NAVAL WAR CULLEBE Newport, R I

U. S. BASES I N JAPAN:

James L. Mitchell

LCDR, SC, USN

A paper submitted to the F a c u l t y of the Naval War College in p a r t i a l sa t is+act ian of the requirements of the Operations Department.

The contents of t h i s paper r e f l e c t my own personal v i e w s and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War Cnll ege or t h e Department of the Navy.

signature: J( I

11 February 1991

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PROeRAM PROJECT TASK WORK UNIT ELEMENT NO. NO. NO ACCESSION NO.

U.S. BASES IN JAPAN: DO WE STILL NEED THEM? {U > 12. BEXW?L&L AUTHOII(5)

JAMES L. MITCHELL. ECDR. SC. USN - . -. - - - - . - . -. - - - . -- . - - -

lk. WM OF REPORT 1138. TIME COVERED 11 4. DATE OF lttqQRT (Year, Ahnett, Day) 11 5 PAGE .COUNT

FOREIGN RELATIONS U.S.-JAPAN

I I I

19. ABSTRACT (-M OII m H m if WeDIV a d &Mil), & m k ~ m b f ) While U.S. bases in Japan remain vital to the security of America's Pacific interests, Soviet peace initiatives and domestic budget deficits- have farced a reexamination of U.S. security policy with its reliance on overseas basing. The American force structure in Japan, the unique Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the Japanese llcomprehensive security" strategy, and threats to U.S. interests in the Pacific are described. The importance of the bases to the National Security Strategy, and their role in executing the Maritime Strategy in a global war against the Soviet Union are analyzed. Prospects for retention of the bases are positive, but are threatened by the divisive trade issue, a perceived Japanese "free ride'' on defense, charges of one- way technology transfer, a changing political balance in Japan, a diminished threat perception in both countries, and Soviet disarmament initiatives. Recommendations to perpetuate basing rights include severing trade-defense linkage; encouraging Japan to assume a greater role in international. affairs, expand its defense forces, increase it

20 DIYTRIBUTION 1 AVAILABILITY Of ABSTRACT 121. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION I

r)D FORM 1473,w MAR 83 APR d n m n may be used untll uahausted. SECURITY CLAISIFIU>ION OF THIS PAGE All other dct~onr are obsolete *uO. e m rmOll WCIP I M S W 1 I

Block 19 (cont.) overseas development assistance, and pay more U.S. basing coets; and promoting joint U.S.-Japanese weapons development.

Abstract. of U.S. BASES I N JAPAN1 DO WE STILL NEED THEN ?

While U.S. bases in Japan remain vital to the security of

America's Pacific interests, Soviet peace initiatives and

domestic budget deficits have forced a reexamination o f U.S.

security p o l i c y w i t h its r e l i a n c e on overseas basing. The

Amer ican force s t r u c t u r e in Japan, the unique T r e a t y of Mutual

Cooperati on and Security, the Japanese "comprehensive security"

s t r a t e g y , and t h r e a t s t o U.S. i n t e r e s t s i n t h e F a c i 4 i c are

c i bed. The import an^ s. o f the b a s e s tu t h ~ Nat i orla1 Sec;ur i t ,, S t r a t e g y , and their r o l e i n e : ; e c u t i n g the M a r i t i m e S t r a t e y y i n a

global w a r a g a i n s t the St3vic.t Union are a n a l y z e d . Praspecte, $or

r e ten t i v n o f t h e bases c7r.E p o s i t i v e , but are threatened by t h e

d i v i ~ i v i . t r ede issue, ~7 p ~ r - c e i v ~ . d J ~ P J I . ~ ~ S C " * V C E ~ ride" or\

Recommendations t o perpetuate bas ing r i chts i n c l u d e se*;ering

t rdc- -J t - - f~ i ls t . liril:.agc.; ~; .ncouragi t~cj Jap,:rl ti, ssscin~r. L. grc2ttr.r r o l z

i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , e;:pand i t s defense fo rces , i n c r e a s e i ts

ovcr-seas d e v e l opment ass! s t a n c e , and pay more U. S. b a s i n g costs;

and promot. i ng joi n t U. S. -Japanese weapons development..

US BASES I N JRPANI DO WE STILL NEED TWPl ?

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. m i 1 itary b r s r r r s t a b l ishmd i n Japan after World War

I 1 providmd the sccurity which enrblmd t h a t devastated country tc

r e b u i l d and f l su r i sh . Those bases w r r s just onu l i n k i n r chain

of bases enc i r c l i ng the Soviet Union a f t e r t h o w a r , r strong

symbol of American commitment t o containment, detersonce, and

forward defense. By 1990, Germany w a s reuni ted, the Warsaw Pack

had dissolved, ina.ermediatr range b a l l i s t i c miss i l s s had been

destroyed under t rea ty , and hundreds of thousands of Soviet

t roops were re tu rn ing home t o be demobilized. Unquestionably the

l e v e l o i t e n s i o n and r i s k o+ w a r bftween the super-powers had

lessened appreciably, and many claimed v i c t o r y i n %he Cold War.

However, just as Americans were p lanning how t o spend the

r esu l t an t "peace dividend," events i n t he Ba l t i c s , Tiananmen

Square, and K u w a i t tempered t h e i r euphoria just as a new nat iona l

s t ra tegy and fo rce s t r uc tu re were being planned.

The number o f U.8. bases abroad cont inues t o decrease as a

r esu l t of budgetary and p o l i t i c a l pressures. The imminent 1 oss

of bases i n the Ph i l i pp ines has focused a t t e n t i o n en the cost and

v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f such bases, and c a l l e d i n t o question t h e i r

continued necessity. A r e the bases i n Japan s t i l l required? I

contend t ha t they remain v i t a l t o U.S. na t i ona l secu r i t y

i n t e r e s t s in the Pae i f i c , and w i l l support t h a t conclusion by

discussing the unique U.S.-Japan s e c u r i t y a l l i ance , t he current

t h r e a t s i n t h e Pac i f i c , and the r o l e t h a t U.S. bases in Japan

p l a y i n the U.S. P a c i f i c strategy. I w i l l examine the prospects

1

f o r r e t a i n i ng thr bas@., and rmcommmnd actions t o ensure thmir

continumd a v a i l a b i l i t y .

BCICKQROUND

US Bases i n Japan. h1.8. f rc i l i t imm i n Japan, which totalled m w m

t h i n 3800 when the ercupat ion mndmd i n 1932, today number 1i9.'

The reduct ion was mutua l ly bene f t c ia l w i t h the U.8. abmdoning

excess, redundant, and d i l ap ida ted facilities which wmrm qu i ck l y

converted t o commercial use. The bases which remain are the very

best i rom an operat ional perspective, occupying 325 square

ki lometers (70% on t h e i s l a n d of Okinawa) and manned by 50,600

U. S. m i 1 i t a r y personnel. a

The Navy operates th ree major bases i n Japan. Yokosuka i s

homepart Sor Commandw Seventh Fleet and the ~sn-ship USS Hiduay

b a t t l m group, and o f f e r s by +ar t h m best ship r epa i r c a p a b i l i t y

west of C a l i f o r n i a along w i th extensive supply, fue l , and

ammunition starage.= Nearby NAF Atsugi serves as base f o r

Hidway's a i r wing and P-3C marit ime p a t r o l a i r c r a f t . Sasebo i s

homeport f o r a three-ship amphibious squadron, soon t o be Joined

by an LHA, and i s s t r a t e g i c a l l y located across the Tsushima

S t r a i t from Korea.

Yokota A i r Base outs ide Tokyo serves as headquarters f o r t h e

F i f t h A i r Force and as t h e hub f o r U.S. m i l i t a r y a i r l i f t i n

Japan. T w o squadrons of F-145 and Navy P-3s a re stat.ioned a t

Misawa AB i n Northern Japan, and more than 70 F-13s along w i th

AWACS, tankers, and reconnaissance a i r c r a f t are based a t Kadena

AB on 0kinawa.-

The Marines comprise h a l f of a l l U.S. forces s ta t ioned i n

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Japan, w i t h t h e i r opmrations concentrated on Okinawr. In addi t im

t o t h m I11 MEFHeadqurrteru, t h e m n t i r m T h i r d D l v i i i o n and 8.t .

