waking up! mindfulness in the face of bandwagons

^ Academy of Management Review2003. Vol, 28. No- 1. 54-70,

WAKING UP! MINDFULNESS IN THEFACE OF BANDWAGONS

C. MARLENE FIOLEDWARD J. O'CONNOR

University of Colorado at Denver

Economic and sociological theories explaining bandwagon behaviors, along withcognitive and behavioral theories ol decision making, do not lully address the processwhereby decision makers choose whether or not to jump on bandwagons. In thisarticle we model the interactions between mlndfulness as a decision-maker charac-teristic and the decision-making context, and we show the impact ot those interactionson managers' ability to discriminate In the lace of bandwagons. We illustrate theframework by applying it to recent integration and disintegration bandwagon behav-iors in the U.S. health care market.

Until recently, integration of hospitals, physi-cian groups, medical groups, and health planswas generally perceived to be the answer toovercapacity, rising costs, and contracting chal-lenges in U.S. health care markets. Health careleaders viewed it as a means of improving effi-ciency and effectiveness and of gaining marketshare (Weil, 2000). Such consolidation in themarketplace represents one of the most domi-nant health care trends of the past two decades,despite a lack of evidence as to its real value(Coddington, Fischer, Moore, & Clarke, 2000). Re-cently, increasing criticism of this trend led to acountertrend of disintegration, which dominatedthe health care merger and acquisition scene inthe late 1990s (Bellandi, 2000a; Lando, 2000). Bothof these trends represent bandwagon behaviors.

Bandwagons are diffusion processes wherebyindividuals or organizations adopt an idea,technique, technology, or product because oipressures caused by the number of organiza-tions that have already adopted it {Abrahamson& Rosenkopf, 1990). Bandwagon behaviors havebeen described in prior research as rangingfrom highly rational behaviors based on posi-tive externalities (Katz & Shapiro, 1985) to con-formist behaviors driven by social pressures to-ward isomorphism (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf,1993). In this paper we focus on adopters ofbandwagon behaviors who are driven to adoptbecause of social pressures.

We thank Devereaux Jennings, Kathleen Sutcliife, RayZammuto, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpfulcomments on earlier versions of this manuscript.

Sociocognitive theories have provided expla-nations of how social processes interact to resultin bandwagons (Van de Ven & Garud, 1993). Andsociological theories have provided significantinsight into the influence of ongoing social rela-tions (Granovetter, 1985) on the extent of diffu-sion of bandwagon behaviors. Left largely un-specified are characteristics of decision makersand the immediate decision context that influ-ence why a given decision maker is more or lesslikely to choose to follow a bandwagon. Draw-ing on theories of managerial and organization-al cognition, we develop a conceptual frame-work that clarifies the interactions between thescanning and information-processing mecha-nisms that characterize the immediate decisioncontext and the degree of mindfulness (a watch-ful and vigilant state of mind) that characterizesexecutive decision makers.

The paper adds value in that it complementsand extends macrolevel theories of bandwagonbehavior by exploring the microlevel processesunderlying the behavior. We know a lot abouthow bandwagons can animate cycles in whichincreases in the number of adopters raise band-wagon pressures, and those pressures, in tum,cause the number of adopters to grow (Abraham-son & Rosenkopf, 1993). We know very littleabout the microlevel decision context that influ-ences whether organizational leaders will makediscriminating choices that fit an organization'sunique circumstances in the face of such band-wagons, or whether they will simply follow thepack. Here we develop a framework to addressthat gap.

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2003 Fiol and O'Connor 55

Decision-making researchers have arguedthat accurate perceptions of the environmentlead to choices that better fit an organization'scircumstances (Tenbrunsel, Galvin, Neale, &Bazerman, 1996; Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993).In line with this reasoning, in a growing body ofresearch, scholars have focused on the need forenhanced decision structures (i.e., scanning andinformation-processing mechanisms that pro-vide access to information and support the pro-cessing oi that information) to improve percep-tual accuracy (e.g., Sutcliffe, 1994; Thomas et al.,1993). We argue that decision structures in-tended to be accuracy enhancing will be re-sisted if managers are mindlessly following abandwagon. Cognitive dissonance (Festinger,1967) would be too great if decision makers al-lowed themselves to become aware of data thatmight be inconsistent with the bandwagon be-haviors they are following.

We suggest that an emphasis on decisionstructures as the way to enhance perceptual ac-curacy actually may lead to the opposite of in-tended results. The widespread belief that en-hanced decision structures should lead togreater perceptual accuracy is likely to placepressure on decision makers to live up to thoseexpectations. If they feel pressure to accuratelyperceive the value of a particular bandwagonbehavior in the face of rapidly changing condi-tions, decision makers may actually end up hav-ing less perceptual accuracy. Felt pressures foraccuracy may lead to the threat-rigidity re-sponse (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981) ofsimplifying interpretations and relying on cog-nitive shortcuts that restrict and constrain indi-vidual choice (Fiol & Huff, 1992). We describe therole of decision-maker mindfulness that canmoderate this potentially dysfunctional effect offormal decision structures, thus contributing togreater discriminatory behavior in the face ofbandwagons. This represents the first attempt tomodel the interactions between mindfulness asa decision-maker characteristic and decisionstructures and to show the impact of those inter-actions on decision outcomes.

Throughout the paper we discuss the implica-tions of our framework within the context of U.S.health care. The U.S. health care market pro-vides numerous examples of bandwagon be-havior. Lee Kaiser, an eminent health care futur-ist, noted that

health care providers are "me too" folks. Theywait for someone else to do something first andthen they rush to copy it. . . . This copy-catbehavior can be seen in the rush to buy upphysician practices, in mergers, hospitals get-ting into HMOs. etc. It is difficult to get hospi-tals to innovate, and hard to prevent them fromcopying the fad of the moment (2000: personalcommunication).

A health care "fad of the moment" throughoutthe late 1980s and early to mid 1990s was inte-gration. A large number of health plans, hospi-tals, and physician groups became part of inte-grated health care systems (Coddington et al.,2000), despite the lack of evidence supportingsuch consolidation (Nerenz, 1992; Wheeler, Wick-izer, & Shorten, 1986).

Extant bandwagon theories provide insightsinto the pressures driving the health care inte-gration behaviors that rapidly diffused between1985 and 1995. Two of the most widely publicizedhealth care integration "success stories" wereColumbia and PhyCor, both founded in 1987. By1996 Columbia had become the tenth-largestemployer in the United States (Coddington et al.,2000), and PhyCor had enjoyed its run as one ofthe darlings of Wall Street. These stories, alongwith other frequently publicized examples of ap-parent integration success, increased the pres-sure on remaining health care leaders to join thebonanza, which then turned sour for many. Aswe describe later, however, some leaders took avery different path that required them to identifystrategic alternatives directly relevant to theirspecific organizational situation. Why? Here weseek to identify the microprocesses that influ-ence which path executive decision makers willchoose when faced with bandwagons.

