BB:4CA

S e co n d F le et il ago: 5CA: I CV LThis a r rangeme[l t is tactically sound, and can

be carried ou t witilout losing an y time, Till lightcruisers (CLl are ou t 1 01 seout duty, Since thtJ ap an es e p la ye r ha s only t hr ee s ea rc he s, it isorlen wortilwilile to send ou t tile weak CL s onsearch dnty, Till CL s arL no t w or th much incombat an d easily s un k , t hu s d i ct at i ng th ei r use,as scouts, T he a dd ed search c ap ab i li t y t h ey giveth e p la y er m o re than makes up for their loss,And ~ h i l espeaking or weak ships, it is often agood idea to transrer a ( ,VL s aircraft to a CVan d keep th e CV L o ut o f harm sway, We suggestthis because the tw o ( VL s ar e worth points

an d only take two h it s a pi ec e before sinking

which is generally a v er y e as y p ro cc ss . By ket pingthem out o r harm s way, yo u ca n ro b tillA m er i ca n p l ay er or valuable easy targets.

TH E L AT E G AM E

Till Late Came usually seals thl decisionsmade in th e llliddiL game, Once Midway ha srallen t h n e is littiL L il 1ee that eitilL r side willengage in decisive combat.

A g oo d deal o r c oy m an eu ve ri ng t ak es p la ce

P G E

during th e Late Came t o ke ep th e Japanese fromthrowing a strike wliich may co st th e Americansth e game. This maneuvering is invariably subtle innature, usually consisting or heading for a safeplace where tile en em y w on t think o f looking.On e good L vasiw t actic at this point is to moveinto an area that s just h ee n s ea re il ed , as mostplayns will n ot r ep ea t a search in t he s am e arL a.O ve rl ap pi ng s ea rc he s a re often a good ideawasterul perhaps

-hu t tiley p re v en t s hi ps

frol11s li pp in g t hr ou gh t he s ea rc h n et .When Midway ralls, the American player is

u su al ly r ac in g a g am e w hi ch is a lr ea dy w on o rlost. When he is sure o r a win Ill will usually1110ve a wa y r ro m M id wa y in an attempt to avoidt he p ur su in g J ap an es e I led , II he h as n t e no ug hvictory points at this lime, he should use hi sknowledge o r t he p os it io n o r t he J ap an es e neetinvading Midway in order to s tr ik e t he m b ef or ehe losl s all hance or victory,

II Midway does no t rai l. L i ther by reason o rt he s in ki ng o r tilL illl/go o r lack o r r e du c ti o n d ueto a loss o r air pow, r ( or bo th ), t he J ap an es eplayer is generally lost unless he c an d ec is iv el yengage t h e A m er i ca n, This is espL cially true with

l L gards t o s ur ra ce combat, a field in whieh theJapanese have a decided advantage,

Once a d ec is io n a t M id wa y ha s been reached,t he g am e is u su al ly o v er ro r all prac t i ca l purposes,Although in close games th e issue ma y no t bed ec id ed u nt il th e very last turn as t he J ap an es etry despnately to engage th e fleeing Americanl l ed in surface combat.

idway Re workedby Vic to r Made ja

The full t it le o f this article w MI D WAY,DAY, TACTICS STALINGRAD Re

orked , Thefirst MIDWA Yarticle, it is includedainly fo r the purpose o f memorabilia.

T h e r e is a m a j o r f a i l i ng in M i d w a yt I believe is due to the turn pattern.

o v e m e n t , s e a r c h , an d op e r a t i o n s .e f e r a b l y, i t sh o u ld be : l / 2 m o v e

en t , s e a r c h , 1 / 2 m o v e m e n t , an de r a t i o n s , H i s t o r i c a l l y s p e a k i n g ,i te a b it of t ime of t en e l a p s e d b eeen r e c c e c o n t a c t and the a r r i v a l

th e a i r s t r i k e . D u r i n g th e ba t t l e

th e J a p a n e s e c a r r i e r s m a d e a s h a r pt u r n n o r t h w ard d u r in g th i s p e r i o d .Consequen t ly, H o r n e t s a i r s t r i k e b e -c a m e c o m pl et e ly w o r t h l e s s ; th e l ead ing35 d ive b o m b e r s an d th e f i g h t e r p r o -t ec t ion of the T P D s n e v e r s i g h t e d th ec a r r ie r s an d th e u n p r o t e c t e d t o rpedop l a n e s w e r e c r e a m e d as a r e s u l t . T h i si n d i c a t e s t ha t p r e pl a n n ed e v a s iv e ac t ionis a noteworthy factor.

T h i s i nnova t ion in th e t u r n p a t t e r nwould m ake i t p o s s i b l e fo r th e sh ip ( s )to be in 9 p o s s i b l e s q s . r a t h e r t han 1dur ing th e o p er at io n s s e ct io n. As am o d e r a t e c o m p e n s a t i o n th e p lane s a r eg iven a s t r i k e p o t e n t i a l of 3. a d j a c e n ts q s . , in s u c ce s si v e o r d e r , o u t o f the 9 .E a c h s ep ar at e s tr ik e wo uld h av e th e

cho ice of s t r i k i n g a n y o n e o f t h e s e 3zo n es p ro v id in g they a r e a ll wi th inr a n g e . Of c o u r s e , to be s u r e o f f in d in gth e e n e m y, 3 a t t a c k s m a y be s e n t . A tany r a t e , t h e s e s t r i k e g r o u p s w o u l d bec l o s e r to w h a t t h e i r n u m b e r s a c t u a l l yw e r e . would be f o o l h a r d y to l a u n c hsu ic ide m i s s i o n s b e c a u s e of the s m a l lchance of l oca t ing th e e n e m y wi th s u ff i c i en t s t r e n g t h , T h i s is a i m e d a tc h a n g i n g MIDWAY f r o m th e p r e s e n tg ue ss in g m a tc h v e r s i o n . G u e s s i n g , o fc o u r s e , w a s a m a j o r f a c t o r in th e a c -t ua l b a t t l e , b u t in th e o r i g i n a l v e r s i o none l ucky g u e s s fo l lowed by an a ll o u ts t r ik e

of tenle f t th e

o u t c o m es e a l e d

(d iv id ing th e s h i p s in to g r ou p s c ha ng esth i s on ly s l igh t ly ) .

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G E

One Ship nv sion Fleet

by Charles Pelto

Though a logical variant this one may un-alance more than balanceOn the morning of 3 June 1942, a l on el y PBY

e of many such aircraft combing th e waters of fidway b ro ke t hr ou gh t he sullen cloud cover to

nd a Japanese fleet stretched ou t below it.ant ica lly dodging th e intense fire co mi ng u p

om th e ships he radioed his base that he hadscovered the ex pect ed invasion fleet. Unrtunately he had only stumbled upon thenvoy that was carrying men to s to rm t he islandfenses. Nagumo s carrier force th e group thate p il ot was looking for was still outside of th earch area and over 70 0 miles to th e north ofe encounter.