A i r Wing are r t r t i o n a d on t h a t i s land, wh i le t h e Wing'a F I A - l B r

and AV-8s are stat ioned a t Iwakuni.

The A r m y maintains no combat troop8 bn Japan, but doe8

r e t a i n t he I X Corps Headquarterr a t Camp Zama I n Yokohama along

w i t h 2,100 support personnel.

The US-Japan Mltual Secur i ty Trraty . A r t i c l e I X o f t he 1947

Japanese Const i tu t ion renounces war and t h e th rea t or use of

force t o s e t t l e i n te rna t iona l disputes, and fo rb ids the

maintenance o f armed forces. Th is c lause accurately r e f l e c t e d

both American and Japanese des i res dur ing t he occupation, bu t as

w a r raged i n Korea and the occupation ended i n 1952, the U.S.

encourage the creat ion of a Japanese Defense Force. Oovernment

e f f o r t s t o overturn A r t i c l e I X i n t h e early 1950's f a i l e d , but

the Japanese Supreme Court d i d rule t ha t the nat ion re ta ined

inherent r i g h t of self-defense, and could l e g a l l y maintain

minimal self-defense Q o r c e ~ . ~ Such a f o r ce was created i n 1952,

but despi te the cour t ' s r u l i n g , i t has long been viewed

d i s t r u s t f u l l y as an i l l e g a l descendent of the Imperiaf Army and

Navy responsible +or the dest ruc t ion of W W I I . Faced with such

strong sentiment, the Government imposed s t r i c t l i m i t s on these

f o r c e s , inc1,tding the p r o h i b i t i o n oS of fens ive weapons, overseas

deployments, and c o l l e c t i v e secu r i t y arrangements. I n addition,

the t h ree non-nuclear p r i n c i p l e s w e r e adopted i n 1967, banning

the production, possession, o r i n t r oduc t i on o f nuclear w e a p o n s

i n t o Japan.&

Japan's nea r - t o ta l reliance on the U.S. f o r her secu r i t y w a s

3

cod i f i ed i n the f i r m t Trmaty sf Mutual Coopmratlon m d B u u r i t y

between Japan and thr Unit08 Statom signod in 1951. I t granted

t h e U.8. bar ing r i q h t s f o r " t h r m r l itanancm of peace and smcurity

i n the Far Eaet, but d i d no t e x p l i c i t l y g l r d g r t he U.S. t o

de f rnd Japan f r o m a q g r m s s i ~ n . ~ A rev ised tsmrty signmd i n 1960

maintained f4mrrican basing, but i s unique am an asymmetrical

t r e a t y i n that wh i le it pledges t he U.S. to defand Japan against

a t tack, Japan is no t s i m i l a r l y ob l iga ted t a come t o the a i d o f

the U.S. unless the at tack were t o occur " i n t h e t e r r i t o r i e s

under the admin is t ra t ion of J a ~ a n . " ~ Such wording w a s necessary

t o comply w i th t he p r o h i b i t i o n against c o l l e c t i v e secu r i t y

arrangements. The t r e a t y a l s o s t i pu l a t es t h a t t h e U.S. would no t

use the bases f o r combat operat ions wi thout p r i o r consu l ta t ion

w i t h t h e Japanese Government. While t h i s p r o v i s i m i n e f f e c t

g ives Japan ve to pawer over U.S. operations, i t has been

in te rp re ted ta m e a n on ly t h a t a i r s t r i k e s could no t be launched

directly from Japanese bases without approval, and the clause has

never been e x ~ r c i s e d . ~ Nei ther t r e a t y w a s popular i n Japan, w i th

p o l 1 s showing 1 ess than one-third of the population supporting

the t r e a t y i n lr!AO. Rat iS ica t ion of t he treaty p rec i p i t a t ed

w i de-spread r i o t i n g , cancel l a t i o n o f a planned v i s i t by President

Eisenhower, and the fa31 o f the Prime M i n i s t e r a l o

The combination o f robust econami c growth, increasing th reat

perception, and strong nat iona l leadership served t o b u i l d pub l i c

support f o r the t r ea t y i n the l a t e 1970's and 1980's. The Soviet

invas ion of Qfghanistan, shoot-dawn o f KAL 007, and build-up of

fo rces i n the Far East, coupled w i t h t h e Mideast o i l c r i s e s and

Vietnamese invasion ob Cambodia c l e a r l y revealed the broad

4

drngera t o Japanerne promperity. Prima Ministrr Nakrmonm mizmd

tho i n i t i a t i v e t o rntrangly amrert Japan's role am a w w l d l r a d r r ,

t o declare the U.8,-Jlpanrse re lat ionmhip an a l l iance, and t o

fos ter a strong nat iona l conmansum f o r that r l l i r ncm. * * He war

a1 so the f irrt t o embracm t h m concept of "comprehrn8ls:i

recur i t y , '~ which consol idatrd p o l i t i c a l , rconomic, and m i l i t a r y

i n i t i a t i v e s t o enhance secur i ty . Increaser i n dafense spending

w e r e balanced by si m i 1 ar inc raarc r i n overseas dove1 oprnent

assistance (ODQ) t o s t r a t e g i c a l l y important countries. T h i s

policy gained wide support both a t home and i n the U.S. which

helped d i r e c t the ODA payments i n consonance w i t h nat iona l

po l icy.

Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Creaked i n 1954 from a po l i ce

reserve, the Japan Self-De9ense Force CJSDF) has developed i n t o a

high1 y capable f o rce 273,000 strong. The JSDF $40 b i l l i o n

budget represents the werld'ta t h i r d l a rges t defense budget, and

while a self-imposed defense spending cap o f 1% o+ GNP has been

on ly symbol ical ly exceeded since 1987, unprecedented economic

growth has permit ted a constant 6.SX growth i n the defense budget

over the l a s t dacade.14 The ppimary JSDF missions are t o defend

Japan f r o m invasion and a i r at tack, and t o p ro tec t selected sea

lanes out t o 1,000 miles. Under the terms of the t reaty , the

U.S. is responsible f o r nuclear deterrence, conventional defense

of Japan beyond the c a p a b i l i t i e s 0 9 the JSDF, and offensive

act ions i n t h e theater.%% The JSDF forces are exceptionally

well-equipped w i th a combination of U.S. and Japanese weapons.

They possess one o f the wor ld 's most capable flSW forces b u i l t

around a force o f 55 destroyers, 14 diesel submarines, and 100 P-

5

3C a i r c r a f t , and their mine warfarm f lomt i m the world's fou r th

18rgur tmxL A i r ds f rnsr c a p a b i l i t y i ncorpora t r r 120 F-1SJ8,

updated F-48, E-2s, and P a t r i o t m i r r f l r r . Tha qraund forcer are

equipped with modrrn armor, he1 icoptaro, and missi les. And the

near fu tu re w i l l rsm t h r add i t ion of Aegis drmtroymrm, 5H-60

hel icopters, Tho88 ships, and ovmr-the-horizon backscattar radar

systems. Yet dmspite i t s impressive hardware and s k i l l , the JSDF

recognizes i t s i n a b i l i t y t o defend e i the r i t s t e r r i t o r y or i t s

SLOCo against the Soviet Union, and maintains i t s continued

secur i t y dependence on the U.S.

