8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

1/18

abcGlobal Research

Equity strategy: Vietnam has been the worst

performing market in Asia y-t-d. 2008 earnings fell by

30% as companies wrote off property losses. But some

quality companies produced decent results and now look

attractively valued.

Fixed income strategy: Government embarks

on subsidised lending programme substantially

draining excess liquidity and VGB appetite. Sell VGBs

on tight(ening) VND liquidity, policy uncertainty.

FX strategy: More stable conditions for USD-VND.VND still looks expensive and capital inflows will continue

to shrink. Expect continued gradual depreciation.

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

Vietnam Monitor(Issue 22)Loan programme drains liquidity, bond

appetite

4 March 2009

Pieter van der Schaft*

Asia Local Rates Strategist

The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited

+852 2822 4277 pietervanderschaft@hsbc.com.hk

Garry Evans*

Equity Strategist

The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited

+852 2996 6916 garryevans@hsbc.com.hk

Daniel Hui*

FX Strategist

The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited

+852 2822 4340 danielpyhui@hsbc.com.hk

Virgil F Esguerra*

Asia Local Rates Strategist

The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited

+852 2822 4665 virgilesguerra@hsbc.com.hk

View HSBC Global Research at: http://www.research.hsbc.com

*Employed by a non-US affiliate of HSBC Securities (USA) Inc,and is not registered/qualified pursuant to NYSE and/or NASDregulations

Issuer of report: The Hongkong and Shanghai BankingCorporation Limited

Disclaimer & DisclosuresThis report must be read with thedisclosures and the analyst certificationsin the Disclosure appendix, and with theDisclaimer, which forms part of it

mailto:danielpyhui@hsbc.com.hkhttp://www.research.hsbc.com/http://www.research.hsbc.com/http://www.research.hsbc.com/mailto:danielpyhui@hsbc.com.hk

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

2/18

2

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

4 March 2009

abc

Key indicatorsUSD/VND FX reserves

15,500

16,000

16,500

17,000

17,500

18,000

Jan-0

6

Ma

y-0

6

Se

p-0

6

Jan-07

Ma

y-07

Se

p-07

Jan-0

8

Ma

y-0

8

Se

p-0

8

Jan-0

9

-2.5%

0.0%

2.5%

5.0%

7.5%

10.0%

12.5%

USD/VND (lhs) Y/y change (rhs)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

D

ec-0

2

D

ec-0

3

D

ec-0

4

D

ec-05

D

ec-0

6

D

ec-07

D

ec-0

8

Foreign reserv es (USDbn)

Source: Bloomberg Source: CEIC, Fitch estimate for 4Q08

O/n call money, benchmark policy rates and 5yr bond yields Headline CPI and ex-food & energy

0

5

10

15

20

25

Jan-0

8

Mar-08

May-0

8

Jul-08

Sep-0

8

Nov-0

8

Jan-0

9

Mar-09

O/n call money Base rateRefinancing rate 5y r VGB

0

5

1015

20

25

30

Jan-0

4

Jul-04

Jan-05

Jul-05

Jan-0

6

Jul-06

Jan-07

Jul-07

Jan-0

8

Jul-08

Jan-0

9

CPI CPI ex -food & energy

Source: Reuters, HSBC Source: CEIC, HSBC

HCMS Index GDP growth

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

Jan-07

May-07

Sep-07

Jan-0

8

May-0

8

Sep-0

8

Jan-0

9

-100%

-50%

0%

50%

100%

150%

200%

HCMSI (lhs) Y/y change (rhs)

5

6

7

8

9

10

Mar-00

Mar-01

Mar-02

Mar-03

Mar-04

Mar-05

Mar-06

Mar-07

Mar-08

GDP, y /y

Source: Bloomberg Source: CEIC

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

3/18

3

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

4 March 2009

abc

The struggle continues

with EPS falling 30% in 2008

Vietnams stock market has continued its gloomy

performance this year. The Vietnam Index has fallen

22% y-t-d, making it the worst performer in Asia. By

contrast, MSCI Asia ex Japan is down only 12%.

Since its peak in March 2007, the Vietnam Index has

now fallen 81% in US dollar terms.

1. Vietnam stock index

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

Jan-06

Apr-06

Jul-06

Oct-06

Jan-07

Apr-07

Jul-07

Oct-07

Jan-08

Apr-08

Jul-08

Oct-08

Jan-09

VN Index

Source: Bloomberg

Other indicators of activity look equally bad.

Turnover has dwindled to almost nothing: average

daily value of stocks traded in February for the Ho

Chi Minh and Hanoi exchanges combined was

only USD13m (see Chart 2). Total market cap has

shrunk to USD10bn, with no listed stocks having

a market cap of more than USD1bn, and only four

over USD500m (of which one has hit its foreign

ownership limit, and one has only USD12m of

foreign buying room left). Table 8 at the end of

this section gives details of all stocks with a

market cap of USD200m or more.

2. Daily trading value on HCM and Hanoi exchanges (20DMA)

0

20

40

60

80

100

Jan-06

Apr-06

Jul-06

Oct-06

Jan-07

Apr-07

Jul-07

Oct-07

Jan-08

Apr-08

Jul-08

Oct-08

Jan-09

USDm

HCM Hanoi

Source: Bloomberg

Foreign investor selling has eased a little: after

total net selling of USD127m in September-

December, foreigners have sold only USD2m

since the start of this year. Mainly, though, this is

because almost all foreign money, apart from

closed-end country funds, has now exited the

country. There is some risk that the country funds

are unwound or closed (the PXP Vietnam

Emerging Equity Fund, for example, recently

allowed fundholders to redeem their shares and

receive the underlying holdings, most of which

they could then sell). But, in general, the foreign

Equity strategy

Vietnam has been the worst performing market in Asia y-t-d

2008 earnings fell by 30% as companies wrote off property losses

But some quality companies produced decent results and now

look attractively valued

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

4/18

4

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

4 March 2009

abc

selling pressure has probably ended. Meantime,

domestic investors remain very bearish, with

sentiment towards the stock market poor.

3. Foreign net buying of Vietnamese equities

-100

-500

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Jan-07

Jul-07

Jan-08

Jul-08

Jan-09

USD

m

Source: Bloomberg (to e nd-Feb)

Clarity on earnings

With all 2008 results announced by end-February,

we now have some much-awaited clarity on how

bad earnings were last year, and how the valuation

of the market now stands. Table 4 shows the

aggregate results for all listed companies (on both

exchanges) and Table 5 details for the 23 largest

(those with market cap over USD100m).