After a brief review of macrotheories ofbandwagons, we turn to theories of cognition,which suggest the need for decision structuresthat will enhance perceptual accuracy. We ar-gue that such cognitive approaches havetended to treat information processing as dis-embodied, ignoring the role of the humanmind in the process. The remainder of the ar-ticle focuses on the impact of mindfulness ondecision-making processes and outcomes inthe face of bandwagons.

BANDWAGONS

Drawing on economic and sociological theo-ries, strategy researchers in the past decade

56 Academy o/ Management Review January

have made significant progress in understand-ing the macrolevel influencers of the extent ofbandwagon behavior in a given collective(Abrahamson, 1991; Abrahamson & Rosenkopf,1993; Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997; Rosenkopf& Abrahamson, 1999). The two types of theoriesthat have been forwarded to explain such band-wagon behaviors are rational-efficiency theo-ries {Katz & Shapiro, 1985) and theories of fads(Abrahamson, 1991). Rational-efficiency theo-rists argue that decision makers adopt an inno-vation because of expected efficiency or returns.Fad theorists claim that information about howmany adopters there are and who specificallyhas adopted the innovation, rather than infor-mation about the innovation itself, generatessocial pressure to conform to bandwagon be-haviors. Specifically, the greater the number ofadopters of the innovation, the more it becomestaken for granted that it is normal and legiti-mate {Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). In fact, organizationsmay adopt the innovation so as not to appearabnormal or illegitimate to their stakeholders(Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

The distinction between rational-efficiencyand fad bandwagons has led to highly produc-tive streams of economic and sociological re-search that have identified the factors causingbandwagon behaviors to diffuse. These streamsof research have also clarified the varying pre-disposition to adopt a bandwagon behavior inthe face of external pressures to conform. A firmwill adopt such a behavior only if the pressureto adopt exceeds the firm's threshold—the pointat which the strength of the bandwagon pres-sure to adopt is greater than the firm's predis-position against adopting (David, 1969).

Researchers have noted a number of factorsthat may influence adoption thresholds for agiven firm. For example, firm size may deter-mine its market power and, thus, may influencethe level of competitive bandwagon pressuredecision makers may feel (Rosenkopf & Abra-hamson, 1999). The reputation of early adoptersalso influences the extent of subsequent diffu-sion (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994). Finally,conditions of high ambiguity appear to influ-ence threshold levels. Under high-ambiguityconditions, bandwagon pressures tend to in-crease (Rosenkopf & Abrahamson, 1999). Theseexplanations are useful in clarifying the rate atwhich bandwagon behaviors diffuse from amacroperspective (Rogers, 1995). A complemen-

tary perspective that focuses on the interactiveeffects of the immediate decision-making con-text and the characteristics of decision makerson leadership choices offers an opportunity tobetter understand the microprocesses that un-derlie specific bandwagon decisions.

To address this opportunity, we turn to theo-ries of managerial and organizational cognition.From a cognitive interpretive perspective, real-ities—including the realities surrounding band-wagon behaviors—are socially constructed.This process of social construction occursamong decision makers within a firm (Weick,1995), resulting in convergence around particu-lar issues as important and worthy of attention.It also occurs among firms within an industry(Spender, 1989), resulting in widely adopted in-dustry "recipes" for success. Such social con-structions may fit a firm's particular circum-stances, leading to effective choice behaviors. Incontrast, the social constructions may lead tochoices that follow the majority, regardless oftheir fit with the particular circumstances of afirm.

The accuracy of managers' perceptions of thevalue of a particular bandwagon behavior to thefirm would appear to be a key determinant ofwhether or not it made sense to adopt the be-havior. In fact, cognition researchers have longargued that perceptual accuracy maximizes theeffectiveness of ensuing behaviors (Tenbrunselet al., 1996; Thomas et al., 1993), suggesting thatmanagerial accuracy should lower the predis-position of a firm to indiscriminately follow abandwagon that does not add value to the firm.What follows is a brief review of research oncognition, especially as it relates to enhancingthe perceptual accuracy of organizational deci-sion makers.

COGNITIVE PROCESSES AND BANDWAGONS

Social cognition is the study of how peoplemake sense of others and themselves and howcognitive processes influence behavior (Fiske &Taylor, 1991). Cognitive theories should there-fore tell us something about how decisionmakers make sense of bandwagons. Two basiccognitive processes characterize managers'sensemaking activities: scanning and inter-pretation (Thomas et al., 1993).

Scanning involves receiving information, andit has traditionally been seen as an antecedent


to interpretation {Daft & Weick, 1984). Scanningprovides the external intelligence that decisionmakers use. The frequency of scanning isthought to Indicate the amount of informationobtained about the environment (Hambrick,1982). Research has suggested that executives inhigh-performing firms scan more frequentlythan those in lower-performing firms (Daft, Sor-munen, & Parks, 1988). In these studies it is im-plicitly or explicitly assumed that there are ob-jective facts out there that managers canperceive more accurately if they obtain moreand better information (Stubbart, 1989).

Interpretation involves processing and under-standing the meaning of the received informa-tion. Interpretation is often viewed as the faultypart of the sensemaking process, because theuse of various heuristics and other cognitiveshortcuts to process information often leads toinaccuracies (Calori, Johnson, & Sarnin, 1992).Traditional views of interpretation assume thatone can maximize the accuracy of decision mak-ing by providing decision makers with more andbetter information (Stubbart, 1989) and by usingbetter decision mechanisms for sorting throughand interpreting the information (Sutcliffe, 1994).

Decisions and resulting action are the out-comes of scanning and interpretation processes,although researchers recognize the reciprocaleffects between them (Thomas et al., 1993). Con-tingency theorists have posited that successfulorganizations tailor their decisions and actionsto environmental conditions (Lawrence &Lorsch, 1967). This assumes the need for prioraccurate perceptions of the environment basedon scanning and interpretation activities. Fromthis perspective, to avoid bandwagon behaviorsthat add little or no value to a firm, it is impor-tant to enhance the accuracy of decision makers'perceptions of those behaviors and their fit withthe firm's particular circumstances.

Researchers have focused significant atten-tion on how to provide managers with more andbetter information through enhanced scanningand information-processing mechanisms. Theyhave argued that more accurate decision mak-ing results from enhanced decision structuresthat increase the speed with which managersreceive information and that expand the rangeof information managers receive (e.g., Gannon,Smith, & Grimm, 1992; Thomas & McDaniel, 1990;Yasai-Ardekani & Nystrom, 1996). Decision struc-tures are formal scanning mechanisms—for ex-

ample, formal scanning systems and proce-dures—and formal information-processingmechanisms—for example, computer-based de-cision tools (Daft & Lengel, 1986). Decision struc-tures support obtaining the required data, aswell as exchanging views about those data inorder to process the information. The assump-tion underlying much of the research in organi-zational cognition is that enhanced accuracyresults from developing decision structuresthat support greater breadth of informationand speed of information exchange (Lyles &Schwenk, 1992).

