waltz - america as a model for the world

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  • 8/12/2019 Waltz - America as a Model for the World

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    America s a Model for heWorld?8.My alculationsromWorld esources1990-91: ReportyThe World esourcesInstituteNewYork:Oxford niversityress,1990), able 6.3.9. More han 0% of homicidesn theUSare ntra-racial.n trendsnddifferentialsnhomicideates eemy HistoricalrendsnViolent rime: uropendtheUnitedtates,inT. R. Gurr, d.,ViolencenAmerica: heHistoryfCrimeNewburyark, A: Sage,1989): 1-54.

    About heAuthorTedRobert urrTed Robert urr, hoformerlyaughttNorthwesternniversitynd theUniversityofColorado,oined heUniversityfMary-landfacultyn1989 s professorfgovern-mentndpoliticsndDistinguishedcholarof theCenteror nternationalevelopmentand Conflict anagement.mong is15

    books ndmono-graphsreWhyMenRebel,which ontheAPSA's Wood-rowWilson rize sthe est ook f1970, nd the orth-coming inoritiestRisk:DynamicsndOutcomesfEthno-political onflictntheContemporaryWorld.

    America s a Model fortheWorld?A Foreign PolicyPerspectiveKenneth . Waltz,UniversityfCalifornia, erkeleyIf theUnitedtates, r f nycountry,ould erve s a model ortheworld, e would ave obelievethatmost fthe mpetusehindforeignoliciess nternallygenerated.ut f heforeignoliciesofnationsreaffectedn mportantways y heplacementfcountriesinthe nternational-politicalystem,ormore imply y heirelativepower,hen ocountryanade-quatelyerve s a model or thers.I. HowthePlacementfStatesAffectsheir olicies

    Because hroughoutost ftheyearsince he econdWorldWartheUnitedtates ndthe ovietUnionwere imilarlylaced y heirpower,heir xternalehaviorsshould ave howntrikingsimilarities.idthey? es,morethan asusuallyeen ealized. hebehaviorfstates anbecomparedonmanyounts. heir rmamentpoliciesndtheirnterventionsabroad retwo fthemostrevealing.n theformerount,heUnitedtatesnthe arly 960sundertookhe argesttrategicndconventionaleace-timeilitarybuild-upheworld asyet een.Wedid o even s Khrushchevastryingatonce ocarryhroughmajorreductionnthe onventionalorcesandtofollow strategyfminimumdeterrence,ndwedid o even

    thoughhebalance fstrategicweapons reatlyavoredheUnitedStates. s one should ave xpected,the oviet nion oonfollowednAmerica'sootsteps,hus estoringthe ymmetryfgreat-powerbehavior. nd o itwasthroughmost f theyears ftheCold War.Advancesmadebyonewere uicklyfollowedy he ther, ithheUnited tates lmostlwayseadingtheway.Allowingor eographicdifferences,he verallimilarityf

    their orces asapparent.hegroundorcesf the oviet nionwere trongerhan hose ftheUnitedtates, ut n naval orceshebalance fadvantage asreversed.The Soviet nion'sargelyoastalnavy raduallyecamemore fablue-waterleet,ut ne of imitedreach. tsnavy ever ad morehanhalf he onnagef ours.Year fteryear,NATO countriespentmore ndefensehan heWarsaw reatyOrganizationountriesid,but heir

    Thebattle fQuasinias ear antiago, une 898. ithographyKurz& Allison,898.LibraryfCongress.December 991 667

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    InFocus

    Decatur's conflictwith heAlgerine tTripoli. llustrationyChappel. Library fCongress.troops emainedoughlyqual nnumbers.ThemilitaryorcesftheUnitedStatesndthe oviet nionremainednrough alance,nd, sweshould ave xpected,heirmili-tary octrinesonverged. e accusedthem ffavoring ar-fightingverdeterrentoctrines,hilewedevelopedwar-fightingoctrinenthename fdeterrence.rom he1960s nward,riticsf ourmilitarypolicy rgedheUnited tates oreconstitutetsusablewar-fightingcapability. efore e became ecre-tary fDefense, elvin . Lairdwrote hat Americantrategyustaim tfighting,inning,ndrecovering, strategyhat equiresthe bilityowagenuclear ar ndthewillingnesso strike irst. necanmultiplyilitarynd civilianstatementso similarffectver hedecades. speciallynthe1970snd1980s,weaccused he oviet nionofstrivingormilitaryuperiority.nturn,heRepublicanlatformf1980 ledgedhat Republicanadministrationould eestablishAmericantrategicsuperiority. 'RonaldReagan s presidentoftenedthe spirationithoutliminatingtbymakingthisgoaltoestablishmarginfsafety or heUnitedStatesmilitarily.ilitaryompeti-tion etweenhe wo ountriesproducedts xpectedesult: hesimilarityfforcesnd doctrines.Comparisonnthe econd ount,