4. Aggregate earnings for all listed Vietnamese companies

2008 y-o-y growth

Sales 39.8%OP 8.4%NP -25.1%EPS -29.5%

2008 2007OPM 8.4% 11.9%NPM 5.8% 11.8%ROE 11.2% 18.0%

Source: HSBC, Bloomberg

The overall picture is straightforward. Sales

growth was extremely strong, up almost 40% y-o-

y, but decremental margins allowed only 8%

growth in operating profits. Large write-offs of

real estate and equity investment losses, however,

pushed down net profit by 25%. Capital-raising

made the EPS line even worse, with a 29.5% y-o-

y decline. ROE fell to 11%, from 18% in 2007.

Of the 329 listed companies for which data was

available, 23 made losses. These included some

5. Earnings data for Vietnams largest listed companies

2008 ___________Growth___________ 2008 2007 2008 2007Code Company Exchange Sector Market

cap(USDm)

Netprofit

(USDm)

Sales OP NP EPS OPM OPM ROE ROE

VNM VIET NAM DAIRY PRODUCTS JSC HCM Food 762 70 23.5% 115.6% 27.6% 27.6% 14.1% 8.1% 26.9% 22.1%DPM PETROVIETNAM FERT & CHEMICAL HCM Chemicals 614 79 71.3% -0.8% 3.7% 3.8% 19.4% 33.5% 29.1% 30.4%HAG HAGL JSC HCM Misc Manufactur 519 40 n/a n/a n/a n/a 36.7% n/a 16.7% n/a

PVF PETROVIETNAM FINANCE JSC HCM Div Finan Serv 452 3 n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.2% n/a 0.8% n/aSTB SAIGON THUONG TIN COMMERCIAL HCM Banks 429 61 83.5% -21.4% -23.5% -23.5% 14.2% 33.2% 13.6% 19.0%PVD PETROVIETNAM DRILLING AND WE HCM Oil&Gas Services 420 53 35.8% 67.8% 62.1% 62.1% 25.8% 20.9% 35.3% 24.2%FPT FPT CORP HCM T elecoms 352 48 150.5% 48.7% 13.7% 11.4% 4.2% 7.1% 28.3% 32.6%PPC PHA LAI THERMAL POWER JSC HCM Electr ic 342 -12 2.0% -12.4% -125.2% -125.2% 21.1% 24.6% -6.0% 21.6%HPG HOA PHAT GROUP JSC HCM Misc Manufactur 286 48 48.1% 33.9% 32.0% 24.2% 12.1% 13.4% 19.5% 19.9%VIC VINCOM JSC HCM Real Estate 263 7 54.5% 15.2% -54.7% -53.1% 26.3% 35.2% 7.5% 13.9%VPL VINPEARL JSC HCM Entertainment 224 2 18.3% 13.4% -51.0% -51.0% 12.6% 13.1% 3.4% 8.1%VSH VINH SON - SONG HINH HYDROPO HCM Electric 207 21 30.7% 66.6% 44.4% 44.4% 61.2% 48.0% 17.3% 12.7%SSI SAIGON SECURITIES INC HCM Div Finan Serv 165 14 -2.2% -67.5% -70.8% -74.0% 23.6% 70.9% 6.5% 21.3%ITA TAN TAO INVESTMENT INDUSTRY HCM Real Estate 119 17 19.1% -21.5% -19.7% -26.1% 30.5% 46.3% 6.4% 11.0%DHG DHG PHARMACEUTICAL JSC HCM Pharmaceuticals 118 8 19.2% 8.1% 6.9% 6.9% 9.9% 10.9% 18.0% 19.5%SJS SONGDA URBAN & INDUSTRIAL ZO HCM Eng&Construct ion 110 10 -40.4% -29.8% -51.3% -51.0% 55.5% 47.2% 14.1% 28.3%PVT PETROVIETNAM TRANSPORTATION HCM Transportation 107 4 254.2% 321.6% 279.9% 166.2% 13.1% 11.0% 4.4% 2.5%ACB ASIA COMMERCIAL BANK Hanoi Banks 904 126 n/a n/a 25.4% n/a v 34.0% n/a 28.1%KBC KINHBAC CITY DEVELOPMENT SHA Hanoi Home Builders 185 16 42.9% 64.9% -15.0% -17.2% 60.4% 52.4% 10.0% 14.3%

PVS PETROLEUM TECHNICAL SERVICES Hanoi Transportation 235 1 50.0% 122.4% -95.7% -96.3% 6.3% 4.3% 0.6% 27.1%PVI PETROVIETNAM INSURANCE JSC Hanoi Insurance 133 11 45.2% -23.4% -24.6% -33.3% 18.5% 35.0% 8.2% 14.3%VCG VIET NAM CONSTRUCTION & IMPO Hanoi Eng&Construction 167 18 n/a n/a n/a n/a -2.4% n/a 18.0% n/aVNR VIETNAM NATIONAL REINSURANCE Hanoi Insurance 123 9 82.4% 175.7% 118.4% 56.0% 31.7% 21.0% 8.4% 11.9%

Source: HSBC, Bloomberg

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

5/18

5

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

4 March 2009

abc

former foreign investor favourites such as REE,

Gemadept (GMD) and Sacom Cable (SAM).

But there were some impressive results too,

mainly from companies that stuck to their core

businesses and did not dabble in property

development and banking. Vietnam Dairy

Products (better known as Vinamilk), for

example, saw EPS growth of 28%, with improved

margins; it managed a return-on-equity of 27%.

Among large listed companies, PV Drilling(PVD), Hoa Phat (HPG), Vinh Son (VSH), PV

Transport (PVT) and Vietnam National

Reinsurance (VNR) all saw EPS grow by more

than 20%.

What this means for valuation

The 2008 results were somewhat worse than we

had been expecting: our valuation analysis

previously was based on the assumption of a 10%

decline in EPS in 2008 (and 15% rise in 2009).

On the basis of the actual data, the VN Index is

trading on a PE of 9.6x historical earnings.

We are now assuming that EPS will be flat y-o-y

in 2009 and grow by 10% in 2010 (since

operatingearnings grew by 8% last year, we think

those are fairly conservative assumptions, as long

as real estate losses were fully written off by

auditors in the latest results). That would put the

index on a 12-month forward PE of 9.5x (Chart

6). That is the cheapest level it has ever traded at

(with the actual 2008 EPS data, valuations in

retrospect were much higher in mid-2008 than

they seemed at the time). But it is not especially

cheap by regional standards. China is on a similar

multiple, Indonesia is on 8.2x and Thailand on

7.8x. These markets also have better earnings

visibility than Vietnam, where there are still no

consensus earnings estimates available.

6. Estimated 12-month forward PE for VN Index

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Jan-06

Apr-06

Jul-06

Oct-06

Jan-07

Apr-07

Jul-07

Oct-07

Jan-08

Apr-08

Jul-08

Oct-08

Jan-09

Source: HSBC

That said, there are some companies that now

trade on low valuations. As shown in Table 8,

Vinamilk is on a historic low PE of 10.8x, PV

Fertiliser on 7.8x, PV Drilling on 7.9x, FPT on

7.2x and Hoa Phat on 5.8x.

