ward on kant's defence of moral freedom

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On Kant's Defence of Moral FreedomAuthor(s): Andrew WardReviewed work(s):Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 4, Hume and Kant Issue (Oct., 1991), pp.373-386Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications

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History of Philosophy QuarterlyVolume 8,Number 4, October 1991

ON KANT'S DEFENCE OFMORAL FREEDOM

Andrew Ward

KANT

seeks to defend moral freedom?the freedom required formoral

responsibility?while insisting that it must be possible to regardeverything that happens in the spatio/temporal world as caused to occur

by antecedently existing factors.

There has been a widespread tendency among analytic philosophers to

treat Kant's defence very uncharitably. The complaint is that, even grant

ing his metaphysical framework, the defence is not merely unsuccessful

but a dismally feeble performance into the bargain. I investigate the main

grounds for this dismissive attitude.1,2

I

We need, first, to clarifywhat Kant is, and what he isnot, attempting in

his defence. He isnot attempting to prove, by the use of theoretical reason,that moral freedom actually exists. Rather, he is trying to show that a

certain principle which (as he thinks) is demonstrably applicable in the

spatio/temporal world?the principle, namely, that every change must be

subject to the law ofnatural causality3?cannot be employed to undermine

at least the logical possibility of moral freedom. And that is all he is

proposing to defend.

His difficulties, nonetheless, are considerable. To begin with, he does not

accept the solution to the apparent conflict offered by compatibilists. On

their account, moral freedom essentially consists in the agent s power to

act unconstrainedly on his own decisions; and, according to compatibilists,

it is, in itself,no threat tomoral freedom if the agent can only be regardedas caused to make these decisions by antecedently existing factors. Kant

cannot accept a solution along these lines because, as he sees it, moral

freedom requires the agent to have the power to originate a morally worthy

decision; and, in common with other libertarians, what he takes this to

entail is that, if faced with amoral choice, itmust be possible to regard the

agentas

capableof

makinghis decision

spontaneously, i.e.,without there

existing anything prior to the decision bywhich the agent isnecessitated

to make it.

Yet, by his own admission, itmust be possible to view the appearance of

373







374 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

each of the agent's decisions as antecedently determined (in fact, by the

agent's empirical character, in co-operation with his beliefs about the sur

rounding circumstances). To deny such necessitation would be to flout the

principle that every change in the spatio/temporal world must be subject to

the law ofnatural causality. How, then, does Kant intend to show thatmoral

freedom and the causality of nature need not be seen as in conflict?

He draws on his distinction between the world ofnoumena (things-in

themselves) and the world of phenomena (appearances). Noumena are not

in space or in time; although they are the ground of all phenomena, and

these do exist, and only exist, as spatial and/or temporal occurrences.

Moreover, space and time do not merely constitute the sole modes of

experience of objects, they are simply forms of each human mind. Appear

ances, therefore, are wholly mind-dependent occurrences: they are con

structed by each of us from the manifold of sense impressions caused in

each mind by the noumenal object(s). From what has been said, it followsthat we never have any experience of noumenal objects (of objects as theyare in themselves), only of their appearances in us. Similarly, we never

experience the noumenal?or, as Kant often calls it, the intelligible?sub

ject (of the subject as it is in itself); we experience only the phenomenal

subject, i.e. a temporal series of inner phenomena?thoughts, desires,

pleasures and pains etc.,?which we each ascribe to one subject (the self).

Save for an important exception to be noted later, temporal phenomena

are all originally experienced to arise passively: whether directly or indi

rectly, they result from the influence of noumenal objects on each of us,

taken as noumenal subjects.

In broad outline, Kant's defence now proceeds as follows. Insofar as the

agent is considered as a phenomenal subject, his decisions must, in their

appearance, fall under the law of natural causality; and, in particular, it

must be possible to think of every one of them, and hence of every one of

hisensuing actions,

asresulting

from hisempirical

character(in conjunc

tion with surrounding circumstances). But, equally, every one of the agents

decisions can be seen as expressing the free choice of the noumenal subject.