    interventionistehavior,equiressomediscussionecause ur onvic-tion hat heUnited tates as beenthe tatusuo,and the oviet nionthe nterventionist,ountryistortsourview freality.heUnitedStates,ike he oviet nion, asoftenntervenednothers'ffairsandhasspent fairmount ftimefightingeripheralars.MostAmericansaw ittle eed oexplainouractions,ssumed ohavebeennthepursuitf egitimateationalinterestsnd of nternationalustice,and ittle ifficultynexplainingheSovietUnion's, ssumed ohavebeen imed tspreadingommunismacross heglobe y nymeans vail-able.Americanssuallynterpretedthe ovietUnion's ehaviorntermsof tspresumedntentions.ntentionsaside, ur nd theirctions avebeen imilar. heUnitedtates, orexample,ntervenedilitarilyodefendlient tates ndsupportedtheirmbitionsoexpandnChina,Korea, ndVietnam.he SovietUnion, or xample,ctednAfghanistans wedid nVietnamand ntervenedirectlyr ndirectlyinAngola,Mozambique,ndEthiopia.BeforeWorldWar I, both heUnitedtatesndthe oviet nionhaddevelopeddeologieshat ouldeasily ropelhemounilateralactionnthename f nternational

    duty:nterventionistiberalismntheonecountry,nternationalcommunismn the ther. either,however, idelyxportedts deologyearlier. hepostwarforeignoliciesofneitherountryan beunderstoodasidefrom he hangedtructurefinternationalolitics,xercisingtspressuresndprovidingts ppor-tunities. ore o than he ovietUnion, heUnited tates asactedall over he loben thename f tsown ecurityndtheworld's ell-being. hus,BlechmanndKaplanfound hat nroughly0yearsfollowing946 hegovernmentftheUnited tates sedmilitaryeansnoneway r anothero ntervenenthe ffairsf other ountriesbouttwice s often s didthe ovietUnion.2II. The ImplicationsfUnbalancedPower

    FrancoiseFen6lon, ho ivedfrom 651 o 1715,was Frenchtheologianndpoliticaldviserndone of thefirsto understandbalance fpowers a generalphenomenonatherhan smerelyparticularondition. e arguedhata countryisposingfgreaterowerthan thers o cannotong eexpectedo behavewith ecencyndmoderation.3istheoremasbeen

    Vietnam 967:Operation aker.PhotobySSG. Breedlove, SAPA.668 PS: Political cience& Politics

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    America s a Model for heWorld?well llustratedy uch owerfulrulerss Charles , LouisXIV,Napoleon,nd KaiserWilhelmI.Therewas notnecessarilyomethingwrong ithhe haracterfthoserulersroftheirountries.taminimum,t wasa surplusfpowerthat emptedhem oarbitraryndarrogantehavior.So long s theworldwasbipolar,theUnitedtates ndthe ovietUnionheld achotherncheck.Withhe rumblingfthe ovietUnion, ocountryrsetofcountriescanpresentlyestorebalance.Oneexpectsworesultso follow. espiteabundantood ntentions,heUnitedStateswill ften ct naccordancewithF6n6lon'sheorem.alance fpowerheoryeads netopredictthat thertates,f hey avechoice,will lock o theweakeride,for t sthe trongeride hatthreatenshem.Inrecentears avewe seenwhattheoryeadsustoexpect? fewexamples illhelp oanswer hequestion.residenteagan,whenasked t a press onferenceow ongwe would ontinueosupportheContra's ffortooverthrowheNicaraguanovernment,egan ogive fumblingnswer. hen,impatientith imself,esaid:Ohwell, ntilheyay uncle. VicePresidentush nFebruaryf1985explainedhemeaningf uncle.He laid eventipulationspon heNicaraguanovernment,hichnsum mountedosayinghat ntilNicaraguaevelopedgovernmentandsociety uchike urswewouldcontinueosupporthe pposition.4Senior fficialsntheReaganadministrationlevatedhe ightointerveneo the evel fgeneralprinciple.s one ofthemaid,wedebatedwhether ehad the ightto dictate he form fanothercountry's overnment.he bottomline was yes,that omerightsremorefundamentalhantheright fnations o nonintervention,ike therightsf individual eople .... [W]edon'thave theright o subvertdemocratic overnmentut we dohave theright gainst n undemo-cratic ne. 5 In managing o muchoftheworld'sbusiness or o long,theUnited tatesdeveloped ragetorule,which urpositionnthe worldnowenablesus to indtulge.hus,CharlesKrauthammerooksforward