Adventurous investors might be willing to dip

their toes back into the water on a long-term basis

to buy some structurally sound companies on

reasonable valuations. Overall, however, our view

remains that the Vietnamese market is likely to

continue to struggle this year, and that there are

more attractive markets in Asia which investors

would be advised to enter first if they believe that

emerging markets in general will recover.

7. Key stock market data

HCM Hanoi Total

Market cap (USD m) 7,666 2,691 10,357No. of stocks 174 176 350Stocks with mkt cap >USD1bn 0 0 0Stocks with mkt cap >USD500m 3 1 4Stocks with mkt cap >USD200m 12 2 14Stocks that hit foreign limit 3 3 6Daily turnover (USDm, 1mth ave) 9 5 13Foreign ownership 23.5% 16.7% 21.8%PE (2008) x 9.6 9.4ROE 22.9% 17.2% 22.8%DY 7.8% 6.1%

Source: HSBC, Bloomberg, HOSE

Garry Evans

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

6/18

6

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

4 March 2009

abc

8. Key valuation data for the largest listed Vietnamese stocks (market cap >USD200m)

Code Name Industry Subgroup Exchange Mkt cap(USD mn)

Ave dailyt/over

(USDm)

Foreignownership

Foreignlimit

Room forforeignbuying

(USDm)

PE Chg 3M

ACB ASIA COMMERCIAL BANK Commer Banks Non-US Hanoi 904 1.40 30% 30% 0 6.0 -16%VNM VIET NAM DAIRY PRODUCTS JSC Food-Dairy Products HCM 762 0.48 44% 46% 12.3 10.8 3%DPM PETROVIETNAM FERT & CHEMICAL Chemicals-Diversified HCM 614 0.64 18% 49% 191.6 7.8 -19%HAG HAGL JSC Miscellaneous Manufactur HCM 519 n/a 17% 49% 165.1 13.0 n/aPVF PETROVIETNAM FINANCE JSC Finance-Invest Bnkr/Brkr HCM 452 0.30 12% 30% 81.9 156.5 -1%STB SAIGON THUONG TIN COMMERCIAL Commer Banks Non-US HCM 429 1.22 30% 30% 0.0 7.3 -23%PVD PETROVIETNAM DRILLING AND WE Oil-Field Services HCM 420 0.57 29% 49% 84.5 7.9 -20%FPT FPT CORP Telecommunication Equip HCM 352 0.79 27% 49% 76.1 7.2 -13%PPC PHA LAI THERMAL POWER JSC Electric-Generation HCM 342 0.27 18% 49% 105.4 -28.8 2%HPG HOA PHAT GROUP JSC Miscellaneous Manufactur HCM 286 0.47 24% 49% 71.9 5.8 -14%VIC VINCOM JSC Real Estate Oper/Develop HCM 263 0.08 5% 49% 116.6 39.0 -50%PVS PETROLEUM TECHNICAL SERVICES Transport-Services Hanoi 235 0.34 9% 49% 94 265.9 -22%VPL VINPEARL JSC Resorts/Theme Parks HCM 224 0.12 17% 49% 72.4 96.6 -60%VSH VINH SON - SONG HINH HYDROPO Electric-Generation HCM 207 0.13 28% 49% 43.3 9.8 0%

Source: HSBC, Bloomberg, HOSE (Data as of end-Feb)

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

7/18

7

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

4 March 2009

abc

We last published on Vietnam on 7 January, when

we recommended rebuilding a position in

Vietnam government bonds (VGBs) due to a

positive near-term outlook predicated on at least

one more easing measure by the State Bank of

Vietnam (SBV) and a benign near-term supply

outlook. While the SBV proceeded with monetary

easing (150bp cut in the base rate and 200bp cut

in reserve ratio) and VGB primary issuance was

scarce (we calculate less than VND2tr in total

issuance year-to-date), the main factor

underlying our previously favourable outlook

flush domestic liquidity due to sluggish bank

lending growth has reversed due to the

governments introduction of a subsidised

loan programme.

Domestic liquidity has shown signs of significant

tightening with the O/N rate at 6.50% while VGByields have retraced 100bp in recent weeks. Tight

VND liquidity has even forced the SBV to inject

liquidity in large amounts via open market

operations (OMOs) for the first time since Q3 08

(see Fig. 1).

1. SBV has injected VND39tr since the start of the subsidisedloan programme

2.5

7.5

12.5

17.5

Jan

-08

Feb

-08

Mar

-08

Apr

-08

May

-08

Jun

-08

Jul-08

Aug

-08

Sep

-08

Oct-08

Nov

-08

Dec

-08

Jan

-09

Feb

-09

Mar

-09

%

(60)

(40)

(20)

-

20

40

60

VNDtrn

Weekly net liquidity injections through OM Os (rhs)

O/n call money rate (lhs)

Source: HSBC

Subsidised loan programmetightens domestic liquidity

Notwithstanding successive base rate and bank

reserve requirement cuts (see Fig. 2), domestic

liquidity has tightened significantly as a result of

the new government-subsidised loan programme.

The programme, announced on 11 February, aims

to stimulate the economy by increasing bank loans

by VND468tr (the government is targeting 2009

credit growth of 20% y-o-y, versus 21% in 2008

and 54% in 2007). Under the programmes terms,

banks have been mandated to provide subsidised

loans to borrowers at a spread of 400bp below the

maximum lending rate of 10.5%, or

Fixed income strategy

Government embarks on subsidised lending programme

substantially draining excess liquidity and VGB appetite

Sell VGBs on tight(ening) VND liquidity, policy uncertainty

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

8/18

8

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

4 March 2009

abc

approximately 6.5%1. This compares with average

system-wide bank deposit funding costs of

approximately 8%.

The loan subsidy program will negatively affect

bank profitability (as the subsidies will be

provided up-front to borrowers, but reimbursed by

the government over an 8-10mth period2) and

possibly result in an increase in non-performing

bank loans (NPLs3) due to the subsidised nature

of the loans and as some loans may be used to

refinance existing NPLs with high interest rates).

1The subsidised loan programme mandates each bank

to commit a certain amount of funds to new loans to

SMEs and exporters especially those in sensitive,

labour-intensive sectors. Many of the loans will be used

to refinance existing high-interest loans as well asconvert foreign currency debt (approximately 20% of

outstanding loans).

2Banks will be reimbursed the 4ppt-interest rate

subsidy by the government with 80% of the subsidy

amount paid on a monthly basis over a period of eight

months, with the final 20% of the subsidy to be

reimbursed by year-end (the tentative termination date

of the programme).

3

The official system NPL ratio is 3.5% by Vietnamese

accounting standards, but could be more than 3x higher

by international standards, according to Fitch

Despite this, local state-owned banks have already

responded by pledging an increased quantum of

lending. Already, local banks have lent out

VND80tr under the programme in February,

which has fully absorbed virtually all available

surplus money market liquidity. In response, the

SBV on 24 February reduced bank reserve

requirements by 100bp to 3% to free up VND10-

15tr in money market liquidity.