For this subject, being outside the temporal series, does not, in its activity,fall under the law ofnatural causality. So although itmust be possible to

regard the appearance of every decision as determined by a preceding

cause, this cause cannot interfere with the freedom of the agent, considered

as a noumenal subject. It cannot because, whereas the phenomenal cause

forms part of the temporal series, the noumenal subject is an atemporal

entity and, thus, can be perceived as producing the decision spontaneously,

i.e., uncaused by any antecedently existing factors.

II

Three criticisms of the defence will concern us primarily:4

1. Since the distinction between noumena and phenomena is a quite







KANT'S DEFENCE OF MORAL FREEDOM 375

general one,moral freedom would have tobe applicable to all animate and,

indeed, to all inanimate objects, e.g., to insects, to trees, and even to stones.

(It is not immediately plain what the purport of this objection is.After all,itmay be said, given that the defence does succeed for human agents, its

applying to other cases as well is, at worst, an irrelevance. However, I take

the point to be that if the only way to save moral freedom for humans

requires one to accept that the behaviour of such things as stones should

equally be seen as the exercise of their free agency, then Kant's defence

must be so far removed from our ordinary conception ofmoral freedom as

no longer seriously to be thought of as protecting it.)

2. Kant s account requires that the agents moral or immoral decisionsshould not be locatable in time,whereas their effects,his actions, are. This

is absurd: obviously these decisions do appear in the temporal series. And

since they do, no use can be made of the phenomena/noumena distinction

to save moral freedom.

3. Even supposing the first two criticisms could be met, the defence

palpably fails. For, to succeed, itmust be possible to say of an agent, who

has not done what he knows he morally ought to have done, that he could

have spontaneously decided to act otherwise, i.e., to do his duty. But it is

absolutely impossibleto

saythis.

Since,as Kant

insists,we must be able

to think of every one of the agents decisions as thoroughly determined in

its appearance by antecedently existing factors; namely, by his empiricalcharacter (in conjunction with his surrounding circumstances). The nou

menal subject, therefore, ismorally superfluous: though itmay itself be

free from the causality of nature, it cannot affect what happens in the

phenomenal world because itmust be possible to consider every decision

that appears as already determined by phenomenal factors. Any break now

in that phenomenal series?running from the agents perception of his

surrounding circumstances through its co-operation with his empirical

character to the production of the immoral decision?would negate theprinciple ofuniversal natural causality. Hence, by his own lights, Kants

notion of moral freedom can never obtain.

Ill

So far as the first criticism goes, Kant explicitly repudiates the allegationthat his account of moral freedom can be applied to every appearance

indiscriminately. For he maintains that, except in the case of human

beings, there is no ground forholding that what appears in the temporalseries is ever determined

by anything

other than exclusively spatio/tem

poral factors. Each of us, on the other hand, feels himself conscious of

exercising powers that he cannot regard as necessitated by appearances;

and, in explaining behaviour we can apparently refer profitably to the

exercise of these powers by other humans but never by anything else that

appears. Specifically, Kant adduces the powers of understanding and








reason: the exercise of these faculties we think of?indeed, according to

Kant, must think of?as occurring without our being necessitated bysensible conditions. "In lifeless, ormerely animal, nature we find no ground

for thinking that any faculty is conditioned otherwise than in a merelysensible manner. Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely

through the senses, know himself also.in acts and inner determinations

which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himself,on the one hand, phenomenon and, on the other, in respect of certain

faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of

sensibility, a purely intelligible object. We entitle these faculties under

standingand reason"

(CPR: A547/B575).Now, as is admitted by all sides, Kant's defence ofmoral freedom refers

only to those capable of activating themselves by means of reason alone:

a capacity which, because it is not sensibly necessitated, must be ascribed

to the noumenal subject. Consequently, simply from the fact that his

defence rests on distinguishing between the subject as noumenon and as

phenomenon, it does not follow that every thing that appears must be

equally capable of moral agency. On the contrary, the defence is addressed

solely to what possesses the motivating power of reason alone, i.e., practical

reason. And, so far as concerns what appears in the spatio/temporal world,

only human beings can even be regarded as candidates forpossessing this

power. (I briefly consider, at the end, the question ofwhy Kant holds thatreason and understanding cannot, in their operation, be thought of as

sensibly necessitated. For the purposes of answering the first criticism, it

is not required to pursue this question.)

