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Kant's ExamplesAuthor(s): David LloydSource: Representations, No. 28, Special Issue: Essays in Memory of Joel Fineman (Autumn,1989), pp. 34-54Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2928583 .

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DAVID LLOYD

Kant's ExamplesAT THE CONCLUSION OF "The Methodology f Taste," the closingsection of the first artof TheCritique fJudgement,antevokes as an exemplarymoment a cultural situationthat resembles what a series of cultural thinkers,notablyGeorg Lukaics nd MikhailBakhtin,willconceive to be the moment ofepic:

Therewasanageand therewerenationsn which he ctivempulse owards social iferegulatedy aws-what onverts people nto permanentommunity-grappledithhehuge difficultiesresented ythetrying roblem fbringing reedom and thereforeequality lso) nto nionwithonstrainingorcemore hat frespect nddutifulubmis-sionthanoffear).And suchmust avebeen the ge,andsuchthenation,hat irst is-covered heartofreciprocal ommunicationf ideasbetweenhe morecultured ndruder ections fthe ommunity,nd how obridge hedifferenceetween he mplitudeand refinementf theformernd thenatural implicityndoriginalityf the atter-inthiswayhitting ponthatmeanbetween igherulture nd themodestworthf nature,that orms or aste lso, s a sense ommon oallmankind,hat rue tandard hich orules ansupply.Hardlywill later ge dispensewith hosemodels.'

It is a momentof appealing utopianism n a heretofore igorously heoreticalwork, one whose appeal can scarcelyhave been negligible n thedisintegratingpostfeudalcondition of late-eighteenth-centuryermany. t can be taken as adocument foran historic ompromisebetween an intellectually owerfulbour-geoisiewith a comparatively nderdevelopedeconomicbase and a traditionallypowerfulbut embattled ristocracy onfrontinghespecterofbourgeoisrevolu-tion. As such, thispassage may appear as a blueprint, fnot theblueprint,fordefining he politicalfunction f aesthetic ulture.2 or this dealized represen-tation of culturalharmonymarks theturnof a "disinterested"esthetic ntoaninterest hat s notmerelymoral-for theexplicitfunction f udgmentis indeedto mediate from ense and understanding oethics nd reason-but also political.The universalclaims of aesthetic ulture, hepostulation f aestheticudgmentas if t were valid for all men,are mostpoliticalpreciselywherethey laim tobeleast so, representing, n the verydenial of interest, he bourgeois interest nforging sphere of purelyformalequalityand identity or all mankind, rre-spectiveof culturaloreconomicdistinctions.he aesthetic phere s held to tran-scend all such"contingent" ifferences,nd,with essparadoxthanmight tfirstappear, it is in the turn to thisdomain as thebeyondfpolitical nterest hatthe

34 REPRESENTATIONS 28 * Fall 1989 C) THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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formal erms fbourgeois deology re constituted. s we shall see,any reflectionupon the aesthetic herefore ntailsa reflection pon the constitutivelementsof bourgeois ideology, nd that particularlyn relation to the pedagogical for-mation ofthe subject.3The concernof thisessay, hen, s with he fateof aesthetic isinterestwhenit fallsback, as itmust,on a pedagogical imperativen order to realize the veryconditionsof its possibility. o formulate he relation chematically,f udgmentmediates between understanding nd reason, t s pedagogy thatconstitutes hebridge betweenpolitics nd ethics.Understandingpolitics s a mode of freedomeffectiven the sphere of nature,one can easily grasphow politics tself houldrequire theaesthetic phereto enable the nteraction f what are, for Kant, oth-erwise entirelydiscretespheres. Any pedagogy formed accordingto aestheticreflectionwill thereforebe constitutive f the verypossibilityf politics tself.

Central to the analysisof these relationshere willbe some questionsas to thestatusof theexemplarywithwhichwe can scarcely ispense) in theaesthetic ndin the pedagogical spheres,questionsthatwill be akinto logically djacent onesofrepresentationn thepolitical phere.Kant's cultural ideal is not merely deal; it has the status of an example(Muster).As an exemplarymoment, nd there are others n theThirdCritique,tdrawsup intoa transcendental nalysisquestionsthat are inevitably istorical.4This is notmerely matter f Kant'sadducing an historical xample by wayofillustrating possiblecultural ynthesis. hat he should do so and, at the end ofa century hathad foregrounded he Roman modeltothepointof nspiring oth1776 and 1789, that he should choose what is apparently Greek model aredoubtlessin themselves nteresting etailsof intellectualhistory.5 ut the veryproblemwe find n establishingwithany certainty hat t is indeed the Greekmodel that Kant has here in mind is indicative f a farmore profound,and inthiscontextprofoundlyproblematic,historicization f the aestheticby wayofexamplesthat re as indispensable o the aesthetictself s they reto"later ges."Our difficultyrises from he fact hat Kant'sexemplarymoment s a formaliza-tionofa specific ulturalmomentwhich, oadapthis ownterms, erives conceptfrom a manifold of (historical)phenomena. The conceptin questionis clearlyregulative ather hanconstitutive: ecould not constructucha cultureforour-selves, but its supposed prior existencenonethelessregulatesour judgmentaccording to the idea of an exemplaryunion of freedom and constraint.Theaesthetic udgment involved here demands the formalization f the specificexample (Beispiel) n order thatit maybecome exemplary musterhaft)nd thesingular nstancegainuniversalvalidity.Universalvaliditysachieved n such a mannerby n aestheticudgmentthat,in this as in other instances,the formalqualities apparently ttributed o theobject (namelythe reconciliation f freedom nd constraint,heindividual andthecollective) re in the firstnstanceproperties f the udgment itself:

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By the name sensus ommuniss to be understoodthe idea of a public ense, i.e. a criticalfacultywhich n its reflectivect takesaccount a priori) f themode ofrepresentation feveryone else, in order,as itwere, o weighits udgement with the collectivereason ofmankind, and thereby void the illusionarisingfrom ubjective nd personalconditionswhichcould readilybe takenforobjective, n illusion hatwould exert prejudicial nflu-ence upon its udgement.... This ... is effected y so far as possible ettinggo of theelementof matter, .e. sensation, n our generalstateofrepresentativectivity,nd con-fining ttention o the formalpeculiarities f our representation r general stateof rep-resentative ctivity.CJ,? 40, p. 151; emphasis noriginal)The "common"or "public"sensethat s involvedhere appears as atone and thesame time the foundationfor and the productof the mode of udgment thatrecurrently roduces and depends upon the identity f the individual subjectwith mankind n general. The insistence f such a circularityt the foundationof aesthetic udgment enforcesa formal historicization f the aestheticthat sinextricable rom tsdependence on theexemplary.To elaborate thispoint: it would be possibleto conceive of the relationshipbetweenthe individualsubjectand mankind n general as a spatialfigure, hesubjectbeing setthen overagainstthehumanity romwhich t s differentiated.Such a spatialfigurewouldperhapshighlighthegeography frelations fdom-ination and would certainly ccentuatequestions of interest. ndeed, such afigurehas a certainself-evidence, self-evidencehatcrystallizesn momentsofstruggle n thefundamentallyntirepresentationalorms f barricades nd guer-rillawarfare,where the politicaland the aestheticmightbe said to coalesce.6Kant's example, however, aves representationpreciselyby endowing a geog-raphyof differences ith temporaldisposition,ffectivetmorethanone level.In the first lace, theexample (BeispielrMuster),s an aesthetic resentationhatwillbecome the meansto the formation f a conceptof"happyunion" glicklichenVereinigung),s suspended between tsownage and a later one (Das Zeitalter..einspdtereseitalter). or thefirst, eingto itself n unreflectiveotality,his cul-turalsolution cannot be exemplary;for the laterage, the example becomes themark of a certain nadequacy orfalling wayfrom n exemplary riginal.But inthissuspension,the presentation f the exemplarymomentbecomes its repre-sentation s representative, otof tself ut ofan ideal to which venthe exampleitselfmust be seen as inadequate. If a laterage continuesto depend upon anearlierexample toconceiveof a possibleunionbetweenconstraint nd freedom,culture and nature, tsverymovement wayfromnature weil s derNatur mmerweniger ahe einwird), n the historicalrocessthatdifferentiatesuniversal om-munication"from "the narrow ifeof the lower animals,"necessitates he inde-pendence ofjudgmentfrom hevery xampleswithwhich t hardly andispense.This paradoxical demand is rooted in the first lace in the problemof acommon sense that satonce the a priorifoundation f taste nd tsproduct.Thecommon sense that is the foundation of taste, precisely s a sense, annot be