However,the governments objective to spur

VND300tr (a further VND220tr) in subsidised

lending by the end of 1Q09 raises major

questions as to how these additional subsidised

loans will be funded and also how the

government intends to fund its borrowing

requirement for 2009 (est. VND55tr).

In this respect, the overarching issue is how the

authorities will be able to maintain their 6.5%

GDP growth target through fiscal stimulus

measures and directed bank lending at a time

when Vietnam may suffer again from a sizable

current account deficit (HSBC house-view:

USD8.6bn or 9.6% of GDP) and a possible BoP

deficit due to a reduced rollover of short-term

foreign liabilities4.

4According to the BIS, Vietnam external liabilities as

of 3Q08 stood at USD14.5bn, of which USD6.5bn

matures by 3Q09.

2. Aggressive policy easing has failed to spur credit growth

Cumulativechange (bp)

1 Mar-09 22 Dec-08 5 Dec-08 21 Nov-08 3 Nov-08 20 Oct-08 1 Oct-08

Base rate 700 7.0% 8.5% 10.0% 11.0% 12.0% 13.0% 14.0%Discount rate 700 6.0% 7.5% 9.0% 10.0% 11.0% 12.0% 13.0%Refinancing rate 700 8.0% 9.5% 11.0% 12.0% 13.0% 14.0% 15.0%Lending rate ceiling 1050 10.5% 12.8% 15.0% 16.5% 18.0% 19.5% 21.0%Reserve requirement- VND, non-term 800 3%* 5.0%* 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 11.0% 11.0%- VND, >12mths 400 1.0% 1.0% 2.0% 2.0% 4.0% 5.0% 5.0%- FC, non-term 400 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 9.0% 11.0% 11.0% 11.0%- FC, >12mths 200 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 5.0% 5.0%

Interest on VND reservedeposits

-350 3.6% 8.5% 9.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 5.0%

Source: HSBC. *Agribank, rural banks and state-run credit funds benefit from preferential minimum reserve requirements of 1% (1 Mar-09), 2% (22 Dec-08)

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

9/18

9

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

4 March 2009

abc

Given tight domestic and external liquidity, the

authorities are faced with limited policy

options. Further reserve requirement cuts (e.g.

from 3% to 1% as recently in Malaysia) may free

up only another VND30tr of liquidity in the

system clearly insufficient to fund either the

VND468tr subsidised loan programme or

VND55tr in net government funding needs

planned for 2009. An alternative option is for the

SBV to resort to quantitative easing or a

monetisation of government borrowings, which

could however introduce upward pressure on the

USD/VND exchange rate.

Instead, as an alternative approach towards

funding the fiscal deficit, the authorities have

signalled that they are considering issuance of

onshore USD-denominated government bonds

through compulsory sales to domestic banks.

The main motivation for the issuance of these

USD bonds is to lower government borrowingcosts by offering competitive yields relative to

local USD bank deposit rates (currently offered

around 2%). By comparison, VGB yields

currently range from 9.10-9.70% (1-15yr, bid),

while the Vietnam 2016 sovereign yields

approximately 9-10%. Moreover, the issuance of

dollar-denominated government bonds would also

help beef up SBVs FX reserves (which stood at

USD22bn in early February according to SBV

Governor Giau) through the transfer of FXliquidity from the banking system to SBV. USD

bond issuance might also help reduce dollarisation

in the economy. Given the governments

VND55tr in funding requirements, at least USD2-

3bn of USD bond issuance would be required to

make a serious contribution to the governments

funding needs and to SBVs FX reserves position,

in our opinion.

However, the major drawback of the USD bond

issuance plan is that it could contribute to a

further drying up of domestic USD liquidity,

unless this FX liquidity is channelled back by

SBV through FX interventions. According to BIS

data as of Sep-2008, private short-term foreign

liabilities totalled USD6.5bn versus USD5.9bn in

private sector foreign assets. As these short-term

foreign liabilities are to BIS-reporting banks, they

may not include private sector foreign currency

deposits held locally.

Implications for the VND

money market and VGBsTightening domestic liquidity has already been

reflected in a rise in the O/N rate to 6.50%

while VGB yields have retraced 100bp trough-

to-current (see Fig. 3) with the 2yr and 5yr

VGBs at 9.20% and 9.40% (bid), respectively.

3. O/N rate and VGB yields have retraced

0

4

8

12

16

20

Jan-0

8

Mar-08

May-0

8

Jul-08

Sep-0

8

Nov-0

8

Jan-0

9

Mar-09

O/n call money 5y r VGB y ields2yr VGB y ields

Source: Bloomberg, Reuters, HSBC

Insofar as the subsidised loan programme

proceeds as planned (i.e. without relaxation of the

VND468tr lending target), there are few signs

that domestic liquidity will be sufficient to

absorb VND55tr in VGB net issuance.

Importantly, banks pledged commitments under

the subsidised loan programme may require some

offloading of VGB holdings in order to raise

funds to lend to borrowers. Our data on maturing

bond redemptions and coupon payments also

show little in the way of reinvestment flows

through the remainder of H1 09 (see Fig. 4) to

help absorb upcoming VGB issuance.

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

10/18

10

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

4 March 2009

abc

4. Under VND4tr in reinvestment flows during Q2 09

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

Jan-0

9

Feb-0

9

Mar-09

Apr-09

M

ay-0

9

Jun-0

9

Jul-09

Aug-0

9

Sep-0

9

Oct-09

Nov-0

9

Dec-0

9

VNDbn

VGB principal VGB coupon VDB principal

VDB coupon HIFU

Source: Bloomberg, HSBC

In addition to onshore banks limited capacity to

absorb VGBs, government supply projections

are also subject to upward revision. For

instance, recent official statements point to

revenue shortfalls (as much as VND90tr due to

optimistic growth and export assumptions5) and

the risk of higher budget deficits will continue to

place pressure on 2009 funding requirements,

which are likely to exceed the original budget

plan (see Fig. 5). Already, on 3 March, the

National Assembly approved an increase in net

issuance from VND43tr to VND55tr, which could

raise outstanding local government bond supply

by about 25%. Although the compulsory sale of

dollar bonds being considered by the government

would invariably decrease the proportion that

would be financed through VGBs, this amount

still excludes planned issuance by VietnamDevelopment Bank (VDB) and Ho Chi Minh City

Investment Fund (HIFU) to the tune of VND30tr

and VND20tr, respectively.

5

The government targeted 2009 real GDP growth of6.5% (compared to HSBC 5.4% and Consensus

Economics 4.8%).