SECURITY THREGTS I N THE PACIFIC

The Soviet Union. The Soviet Union i s the only nat ion i n the

world tha t can threaten t h e existence of t h e United States, and

i t i s therefore the primary foeus of U.S. and Japanese forces i n

the Pacific. Soviet +orce levels i n the Far East are enormous,

and announced force reduct ions are w i l l l a r g e l y be o f f s e t by

cont inuing qua l i t a t i ve improvements. Ground forces are expected

t o be cu t f r o m 45 d i v i s i ons t o 38, a i r regiments reduced from 27

t o 16, and t h e Soviet P a c i f i c F leet , comprising some 100 major

surface combatants and 148 submarines, w i l l lose j u s t f i v e

submarines. Most remaining u n i t s w i l l be equipped wi th +ar more

modern equipment, w i t h the f l e e t increasing SSM capacity 100%.

SAM capacity 5Q%, and amphibious l i f t capacity 60%. And no cuts

are planned i n the theater bomber fo rceo which includes 85

Backfires. l7 The ma jo r i t y 0 9 these forces are arrayed along the

Chinese border, but s ince the recent rapprochement between those

countries, troop l e v e l s and tension have been reduced on both

4

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r i d r s . Thmre have bemn v i r t u a l l y no reduct ions i n thm forces

facing Japan.

During the f i n a l days o f W W l 1 , t h e Soviets smizmd the four

rauthernmast Kurilm Is lands, w i t h S t r l i n s ta t i ng "Hmncmforth,

t h e K u r i l e Is lands s h a l l not serve am a means t o cut of f t h r

Soviet Union from the ocran or as r base f o r a Japaneoe at tack on

our Far A11 Japanese res iden ts w a r e expel led i n 1947,

and t h e d ispute over the i s lands has kept the. two nat ions from

formal ly s ign ing a W W I I peace t rea ty . In 1978, the Soviets

f o r t i f i e d three o f t he four i s lands w i t h a f u l l army d i v i s i o n and

40 MIG-23s, posing a d i r e c t t h rea t t o Hokkaido and t he Soya

S t r a i t . f T S t ra teg ica l l y , t he ac t i on w a s intended t o i n t im ida te

Japan and weaken i t 5 a l l i a n c e w i t h the U.S. Instead, the

provocat ion r a l l i e d support i n Japan f o r the YSDF and the U.S.

a1 1 iance. When i n 1983 Prime M in i s t e r Nakasone f o r ce fu l 1 y

declared h i s n a t i o n ' s i n t e n t i o n t o serve as an unsinkable

a i r c r a f t ca r r i e r , t he Soviets responded by moving 137 SS-20

miss i l es i n t o the theatero20 Although these m i s s i l e r have since

been destroyed under t rea ty , t he Soviets have conducted regular

m i l i t a r y exercises i n t he Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, i nc lud ing

simulated a i r a t tacks on Japanese radar sites end amphibious

assau l ts i n the Kuriles c l e a r l y seen as aimed against Hokkaido.

This t h rea t of invasion has been bo ls te red by the presence of t he

Sov ie ts ' oo ly naval i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n and the add i t i on o f LASH

and RO/RO vessels t o t he P a c i f i c merchant f leet.2'

Gorbachev'e Vladivostok i n i t i a t i v e i n 1986 was an attempt t o

reduce tension i n the reg ion and encourage Japanese investment t o

develop the resources of Siberia."' But t he Japanese remain

7

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f . - .

d i s t r u r t f u l of thm po i red Soviet m i l i t a r y forcm, and havm made

r e t u r n o# thr K u r i l e s a precondi t ion f o r m y soaiour

c o ~ p r r a t i o n . ~ ~ 8 t r a t eg i ca l l y , i t i s u n l i k s l y t h a t thm $ 0 v i 8 t ~

w i l l be w i l l i n g t o t rade themu i s lands f o r Japanasm t rade and

dmvml opmmnt c a p i t a l . North and South Korea. A recent South Korean Defense White Paper

s ta tes t h a t t h e 1.2 m i l l i o n troops fac ing each other across t he

Korean dem i l i t a r i zed zone possess BO t imes more m i l i t a r y

capab i l i t y than t h e forces which clashed dur ing t h e Korean War.

Even m o r e ominous, the paper p red i c t s that t h e North Koreans are

j u s t f i v e years away from producing nuclear wsrpons."" Despite

South Korean peace i n i t i a t i v e s , the war between t he two nat ions

could resume a t any t i m e , and as K i m i l Sung ages, the temptation

f o r him t o complete what he s ta r ted i n 1950 may be increasing.

Armed w i th nuclear weapons, he could i n t im ida te t he South and

poss ib ly deter a U.S. t a c t i c a l nuclear response. Nei ther China

nor the Soviet Union i s l i k e l y t o support N o r t h Korea i n another

war s ince both are seeking improved t i e s w i t h the West, and

without t h e i r support, North Korea could n o t win a pro t rac ted

conventional war against the U.S. -South Korean a1 1 iance. This

f a c t increases the at t rac t iveness of a shor t nuclear war. Given

the s t rength o f the South and the looming nuclear t h rea t posed by

the North, the r i s k o f p r e e m p t i v e a t tack by the South i s a l s o

growing. Many believe t h a t the presence o f U.S. t roops serves

m o r e t o r e s t r a i n t he South than t o deter the North, and

initiatives t o remove those troops could @rove most

destabi 1 i z ing . Certainly the withdrawal of U. S. t roops would

encourage South Korea t o develop t h e i r own nuclear capab i l i t y ,

8

f u r t h m r dmstab i l i z ing t h m rmgion.

China. U n t i l the bloody ovrntw a t Timanmrn Square, China w a r

rmmn increas ing ly as a Western a l l y , w i t h most o f her forcmm

deployed against Soviets a l s n p t he n o r t h r r n border, w i t h

i n t r r n a t l o n a l t r a d r booming, artd w i t h steady progrmsu towards

dmmocracy and capi tal ism. The Sino-8ovi r t rapprochement

i n i t i a t e d by Oarbachev had lessmod tans ions between thasa long-

t ime adversaries, and t h e Chinese armed forcets were being reduced

f r o m four t o three m i l l i o n wh i le modernizing w i t h Western

support. "s Now a1 1 P a c i f i c powers are reexamining t h e i r

r e l a t i o n s w i th China, and much o f the t rade and cooperation have

ceased. The very l eg i t imacy of the regime has been c a l l e d i n t o

question, w i t h d e s t a b i l i z i n g consequences f a r the e n t i r e region.

Should the government choose t o d i v e r t i n t e r n a l unrest by

engaging i n external con+ l i c t , a 1 i ke l y opponent i s Vietnam,

against whom China has maintained some 300,000 troops i n a s t a t e

0 9 conf ron ta t ion against an equal number o f Vietnamese s ince

t h , ~ i r 1979 invasion. A rmcant c lash between Chinese and

Vietnamese warships near the Spra t l y Is lands h i g h l i g h t t h e

c o n f l i c t over those i s lands which a l s o invo lves t h e Ph i l i pp i nes

and P l a l a y ~ l a . ~ ~ China might once more attempt t o seize t he

i s land o f Kiomen from Taiwan as i t d i d i n 1949 and 1958. Another

poss ib le opponent might be I n d i a w i t h whom China has engaged i n

armed c o n f l i c t and arms c ~ m p e t i t i o n . ~ '