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deduced transcendentallyrbe suppliedbyuniversal ule: its xercise s itsman-ifestation epends upon priorexamples.But the danger of thisdependence isthatit threatensto produce dependence in the verysubjectwhose relation tojudgment shouldbe one of "free onformityo aw." Without hisrelationoftheindividualto humanityn general,we could noteven speak of"commonsense,"for withoutautonomous subjectsthere could be no communicationthroughwhich heuniversalityf common sensecouldbe realized.)At thesame time, hatcommon sense which s a universalhuman property nd foundation fthe aes-thetic, o whichappeal is alwaysmade in the processesof aestheticudgment, sin thefirst lace a latencywhich mustbe drawnout and made manifest y theforceof examples. The example, a formalization f the particular uch that tcomes to representa universal dea, is indispensableto the productionof thecommonsenseon which ssent to itsexemplary r representativetatus s based.It is the sine qua non of a pedagogy whichmust produce in its subjectsthatcommonsense fromwhich t derives ts egitimacy.An exemplarypedagogy,by virtueof its dependence on examples,mustaccordinglyalways entail a formallyhistoricalformation f its subjects.Thisformalhistoricitys evident t several evels:1)The exemplary tatus fthe exam-ples called upon in pedagogical practice s predicatedon a formalization hat shistorical, ependent at once on a lapse and an idealizing projection.2) Onlytemporally s thecommon sense latent neach and everyhuman subjectrealizedor developed. 3) The subjectof pedagogy is alwaysbelatedwithregard to theexamplesthatare held up forudgment.4) The subjectofpedagogyalwaysfallsshortof theexamples that re projected.5) The pedagogue is always xemplaryforthestudent, hat s,at once precedent nd projected s a model. Wewillelab-orateeach one ofthese propositionsn turn.1)We have already seen, n relation o an example,howtheexamplecontainsan historical tructure, redicatedon an historically ecessary apse awayfromwhat ooks like the natural mmediacy f an historical ultureto itself nd pro-jected forward s exemplaryof whatmust be reproduced,artificiallyr by wayof pedagogical formalization,n a future tate. Further nalysis,bymeans of afurther ormalization,willshowthat the historical haracterof thisexample isnot an accidentalresultof thegeneralclaimsbeingmade but is intrinsic o thestructure f the example as such. For an example is alwaysan example for thejudgmentand, inorderto havethegeneralvalidity r universal ommunicabilityofthe exemplary i.e., of that towhichthe assentofother udgmentsmaybe atleastformally emanded), theexamplemustbe udged for tsformal nd notforitsmaterialor accidentalqualities CJ, 40, p. 151). In the first lace,then, omesthepresentation f a sensuousmanifold, elativelyccidental n its nternal ela-tions, nd only n the second place itsrepresentation or the udgment,"lettinggo of the elementof matter" nd "confiningur attention o theformalpeculiar-ities of our representationor general state of representative ctivity"ibid.).

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Insofar as it serves s an example, therefore, ny objectofjudgment,whether napparently atemporal form such as a Grecian urn or an apparentlyhistoricalmatter such as Greek culture, necessarilynvolvesa temporalstructuren themovementfrompresentation orepresentation,romBeispiel o MusterbleibendeBeispiel) nd finally oBegriffsee KU, 300).2) The exemplarity f theexample in itstemporal tructure s not a charac-teristic f the object itself indeed, as we have seen in theexampleofGreekcul-ture, tcannotbe exemplary o or for tself)but mustbe referred o the"generalstate of representative ctivity" f the udging subject.The temporality f theexampleforthis ubject salready function f an exemplary emporalityn eachact of udgment. Ifwe consider the form nlyof the actofjudgment, bstractedfrom ts specificmaterial nstance, t becomes exemplary f any ct of udgmentas a universally alidrepresentationf common ense, nd thatprecisely yvirtueof the temporalmovementfromthe material o the formal hat s definitive fsuchajudgment. Butthe actofjudgment,formallyonsidered, ssimultaneouslyexemplaryof the relation between udgment and the productionof commonsense,since therepetition f acts of udgment n theirformalitytself onstitutesthesphereof common senseboth within ach individual nd as a public sphere.This entailsan analogous formalization, hereby ach actof udgmentbecomesexemplary by risingabove "subjective nd personal conditions" nd by beingweighed againstthepossible ather han the actual udgmentsofothers.The for-malizationwithin ach udgment sthereforexemplary fa necessary ormaliza-tionofall udgmentthat s constitutive f thepublicsphereof common sense. Itisnot difficulto showthat, orKant,theprocessdescribedhereis formallyden-ticalwith hatwhichthe human race undergoes n themovement rom heprim-itive mmediacyof gratificationharacteristic f "thesavage" to the interest n"universalcommunication" haracteristicf civilization.73) It is to thisprocessof formalization hat n exemplarypedagogy is direc-ted, assuming as its metahistorical oles a prior immediacy from which theexample lapses (orrises:theology s neverfaroffhere)8 nd a projecteduniversalcommunicability hatis at once its goal and its product. On the one hand, itdepends on examples,withoutwhich tcould notproducea conceptf tsend andwithoutwhich,more importantly,twould become a systematic r "mechanical"ratherthanan exemplarypedagogy; that s, t would operate byway of determi-nate concepts upon theunderstandingratherthanby evoking the free play ofthesubjectivejudgment.On the otherhand, dependenceupon examples remainsa constant hreat o what s to be produced, namely, free relation fthesubjectto itself nd toothers, hat s,a free onformityo aw.There is,atfirst, he purelyempirical problemthatthesubjectofpedagogyhas theexample held up beforehim or her,thatshe or he comes alwaysafter the fact and depends upon theexample foredification.That is, however,merely wayofexpressing hemorecriticalpoint that,preciselybecause itis a mode ofsense, ommon sense cannot

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be manifested r produced in the absence of examples.Which s to saythat, n acertain ense,what smost original ohuman being,thefoundation fjudgmentand of communication fnot, indeed, of reason itself, s not autonomous butactuallydepends upon its objects.9The sphereof common sense, properlyonethat stablishes he dentitynd equality fall udging humansubjects s possibleby way offormalization, an onlybe producedor reproducedby way ofthe con-stant nsistence f its nstantiations. he power of the exampleover thestudentis accordinglytself formal nd notmerely ncidental haracteristicfaestheticpedagogy. It is notmerelythat dependence on examples-"the go-carts f thejudgement"'0-hampers the ndependenceof the mindemergingfrom utelageinsofar s thestudentmistakes he example forthe rule,thereby ixating n theparticularmatter atherthan thegeneralform.That dependence ismoreovernecessaryformal onsequence of the ntrinsic istoricityf examples themselves,"withwhich a later age can scarcely ispense."4) The dependence of the belated student upon historical examples ismatched bythe students' nadequacy withregard to theexemplary s projectedideal, and again in consequence of the formalhistoricityf the exemplary.Thenecessarycontingent nadequacy of the studentto the ideal projectedby peda-gogy, function, o to speak,oflacking ge, experience, rudition, rwhatever,as well as of institutional ositioning,s here no more thanthe expressionof asystematicncapacity.Only bythe achievement fan entire ndependence fromexamples,as the matterof or forudgment,could the udging subjectattaintothepure formalityf theideal. But even supposingtheexamplewere givenofan exemplarypedagogy, such indeed as Kant describeshere, in which exam-ples continuallygive way to a process of formalization hat seeks to dispensewiththem,the ideal remains strictlynconceivablewithout n-even minimal-instance of exemplificationhat s finallyrreducible s what musthave beenformalized.5) One resultof thistwofold hortcoming f thestudent s the nexpungiblemelancholy f thepedagogical scene,even, f notespecially,n its ronicmode. Acertaintheologicalresidue taints ven themost secular accountsof liberal edu-cationwith he dea ofa fallfrom heself-immediacyf thatwhichbecomes exem-plary but is not that for tself,withthe anxiety f an unattainableredemption.But the allure of a melancholy ura should not preventrecognition f the inti-mate relationbetweenprecisely ucha model ofenlightened ducation,directedat developingthe autonomyof the studentsby wayof an always projectivedis-placementof "truth," nd the institutions f pedagogy themselves,withtheirhumane hierarchies fpowerthat hegeography fevery lassroomreproducesand reinforces eneaththetemporal cheme t frames."IWewillreturn o locatethelogical ground of thisrelation n the universal laims made by iberalor aes-theticeducation, as bycriticalphilosophygenerally, oncentrating ere on theexemplary tatusofthepedagogue as presentedbyKant.

