Updated Fact Sheet

O b a m a’s s au d i C O n n e C t i O nthe Obama–al-Qaeda allianCe

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Create a Select Committee to Investigate Benghazi, Declassify the 28-page Chapter of the Joint Congressional Inquiry on the Saudi Involvement in 9/11

While claiming credit for the killing of Osama bin Laden

(OBL), President Barack Obama was forging an alliance with al-

Qaeda. First, to overthrow the government of Libya, and, now,—

the government of Syria. This reckless and lawless policy of

allying with the perpetrators of 9/11, 2001, and, now, 9/11,

2012, to conduct war without the consent of Congress, in vio-

lation of the U. S. Constitution, runs the immediate danger of

leading to world war, which can only mean thermonuclear war.

Explosive new information suggests that, in doing this,

Obama has worked with the government of Saudi Arabia, the

same government which has been implicated in the original

9/11, 2001, and whose role in both terrorist attacks on the

United States has been covered up by both George W. Bush

and Barack Obama.

This is “the elephant in the room,” which explains why the

Obama Administration has lied, and attempted to cover up the

true facts about Benghazi. The policy of allying with al-Qaeda,

and covering up that alliance and its consequences, is, indeed,

an impeachable offense. The President of the United States,

as well as all members of the Senate and the Congress, swears

an oath to “support and defend the Constitution against all

enemies foreign and domestic.” The President has violated

that oath. The question is whether members of Congress will

have the courage to fight for the truth and for justice on behalf

of the victims of this criminal policy, and to uphold their own

oath of office.

While certain facts have come out, the basic issue of

Obama’s alliance with al-Qaeda has not been addressed. On

Monday, February 18, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of

the Algerian government declared the former emir of the Liby-

an Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Abdel Hakim Belhadj, persona

non grata in Algeria because of his terrorist connections. What

does the Algerian government know, that the U. S. Congress has

thus far failed to publicly question? Why does Belhadj contin-

ue to be protected? Is it because he is an ally of the Obama

administration, as well as some of its allies in the Republican

party, in the attempt to overthrow Syria’s Assad?

According to Al-Hayat from January 2, 2012, Belhadj was in

Benghazi in April, 2011, where he helped organize the Febru-

ary 17 Brigade, which was hired by the State Department to

guard the Benghazi mission. The February 17 Brigade was the

conduit through which the Libyan Defense Ministry made pay-

ments to Ansar al-Sharia before September 11, 2012, and, after

a short interruption, it has resumed that role. Thus, the group

defending the U. S. mission was the paymaster of the group at-

tacking the mission, and still continues to be that.

According to the New York Times, in September, 2011 Bel-

hadj was appointed a member of the Supreme Security Com-

mittee (SSC). An SSC officer took photos of the mission on the

morning of the attack, and the SSC failed to post an official ve-

hicle outside the mission 24/7, as requested. According to Ma-

thieu Pellerin, director at the Centre of Strategic Intelligence

on the African Continent (CISCA), based in Paris, Belhadj is “the

current head of domestic security” in Libya.

During the overthrow of Qaddafi arms shipments from Qa-

tar and the U. A. E., approved by Obama, which were in violation

of the UN arms embargo, went directly to Belhadj, bypassing

the Transitional National Council. Obama had originally ap-

proached Saudi Arabia to provide the weapons.

Moreover, an e-mail dated February 16, 2013 from Sidney

Blumenthal to Hillary Clinton, which was hacked by someone

calling himself Guccifer, and then, later, published by Rus-

Researched and compiled by William Wertz

This fact sheet was last updated on May 4, 2013.

sia Today, reveals that, according to French intelligence, the

Benghazi attack was carried out by al-Qaeda, and funded by

“wealthy Sunni Islamists from Saudi Arabia.” This fact is report-

edly known by both Algerian and Libyan intelligence agencies.

Moreover, according to a second hacked Blumenthal memo,

dated September 12, 2012, Mohammed Yussef el Magarief, the

President of Libya, believed at the time that the Benghazi ter-

ror attack was part of a covert campaign led by Abdel Hakim

Belhadj to link him to the CIA.

Now, more than ever, two steps are required: 1) the cre-

ation of a select committee to investigate the Benghazi event,

as proposed by Rep. Frank Wolf; and 2) the declassification of

the 28-page chapter of the report of the Joint Congressional

Inquiry on Saudi Arabia’s involvement in 9/11, 2001, as called

for by Rep. Walter Jones.