There are both theoretical and empirical rea-sons to doubt the above arguments. Kiesler andSprouU (1982) developed a number of theoreticalarguments that shed doubt on the ability ofstructures and systems alone to enhance man-agers' perceptual accuracy. They argue thatstructural mechanisms, in and of themselves, donot bring about enhanced accuracy, becausegreater speed of information flows may lead topressures of overload, and increasing thebreadth of information may only increase thepotential for bias. Results from empirical re-search examining the role of decision structuressimilarly have failed to demonstrate conclu-sively that decision structures influence mana-gerial accuracy. Sutcliffe (1994), for example, hy-pothesized that greater internal and externalscanning would produce a better fit betweenperceptions and objective environmental indi-cators for respondents from 502 firms in 35 in-dustries. The proportion of variance she wasable to explain was very low. While she sug-gested that this may have been due to four-digitSIC data that inaccurately depicted an organi-zation's objective environment, we propose analternative explanation below that suggests theneed to specify more fully current models link-ing decision structures with improved scanning,interpretation, and decisions.

ACCURACY AND BANDWAGONS

Accuracy is being in conformity to fact. Accu-racy in assessing the value of bandwagon be-haviors is particularly challenging for organiza-tional decision makers, because the relevantlacts, the interrelationships among those facts,and the implications of those facts for their or-ganizations are often not only highly ambiguousbut also in continual flux. In a dynamic decision

58 Academy oi Management Review January

environment, accuracy in relation to any one ofthese must therefore involve constant change.

Ironically, as it has become more difficult toaccurately pinpoint events or situations be-cause of rapid environmental changes, there ap-pears to be a growing belief that organizationaldecision makers can achieve such accuracy. Theincreased availability of information to decisionmakers has led to inflated expectations thatthey are capable of accurately assessing thedecision situation and of acting on it appropri-ately (Ginsberg & Venkatraman, 1995). These ex-pectations emanate from boards, customers,suppliers, and other interested stakeholders.The widespread belief that it is possible toaccurately assess facts out there, and the in-flated expectations of stakeholders about de-cision makers' capabilities to do so, inevitablyresult in managers' feeling increasing pres-sures to provide accurate assessments of theirenvironment, including assessments of band-wagon behaviors.

Felt pressures for accuracy in the face of rapidenvironmental change often lead to predictableand unintended results. To cope with the diffi-culty of achieving perceptual accuracy in rap-idly changing decision environments, decisionmakers often use cognitive simplifying pro-cesses that leave conclusions unchanged whenrealities are changing. Such simplificationstend to reduce the active search for more infor-mation, encouraging decision makers to rely in-stead on cognitive shortcuts (Fiol & Huff, 1992).This is consistent with the restrictive effect ofstress on information processing (Holsti, 1978;Staw et al., 1981), Felt pressures for accuracyduring times of uncertainty and change inevita-bly lead to stress, and stress leads to restrictionof independent choice (Holsti, 1978). Compound-ing these restrictions, felt pressures for accuracyat a given point in time may lead people towithhold judgments and communications untilthey can demonstrate the validity of their views(Weick, Sutcliffe. & Obstfeld, 1999). The com-bined tendencies to simplify and withhold infor-mation seem likely to restrict search and con-strain independent thought (Corner, Kinicki, &Keats, 1994; Fiol & Huff, 1992), thus contributingto following generally accepted patterns ofbandwagon behavior when confronting com-plex environments.

In summary, research that has focused atten-tion on how to improve the accuracy of manage-

rial perceptions has tended to treat information-processing mechanisms as separate anddisembodied from the decision makers who usethem. The problem with such a disembodiedapproach is that it ignores the fact that decisionmakers themselves often influence the decisioncontext by mentally and socially constructingthe realities that later constrain them (Weick,1995). In the remainder of the paper we developa framework that more fully specifies prior mod-els of decision making by bringing the decisionmaker to the forefront. This framework describesthe interactive effects of mindfulness and deci-sion structures on a manager's ability to dis-criminate in the face of bandwagons so as tomake decisions appropriate to the firm, ratherthan simply follow the majority.

MINDFULNESS AND BANDWAGONS

In the information-rich contexts that charac-terize the worlds of executives today, the scarceresource is typically not information but theamount of mindful attention that decision mak-ers allocate to making the information meaning-ful (Hansen & Haas, 2001). Langer (1989) intro-duced the concept of mindfulness as a state ofalertness and lively awareness that is mani-fested in active information processing, charac-terized by the creation and refinement of cate-gories and distinctions and the awareness ofmultiple perspectives. More recently, she indi-cated that "a mindful approach to any activityhas three characteristics: the continuous cre-ation of new categories; openness to new infor-mation; and an implicit awareness of more thanone perspective" (Langer, 1997; 4).

In contrast, mindlessness is characterized byrelying on past categories, acting on automaticpilot, precluding attention to new information,and fixating on a single perspective (Langer,1997; Weick et al., 1999). Those who are mindlessoperate from a state of reduced attention thattends to lead to mechanically employing cogni-tively and emotionally rigid, rule-based behav-iors. Trapped in previously created categories,these individuals easily confuse the stability oftheir assumptions with stability in the world,thus giving themselves a false reading on theirsurroundings (Langer, 1989).

Three central dimensions of the mindfulness-mindlessness continuum, therefore, extend(1) from category creation to category rigidity.


(2) from openness to new information to auto-matic behaviors that preclude new information,and (3) from awareness of multiple perspectivesto fixation on a single point of view. Mindfulnessmeans that the mind is present in embodiedeveryday experience (Varela, Thompson, &Rosch, 1991). Those who manifest mindfulnessengage in thought patterns that allow them tomake a larger number of currently relevant,more precise distinctions. By remaining alert topotential changes in their situation, mindful in-dividuals are more adaptively responsive toshifts in their environment. This fosters a richaction repertoire with w^hich to successfullygreet the unknown (Langer, 1989; Weick et aL,1999).

Mindful scanning entails an expanded datasearch that extends beyond data relevant topast events and past behaviors, or what othersare doing, and that leads to new, pertinent dis-tinctions and categories. It entails a search forcurrent data that may disconfirm as well as con-firm existing beliefs. Mindful, self-questioninginterpretations lead to regular efforts to updateand expand awareness of multiple perspectivesmost relevant to the organization. And mindfuldecision making involves discriminating choicesthat best fit a firm's unique circumstances, ratherthan familiar and known behaviors based onwhat others are doing.