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The demand made byKant upon theMasteris thathe should be at onceexemplary nd thesiteofexamples: "Der MeistermuBes vormachen asund wiees der Schuler zu Standebringen oll."1'2 he act ofexemplifications here at oncespatial and temporal:ifthe Master can stand before the students n his role asexemplar, t s onlybecause he has done before whatthey n their urn must doafter his example. What the Master'sstanding n the classroomspatially epre-sents,namely punctual gathering fdisparateand ill-informedubjectivitiesothe lightof the exemplary, epresentsmore importantly temporalrelation nwhich, s exemplary, he Master sat once prior nd projected, nstance Beispiel)and model (Muster).Needless to say, heexemplary tatusof thepedagogue hasnothingto do withpersonal or moral character; t is an effect f the historicalstructure fexemplifications it nformswhat sprecisely liberal ducation. Theincidental,material, nd spatial presenceof theMaster, Beispielwhose singu-larity ecomes indifferent,s assumed in his transformationlong temporal inesinto a Muster hat s,as is any example that s truly xemplary, rojected towardan ideal.One might ay, ccordingto thelogicof theexampleoutlinedabove, that tis intrinsic o the function f theexemplarypedagogue todisappoint. Followingboth this logic and that of the liberal education that Kant here sketches, tbecomesclear that he"perfect" edagogue, insofar s sucha prodigy s conceiv-able,would be as imperfectn exampleas would thepedantic pedagogue whosepractice s limited othe nculcation frulesand regulations yrote. Forit s theforceof theexample to fallshortof the deal towhich tgestures,ust as it s theproper procedureofthepedagogue topointoutthis hortcomingf theexamplewithregardtothe deal:Onlyby xcitinghepupil's maginationoconformityith given oncept, ypointingout how he xpressionalls hort fthe dea towhich,saesthetic,he oncepttself ailstoattain,ndbymeans fsevere riticism,s tpossible oprevent ispromptlyookinguponthe xamplesBeispiele]etbefore im s theprototypesf xcellence,nd as models[Muster]orhim o mitate, ithoutubmissiono nyhigher tandard r tohis wn riticaljudgement. his would esultngenius eing tifled,nd,witht, lsothefreedomftheimaginationn tsvery onformityo aw-a freedom ithout hich fine rt s notpos-sible,noreven s much s a correctaste f one'sownfor stimatingt. CJ,? 60, p. 226)This passage,whichamounts to a sketch f theproceduresofa liberalas well asa specificallyrtistic ducation, s deeply nformedbya structure fdisappoint-ment,orofun-deception, nt-tauschung.n the realm ofthe aesthetic, very on-cept mustbe revealed to be a deception,sinceitis onlytheformal ossibility fbeing subsumed under a conceptthattheexample should represent.The freeplayof the understanding nd the imaginationwould otherwise e stifled, ndwiththat the possibility f the reconciled and reconcilingwork of the genius.Accordingly,n therelationship etween the Master and thestudents s in thatbetween theconceptand the udgment,all that heMasterexemplifies vormacht)

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mustdisappoint fhispedagogy s to be exemplary. he students' isappointmentin theMaster, tself crucial moment n aesthetic ducation, s the fulfillmentfa processofexemplification hosegoal is to produce autonomyof udgment inthe student.Clearly, f course, theexemplary tanding f thepedagogue isformally naf-fected by the disappointment f the students.Rather, hatexemplary tatus sreinforcedby a transitionn thestudents' elation o the example from oncen-tration n itsmaterial r conceptual nstantiationfapparentrules ofprocedureto theprocessbywhich estheticudgmentsare to be made. The pedagogue nowexemplifies he processofenlightenmenthat s nitiated ytheperception f theperpetualand determinate nadequacyof theexample to the ideal. It would becorrect o saythat theexemplary tandingof thepedagogue is, n consequence,an ineradicableeffect f structuremerely, ere tnot for he fact hat hematerial

presenceof the Master s a crucialmoment n the temporalityf exemplification.In accordance withthehistorical tructure f any example,it is the spatialpre-sentation fthepedagogue, the there-beforenessfthe Master n all his materi-ality, hat mustbe overcomeor displacedbya temporalrepresentation oundedin the fact of the Master's absolute priority-his always having been therebefore-but is thendeferred ntotheperpetual nadequacy of the model to theideal. We can see that, n thismovement rompresencetodeferral, he structureof theexample is retained, uch thatthedisappointment iscovered n the nad-equacy of the pedagogue giveswaytoan exemplariness ounded n a processofprojectionwhichthe Masternow comestorepresent othe students.There isconsequentlyno escape from he nsistence f theexemplarywithinthismodel pedagogy.Or rather, here s one, butonlyfor the genius,a conceptthat n a veryreal sense is requiredwithin he Third ritiqueo create a rupture,in theform fexemplaryfreedom,n theotherwise ismalcontinuities f exem-plaryrepetition.The conceptof the genius in the ThirdCritique as been fre-quently nough discussed elsewhere o need little laborationhere.'3Suffice ttosaythat theprincipalproblemfor Kant is to accountfora productivity hich sapparently t once rule-boundand free,which, n otherwords,achieveswhat selsewhere mpossible, following f examplescombined with ndependence ofthem:It [therule] annot eone setdown na formuland servings a precept-for hen hejudgement ponthebeautiful ould e determinableccordingoconcepts. athermusttherulebegathered rom heperformance,.e.,fromheproduct, hich thersmay setoputtheir wn alent othe est,oas to et t erve s a model Muster],otfor mitation[Nachmachung],ut forfollowingNachahmung].CJ,? 47, p. 171; KU, 245)14"The possibility f thisis difficulto explain,"Kant goes on, and at least partof the difficultys to explain the possibility f a followingof examples thathas nothingto do with earning.The oppositionof genius to learning s abso-