    to anoverwhelminglyowerfulAmericaunashamedlyayingownthe ules f world rderndbeingpreparedo enforcehem. 6eemingtoreflecthe ame pirit,residentBush,na speech fAugust, 1990,a speechost n the xcitementfIraq's nvasionfKuwait,announcedhatwe would reparefor egionalhreatsinwhatevercorner ftheglobe heymay ccur.Buthowdo threatsrisingnoddcornersf theglobe onstitutedangersor s,and howmanythreatsf what ortwouldweneedtoprepareo meetfourconcernwere oprotectnly urvitalinterests?With enignntent,heUnited tateshasbehaved,nd untiltspower sbroughtntosemblancefbalance,willcontinueobehavenways hat nnoy ndfrightenthers.

    Thepowerfultatemay, ndtheUnited tates oes, hinkf tselfsacting or he akeofpeace, ustice,andwell-beingntheworld. utthese erms ill e definedothelikingfthepowerful,hichmayconflict ith hepreferencesndtheinterestsfothers.n internationalpolitics,verwhelmingower epelsand eads thers otryobalanceagainstt. With enignntent,heUnited tates asbehaved,nduntilitspowersbroughtnto semblanceofbalance,will ontinueobehave nways hat nnoyndfrightenthers.

    America'smanagementfthewaragainstraq, ndthe ubsequentreactionfothers,rovideellingexamples.heUnited tateskillfullyforged wide oalition fstatesnoppositiono raq's nvasionfKuwait, ut heUnited tatesopposed he ffortsfFrance ndothersofind peacefulettlementalong heway.TheUnitedtatespressedthertatesoagree hat heembargo ould xpirenJanuary15,unlessraqcomplied ith he

    United ations' esolutions,henmany ther tates referredogivethe mbargomore ime o work. heUnitedtates hose hedaywhenhewar hould eginnddeterminedhow t should efought,aining ellmore estructionrom he irthanimmediate ilitarybjectivesrequired.Many tates eacteds onewouldexpecto America'smakinghedecisions.give nly few xamples.Philippineoreign inisteraulManglapusalled heUnitedtatesconstable f theworld ndwondered hetherit wasnecessaryor evenf t s ust forAmericaoimpose newworld rder. rofessorSakujiYoshimuraf WasedaUniver-sityxpressedisdistresshisway:Americas a mightyountry-anda frighteningne . .. forbetter rworse heGulfwarbuilt newworldorderwith merica t thehead ..thiswill e fine s long s the est ftheworld cceptstsrole sAmerica'snderlings. nopposi-tionmemberf theDiet,MasaoKunihiro,bservedhat he feelingthatAmericas a fiercesomeountryisgrowingnJapan. '7nFrance,fears fAmericanmperialismerewidelyxpressednddebated.nearly eptemberf 1991 oreignministerolandDumasremarkedthat American ight eigns ithoutbalancing eight, ndJacquesDelors, residentftheEuropeanCommunityommission,autionedthat heUnited tatesmust ot akechargef theworld. oth fthemcalled n theUnited ationsnd theEuropean ommunityocounter-balanceAmericannfluence.Professor ichael oylehasshownhat arelyodemocraciesfightemocracies,ut ddsrightlythat hey ightlentyf wars gainstundemocratictates. he firstgeneralizations not as strong smanyhavethoughttto be. Not onlywas Germany democracyn 1914but also itsbeing democracy elpedto explain he outbreak f war.AsChancellorBethmann ollweglamented efore heevent,nterestssupportingherulingmajoritypushedforpolicies ure oaccumulate nemies orGermany.Junkersn the eastdemanded tariffagainstRussiangrain. ndustrialinterestsnthe northwestupportedthe Berlin o Baghdadrailroad nd