Traditional cognition research that has fo-cused on decision structures alone as a way toenhance perceptual accuracy, as discussedabove, misses the critical moderating role of thestate of mindfulness of decision makers. Effortsto implement improved decision structures arelike replacing an old telescope lens with a newand more powerful one: this will have no impacton the accuracy of telescopic viewing if no oneis awake to look through the telescope. Decisionstructures that research has prescribed as ap-propriate for enhancing perceptual accuracysimilarly will have little effect on decision mak-ing if they point to information that decisionmakers do not want to know or are not capableof knowing. If, for example, decision makers aremindlessly following a bandwagon, they willtend to avoid paying attention to informationthat in any way threatens their current percep-tions and known patterns of behavior (Festinger,1967). According to Mooers' Law, an informationsource or system will tend not to be used or paidattention to whenever it is more painful and

troublesome for the potential user to have theinformation than not (Mooers, 1960).

Leadership choices at Griffin Hospital (Freed-man, 1999), during the 1980s and 1990s, provide astriking example of mindful decision making inthe face of bandwagons. Surrounded by compet-itors and faced with a declining patient base,limited resources, and dissatisfaction in thecommunity, the leaders might have followed thecommon wisdom of the time, either finding analliance partner or possibly cutting back on ser-vices, staff, and space to minimize costs. In-stead, they chose a very different path, initiatingdistinctive categories of actions to identify anew customer segment, to clarify their needs,and to develop the organizational capabilitiesto meet those needs. This has led not only to apositive reversal of their economic results butalso to enjoying the benefits associated withbeing an employer of choice, as evidenced bytheir recent consistent recognition by FortuneMagazine as one of the 100 best places to workin the United States (Levering & Moskowitz, 2000,2001).

Our discussion supports the importance of areal-time form of perceptual accuracy in achiev-ing organization-environment fit. We have ar-gued, however, that direct pressures to achieveaccuracy through enhanced decision structureswithout regard for the mindfulness of decisionmakers is not likely to produce the desired out-come. Instead, such pressures may lead to staticcharacterizations based on what is generallyaccepted to be true. Although accurate percep-tions of internal and external conditions appearto have played an important role in the GriffinHospital case, we propose that the generalmindfulness of decision makers, rather than adirect focus on being accurate about specificevents or situations, led to the discriminatingbehaviors. A preoccupation with accuracy atGriffin Hospital might easily have led to re-duced scanning and a focus on widely acceptedconsolidation and/or cost-reduction solutions,instead of the dramatic transition the leadersundertook. Mindfulness allowed leaders to re-sist bandwagon pressures to implement gener-ally accepted solutions and to follow their ownuniquely successful strategy. They engaged in asearch for additional relevant information, andthey interpreted that information in ways thatwere directly relevant to their specific situation,leading to discriminating decision making.

60 Academy of Management Review January

FIGURE 1Decision Structures, Mindfulness, and Decision-Making Processes and Outcomes

Decision structurescharacterizing thedecision-makingcontext

Mindfulnesscharacterizingdecision makers

Scanningprocesses

Interpretationprocesses

Decision-makingoutcomes

Scanning andinformation-processing

mechanisms

Expandedscanning

(Pla)

Moderatingeffect of

mindiulness

Morecontext-relevantinterpretations

(Plb)

Restrictedscanning

(Pla)

Lesscontext-relevantinterpretations

(Plb)

Morediscriminating

decisionsin the face ofbandwagons

(Pic)

Lessdiscriminating

decisionsin the face ofbandwagons

(Pic)

These arguments are summarized in Proposition1 and Figure 1.

Proposition ]; The greatei the mindful-ness oi decision makers, the greatertheir tendency will be to use scanningand information-processing mecha-nisms in a way that (a) expands scan-ning, (b) which, in turn, will enhancecontext-ielevant interpretations of theinformation, (c) thus enabling discrim-inating decisions in the face of band-wagons.

Figure 1 depicts the skeletal version ol thearguments developed in this paper. The greaterthe degree of mindfulness of decision makers,the more likely it is they will use decision mech-anisms to expand their search for information.Greater access to pertinent information encour-ages more context-relevant interpretations ofthat information, leading to the ability to dis-criminate between decisions that are appropri-ate for others and those that are appropriate forone's own organization.

In this form the proposed relationships are sogeneral as to be nearly impossible to operation-alize. We know very little about the specific pro-cesses by which varying degrees of mindfulnessinfluence decision makers' scanning and inter-

pretation processes, and thereby decision out-comes. In the remainder of the article we morefully specify the sources of mindfulness in organ-izations and identify the more specific effects ofmindfulness on scanning and interpretation pro-cesses and, thus, on decision outcomes.

MINDFULNESS AND THE DECISION-MAKINGPROCESS

Weick and his colleagues suggest a numberof processes that lead to mindfulness in organi-zations, including reluctance to simplify inter-pretations, commitment to resilience, and preoc-cupation with failure (Weick et al., 1999}.' Thefollowing sections build on that prior work by

* Weick and his colleagues (1999) propose sensitivity tooperalions as one of Ihe processes leading lo mindfulness.These authors define sensitivity to operations as broad sit-uational awareness. Although such awareness is central tothe concept of mindiulness, we propose that its relationshipto mindfulness is rather more circular than causal. EvenWeick and his colleagues, while arguing that sensitivity tooperations leads to mindfulness, state that such sensitivityis about acting "thinkingly" {1999: 97), thereby implying thatthe two are similar constructs. They also imply a reversecausality in their statement that sensitivity to operations isthe result ol gathering details into "mindful processing"(1999: 99). Given the inherent circularity in these arguments.


TABLE 1The Moderating Effects of Varying Degrees of Mindfulness on Scanning and Interpretation

Degree of Mindfulnesa Effects on Scanning Effects on Interpretation

Greater reluctance tosimplify

Greater commitmentto resilience

Greater preoccupationwilh both successand failure

1Greater mindfulness

More likely toattend to detailsbased on currentorganizationalconditions (P2a)

+More likely to scan

throughexperimentationon the fringes oiwhat is known(P3a)

-(-More likely to scan

for contradictoryinformation (P4a)

Expanded scanning(Pla)

More likely tounderstand the valueof information forcurrent circumstances(P2b)

+More likely to interpret

unusual andunexpected results asrelevant if within thebounds of a firm'spurpose (P3b)

+More likely to interpret

data based on abelief that pastpractices may bewrong (P4b)

1More context-relevant

interpretation (Plb)

specifically relating those three sources ofmindfulness to the scanning and interpretationbehaviors of managerial decision makers. Table1 summarizes the discussion that follows. Asdepicted in the left column, greater reluctance tosimplify, greater commitment to resilience, andgreater preoccupation with both success andfailure additively lead to greater mindfulness.That is, we propose that a greater degree of anyone of these leads to greater mindfulness. Wefurther propose that the moderating effects ofeach one of the three processes on scanning andinterpretation are somewhat different. Those ef-fects are again thought to be cumulative, lead-ing to an overall level of expanded scanningand more context-relevant interpretation.