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lute, since "learning s nothingbut imitation"CJ,?40, p. 169). For the genius,the example (here,Beispiel) s no more than a minimal stimulus o productionaccordingto naturalgifts hat re original o himand thatwork on similar ines"(aufAhnlichert)to those of thepreviousgenius (CJ,? 47, p. 170). The geniusstandsoutside therepetitions f an exemplarypedagogy, incehis skills an beneithercommunicatednor learned and sincetheoriginalityf the geniusis notprogressivebut returns lwaysto the same ground in nature.Paradoxicallyforaesthetics, he repetition ropertoGenius s one that annotdevelopnd forpre-cisely hatreason leaves the freedomof thesubject ntact.For all that,geniusremainsexemplary: t s the "exemplary riginalitymus-terhafteriginalitdt]f the natural ndowments f an individual n thefree mploy-mentof his cognitivefaculties"CJ,?49, p. 181; KU, 255). Exemplaryfor thesubsequent genius only n the accidentalor contingent ense impliedabove,thegenius produces forhumanity t largeexemplaryproductsforthe udgment oftaste.Unlike genius,taste s a progressive aculty nd intimatelyssociatedwithpedagogy. Indeed, as we have seen,theprogressive ormation f taste s insepa-rable from n exemplarypedagogy.The problem hat riseshere sthat lthoughthe conceptof genius indicatesan example of human freedom ndependentofimitation, t providesno solutionto producing that freedom n the sphere ofpedagogy.Not that hiswouldbe a problem,were tnotthatwhatdefinesgeniusis effectivelyhattowhichtheformation f taste s intendedtobringthesubject,namely,to the perfectreconciliationof freedom and constraint. Hence, ofcourse,theease withwhich theconditionsfor thepossibilityf a "correct aste"are subsumedwithin hosefor hepossibilityf a "fine rt" tall; CJ, 60, p. 226.)The discussionof genius thusrecapitulatesn manyrespectsthe discussionof taste that precedes it. In other, qually important espects t is incompatiblewiththe termsestablishedfor the developmentof taste.To reiterate, oth theconceptsofdevelopmentnd ofautonomyre inseparablefrom he conceptof taste.Thus, in section 32, Kantwrites fthe youngpoet:It s onlynaftertime,henhisudgement asbeen harpenedy xercise,hat fhis wnfreewill ndaccordhedeserts isformerudgements-behavingn ustthe ameway swith hose fhisudgements hich ependwhollyn reason.Taste ays laim implyoautonomy.omake heudgementsfothers hedetermininground fone's wnwouldbe heteronomy.CJ, 32, p. 137)Though theyoungpoetcanbyno means be coercedto conform othe udgmentofothers,nonetheless n the independentdevelopmentofhis taste he comes toconform.The possibility,ndeed froma certainstandpoint he inevitability,fthisprocessderivesfrom formal dentityn the mode of aestheticudgmentinall subjectsthatpermits he claimtouniversalityf a udgmentof taste just as ifit were objective" CJ, ?32, p. 136).15 The process of udgment occurs conse-

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quently na fashionwhich eems to makeno firm istinctionetween hatprocessas it takes place in the geniusor in themerepersonoftaste:FollowingNachfolge]hich asreferenceo a precedent,nd not mitationNachahmung],is theproper xpressionor ll nfluence hich heproductsf an exemplaryexemplar-ischen]uthormay xert ponothers-andthismeansno more hangoing othe samesources or creative ork ausdenselbenuellench6pfen]s those owhich e went orhiscreations,nd earningromne'spredecessoromore han hemode f vailingneselfof such sources. aste, ustbecause tsudgement annot e determinedy oncepts rprecepts,samong llfacultiesnd talentshevery nethat tandsmostn needofexam-ples Beispiele]fwhathas nthe ourse f culturemaintainedtselfongestnesteem inBeifall].hus t voids n earlyapse nto rudity,nda returnothe udenessf ts arliestefforts.CJ, 327, pp. 138-39;KU,213; emphasisn original)

It is the processofdevelopmenthat gain distinguisheswofaculties-geniusand taste-which are otherwiseapparently denticalin theirprocesses,bothdemanding originality nd autonomy,both required to returnto exemplaryinstances for procedures not for rules.'6 Genius constitutes n exceptionalexample, bydefinition npredictable n themode of itsproductions,which nturnonlymake the transition rom nstanceto model by wayof aestheticudg-ment.Where the productsof genius,and indeed initiallyhe objectsofaestheticjudgmentingeneral, re conceived sBeispiele,t s taste hat dentifiesheir xem-plary musterhaft)uality. t is not hard to be convincedof theregularity f thisconceptual patterningn the ThirdCritique: ime and again, the termBeispielsemployedfor objectsthat are in theprocessof beingor haveyettobe taken upinto the udgmentsof tasteor that, or he subsequentgenius, re mere nitiatinginstances obe followed,not mitated.Muster,nd its adverbialderivativemuster-haftor,less often,exemplarisch),n the contrary,re reservedfor thatwhich sprojectedas exemplary nthe stronger enseofa model fortheestimation fallattainments r judgments. Insofar as Beispiele ecome exemplary,musterhaft,developmental ogic is intrinsic ere; insofar s a development s impliedfromthecasual intuition o a universal laim,what snarrated s thecriticalmovefromprivateudgment to "universal ommunicability."he analysis faestheticudg-ment as a faculty s thus governedby its implication n the formof universalhistory, or which the insistenceof the exemplary s indispensable,ust as theaestheticudgment itself othproduces and estimates rogress owarduniversalcommunicability n the basis of examples,Beispiele, hat through it becomeMuster:But in the universalommunicabilityf the sensationofdelight r aversion)-a com-municability,oo, hat xistspart romny oncept-inthe ccord, o far spossible,fallagesandnations s tothis eelingn therepresentationf certainbjects, e have heempiricalriterion,eak ndeed ndscarce ufficiento raise presumption,fthederi-vation fa taste, hus onfirmedyexamplesBeispiele],rom rounds eep-seatednd

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shared alike byall men, underlying heir greement nestimating heformsunderwhichobjectsare givento them.For this reason some productsof taste are looked on as exemplaryexemplarisch].CJ,?17, p. 75; KU, 149)The problemthat recurshere fortaste,one by definition bsent in the case ofproductivegenius, s howto guaranteethe autonomyfjudgmentsof tasteunderthe conditionof their onstitutiveependence on examples.The argument hatfollows nticipates hatmade muchlater n section60, thoughwith pecific ef-erence totasterather han togenius:For this reason some products of taste are looked on as exemplaryexemplarisch]-notmeaningthereby hatby mitating thers astemaybe acquired. For tastemustbe an orig-inal faculty;whereas one who mitates model [Muster], hile howing kill ommensuratewithhis success, only displaystasteas himself critic f thismodel [zeigt,ofernr estrifft,zwarGeschicklichkeit,bernurGeschmack,ofernrdiesesMuster elbst eurteilenann].Hence itfollows hatthe highestmodel [das hochste uster],hearchetype Urbild] f taste, s a mereidea, whicheach personmust beget n his ownconsciousness, nd according to whichhemustformhis estimate f everything hat s an Objectoftaste, r that s an example [Beis-piel] of critical aste, nd even of universal aste tself. CJ,? 17, pp. 75-76; KU, 149-50)The archetypeof taste mustbe autonomously begotten or, rather, broughtforth" hervorbringen]y each judging subject as the "highestexample," theexample ofexamples bywhich ll otherexamples, s mereBeispiele,re atfirst obe estimated.Clearly ts attainment f the status f dea,however,would demandtheimpossibleconditionof theexampleof osing tsexemplificatorytatus, ru-cial to which is itsmaterial nstantiation n a representation f whateverkind.Even the highestofexamplesmust fall shortof the deathat s,as Kantgoes onto remark,"a conceptof reason," .e., notsusceptible f representation,nd beredefinedas an ideal, therepresentation f an individualexistence s adequateto an idea":Hence this rchetype f taste-which rests, ndeed,upon reason's ndeterminatedea ofamaximum,but is not, however, apable of being representedby means of concepts,butonly in an individual presentation-may more appropriatelybe called the ideal of thebeautiful.Whilenothavingthis deal in ourpossession,we still trive o beget twithin s[dochnuns hervorzubringentreben].CJ,?17, p. 76; KU, 150)Whatappears at first s theunproblematic egettingneach and everyndividualof an idea thatwould guarantee thesubject's ritical utonomybecomes, bythevery ogicof theexampleand ofthefaculty roperto theaesthetic, .e.,the mag-ination,a striving fteran unattainablepossession.For no example can escapethe conditionofbeing given n a presentation ven where itsexemplaryrepre-sentation s projectedtoward the ideal to which no presentation ould be ade-quate, nor can the activity f (aesthetic) udgment take place without such