South East fisia. The Vietnamese ended t h e i r ten-year occupation

of Cambodia i n 1990 under heavy pressure from China and t he

Associat ion of South East Asian Nat ions (MEAN) , but f i g h t i n g

rages on between the var ious f ac t i ons vy ing f o r con t ro l of t h a t

9

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nation. Vimtnrm'a rconomy ham v i r t u a l 1 y COX lapsed, and Soviet

economic support and ume of f ac i l i t imm at Cam Ranh Bay havm

decrerrsd, probably i n o Soviet p loy t o encourage tho Philippines

ta close U.S. b a s m ~ . ~ ~ This ac t ion i s s t rong ly opposed by the

&her membws of OSEAN w h o c red i t the Ammrfcan prmrence at thew

baser w i th provid ing the regional s t a b i l i t y which allowmd t h e i r

economies t o prosper. Singapore's af f m r of 1 i m i ted basing

support f o r U.S. sh ips and a i r c r a f t was intended t o demonstrate

t h a t posi t ion. However i t now appears t h a t the Ph i l i pp ine bases

w i l l soon close, and the procpects f o r t h a t eountry are bleak

w i t h t he communist insurrect ion, cont inuing coup attempts, and a

feeble economy combining I s fu r the r weaken the country and

des tab i l i ze the reqionmQW

India. Continued growth of the Indian armed forces has ra ised

fears among the ASEAN nations. I n pa r t i cu la r , the Indian Navy

has expanded its operations t o the Malacca S t r a i t s i n an

announced e f f o r t t o contro l the sea approaches to the Indian

Ocean. And with nuclear weapons, a funct iona l ICBM, and

in ternat iona l p o l i t i c a l ambitions, the po ten t ia l f o r renewed

m i l i t a r y confrontat ion wi th Pakistan and C h i n a remain highgSo

The Middle East. The current w a r i n the Persian Bulf

demonstrates b o t h the extreme v o l a t i l i t y and s t ra teg ic importance

of t he regicm. The entire world economy r e l i e s on the flow of

o i l from the G u l f , in ter rupt ions t o which have proven t o have

devastating e f f ec t s on t h e economies of i ndus t r i a l i zed and

developing nat ions a l ike . Although the U.S. and its coa l i t i on

par tners have demonstrated cont inuing resolve t o pro tec t that

o i l , i t s value w i l l continue t o i n v i t e acts of aggression from

10

countr ies w i t h i n and outmido tho region.

Japan. To many ceuntr ies i n the Paci f ic , Japan r rp ro ren t r a

orr ioua threat. I t s huge economy and dncrrasingly capable J8DF

are seen as a new attempt t o establirh tho Oreater Eaat haia Co-

Prosperi ty Sphere. hlthough i t ha8 come t o bm accepted tha t t he

U.S. and Jdpan w i l l j o i n t l y ensure the secur i t y of northoaskern

Asia, warships f l y i n g the r i s i n g run are unwelcome i n t he

southeast. A major reason f o r the small s i ze of the JBBF i s

"...the negative perceptions of Japan's rearmament ... twhiehl

seem universal i n Asia."=' Although China has expressed support

+OF the U,S.-Japan a l l iance, i t sharply c r i t i c i z e d the Japanese

decision t o exceed the 1% GNP defense spending cap.=*

The United S t a t ~ s . Although the United States i s widely credi ted

w i t h providing t he secure environment under whieh so many Pac i f i c

R i m nations b u i l t t h e i r economies, i t i s a lso seen by many as a

destab i l i z ing inf luence i n the region. Opponents of U.S. bases

contend that the U.S. presence only provokes the Soviet Union and

waul d involve the host nat ion super-power conf 1 i c t .

THE ROLE OF JAPANESE BASES I N THE US PACIFIC STRATEGY

"The presence i n Japan oQ U.S. bases and armed farces provides a m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l l i n k understood by b a t h friend and foe. Naintaining some U.S. -forces i n Japan serves the i n t e res t s o f both nations. It is a dis- incent ive t o nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n and a deterrent t o nuclear threats. w33

US National Secur i ty Pol icy. The American post-war secur i ty

strategy of containment not only succeeded i n i t s purpose of

res t ra in ing t h e spread oC communism, but a lso proved f l e x i b l a i n

I

rasponre t o rmgionol contingrncirm. That otratmgy r m a m i n m i n

f o r c r today, b u i l t on four basic m~emmntrr S ~ t e r r m c ~ , AlPianco,

Forward Dmfensr, and Forcm Pro j rc t ion .

Dmterrence. Dmtmrring nuclear at tack must be the h i g h m t

p r i o r i t y of tho U.8. a r m d fercem. Rathrr s t r r i g h t f w w a r d whm

the U.8. enjoyed overwhelming nuclear super ior i ty , i t has becomm

f a r more d i f f i c u l t i n an age of nuriaar p a r i t y and p ro l i f e ra t i on .

Since there i s cur rent ly no dadense against nuclear attack, the

U.S. employs the doctr ine o+ Qlexib le response t o deter such an

attack. Th is "nuclear umbrella'' i s easily extended to an a l l y ,

and coverage is assumed by many countr ies not fo rmal ly al igned

w i th the U.S., but i s f a r more cred ib le when accompanied by the

s ta t ion ing of U.S. forces i n t ha t country. Thus the presence of

U.S. forces serves as a guarantee of U.S. s t ra teg ic defense of

Japan. But with t h e i r organic t a c t i c a l nuclear capab i l i t i es ,

those forces a lso contr ibute d i r e c t l y t a the U.S. f l e x i b l e

response capabi l i ty . The a b i l i t y t o escalate t o the nuclear

l eve l is expected t o become increasingly important as nuclear

p r o l i f e r a t i o n increases the threat of regional c o n f l i c t .

The presence of U.S. bases i n Japan makes the prospect e+

a t t a c k on tha t nat ion almost inconceivable except under the

scenario of global war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

However, i t s c i t izens, ships, and commercial i n te res t s areund the

world are h igh ly vulnerable t o attack. This then is the form

conventional deterrence takes today, w i ttr the global f orcos of

the U.S. deterr ing aggression against Japanese global in teres ts .

All iance. Strong a l l i ances enable t h e U.S. t o combine

m i l i t a r y and economic resources wi th its a l l i e s t o best meet any

12

thrmat t o shared intermst8 worldwide. President Bumh has mitton

t ha t " O u r a l l i ance w i t h Japan remains a centerpiece of OW

s+cu r i t y . po l i c y and an important anchor of r t ab i l i t y . *= - AS t he

r e l a t i v e economic power of the U.8. t o i t s major a l l i e s drclinms,

i t has becomr p o l i c y t o increasingly s h i f t t he respons ib i l i t y and

cost o f defensa t o Qhoor al l ims. Japan, w i t h world's socond

la rges t economy, has recognixed tha new po l i cy , Lncrr rs ing

def ensa spending, burden-sharing support +or U. 9. forces i n

Japan, and s t ra teg ic ODA under the aegis of comprehensive

secur i ty . Within p o l i t i c a l constraints, the JSDF has been

s t ruc tured t o compliment the c a p a b i l i t i e s of U.S. forces with the

JSDF serving as the sh ie ld f o r the U.S. spear.

Forward Def ens@. Forward defense o f U. 6. i n t e res t s abroad

requi res forward deployed forces. This i n t u r n requ i res e i the r

overseas bases i n the v i c i n i t y o f those in te res ts , o r

l o g i s t i c a l l y sustainable naval u n i t s and l a rge s t r a t sg ie l i f t

c a p a b i l i t y i n crder t o remain on s t a t i o n and r a p i d l y re in force i n

t ime oS c r i s i s . Overseas bases are the p re fe r red option, but

r e l y on the shared i n te res t s af the host government t o be viable.

U.S. bases i n Japan are arguably the country 's best overseas

bases, They are geos t ra t rg i ca l l y located, provided without cost

and heav i ly subsidized by Japan, are except iona l ly well-equipped,

and enjoy wide pub l i c support. Their p rox im i ty t o Korea, the

Soviet Union, China, and Southeast Asia permi t a r ap id and

powerful U.8. response t o any emergent c r i s i s , thereby serving as

a strong deterrent t o ac t ion in imica l t o U.S. in teres ts .

Force Projection. Force p ro jec t ion is essent ia l t o the

forward defense of U.S. i n t ~ r e s t s overseas. The U.S. f orees

13

rtat ionmd permanently i n Japan gorress tremmndously large,

f l e x i b l e , and rrmponsivr pawrr p ro jec t ion c a ~ a b l l l t i m s .

Togwther, the c a r r i e r b a t t l e group and Marine MEF can p ro jec t

offmnsivr pawar at any l e v e l an the s c r l r o$ conf l ic t , and do so

quick ly anywhere i n the theater. The l o g i s t i c s i n4 ra r t r uc tu re of

the bases not on ly make there forces sustainablr, but a l so permit

rap id and e f f i c i e n t reinforcement through t h e i r establ ished

transpartat i on network.

