vietnam pacification

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PACIFICATION

A Reference Pamphlet) PAGE

FOREWORD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2WHAT IS PACIFICATION? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3WHY PACIFICATION? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3FROM PAST TO PRESENT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4TERRITORIAL SECURITY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6VC INFRASTRUCTURE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10PEOPLE S SELF DEFENSE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11LOCAL GOVERNMENT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12R FUG S 14CHIEU HOI - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 15.INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA - - - - - - - - - - - - - 16RURAL ECONOMY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 16

-WHERE DO WE FIT IN? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 17


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FOR WORWhile the issues in the Vietnam war have

been clearly stated by our national leadershipthe means for achieving a satisfactory con-clusion to the conflict have not always beenequally clear. There has existed flir manyyears widespread agreement that the JJest wayto end the conflict satisfactorily was to winthe hearts and minds of the people. Howeveronly in the past two years has there been atruly coordinated GVNFree World Forceseffort toward gainiug the full support of theVietnamese people thereby depriving theenemy of his claim to popular backing. Thisyear the emphasis is on the people ratherthen providing them material things. The pro-grams intended to achieve this goal are in-cluded in what is called pacification .

Each American serving in the Republic ofVietnam has either directly or indirectly apart in this extensive campaign to demonstratethat the Government of South Vietnam offerscitizens the greatest opportunity for a freepeaceful and full life. Yet because pacifi-cation has such extensive and complicatedobjectives it is often misunderstood. Thispamphlet is intended to fill a gap andthereby enable leaders at ll levels to ensurethat their personnel fully understand what isinvolved in pacification. is important that Americans understand that pacification isour best hope for the future of South Vietnamand which if it succeeds offers us the quick-es t ticket home.

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WHAT IS P CIFIC TIOPacification is a military political

economic and social p ~ o e s s means: s t a b l i s h i n ~ or reestablishing locagovernment responsive to and involving

the participation of the citizens;-Providing sustained credible security;-Destroying the enemy s underground

government;-Asserting or reasserting GVN politicacontrol;-Involvement of the people in the centragovernment;-Initiating economic and social activitycapable of se lf-sus tenance and expansion.

Included in the economic side of pacification is the opening of roads and waterwaysand the maintenance of lines of communicationimportant to economic and military activity

The 969 Government of Vietnam Pacification Campaign is founded on one allimportant principle: Community Spirit. Development of a national Community Spirit isbased on cooperation among the Vietnamesepeople cooperation between the people andthe Government of Vietnam and cooperationamong government agencies. In other wordspacification places special emphasis on throle of all the people a s participants n thmilitary political economic social and educational .efforts. These efforts aim at shattering the VC organization restoring publisecurity and ultimately in establishing[ltable and viable R ~ p u b l i c of Vietnam.

WHY PACIFICATION? _To the people of Vietnam pacificatiowill provide security peace and social justice. t will mean a greater degree of personainvolvement with their government than th

IIIople have experienced at any time in theipast. As formerly hostile or apathetic villagerobserve the gains achieved through thesvarious programs as they realize that throug


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The tranquil l if e tha t the people of Vietnamlong fo r lies with their allegiance to a freelyelected overnment of Vietnam

acification intends to mold a proud coura-geous people into a modern free and prosperousNatton

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the combined strength of the RVNAF thepolice, their local self-defense forces, andtheir personal involvement they need no longerfear the threat posed by the ve, then willthey recognize their best chance for a tranquillife lies with allegiance to a freely electedGovernment of Vietnam. ,For the Free World Forces, pacificationprovides assurances of a more cooperativecitizenry. Villagers fearing enemy retaliation,against which they have no defense) seldomprovide willing assistance to allied forces.With the villages organized for self-defenseand with the Viet eong infrastructure rootedout, villagers will have become far more willing partners in efforts to defeat the enemy.As the ve is deprived of local support, oftenachieved through intimidation of defenselessvillagers, he will become the proverbialfish out of water , losing most of his presently fractional popular support.

