venture capital syndication and firm value: entrepreneurial financing of grand junction networks...
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Venture Capital Venture Capital Syndication and Firm Syndication and Firm Value: Value: Entrepreneurial financing of Entrepreneurial financing of Grand Junction NetworksGrand Junction Networks
Hoje JoHoje Jo
Santa Clara UniversitySanta Clara University
Outlines of presentationOutlines of presentation
MotivationMotivation ObjectivesObjectives HypothesesHypotheses Grand JunctionGrand Junction Field-based Field-based
InterviewsInterviews
IPO vs. AcquisitionIPO vs. Acquisition ValuationValuation The dealThe deal PerspectivesPerspectives ConclusionConclusion
Motivation of VC SyndicationMotivation of VC Syndication
Risk sharing [Wilson (1968)] Risk sharing [Wilson (1968)]
To lead to a superior selection of investments [Sah and To lead to a superior selection of investments [Sah and Stiglitz (1986)]Stiglitz (1986)]
To achieve a shared strategic goal [Lorange and Roos (1992)]To achieve a shared strategic goal [Lorange and Roos (1992)] To mitigate information asymmetry between early and late To mitigate information asymmetry between early and late
investors [Admati and Pfleiderer (1994)]investors [Admati and Pfleiderer (1994)] To network, collaborate, and align strategically [Stuart To network, collaborate, and align strategically [Stuart
(1998)](1998)]
To collude for window dressing to overstate VC’s To collude for window dressing to overstate VC’s performance [Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny performance [Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991)](1991)]
Motivation of VC Syndication Motivation of VC Syndication (Continued)(Continued)
Syndication may increase the bargaining power Syndication may increase the bargaining power of the VCS [Gompers (1993).]of the VCS [Gompers (1993).]
The syndication of investment allows VC to The syndication of investment allows VC to diversify into more investments [Gompers diversify into more investments [Gompers (1998)].(1998)].
Second opinion hypothesis: Bringing other VCs Second opinion hypothesis: Bringing other VCs to do additional due diligence acts as a second to do additional due diligence acts as a second opinion on the investment opportunity. (Having opinion on the investment opportunity. (Having other VCs okay the deal makes it less likely other VCs okay the deal makes it less likely that bad deal get funded [Lerner (1994)].that bad deal get funded [Lerner (1994)].
Previous Literature of VC Previous Literature of VC syndicationsyndication
Syndication is a commonplace in biotech [Lerner (1994)]Syndication is a commonplace in biotech [Lerner (1994)] Changing syndication pattern may affect valuation Changing syndication pattern may affect valuation
[Gompers andLerner (1999)][Gompers andLerner (1999)] Evidence regarding the impact of VC syndication on firm Evidence regarding the impact of VC syndication on firm
value is scarce.value is scarce. Notable exception: Venture firms “endorsed/certified” Notable exception: Venture firms “endorsed/certified”
by prominent strategic alliance partners (i.e., by prominent strategic alliance partners (i.e., investment banks, equity investors, & joint venture investment banks, equity investors, & joint venture partners) perform better (I.e., go for public faster with partners) perform better (I.e., go for public faster with higher valuation) than otherwise comparable firms that higher valuation) than otherwise comparable firms that lacklack prominent associates. [Stuart, Hoang & Hybels prominent associates. [Stuart, Hoang & Hybels (1999)](1999)]
Objectives Objectives To examine the relationship between VC To examine the relationship between VC
syndication and firm value using a clinical case as a syndication and firm value using a clinical case as a preliminary step.preliminary step.
To formulate possible hypotheses regarding the To formulate possible hypotheses regarding the relationship.relationship.
To evaluate the relationship based on field-based To evaluate the relationship based on field-based interviews.interviews.
To evaluate Grand Junction from its inception to To evaluate Grand Junction from its inception to exit using valuation methods.exit using valuation methods.
VCs can add value in VCs can add value in general via:general via:
Strategic developmentStrategic development active board membershipactive board membership attract outside expertise, later round attract outside expertise, later round
investors, and other stakeholders, investors, and other stakeholders, i.e., managementi.e., management
provide contacts, access to provide contacts, access to information, people, and institution. information, people, and institution.