Reluctance to Simplify

Weick and his colleagues (1999) propose thatreluctance to simplify leads to mindfulness.Strategic decisions typically involve a highlevel of complexity. As a result, organizationaldecision makers often use cognitive simplifyingprocesses that allow them to make sense of and

we treat sensitivity to operations as synonymous with mind-fulness, rather than trace its causal effects on mindfulness.

manage the complexity {Fiske & Taylor, 1991).Such simplified strategy making implies thetype of intense focus and the consistency of styleoften characterizing successful start-up organi-zations that focus "narrowly and passionatelyon one or two pervasive and dominant goals"(Miller, 1993: 122).

Too much simplicity over time, such as ob-serving what the bandwagon is doing ratherthan doing the hard work required to under-stand a complex environment, can lead to de-cline. This is true even during times of tremen-dous success. As Miller {1993) notes, outstandingorganizations often lapse into decline becausethey develop too sharp an edge. They oversim-plify interpretations, which, in turn, leads to ho-mogenous and bandwagonlike collective be-liefs and behaviors.

At the other extreme, the argument is oftenmade that too much complexity, resulting fromcontinuous reluctance to simplify, can lead toinformation overload that slows strategic deci-sion making {Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984). Themore complex thinking {i.e., reluctance to sim-plify) that we propose leads to enhanced mind-fulness, however, is focused on real-time infor-mation—based on understanding experiencehere and now—rather than what Eisenhardt

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(1989) calls "planning information," or purelycognitive representations. Real-time informa-tion that gives executives intimate knowledge oftheir business appears to speed decision mak-ing, while planning information, which attemptsto predict the future, does not (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Reluctance to simplify interpretations of real-time information does not lead to increased gen-eral scanning of the environment. Rather, ittends to make scanning efforts more focused ondetails relevant to current organizational condi-tions. The intimate knowledge of the businessthat results from such a focus is likely to pro-mote greater understanding of the value of in-formation that may be inconsistent with pastexperience but relevant here and now {Eisen-hardt, 1989). And, finally, understanding thevalue of information for current and unique cir-cumstances, rather than relying on other firms'experiences with bandwagon behaviors, willtend to lead to more discriminating decisions inthe face of those behaviors.

Proposition 2: The more reluctant de-cision makers are to simplify real-time information, (a) the greatertheir tendency will be to use deci-sion support structures in a way thatfocuses scanning efforts on detailsrelevant to current organizationalconditions, (b) which, in turn, wiilmake it more likely that they willunderstand the value of the informa-tion for current circumstances, thusenabling more discriminating deci-sions in the face of bandwagons.

Simplified interpretations of both integrationand disintegration trends in health care havebeen easily justified, and on the surface thesimple justifications have appeared legitimate(O'Connor & Fiol, 2002). The reasons for growththrough alliances have included increased mar-ket share, expanded negotiation power, betterrisk coverage, increased valuations, lower costsbecause of shared overhead, expanded invest-ments in systematic guidelines and technolo-gies, improved access/coverage, and better pro-fessional managers, who would naturallyimplement the systems and structures neces-sary for ongoing success. Hearing these argu-ments over and over and seeing their peers pur-suing the apparent benefits, many health care

leaders began to believe that this truly was thefad that was going to work.

Recently, however, the arguments have begunto shift (O'Connor & Fiol, 2002). Some health careleaders are now indicating that the sum of theparts is worth more than the combined wholeand, therefore, that breaking up the whole canbest create value. Divestiture, some argue, willstop significant losses, improve profits, enhancecash flows, allow leaders to focus business ef-forts on core competencies to better serve cli-ents, shorten reaction times, and improve over-all operating performance.

Beyond the simple justifications of both inte-gration and disintegration, however, lurk signif-icant potential challenges and problems. Onlythe hard work of going beyond these simple andgeneralized explanations and justifications canuncover them. Such hard work, for example,might lead to noticing that health care integra-tion is related not only to an expanded scopeand scale of operations (which generally ac-cepted wisdom indicates would reduce costs)but also to increased complexity (which is likelyto increase costs). After the fact, health care al-liance partners such as Beth Israel-Deaconess(Todd, 1999) and Heritage Health System (Kirch-heimer, 2000) have reported experiencing suchcomplexity and higher cost consequences.

Commitment to Resilience

Mindfulness is also thought to result from acommitment to resilience (Bourrier, 1996; Weicket al., 1999), which is about recovering fromfailure. A commitment to resilience is a generalmindset that includes a belief that the road tosuccess is rarely a straight line and that bounc-ing back from setbacks must be a way of life. Itis the overall capability "to investigate, to learn,and to act, without knowing in advance whatone will be called to act upon" (Wildavsky,1991: 70).

A general commitment to resilience oftenleads to formal support for experimentation andimprovisation (Bourrier, 1996). The belief that"we can always bounce back from failure"makes open-ended discovery in unknown terri-tory less terrifying. Experimentation expandsthe range of what is noticed, as well as therange of possible action. Variance seeking,rather than consistency with prior practice, isthe aim of experimentation (McGrath, 2001). Un-


der conditions of high uncertainty, variance-creating strategies have been found to be morevaluable to organizations than attempts to di-rectly improve on known practices (Eisenhardt &Tabrizi, 1995).

Highly adaptive firms typically demonstratethe ability to simultaneously engage in explora-tion for the creation of future knowledge andimprovement of current knowledge and routines(Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991; Tushman& O'Reilly, 1997)—that is, the focus is on thepresent and future, simultaneously. Brown andEisenhardt (1998) similarly have argued that ifmanagers focus too much attention on only thepresent, they end up chaotically reacting to themarket, and if they focus too much attention ononly the future, they tend to lock into that futureand lose their flexibility. Experimentation en-compasses both a present and a future orienta-tion in that it relies on small, fast, and cheapprobes to gain insight into the future, withoutlosing the flexibility to react to the future thatactually unfolds in the present.

A general commitment of organizational deci-sion makers to resilience thus shows up as a will-ingness to engage in experimental activities. Thisleads to an expansion of scanning, beyond thatsupported by formal scanning mechanisms, to in-clude that which is learned from experimentationon the fringes of current operations. Continuousvariance seeking through experimentation, how-ever, may wreak havoc if it is not contained insome manner. Interpretations of the results ofexperimentation—although loosely coupled tospecific outcomes—must be bound within cer-tain parameters to lead to productive decisionoutcomes. A firm's purpose provides usefulboundary delineations for this activity (Collins& Porras, 1994). As the reason for an organiza-tion's existence, its purpose is a powerful gaugeof the meaning and the relevance of the out-comes of broad experimentation.