FROM PAST TO PRESENTPacification in South Vietnam is not new.

In fact, the first intensive efforts began in 954 shortly after Ngo Dinh Diem becamePresident. Limited, slow, but sure progresswas being made, economically and politicallyin the first few years after the founding of theRepublic. Under various names, such as the. Strategic Hamlet -Program and the Revolutionary Development Program, the GVN'spacification program was intended to mold aPloua, c'?,urageous and individualistic peoplinto a modern, cohesive and free nation. Thi,meant among other things,.generating cooperative public attitudes toward central government ina people who have been fragmented iopposing religious and ethnic groupingsloyal to family while apathetic to all government, and who only recently had won'independence from their colonial masters. With thadded pressures of Hanoi-directed insurgencyit was obvious that pacification had a rockfuture.


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The various pacification programs achieved only spotty success until l at e 1966 when amajor effort was initiated avoiding past errorsand embarking upon a meaningful program to,while providing sec urity to the people, denythe enemy the base of popular support withoutwhich he c an not e lli st .In early 1967, the Vietnamese governmentreviewed and assessed its organization toaccomplish the task of pacifying the Republicof Vietnam. The United S ta te s Government,pr incipal a dvi so r to the Government of Vietnam, reevaluated it s task-organization, and it,too, made sweeping c hange s. Together boththe GVN and USG agreed upon new conceptsand began a combined venture to establishnew joint plans and missions of the variousmilitary and civilian agencies.

On the US side the responsibility for acombined c iv il and military pa cif ic ation advisory effort was assigned to MACV. Thebasic arrangements for unifying the pacification effort first .involved appointing a Deputy with the rank of Ambassador) to COMUSMACVfor Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support DEp.;CORDS), at the Saigonlevel. A major staff section was als o form-ed within th e MACV staff under the AssistantChief of Staff for CORDS MACCORDS .

By using the resources of the US StateDepartment, US Information Agency USIA ,US Agency for I nte rna ti on al DevelopmentUSAID and MACV, the DEPCORDS MACVs up er vi se s the formulation and ellecution ofaU plans, policies and programs, military andcivilian, which support the GVN s pacificationeffort. Policy guidance flows from the Ambassador, to COMUSMACV, to DEPCORDS and ondown to the l ow es t pac if ica tion advisory e le ment.

Through its US advisory organization,MACCORDS advises the GVN on al l pacification activities Technical matters includinga ction s involving refugees, agriculture andpolice, are also handled by MACCORDSthrough d ir ec t t ec hn ic al c ha nne ls by eithertechnical staff elements within MACV.

Vietnam s Prime Min is te r Tran Van luangassures the people of the GVN interes t andefforts in pacifying the Republic of VietnamIn early 1967 U S Ambassador rthurGold-berg v is ited Vietnam provinces and conferredwith U S and Vietnamese officials on Pacifi-cation prospects

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The progress achieved since May 1967may have been instrumental in promptingHanoi s dec ision to launch a major offensivein 1968 to assist in halting pacification of thecountryside. While the need to assist thevictims of the Tet and May assaults impededpacification s progress, by year-end the pro-grams were more effective than ever before.In November 1968 the GVN implemented anAccelerated Pacification Campaign. TheGVN s success in this campaign can be measured by the frequent, loud denunciation ofthe program by the VC as well as his latestoffensive.With the establishment of a Central Paci-fication and Development Council in 1968 andthe e ight new objectives for the 1969 Pacification Campaign described below, pacification has received new impetus.PROVIDING TERRITORIAL SECURITY FOR90 OF THE POPULATION BY THE END OF1969.