On April 16, 2013 the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit

reinstated the suit brought by the families of the victims of 9/11

against 12 individuals including nine Saudi charity officials.

In light of the cover-up of the original 9/11, and the cover-

up of “Benghazi,” the recent Boston Marathon bombing, plus

the fact that the U. S. is being drawn into a war in Syria in sup-

port of Saudi-backed al-Qaeda forces, a 9/11 Review Commis-

sion should also be immediately activated, as provided in the

Defense Authorization continuing resolution signed into law

on March 26, 2013.

This updated fact sheet presents the currently available

evidence from the public domain:

The Case of Libya

In the case of Libya, the evidence of Obama’s alliance with

al-Qaeda is overwhelming.

Under the guise of the Blair doctrine of humanitarian inter-

ventionism, or the “right to protect,” President Obama ordered

American military forces to create a no-fly zone, providing close

air cover for the al-Qaeda–affiliated LIFG, and approved the pro-

vision of weapons to them to overthrow Muammar Qaddafi. He

did this in violation of the U. S. Constitution and the War Powers

Resolution. He also clearly violated the UN arms embargo by

organizing the provision of weapons to the opposition.

The opposition in Libya was dominated by the Libyan Is-

lamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which was created in the 1990s by

Abdel Hakim Belhadj, who had fought together with al-Qaeda

and the Taliban in Afghanistan, from 1988 to 1992. (On Febru-

ary 15, 2011, the LIFG, perhaps attempting to gain favor from

Barack Obama, changed its name to the Libyan Islamic Move-

ment for Change.) After Kabul fell in 1992, Belhadj moved to

Sudan with Osama bin Laden.

In 1995, British MI6 approached the LIFG, many of whose

leading members resided in the U. K., to carry out a coup

against Qaddafi. After the coup and four assassination at-

tempts against Qaddafi failed, many members of the LIFG were

jailed in the Abu Selim prison in Tripoli.

Four leading members of the LIFG, who later participated

in the overthrow of Qaddafi, escaped back to Afghanistan in

1998 where they provided training to al-Qaeda in camps situ-

ated in Jalalabad and Kabul.

Kronos Advisory, LLC in its December 16, 2011 report “A

View to Extremist Currents in Libya” reports that JTF-GTMO1

analysts have asserted that most LIFG fighters fought along

with bin Laden in Afghanistan, and trained at the OBL-spon-

sored Torkham Camp on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. LIFG

fighters played a critical role preparing al-Qaeda and Taliban

fighters for operations targeting Western forces. Leaked JTF-

GTMO detainee assessments reveal that training provided at

a camp in Afghanistan by one LIFG military committee official

was so renowned that Yemeni al-Qaeda member Zuhail Abdo

Anam Said al-Sharabi, who underwent training to become a

suicide bomber for an aborted component of the original 9/11

attacks, told interrogators he traveled to Afghanistan to under-

go training there to prepare for participation in the 9/11 plot.

A note contained in the 9/11 Commission Report reveals

that the so-called mastermind of the 9/11 attack, Khalid

Shaykh Mohammad, claimed to have provided members of the

LIFG computer training.

LIFG member Abu Anas al-Libi was indicted along with

Osama bin Laden for the August 7, 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of

the U. S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanza-

nia. He is now believed to be operating clandestinely in Libya.

JTF-GTMO detainee assessments reveal the LIFG’s guest-

house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan was visited by many promi-

nent terrorists, including in 2000 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,

who later became the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

In 2001, when the U. S. invaded Afghanistan, Belhadj,

who had returned to Afghanistan in 1998, fled to Tora Bora

with Osama bin Laden. Sami al-Saadi, the spiritual leader of

the LIFG, elected to stay in Kabul to fight the U. S. forces. Both

eventually escaped. Two other members of the LIFG who later

participated in the Obama-led overthrow of Qaddafi, were ar-

rested by the Pakistanis and handed over to the U. S. They were

Abul Hakim al-Hasadi and Abu Sufian bin Qumu, both originally

from Derna, Libya.

Al-Hasadi, who had fought for five years in Afghanistan,

was sent back to Libya and jailed. When he was released in

1 Joint Task Force, Guantanamo [—Ed.]

2

2008, he recruited Libyans to join al-Qaeda to fight the U. S. in

Iraq. Qumu was sent to Guantanamo until he was later returned

to Abu Selim prison in Tripoli. He was released in 2010.