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examples being presented to it. The ideal is accordingly trictlynd essentiallyunattainable,not forthe contingent eason thatmankindor its rtists re not yetadequately cultivated, ut accordingto the ogic of the aesthetictself.'7This logic of the aesthetic,predicated on the insistence fexemplarymate-rial, howeverresidual or minimal t may become, places the deal irrevocably utof reach. At the same time, t sthe demand, equally ntrinsico the aesthetic, hatjudgments of taste be made autonomously,which eads, a littleparadoxically, othe limitsto be posed on the autonomyof the aesthetic phere itself.For thenecessity o pose an "ideal of beauty" as the only guarantee of theautonomyofeach subject's udgmentoftaste entails movement rom he purely esthetic othe moral. Where an ideal s positedfor any object,an underlying nd must bedeterminableforthatobject.In consequence, "Onlywhathas in itself he end ofits real existence,only man that s able himself o determinehis ends by reason... admits .. of an ideal of beauty"CJ,?17, p. 77).18 This figure f Man is atonce the ground and the end of the aesthetic; ike common sense, t s the basison which the universality ftheaesthetic an be posited and theend thatmoralreflection inds n the examples of taste. Encapsulatedin section17, "The Idealof Beauty," s the narrative hateverywhere hapes the Critique, narrative hatmoves from matter o form,from ense to commonality,rom xample to idea,from beauty to morality. t is also, crucially, he narrativewithinwhich the"normal idea," which allowsof culturaland geographicaldifferencesn percep-tion and judgment (cf.CJ,?17, p. 78), is superseded bythe rational dea whoseproximal attainment s governedby a singular and ethical temporality.Withinthis narrative the importance of judgments of taste is to negotiatedevelop-mentally he circularmovement rom ommon ense o commonenseand to do sobywayofexamples.This narrative scontained lready nthe historical haracterof the example and in the aestheticdispositionof the udging subject, n bothcases proposingto mediate between henecessary ifferenceftheparticular ndtheequally necessaryuniversalityfcommunicabilityMittelbarkeit).We have already seen how the historical tructure f the example as suchcauses a perpetual deferralwithin he pedagogical scene, giventhat the idealwhich the example represents s alwaysbeyondattainment.'9Now,since we seeinsection17that norderfor he aesthetic o ead totheautonomy ftheudgingsubject t mustconnectwiththemoralthrough hepositingof an ideal,we canstatethat the processof thispedagogymustbe ironic.For it entails the formalreflectionfthesubject upon the conditions fany udgmentinparticularuponan (exemplary)objectas a condition t once forthe udgmentofitsadequacy tothe ideal and of the formalcapacityof the subjectas critic, .e., as autonomousratherthandependenton theexample. The formalreflection pon thepartic-ular reflection as an ironicnarrative tructurensofar s thesecondary eflectionalways"knows more"than thatpriorone upon which treflects,fonlybyvirtue

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of itsgeneralization.This is tosaythat rony s always f a temporalor narrativenature and requires a developmental economy that is always at someone'sexpense.To describeirony n these terms s of course immediately o take issuewithwhat at present s probably hesinglemost nfluentialrgument oncerning henatureofirony, amelyPaul de Man's essay"The Rhetoric f Temporality."20npart2 of thisessay,de Man emphasizeswhat are forhimtwocrucialfeatures firony:the simultaneityf itssplitconsciousness, ppearing "as an instantaneousprocessthat takesplace rapidly, uddenly,n one singlemoment" BI, 225), anditsradical antagonismnotonly o historical hinking ut also to the"reconciliationof the selfwith heworldbymeansof art" BI, 219) that s theburdenof severalversionsof aesthetichistory. o an extent, nd despitethenecessityt involveshim in of skirting heproblemraised byLukacs's and, indeed,Bakhtin's) den-tificationf thenovelwith n ironicconsciousness, e Man's characterization firony spersuasive.2' t is insufficient,owever, reciselynsofar s it gnoresthedevelopmental chemathat tructureshe formal emporalityf rony, egardlessof whether tsduration s the nstantaneous pperceptionofa split onsciousnessor the extended narrative imeof the novel. For as inthe case ofthe exemplary,itis precisely herecognition f a perpetualinadequacyhat regulatesthepeda-gogical effect f an ironic aesthetic n a continuous"strivingo attain"which, sindeed de Man putsit, ppears as "an endlessprocessthat eads to no synthesis"(BI, 220). Onlythisdivisionofthesubject,betweenthematerial nd the formal,the interested nd the ethical, r, nthe terms f Baudelaire's essay"De l'essencedu rire,"on which de Man leans, the inferior nd the superior,produces theethicalSubject as a formalrepresentativef the human.Accordingly, e Man'sassertion hat,forBaudelaire, superioritynd inferioritybecomemerely patialmetaphors o ndicate discontinuitynd a pluralityf evelswithin subject hatcomes to know tself yan increasingdifferentiationromwhat s not" BI, 213),is notonlyerroneous butdepends on a significantuppressionof theexplicitly"universalhistorical" rameworkfBaudelaire's essay.Within oth the ndividualman and withinhumanity n general,Baudelaire contends, hecapacity o per-ceive thecomic,and eventually otranscend t nthe aesthetic f a "poesie pure,"is a productofspecifically istorical ulture.The claritywithwhichBaudelaire'sremark ndicatesthe relationbetweenthe double natureof man and the foldingover of the history f "l'homme"withthatof "l'humanite"'-anothermode of"dedoublement"-makes itworth uotingatsomelength:The comic, hepower f aughter,ies nthe newho aughs nd n nowayntheobjectof aughter. he manwhofalls oesnot augh thisownfall, nlesshe is a philosopher,a manwho hasacquired, rom abit, he apacityo dividehimselfsededoubler]apidlyandobserves a disinterestedpectatorhephenomenafhis elf ... Comparing,sweare entitledo,humanityoindividualman l'humanitgl'homme],e see thatprimitivenations,ust likeVirginie,annot onceive f caricaturendhaveno comediestheholy

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scriptures, fwhatevernation,never augh); and that, dvancing ittle y ittle oward hecloudypeaks of intelligence, r bentover the dark furnacesofmetaphysics,henationsbegin to laugh diabolicallywithMelmoth's augh; and finally hat, f n these same ultra-civilizednationsan intelligence riven bysuperiorambitionwishes to crossthe limits fworldly ride and launch itself oldlytowardpure poetry,n thispoetry,impidand pro-found as nature, aughterwillbe lacking s in thesoul of the Sage.22Given ts ronicpremises, t sall themore strikinghat hispassageshouldrepro-duce so accurately he developmental chemaofaesthetic istoryn tsmovementfrom hesupposed primitivencapacity orself-reflexiveisinteresthrough hedivisionofthesubject, nd ofsubjectfrom ubject, hat hisentails, o a possibletranscendenceof that divisionin an identity etweenthe purestartifice ndnature.Far from epresenting dismantlingf the historical orm faesthetics,ronybelongsin itsvery tructurewithin heformaldevelopmental emporalityftheaesthetic. t isaccordinglynterestingonote, nsofar s de Man attempts oasso-ciate ronywith llegory ncontradistinctiono the symbol, hathe evinces sim-ilar blindnesswith egardto themetaironic tructure fsymbolistestheticstself.Forit s an entiremisreading f symbolistesthetics osuggest hat, n anysimplesense,"intheworldof thesymbol twouldbe possibleforthe magetocoincidewith he substance"or that thesymbol ostulates hepossibilityf an identityridentification"BI, 207). The error s appropriate, ince t s precisely he ronicstructure fsymbolistesthetics opresent very ymbol s, ineffect,hesymbolof an error: thatis to say,the reflection pon any signor objectpresentedassymbolic ntails therecognition f its nadequacyto thetotalityhat t s held torepresent.Precisely his nadequacy giveswayto an ironic methodologyf sym-bolismthatcauses thesubjectto seektoconstitute he truth r totality hichtheobject is inadequate to represent.Thus, to cite a quite representative assagefrom Samuel TaylorColeridge'sThe Friend,n whichhe is discussingthe com-municationof truth hrough a right hough nadequate notion":Observe, how graciouslyNature instructs er human children.She cannot give us theknowledge derivedfrom ightwithout ccasioningus at first o mistake magesof reflec-tionfor ubstances.But thevery onsequencesof the delusion ead inevitablyo itsdetec-tion; and out of the ashes of theerrorrisesa new flower fknowledge.We notonly see,but are enabled to discoverbywhat meanswe see. So too we are under thenecessity,ngiven circumstances, f mistaking square fora round object; but ere the mistakecanhave any practicalconsequences, it is not onlyremoved,but in its removal givesus thesymbol f a newfact, hatofdistance.23Symbolistpedagogy shares the structure f the exemplaryprecisely nsofaraswhat s involved n every nstance s theproductionof a disappointment r un-deception.And as becomesvery lear in theabovepassage,what this nvolves salways n ironicrelationbetween henecessarilyssumednaiveperceiver nd thesuperior consciousness.