Fo r th e simplification of th e game AH ha ssignated t he J ap an es e cruiser AT AGO as th e

ansport convoy. But it was miles to th e rear ofe actual invasion group a nd d oe s not appear one b oa rd until June fourth. Players of th e gameo de si re r ea li sm a nd h is to ri ca l a cc ur ac y m ay

t like th e idea o f some 5000 t r oo p s c r am m edboard on e l it tl e c ru iser a long with th e assort

ent of p ar ap he rn al ia n ee de d to o ve rr un t heidway garrison of 2000.T he g ro up was comprised of twelve transports.

ese were escorted by thr ee patrol boats alsorrying t ro op s, t hr ee d es tr o ye r divisions and a.

ght cruiser th e J lN TS U. O nb oa r d t he t ra ns po rt sere troops of th e 2n d Combined Special Navalanding Force augmented by t he A rm y s Ichiki

tachment.

Th e e nt ir e g r ou p e nt er s play at 0 90 0 o n Juneird. To take Midway th e Japanese p la y er m us tove at least nine of t he t ro op carrying ships toe isl.and s squ ar e an d remain there fo r fournsecutive turns.Each transport has a screening factor of one.

s no surface factor. T he p at ro l b oa ts have a I-Irface-screening factor. Th e flagship JINTSU has2-3 factor. As for the DesDiv I use th e rules

om th e article W ha t Nex t? Destroyers atidway,

To sink t he J IN TS U requires three hits. Th eL is w or th t hr ee v ic to ry p oi nt s. All t he t ro opr ryi ng s hi ps a re sunk aft er tw o hits and areort h tw o p oints each. Th e DesDiv s a re worthee p oi nt s each. B ut o nl y a ft er th e last captain

s gone down in th e la st s hi p of each divisionn th e US player collect th e points.T ho se J ap an es e w ho like th e ATAGO method,

th i ts abi l ity to hide u nd er t he smoke from theB s and CA s guns ma y n ot j um p at what I moposing. But by splitting th e Imperial Fleetto two or three s ta ck s i ns te ad of one t he USayer will b e m or e interested in the whereabouts

the carrier group than in a handful ofanspor.ts of low value. Besides th e on e big stackpt falling over on the search board. By keepinge t ra ns po rt group to th e rea r until US airwer is reduced or th e Yamato group with itsper BB s appears th e Japanese player can thenil to Midway with little w or ry a b ou t screening.Together with the rules provided by other

t ic les such as Midway-Unstereotyped andMidway-Equilibrated, thi s var iant could result

some of the most complicated battles everonc eiv ed. M ay be e ve n as complex as th e actualcounter.

Midway ism rck Styleby P e t e r H a r l e m

ne the best early variants

One of th e p r o b l e m s of M idw ay i si t s s ur fa ce b at tl es Ya m a t o with e i g h th i t s s t i l l h a s a s u r f a c e f a c t o r of 18 . T or e m e d y th i s I p r o p os e u s in g s o m e ofth e B i s m ar c k a tt ri b ut es F i r s t a ne ws y s t e m of s c o r i n g h i t s i s needed . Iad d h it b o x e s fo r bo w a n d s t e r n gunsa s in B i s m a r c k l eav ing th e p r e v i o u sh i t s a s m i d sh i ps h it s T h e b e s t way Ifound w as a s fol lows: U. S. s h i p sE n t e r p r i s e H o r n e t , York town; 2 bo w

guns , I s t e r n 5 m i d s h i p s M i n n e a ? o l i s ,New O r l e a n s Vincennes ; 4 bow, 2 s t e r n5 m i d s h i p s A s t o r i a P e n n s a c o l a 3bow, 3 s t e r n 4 m i d s h i p s N o r t h h a m pt on , P o r t l a n d ; 4 bow, 2 s t e r n 4 m i d -s h i p s F i n a l l y c r u i s e r At lan ta ; 2 bow,1 s t e r n 3 m i d s h i p s J a p a n e s e sh ipsa s fol lows: B a t t l e s h i p s Ya m a t o ; 12bow, 6 s t e r n 10 m i d s h i p s ; Naga to ,Mutsu ; 7 bow, 6 s t e r n 8 m i d s h i p s ;Kongo, Hie i , K i r i s h i m a Haruna ; 5bow, 5 s t e r n 6 m i d s h i p s C a r r i e r sA k a g i , Kaga ; 2 bow, 3 s t e r n 5 m i dsh ips ; H ir yu ; S o ry u ; 1 bow, I s t e r n 3m i d s h i p s ; Zuiho ; 1 bow, l s t e r n 2 m i dsh ips ; Hosho ; 2 bow, 0 s t e r n 2 m i ds h i p s J ap C r u i s e r s A t a g o , H a g u r o ,Myoko, 4 bow, 2 s t e r n 4 m i d s h i p s ;C h i k u m a , Tone ; b bow, 0 s t e r n ( a l lt h e i r m a i n b a t t e r i e s w e r e up f r o n t ) , 3m i d s h i p s ; C h o ka i , K u m ano , M i k u m a ,M o g a m i , Suzuya ; 4 bow, 2 s t e r n 3 m i d -s hi ps ; L ig ht C r u i s e r s N a g a r a , S e n d a i ,Yu r a ; I bow, 2 s t e r n 2 m i d s h i p s

All g un b o x e s a r e u s e d in th e s a m eway a s in B i s m a r c k To s ink a sh ipa ll m id sh ip bo x es m u s t be checked .T h e s u r f a c e c o m b a t r e s u l t s t ab le a l s oh a s to be r e v i s e d T h e r e i s nO w tw or a n g e s ; B r a n g e 4 s q u a r e s fo r B a t -t l e s h i p s on ly an d A r a n g e 3 s q u a r e so r l e s s fo r a ll o t h e r s h i p s . B a t t l e -sh ip s can n o t f i r e into s q u a r e s ones q u a r e a w a y. T h e y m u s t r e m a i n 2s q u a r e s o r m o r e

H e r e is th e s , ;gges ted Ba t t l e r e s u l t st ab l e :

B r a n g el IWg a e n e m y

B r o a d s i d e Bow S t e r n

d ie r o l lBow Bow S t e r n

h it h it h itS t e r n Bow midsh ips

h it h it h it

3 m i d s h i p s -

4

5

6

A r a n g e F ir in g a t e n e m y

B r o a d s i d e Bo w S t e r n d ie r o l l

Bo w Bow S t e r n H it

S t e r n Bo w S t e r n2 Hit

3 Midsh ips Midsh ips Midsh ip

4 Midsh ips

5 -

6 -

T h e s e Ta b l e s o p e r a t e in th e s a m ew ay a s th e t a b l e s in B i s m a r c k

T he on ly o t h e r p r o b l e m to so lve is :in an aerial a tt ac k what hits ar e scored.T his i s so lved by making a ll hi ts , s c o r -ed by t o r p e d o s q u a d r o n s m i d s h i p s h i t s .A ll h i t s by d i v e b o m b e r s q u a d r o n s ca ne i t h e r be s c o r e d a s m i d s h i p s o r a s hitson bo w an d s t e r n R e m e m b e r t ha t whena ll b o x e s in bow o r s t e r n s e c t i o n s a r echecked , th e n ex t h it in t ha t s ec ti on iss c o r e d a s a mic.lship h i t .