According to the second criticism, Kant affirms that, when faced with

whether to act for the sake of the moral law, the agent's decision cannot

appear in the temporal series. I do not agree with this interpretation. Kant

does maintain that, on those occasions where we do resolve to act for the

sake of themoral law?which he equates with exercising themotivatingpower of reason alone?we are conscious, or seem to be conscious, of

exerting a power that is not preceded by any temporal condition; and, in

that sense, we at least seem sometimes to be conscious of exercising a

faculty that is outside time. But Kant is not thereby maintaining (the

evidently implausible thesis) that the rational resolution cannot be experienced as following on given events in the temporal series and, hence, as

appearing in time. What he ismaintaining is that this resolution need not

be seen as causally arising from anything that precedes it. It is, he claims,

at least not self-contradictory to hold that the noumenalsubject

of itself,

i.e., spontaneously, produces the rational resolution to act that now ap

pears in the temporal series. Thus, although that resolution can, in its

appearance, be located in time, it need not be seen as arising from any

antecedently existing factors. Instead, it can be considered as causally a

first beginning of a series, even though it is preceded by events in the








phenomenal world. "For this resolution and act ofmine do not form partof the succession of purely natural effects, and are not a mere continuation

of them.It does indeed follow upon them but without arising out of them;and accordingly, in respect of causality though not of time,must be entitled

an absolutely first beginning of a series of appearances" (CPR:

A450/B478).

Admittedly, this account does require that every rational resolution can

be viewed as caused by the intelligible subject, which is an atemporal

entity.Kant believes that to accept themoral law as binding upon one (as,he thinks, we each do) requires the postulation of a subject that is both

outside the temporal series and, yet, capable ofproducing morally worthyeffects within it. For, he claims, only on such a joint presupposition can

moral freedom be acknowledged as logically possible; and, unless it is, ones

seemingly undeniable consciousness ofmoral obligation would need to be

recognized as illusory. He accepts that we cannot really understand how

what isnot in time at all (the intelligible subject) can cause effects (rational

resolutions) which do appear in time, indeed at various times. But we can

explain why this is incomprehensible to us, viz that as phenomenal beings,

all our consciousness is located in time, and so we cannot know what it is

like to exist tunelessly while, yet, producing effects in the temporal series.

However, given this explanation of the incomprehensibility, his opponentsare not in a position to assert that it is self-contradictory for an atemporal

entity to produce temporal effects (see e.g., CPR: Bxxvii-xxix).

Undoubtedly it is the third criticism that has principally been enlisted

by analytic philosophers as their ground forwholesale dismissal ofKants

defence. So far as I know, Kant never explicitly discusses it. Given his

acuteness, and the centrality of the concept of freedom within his meta

physics, this suggests that he thinks his defence deals with the third

criticism. It is not, after all, as though the criticism is especially difficult

to spot while, ifvalid, it looks ruinous.In order to tackle the criticism, I need to say more about Kants notion

of causality as it applies in the spatio/temporal world. He thinks of each

object as possessing a particular set of causal powers: what he terms its

empirical character. We discover what this character is like by seeing how

the object behaves in the various types of circumstance inwhich it exists.

Any manifestation of empirical character is a temporal event that, as such,

must be preceded by some other event upon which itmust be possible to

see the later event following according to a universal rule. Consider a

stationary billiard ball, on a smooth surface, that is struck by a cue. Part

of the billiard balls empirical character is its dispositional power tomove

offfromrest if struck. We learn of this power fromhaving observed its pastbehaviour anchor the behaviour of other similar objects in the same cir

cumstances. Analogously, each human being has an empirical character or

set of dispositions to behave, which we come to know by observing his








actions in the various types of circumstance in which he lives. "Man is one

of the appearances of the sensible world.Like all other things innature,he must have an empirical character. This we come to know through the

powers and faculties which he reveals inhis actions" (CPR: A546/B574).