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It is,of course,the function f a liberalpedagogyto produce that ronicrela-tion not onlybetweenubjects, s in thefirstnstance hrough chooling,butalsowithin ach subjectas an internalized thical attitude.We might rgue thattheconditionof such an ironicdisposition s the fundamentalprerequisitefortheinculcationof ideologysince it assumes,as an internalmechanismof themostformal nd "transferrable" ind, thesubordination f theindividualto theuni-versal.24t is at thispointthatpedagogynecessarily pens on to thepolitical.Furthermore, houghthismayseemsurprising iventhe extent owhich heironicmode ishabitually ssociatedwith certainkindofautonomy fjudgment,there is an intimate ink between the ironic and the institutionalnsofar s theironic is a moderatherthan an incidental ttitude.Exactly nasmuch as liberalpedagogy, s a consequence of tsexemplary tructure,s drawntoward n ironicdisposition or displacement)of power/knowledge elations, ythe same tokenirony, s a mode, is inseparablefrom splitdisposition fsuperiority/inferiorityor of latent and manifest onsciousnessthat must alwaysmake an example ofsomeone. The ironic attitude s the internalizedmodalityof the institutionalgeographyof the classroom.The ironicattitude s, accordingly, he subjectivecounterpart o the dea ofthecanon,sinceonly nrelation oexamples subjecttoa universalizing ormalization an an ironicpedagogytakeplace. As thebodyof"exemplaryproductsoftaste" hroughwhich heudgment s cultivated oreachsubject,a canon is indispensableto that formalization f the udgment whoseprogressivenature is inspiredby ts ownperpetualinadequacy to thatexampleofexamples,the ideal. The subjective elation o thecanon implies, herefore,progressivenarrative faesthetic onsciousnesswhoseassimilative orce s in nowaydiminished-rather, t saugmented-by itsformalnterminability.aradox-ically,however,what the canonical examples exemplifys the "grounds deep-seated and shared alikebyallmen,underlying heir greement nestimatingheformsunder whichobjects re giventothem" CJ, 17,p. 75). There isa tension,ifnot a contradiction,n otherwords,between hefunctionf the canon as a bodyofexamples subjectedto udgment to theend of itsdevelopment nd the lessonof thecanon,which s the transhistoricaldentityr equivalenceofjudgmentsoftaste s ofproductsofgenius.25 his paradox,whichperhapsmarks hetransitionfromthe historicalrelativism f the Enlightenment o the developmentaluni-versalhistories f the nineteenth entury,s onlyresolvablebysubordinatingspatialdistribution f differingulturalproductsand judgmentsto a temporalmodel of aestheticdevelopmentthat entailsan ethical udgment as to the ade-quacyofany givenhistorical roductorjudgmentto the deal. The form nwhichany udgmenttakesplace alwaysremains dentical; hedevelopment fjudgmenttakesplace through he ncreasing utonomy f ts phere, nthe ndividualor inthespecies.Out of thisparadox and itsresolutionwill mergetheexplicitlyevel-opmental aestheticpedagogies thatrun throughthe nineteenth enturyfromFriedrich Schiller to MatthewArnold, though these will in turn come to be

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hauntedby hefundamental poriaofaesthetics, amely he difficulty,iven heirhistorical laims,of accountingforthecontinuing ppeal of ancientartifacts.26This slippage from he aesthetic o the ethical s,as we have seen,not a mis-readingof the aestheticbut an elaborationof a productive ontradiction hat san inevitableconsequence of the universalizing laimsof aestheticphilosophyevenwhere tseemsmost resistant opractical pplication.There is,accordingly,no clear demarcationbetweenKant's"philosophical"deductionof theaestheticand, for example, Schiller'spedagogical Verwendungf Kantianideas: the latteris not so much a "regression" s, as in Hegel's perceptionof it,a completionofthe ogicof the Third ritique.27 rom ts nception, esthetics ivesthe example toa pedagogy withwhich t can scarcelydispense,requiring hatpedagogy as themeans to constitutehe very pace whichgrounds theverisimilitudef itsexam-ples. This space being thatof "commonsense," t provides n turn the funda-mentalconditionbothfortheformation fpolitical ubjects n thespecific ormof "representative"ndividualsand for the apparent self-evidence f the canonas a body of representative exts.What thismeshingof the aestheticand thepoliticalwithinthe fieldof pedagogy implies is thatany sustainedattempttorethink he natureand function f cultural ducationfrom radicalperspectivemust pass by wayof a priorcritiqueofthe political ultureofrepresentation.nthe absence of such a critique,radicalpedagogywill continue to reproduce, atthe"microscopic" evelofits mplicit ractices, heprocessesofideological nter-pellationthat tsexplicit endency eeks todisrupt.Notes1. Immanuel Kant, Critique fJudgement,rans.with nalytical ndexes byJamesCreedMeredith (Oxford, 1982), ? 60, p. 226-27, referred o in the text hereafter s CJ.Citations n German from he Third ritiquere fromKritik erUrteilskraft,d. WilhelmWeischedel Frankfurt-am-Main,974),citedthroughoutn the text s KU. The allu-sions to GeorgLukaics nd MikhailBakhtin re,ofcourse,toTheoryf heNovel, rans.Anna Bostock Cambridge,Mass., 1971),esp. chaps. 1and 3; and to TheDialogic mag-

ination: ourEssays, d. Michael Holquist,trans.CarylEmerson and Holquist (Austin,Tex., 1981). Bakhtinremarks ypicallyntheessay Epic and the Novel"that the epicworldknowsonlya singleand unifiedworldview, bligatorynd indubitably rue forheroes as well as for authors and audiences" (35). It should be remarkedfromtheoutset thatforKant the organicnatureof such a communitys alwaysalready theproductof an art,dependenton the form f the "as if" which, s we shall see,governsall aesthetic productions. t is not,therefore, primalcondition of the human dis-rupted bytheadventof modernity s, withvarying ffect,tappears for Luka'csandBakhtin.This, as I argue at theend of this ssay, s closelyrelated to the ronic truc-tureofexemplarypedagogy.2. I have discussed thespecificallyolitical unction f aesthetic ulture n David Lloyd,"Arnold,Ferguson,Schiller:AestheticCulture and the Politics f Aesthetics," ultural