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hicken m motoby Linco ln Cla rk

This deceptive t it le is another variant whichayers may wish to try jo r thesakeojvariety Alsoplausible history

Being s ta ck ed u p aga inst a superior fleet. yo uus t agree t hat the United States was l uc ky t oin the battle of Midway. Yet d es pi te th eumerically larger fleet t ha t J ap an committed to

Midway proper, she s imul taneously sent anotherowerful fleet to the Aleutians. Suppose Isorokuamamoto had a sudden attack of th e heebieeebies just after the sortie of th e Combinedleet from Japan in late May. Th e sudden

ncrease in U.S. radio traffic indicates that maybehe en em y k no ws of his secret plan to seize

Midway and d es tr oy t he American car ri er f leet .Maybe he should recall th e Aleutian squadronslready s te am in g t ow ar d D ut ch H ar bo r. Attu, and

Kisha. Suppose he does.

CL JlNTSU enters wi th 0 50 0 J un e 4 fl ee tdefensive value

hits to sinkpoint s

This ship was flagship to Invasion Fleet, no tATAGO, bu t why argue?

1st night turn (0300) June 5-CVE RYUJO 7T, SF

2 d ef ens iv e v al ue 2 h it s to sink 7 points

CVEJUNYO 7D,8F

2-3 defensive value 3 hits to sink 7 points

CA MAYA, TAKAO6-3 d ef en siv e v alu e 3 h it s to sink 3 points

CA NACHI6-3 d efe ns iv e v alu e 4 h it s t o sink 3 points

for t ho se w ho employ destroyers:

DesDiv 7 3 DO s) plus 2 DO s DesDiv?)I f a pp ea ri ng t hi s tu rn , enter at A-I. Each turndelayed permits ships to appear in on e areafarther east or south. i.e. if ships enter at 0700June 5, they can enter at C-I or A-3.

0700 June 5--BB HYUGA, ISE, FUSO, YAMASHIRO

13-7 defensive value 7 h it s t o sink 7 points

CL 1 KITAKAMI4- I defensive value 2 hits to sink 2 points

CL TAMA3 defensive value 2 hits to sink 2 points

CL ABUKUMA, KISO3-2 defensive value 3 hits to sink 3 points

DesDiv 20, 21, 24, 27 (4 D O s e ac h) plus DesDiv6 (3 DO s)

ABUKUMA an d KISO are f lagships fo r Attu andKisha la nding forces. More on their use la ter.SalJle entry as for other force.

T hi s a dd s up to an impressive total of Japanesestrength, bu t don t despair, USA e rs. A heavywerge ld accompanies it. It is an h is to ri ca l f ac tthat the Japanese did not know th e location ofth e U.S. carrier fleet until 07 28 J un e 4. Th eoperational plan of the First Carrier StrikingForce flatly d is c ou n te d t he possibility of contact

P G 9

with th e U.S. f leet before t he c ap t ur e of Midway.Why then, dear reader, is th e U.S. player t rea tedto th e sight of the Japanese carrier fleet muckingaround in a corner fo r at least twelve hours onJune 3 and making no attempt whatever to closeth e range on i ts target? A hh s oo , inside inflomation. Don t co unt on it

You a re charged , Admiral Nagumo, wi th carrying ou t an air s tri ke n o l ate r t han 0 70 0 Jun e 4on Midway Island. If y ou don t, h an d ten pointsto th e U.S. p la ye r a nd a dd five more to the kittyfor eve ry t ur n y ou fail to meet the deadline. Allyour ships will e nt er at their specified times; noearlier, no later. If you spot an y U.S. sur facevessels before 0700 June 4 inc lusive , yo u arefreed from your obligations. If you don t findhim, he doesn t exi st ; he i sn t w it hi n a thousandmiles of you; yo u will fol low t he o p er a ti on a lplan: attack and seize Midway, then w ai t f or th eU.S. f leet to come t o yo u.

T he two nor thern l anding forces each containabout 1200 men (for t ho se w ho i nc or po ra tetransports, ABUKUMA ha d one, K IS O h ad two,)

So even if AT AGOis

sunk, an i nv as io n ca n s til lbe made. There are 5000 men in the AT AGOfleet. I f o nl y h al f t ha t n um be r land, s ix turns arerequired to capture Midway; if 1200, eight turns;if 6200, 3 tu rn s; if 7400, 2 turns. less than5000 me n land, on e battleship must stay onMidway to lend artillery support.

This version, as do all, complicates things. It isan improvement, I think, over others I have se enbecause there are no new rules to learn, just moreships to incorporate. Th e v er y real fault in th eJapanese plan, ignoring th e U.S. f leet , is apparent.Bu t even if th e first four carriers a re s u nk , Japanca n still lean on he r second platoon.

W h a t N e x te s t r o y e r s a t M i d l N a y

h i t s to s ink it , so it h a s d e f e n s e f a c t o r sof 4 - 4 .

Now, t ake 8 r ed c ou nt er s and l a b e lt h e m D e s D i v 2 4 8 1 0 1 1 9 1 7 a n d 19 .

On th e h i t r e c o r d pad , c r e d i t D e sDi v 2 w ith f ou r h i t s 4 wi th four h i t s

8 with tw o h i t s 9 wHh t h r e e h i t s 10wi th t h r e e h i t s 11 with f o u r , 17 wi th

b y S te ve M ar s ton

Manyplayers have adoptedthejol/o wing rulesor theaddition o f destroyers as an integral p r t o fhe game

F i r s t t ake a m e s s of b l a n k c o u n t e r srom th e box . T h e n s el ec t t hr ee b lueoun te r s f r o m th e p i e c e s you h a v e n e x t

you, an d l a b e l t hem De sDiv I , 2 and. (DesDiv s t a n d s fo r s t r o y ~ rD i v iion) . h e f a c t o r s s u r f a c e a nd s c r e e nng) a r e d e t e r m i n e d by th e a m o u n t o f

i t s n e e d e d to d e s t r o y th e e n t i r e d i v iion. E x a m p l e : D e s D i v 1 r e q u i r e s 4

DesDiv

D e s D i v 2

DesDiv 6

3

4

4

f o u r , an d 19 wi th four h i t s . E v e r y U

d e s t r o y e r d iv i s ion , w h e n d e s t r o y e d i s

w o r t h t h r e e v i c t o r y p o i n t s .All American dest royers ar e present at start,

while only Japanese divisions 4, 10, an d 17 appearat start. DesDiv 8 c om es i n w it h th e next group o fJapanese ships , t he 2 nd and 9t h divisions with th eA t ag o g fo u p, an d th e 11th an d 19th with th e last~ u p

N a t u r a l l y t h e r e m u s t be a d i f f e r e n tw ay to r e c o r d ba t t l e d a m ag e . E ac hl it tl e s q ua re in the d e s t r o y e r s h it r ec o r d s e c t i o n r e p r e s e n t s 1 d e s t r o y e r .H e n c e , if on e h i t i s r e g is t e r e d on ed es tr oy er i s su n k . S in ce a d e s t r o y e ri s sunk , n at ur al ly f ir ep ow er i s d ec r e a s e d so , s a y i f D e s D i v 2 o f b lu es u s t a i n e d on e h i t , it h a s t h r e e d e s t r o ye r s l e f t so i t no w h a s d e f e n s e f a c t o r sof 3 - 3 .