Now Kant maintains that it is at least not self-contradictory to regard

every manifestation of empirical character as expressing the free choice of

the noumenal subject. The idea is that the agent, qua phenomenal being,is born with or otherwise naturally acquires a certain set of sensuous

dispositions (felt as desires or inclinations); and the noumenal subjectchooses whether to allow action by means of whichever of these sensuous

impulses is, under given circumstances, naturally generated or, instead,

to act spontaneously through the causality of reason. In either case, the

ensuing conduct must fall under a universal rule. For suppose that, on a

certain occasion, the agent acts through a desire or inclination, thereby

manifesting in conduct a sensuous disposition. It follows that his conduct

will always be the same, under the same circumstances. If itwere not, it

would break Kant's own principle that there can be no breaks in the natural

causation of events. But suppose that, on a certain occasion, the agent acts

through the causality of reason; that is, bymeans of a rational resolution

and, hence (forKant), for the sake of themoral law. It equally follows that

his behaviour will always be the same, under the same circumstances. This

follows because if the (unchanging) noumenal subject, by means of its

faculty of reason, can be denominated the cause of conduct on any occasion,

that same act will constantly occur under the same circumstances. "For

every cause presupposes a rule according to which certain appearances

follow as effects; and every rule requires uniformity in the effects. This

uniformity is, indeed, that upon which the concept of cause (as a faculty)is based" (CPR: A549/B577).

So an agent's empirical character can be thought of as an amalgam of

dispositions to act, some of which are manifested by means of the occur

rence of operative sensuous impulses and some of which can at least be

regarded as manifested by means of the appearance of rational resolutions.

Whether, on a given occasion, an action is produced through a sensuous

impulse, or through reason, the same determining ground and, hence, the

same action must constantly appear in the same circumstances. This

means that, whichever determining ground prevails (sensuous or rational),

there will be no break in the natural law of causality, according to which

every change must fall under a universal rule. "But I say: the law of nature

stands, whether the rational being is the cause,by

reason and through

freedom, of effects in the world of the senses, or whether it does not

determine these effects out of grounds of reason. For in the first case, the

act happens according tomaxims the effect of which in appearance will

always be in conformity with constant laws; in the second case, the act

happening not according to principles of reason, it is subject to empirical








laws of sensibility, and in both cases the effects are connected according to

constant laws; we demand no more for natural necessity, indeed we know

nothing more of it* (Prol: section 53 (italics original)).

Let me illustrate. Say that, by observation of an agent s past actions, we

discover that under certain circumstances he exhibits, or seems to exhibit,

a genuinely selfless disposition: so, in this case, we ascribe the relevant

decisions and actions to the causality of reason. We can now cite this

character trait as leading to selfless action in the same future circum

stances. Or say that, by the same kind ofobservation, we discover that an

agent possesses a certain sort of mendacious disposition: so, in this case,

the relevant decisions and actions are ascribed to the operation of asensuous impulse. This discovery, too, can be employed to predict menda

cious action in the same future circumstances. Quite generally, whatever

the nature of the agent s determining grounds, we can in principle account

for all his future actions?assuming knowledge of his future circum

stances?by reference to his empirical character; and this, in turn, will

have been discovered from observation of his past actions in themultifar

ious situations of his life (as a scientist may discover the causal powers of

a purely physical object through observation of its past history). "Itmaybe admitted that if itwere possible forus to have so deep an insight into

a mans character, as shown both in inner and outer actions.his future

conduct could be predicted with as great a certainty as the occurrence of a

solar or lunar eclipse" (CPractR: Ak. V99; Beck pp. 102-103; Abbott p. 193).5

But inwhat way does Kant's conception of causality help to answer the

third and crucial criticism? The criticism, to repeat, is that the agent, even

qua noumenal subject, cannot be held responsible for the present appear

ance of an immoral decision; for we must be able to regard its appearance

as already determined to occur, at the present point in the temporal series,

by the agent's empirical character (in conjunction with his beliefs about

thesurrounding circumstances).