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Critique 2 (Winter 1985-86): 137-69; and in "Analogies of Aesthetics: The Politics ofCulture and the Limits of Critique" (unpublished); in both I attempted to delineatesome of the crucial historical determinants on the emergence of a doctrine of aestheticculture in late-eighteenth-century Germany. The best account of the sociohistoricalcondition of Germany and of its bourgeois intelligentsia at this epoch is still W. H.Bruford,Germanyn the ighteenthentury: heSocialBackgroundf he iterary evival(1935; reprint ed., Cambridge, 1959). See also Georg Lukaics, "Zur AesthetikSchillers," in Werke, ol. 10, Problemeder AesthetikNeuweid and Berlin, 1969), 18-19,26-27, on the constraint on the German bourgeoisie to conceive of attaining theresults of a bourgeois revolution without engaging in an actual revolution. More gen-erally, ee Nicolao Merker,An denUrspriingener deutschendeologie:Revolution ndUtopie imjakobinismus, trans. Manfred Buhr (Berlin, 1984), on the political situationof the German bourgeois intellectuals. In "Kant und die Wende zur Aesthetik," Zeit-schrriftfuirhilosophische orschung 16 (1962): 252, Odo Marquard raises the question,in this context, as to whether the aesthetic should be seen as the instrument or thesubstitute for the political realization of ethical ideals.3. I have elaborated the political function of the formalism of bourgeois aesthetics moreextensively in Lloyd, "Arnold, Ferguson, Schiller," esp. 166-68; and in "Genet's Gene-alogy: European Minorities and the Ends of the Canon," Cultural Critique 6 (Spring1987): 161-85, esp. 171-72.4. I should remark from the outset that since writing the firstdraft of this essay, I havebeen struck by Cathy Caruth's conclusions on the narrative form of examples in therather different context of the Critique ofPure Reason. As she remarks in her brilliantessay "The Force of Example: Kant's Symbols," Yale French Studies 74 (1988): 26, onaccount of the personification of philosophy itself "the mediation provided by theexample must, therefore, be understood in narrative terms." I seek here only toextend that remark to the structure of the example as such.5. Karl Marx makes the celebrated comment in TheEighteenth rumaireofLouis Bonaparte(Moscow, 1977), 11, that the participants in the French Revolution "performed thetask of their time in Roman costume and withRoman phrases." The shiftfrom Romanto Greek models as a crucial element in the formation of post-Enlightenment theoriesof culture has been apparent at least since Walter Pater's essay on Winckelmann in TheRenaissance. But the most important recent study is Martin Bernal's TheFabricationofAncient reece, 785-1985, vol. 1 of BlackAthena: heAfro-Asiaticoots fClassicalCiv-ilization New Brunswick, N.J., 1987).6. A full demonstration of the antirepresentational formofbarricades and guerrilla war-fare would require another essay. Crucial to both, however, is the breakdown of theprocess of temporal deferral constitutive of the political culture of representation andits replacement by the dramatically spatial disposition of social relations as relationsof conflictingforces. T.J. Clark's "The Picture of the Barricade," chap. 1 of TheAbsoluteBourgeois:Artistsnd PoliticsnFrance, 848-1851 (Greenwich,Conn., 1973), is pecu-liarly suggestive on the difficultiesof representing artisticallythe barricades thrownup by the people at the very point at which the possibilityof their being representedpolitically has collapsed. The breakdown of representative politics is what Marx in TheEighteenth rumaire perceives as the criticalelement of 1848 and the Bonapartist coup.In more general terms, Michel Foucault remarks programmatically on the necessityto spatialize discursive forms in order to analyze the disposition of power relations:

Once knowledge can be analysed in terms of region, domain, implantation,displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which

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knowledge functions s a form of power and disseminatesthe effects fpower.... Metaphorising hetransformationsfdiscourse n a vocabularyof time necessarily eads to the utilisation f the model of individualcon-sciousnesswith ts ntrinsic emporality. ndeavouringon theother hand todecipher discourse throughthe use of spatial, strategicmetaphorsenablesone to grasp precisely he pointsat whichdiscourses are transformed n,through, nd on thebasisof relations fpower.

"Questions of Geography," n PowerlKnowledge:electednterviewsnd OtherWritings,1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans.Gordon et al. (New York,1980), 69-70. I wouldonly contend, as throughoutthisessay,that at any givenmomentthe apparently"intrinsic" emporality f the ndividual s produced, nthe present nstancepedagog-ically. he geographyofclassroomrelations s a classic nstance f the temporalizationof power relations n whicharbitrary ispositionsof authority re legitimatedbyappeal to the transcendental emporalityf theexemplary.Whatgivesthis ocus ofauthority tsverisimilitudes the foldingover of this nstitutionalemporalitywithwhat appears as the "intrinsic" emporality fthe ndividual ubject.7. The argument oncerning he social and developmental haracter f taste s made atCJ, ? 41, pp. 155-56. I have discussedtherelationbetween social developmentandthe narrative nternal o each act ofjudgment more fullyn"Analogiesof Aesthetics."In "Parergon,"Jacques Derrida makes the suggestivebut unfortunately undevel-oped" comment hat

If on the other hand a determinate nthropology ntervenesn this ritiqueof aestheticudgment, a whole theory f history,f society,nd of culturemakesthedecisionat what s the mostformally riticalmoment.This theoryweighs upon theframeswith ll itscontents.In Truthn Painting, rans.GeoffBennington nd Ian McLeod (Chicago, 1987), 105.This essay s intendedtoelaborate thisobservation.8. See again Caruth's"Force of Example," 25, wherethe lifeof philosophy s seen todepend on the ifelessness fmatter, chiasmatic arrative hat heattaches oa Chris-tian narrative fredemption.The ethicalnarrative funiversalhistory hat nformsexemplarypedagogy is easily envisagedas a seculartransposition f theredemptivenarrative f Christianitynd clearly etainsmuchof tstemporalfigurality.9. I am indebted forthis bservation o T.W. Adorno's exposition f the "primacy f theobject" n the late essay "Subjectand Object," n TheEssential rankfurtchoolReader,ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt New York, 1978), esp. 502-4.10. See Immanuel Kant, Critique fPureReason,trans. Norman Kemp Smith London,1978), 178.11. Shoshana Felman'sveryfine ssay "Psychoanalysisnd Education: Teaching Termin-able and Interminable," n "The Pedagogical Imperative: Teaching as a LiteraryGenre,"YaleFrench tudies 3 (1982): 21-44, is instructive,fnotexemplary, f ironicaccounts of pedagogy, especially in its appeal to the potential interminabilityfteaching.This is open to critiquenotsimplyfor theformalism f itsanalysis,whichentirely gnoresthematterfteaching, ut also insofar s itoverlooks he nstitutionalgeographyof bothpsychoanalysisnd pedagogythat horesup the effect fmastery,esoteric or not, even in the moment of its self-critique. atya Mohanty's"RadicalTeaching,Radical Theory:The AmbiguousPolitics fMeaning," nTheoryn the lass-room, d. CaryNelson (Urbana, Ill., 1986), 149-76, is a forceful ritiqueof thisandseveral otheressays n thesamevolume fortheirpurely transcendental" adicalism.12. KU, 299. I cite the German here since theEnglishtranslation f vormachenwhichmy

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German dictionary efines, mong others things, s als Beispiel ienen) s "illustrate"(CJ,? 60, p. 226) considerably educesthe semantic ield f the original erm.13. Jacques Derrida's"Economimesis," rans.R. Klein,Diacritics 1, no. 2 (Summer1981):3-25, is an indispensableanalysis ftheproblematic fgenius n theCritiquefjudge-mentn relation to thedifferentiationf the aesthetic phere. TimothyGould's "TheAudience of Originality:Kant and Wordsworthn the Receptionof Genius," n EssaysinKant'sAesthetics,d. Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer Chicago, 1982), 179-93, is a usefulaccount of the relationbetweenthe definition f genius and the possibility f thecommunicabilityf itsproductions.14. Derrida commentson this passage and on the punning differentiationetweenNachahmungnd Nachmachungn"Economimesis," 0-11.15. This formal dentity f the mode ofjudgmentcan also be seen interms fprinciples:see Immanuel Kant,On EducationAnnArbor,Mich., 1960), 9: "Uniformityan onlyresultwhen all men act accordingtothesameprinciples,whichprincipleswould haveto become with hem secondnature."That thepoetnowconforms utonomously oothers' udgments san indexthatprinciples fjudgmenthavebecome second naturein him.16. The otherdistinction o be made here is thatwhich Kant makes betweengenius andscience: science can be communicatedmethodically ysheer imitation, nd distinc-tions n achievement re ofdegree,notkind; geniuscan neverbe communicated.Bythesame token, cience s progressive nd indefinitely erfectiblewhereasgeniushasreached its imit CJ,? 47, pp. 169-70). On thisdistinction,nall probability,homasDe Quinceybased his famousdistinction etween he iterature fknowledge nd theliterature f power,designatingbythe formerworksof practical nformation, romcookery ogeometry,ythe atterworks fthe magination.t isperhapsan importantindex of the receptionof Kant in England thatDe Quinceyeffectivelylides the dis-tinction etween taste nd geniushere: the readerrepeatstheworkof the author andis endowed therebywith some of the latter's power."See De Quincey,"AlexanderPope," in Works,ol. 8 (Edinburgh,1863), 5-9.17. Thomas Huhn has argued to me thatthis rgument an be givena positivevalency,reading "theparadox of theexemplary" s "the revelation nd critiqueof pervasivemis-identityecause it alone refuses oforgeyet nothermis-identity";ersonalcom-munication,16January1989. This is potentially veryforceful ritiqueofmyargu-ment and raises the opportunityo remark hat t sprecisely he burden ofthis ssaytocritiquefrom tsverygroundsthebynow habitual transformationf "the affirma-tivecharacterof culture" nto itsnegative, ritical, ut still pecular image. For thisstrategy f Left aesthetics eavesunbroached thenecessary askofcritiquing he con-stitutive ole of aesthetic ulturewithin he totalformation fthepolitical ultureofrepresentation, taskwhich take tobe fundamental oanycurrent ethinkingf thepolitics fcultural ducation.18. Derrida comments n"Parergon,"108,of a similarpassage of the Critiquefjudgementthat