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SUBMARINE B ATT L E T AB LE

DIE 2 3 4 5 6

HITS: 0 0 2 3 4

SU B IS : sunk sunk sunkSu b v. s. Wa r s h i p

HITS: 0 0 0 Su b v. s . ATAGO

SU B IS : sunk sunk sunk

HITS: 1 1 Su b v . s .c r i p p l e (Ship o t h e r t han Atag

t h a t i s su nk if it s u s t a i n s on e m o rSU B IS : sunk sunk h i t . \

No w t h e n , a s th e s u bm a r in e c o u nt e rsr e p r e s e n t c e n t e r s of su b g r o u p s c o v e rin g m o r e t han on e s q u a r e , t h e r e i s a

c ha nc e f or su b b a t t l e on s q u a r e s a d j a c e n tto th e su b c o u n t e r an d a l so t h a t r o vin g s c r e e n de s t r o y e r s will ca tch a su ban d s in k i t . C on seq uen tly , when a UN

No c o n t a c tSu b sunkSu b ba t t l e

Su b ba t t l eSu b b a t t l e

No c o n t a c t

DI E R O L L

3

4

5

6

t m a k e s l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e if yo u a

th e J a pa n es e s ub m ar in e o r n o t (Ith e o r i g i n a l York town w i s h e s it cousay t h a t ) . f you do, g ive it the sama b i l i t i e s a s an A m e r i c a n su b growith on ly one r e m a i n i n g sub . Also ,i t m o v e o u t 15 s q u a r e s on th e f im o v e .

A s I m e n t i o n e d b e f o r e , I deve lopeth e s u b m a r i n e g am e b al an ci ng methb e c a u s e of m y d i s l i k e of th e B-m e t h o d . H o w e v e r, I m u s t w a r nt h a t yo u h av e to d e v e l o p a l i t t l e skto u s e it p r o p e r l y. I b e l i e v e I

g u a r a n t e e a m o r e i n te re st i n g gat han wi th th e B -1 7 s an d if you th

th e Japanese have an u n be a ra b le e dg e w it h eimethod, y ou c an c om bi ne t he two.

sh ip g ro up i s found a d j a c e n t to a

c o u n t e r , th e A m e r i c a n p l a y e r r o l l sd ie an d c o n s u l t s th e fo l l owing t ab le .a su b b a t t l e i s r o l l e d , th e p l a y e r sth ro ug h th e p r o c e d u r e ou t l ined in

p r e c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h .

T he A m e r i c a n p la ye r i s r e qu ir ed

go t h r o u g h the ab o v e p r o c e d u r ee ve ry a d j a c en t s q ua r e with Japaness h i p s on i t . A lso he m u s t f igh t as h i p s t h a t a r e on th e s am e s qu ar eth e su b c o u n t e r . H o w e v e r, he mn o t be in m o r e su b b a t t l e s in on e tuthan he h a s s u b m a r i n e s . f a UN shgroup i s a d j a c e n t to tw o o r m o r ec o u n t e r s , th e A m e r i c a n p l a y e r h ascho ice of which su b g r o u p to u s e .

IJ N sh ip group on a s ing le s q u a r e mn o t be in m o r e t han one sub ba t t l et u r n . Tw o o r th r e e su b c o u n t e r son e s t a c k c o u n t a s a s ing le coun teS ince t h r e e s u b s a r e n e e d e d to sea ran a r e a , th e A m e r i c a n p l a y e r m ay fit prof i t ab le to s ta ck h is c ou nt er s whsu b l o s s e s b r i n g th e i nd iv id u al coune r s be low t h r e e s u b s . When a

group i s down to one sub , i t lo se sab i l i ty to do b a t t l e on a d j a c e n t squaran d m ay o nl y f ig ht s h i p s on i t s os q u a r e .

S S 3 2 l

T h e s e su b group c o u n t e r s c a n a l so b efound by a i r o r s e a s e a r c h ( m a i n l y tok e e p th e A m e r i c a n f r o m chea t ing) , b u tth ey c an no t b e a t t a c k e d by a i r . Shipv. s. su b e n g a g e m e n t s w ill b e ou t l inedb e l o w.

In add i t ion to th e c o u n t e r s , th eA m e r i c a n a d d s th e fo l l owing to h is H itR e c o r d :

E a c h bo x r e p r e s e n t s one s u b m a r i n e .Note t ha t e ac h g r o u p i s w o r t h 2 po in t sto th e Japane .se p l a y e r if c o m p l e t e l ywiped ou t .

f a sub group c o u n t e r f inds i t s e l f onth e s a me s qu a re a s a J a p a n e s e sh ip o rs h i p s , th e J a p a n e s e p l a y e r m us t putt h es e s hip s on th e ba t t l e b o a r d . Th eA m e r i c a n t he n p ic ks o u t which sh ip hew i s h e s to a t t a c k , r o l l s th e d ie , an dc h e c k s th e r e s u l t s on th e S u b m a r i n eB a t t l e Ta b l e . Hi t s on UN s h i p s a r er e c o r d e d , an d if a su b sunk is r o l l e d ,on e box i s checked of f on th e a p p r o p r i a t esu b g r o u p . f t h e r e a r e no a i r a t t a c k so r s u r f a c e c o m b a t p lay then con t inuesa s b e f o r e .