In line with the above discussion, we proposethat the mindfulness that results from commit-ment to resilience leads to a focus of scanningefforts on those data that emerge from broadexperimentation on the fringes of current oper-ations. Given that such experimentation will,almost by design, lead to unexpected results,there will be a greater tendency to view theunexpected and unusual as relevant for consid-eration. Seeing the relevance of unexpected re-sults provides a useful foundation for achieving

greater decision-making discrimination in theface of bandwagons.

Pioposition 3: The greater decisionmakers' general commitment to resil-ience, (a) the greatei their tendencywill be to use decision support struc-tures in a way that expands theirrange oi scanning through experimen-tation on the fringes of what is icnown,(b) which, in turn, will make it morelikely that they will interpret unusualand unexpected results as relevant ifthey are within the bounds of thefirm's purpose, thus enabling morediscriminating decisions in the face ofbandwagons.

Consistent with this view, Grifiin Hospitalleaders were willing to doubt the wisdom ofsimply extending and improving upon their suc-cessful past practices of developing services fortheir traditional aging blue-collar patient base.This opened the door to the discovery of morevaluable alternatives, such as new services foryoung, expectant mothers (Freedman, 1999). An-other example of experimentation is evident inthe academic health care institution thatMalvey, Hyde, Topping, and Woodrell (2000) de-scribe. Through experimentation within thebounds of its institutional purpose, this institu-tion created a medical mall for an underservedinner city population, rather than following thebandwagon toward providing more services foraffluent patients in an upscale medical mall.

Preoccupation with Both Success and Failure

Weick and colleagues (1999) also suggest thata preoccupation with failure encourages mind-fulness. Langer (1989) similarly proposes thatmindfulness is more likely when (1) external fac-tors disrupt initiation of a mindless sequence orprevent its completion, or (2) negative conse-quences are experienced that are discrepantwith the outcomes previously resulting fromsimilar behaviors. Both of Langer's conditionsare related to failure. Concerns about failureappear to lead to mindfulness, especially whenthe failure is perceived to be very personal. Ev-idence suggests that when socially acceptedjustifications for unsuccessful outcomes are toocostly, or when such outcomes are seen to bepersonally relevant, people tend to employ more

64 Academy oi Management Beview January

mindfully complex decision strategies (McAllis-ter, Mitchell, & Beach, 1979; Tetlock, 1983). Grove(1996) may have been pointing toward this needto be preoccupied with failure when he wroteOnly the Paranoid Survive.

In contrast, bandwagons appear to thrive froma preoccupation with avoidance of distinctiveactions that might result in failure. Prior re-search suggests that decision makers often fol-low bandwagons because they are afraid of thefailure that may ensue if they do not follow whatothers are doing (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf,1990). The extent of decision makers' counteringpreoccupation with the potential failure associ-ated with following bandwagon behaviors mayimpact their propensity to simply follow the be-haviors of others.

The assertion that a preoccupation with fail-ure leads to mindfulness appears to contradictresearch on the power of Appreciative Inquiry(Cooperrider & Srivastva, 1987) and positive fu-ture visions (Collins & Porras, 1994). Both arebased on the power of a positive rather thannegative preoccupation. Although it is certainlypossible to be mindfully positive, the cautionarynote here is that inquiry is not likely to be asactive when one focuses on success as it iswhen one focuses on the possibility of failure.

Whereas an emphasis on success increasesillusions of control, an emphasis on failure maycompletely eliminate any sense of control andlead to learned helplessness (Matute, 1994).Rather than a focus at either extreme, a mindfulinclusion of both may be valuable. We agreewith Weick et al. (1999) that focusing on possiblefailure appears to promote mindfulness and,thus, is likely to limit bandwagon behaviors. Wepropose, however, that this alone may not besufficient for enduring success. A single-mindedfocus on failure is likely to drive a firm into theground as quickly as a singular focus on suc-cess. Enduring effectiveness may require a par-adoxical focus on both success and failure.

A preoccupation with failure along with suc-cess may lead to a form of paranoid scanning.Rather than scanning only to confirm existingpractices and norms, mindful managers, para-noid in their preoccupation with both successand failure, would tend to scan to simulta-neously confirm and disconfirm them (Grove,1996). And if decision makers scanned for suchcontradictory information, it follows that theywould tend to interpret the information they en-

countered from a belief that past practices maynot necessarily be right for the present, and tomake more discriminating decisions as a result.

Proposition 4: The greater decisionmakers' general preoccupation withboth failure and success, (a) thegreater their tendency will be to usedecision support structures in a waythat encourages scanning for contra-dictory information, (b) which, in turn,will make it more likely that they willinterpret the information from a beliefthat past practices may be wrong, thusenabling more discriminating deci-sions in the face of bandwagons.

Underspeciiied Decision Structures

In addition to the three processes discussedabove, Weick et al. (1999) identify underspeci-fied decision structures as a source of mindful-ness in organizations. The specification of deci-sion structures refers to the extent to which rulesand procedures govern decision situations suchthat they become routinized (Nelson & Winter,1982). To the extent that structures are less spec-ified, they are more fluid, flexible, and adaptiveand, thus, leave more room for individual dis-cretion. Troublesome cues are exposed to awider range of individuals with more varied ca-pabilities, who are in a position to notice themand take useful action. In contrast, highly spec-ified structures are composed of orderly routinesand procedures that prescribe in a more rigidway who should notice and act on what issues.

Weick and his colleagues (1999) argue thatunderspecified structures lead to mindfulnessand that overspecified structures encouragemindlessness. By encouraging mindless behav-ior, the very orderly and highly specified struc-tures and procedures that are put in place toreduce error can end up spreading errors around(Turner, 1976). This holds important implicationsfor research in which it is argued that well-specified decision structures must be put inplace to increase the breadth of information andthe speed with which managers receive the in-formation in order to improve perceptual accu-racy. While providing access to relevant infor-mation is clearly important, perceptualinaccuracies may, in fact, be amplified by over-specifying decision structures. Overspecified

2003 Fioi and O'Connor 65

structures may also narrow the focus of atten-tion, ensuring that bandwagon-inconsistent in-formation is not considered.