The thirdCritique epends inan essentialmanner-these examplesshow t-on a pragmatic nthropology nd on whatwouldbe called, n morethan onesense, a reflexivehumanism.This anthropologistic ecourse,recognized nits uridical and formal gency,weighsmassively, y tscontent, n this up-posedly pure deduction of aestheticudgment.19. The German word that Kant uses throughout he ThirdCritique or"represent" svorstellen.lthoughOdo Marquardwrites xtensivelynd suggestivelyf a "strikt er-

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tretbare rkenntnissubjekt"a strictlyepresentable ubject) n "Kantund die Wendezur Aesthetik," 44, the concept of vertreten,ith ts double valence of interchangeand representation,s as yetonly mplicitn the structure fKant'sthought.OnlyinSchiller's etters n theAestheticducation fMan does the usage of vertretenegintobeattachedto aestheticworks, nd this stillprecedes the modern politicalusage of thetermforparliamentary epresentation. have discussedthese terms urthern"Anal-ogies of Aesthetics."20. Paul de Man, "The Rhetoric f Temporality,"n Blindnessnd nsight: ssaysn the het-oric fContemporaryriticism,nd ed. (London, 1983), 187-228; cited nthetexthere-after s BI.21. Cf. BI, 210. Franco Moretti, n TheWay ftheWorld: heBildungsroman n EuropeanCultureLondon, 1987), 98, emphasizesthe inkagebetween rony nd thenovel madebyBakhtin and YuriLotman. I should perhapsremarkhere thatMoretti's ccountofthe relationbetween ronyand the impossibilityf achievedreconciliation eems tome far more persuasive than de Man's in its accountof the contradictionsnherentwithin ronic representation.de Man's circumvention f the relationbetween ronyand the novel even involveshim in what is almost an uncharacteristicmomentofinverted iterary-historicalositivismn remarking hat inGermany, or nstance, headventof a fullyfledged ronic consciousness . . certainly oes not coincidewithparallelblossomingofthe novel" BI, 210).22. Charles Baudelaire, "De l'essencedu rire et generalementdu comique dans les artsplastiques," n Oeuvres ompletesParis,1980), 694-95; mytranslation.23. Samuel TaylorColeridge, TheFriend:A Series fEssays oAid in the ormationfFixedPrinciplesnPolitics, orals, ndReligion,with iterarymusementsnterspersedLondon,1899), 26. The "Essayson Method," n thesame work, re devotedto theexpositionofphilosophicalmethod nterms fthe continualdiscovery f the nadequacyofany"idols"to representthetruth dequately. n "The Forceof Examples," 29-30, CathyCaruth gives a brilliantdemonstration f the relational tructure f Kant's symbolsthat s entirely oherentwith his nalysis f themethodology fsymbolism.24. In a quite literal ense,JohnStuartMill understands his onnectionbetweenpoliticsand pedagogyas requiring heagencyof the state ntheestablishment f educationalinstitutions hoseprincipal nd is theformation f citizens. ee OnRepresentativeov-ernment,n Utilitarianism,iberty,nd RepresentativeovernmentLondon, 1910), passimbutesp. 280: "Universalteachingmustprecede universal nfranchisement." entralto Louis Althusser's nalysisof "ideologicalstateapparatuses"are the schools,a factoftenoverlookedbydiscussionsof hisessay,whichhave tended toemphasizeitspsy-choanalyticaldimension.What Althussergraspsmostclearly n theconceptof inter-pellation,which ndeed has close affinities iththe momentof self-consciousnessnBaudelaire's pratfalls,s thatthe formation rhailingoftheSubject nanygiven ndi-vidual is the formal onditionforthetransformationfthat ndividual ntothe deo-logical form of the citizen. See Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological StateApparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation),"n Lenin and Philosophynd OtherEssays, rans. Ben BrewsterNew York, 1971), 152-57, 174,and 180-83.25. One can see the tension n Baudelaire's "De l'essencedu rire" between the comic asindex of a "dualite permanente" n humanity nd thedevelopmentalhistory f thecomicas a versionofthis ruxofthe aesthetic. . S. Eliot's ssertion, n theotherhand,of an "ideal order"amongartworks s an extremeversion f theattempt oescape thiscrux,butithas as itsevident onsequence thenecessityo substitutemyth orhistory.See "Tradition and the Individual Talent," n Selectedrose, d. JohnHayward Har-mondsworth, ng., 1963), 23. The poeticresult f the abandonmentof the develop-

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mental function f the aesthetic, orrelative o Eliot'spoliticalroyalism nd religiousAnglicanism,s not so muchclassicism s thedeliberate nd defensivedeployment fcliche such that t becomes impossiblefor the reader to claim identification iththe"experience"of poet,martyr,r saint, n untraversable ap havingbeen constitutedbetween the postulated inimitable xperience and the evacuated formsof the lan-guage. Murdern theCathedralnd FourQuartetsre exemplary f thismode boththe-matically nd performatively.he deployment f cliche nthisfashion s of coursenomore thanan extensionofthe dialecticof originalitynd reproducibilityesignatedironically s a conditionof modernart byBaudelaire's comment hat he poet'sfunc-tion is to produce new cliches.See also WalterBenjamin,"On Some Motifs n Bau-delaire," n lluminations,d. Hannah Arendt, rans.HarryZohn (London, 1973), 194:Baudelaire "went o far as to proclaim s hisgoal 'the creationof a cliche.' n thishesaw the conditionof everyfuturepoet; he had a lowopinionof those whowere notup to it."26. The clearest tatement f theproblem sprobablyKarl Marx's:"The difficultye areconfrontedwith snot,however, hat funderstanding ow Greekart and epicpoetryare associatedwith ertainforms f social development.The difficultys that hey tillgiveus aestheticpleasureand are in certain espects egardedas a standard nd unat-tainable ideal"; "Introduction"to A Contributiono theCritique fPoliticalEconomy(Moscow, 1970), 217. The best discussionof thisproblem, nd themost convincingattempt t itsresolutionfor materialist esthetics,s MichaelMcKeon's "The Originsof Aesthetic Value," Telos57 (Fall 1983): 63-82. For a compellingaccount of theuntranscendable"antinomicstructure f the aestheticsof the bourgeois age," seeFerene Feherand AgnesHeller, The Necessitynd the rreformabilityfAesthetics,"in Feher and Heller, eds., Reconstructingesthetics:Writingsf theBudapestSchool(Oxford, 1986), 17 and passim.27. Paul de Man, in a late lecture ntitled Kant and Schiller," haracterizes eceptions fKant of which Schiller s exemplary s "a regressionfrom he incisiveness nd fromthe criticalmpactof theoriginal";unpublishedpaper, p. 2 (I am indebtedtoLindsayWatersforsending thistranscript o me). Hegel's remarkon Kant's completion bySchillercan be found in the ntroductionotheAesthetics,rans. T.M. Knox (Oxford,1979), 61.

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