The key to paci fi cation is providing con- .tinual securi ty in vi ll ages and hamlets fromVC local forces, guerrilla units, and VC/NVAmain forces. Other aspects of pacification cannot proceed until the country sid eis relatively cl eare d and secured. The mostimportant GVN elements providing TerritorialSecur.ity include:

ARVN: The Army of the Republic of Viet-ARVN) regular forces, augmented byRegional Forces when available, have theprimary responsibility for clearing operations.

ARVN maneuver battalions move into thetarget area, destroy or e je ct the enemy andsaturate the area with friendly troops. At theend of the clearing phase Regular Force/Popular Forces take over the area and beginthe task of security thus relieving ARVN tomove on to clear new areas.

RF PF: Regional Forces and PopularForces RF PF can be compared with theUS National Guard on full time duty in their6

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ARVN U S and WM keep hamlets anvil lages safe from V attacks so Pacificatioobjectives can be achieved

RVN regular forces have the primarresponsibility fo r clearing an area of VC anNVA forces

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own home state and town. They are the backbone of Territorial Secur,ity and c on st it ut eapproximately one-half of the manpower in theVietnamese Armed Forces. Where RF /PFstrengths are adequate, they may conduct theclearing phase. However, their primary concernis continual security for areas undergoingdevelopment. The PF units provide localsecurity for the hamlet in which they arebased, by conducting small military operationsand ambushes in the vicinity of the hamlet.RF soldiers are recruited from and serve intheir home provinces and provide security forthe district in which they are base d. They conduct military operations against local guerrillaforces, often working with PF ARVN andother Free World Forces.

NP: Following the clearing of an area,National Police NP) maintain law and order,protect life and property, and perform regularpolice functions. They also support and assistRVN Armed Forces on search operations thatinvolve civil population. When required, theyassist military forces in suppressing VCinsurgency.

PSDF: People s Self-Defense Force arelocal self-defense VOlunteers organized asunits and trained by the RD Cadre or by RF /PF personnel. The PSDF provide continualactive and passive defense for the hamletwhich includes gathering information andintelligence and warning the population ofattack and similar actions. When these forcesare armed they. also provide internal securityof the hamlet, establish guard posts, listeningposts and patrols.

US/FWIIfAF: U.S: an4 Free World MilitaryArmed F or ce s engage in territorial sec uri tyoperations to destroy VCIl,ivA main forceunits and, neut rali ze VC/NVA base areas .They also conduct military operations in support of pacification within their tacticalareas of responsibility.The presence of PF RF, NP, ARVNPSDF or US/FWMAF unit in the neighborhoodhas a dramatic effect on the rural constructionactivity, for territorial security is an essential

Regular orces IR } are recruited from theirhome provinces and conduct military operationsagainst guerrillas

Popular orces IP provide security fo rhamlets in which they are based

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CLOCALELECTION

Village Hamlet_ Gavt

TH E C O M M U N I TP C IF IC T

PROVIDETERRITORIAL SECURITY

I RVNAF I FWMAF N T O N ~ PEOPLE S VILLAGEPOLICE SELF HAMLETDEFENSE RADIO FORCE SYSTEMIARVN I rRF IpF

@ EDUCATINCREASE THE NUMBEROF HOI CHANH(CHIEU HOI)GENERATION RECEPTION REHABILITATlON

I I PSYOPS Open Armt o c ~ t i ~ n l l l ARVNI Kit B I ivilian IMotivation Center Training arson APT EmploymentScoutI I_. National Hoi hanhReconciliation Trl ining

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REDUCECOLIMITIMPROVELOCS

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T h e e re T he BTHB 9 9P C

MOBILEINFORMATlONTEAMS

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VILLAGE HAMLETINFORMATlONCADRE.