We agree that overspecified structures tend toreduce mindfulness in the high-reliability organ-zations that are the focus of the Weick et al.(1999) study. But mindfulness is the rule ratherthan the exception in high-reliability organiza-tions. How does this assertion relate to organi-zational decision makers who are not as mind-ful? If decision makers are relatively mindlessto begin with, it would seem that underspecifiedstructures would simply tend to support the lackof awareness or responsibility. We argue for acontingency view by suggesting that structuralspecification may have very different effects ondecision makers who are more or less mindful tobegin with. If a high degree of mindfulness isthe norm, we propose^—as do Weick et al.(1999)—that overspecified structures will tend toreduce mindfulness and that less rigid under-specified structures will tend to support condi-tions that allow mindfulness to be maintained.In contrast, if mindlessness is the norm, we dis-agree with Weick et al.'s (1999) assertion thatunderspecified structures will lead to enhancedmindfulness. Instead, we argue that underspeci-fied structures will tend to further encourage theavoidance of mindful responsibility and thatoverspecified structures, though leading toshort-term control, will similarly support bu-reaucratic routines and, thus, further mindless-ness. In summary, we argue that structuresthemselves do not and cannot create mindful-ness. However, overspecified structures canlead to reduced mindfulness if it already exists.

Health care integration examples supportsuch a contingency view. After mergers haveoccurred, numerous compromises have oftenkept things vague, rather than clarifying issuessuch as who would be the boss, how decisionswould be made, what the future vision would be,or what computer system would be used afterconsolidation. Such underspecified decisionstructures have often been associated with thefailure of consolidation efforts (Hensley, 1999;Todd, 1999). Highly respected health care or-ganizations have been caught, at least tempo-rarily, in the trap of mindlessly following othersinto poorly clarified integration efforts. Puttingfew decision structures in place both fits thismindless behavior and reinforces it. In contrast,putting underspecified, flexible, and fluid deci-

sion structures in an initially mindful organiza-tion will tend to support continued mindfulness.For example, integrated systems such as Minis-try Healthcare (Desien, 2000, personal communi-cation) and Centura Healthcare (Austin, 2000;Swedish, 2000, personal communication) maywell owe a part of their current success to amindful, mission-driven leadership. Under-specified structures may, in fact, promote con-tinued mindfulness only in contexts wheremindful behaviors are already the norm.

Proposition 5a: In organizations wheremindfulness is the norm, underspeci-iied decision structures will lead tocontinued mindfulness over time.

Proposition 5b: In organizations wheremindfulness is the norm, overspeciiieddecision structures will lead to re-duced mindfulness over time.

Proposition 5c: In organizations wheremindlessness is the norm, neither un-derspeciiied nor overspecified deci-sion structures will lead to greatermindiulness over time.

We have proposed that mindfulness influencesthe usefulness of decision structures in two ways.First, as we argued earlier in the paper, mindless-ness leads to unwillingness to doubt what isgenerally thought to be the truth about the valueof bandwagon behaviors. This is expressed asresistance to or disregard for decision structuresthat may lead to uncovering bandwagon-inconsistent data. Second, varying degrees ofmindfulness determine the appropriate level ofstructural specification. The greater the mind-fulness, the less specified and routine should bethe decision structures. In contrast, the greaterthe mindlessness, the more decision makerswould seem to need specified decision struc-tures to ensure short-term control, even thoughthis is not likely to increase their mindfulness.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Following the seminal works of Burns andStalker (1961), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), andThompson (1967), researchers have argued thatthere needs to be a fit between a firm's behaviorand its environment. Between environmentaldata and a firm's behavior lie a number of in-tervening cognitive variables, however, that de-

66 Academy ol Management Beview January

termine the degree of accuracy in perceivingenvironmental conditions. It is widely acceptedthat the more accurately organizational deci-sion makers perceive their environment, themore likely they are to achieve a Lawrence andLorsch type of fit. As a result, much research hasbeen devoted to enhancing perceptual accuracy.

Perceptual accuracy would appear to be thedecision-making characteristic that distin-guishes those organizations that indiscrimi-nately follow a bandwagon from those that donot. And decision support structures and sys-tems would appear to lead to greater accuracyand, thus, to less indiscriminate behavior. De-spite the appeal of these traditional arguments,research results from studies testing these ideashave not been highly convincing. In this articlewe have argued for further specification of tra-ditional decision-making models. We have de-scribed why it is that decision structures in-tended to enhance perceptual accuracy willtend to have little impact if mindlessness is thenorm.

One contribution of this paper is that it com-plements and extends macrolevel theories ofbandwagon behaviors by identifying the mic-rolevel characteristics of the decision contextand of decision makers that influence why agiven firm will resist following bandwagon be-haviors. If decision makers mindfully assessboth the external environment and their internalcapabilities, they are likely to join a bandwagononly if it is advantageous to their specificcircumstances.

Second, our discussion of the dangers of fo-cusing directly on achieving accuracy addsvalue in the form of a seemingly paradoxicalprescription. To achieve real-time accuracy, de-cision makers must adopt a mindset that tendsto lead to multiple and changing interpretationsof surrounding events. Variable interpretationsmay, in fact, signal mindfulness and a dynamicand real-time form of accuracy rather than alack of accuracy. Prior research laid the ground-work for this by describing the three character-istics of mindfulness. Our study has refined andoperationalized the construct by extending itfrom the context of highly reliable organizationsto the scanning, interpretation, and behaviorprocesses of organizational decision makers ingeneral. It represents the first attempt to modelthe interactions between mindfulness as a deci-sion maker characteristic and decision struc-

tures, and to show the impact of those interac-tions on decision outcomes.

Finally, the paper contributes to the under-standing of why studies examining the relation-ship between decision structures and percep-tual accuracy have been able to explain verylittle variance. We have argued that people willresist the adoption and use of appropriate deci-sion structures if mindlessness is the norm. Andcontrary to the arguments of Weick and his col-leagues (1999), we have proposed that under-specified structures cannot produce mindful-ness. As such, our framework both complementsand extends prior work on the links betweendecision structures and perceptual accuracy.

Throughout the paper we have used illustra-tions from health care. However, we proposethat the framework developed here is as rele-vant to other bandwagon phenomena as it is tothe health care trends noted. For example, ourpropositions might just as well be applied to1990s total quality initiatives, to re-engineeringbandwagons across industries, or to the recentdot.com investment and disinvestment trends.

Directions for Future Research

We have developed an initial framework forunderstanding the relationship between mind-fulness and decision-making processes in or-ganizations. We encourage future research thatelaborates on this framework. A number of in-teresting avenues exist for future work. For ex-ample, researchers might define and model theconstruct of mindfulness at the level of thegroup or organization. How do the outcomes ofthe mindfulness of senior decision makers com-pare to those of the mindfulness that is widelydistributed among individuals throughout theorganization? How is such organizational mind-fulness developed, under what conditions is itmost valuable, and what are the barriers toachieving it?