See Timmons (1999)See Timmons (1999)
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Allocation of Venture Capitalist Time
Source: Zider (1998)
Allocation of Venture Capitalist TimeAllocation of Venture Capitalist Time
Possible hypotheses : Possible hypotheses : Adding value by VC Adding value by VC syndication syndication
Effective Monitoring HypothesisEffective Monitoring Hypothesis::
When syndicated VCs have a When syndicated VCs have a superior investments, they provide superior investments, they provide best efforts in monitoring, financing, best efforts in monitoring, financing, advising, recruiting, networking, and advising, recruiting, networking, and consulting due to their reputation as consulting due to their reputation as well as their compensation.well as their compensation.
Alternative hypothesisAlternative hypothesis
Substitute Monitoring HypothesisSubstitute Monitoring Hypothesis;;
Because outstanding management Because outstanding management can outperform from the beginning can outperform from the beginning to the end, syndicated VCs will not to the end, syndicated VCs will not interrupt entrepreneurs unless interrupt entrepreneurs unless doing so is necessary. doing so is necessary.
Oversight Demand Oversight Demand HypothesisHypothesis
VC syndication tends to monitor VC syndication tends to monitor the portfolio firm more when the the portfolio firm more when the demand for oversight of private demand for oversight of private firms is greater [Lerner (1995)]firms is greater [Lerner (1995)]
Second opinion hypothesisSecond opinion hypothesis
Bringing other VCs to do additional due Bringing other VCs to do additional due diligence acts as a second opinion on the diligence acts as a second opinion on the investment opportunity. (Having other investment opportunity. (Having other VCs okay the deal makes it less likely VCs okay the deal makes it less likely that bad deal get funded [Lerner (1994)].that bad deal get funded [Lerner (1994)].
This hypothesis is related to leading to a This hypothesis is related to leading to a superior selection of investments [Sah superior selection of investments [Sah and Stiglitz (1986)]and Stiglitz (1986)]
Grand Junction NetworksGrand Junction Networks
Leader in the Ethernet LAN Switching Leader in the Ethernet LAN Switching MarketMarket
Private company funded through 3 Private company funded through 3 rounds of venture financingrounds of venture financing
Experiencing rapid growth in revenues – Experiencing rapid growth in revenues – over $65 million expected in 1996over $65 million expected in 1996
Founder’s equity is 18.2%Founder’s equity is 18.2% Critical decision: go for IPO or be Critical decision: go for IPO or be
acquiredacquired
Howard Charney, the Howard Charney, the founderfounder
One of the founders of 3Com.One of the founders of 3Com. B.S. & M.S. in M/E from M.I.T.B.S. & M.S. in M/E from M.I.T. J.D./MBA from J.D./MBA from Santa Clara UnivSanta Clara Univ.. Found Grand Junction in early 1992.Found Grand Junction in early 1992. ““Kind of guy people walk through Kind of guy people walk through
walls for” confirms Kathryn Gould. walls for” confirms Kathryn Gould.