    December 991 669

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    InFocusthebuildingf a battlefleethatcould hallengeheBritishavy.Russia nd Britain ere nnoyedndfrightenedyGermanolicieshathelpedoforgendstrengthenheTriple ntente,hichnturnmadeGermanoliticalndmilitaryeadersentertainhoughtsffightingpreventivearbeforehe nemiesfGermanyould ecometillstronger.nemightdd thatn1812theUnited tates hose ofightwar gainsthe nly therountrythat ould hen e called emocratic,andthat atern the enturyhenorthernmericanemocracyfoughthe outhernne.Still, eacehasprevailed uchmore eliablymong emocraticcountrieshan lsewhere.n externalaswell s on nternalrounds,hope hatmore ountriesill ecomedemocratic.III. Conclusion

    Yetfor llofthe easons ivenabove,wecannot akeAmericarany therountrys a model or heworld.Wemightemindurselves

    thatnthepastdecade lonewe haveinitiatedhree ars eginningiththe neagainst renadandendingwithhe neagainstraq. n theinterveningar gainst anama,wenotonly iolatednternationalawbutwe violatedaws hatwe hadlargely ritten:amely,he harterof theOrganizationf AmericanStates. believehatAmericasbetterhanmost ations,fear hatit s not smuch etters manyAmericanselieve.n internationalpolitics,nbalancedower onsti-tutes dangervenwhen t sAmericanowerhats outofbalance.

    Notes1. Melvin . Laird, HouseDivided:America'strategyap Chicago: eneryRegney,962), p.53,78-79.2. Barry lechmanndStephen. Kaplan,Forcewithout ar:U.S.Armed orces s aPoliticalnstrumentWashington:rookingsInstitution,978).3. Herbertutterfield,The Balance fPower, nButterfieldndMartinWight,eds.,DiplomaticnvestigationsLondon:

    George llen Unwin,966), . 140.4. Excerptsrom emarksyVice resi-dentGeorge ush, ressRelease, ustin,Texas, ebruary8,1985.5. QuotednRobertW.Tucker,nterven-tion nd the eagan octrine,New ork:CouncilnReligionnd nternationalffairs,1985), . 5.6. InChristopherayne,TheUnipolarIllusion: mericanoreignolicynthe ostColdWarWorld. resentedo theWashingtontrategyeminar,pril 5, 1991,p. 21.7. Quotationsrefrombid., p.21-22.8. New York imes,France o U.S.: Don'tRule, eptember, 1991, .A8 no byline).

    About heAuthorKenneth .WaltzKenneth . Waltzisthe ordProfessorof nternationalRelationst theUni-versityfCaliforniaatBerkeley.e wasthepresidentfAPSA,1987-88.

    Politics, Political Science and thePublic InterestNortonE. Long, UniversityfMissouri-St. ouis

    Editor's ote:Norton . Long,Professormeritus,niversityfMissouri,t.Louis,was wardedhe1991JohnGausAwardhonoringlifetimef exemplarycholarshipntheoint raditionfpoliticalcienceand,more enerally,orecognizeachievementndencouragecholar-ship npublic dministration.The ward ommitteeaschairedbyJohn . Rohr,Virginiaoly-technicnstitutend StateUniversity,and ncludedarry ailey, empleUniversity;eane .Kirkpatrick,AmericannterprisenstitutendGeorgetownniversity.The ollowings the nnualGauslectureresentedyNorton . Longduringhe 7thAnnualMeeting.

    Marx saiduptonow hephiloso-phers avemerelynterpretedheworld. he mportanthings tochanget. Wethinkoliticsndpoliticalnstitutionsre mportantandworthyfstudyecause o animportantegree heyanfor oodor llchangeheworldwe ive n.Thestudyfpoliticsnemight opewouldyield nowledgehatmightpermitndencouragehangenthepracticefpoliticshatwouldimprovehehuman ondition.Inthe wentieshe tudyfpoliticsandpoliticalnstitutionsas ustemergings a separateisciplinefrom istory,aw andphilosophy.Thedepartmentst ColumbiandHarvard ere amed ublicaw and Norton. Long

    670 PS: Political cience& Politics

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