In extending the construct of individual mind-fulness (Langer, 1989, 1997) to the level of organ-izations, Weick and his colleagues (1999) implywidespread adoption and dispersion of mindful-ness among an organization's members. Suchwidespread dispersion may be both more possi-ble to achieve and more valuable in some or-ganizations than in others, with high-reliabilityorganizations anchoring an extreme end of thecontinuum. Future research must determine


whether and wben mindfulness is most valu-able for organizations to cultivate. We also needto know more about how widespread mindful-ness must be among decision makers in order toproduce positive outcomes, as well as tbe costsand returns of tbe investment required to pro-duce tbis level of mindfulness. It seems obviousthat the huge investment to produce greatermindfulness would be justified by the seriousconsequences of failure in the high-reliabilityorganizations that were the focus of the Weicket al. (1999) study (e.g., nuclear power genera-tion plants, air traffic control systems). A sim-ilar argument might be made for many healthcare organizations. Further clarification of therelative costs of developing mindfulness and ademonstration of the associated returns wouldbe useful in specifying the range of organiza-tional settings where sucb investment wouldbe appropriate.

We need empirical evidence as to whether theprocesses we have described lead to enhancedmindfulness, as we have proposed, and whetherthey interact with decision-making processes,as we have suggested. We have attempted tospecify these relationships in a way that allowsempirical testing. For example, does enhancedmindfulness lead to expanded scanning, wbichtben leads to more context-relevant interpreta-tions and decision making, as we have argued,or does mindfulness more directly affect inter-pretation and decision-making processes with-out the intervening effects on scanning? Do com-mitment to resilience, preoccupation with bothfailure and success, and reluctance to simplifyhave an additive impact on mindfulness, as wehave suggested?

Three sets of variables are central to testingthe relationships suggested in our propositions:(1) measures of mindfulness, (2) operation-alization of the three processes we propose leadto mindfulness, and (3) operationalization of tbeproposed outcomes of mindful decision pro-cesses. One might operationalize evidence ofmindfulness as the ability and tendency of man-agers to make distinctions and, thus, create/refine categories not common to their competi-tors. Similarly, measures of openness to andinterest in new information, as well as anawareness of multiple possibilities not typicallyconsidered by competitors, would provide evi-dence of the presence of mindiulness.

It is not likely that evidence of the three pro-cesses leading to mindfulness (reluctance tosimplify, commitment to resilience, and preoc-cupation with both success and failure) can beobtained through direct questioning. Given thatthese processes are general predispositions,rather than specific behaviors, people may notbe highly conscious of their own level of en-gagement in them. Evidence of these sources ofmindfulness should therefore be collected frommultiple sources and compared for reliability.Managers' self-reports should be supplementedwith others' reports about them, as well as re-searcher observation over time.

Finally, we have proposed that varying de-grees of mindfulness impact the decision-making process in ways that produce greaterdecision maker discrimination in the face ofbandwagons. That is, more mindful scanningand interpretation lead to the ability to distin-guish between the value of bandwagon behav-iors for a particular circumstance and the valuethat others have attributed to them. Mindful out-comes defined in this way allow the possibilitythat mindfulness may sometimes result in fol-lowing bandwagon behaviors, if those behav-iors are perceived as uniquely valuable. Rele-vant outcome measures, thus, cannot be"followed the bandwagon" or "did not follow thebandwagon." Rather, outcome measures shouldbe based on expert opinions about the level ofmanagerial discernment and insight into theunique circumstances of a particular firm in re-lation to bandwagon behaviors.

Implications for Practice

We have proposed that the benefits of mind-fulness include (1) expanded scanning, (2) con-text-relevant interpretation of internal andexternal conditions, and (3) discriminating deci-sions vis-d-vis bandwagons. If the benefits ofmindfulness are so apparent, why is there somuch seemingly mindless behavior, such asthat reflected in many fad bandwagons? Thenatural progression for most organizational de-cision makers, without specific intervention,would seem to be toward mindlessness, for tworeasons. First, it requires less of the hard workassociated with independent thought and lead-ership. This argument is consistent with Ber-trand Russell's position that "most people wouldrather die than tbink" (as quoted in Wilson &

68 Academy o/ Management Review January

Wilson, 1998: 6). Second, mindfulness minimizespersonal risk by providing a ready justificationfor less than successful leadership choices. It istherefore not entirely surprising that manydecision makers adopt a relatively mindlessfoUow-the-bandwagon orientation.

Our framework offers practical guidance fororganizational decision makers interested in de-veloping greater mindfulness. First, a preoccu-pation with either success or failure alone is notlikely to lead to effective and discriminatingdecision making. Rather, decision makers' pre-occupation with failure along with a preoccupa-tion with success leads to greater mindfulness.The implication for leaders is that paradoxicalthinking must become a norm in their decisionprocesses. Along with great positive visions forsuccess, leaders must develop a focus on thedangers lurking around every corner.

Another extension of prior work that has directimplications for practice involves the appropri-ate level of specification of decision supportstructures. Weick et al. (1999) propose that un-derspecified structures lead to enhanced mind-fulness. We argue that this is likely to be so onlywhen decision makers are mindful to beginwith. We suggest that combining mindlessnesswith underspecified structures is a sure recipefor loss of control, irresponsibility, and unac-countability.

Scanning, interpretation, and decision-makingoutcomes reciprocally influence one another.This means that the manner in which decisionsare ultimately made seems likely to impact themindfulness of those involved in subsequentscanning processes. For example, to the degreethat individuals engaged in scanning processeswitness decision makers choosing to blindly fol-low current bandwagon practices rather thanrely on the mindful information that tbey haveprovided, they are likely to recognize the futilityof their efforts and reduce the level of hard workrequired to maintain their mindful contributions.

Our discussion of the effects of mindfulnesson decision processes and outcomes has high-lighted not only the tenuous nature of mindful-ness but also tbe numerous ways it can be rein-forced. We have argued that mindfulness leadsto expanded scanning, which, in turn, leads tomore context-relevant interpretations and morediscriminating decision behavior. The resultingsuccess, if left unchecked, will tend to lead tooverconfidence and less subsequent mindful-

ness. If left unsupported by continuous reluc-tance to simplify, commitment to resilience, andpreoccupation with failure as well as success,mindfulness might lead to sufficient success toundermine and destroy the mindful processesthat created it.

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C, Marlene Fiol is currently a professor of strategic management at the University ofColorado at Denver. She received her Ph.D. in strategic management from the Uni-versity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Her research interests include organization-al cognition and interpretation, organizational learning, and enlrepreneurship.

Edward J. O'Connor is currently a professor of management at the University olColorado at Denver. He received his Ph.D. in industrial/organizational psychologyfrom the University of Akron. His research interests include entrepreneurship, lead-ership, and organizational cognition.

waking up! mindfulness in the face of bandwagons

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