INTENSIFY INFORMATION PROPAGANDA EFFORTS

GVN MASSMEDIA

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PIRIT P R I N C I P L E IO S J E C T I V E S

@ESTABLISH LOCAL ORGANIZEGOVERNMENT IN VILLAGES PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE TRNG iPEOPLE SHAMLET CENSUS RDMGMT PROGRAMS GRIEVANCE CADRE SELF DEFENSEEE BOARDS FOR OFFICIALS GROUPS

Motivate Effective DISTRIBUTIONTo'Protect Adm & TRAINING OF WEAPONS ndDev. MgmtVillage ISELF-HELP I PSDF IPROJECTS CadreI I HEALTH PUBLIC AGRICULTURALWORKS SERVICES

@iI REDUCE THE VCIII IICENTRALPHUNG HOANG COMMITTEE

I NATIONAL POLICE I RD CADRE I IDIOCCI FIELD FORCEI G .Detention RD I Hoi I PSDF PRU/ APT IFacilities Teams Chanh , .. -0 ~


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ap turing and rallying members of the Vnfrastructure helps eliminate the V controlover hamlets and villages

prerequisite to the successful achievemenof other pacification objectives.

iELIMINATINGi THE VIET CONGINFRASTRUCTURE

The attack on the enemy infrastructure ismost important program in the clearing andsecurity phases of pacification. This Vietnamese program provides a combined systemof GVN IUS intelligenc e gathering and collating agencies from the na tional l eve l downthrough corps, province and di st ric t le ve lsThe information gathered ser ves to identifyhard-core communists and VC agents operating at all levels of the insurgency. Oncidentified they are tar ge ted by action forceand killed, captured, or rallied with the objective of eliminating VC influence over thelocal population and denying important assistance to VC /NVA military forces. The mosimportant sub-programs in eliminating theVC infrastructure are:

PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX: The framework for attacking the VCI is called PhungHoang by the Vietnamese and Phoenix by theU.S. This organization consists of coordinating committees down to the province le ve lThe operational elements a re the Provinciaor D is tr ic t I nte llige nc e and Operations Coordination c en te rs PIOCC/DIOCC). T he secenters normally consist of representativesfrom the various military, paramilitary andGVN c ivi li an a ge nc ie s operating within th eprovince and di st ric t responsible to the pro

v i n c ~ and district c hi ef s. The primary goal othese centers is exploiting infrastructureintelligence, and evaluating and disseminating

the information for planning quick reactionoperations. These ce nters also provide intelligence support for military operations. PhungHoang operations are targeted on disruptingharassing, capturing, and eliminating loc aVCI members. Phung Hoang also aims at inducing VCI members to defect, when possible

NP/NPFF: Once an area has been clea redby FWMAF or ARVN the National Police

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Field Force NPFF playa key role in secur-ing the area. NPFF, a component of the GVNNational Police, locate and eradicate the VCIin the dist rict , village and hamlet. Once thistask is completed, the NPFF continues tosecure an area by preventing the VC resur-gence, conducting necessary field operations,and safeguard the extension of other NationalPolice present in the rural area. They workin close collaboration with village and hamletauthorities and the GVN Special PoliceBranch.

Detention System and Facilities: Capturingmembers of the VCI is not enough. They mustbe safely confined and restrained until thewar .is over or until they rally and ass.ist in thefurther destruction of the VCI A GVN prisonand detention facilities improvement programestablishes a penal system capable of pro-viding sufficient and appropriate facilities forcaptured VCI Emphas.is on the detentionsystem is placed on prisoner vocational train-ing and rehabilitation to induce prisoners torally and become constructive rather thandestructive.ORGANIZE TWO MILLION PEOPLE FORSELF DEFENSE AND DISTRIBUTE 400,000

WEAPONSSecuring an area presents two problems-liberating areas from the v and keeping theareas liberated. In clearing an area Viet-namese military forces augmented by allied~forces conduct the initial operations. But,once an area is liberated from VC control,regular military and government forces cannotoccupy an area, but must move on to clearnew areas. a newly liberated area does nothave sufficient RF, PF police units or trainedand armed citizens, VC control filters back inthe area as soon as it is vacated by the mainmilitary force. Consequently, if all the clearedareas are to stay liberated the people them-selves must ultimately secure themselves bybecoming a part of a self defense force. Moti

ational Police F ie ld Forces r el y on t he helpOf the local populatton to expose hidden V lmem ers