Executing the Maritime Strategy. The U.S. Maritime Strategy i s

based on the s a m e p r i nc ip l es of deterrence, a l l iance, forward

defense, and fo rce p ro jec t ion as t he National Securi ty Strategy.

I n appl icat ion, i t comprises a three-phase sequential concept of

operations f o r the employment of naval forces. Phase I attempts

t o deter c o n f l i c t through presence and forward deployment. Phase

I1 seizes t h e i n i t i a t i v e once c o n f l i c t has erupted i n order t o

gain sea cont ro l and put the enemy an the defensive. Phase I11

takes the f i g h t t o the enemy by s t r i k i n g h i s homeland i n support

of the land ba t t le . The importance of the U.S. bases i n Japan to

the successful appl1eation of the Marit ime Strategy i n the

Pac i f i c can best be demcnstrated by examining the worst-case

scenario af global war against the Soviet Union.

Phase I . Most s t r a t e g i s t s be l ieve t h a t the Soviets have

l i t t l e t o gain by s t a r t i n g a w a r i n the Far East, and tha t any

super-power con+ 1 i c t there would r e s u l t from an i n i t i a l Soviet

th rus t i n t o Western Europe.== I n t h i s scenario, the Soviets

would l i k e l y issue an ult imatum t o Japan t h a t U.S. use o f

Japanese bases i n the war would be considered a h o s t i l e ac t by

Japan. Such a threat would l i k e l y strengthen Japanese resolve.

14

With thm dimsolution of t h m Warsaw Pact, i nd i ca t i on rnd warning

t ime fo r r Europman i n v r r i ~ n would 1 i kml y now b r mrasurad i n

month8 vicm days. During t h i s pariod, U.8. and JBDF f o r c r s i n

Japan would go on hei ghtmned a le r t , i nc r ra re survei 11 wnca of

Soviet forcms, and c loso ly monitor f lemt movemmts. Should the

Sovi rt sur f ace f l e e t and submarine + O P C ~ surge from Vladi vostok , the U.S. and JSDF would immediately mine the Tsushima, Tsuparu,

and Soya S t r a i t s t o t r ap the Soviet f l e e t i n the Sea of Japan.

This would be considered a provocative ac t which the Japanese

would permit under only the most threatening circumstances. Wall

before the mining, the Seventh Fleet and JHSDF would so r t i e , end

add i t iona l U.8. b a t t l e groups and a i r c r a f t would deploy t o the

theater t o improve readiness and demonstrate resolve. A show of

s t rength a t t h i s po in t would be especially important t o preclude

Chinese accommodation w i t h the Soviet Union, and thus t o ensure

t h a t Soviet forces could not be redeployed against NATO o r Japan.

Phase 11. Once h o s t i 1 i t i e s had begun i n Europe, t h e U. S.

Navy would engage Soviet forces world-wide i n order t o gain sea

cont ro l and se i ze the i n i t i a t i v e . U.S. and JSDF a i r forces would

defend bases i n Japan from Soviet a i r a t tack, whi le also

attempting t o i n t e r d i c t Backf i re ra ids against the combined

fleets. Those f l e e t s would be engaging t h o s e Soviet submarines

and sur9ace units t ha t had reached the Pacific before the s t r a i t s

w e r e mined. X f a l a rge number of submarines had escaped, U . S .

submarines would be employed i n countering tha t threat.

Utherwise, the U.S. submarine farce wauld enter t he Sea of

Qkhotsk t o attack the Soviet ballistic miss i le submarines i n

t h e i r bastion. This t a c t i c , intended p r imar i l y t o reduce the

15

Soviet second-strike s t ra toq ic reomrve and provide the U.B. a

mourco o f lwmrapo, would also amrve as an incent ive fw tha

Soviets to r e s t r i c t t h e i r naval f e r c m m t o t h r bast ion defonoe

mffort . I f th8 Bovimts re f ra ined from at tacking h p a n directly,

then Japan might r m s t r i c t the U.8. f r o m launching a i r mtrikmm

from Japanese basss against Soviet bares. Attacks against

aperat ing Soviet a i r and naval u n i t s would l i k e l y be permitted

under these circumstancas, which would eventual ly st imulate the

Soviets t o s t r i k e t h e bases i n Japan. U n t i l the SovLrts crossed

tha t l i n e and so removed any remaining Japanese res t ra in t , a l l

a t tacks on Soviet bases, even those i n the Kur i les and southern

Sakhalin Island, would have t o be performed wi th naval aviat ion.

Since a l l ava i lab le ca r r i e r b a t t l e groups would be employed

against the Soviet a i r c r a - and submarines menacing the 8LOCs

throughout the P a c i f i c and Indian Oceans, a t t a c k s on Saviot bases

would l i k e l y be deferred u n t i l t he t h i r d phase sf the campaign.

h e 1 1 1 Once the Soviet air and submarine forces had

been s u f f i c i e n t l y a t t r i t e d t o cons t i t u te a l l i e d sea control , and

presuming t h e land war in Europe continued without resor t t o

nuclear weapons, the U.S. could take the war t o the Soviets i n

the Far East. The submarine w a r i n the bast ions would be joined

by U.S. and JSDF a i r forces i n an e f f o r t t o destroy a l l Soviet

naval u n i t s trapped i n the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk. The a i r

Qorces would also attack the Soviet a i r dedense system with the

goal of exposing the ground forces and i n d u s t r i a l targets t o

s t r a t e g i c bombing. Meanwhile, U. S. and JSDF naval and amphibious

units would seize t h e d i s p u t e d Kut-ile Islands, and possibly even

Sakhalin I s l a n d t o serve a5 a post-war bargaining chip.

16

Role of thm J8DF. Ths maJority of U.B. barer i n Japan are Joint-

us. f a c i l i t i e s w i th t h r JSDF which servm t o promote clomm

operatf ma1 r e l a t i o n s between the two qorces. Both mldmr arm

wel l aware 09 t h e i r mutual dependence i n r war wi th ths Sovimt

Union, and the necessity f o r maximum in te r -operab i l i t y and

cooperati on. To t h a t end, combined planning, t ra in ing, and

exercises have been s tead i l y increased over the last decade.

Both governments have agreed t o ro l es and missions fo r t h e i r

forces which maximize capab i l i t y while minimizing redundancy.

The JSDF has developed impressive ASW, a i r defense, and mine

warfare capab i l i t i es whi le the U.8. forces based i n Japan arm

p r imar i l y of fensive i n o r ien ta t ion and st ructure. Incrers inp ly ,

t h e JSDF is capable of defending i t s t e r r i t o r y and i t s v i t a l

SLOCs, thus f reeing U.S. forces t o respond t o threats throughaut

an enormous theater. I n +act, the U.S. deployments t o tho

Persian Gulf dur ing the I ran ian C r i s i s demonstrated t o the

Japanese Sovernment just how over-extended U. S. P a c i f i c forces

were, prompting the Japanese t o expand t h e i r own forces t o assume

t h e 1,000 m i l e SLOC defense mission.

Regional Security. While the Soviet Union presents by f a r the

most dangerous t h rea t t o U.S. i n te res ts i n the Pac i f i c , t9ak

threat is perhaps the m o s t improbable. The con9 l ic ts most likely

to involve U.S. forces are regional, the r e s u l t of hegemonic

ambitions, border d i s p u t e s , revolut ions, and insurgencies. While

the U.S. proudly takes c r e d i t f o r provid ing post-war reg iona l

s t a b i l i t y , tha t there has been nearly continuous c o n f l i c t during

t h i s period, inc lud ing the Chinese revolut ion, and wars i n Korea,

Vietnam, Cambodia, India-Pakistan, and Iran-Iraq. Such c o n f l i c t s

17

w i l l continue i n the future, and the Sevrnth F l r r t i n Japan w i l l _ -

remain the primary U.8. rmmponse t o l i m i t such c r i r r a .