The “Four Cornerstones”The “Four Cornerstones”
ManagementManagement: Founded in 1992 by : Founded in 1992 by Howard Charney and several colleaguesHoward Charney and several colleagues
TechnologyTechnology: Developed Fast Ethernet : Developed Fast Ethernet switching -10x faster data transferswitching -10x faster data transfer
MarketMarket: Currently using Ethernet, easily : Currently using Ethernet, easily upgraded, other products problematicupgraded, other products problematic
FinancialFinancial: Strong financial potential, : Strong financial potential, projected IPO in 1995, Profitable in projected IPO in 1995, Profitable in 1995 1995
Structuring the DealStructuring the Deal
ValuationValuation: Comparables most common : Comparables most common (95%) in Silicon Valley; Compared to 12 (95%) in Silicon Valley; Compared to 12 other companiesother companies
Preferred vs. Common StockPreferred vs. Common Stock: Common for : Common for employee benefits, Preferred for investorsemployee benefits, Preferred for investors
Present Value of Future StockPresent Value of Future Stock: Back into : Back into present stock price with dilution effectspresent stock price with dilution effects
Term SheetTerm Sheet: 2 Seats on board, anti-dilution : 2 Seats on board, anti-dilution provisions, West vs. East Cost Deals provisions, West vs. East Cost Deals
Financing Notes of VC Financing Notes of VC SyndicationSyndication
Series ASeries A: (i) Merrill, Pickard, Anderson & Eyre (MPAE) *; : (i) Merrill, Pickard, Anderson & Eyre (MPAE) *; Kathryn Gould, Kathryn Gould,
(ii) Technology Venture Investors (TVI); David Marquardt (ii) Technology Venture Investors (TVI); David Marquardt (Microsoft, Usoft, Sun, Adaptec, Auspex), (Microsoft, Usoft, Sun, Adaptec, Auspex),
(iii) Associated Venture Investors (AVI),(iii) Associated Venture Investors (AVI), (iv) Matrix Partners; Andrew Verhalen.(iv) Matrix Partners; Andrew Verhalen.
Series A-1Series A-1: Matrix Partners*, MPAE, TVI & AVI.: Matrix Partners*, MPAE, TVI & AVI.
Series BSeries B: Mezzanine round from same investors and : Mezzanine round from same investors and Sutter Hill Ventures and New Enterprise Associates.Sutter Hill Ventures and New Enterprise Associates.
Lead Investor: Kathryn Lead Investor: Kathryn GouldGould
U. Toronto B.A.in Physics & U. Toronto B.A.in Physics & U.Chicago MBAU.Chicago MBA
Marketing V.P. at OracleMarketing V.P. at Oracle One of the most successful VC One of the most successful VC General Partner of MPAEGeneral Partner of MPAE Founder of Foundation CapitalFounder of Foundation Capital ““Third Sex”Third Sex”
Summary of Entrepreneurial Summary of Entrepreneurial FinancingFinancing
FoundersFeb '92
Series AFeb '92
Series A-1Dec '92
Series BOct '93
Founders'Shares
2,340,000 - - -
Sharesissued
- 5,910,402 2,623,101 4,257,497
Paid inCapital
- $4,452,504 $3,497,470 $8,500,005
Total sharesissued
2,340,000 8,250,402 10,873,503 15,131,000
Price/Share NA $0.75 $1.33 $2.00
FoundersEquity
100% 28% 22% 15%
Series AEquity
- 72% 54% 39%
Series A-1Equity
- - 24% 17%
Series BEquity
- - - 28%
Post-moneyValuation
- $6,215,304 $14,498,012 $30,208,730
The Grand PlanThe Grand Plan
AchievementsAchievements Market acceptance Market acceptance Financial GrowthFinancial Growth Second Generation of ProductsSecond Generation of Products What’s Next…What’s Next… CFOCFO Investment BankerInvestment Banker Execution!Execution!
Field-based InterviewsField-based Interviews
VCs add the most value when they are VCs add the most value when they are members of the board and the organization members of the board and the organization must overcome a difficult time.must overcome a difficult time.
When the chosen distribution system of Grand When the chosen distribution system of Grand Junction was not working, Gould suggested a Junction was not working, Gould suggested a new distribution system and sales rose by 25%.new distribution system and sales rose by 25%.
But, Gould & other VCs took a laisses-faire role But, Gould & other VCs took a laisses-faire role until issues arose.until issues arose.
Field-based Interviews. Field-based Interviews. Continued.Continued.
Verhalen (Matrix) also said that the VCs did work Verhalen (Matrix) also said that the VCs did work together as a team, but they all played a fairly together as a team, but they all played a fairly passive role, as Grand Junction was doing very well.passive role, as Grand Junction was doing very well.
From these interviews, it seems that the substitute From these interviews, it seems that the substitute monitoring hypothesis is more relevant than the monitoring hypothesis is more relevant than the effective monitoring hypothesis. Additionally, effective monitoring hypothesis. Additionally, oversight demand and second opinion hypotheses oversight demand and second opinion hypotheses are also supported.are also supported.