5. MOF financing, VNDtr

2008 (firstestimate)

2009 (plan) Notes

GDP 1,490 1,813Total revenues and grants 399 390 Revenues

may beVND90tr

lowerTotal exp. (excludeprincipal payment)

439 457

Primary def icit (31) (53)- Def icit /GDP (%) -2.1% -2.9%Principal payment 35 35Total financing (net) 31 53

Of which: - -Domestic (net) 23 43 NationalAssemblyapprovedVND55trissuance

- Issued 51 71- Repayed 28 28External (net) 8 10- Issued 15 16- Repayed 7 6Overall deficit (grossissuance)

(66) (87)

- Deficit/GDP (%) 5.0% 4.8%

Source: MOF

Bottom line: Sell VGBs, target10-11% yields near term

Given this backdrop, the outlook for VGBs has

deteriorated markedly in recent weeks. Policy

uncertainties emanate from whether the

government will allow the subsidised lending

programme to proceed as planned in the process

reducing demand for VGBs or whether credit

growth targets and lending requirements will be

relaxed in light of a higher government bond

issuance schedule.

It is possible that the government may scale back

its ambitious loan programme, but the initial

impact (VND80tr in new loans just since mid-

February) has already withdrawn liquidity from

the banking system. Rising NPL ratios as well as

lower scope and flexibility for further SBV easing

is unlikely to breathe life into the market in the

same way as flush liquidity conditions did in4Q08.

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

11/18

11

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

4 March 2009

abc

Aside from tightening domestic liquidity, SBVs

subsidised loan program will put upward pressure

on VGB yields and may also lead to upward

pressure on USD-VND if accompanied by large

scale issuance of USD-denominated bonds or

major liquidity injections by SBV.

Against this uncertain backdrop, we recommend

reducing exposure to VGBs until there is more

clarity about the authorities policy direction. In

the meantime, we revise our VGB yieldforecasts upwards to 10.00-11.00% within the

next 2-3 monthsto take into account the outlook

for tighter money market liquidity and increased

VGB issuance, with the caveat that the rise in

VGB yields may be tempered in the event of

major liquidity injections by SBV in order to cap

any further rises in the O/N rate and/or to

monetise government borrowings.

Virgil Esguerra / Pieter van der Schaft

Addendum6. Recent VGB and VDB auction results

Date Plan.size

Tenor Type Targetyield

Result (issue size,VNDbn)

1-Dec-08 1,000 12mth VGB T-notes

8.98% Size issued: 1000

1-Dec-08 500 2Y VGB 9.50% Size issued: 20300 5Y 9.50% Failed

2-Dec-08 200 3Y VDB 9.50% Failed300 5Y 9.80% Size issued: 28

10-Dec-08 700 2Y VGB 9.00% Size issued: 100300 3Y 8.80% Size issued: 100

15-Dec-08 500 2Y VGB 9.00% Failed23-Dec-08 200 3Y VDB 8.98% Size issued: 200

300 5Y 8.70% Failed30-Dec-08 200 3Y VDB 8.50% Failed

300 5Y 8.50% Failed14-Jan-09 850 2Y VGB 8.00% Size issued: 250

500 3Y 8.05% Size issued: 100150 5Y 8.15% Size issued: 100

15-Jan-09 1000 12mth VGB T-notes

7.49% Size issued: 1000

11-Feb-09 1000 2Y VGB 6.70% Size issued: 1001000 3Y 6.75% Failed

13-Feb-09 500 5Y VDB n/a Failed500 10Y n/a Failed

16-Feb-09 700 2Y VGB 6.70% Size issued: 100800 3Y 6.70% Failed

20-Feb-09 500 5Y VDB n/a Failed500 10Y n/a Failed

23-Feb-09 500 2Y VGB 6.70% Failed500 5Y 7.20% Failed

26-Feb-09 500 2Y VGB 6.95% Failed500 3Y 7.00% Failed

27-Feb-09 500 5Y VDB 7.00% Failed500 10Y 7.00% Failed

Source: HSBC Vietnam, Bloo mberg

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

12/18

12

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

4 March 2009

abc

Since we last published in these pages, the USD-

VND market has seen some of the least eventful

weeks in recent years. The official midpoint has

remained stable around 16,975, official USD-

VND spot has remained steady at the ceiling

around 17,484, while the NDF fixings have

remained in slight premium on average about 100

VND above the band (Chart 1).

Indeed, the fundamentals have become less hostile

to VND in the last few weeks. Notably, Vietnam

posted a monthly trade surplus of USD390m in

January, the first such monthly trade surplus in

three years. Given the lunar new year-related

volatility, as well as uncertainty between falling

imported intermediate goods and the potential

similarly sized though lagged fall in exports, it

would be very premature to draw conclusions that

Vietnam has shifted into structural surpluses.

However, it is still safe to assume that the large

falls in the consumption and investment related

imported goods categories (e.g. automobiles,

steel, cement) driven by a sharp slowdown in

domestic demand, will help reduce USD demand

in the coming months.

The other improvement in the backdrop for VND

is that the foreign portfolio liquidation process

appears to be coming to an end. Foreign equity

flows have been minimal for several months now,

and while aggregate data is unavailable, anecdotal

evidence suggests that foreign bond liquidation is

basically completed. Together with a sharp

slowdown in FDI flows, FX regime management

FX strategy

More stable conditions for USD-VND

VND still looks expensive and capital inflows will continue to

shrink

Expect continued gradual depreciation

Chart 1: USD-VND, trading band, and NDF fixing Chart 2: Real exchange rate

15900

16400

16900

17400

17900

Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09Official Mid USD/VNDCeiling NDF Fix

l

55

70

85

100

115

130

Jan-90 Jan-94 Jan-98 Jan-02 Jan-06

REER LR Avg Avg since 1998

Source: Bloomberg; ASIA denotes simple average of the region Source: HSBC

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

13/18

13

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

4 March 2009

abc

by the SBV should become more familiar, as

conditions have reverted closer to pre-WTO

accession conditions where trade flows, rather

than investment flows, are the predominant source

of FX activity.

However, in the near term, we are somewhat

concerned about the as-yet unclear plans to offer

USD-denominated treasury bonds to the onshore

market. This is discussed in more detail in the

preceding fixed income section. For the FXmarket, the impact appears pretty clear this will

absorb USD from the private sector and from the

financial system. The impact on net USD-VND

demand will be mitigated to the extent that the

USD proceeds are recycled into the market, either

through SOE on-lending (to fund SOE imports, or

to roll over USD debt), or sold by the government

back into the market to fund local spending. Still,

the risk is that such a move creates unexpected

volatility in USD supply that feeds into the FX.

More broadly, we continue to expect, going

forward, that the SBV should manage a gradual

depreciation. Despite some improvement on the

trade balance, we still believe fundamentals

support a weaker currency. For one, especially

with the considerable weakening of peer

currencies in Asia, as well as inflation which

remains in the double-digits, the VND is now very

expensive. Despite the recent nominal

depreciation against the USD, in real effective

terms (Chart 2) the VND remains about 23%

above its long-run REER average and close to its

historical extremes.