SS 2 = c J T I

S S l D I D

By R i c h a r d G u t e n k u n s t

In th e e a r l y a f t e r n o o n of Ju n e 6 th ,1942, t he h um ble J ap an e s e s u b m a r i n e1-168 sank th e d e s t r o y e r H am m an n a ndf in i shed of f th e h ea vil y d am ag ed bu tsavab le York town . T h u s th e J a p a n e s eNavy w as s av ed th e h um il i at i on of su ff e r i n g a c o m p l e t e s k u n k in th e Bat t l e ofM i d w a y. E a r l i e r in th e b a t t l e t h i ss a m e s t u n t w a s pu l l ed by th e A m e r i c a n

s u b m a r i n e Nautilus on th e u n f o r t u n a t eS oryu w hich had j u s t b a r el y s u r v i v e d a

d i v e - b o m b i n g a t t a c k . By c o n t r a s t , th eB - 1 7 s b a s e d on M id wa y did no t m a k eone b om b h it on an y J a p a n e s e sh ip d u r

in g th e e n t ir e b a t tl e .So w h a t op t iona l r u l e does Avalon

Hil l u s e in t h e i r g a m e ? Wh y B - 1 7 a ttacks, o f course T h is i s a g r o s s i nj u s t i c e to th e S u b m a r i n e S e r v i c e

f th e s u b m a r i n e s a r e i nc luded inth e g am e, th e A m e r i c a n s s t and to g a i n ,a s th e U . S . h ad 11 s u b m a r i n e s onp a t r o l in th e a r e a r e p r e s e n t e d b y Av a lo nH i l l s m a p b o a r d , w h ile the J a p a n e seh ad only th e 1 - 1 6 8 .

O ka y, so ho w d o e s on e pu t s u b m a r i n e sinto th e g a m e ?

F i r s t of a l l , t ake t h r e e b lank b luec o u n t e r s f r o m th e e x t r a s i nc luded in

th e g a m e an d n u m b e r t hem a s fol lows:SS 1, SS 2, SS 3 . T h e s e r e p r e s e n t Subm a r i n e g r o u p c e n t e r s . T h e s e a r e m o ved l i ke s u r f a c e sh ip c o u n t e r s e x c e p ttha t th ey c an on ly m o v e one s q u a r e p e rt u r n . H o w e v e r, on th e f i r s t t u r n t heycan b e m o v e d o u t up to 15 s q u a r e s .

Du e to t he ir r est ric te d v isu al sightingarea \ I r e q ui r e a t le a s t 3 s u b m a r i n e s

to s e a r c h a s e a r c h a r e a . E a c h of th et h r e e sub g r o u p c o u n t e r s r e p r e s e n t sa t l e a s t 3 s u b m a r i n e s , an d t h e r e f o r e isa l lowed to s e a r c h a r e a s in th e s a m em a n n e r a s a s u r f a c e sh ip c o u n t e r .

r ss njusticeto ubmarines

good counterpart to the preceding article Steve Marston

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P G

idw y nd the ritish Home leetby Richard D Thurston

AA Factor Hit Boxes Victory Points

specifically mentioned below remain in effec t.I. search procedures are unchanged except that

th e US player loses hi s extra search square an d ull-board capability on an y tuni in which Midway isbombarded by Japanese ships.

2. B-17 rules are completely discarded. (B-ITsnow can only be used against transports, forthose who play with transports.)

Fo r those wh o use des troyers, each Bri ti shgroup is a cc om pa ni ed b y o ne DO division consisting of four DO s .

to hold back the Japanese in th e Pacif ic unti l USstrength can be restored. Ostensibly bound forth e Indian Ocean, th e Bri ti sh ships have sneakedaround Cape Horn and have now arrived at

Midway just ba re ly in t ime to bring th e US Flee tto a r ou gh p ar it y w it h th e Japanese.

So much for history, (unusual and far-fetchedas this chronology a pp ea rs . i t could ha ve happ en ed t hi s w ay, given a few d is as te ro us de ci si onsby the Axis and some really good luck for th eAllies in battle.) In the situation described in th ef irst five paragraphs, of course, poor, old Yamamoto has just abo ut had it. This makes forexciting reading, bu t no t very good wargaming,So, let's just turn back th e clock a couple ofda ys. It is now 0500 hours, June 3d, Yamamotohas just lost his a pp et it e u po n receiving th efol lowing dispatch from UN Intelligence:

Reconnaisance submarines have j us t r ep or te dth e majority of th e British Home Fl ee t has be en

sent to the Pacific instead of t he I nd ia n O ce an aspreviously reported. T hi s p ow er fu l f or ce is divided i nt o t hr ee groups. Gro up I , which includesth e battleship Rodney, carrier Victorious an d thrcruisers will arrive o n y ou r Search Board at about1500 hours today. Group 2, which includesbattleships King George V Duke York and nson with tw o cruisers wil l arr ive about 0500hours, June 4 th , G ro up 3, which includes battle- .ship Ramillies, battlecruiser Renown carrier lllus-trious and two cruisers wil l arr ive at 1100 hours,June 4th. Also, c onf ir ming e arlier r epor ts. UScarrier Yorktown ha s b ee n r ep ai re d and will bewith Enterprise an d Hornet. Good luck

Searchboard counters for these ships will befound in your Bismarck game set, except fort hos e f or nson Duke York, l l lustrious an dCairo. You l l ha ve to make Battleboard countersfor th e carriers and cruisers and the two newBB s. Ship charactefistics are coven;d in th efollowing table:

Prefaced by afarfetched, hypothetical history,his variant nevertheless borders on the ingeniousnd isan interesting wayto ad d a little variety to theasic situation. It is strongly suggested, however,

hat theproposed stacking rule (6.) be ignored.The time is 1700 hours , June 4, 1942 and

dmiral Yamamoto is worried . His t lagship isow just arriving in the combat area and hisontidence has been shaken already by then exp ec te d A me ri ca n r es is ta nc e to his t hr ust a tidway. Intel ligence has estimated o nl y o ne USrrier and f ou r c rui se rs in the a rea. bu t he hasentified three carriers and eight cruisers and th er/sea battle has been feroc ious . Already, Akagid Sbryu have sunk and Hiryll. badly damaged.t leeing to the west with v ir tual ly all her aircraft

s t. Three cruisers havc sunk and batt leshiparlllw is limping back w it h Hiryu, her decksearly awash.

All is n ot lost, how ever. in fact th e Japanese

eet is still in good shape to take Midway andes troy the remnants of t he Yan ke e le et . York-wn, Hurnet a nd f ou r US cruisers are already one bottom and t nterprise has tled to the

out he as t wi th slight da ma ge . Kaga hav ing revered the surviving aircraft from the twonken carriers, is now a lm os t a t full strength

nd is a match for Enterprise. All he has to doow is press on to Midway and let his batt leshipsase d ow n a nd sink th e elusive US ships.As night fal ls , however, he receives disquieting

ws. A scout plane has reported a bat tl eship,ree cruisers and an undamaged car ri er s teamingward his transport fleet. Yamamoto smiles. Asformer aviator, he knows how easily cruisers

n become ba tt le shi ps a nd destroyers can beome cruisers. especially in t he twilight. T hi s isndoubtedly th e Enterprise and her escort , makg one last s or ti e t o t ry a nd di sa ble th e li N fleetefore their inevitable d es tr uc ti on . Tru e, t he p il otys there is something odd in the appearance of

hese ships, bu t warships take on strange shapesnder combat conditions, especially in poor light.upremely c on fi de nt , Yam am ot o o rd er s Kungond Hiei. w it h t hr ee heavy c ruis ers . t o i nt er ce ptese survivors a t dawn. He knows that Enterprise

as very few a ircr aft left a boa rd as the survivorsom Hornet and Yorktown have landed atidway. Kaga and the rest of th e le et will dealith them.At dawn, the situation is radically changed.