The capability of CEO is also crucial.The capability of CEO is also crucial.
The Suitor – Cisco SystemsThe Suitor – Cisco Systems
Market cap of nearly $19 billion in Market cap of nearly $19 billion in 19951995
Rapid growth – aggressive acquisition Rapid growth – aggressive acquisition strategystrategy
Switching technology would Switching technology would complement Cisco’s router dominancecomplement Cisco’s router dominance
Strategic acquisition to keep Strategic acquisition to keep technology from competitors technology from competitors
Grand Junction – Exit Grand Junction – Exit StrategyStrategy
IPO or AcquisitionIPO or Acquisition Grand Junction files S-1 formGrand Junction files S-1 form
• Hot IPO marketHot IPO market Cisco’s initial offer is $325 millionCisco’s initial offer is $325 million Cisco raises the offer to $346 Cisco raises the offer to $346
millionmillion Is this a good deal?Is this a good deal?
Exit, stage left. . . .Exit, stage left. . . .AcquisitionsAcquisitionsAcquirerAcquirer TargetTarget Price ($ Mil)Price ($ Mil) DateDate
CiscoCiscoSystemsSystems Crescendo Crescendo $89$89 Sept. Sept. 1993 1993
Newport SystemsNewport Systems $83$83 July 1994July 1994KalpanaKalpana $204$204 Oct. Oct.
19941994LightsteamLightsteam $120$120 Dec. 1994Dec. 1994CombinetCombinet $115$115 Aug. 1995Aug. 1995Internet Junction $5.5Internet Junction $5.5 Sept. Sept.
19951995
3Com3Com SynerneticsSynernetics $107$107 Jan. 1994Jan. 1994NiceComNiceCom $59$59 Oct. 1994Oct. 1994SonixSonix $70$70 May 1995May 1995Primary AccessPrimary Access $170$170 June June
19951995ChipcomChipcom $721$721 Oct. 1995Oct. 1995
Bay NeyworksBay NeyworksCentillionCentillion $140$140 July 1995July 1995
IPO vs AcquisitionIPO vs Acquisition
IPO’sIPO’s PrestigePrestige Trading regulationsTrading regulations Lack of immediate liquidityLack of immediate liquidity Litigation exposureLitigation exposure Reporting requirementsReporting requirements Recruiting difficultiesRecruiting difficulties
AcquisitionsAcquisitions Positive change of pacePositive change of pace Loss of autonomy/authorityLoss of autonomy/authority Financial rewardFinancial reward
IPO vs. AcquisitionIPO vs. Acquisition
Positives Negatives
IPO Option - Attractive market for IPOs
- Prestige of taking a companypublic
- Some key employees thoughtgoing public was a goal
- May not be able to sustain longterm growth on its own if wentpublic, products may notprevail
- Hard to attract top technologytalent after the IPO without theequity incentives of a start up
- As an officer of public companyCharney would becomevulnerable and accountable forcompany’s actions
- Reporting to stockholders canbe a large distraction
- No immediate liquidity
IPO vs. AcquisitionIPO vs. Acquisition
Positives Negatives
AcquisitionOption
- Attractive mechanismthrough which technologycan be accepted
- Lifestyle at Cisco was likelyto be more relaxed andrequire fewer hours at work
- Several key employees wouldhave to leave
- Management team and Charneywould be demoted to middlemanagers giving lessautonomy and authority
Risks and OpportunitiesRisks and Opportunities
Changes in TechnologyChanges in Technology• Dynamic demandDynamic demand• Risk of obsolescenceRisk of obsolescence
Market AcceptanceMarket Acceptance• Greatly impacted by future standardsGreatly impacted by future standards
CompetitionCompetition• Strong established market leadersStrong established market leaders
Human CapitalHuman Capital
Valuation ApproachesValuation Approaches
Net Present Value MethodNet Present Value Method• Common industry approachCommon industry approach• Extremely sensitive to terminal value, WACCExtremely sensitive to terminal value, WACC• Cash flow assumptions may be difficultCash flow assumptions may be difficult
Comparables MethodComparables Method• Common industry approachCommon industry approach• Use for private company valuations can be difficultUse for private company valuations can be difficult• Generally adjusted based on capital structure, illiquidity, risksGenerally adjusted based on capital structure, illiquidity, risks