We also expect capital inflows, both on direct and

portfolio flows, to remain feeble through the next

several quarters, at least until global financial

markets recover and the global economy troughs.

Finally, the SBV would likely take the opportunity

to rebuild its FX reserves, if it can manage to

weaken the VND in line with the region while

maintaining overall FX market stability.

Daniel Hui

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

14/18

14

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

4 March 2009

abc

Disclosure appendix

Analyst certification

The following analyst(s), who is(are) primarily responsible for this report, certifies(y) that the opinion(s) on the subject

security(ies) or issuer(s) and any other views or forecasts expressed herein accurately reflect their personal view(s) and that no

part of their compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendation(s) or views contained

in this research report: Pieter Van Der Schaft, Garry Evans, Virgil Esguerra and Daniel Hui

Important disclosuresStock ratings and basis for financial analysis

HSBC believes that investors utilise various disciplines and investment horizons when making investment decisions, which

depend largely on individual circumstances such as the investor's existing holdings, risk tolerance and other considerations.

Given these differences, HSBC has two principal aims in its equity research: 1) to identify long-term investment opportunities

based on particular themes or ideas that may affect the future earnings or cash flows of companies on a 12 month time horizon;

and 2) from time to time to identify short-term investment opportunities that are derived from fundamental, quantitative,

technical or event-driven techniques on a 0-3 month time horizon and which may differ from our long-term investment rating.

HSBC has assigned ratings for its long-term investment opportunities as described below.

This report addresses only the long-term investment opportunities of the companies referred to in the report. As and when

HSBC publishes a short-term trading idea the stocks to which these relate are identified on the website at

www.hsbcnet.com/research. Details of these short-term investment opportunities can be found under the Reports section of thiswebsite.

HSBC believes an investor's decision to buy or sell a stock should depend on individual circumstances such as the investor's

existing holdings and other considerations. Different securities firms use a variety of ratings terms as well as different rating

systems to describe their recommendations. Investors should carefully read the definitions of the ratings used in each research

report. In addition, because research reports contain more complete information concerning the analysts' views, investors

should carefully read the entire research report and should not infer its contents from the rating. In any case, ratings should not

be used or relied on in isolation as investment advice.

Rating definitions for long-term investment opportunities

Stock ratings

HSBC assigns ratings to its stocks in this sector on the following basis:

For each stock we set a required rate of return calculated from the risk free rate for that stock's domestic, or as appropriate,

regional market and the relevant equity risk premium established by our strategy team. The price target for a stock represents

the value the analyst expects the stock to reach over our performance horizon. The performance horizon is 12 months. For a

stock to be classified as Overweight, the implied return must exceed the required return by at least 5 percentage points over the

next 12 months (or 10 percentage points for a stock classified as Volatile*). For a stock to be classified as Underweight, the

stock must be expected to underperform its required return by at least 5 percentage points over the next 12 months (or 10

percentage points for a stock classified as Volatile*). Stocks between these bands are classified as Neutral.

Our ratings are re-calibrated against these bands at the time of any 'material change' (initiation of coverage, change of volatility

status or change in price target). Notwithstanding this, and although ratings are subject to ongoing management review,

expected returns will be permitted to move outside the bands as a result of normal share price fluctuations without necessarily

triggering a rating change.

*A stock will be classified as volatile if its historical volatility has exceeded 40%, if the stock has been listed for less than 12

months (unless it is in an industry or sector where volatility is low) or if the analyst expects significant volatility. However,

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

15/18

15

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

4 March 2009

abc

stocks which we do not consider volatile may in fact also behave in such a way. Historical volatility is defined as the pastmonth's average of the daily 365-day moving average volatilities. In order to avoid misleadingly frequent changes in rating,

however, volatility has to move 2.5 percentage points past the 40% benchmark in either direction for a stock's status to change.

Prior to this, from 7 June 2005 HSBC applied a ratings structure which ranked the stocks according to their notional target

price vs current market price and then categorised (approximately) the top 40% as Overweight, the next 40% as Neutral and

the last 20% as Underweight. The performance horizon is 2 years. The notional target price was defined as the mid-point of the

analysts' valuation for a stock.

From 15 November 2004 to 7 June 2005, HSBC carried no ratings and concentrated on long-term thematic reports which

identified themes and trends in industries, but did not make a conclusion as to the investment action that potential investors

should take.

Prior to 15 November 2004, HSBC's ratings system was based upon a two-stage recommendation structure: a combination ofthe analysts' view on the stock relative to its sector and the sector call relative to the market, together giving a view on the

stock relative to the market. The sector call was the responsibility of the strategy team, set in co-operation with the analysts.

For other companies, HSBC showed a recommendation relative to the market. The performance horizon was 6-12 months. The

target price was the level the stock should have traded at if the market accepted the analysts' view of the stock.

Rating distribution for long-term investment opportunities

As of 04 March 2009, the distribution of all ratings published is as follows:

Overweight (Buy) 39% (30% of these provided with Investment Banking Services)

Neutral (Hold) 38% (31% of these provided with Investment Banking Services)

Underweight (Sell) 23% (24% of these provided with Investment Banking Services)

Analysts are paid in part by reference to the profitability of HSBC which includes investment banking revenues.

For disclosures in respect of any company, please see the most recently published report on that company available at

www.hsbcnet.com/research.

* HSBC Legal Entities are listed in the Disclaimer below.

Additional disclosures

1 This report is dated as at 04 March 2009.2 All market data included in this report are dated as at close 03 March 2009, unless otherwise indicated in the report.3 HSBC has procedures in place to identify and manage any potential conflicts of interest that arise in connection with its

Research business. HSBC's analysts and its other staff who are involved in the preparation and dissemination of Research

operate and have a management reporting line independent of HSBC's Investment Banking business. Chinese Wallprocedures are in place between the Investment Banking and Research businesses to ensure that any confidential and/orprice sensitive information is handled in an appropriate manner.

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

16/18

16

Asia / Vietnam

Strategy

4 March 2009

abc

Disclaimer

* Legal entities as at 22 October 2008

'UAE' HSBC Bank Middle East Limited, Dubai; 'HK' The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking

Corporation Limited, Hong Kong; 'TW' HSBC Securities (Taiwan) Corporation Limited; 'CA'

HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc, Toronto; HSBC Bank, Paris branch; HSBC France; 'DE' HSBC

Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG, Dusseldorf; 000 HSBC Bank (RR), Moscow; 'IN' HSBC Securities

and Capital Markets (India) Private Limited, Mumbai; 'JP' HSBC Securities (Japan) Limited,

Tokyo; 'EG' HSBC Securities Egypt S.A.E., Cairo; 'CN' HSBC Investment Bank Asia Limited,

Beijing Representative Office; The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited,

Singapore branch; The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited, Seoul Securities

Branch; HSBC Securities (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd, Johannesburg; 'GR' HSBC Pantelakis

Securities S.A., Athens; HSBC Bank plc, London, Madrid, Milan, Stockholm, Tel Aviv, 'US'

HSBC Securities (USA) Inc, New York; HSBC Yatirim Menkul Degerler A.S., Istanbul; HSBC

Mxico, S.A., Institucin de Banca Mltiple, Grupo Financiero HSBC, HSBC Bank Brasil S.A. -

Banco Mltiplo, HSBC Bank Australia Limited, HSBC Bank Argentina S.A., HSBC Saudi Arabia

Limited.