How can we think of theagent,

at the

point where his immoral decision appears in the temporal series, asmakingthat choice spontaneously, if it is possible accurately to predict its appearance from knowledge of antecedently existing phenomena?

It isno good seeking to evade this difficulty by declaring, as a number of

commentators have, that Kant thinks it is never possible accurately to

predict the appearance of an agent's choice.6 According to them, all that

Kant thinks we can be entitled to affirm, prior to any occasion on which an

agent's decision appears, is that there is some universal rule covering his

behaviour; and until that decision appears, itmust inprinciple be an open

question just what the covering law contains. The agent, therefore, is free

because what decision will appear, on any given occasion, cannot ever be

predicted.

This interpretation fails to square with the tenor of Kant's approach.From the phenomenal viewpoint, Kant does not distinguish between the








behaviour of human agents and any other natural objects, e.g., billiard

balls or solar systems. He asserts that all objects in nature have empirical

characters (see CPR: A546/B574). Now I take itthat there can be no doubt

that he thinks that the behaviour of e.g., billiard balls can be accurately

predicted (from knowledge of their empirical characters and surrounding

circumstances); and so precisely the same degree of accuracy, and method,

ofprediction must be granted to the decisions and actions of human agents,conceived as appearances. Moreover, Kant claims that before ever an

agent's actions have occurred, "they are one and all predetermined in the

empirical character" (CPR: A55S^B581); and this is clearly inconsistent

withclaiming that,

from thephenomenal standpoint,

theagent's

actions

are in principle open prior to his decisions appearing. In any case, Kant

actually considers the possibility that prediction of a man's acts should

become available to us with as great a degree of certainty as the behaviour

of an inanimate object; and he says that, in such an eventuality, "we could

nevertheless still assert that theman is free" (CPractR: Ak. V99; Beck p.

103; Abbott p. 193). There is no suggestion that the ascription ofmoral

freedom depends on the impossibility of prediction; to the contrary, he

believes that he can defend moral freedom while admitting as great a

degree of prediction with human acts as must be admitted with the

behaviour of inanimate objects.

We are still left, then, with the question ofhow, given Kant's account of

the causation of human behaviour, his conception of moral freedom can be

defended. The answer really does depend on taking seriously his distinction

between the self as noumenon and as phenomenon. From the viewpoint of

the noumenal subject, there can be nothing in the antecedent series of

appearances that renders inevitable any morally discreditable decision

that appears in the temporal series. Rather, each of the agent's decisions

can be considered as expressing the free choice of the noumenal subject.

This subjectcan be seen as

choosingall of the

agent'sresolutions to act

and, thus, of creating his whole empirical character.

Admittedly, given we know the surrounding circumstances, the agents'

resolutions can, in their future appearance, be infallibly determined from

a full knowledge of his empirical character (gleaned from the past appearance of his resolutions, in themultifarious circumstances of his life). But

the agent, qua noumenal subject, is not in time and so cannot be deter

mined to choose by any phenomenal factors whatsoever; whilst his empir

ical character can be seen as merely the summary expression of all the

ways in which the noumenal subject exercises its free choice. Consequently,

although an agent's decision can, in its appearance, be infallibly predicted

from knowledge of his empirical character and surrounding circumstances,

we can nonetheless say, when any immoral decision appears, that the

agent, qua noumenal subject, could and should have decided otherwise.

For this is to say that nothing in the series of phenomena, prior to the








appearance of any immoral decision, determined the noumenal subject's

choice: the subject was, therefore, able to act through the causality ofreason but chose not to. When the agent is viewed as a noumenal subject,

not a single one of his decisions can be seen as determined by anything

antecedently existing its appearance. Quite the reverse: from that view

point, every decision (and so every aspect of the agent's empirical charac

ter) is to be seen as merely the consequence of the spontaneous choice of

the noumenal subject.