Evan while the Swvsnth Fimmt i s growing, the U.8. Navy ham

begun a major fo rce reduct ion motivated by t h m decl ine of thr

8ov ie t threat and the fimerican economy. I n t h i s mvisonmmnt, t h e

U.S. has encouraged the JSDF t o p lay a l a r q r r r o l e i n Pac i f ic

regional securi ty. Japan has so f a r res i r tmd t h i s mbfort, c i t i n g

i t s neighbors' oft-pronounced +ears of Japanese rearmament and

m i l i t a r y domination. Though a v a l i d concern, i t i s not

s u f f i c i e n t reason t o avoid in te rna t iona l respons ib i l i t i es . Those

nat ions which today welcome the s t a b i l i z i n g U.S. presence could

soon learn t o appreciate a combined U.S.-JODF presence,

espec ia l ly when the a l t e rna t i ve might be a power vacuum i n the

region. Japan i s completely dependent on the SLOCs t o the Middle

East, and as an economic super-power and emerging leader i n the

f r ee world, has a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o defend those routes.

PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED US BGSING I N JAPAN

The U.S. bases i n Japan cur ren t l y enjoy wide popular support

i n t ha t country. Under the F a c i l i t i e s Improvement Program, the

Government of Japan i s invest ing over *SO0 m i l l i o n annually t o

upgrade and modernize those bases, bu i l d i ng new housing, p ie rs ,

hangers, warehouses, f ue l tanks, and maintenance f a c i l i t i e s .

This e f f o r t has been matched by the continuous upgrading of U.S.

equipment deployed t o those bases, most notably the replacement

of seven older surface combatants w i th Aegis cruisers, Spruance

destroyers, and P e r r y f r i ga tes , and t he scheduled r e l i e f of USS

Uiduay by USS Independence l a t e r t h i s year. Mhile the prospects

18

f o r there barer are br ight , there are i s w e 8 which could t h r e a t m

them. As both thr U.8. and Japan r m v i m w t h e i r s u u r i t y

8tratrgi.r i n l i g h t of r ap id l y changing world avcmt8, them.

issues w i l l r equ i re care#ul consideration.

Trade-De#onre Linkage. The g r e r t e r t threat t a thr U.S.-Japanese

a l l i ance i s the t rade isrue. A s t he Japanese economy booms and

the t rade imbalance continues t o favor t h a t country, Americans

have begun t o decry Japan's "bree r i d e " at U.S. expense. Few on

e i t he r side of the Pac i f i c would d ispute t h a t American

wi l l ingness t o bear the defense burden and open i t s markets were

instrumental t o Japan's economic success. Fewer s t i l l would deny

tha t the Japanese continue t o p ro tec t t h e i r market% while taking

f u l l advantage o f open markets abroad. There are l r g i t i m a t c

issues which must be resolved between the two qovernmonts. But

they are trade issues, and e f f o r t s t o l i n k them to mutual

secur i ty cauld undermine the a l l iance.

A s U.S. economic strength decl ined r e l a t i v e t o Japan, i t M a s

recognized i n both countr ies t h a t Japan m u s t contr ibute " t o a

peaceful world on a scope commensurate w i t h i t s enormous economic

and techno l~q i ca l ~ t r s n g t h . " ~ ~ Japan responded wi th large,

sustained increases i n defense spending, burden-sharing, and

s t ra teg ic ODQ under its comprehensive secur i t y pol icy. It now

boasts the world's t h i r d la rgest defense budget, i s the wor ld ' s

la rgest ODfl donor, and contr ibutes mare t o the cost of

maintaining U.S. farces averseas than any other a l l y , paying the

equivalenh a t SS6,000 per year bar each U.S. serviceman serving

i n Japan. These fac ts are seldom mentioned by Congre~r~ional

"Japan-bashers" who continue t o charge tha t "Japan evades g labal

19

responsi b i l i t i m r i n favor o f rrlf -cmn' srad veonomic rxpansim. "=,

U.8. admirrirtraticsn o f f i c i r l m 'a1 ; rec i r tm thf a enpanding

Japanese commitment t o mutual secur i ty , and whi le qu imt ly

continuing t o press Japan f o r w e n grratmr ef for ts , have worked

hard t o s rver tho l inkage bmtween t r rdm and dafmnar i n Congrer8.

The very r e a l fea r i n both c a p i t a l s i s that continued U.8.

v i t r i o l w i l l sour popular Japancum support f o r t he sustained

comprehensive secu r i t y build-up, w i t h h i gh l y d i s rup t i ve p o l i t i c a l

resul t ~ s . = ~

Technoloqy Transfer. Another aspect o f t h e trade-defense l inkage

centers on the t rans fe r of U,S. de+ense tmehnology which could be

explo i ted by Japanese indust ry t o f u r t he r erode bmewican

commercial advantages. The FS-X p ro j ec t w a s assai led as a

technology give-away t ha t would t ha t would enable Japanese

i n d u s t r y t o undermine the U.S. commercial av ia t ion industry . In

f a c t , the Japanese Government had intended t o design t h e i r own

a i r c r a f t , bu t instead bowed t o U.S. pressure t o co-produce an F-

16 der i va t i ve in order t o help balance the t rade deficitW4O

Under a U.S.-Japan m i l i t a r y technology agreement signed i n 1983,

the U.S. became the only authorized rec ip i en t o f Japanese

m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l technology. And the FS-X deal w a s resisted

i n Japan f o r t he same reason i t w a s opposed i n the U.S. since the

Japanese had t o agree t o share the p lane's phased array radar and

composite wing design^.^' Many of Japan's high-tech weapons are

U.S. systems b u i l t under l i cense i n Japan. These inc lude the F-

15, P-3C, SH-60, P a t r i o t miss i le , and Regis destroyer. Such

arrangements g r e a t l y enhance i n te r -ope rab i l i t y and decrease

weapons cost f o r both nations. The 1986 Japanese dec is ion t o

TO

pa r t i c i pa te On tha Stratogic Dmf finam I n i t i a t i v e (SDI) program

bedmm very wel l f o r thm f u tu re a4 two-way technology tranefwr,

and very ominously f o r fu ture o f h o r t i l c forces. Qivmn t h m

enormous cast of modmrn weaponr development, a U.B.-Japanmsm

c o a l i t i o n can bm mxpreted t o out- inver t and out-produco thm

Soviet Union, at~d f rvmrably shlf t i n q t h e m i l i t a r y balancm."=

Japanese P o l i t i c a l Support. While the current U.8.-Japan

a l l i ance now enjoys the support of 7 0 X of the Japanese publ ic ,

and the JSBF i s braadly perceived t o have established i t 5

legi t imacy and value, both cot idi t ions date only t o the l a s t

decade. The L ibe ra l Democratic Party (LDP), i n power since 1955,

has walked a very treacherous path t o b u i l d a consensus +or the

current strgtegy c+ comprehensive security. Primc Minister

Nakasone w a s the f i r s t Japanese leader t o assert Japan's new r o l e

as a world leader and as an equal partner i n the a l l i ance w i t h

the U.S, Pac i f i s t sentiment remains strong i n Japan, and the

Const i tu t ion 's renunciat ion of war is widely supparted. The

Oovernrnent's s e n s i t i v i t y t o pub l i c perception was graph ica l ly

demonstrated in 1988 w h e n a JSDF submarine co l l i ded wi th a aport

f i s h i n g boat. Upon completion o f the invest igat ion, every f l a g

o f f i c e r i n t h e chain a+ command up t o and inc luding t h ~ . Min is ter

o f Defense resigned. S t i l l , some contend tha t the depth of

ant ipathy towards the m i l i t a r y is overstated, c i t i n g the

reve la t ion i n 1974 t h a t U.S. warships based i n Japan were armed

wi th nuclear weapons, The r e s u l t i n g outcry was i n f a c t muted and

shor t - l i vedm4= I n f ac t , most recent pub l i c opposit ion t o the

bases has focused on land use, safety, and noise.