Issuer of report

The Hongkong and Shanghai

Banking Corporation Limited

Level 19, 1 Queens Road Central

Hong Kong SAR

Telephone: +852 2843 9111

Telex: 75100 CAPEL HXFax: +852 2596 0200

Website: www.research.hsbc.com

This document has been issued by The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC) in the conduct of its Hong Kongregulated business for the information of its institutional and professional customers; it is not intended for and should not be distributed toretail customers in Hong Kong. The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited is regulated by the Securities and FuturesCommission. All enquires by recipients in Hong Kong must be directed to your HSBC contact in Hong Kong. If it is received by a customerof an affiliate of HSBC, its provision to the recipient is subject to the terms of business in place between the recipient and such affiliate. This

document is not and should not be construed as an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to purchase or subscribe for any investment.HSBC has based this document on information obtained from sources it believes to be reliable but which it has not independently verified;

HSBC makes no guarantee, representation or warranty and accepts no responsibility or liability as to its accuracy or completeness.Expressions of opinion are those of the Research Division of HSBC only and are subject to change without notice. HSBC and its affiliatesand/or their officers, directors and employees may have positions in any securities mentioned in this document (or in any related investment)

and may from time to time add to or dispose of any such securities (or investment). HSBC and its affiliates may act as market maker or haveassumed an underwriting commitment in the securities of companies discussed in this document (or in related investments), may sell them toor buy them from customers on a principal basis and may also perform or seek to perform investment banking or underwriting services for or

relating to those companies.HSBC Securities (USA) Inc. accepts responsibility for the content of this research report prepared by its non-US foreign affiliate. All U.S.

persons receiving and/or accessing this report and wishing to effect transactions in any security discussed herein should do so with HSBCSecurities (USA) Inc. in the United States and not with its non-US foreign affiliate, the issuer of this report.In the UK this report may only be distributed to persons of a kind described in Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000(Financial Promotion) Order 2001. The protections afforded by the UK regulatory regime are available only to those dealing with arepresentative of HSBC Bank plc in the UK. In Singapore, this publication is distributed by The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking

Corporation Limited, Singapore Branch for the general information of institutional investors or other persons specified in Sections 274 and

304 of the Securities and Futures Act (Chapter 289) (SFA) and accredited investors and other persons in accordance with the conditionsspecified in Sections 275 and 305 of the SFA. This publication is not a prospectus as defined in the SFA. It may not be further distributed inwhole or in part for any purpose. The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited Singapore Branch is regulated by the MonetaryAuthority of Singapore. In Australia, this publication has been distributed by The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited

(ABN 65 117 925 970, AFSL 301737) for the general information of its wholesale customers (as defined in the Corporations Act 2001).Where distributed to retail customers, this research is distributed by HSBC Bank Australia Limited (AFSL No. 232595). These respectiveentities make no representations that the products or services mentioned in this document are available to persons in Australia or arenecessarily suitable for any particular person or appropriate in accordance with local law. No consideration has been given to the particular

investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any recipient.

In Japan, this publication has been distributed by HSBC Securities (Japan) Limited. It may not be further distributed in whole or in part forany purpose. Copyright. The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited 2009, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this publication maybe reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, on any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or

otherwise, without the prior written permission of The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited. MICA (P) 258/09/2008

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

17/18

abc

Multi-asset

GlobalPhilip PooleGlobal Head of Emerging Markets Research

+44 20 7991 5641 philip.poole@hsbcib.com

Economics

Latin AmericaAndre Loes+55 11 3371 8184 andre.a.loes@hsbc.com.brJavier Finkman+54 11 4344 8144 javier.finkman@hsbc.com.arRamiro D Blazquez+54 11 4348 5759 ramiro.blazquez@hsbc.com.arJonathan Heath+52 55 5721 2176 jonathan.heath@hsbc.com.mxJuan Pedro Trevino-Gutierrez+52 55 5721 2179 juan.trevino@hsbc.com.mxLorena Dominguez-Torres+52 55 5721 2172 lorena.dominguez@hsbc.com.mxAsiaQu Hongbin+852 2822 2025 hongbinqu@hsbc.com.hkFrederic Neumann+852 2822 4556 fredericneumann@hsbc.com.hkRobert Prior-Wandesforde+65 6239 0840 robert.prior-wandesforde@hsbc.com.sgChristopher Wong+852 2996 6917 christopherwong@hsbc.com.hkJanus Chan+852 2996 6975 januschan@hsbc.com.hkCEMEAJuliet Sampson+44 20 7991 5651 juliet.sampson@hsbcib.comKubilay Ozturk+44 20 7991 6045 kubilay.ozturk@hsbcib.comAlexander Morozov+7 49 5721 1577 alexander.morozov@hsbc.com

Murat Ulgen+90 21 2366 1625 murat.ulgen@hsbc.com.trSimon Williams+971 4507 7614 simon.williams@hsbc.com

Credit

Dilip Shahani+852 2822 4520 dilipshahani@hsbc.com.hkBecky Liu+852 2822 4392 beckyjliu@hsbc.com.hkDevendran Mahendran+852 2822 4521 devendran@hsbc.com.hkZhiming Zhang+852 2822 4523 zhimingzhang@hsbc.com.hkOlga Fedatova+44 20 7992 3707 olga.fedotova@hsbcib.comChavan Bhogaita+971 4507 7695 chavanbhogaita@hsbc.comKeerthi AngammanaCredit Strategy+44 20 79915431 keerthisri.angammana@hsbcib.comUnited Arab EmiratesChavan BhogaitaHead of Credit Research

+971 450 77695 chavanbhogaita@hsbc.com

Currency

Clyde Wardle+1 212 525 3345 clyde.wardle@us.hsbc.comRichard Yetsenga+852 2996 6565 richard.yetsenga@hsbc.com.hkDaniel Hui+852 2822 4340 danielpyhui@hsbc.com.hkPerry Kojodjojo+852 2996 6568 perrykojodjojo@hsbc.com.hkMarjorie Hernandez+1 212 525 4109 marjorie.hernandez@us.hsbc.com