Of course, for the reasons explained earlier, all of an agent's resolutions

must exhibit a constancy in their appearance in the temporal series. It is,

indeed, this constancy that permits us to ascribe a particular empiricalcharacter to the agent (from past observation), thereby enabling us to

predict his conduct on future occasions. But the fact that the noumenal

subject, in virtue of its timeless intelligible nature, chooses in such a waythat the agent's resolutions invariably exhibit a constancy in theirmode

of appearance is consistent with affirming that no phenomenal conditions,

prior to the appearance of any of the agent's resolutions, can have deter

mined the noumenal subject's choice. Accordingly, the agent, qua noumenal

subject, can be thought of as free and as responsible for his choice, at the

very moment when his resolution appears in the temporal series, even

though its appearance can in principle be predicted with certainty from

knowledge ofhis empirical character. *[T]he entire history of his existence as

a sensuous being, is seen in the consciousness of his intelligible existence as

only a consequence, not as a determining ground, of his causality as a

noumenon. From this point of view, a rational being can rightly say of any

unlawful action that he has done that he could have left itundone, even if s

an appearance itwas sufficiently determined in the past and thus farwas

inescapably necessary. For this action, and everything in the past that deter

mined it,belong to a single phenomenon of his character, which he himself

creates, and according towhich he imputes tohimself as a cause independentof all sensibility" (CPractR: Ak. V97-98; Beck p. 101; Abbot p. 191-2).

IV

In the light of this exposition, we can locate one of the greatest misun

derstandings of Kant's defence. It arises from his contention that every

resolution must, in its appearance, be subject to the natural law of causal

ity.Many critics take this to entail that all manifestations of an agent's

empirical character must be conceived as expressing sensuous disposi

tions: as such, they would be experienced as desires or inclinations, which

themselves would constitute the sole possible determinants of action. If

this were a correct inference from his metaphysical principles, Kant would,

indeed, be forced to admit that the agent, even qua noumenal subject, could

never be blamed for any immoral occurrence. For desires and inclinations,

sensuous impulses, are what Kant calls "gifts or misfortunes of nature:"








none of them arises through the spontaneous activity of the noumenal

subject; each happens passively to the agent, as the necessary result of

some preceding phenomenal occurrence, which itself must have a preced

ing phenomenal cause and so on, back through the unending regress of the

temporal series. Consequently, if the empirical character had to be exclu

sively composed of sensuous dispositions to act, the noumenal subjectwould be a morally superfluous entity: each of the agent's decisions would

have to arise from some sensuous impulse (itself necessitated to arise by

preceding phenomena and so on), and no decision could in principle be seen

to arise from his own spontaneous activity.

It will not do to propose that the agent, qua noumenal subject, couldchoose the entire series of phenomenal causes resulting in his present

decision.7 This proposal?besides seemingly having the highly paradoxicaleffect ofmaking the agent, wholly or partially, responsible forevery priorevent in the universe8?would not permit the present decision to be viewed

as spontaneously produced. Clearly not, since the noumenal subject has to

choose the antecedent series of causes necessitating the present decision;

and that would go against Kant's requirement that we can view the agent

as able tomake his decision without there existing any preceding factors

bywhich it isnecessitated.

On my reading, however, although it is true that the agent's desires and

inclinations must be taken as one and all predetermined in their occur

rence, it does not follow that the agent's empirical character (which onlycontains his operative dispositions to act) must be constituted, either in

whole or in part, out of operative sensuous dispositions; and, therefore, it

does not follow that any of its manifestations have to be seen as predeter

mined. Rather, every manifestation of empirical character can be seen as

resulting from the choice of the noumenal subject: its choice is between

allowing a sensuous impulse to be operative (that is, to produce conduct)or

exercising, instead,the

causalityof reason.

Given Kant's conception of the law of natural causality, there is no break

in that law merely because some actions may not result from sensuous

impulse. For what he takes the law to require is that all of the agent'sresolutions and actions should, in their appearance, fall under universal rules;

and, as we have seen, this they will do whether a given decision arises from

reason or sensuous impulse. On the other hand, if the law entailed that the

agent's empirical character must be entirely formed out of sensuous disposi

tions, every one of his choices could only be regarded as determined by

antecedently existing phenomena. But Kant's defence is precisely designed to

avoid that consequence, while still allowing for the complete conformity of the

agent's conduct with the law of natural causality.