Campaigning on opposit ion t o a nat ional consumption t a x and

21

a major p o l i t i c a l mcmdal which ta in tmd mast of t h m LDP

I r rd r rmhip , the Sepanesm S o c i a l i s t Party (38P) achimvrd Pargr

r l r c t n r a l ruccesr I n 1909 which enabled thvm t o Sorn a ma jo r i t y

c o a l i t i o n i n the Upper Houmm of thm While secu r i t y warn

no t an imoum i n t h i r campaigno t he d e c t l o n he ld ominous

imp l i ca t i ons 90r t he Urns.-Japan a l l i m c o s ince t h m JSP ham lang

he ld t h a t both t h e J8DF and thm secu r i t y a l l i r n c o w i t h t h m U.8.

a r e uneonsti t u t i o n r l . A 1 though t he Par ty has recent1 y %of tamed

i t s stand on these issues i n an e f f o r t ta broaden i t s support,

members of the JSDF were r e l i e ved by t h e outcome of subsequent

e l ec t i ons i n 1990 i n w h i c h the LDP r e ta i ned i t s s t rong m a j o r i t y

i n the more pswerf u l Lower Hstlse. S t i 11, t he Soc i a1 i sts nan have

the ability to b l a c k LPP defense d n i t i a t i v ~ c . ~ ~

Soviet Diplomacy. Soviet past-war s t ra tegy towards Japan has

consisted sf i n t i m i d a t i o n and blandishment. When Japan renewed

its t r e a t y w i th t h e U.S. i n 1960, t he Soviet Union declared the

Kurile Is lands would not be returned u n t i l a l l U.S. forces had

been removed from Japan. I n 1978, those i s lands were f o r t i f i e d

as p a r t of the massive Soviet m i l i t a r y bui ld-up i n the Far East.

When Prime M in i s te r Nakasone declared Japan an unsinkable

a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r , TASS declared there was no such t h i ng in t he

nuclear age, and SS-20 m i ss i l e s were pos i t ioned i n the Far

East. eb T h i 5 strong-arm Soviet approach has bean h i gh l y rounter-

p roduc t i ve , serv ing t o strengthen Japanese resalva and cement t h e

alliance w i t h t he U.S.

Today, w i t h t h e i r economy near ing c o l l apse, Soviet r m t i onal

ob jec t i ves have s h i f t e d f r o m achieving m i l i t a r y supe r i o r i t y t o

a t t r a c t i n g c a p i t a l investment. A f t e r f o r t y years o f threats , and

22

dealing now f r o m a pornition o f economic strangth, Japan ham

assumed a hard l i n e towards the Soviets. While recovery of tha

Mur i lo Imlands rrmains a h igh nat ional p r i o r i t y , i t i s

inconceivable tha t Japan would t rade o f f i t s a l l i a n c r w i th the

U.S. +or the re tu rn o f that tmrr i to ry , even i f accompanied by

non-aggrmrsion pacts and Siberian devel~pmcnt deals. Borbachov

could more p laus ib ly use the re tu rn of the is lands as pa r t of 8

regional d e m i l i t r r i z a t i o n plan, along the liner o+ t he

ConvefitionaI Forcrs i n Europe formula, or the s f f a r t o vacate Cam

Ranh Bay i f the U.S. l e f t the Phi l ippines. Such an o f f e r might

s t imulate pub l ic pressure f o r good-faith negot iat ions which could

wel l conclude wi th a l i m i t e d reduct ion o f U.S. basing i n Japan.

Threat Perception. Some among the Japanese populat ion see l i t t l e

threat from the Soviet Union under the enlightened leadership of

Gorbachev, and therefore advocate a nat iona l p o l i c y a+ armed

n e u t r a l i t y and the removal of U.8. forces from Japan. Even some

w h o acknowledge the Soviet threat believe t ha t the a l l i ance with

the U.S. presents an even greater r i s k , w i t h one c r i t i c wri t ings

". . .the Soviet th reat ex i s t s ?or Japan on ly so f a r as Japan cooperatrs m i l i t a r i l y w i th the United Strtms. By strengthening its defenses and stepping up m i l i t a r y cooperation w i t h the U n i t ~ d Stator, Japan i s i n f a c t steadi 1 y undermining i t s own secur i t y and i n v i t i n g Soviet nuclear

Although such neutralist sentiments are nut cu r ren t l y shared

by the m a j o r i t y , most Japanese recognize t h a t the Soviet Union i s

not so threatening as i n years past. Not surpr is ing ly , there are

now c a l l s f o r a "peace dividend" i n Japan too. Given the cool ing

Japanese economy and the budgetary problems that l eo t o t h e

imposit ion of a h igh ly unpopular consumption t a x , S t can be

. . . - . _. .' ,' . . . . .;.. * , ' z '. "-.'M. .

. . . . . . : . . . L .,.e * - - . . '

f o roc rs t that t h m ratem of growth i n a l l phasoe of compreh~mivm . 5 . .

smcurity w i l l slow i f ne t d r ~ l i n a . * ~ Hourvor, such f i s c a l

constra ints are u n l i k e l y t o slaw burden-sharing peymmntm +or U.8.

forces i n Japan givmn the tremrndous value of the c u r r m t dmfenu

rrrangemmnts. Xn thm words 09 P r i me M i n i s t o r Nakasonm, "Japan

w i l l dmfend i t s e l f by i t s own e f f o r t s , but 8190 w i l l use lJ.8.

forces one hundred percent i n an emergmncy. This w i l l makm t h m

defense cost

CONCLUSIONS

The U.S.-Japan Mutual Securi ty Treaty i s , i n the wsrdo of

President Bush, "one of the most important b i l a t e r a l

re lat ionships i n the world and i t i s i n our s t ra teg ic i n te res t t o

preserve The vast post-war network of U.S. overseas bases

has now shrunk t o a " tau t and precarious s t r ~ c t u r a . " ~ ~ Given the

preponderance of P a c i f i c commerce and the ant ic ipated loss o f

bases i n the Phi l ippines, the Japanese bases have arguably become

the most geostrategical l y important 09 a1 1 U.8. t~ases abroad.

Certa in ly they are essent ia l t o the execution o f the U.S.

Maritime Strategy i n the Western P a c i f i c . They are equal ly v i t a l

t o Japan, serving t o guarantee not only the d i r ec t defense of the

3apanese homeland, but also U.8. pro tec t ion of Japan's worldwide

commercial in terests. The bases serve v i t a l nat ional in teres ts ,

enjoy wide pub l ic support, a re h i gh l y cost-effect ive, and would

appear i n no jeopardy. But th reats t o the bases do e x i s t , and

m u s t be addressed ta ensure the bases continue to pro tec t shared

in te res ts in the Pac i f i c .

First and most important ly, the d i v i s i v e trade d ispute

24

betwamn thr U.S. and Japan must b r rmsalvmd without linkage t o

the security relationship. Thm myth of tho "frus ride" m u m t bm

dirprllmd, and the Ammrican public informed regarding thm Pargm

contributions thm Japanrsa are making Qo their own dafmnrm.

Secand, t h e allianea must continua to mvolvm with Japan

assuming +ull and mqual partnership. Along thmsm same lineal thr

U.S. should encourage Japan to play a larger role in the

international community commmrurate with its economic status.

In particular, Japan should seek a chair on the U.N. Security

Council, a leadership role in economic institutions such as the

World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and r Const i tut ional

amendment t o permit JSDF participation in U.N.-sponsored

peacekeeping f orees.

T h i r d , the JSDF should continue its careful expansion and

operational integration w i t h U.S. forces. The pol icy of national

specialization has produced an increasingly patent combined force

widely accepted as stabilizing in a volatile region of the world.

01 mng wi t h expanded capabi 1 i ty m u s t come expanded author i ty to

protect Japanese interests farther than 1,000 miles from t h e kame

islands to maintain stability when U.S. Corces are over-extended.