Real Options MethodReal Options Method• Not common in the industryNot common in the industry• Improves on NPV through valuing contingencies built into investmentImproves on NPV through valuing contingencies built into investment• Modeling real-life investment options can be difficultModeling real-life investment options can be difficult
Comparables MethodComparables Method
Six public companies chosenSix public companies chosento provide multiplesto provide multiples
Revenue, Book Value, EarningRevenue, Book Value, Earningmultiples chosenmultiples chosen
Cisco multiples weighed higherCisco multiples weighed higher Average of valuations based onAverage of valuations based on
multiples – $250 millionmultiples – $250 million
Net Present Value MethodNet Present Value Method
Assume:Assume:• 7% Terminal Growth,7% Terminal Growth,• 17% WACC17% WACC
Cash flows developed based onCash flows developed based on$1.5 billion Ethernet market in 1997$1.5 billion Ethernet market in 1997
Sensitivity analysis for WACC andSensitivity analysis for WACC andTerminal Growth Rate performedTerminal Growth Rate performed
Valuation = $372 millionValuation = $372 million
Real Options MethodReal Options Method
Black Scholes Model is used to value optionBlack Scholes Model is used to value option Base Assumptions:Base Assumptions:
• S=$483.2 millionS=$483.2 million• X=$346.0 millionX=$346.0 million• T= 3 months, 1 year, and 2 yearsT= 3 months, 1 year, and 2 years• Std Dev of Returns= 50%Std Dev of Returns= 50%• Risk Free Rate= 5%Risk Free Rate= 5%
Valuations = 536 millionValuations = 536 million• Average of $500 million, 536 million, 571 millionAverage of $500 million, 536 million, 571 million
Valuation SummaryValuation Summary
Weighting of valuation approachesWeighting of valuation approaches
ValuationApproach
Valuation Weighting Solutions Weighted Averages
A B C A B C
Comparables $205.40 X 33.3% 40% 50% = $68.46 $82.16 $102.70
Net PresentValue
$372.06 X 33.3% 30% 20% = $124.20 $111.79 $74.50
Real Options $535.36 X 33.3% 30% 30% = $178.37 $160.60 $160.60
Weighted Total per Solution $371.03 $354.55 $337.8
Average $354.46
The DealThe Deal
Early Aug, 95 - Cisco offered $200MEarly Aug, 95 - Cisco offered $200M Late Aug, 95 - Offered $325M, 5M Late Aug, 95 - Offered $325M, 5M
sharesshares Sept. 11 - Filed S-1 with the SECSept. 11 - Filed S-1 with the SEC Sept. 16 - Chambers re-submitted Sept. 16 - Chambers re-submitted
$325M$325M Charney countered with 5M shares, Charney countered with 5M shares,
$346M$346M
Perspectives of various Perspectives of various stakeholdersstakeholders
Employees of Grand Junction: were not Employees of Grand Junction: were not in favor of an acquisition strategy.in favor of an acquisition strategy.
VCs are favorable in the acquisition VCs are favorable in the acquisition since they will receive a fair value for since they will receive a fair value for their interests as well as immediate their interests as well as immediate liquidity.liquidity.
Management is favorable of an Management is favorable of an acquisition because they want the acquisition because they want the technology to succeed.technology to succeed.
ConclusionsConclusions
Final Valuation = $354.46 millionFinal Valuation = $354.46 million(Range : $337.8 million and $371.03 million)(Range : $337.8 million and $371.03 million)
The final Cisco offer falls within the range of The final Cisco offer falls within the range of determined valuationsdetermined valuations
VC syndication does play a role in building VC syndication does play a role in building up the equity value of Grand Junction.up the equity value of Grand Junction.
VC’s role was generally passive.VC’s role was generally passive. This preliminary evidence awaits formal This preliminary evidence awaits formal
tests.tests.