As I understand it, then, Kant's central concern is to defend moral

freedom against predeterminism, according to which the agent must be

considered, from every point of view, as caused to make his decision by








factors which precede its appearance. If the agent could only be viewed as

a phenomenon, itwould be impossible to defend Kantian freedom. For, inthat case, all the agent's resolutions would have to be constituted out of

desires and inclinations, and so result from antecedently existing phenom

ena; and the requirement that the agent should be able tomake his choice

spontaneously would be forever unfulfilled. Nonetheless, Kant is far from

maintaining that moral freedom consists in the choice being undetermined:

that would be to hold that it arose by chance, and not that itwas the

responsibility of the agent. What is required is the possibility of viewingthe agent asmaking the decision, butmaking itunconditioned by anteced

ently existingfactors. We

need, therefore,to think of the decision as

determined by the agent, but determined in his atemporal nature, i.e. in

his existence as a noumenon (although from our phenomenal viewpoint,

we can never know why the noumenal subject produces some decisions out

of reason and allows others through sensuous impulse: see e.g.,

CPi?:A557/B585).

In this way, we can regard the agent, qua noumenal subject, as deciding

spontaneously, while yet admitting that, fromthe phenomenal standpoint,

every one of his decisions is determined in advance of its appearance by

the empirical character (in conjunction with surrounding circumstances).

This is possible because, from the noumenal standpoint, every manifesta

tion of the empirical character is the result of the noumenal subject's

spontaneous decision (so nothing can precede itbywhich it is determined

to occur); but since this decision exhibits a constancy in its mode of

appearing in the temporal series, the agent's choices can also be regarded,

i.e., from the phenomenal standpoint, as proceeding necessarily from his

empirical character. Unless it is possible to view the agent's choices as

determined but not predetermined, Kantian freedom could not exist: "free

dom consists not in the contingency of the act (that it is determined by no

grounds whatever), i.e.,not in indeterminism .but rather in absolute

spontaneity. Such spontaneity is endangered only by predeterminism,where the determining ground of the act is in antecedent time,with the

result that, the act being no longer inmy power but in the hands ofnature,I am irresistibly determined" (Relig: BK I, General Observation, fn 3

(italics original); Ak. VI 49-50; Greene and Hudson p. 45; Abbot p. 359).

I have tried to explain how, granting his metaphysical framework, Kant

can allow for the logical possibility of the spontaneity of the agent, consid

ered as a noumenon, while acknowledging that the law of natural causality

does, and must, apply to the agent, considered as a phenomenon.

V

I end with a brief discussion of a materialist objection, which runs as

follows. Even if it can be shown that it isnot self-contradictory forKant to

defend moral freedom, the fact remains that his notion of freedom is








unjustified. It isunjustified because all of a persons mental life, includingall acts of thought (and so all acts ofunderstanding and reason), have been

shown, on observational grounds, to result from preceding physical phe

nomena in the brain. Thus, even supposing that reason can be practical

without the need of sensuous impulse, the fact is that its operation is

entirely governed by antecedent (physical) causes. Since, therefore, predeterminism is a reality, belief inKantian freedom isprovably unjustified.

Let me say,first, that Kant would regard itas wholly inadequate to replythat since he is concerned only to defend the logical possibility ofmoral

freedom, the discovery that freedom is infact unjustified does not damage

his defence. A central thesis ofhis critical philosophy is that issues concerning the immortality of the soul, moral freedom, and the existence of

God cannot be settled?even as probable hypotheses?either by theoretical

reason or by experience. It is, he holds, impossible for us as phenomenal

beings to settle such questions. That all-important Kantian thesis would

have to be given up ifmoral freedom could be shown to be unjustified by

appeal to experience.

So how would Kant have answered thematerialist? It can hardly be that,at the end of the eighteenth century, a philosopher would be unaware of

the claim that all mental states are dependent onmatter. My suggestionis that he would seek to counter the objection by referring to his idealism.