Well trained People s Self Defense forces helpk eep l iberated areas from being reoccupiedby VC

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vating them and training them to do so is themajor objective of the People s Self-DefenseProgram.RD Cadre: Revolutionary DevelopmentCadre RDC are Vietnamese nationals trainedto become skilled in certain special ties and

sent to live in the villages among the ruralpopulation. The RD Cadre is directly or .indirectly involved .in each of ihe eight Pacification Programs. RD Cadre participate inbuilding the village and hamlet .infrastructureand serve as a vanguard element carrying theGVN political doctrine to the people. The RDCadre are organized .into 3D-man teams anddeployed permanently at the village level under the operational control of the Chairman ofthe Village Administrative Committee.

RD Cadre operate as eight-man teams .inthe contested hamlets within a village, inclose coordination with the Popular Forces orother security elements. Their objective is toassist in upgrading contested hamlets to asecurity level through the following processes:

A. Identify the VC infrastructure.b. Organize and train People s Self-Defense Forces.c. Organize the elections of local offi

cials.d. Start the implementation of self-helpprograms.

ESTABLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ALLVILLAGES IN THE LAND

As the Paris peace negotiations proceed, the objective of establishing responsive local government becomes increasinglyurgent. The Viet Cong has undertaken a crashprogram to establish Liberation Committeesin hamlets under their nominal control, conducting elections, often as their terroristslurk in the background. The GVN has made theestablishment of local administrations an itemof high priority.

In each village and hamlet the local political administration must react satisfactorilyto the programs of the central government and12

evolutionary Development RD Cadre playa key role in carrying out the aci ficationeffort in hamlets and villages.

acification places special emphasis on thet ra in ing of local administrators who must re-spond to the needs of the people.~


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at the same time respond to the needs of thelocal people. As contested areas are secured,democratic institutions are initiated. Villageadministrative committees and councils areappointed, Village officials are selected andprovided with the training necessary to perform day-to-day tasks with reasonable efficiency. Pending the organization of elections or ifqualified officials cannot be found locally,the province and district government may tem-porarily appoint qualified personnel fromthe RF P or RD Cadre. Village/hamlet elections, Census Grievance committees, newdecrees providing for additional political andeconomic autonomy to the village, an activeRD effort, and the planned v.i11age developmentprogram improves the villager s life and giveshim more control over it.Self-Help: Once security has improvedwhereby a hamlet can be assured of reasonableprotection, the developing phase of pacification begins through the Self-Help Program .This program is designed to have the government and the people cooperate on small village/hamlet) construction projects. RD Cadreteams, already placed in the hamlets and villages, assist the economic and social aspectof the developing process. Projects begunduring the securing phase are carried to com-pletion and new projects are instituted whichare of greater permanence and depth than thosebegun earlier.Operations to be carried out include: 1Public Health-Provide basic health facilities,improve living conditions and lay a foundation r a better life; 2 .Education-Provide adequate educ lltional facilities, training of teachers, conduct youth affairs, teach the peoplehow to adapt to new and .aggressive ways oflife; 3 Agriculture Services-Teach thepeople how best to use their land, irrigate, andimprove crop production, organize the peopleinto cooperatives and associations to produceand earn more teach the people new animalbreeding techniques,.livestock care, improvedfishery techniques; and 4 Public WorksShow the people that i f they will help, they

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mphasis on the people and sel f help proj-ects is a predominant theme in Pacification

Improved crops provide farmers and allVietnamese citizens with a higher s tandardof living

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Pacification helps provide adequate educationfacilit ies and trained teachers

strong village government freely elected bythe people enables Paci fica tion to succeedthrough the principle of The ommunity Spirit

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can have new roads bridges homes schoolines of communications dams electrificatiand other improvements in their hamlets avillages through the use of government mateals and technical assistance.