rst, the t nterprise, with three cruisers. isscovered again near Midway. recovering aircraftom the island. Then a group of torpedoombe rs s tr ik e a t t he c ri ppl ed Hiryu and Harlina,nking both in minutes. KOllgo and Hiei aretacked by a no t he r g ro up of torpedo bombers,Ullgu taking on e hit and Hiei, t hr ee . Stillessing their attack, the two battlewagonse suddenly s traddled by heavy-cal ib re she ll fi re

extreme range by an unseen enemy. Despitee a cc ur at e and concentrated s hel lf ir e, the t wo

ships press on and are soon in sight of theirsailant, a large ba ttle hs ip with three turretsrward. Taking f ou r m or e hits in rapid succes

on, Hiei blows up. Kungu, now alone, continuese unequal fight until she is ha mmer ed tolivion, s co ri ng t hr ee hi ts o n h er attacker in theocess. Final ly. Cruiser Nagara, scouting ahead

t he t ra ns po rt g ro up . r ep or ts s ig hting three

e ne my b attle ship s with q ua dr up le t ur re tsapproaching f rom the sou theast .

Yamamoto is stunned. He needs no recognitionmanuals t o ac cou nt for thes e mys te riou s ships

now. T he o dd ly -c on fi gu re d b at tl es hi p that hasdestroyed Hiei and Kongo can only be HMSRodney killer of Bismarck and sharp-shooterof t he Roya l Navy. Th e other three can only beKillg George V nsun and Duke York, th enewes t and deadl iest in th e British Navy. Worseyet. there are p ro ba bl y t wo British carriers ou tthere somewhere. Grimly, he recal ls his scat teredfleet . Rally around the lagship Only th e powerful 18-inch guns of Yamato and the 16- inchers ofNagatu and Mutsu can save the day, nowOutnumbered in th e a ir and only slightly superioron the sur face , Yamamoto must now fight. no tf or Midway a nd e as y v ic to ry, but for th e survivalof his navy.

How did this all come a bo ut ? T he details are

no t really important. In broad outline, th e Germ an s ur fa ce Navy was vi rtu al ly destroyed in anall-out attack o n an A rc ti c C on voy. Cut of f fromthe ir base by t he British H om e F le et , as si ste d bythe US battleships Washington and South Caro-lina, both of whom w ere s eri ou sly d ama ge d int he ba tt le , every German battleship a nd b at tl ec ru is er was s un k or d am ag ed so severly as to beou t of action for at leas t a year.

S imilar ly, a German-Italian. invasion of Maltawas a nni hil ate d by Anglo-American sea and airpower. The Italian fleet was almost totally destroyed at the cost of th e USS Wasp and HMS rk Royal , Nel son and Warsp ite. S ince Bri ti shbattleships and c ar ri er s we re no l ong er n ee de d inEuropean waters, and in compensation for th eloss of Wasp and the temporary disability ofWashingtoll and South Carolina: Churchi ll hasoffered the British Home F le et to Admira l King

Ship (s) Surface FactorKing George V Anson,Duke o f York (BB) 12Rodney (BB) ISRamillies (BB) 10Renown (CB) 9Victorious, Illustrious (CV) 3Kenya, Norfolk, SuffolkSheffield, Dorsetshire (CA) 6Cairo, Hermoine (CLAA) 2

Aircraft Carrier Capacities:VictoriousIllustrious

All British Ships enter fr om t he Southeast edgeof the Searchboard. Rodney Victorious. Cairo,Norfolk and Suffolk enter at 1500 hours, June KG V A ns on , D uk e York, Kenya and Dorset-shire enter at 0500 hours. June 4. RamillieRenown I llustr ious, l Iermoine and Sheffieldenter at 1100 h ou rs . June 4.

Because of the additional units now at th eAllied commander's disposal, some of t he rulesimposed by AH to give the US s ide a reasonablechance are no longer needed. All rules no t

87553

36

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American Plans for Midway

by Monte Gray

Mass o r Maneuver

Atago are good: and if this occurs, all thAmerican has to do is hide ou t for the durat ioof the game.

There is one bad drawback to plan B. Iffirst Japanese task force joins up with the Atago'stask force the chances of success are slim. Threason being t ha t w it h t he ir co mbi ned force the

defensive fire would betoo

strong.If the Japanese sends his first task forcesoften up Midway, then the Americans shoulda ttack the Atago task force at once

If neither plan A nor plan B can be used thenplan C should be followed.

Af ter this a tt ac k t he Americans will havep oi nt s f or sinking I of t he b at tl es hi ps and thecruisers. The Amer icans will also get 6 points forholding Midway. Since these po ints wouldmore than the Japanese player would get for takinMidway, th e Americans would win (i f no Americships were lost).

Af ter a tt ack in g the last task force t he American has two continuations:

I. The American could continue to h un t dot he remaining t wo ba ttl eshi ps from t he Yamatotask force. This course is recommended to thhearty souls who are willing to risk the ir shipsa co unt er-a ttack (at least if you re playingcompetent Japanese player).

2. To retire int o the horizon, never to be sagain in the course of the game.

C. Attack the last Japanese task force consisting of the battleships Yamato, Nagato, aMutsu, the light carrier Hosho, and the lightcruiser Sendai.

T her e are two reasons that make this attacfeasible. First, it will enter the board alone. IfJapanese wait for it the Americans will getleast 12 points for hold ing Midway. Then allAmericans have to do is sink a couple of cruisto win the game.

Second, the Americans will sink at leastbattleship plus the smaller ships, assuming areasonable plan of attack.

Th e Americans s ho uld p re pa re fo r this attackin two ways.

I. The bombers from Midway shouldtraded for fighters from the carriers.

2. The American ships should be spread downon the A row areas so as to be able to shsearch if t he e nemy i sn 't f ou nd by air search. Theships can be divided any way as long as therecarrier o n squar es A-2G, A-4A, and A-5G. Theyshould be placed there because then the attackingplanes can usually get back to at least 2 ofcarriers.

Go after the second main Japanese taskforce consisting of the flagship Atago, 2 ba ttleships, 3 heavy cruisers, I light carrier, and I lightcruiser.

The Cs strategy fo r the American playerWhen I command the Americans I usually

exercise one of three plans.A. Go after the first Japanese task force

consisting of four heavy carriers, two battleships,two cruisers, and one light cruiser.

To make this plan work the Americans must

find the Japan ese fleet wi thin t he first few turns.Once the U N fleet is located the Americans mustproceed cautiously. If the Japanese finds theAmerican before the American is within range toattack then the chances for success are considerably reduced. When the American fleet iswithin attacking range he must send all of hisaircraft to participate in the attack on theJapanese fleet. He should also include th e planeso n Midway island if t he y are withi n range. Sincethe American fighters will ta ke care of the UNC.A.P. the bombers will be able to attack theenemy fleet unimpeded, save for A.A. fire.