Fourth, Japan must continue to increase its strategic QDA i n

cooperation with the U. 6. In a world i n c r e a s i n g l y characterized

by economic vice military competition, such financial assistance

is of ten not only more persuasive than military pressure, but Car

mare stabilizing and domestically acceptable. And the Japanese

policy of comprehensive secufity should b e touted in America to

inform the public that Japan is the world's largest OD4 donor,

and that such assistance is a carefully planned element of their

25

nat iona l

F f f

def mnsm

th, cont inur t o increase burden-sharing paymmntm for the

c o r t of maintaining U.S. t roops i n Japan, t o inc lude thm f u l l

labor cost of a11 20,000 Japanmse mmployees a t the U.S. basrr and

continued modernization of bas. f a c i l i t i e s . BucR burden-mhartng

would be popular both in Japan and t he U.8. I n an economy noted

for f u l l mmployment and a one Job f o r l i f a eth ic , asruming tho

labor costs would sh ie l d Japanese employees from U.S. cort-

c u t t i n g i n i t i a t i v e s and re in fo rce the percept ion t h a t they serve

the Japanese defense e f f o r t . The f a c i l i t i e s improvement program

is also popular i n tha t i t st imulates l o c a l conetruct ion f i rms

whi le improving the operat ional c a p a b i l i t i e s of jo int-ueo bases

which defend the nation. Just as important, a l l such payments

help t o d i s p e l the " f ree ride.: perception i n the U.S., and w i l l

moderate pressure t o reduce forward-deployed forces.

F ina l l y , high-tech weapons development cooperation m u s t be

encouraged by both governments along the l i n e r of t h e currant 901

project . The establishment o f U.S.-Japanese drfmnse consort ia

w i l l d i f i u s e the technology t ransfer issue, opt imize research and

development investment, and lead t o t h e product ion sf weapons

systems sure t o preserve and extend the U.S. and Japanese

q u a l i t a t i v e advantage i n combat. *

1. Fred Qreenm, Stresses i m U-SI-Japanese Security Re- l a t i ons (Washington, DCr The Broakings fnmtftutian, 19751, p. 47.

2. bairnem Agency, Japan, Defense o f Japan 1989, White Paprr (Tokyo~ The Japan Timmm, 1-1, pp. 187, 214.

4. Louis W. Baumr, wJrprneso Drc i r ions rnd t h m U.S. H i 1 i t a r y Strat rgy , I* Unpubl i shed Research Paper, U. 8. Naval War College, Newport, R I : 1987, p. 14.

S. Oreeno, p. 3.

6. Rowland D. Reisiy, "CINCBAC's View of Japan's Maritime Importance, Unpubl i shed Research Paper, U. S. Naval War Gal 1 ear, Newport, R I : 1989, p. 4.

7. Stephen N. Wiley, "Japan's Decisions," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval Nor College, Newport, RI: 1997, p. 5.

8. Defense Agency, Japan, p. 276.

9. Greene, p. 65.

1 Hajirne Matsusaki and Br ian Y. Shiroyama, "Japanese M i l i t a r y Burden~har ing ,~~ E s s a y s On S t r a t e g y V I (Washington, DC: National Defense Univers i ty Press, 1989) , p. 138.

11. I b i d . , pp. 139-140.

12. Bernard J. Lawless and Rust M. Deming, "Japanese Defense Policy: Needs and Rea l i t i s r , " E s s a y s On S t r a t e g y f V (Washington, DCs National Defense Univers i ty Press, 1987). pp. 126-127.

13. Defense Agency, ~aban , p. 311.

14. Lewis P. Young, '#The US-Japan M i l i t a r y Partnership - Thoughts of the Future," Asian Defence J o u r n a l , June 1989, p. 31.

15. W i l l iam Clark Jr. , "U. S. -Yapan Relations, " O r p a r ~ n c n t of S t a t e Bu l le t in , December 1988, pp. 28.

1 Denis W. Pelear, "Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and the US. Maritime Strategy i n the Paci+ic," Unpublished Research Paper, U.8. Naval War College, Newport, R I B 1988, p. 24.

17. U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet H i f ~ t a r y Power 1990 (Washington: Government P r i n t i n g Off ice, 19901, p. 98.

1.8. Wo1+ Mondl, "Stuck i n r Mould: Japan and the Boviet Willenniumr Studies, Winter 1989, p. 461.

Tho Rml &ti onahlp Between Journal o f Onterna t lona l

19. Dmfmcr Agencyo Japan, p. 45.

20. Atsushi Tokinoya, The Japan-US All irncrr A Japanrse Perspect ive. hdolphi Paprrr, no. 212 (London: In ternat iona l I ns t i ku to for Stratmqic Studios, 1986). p. 33.

21. Dofonsr Agmncy, Japan, p. 41.

22. Nina G. Oolovyatenko and Artem Yu Rudnitrky, " In Search of Soviet Po l i c y in the Pac i f ic , " The P a c i f i c Review, Vol 3 , No. 3, 1990, p. 203.

23. Mendl, p. 473.

24. Norman Friedman, "World Naval Developments," U.S. Naval I n s t i t u t e Proceedings, February 1991, pp. 109.

25. T h o m a s B. Hayward and Ronald J. Hays, "We M u s t Maintain Security Posture We Now Enjoy i n the Pac i f ic , " the Almanac o f Seapower 1990, January 1990, pp. 52.

26. Defense Agency, Japan, p. 63.

27. Fred C. Xk le and Terumasa Nakanishi, "Japan's Wand Strategy," Foreign Af fa i rs , S u m m e r 1990, p. 85.

28. H a y w a r d and Hays, p. 54.

29. Leszek B u s r ynski , "Decl i ning Superpowers: T h e Impact on ASEfiN," The Pac i f i c Review, V o l . 3, NO. 3, p. 259.

31. Edward A. Olsen, U,S,-Japan S t r a t e g i c Reciproci tyr A Neo- fn ternr t ionr I i+ t Yieu (Stanford, CA: Hoover I n s t i t u t e Press, l98S), p. 143.

32. Matsusaki, p. 125.

33. I k l e and Nakanishi, p. 91.

34. George Bush, Nat ional S e c u r i t y S t r a t e g y o f t h e United S t a t e s (Washington: U.S. Qavt. P r i n t i n g Of f ice , lWQ) , p . 12.

35. Francis Fukuyama, "Asia i n a Global War," Comparative Strategy, V o l . 6, No. 4, 1987, p. 394.

36. I k l e and Nakanishi, p. 81.

37. Jammm Dm Hessman and Vincrnt C. Thomrs, "Full Up and Rordy t o Doplay8 I n t r rv iew with Adm. David E. Jerrrnirh, C I N C B ~ T , * ~ 8 8 Power, Pecrmbmr 1989, ppm 14. -... , >

.-, ,' : .; . < . . ;

38. Peter EnnLs, "The U,B.-drpm Socur i ty Trmhty8 Can I t Survive i n the 'Post-Cold War Era'?" Tokyo Business Today, Junr 1990, ppm 12.

39. Tsunro Akaha, "Japan's Secur i ty Pol icy A f t e r US HegmmanylV8 Uillrnniurr Journal o f % n t e r n a t i o n r l Studies, Winter 1989, p. 449.

40. Young, p. 34.

41. Akaha, pp. 444-447.

42. Young, p. 36.

43. Greene, p. 70.

44. Michael W. Donnelly, "No Great Reversal i n Japan: Elections for the House of Representatives i n 1990, " Pacific A f f a i r s , Fall 1990, p. 303.

45. I b i d , , p. 320.

46. Tokinoya, p. 33.

47. Matsusakb, pp. 144-150.

48. Ibid., p. 128.

51. Robert E. Harkevy, 8ascs Abroads The OIobrl Foreign Hi2 i t a r y Presence tOx+ordr O x f o r d Univers i ty Press, 19891, p. 65.

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