Emphasis on people and not things is tpredominant theme in pacification in 196The Government will ssist the people by prviding financial support to the villagescarrying out self help programs. The Goverment has established pacification and develoment councils at the national corps provicial and distr ict levels to provide technicassistance and coordinate the whole effoThe village however is the primary focusthe 1969 program.The people through the village councdecide on the projects ranging from road rpairs to pig pens. Then with technical anmaterial assistance from the GVN CORDField representatives and military civic ation groups the people carry out their prjects contributing labor and often moneyconstruction materials.

A successful pacification campaign wprovide the environment for greater politicsupport for the GVN at the grass roots levand the achievement of economic and socidevelopment goals.

During the past decade the Viet Cong havassassinated thousands of village and hamlleaders knowing w ll that leaderless masseare easily influenced and .intimidated. ThGVN has therefore placed special emphason the training of local administrators s

h n h e ~ will be capable of not only effectvely managing the administrative apparatubut also leading and motivating the peoplethe development and protection of the villagREDUCE THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES T

ONE MILLION RESETTLE 300 000Refugees represent a significent percetage of the total population of Vietnam and aa vi tal factor in the pacification program. B

virtue of their numbers and their family an

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village connections in contested VC areasrefugees are an exploitable resource for thedevelopment phase of pacification.The GVN Refugee Program is designed toreturn villagers to their homes reintegratethem into a normal life and provide them withthe opportunities and skills to participate inthe self help programs. Refugees usuallyleave their native hamlets because of militaryoperations or to avoid communist pressure.Some take up temporary residence with rela-tives in pacified areas until they can return totheir native areas; others require temporaryrelief and ssist nce in resettlement. To pro-vide for refugee reception care and resettle-ment or return to their homes refugee subpro-grams consist of the following:Relief Program Temporary relief is givento ll refugees seeking asylum. This includesal l spects of logistics commodities andservices such s medical sanitation trans-portation food clothing and temporary shelter.Relief grants are provided for refugees needingand desiring such funds.Resettlement Program This program pro-vides for the creation of resettlement hamletswith all necessary auxiliary facilit ies. Refu-gees who cannot immediately return to theirnative areas are resettled until they canreturn. Refugees who settle in a new place orreturn to their native areas are given reset tlement subsidies.

Refugee Welfare Technical guidance isprovided in the fields of self help pro-grams handicrafts cottage industries and theformation of cooperatives. Youth educationand vocational training s well.. s politicaland psychological orientation of refugees alsohelps transform the refugee population into auseful sset to the pacification effort.

INCRE SE NUM ER OF RALLIERS TO20 000 UNDER THE CHIEU HOI PROGR MChieu Hoi serves s a bridge over whichdefecting VC can help the GVN rebuild the

country instead of destroying it. The Chieu

Once efugees have been given rel ief and areresettled they contr ibute much to the acifi-cation effort

Since 1963 more than 1 VC and NVAdefected to the side of the GVN through thePacification Chieu Hoi program


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Hoi program appeals to VC NVA military andcivilian personnel to defect (rally) to the GVNA rallier is called a Hoi Chanh (one who hasreturned to the path of right) and offeredfriendship and a new begining in life. TheChieu o program serves to convert.militaryand civilian VC and NVA ralliers into usefulcitizens and includes receiving, quartering,reindoctrination, training, mo'tivating and someemployment. Chieu Hoi also enables the GVNto obtain valuable .intelligence informationthrough the Hoi Chanh; it weakens the com-munist cause through the loss of personnel,and causes dissension and distrust among thecommunist military and political agencies.This program includes:

Chieu Hoi Centers. Each province has aChieu Hoi Center to receive and retain HoiChanh. The centers have adequate facilitiesfor classification of returnees, .interrogation,feeding and billeting, political .indoctrinationclasses vocational training, and limited recreation for the returnees.Rehabilitation. Each Hoi Chanhis guaranteed safety, good treatment and an opportunity for rehabilitation. Based on the .infor- .mation and assistance he provides' many HoiChanh are used by US FWMAF units in tactical operations .i.e., locating and capturingVC stores of materials, search and clearoperations. Others are tested and .incorporatedin the Kit Carson Scout Program and employedas full-time scouts or guides for tactical units.Many US units a lso employ Hoi Chanh inadministrative or specialized functions. Sincere ralliers with military rank or experi-ence who have achieved meritorious accomplishments are accepted .into ARVN as regulars.

PSYOPS Program. Although psychologicaloperations are employed in each of the eight.inter-related pacification objectives its greates t impact is in Chieu Hoi. There is a closecorrelation between the returnee input rate andthe well-organized PSYOPS Committees andArmed Propaganda Teams. These committeesand teams util ize an inducement and propa-16

ganda program which dramatically affect tsuccess of the Chieu Hoi Program and toverall effort of pacification..

INTENSIFY PROPAGANDAAND INFORMATION EFFORTS.

Even though the GVN has attempted in tpast to explain the government's programsthe people, it was only with the onset of t1969 Pacification Campaign that informing tpublic was adopted as a major pacificatioobjective. Tackling an area in which the ViCong have demonstrated great skill, the GVMinistry of Information has assigned higpriority to dissem.inating and explaining to thpopulation, particulary in rural areas, thpacification and development campaign. ThGVN is employing all available media to ecourage and motivate the entire populationactively participate in achieving the nationobjectives. V Wage and Hamlet InformatioCadre and Mobile Information Teams havbeen organized to get the word to all thpeople.

STIMULATE THE RURAL ECONOMYThe Republic of Vietnam is potentially

wealthy nation. It s fertile paddy-land anvegetable farms, rubber plantations and untapped lumber tracts stand as a promise thonce peace is restored, economic growth winot be far behind.

As stated previously clearing and securin are. essential preliminary steps to providina more- promising future to the Vietnamepeople. However, the greatest appeal to thpopulace the promise' of increased properity. Therefore, one of the objectivespacification is economic revival of this oncthriving nation, in order to provide all icitizens with a higher standard of living angreater opportunity for personal happinesThe restoration of South Vietnam to its formhigh productivity is expected to accelerasharply in 1969.

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Lin es of communication are being s ecuredand rebliilt or con stru cted to provide g reateraccessibility to markets. L ow -in terest l oa nsare more easily obtained by rural citizen s andeconomic restrictions are gradually beingreduced. In cr ea sed ri ce production ach ieve dthrough the introduction of new rice s train simproved irrigation and fertilization and cropd iv ersification hold g reat promise for productivity and prosperity for the rural Vietnamese.

WHERE DO WE FIT IN

security.Then there is the advisory effort; the

M CV training mission of assisting RVNimprovement and the CORDS task of snpporting e ach of the program o bj ect iv es by estab-lishing close working relationships betweenUS tactical units and GVN o ffi cia ls and org an iz at io ns with t he pro vi nces v il la ge s andhamlets.

THE TICKET HOMEThere it is ; a plan to end a long and com

plex war on a note which will offer to theSouth Vietn amese the hope that they and theirchildren may face a free p eacefu l and happyfuture.

With our help and the help of other FreeWorld Forces the GVN has inaug urated amas sive p acificatio n effort to win p eace whichhas el ude d it s citizens for many y ea rs . Onlyby understanding the objectives of Pacifi cat ion ca n we ren der the ass is ta1lce req uiredto e ns ur e t he program s success nd succeedit must. For Americans serv in g in Vietnamsuccessful pacification is The one-way tickethorne .

M CCORD M COI Command Iuformation Pamphlet March 69 7


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vietnam pacification

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