The materialist s claim that thought depends onmatter amounts to the

claim that without the existence and operation ofmatter, thought would

not exist. But, according to Kant's idealism, the correct position is that

since the whole material world ismere appearance, the thinking subjectmust exist and be able to operate logically prior to, and hence indepen

dently of, the existence ofmatter. For it is the operation of the thinking

subject on the given sense impressions that makes possible the very

existence ofamaterial world. If the thinking subject did not exist and have

thecapacity

tooperate independently

of the action ofmatter,

there could

be no such thing as matter at all (see e.g., CPR: A383; A547/B575).

Consequently, thematerialist's claim is self-contradictory: itboth asserts

and denies that thought is dependent onmatter. For thematerialist asserts

that thought depends on matter, while simultaneously asserting that

matter exists. But ifmatter does exist, the thinking subject must be able

to operate logically prior to, and so independently of,matter. Since his

claim is self-contradictory, thematerialist cannot be justified inmaintain

ing that thought is dependent onmatter, whether he bases his claim on

observation or theoretical reason.

The most that thematerialist would seem entitled to affirm is that, in

all observed cases, an exceptionless correlation has been discovered be

tween the existence of certain physical occurrences and the existence of

certain thoughts. But however often and widely such correlations are

observed, thematerialist cannot proceed to affirm that he is justified in








holding that one's exercise ofthoughtmust depend onmatter. Given Kant's

metaphysical framework, itwould be self-contradictory for the materialistto claim to be justified in holding that one lacks the capacity to initiate

conduct spontaneously through reason. And this contradiction must re

main even ifwe suppose that not a single instance of the causality of reason

is ever, in fact, identified.

University of York

Received October 15, 1990

NOTES

1. For example, Kant's defence is "desperately weak," according toW.H.Walsh

(Kant's Criticism ofMetaphysics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1975),p. 209): it can be seen to "break down completely," according to C.D.Broad (Kant:

An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 292); it "com

pletely fails" according to J.L.Mackie (The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1982), p. 172); it is "a hopeless failure," according to Ralph Walker (Kant

(London: Routledge, 1978), p. 148), a judgment approvingly quoted by, among

others, Ted Honderich (A Theory ofDeterminism (Oxford: Clarendon F*ress, 1990),

p. 462); it is "a shattering failure," according to Bernard Williams (Problems of the

Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 228); and it is "worthless,"

according to Jonathan Bennett ("Kant's Theory of Freedom," in Self and Nature in

Kant's Philosophy edited Allen W. Wood (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984),

p. 102).

2. Texts, abbreviations, and translations used:

I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) tr. by Norman Kemp Smith (London:

MacMillan, 1929)I. Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (Prol) tr. by Peter G. Lucas

(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1953)

I.Kant, Critique of

Practical Reason(CPractR)

tr.by

L. W. Beck(Indianapolis:

Bobbs-Merrill, 1956) (references also given to T. K. Abbott's translation: Kant's

Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory ofEthics (London:

Longmans, 1909))I. Kant, Religion within theBounds ofReason Alone (Relig) tr. by T. M. Greene

and H. H. Hudson (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1960) (reference also givento the Abbott translation cited above)

3. See "Second Analogy," CPR: A189/B232-A21^B257. I have discussed the

principle in "On Kant's Second Analogy and His Reply to Hume," Kant-Studien,vol. 77 (1986)

4. My statement of them follows Sir Geoffrey Warnock's extremely clear exposi

tion in his recorded dialogue with Godfrey Vesey, entitled "Kant: Freewill and

Determinism," Open University Tape A202 (The Age of Revolutions)/!^.

5. This account does not make an agent's future behaviour as inflexible as itmayseem. If someone is provided with new information, e.g., that he has always lied

in such and such a situation, this would itself introduce a change in his circum

stances and could, therefore, lead to different future behavior.








6. See e.g., Michael Rosen "Kant's Anti-determinism," Proceedings of the Aristo

telian Society, vol. 89 (198?/9).7. Proposed by Allen Wood in "Kant's Compatibilism," Self and Nature in Kant's

Philosophy, Allen W. Wood (ed.) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 89-93.

8. The paradox is argued for convincingly by Ralph Walker, op. cit., p. 149

ward on kant's defence of moral freedom

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