Fixed Income

Pieter Van Der Schaft+852 2822 4277 pietervanderschaft@hsbc.com.hkVirgil Esguerra+852 2822 4665 virgilesguerra@hsbc.com.hkPablo GoldbergHead of Latin America Fixed Income Strategy

+1 212 525 8729 pablo.a.goldberg@us.hsbc.comAlejandro Mrtinez-CruzDebt Markets+52 55 5721 2380 alejandro.martinezcr@hsbc.com.mxHernan M YellatiDebt Markets

+1 212 525 6787 hernan.m.yellati@us.hsbc.com

Equity

CEMEA

EuropeWill Manuel

Head of CEMEA Company Research+44 20 7992 3602 will.manuel@hsbcib.comJohn LomaxHead of Equity Strategy, GEMs+44 20 7992 3712 john.lomax@hsbcib.comWietse Nijenhuis+44 20 7992 3680 wietse.nijenhuis@hsbcib.comMaciej Baranski+44 20 7991 6782 maciej.baranski@hsbcib.comAnisa Redman+44 20 7991 6822 anisa.redman@hsbcib.comHerve Drouet+44 20 7991 6827 herve.drouet@hsbcib.comSergey Fedoseev+44 20 7991 6831 sergey.fedoseev@hsbcib.comVeronika Lyssogorskaya+44 20 7992 3684 veronika.lyssogorskaya@hsbcib.comTurkeyCenk Orcan

Co-Head of Turkey Equity Research+90 212 376 4614 cenkorcan@hsbc.com.trBulent YurdagulCo-Head of Turkey Equity Research

+90 212 376 4612 bulentyurdagul@hsbc.com.trLevent Bayar+90 212 376 4617 leventbayar@hsbc.com.trTamer Sengun+90 212 376 4615 tamersengun@hsbc.com.trErol Hullu+90 212 376 4616 erolhullu@hsbc.com.trIsraelAvshalom Shimei+972 3 710 1197 avshalomshimei@hsbc.comYonah Weisz+972 3 710 1198 yonahweisz@hsbc.comUnited Arab EmiratesKunal Bajaj

+971 4 507 7458 kunalbajaj@hsbc.comMajed Azzam+971 4 507 7380 majed.a.azzam@hsbc.comEgyptAlia El Mehelmy+202 2529 8438 aliaelmehelmy@hsbc.comWael Orban+202 2529 8437 waelorban@hsbc.comAhmed Hafez Saad+202 2529 8436 ahmedhafezsaad@hsbc.com

GEMs Research Team

mailto:yonahweisz@hsbc.commailto:yonahweisz@hsbc.com

8/11/2019 VN Monitor 0903

18/18

abc

Equity CEMEA (continued)

AsiaSanjeev KaushikIndia Head of Research

+91 22 2268 1271 sanjeevkaushik@hsbc.co.inReal EstateHerald van der Linde+852 2996 6575 heraldvanderlinde@hsbc.com.hkAshutosh Narkar+91 22 3023 1474 ashutoshnarkar@hsbc.co.inLouisa Fok+852 2996 6629 louisawmfok@hsbc.com.hkMichelle Kwok+852 2996 6918 michellekwok@hsbc.com.hkAlvin Wong+852 2996 6621 alvincmwong@hsbc.com.hk

BanksTodd DunivantHead of Banks, Asia-Pacific

+852 2996 6599 tdunivant@hsbc.com.hkYork Pun+852 2822 4396 yorkkypun@hsbc.com.hkSaumya Agarwal+91 22 2268 1235 saumyaagarwal@hsbc.co.inKathy Park+82 2 3706 8755 kathypark@kr.hsbc.comShary Wu+852 2996 6585 sharywu@hsbc.com.hkKatherine Lei+852 2996 6926 katherinelllei@hsbc.com.hkInsuranceJohn Russell+852 2822 4321 john.russell@hsbc.com.hkPatricia Cheng+852 2996 6584 patriciacheng@hsbc.com.hkIndustrialsSumeet Agrawal+91 22 2268 1243 sumeetagrawal@hsbcib.inSteve Man+852 2822 4395 steveyfman@hsbc.com.hkSandeep Somani+91 22 2268 1245 sandeepsomani@hsbc.co.inSachin Gupta+91 22 2268 1079 sachin1gupta@hsbc.co.inMark Webb+852 2996 6574 markwebb@hsbc.com.hkAzura Shahrim+852 2996 6976 azurashahrim@hsbc.com.hkEric Lin+852 2996 6570 ericpklin@hsbc.com.hkNatural ResourcesDaniel Kang+852 2996 6669 danielkang@hsbc.com.hkSarah Mak+852 2822 4551 sarahmak@hsbc.com.hkSteven Hong Xing Li

+852 2996 6941 stevenhongxingli@hsbc.com.hkGary Chiu+852 2822 4297 garychiu@hsbc.com.hk

Scully Tsoi+852 2996 6620 scullytsoi@hsbc.com.hk

Chris Chan+852 2996 6619 chris.chan@hsbc.com.hk

Equity StrategyGarry Evans+852 2996 6916 garryevans@hsbc.com.hkSteven Sun+852 2822 4298 stevensun@hsbc.com.hkLeo Li+852 2996 6919 leofli@hsbc.com.hkJacqueline Tse+852 2996 6602 jacquelinetse@hsbc.com.hk

Consumer BrandsSean Yang+852 2822 4342 seanyang@hsbc.com.hkPercy Panthaki+91 22 2268 1240 percypanthaki@hsbc.co.inJessie Guo+852 2996 6572 jessieytguo@hsbc.com.hkSummer Wang+852 2822 4337 summerwywang@hsbc.com.hk

TMTSteven C Pelayo+852 2822 4391 stevenpelayo@hsbc.com.hkTse-yong Yao+852 2822 4397 tse-yongyao@hsbc.com.hkTucker Grinnan+852 2822 4686 tuckergrinnan@hsbc.com.hkWalden Shing+852 2996 6751 waldenshing@hsbc.com.hkShishir Singh+852 2822 4292 shishirkumarsingh@hsbc.com.hkRajiv Sharma+91 22 2268 1239 rajivsharma@hsbc.co.inWanli Wang+8862 8725 6020 wanliwang@hsbc.com.twFrank Su+8862 8725 6025 frankkssu@hsbc.com.twChristine Wang+8862 8725 6024 christineccwang@hsbc.com.tw

Leo Tsai+8862 8725 6022 leocytsai@hsbc.com.twSmall & Mid-capHerald van der Linde+852 2996 6575 heraldvanderlinde@hsbc.com.hkKen Ho+852 2996 6593 kenho@hsbc.com.hkElaine Lam+852 2822 4398 elainehlam@hsbc.com.hkParash Jain+852 2996 6717 parashjain@hsbc.com.hkSandeep Somani+91 22 2268 1245 sandeepsomani@hsbc.co.in

GEMs Research Team (continued)