In this type of attack the American can almostalways sink at least two carriers, and possibly oneor two of the screening vessels. Of the four

Japanese carriers the ones that should be hit thehardest are the Soryu and the Hiryu. onlytakes 3 hits to sink them compared with theKaga and Akagi which take 5. Besides beingeasier to sink, t he y each car ry as many planes asthe Akagi and almost as many as the Kaga. Oncethe Japanese player loses these 2 carriers hischances of winning are lessened by about 45% to55 . Depending on how bad the rest of the taskforce was hit .

T he best time for t he Americans to m ou nt thisattack is the turn immediately preceding nightfall.Then, under the protection of d arkn ess th eAmerican fleet can slip away into the vastexpanses of the Pacific.

T he re are 2 f actor s that will keep plan A fromworking:

1. If the Amer icans do no t find the Japanese.2. If the Japanese f ind the Amer icans, with or

without the Americans finding them. If thisshould occur the Amer ican player would find hischances of winning considerably reduced.

As one can see, i f e ither of the above problemso ccu rs th e American play er should pr oceed toplan B or C.

The purpose of this plan is to sink t he Atago.This vessel, the flagship, is the UN s only meansof takin g Midway. Th e ch ances of sinking the

4. US player no longer receives any credi t fordelaying UN capture of Midway. UN receives 25bonus points if he actually p t u r ~ sMidway, 10extra points if he reduces Midway defenses to0-0, but does no t captu re it. Midway reductionrules are unchanged, except that Midway defensesare reduced by I point per tu m for each 10surface factors BB and cruiser only) used inshore b ombar dment. Shore b om bar dmen t is

accomplished o nl y by BB and cruisers in theMidway sq uare and only if there are no US orBritish ships in the square dur ing the turn.

5. British planes may no t be readied on UScarriers or o n Midway. T he y may land a nd fly of ffrom US carriers or Midway, bu t cannot conductoffensive or defensive missions. Same rules applyto US planes and British carriers.

6. To avoid the cOmmon Tower of Pisatac tica l formation , no more than six major ships,(not counting destroyers transports, if used),may be placed on any single square. Exceptionno stacking limi t on the Midway square or duringthe later stages of surface combat.

7. No more than one carrier's load of planesmay attack a single square in one wave. Wave

attacks are authorized, anvil attacks are not.'Exception no limi t is placed on planes attackingMidway or defending it.

8. Battleboard procedures:a. Players roll the die to determine who

sets up first. Roll of I, 3 or 5 means Allies set upfirst; 2, 4 or 6 means Jap sets up first. Movementorder same as setup.

b. British Battleships have a range of 5squares on Battleboard during the daytime, 4squares at night. British Cruisers have a range of4 in daytime, 3 at night. UN Battleships have arange of 4 during day, 3 at nigh t. All other shipshave a range of 3 during day, 2 at night.The difference is due to th e overwhelming

superiority of British radar at this stage of th e war .US radar was no t nearly as good until th e 1944-45period, an d Japanese radar was never a s good . )

c. Escape from the bat tleboard can only beaccomplished by roll ing a 6 on the die. Theno nl y the ships on the last row of t he b oar d mayescape.

d. An air strike may precede surface combat, but once surface combat has begun, no airst rikes may be conducted against sh ips involved.(Too hard to tel l friend from foe.)

9. Battle damage results: A ship is consideredcrippled if it has received more than 1/2 the

number of hits required to sink it. (Examples:Hornet would be crip pled by 3 hits, YamalO by 6hits, Hiryu by 2 hits.) Once a ship has beencrippled the following limitations apply:

a. It is restricted to I sq uare per turnmovement.

b. Its surface and AA firepower is reducedto 1/2 normal. ( round this figure up for defense,down for offense.)

c. Its aircraft handling capability is reducedto 1/2 normal. (Excess planes on carriers a t thetime of crippling need no t be removed, bu t only1/2 the normal number may be launched orlanded during a single turn.)

d. It cannot bombard Midway.10. Recovery squares for aircraft participating

in an aerial a tt ac k are given only if enemy shipsor fighters are encountered on that airstrike.

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THE REST OF THE ALPHABET by Lloyd BergerThe unusual title o f this article was prompted by

he preceding article by onte Gray an d serves ashe otherside o f the coin fspecial note though ishe introduction the 6-9-6 attack which hasprac-ically become a standard tactic

Has the commander of the Imperial JapaneseCombined Fleet taken to drinking saki in an

ttempt to quiet his shattered nerves, fearing thatPlan A, B, or C might be sneaking up on him?

Seriously, f or p ure fun t he re is no game tha tan rival Midway The excitement of trying toake-out your opponent, of a tt em pt in g to o uthink ( or out-guess) him makes this game t ota lnjoyment, even though there is only the slightesthance that the Japanese can lose, Mr. Monte

Gray notwithstanding.The Japanese can lose, but it is nearly impos

ible if the competent Japanese player remembershree things:

Your p rime o bjec ti ve is to sink the USarriers and then i f there is time take Midway

Yamamoto assumed tha t the US f leet would getnto act ion only after Midway was a ttacked. Younow better. Therefore Midway will be theros ting on the cake , bu t the cake i tsel f (the USarriers) should be first. Don t make the same

mistake Yamamoto made

2 Do e ve ry th in g yo u can to avoid beingttacked 11 the first day

Send Tone and Nagara to the D column. T he ywill arrive a t 130 0 June 3. Combining these twohip searches with your t hr ee air searches, y ouearch five areas , D2 through D6. This is enougho spot a US threat. Vary the areas where you

have ship searches so it will be ha rd er for the USlayer to find them. Should he a tta ck t he m, it

will be a worthwhile price to pay to find ou t hisposition. He will also have to use at least two ofhis searches to locate them, enabling your carrierso more easily escape detection.

On 1500 June 3, include D I, D2, D6, and D7n your five searches. If the US is trying an en dun, you will spot him. he has anticipated yourearch pattern switch and slowed down on his

end run to avoid be ing found, he will never be ina posit ion to attack you on the first day, theonly day you really have to worry about.

On 17 00 J un e 3, search C2 th rou gh C6, just inase he tries to sneak through one of the gapseft in your basic search screen. I f yo ur carriersre in the A column, he cannot attack withoutlso being sighted, allowing you to attack him. Ifhe US barges (no reflection intended on the UShips) into your search screen, use that informa-

tion to avoid combat on the first day like youwant to avoid a flat tire on the freeway. Onlywhen the Atago group unite s with your carriersare you defensively strong enough to tradepunches and live to tell about it.

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3 When yo u attack t he US carriers think6-9-6. If y ou c an no t avoid being attacked on thefirst day, you must attack him with full strength.Keep all your fighters on CAP. If he sends a ll hisfighters on escort, yo u have two fighter factors to

add to the defens ive power of your ships. If hehas exchanged the Enterprise 's f ighters for thetwo 1 s a nd six D's f rom Midway, you have tenfighter factors to add to y ou r defense. So muchthe better If the US player keeps all his fighterson CAP, call o ff y ou r attack on his carriers. Hewill undoubtedly do t he same thing. Tim e is onyour side at this point of the game.

But if you can attack (and this applies at anyt ime) the secre t to sweet success is the ole 6-9-6attack. What' s tha t? Simply this : six 1 s attack,ing on o ne side of two US carriers, nine D's onto p of the same t wo carriers, a nd six 1 s on theother side of those two carr ie rs . On the thirdcarrier, at tack with three 1 s on one side, nine D'son top, and three 1 s on the other side. (After

the first day, you will have more 1 s tostrengthen this attack.) That leaves you with oneT and one D left over. Apply both of them tothe Atlanta.

In order to p re se nt a viable defe nse, th e USplayer will have to sacrifice one car rier (wi th nodamage to you), accept three I: I attacks on hissecond carrier, an d two I: 2 attacks plus one I:a tt ac k on his third carrier. Even with the worspossible luck, you get on e (sacrificed) carrier andone heavily damaged (thre e hits) carrier. Withaverage luck you can s ink two carriers and leaveone lightly damaged. And w ith spectacular dierolls you can sink two carriers and leave the thirdc arrier a lm os t sunk. Not bad for two hourswork, eh? In addition, he will have to ignoreyour attacks on the Atlanta, allowing yo u twoI: I a tt ac ks a nd a fair chanc e to sink her.

Th e reason for thi s is that the defensive factorsof all US ships are in u ni ts of three . All th e USplayer can do is pu t u p seven u ni ts of three todefend one carrier against seven JaJlanese units ofthree , five units of three to g uar d his se condcarrier from your five units of three, and nothingto pr ot ec t his t hi rd ca rrie r, against whic h youhave seven units of three. Experience shows thatyou have a good chance to sink two US carriers,bu t don t count on it. A follow-up a tt ac k will benecessary.

Can the US ever win at Midway aga inst acompetant opponent? Yes, if the US player canhit the Japanese carriers first, the n escape un

touched, and come back to hit the Japanesecarr ie rs once more . But i rs seldom win games.Assumpt ions inc luded in these observa tions are:

I. Ships must come on as per the the Order ofAppearance Table.

2. Torpedo squadrons a ttack only the sides ofships.

Now, if only Mr. Gray didn t live so far away.He may like his ABC's, bu t I d sure like to showhim the rest of the alphabet

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PA G E 14

Back to Nuts a n d Bolts Midway: Strategic Perspectivesby Harold Totten

Percentages for each turn represent the assumption t h at t heCVSFwas not found i n t h e preceding turn, and that the Americansearches li mit th e possible hiding areas as much as ism them ti lly feasible.

SEARCH TACTICSThe essence of strategic m aneuver in

Midway lies i n s et ti ng up search patterns andescaping the search. Hopeful ly my words will besomewhat obvious, bu t for those wh o have notyet mastered th e game, they bear repeating.

A s w as pointed o ut i n th e Midway Thesis(Vol . 9, No.4), f or t he J ap an es e pl ay er to g etcaug ht in a corner zone of a sea area isdisas terous , for th e American, with his foursearches, is assured finding you on th e nextturn (assuming night does no t fall). This giveshi m the option to attack no w or next turn,me an ing the Japanese player will have somerather rough decisions as to whether o rno t to flyCAP and whether o r n ot t o f ly o ff readied planes(if he cannot attack the Americans). So tr y andkeep aw ay fr om those corners . I t makes hi ssearch more difficult.

Ho w should you follow up search in a turnafter y ou h av e found an enemy formation? Thisdepends upon t he general expected direction of

e ne my m ov em en t (see diagram 1 and 2)Diagram 1 shows a lateral expected direction ofmovement . The four areas shown are areas of

2

NOTES ON THE SUICIDE TACTIC

The suicide tactic, which engenders a certainamount of risk, consists in the American findinth e CVSF sometime before CruDiv 7 joins it, anattacking at extreme range, sacrificing haircraft in order to strike a decis ive blow. It cafail with bad luck, bu t it gives the Americanstrategic threat early in the game.

Assuming the American steams west withou t delay, and the 0700 Japanese move i s in thB column, then the at tack is feasible. At 0900,is feasible anywhere bu t the tw o rows in columnA that are closest to t he west edge o f the boardO n t he 11 00 t u rn t he American can hi t anyplacon th e board, and it's important that the VS loses i tself ' on this t u rn . A ss uming the VSand CruDiv 7 join on 1500 (earliest possible), itsnot worth it on 1 50 0 and after. Bu t if the attaccomes o ff t he A me ri ca n used t o s te am off thboard, unharmed.

Only AH haschanged that . The ne w rulingleaving the board f or ce s t he A me ri ca n t o w ai taround until his f lee t is attacked. This makesthes ui cide s tr at eg y more risky than in the pa(almost untenable, in fact) because the Amerc an h as to gain eno ug h point s t o o ff se t damagto his fleet as well as offset t he f al l o f M id wa yitself.

Bu t ho w should we define fleet ? Is leavinthe Atlanta behind on Midway Island sufficientor must it consist of all the American ships? Anif it must be more, does t hi s n ot pu t a strategi

crimp on th e American player wh o must nokeep all h is s hi ps t og et he r as a fleet unattacked? I also think the rul ing has no historica

You find a pl ay er b y searching along hiexpected path o f movemen t. T hi s is difficult it erms o f finding the American, wh o ma y have npath o f m ovem ent , bu t we may generallya ssum e the Jap anese p la ye r t o be h ea de d forMidway, so his general direction is delineated bthe victory conditions.

Yo u l ose yourself i n the mists by movingwhere no t expected. This can be in the form ode lay in g y ou r m ov em ent f or a turn so youropponent searches the area ahead o f youLosing a single turn is better than l osi ng anumb er o f ships. However, y ou c an get extremein trading o ff t im e for s tea l th , as in the Bergerstrategy (which I will discuss shortly). Anothersearch avoiding tactic is to move into an areaal ready searched i n t he p re vi ou s t ur n, whichusually works unless your opponent usesoverlapping searches. I t would be well worthyour time to consider the patterns which youopponent s ee ms t o us e i n o rder to avoid them.

an American search, t he thr ee shaded showJapanese search in the same situation. Diagram2 shows a diagonal direction of movement, andthe searches shown are as in diagram 1 (shaded,Japanese).

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5

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North/SouthCenterExtremes

However, on the 0700 turn the CVSF can moveto a sea z on e which allows escape by the 0900turn.

For optimum results ifthe American does no tfind the CVSF o n t he 0500 turn he should then

call A3-4 and 83-4 o n t he 0700 turn assumingth e initial southern search of A4-7). This gives a50 chance of f ind ing the CVSF (as there areeight possible areas f or i t t o hide). If no