In 2004, Belhadj and Sami al-Saadi were captured by the

CIA in Bangkok, Thailand, and returned to Libya, where they

were also imprisoned in Abu Selim. This was shortly after Tony

Blair had organized the recognition of Qaddafi by the West. At

the time, Blair stated that Qaddafi wanted to join the West in

combating al-Qaeda.

Al-Saadi, who Taliban leader Mullah Omar once called the

“Sheikh of the Arabs,” was the author of a plan to overthrow

Qaddafi. This plan was found in the home of Abd al-Rahman al-

Faquih in Birmingham, U. K., during a police raid in the middle

of the last decade. Al-Faquih had been convicted in absentia

by a Moroccan court for complicity in the May, 2003 suicide

bombings in Casablanca. This same war plan would later be

employed against Qaddafi, beginning in February, 2011.

In March, 2010, due to the intervention of Tony Blair, Saif

Qaddafi (Muammar’s son) announced the release of Belhadj

and other members of the LIFG and the Muslim Brotherhood

from Abu Selim as part of a reconciliation of the Qaddafi gov-

ernment with the LIFG and the Muslim Brotherhood. The medi-

ator in this effort, which began in 2005, was the Libyan, Muslim

Brotherhood-linked, Qatar-based cleric Ali al-Sallabi. Less than

a year after they were released, Belhadj and the other mem-

bers of the LIFG became the core of the opposition to Qaddafi.

According to The Wall Street Journal, bin Qumu began training

jihadists in Derna in April of 2011.

LIFG Designated a Terrorist Organization

At the time of the operation to overthrow Qaddafi under

the cover of a UN resolution, the LIFG was designated a terror-

ist group by the U. S. State Department, the U. K. Home Office,

and the United Nations Security Council.

On September 25, 2001, President Bush signed an execu-

tive order to freeze the LIFG’s assets in the U. S. In December,

2001, the LIFG was added to the Terrorist Exclusion List. On

December 8, 2004, the LIFG was designated a Foreign Terrorist

Organization by the U. S. State Department. An excerpt from

the U. S. State Department report reads as follows:

On November 3, 2007, senior al-Qaeda leaders

announced that LIFG had officially joined al-

Qaeda. Activities: Libyans associated with the

LIFG are part of the broader international terror-

ist movement. The LIFG is one of the groups be-

lieved to have planned the Casablanca suicide

bombing in May 2003. Spanish media in August

2005 linked Ziyad Hashem, an alleged member

of the LIFG’s media committee, as well as the

imprisoned amir Abdallah al Sadeq (Belhadj),

with Tunisian Islamist Serhane Ben Abdelmajid

Fakhet, the suspected ringleader in the 2004

Madrid attacks.

Abdallah al-Sadeq is the nom de guerre of Abdel Hakim

Belhadj. According to Kronos Advisory, LLC, in 2011, Belhadj

admitted that he was called twice by Fakhet weeks before the

Madrid bombings. He said he did not answer the phone, but

called Fakhet’s Jordanian business partner instead. The Span-

ish investigation named him a co-conspirator.

Excerpts from the UN resolution read as follows: “LIFG com-

manders, including Abu Yahya al-Liby and the now-deceased

Abu al-Laith al-Liby, have occupied prominent positions within

Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership. On 3 November 2007, LIFG for-

mally merged with al-Qaeda. The merger was announced via

two video clips produced by Al-Qaeda’s propaganda arm, Al-

Sahab. The first clip featured Usama bin Laden’s (QI.B.8.01)

deputy, Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri (QI.A.6.01), and

the second featured Abu Laith al-Liby, who then served as a

senior member of LIFG and a senior leader and trainer for Al-

Qaeda in Afghanistan.”

Obama Provides Weapons to Al-Qaeda with the Assistance of Saudi Arabia

According to the article “America’s secret plan to arm Lib-

ya’s rebels. Obama asks Saudis to airlift weapons into Beng-

hazi” by Robert Fisk, published in The Independent on March

7, 2011, just 3 weeks after the February 15, 2011 launching

of the overthrow of Qaddafi in Benghazi, the Obama admin-

istration “asked Saudi Arabia if it can supply weapons to the

rebels in Benghazi. . . . Washington’s request is in line with

other US military co-operation with the Saudis. The royal fam-

ily in Jeddah, which was deeply involved in the Contra scandal

during the Reagan administration, gave immediate support to

arm guerrillas fighting the Soviet army in Afghanistan in 1980

and later—to America’s chagrin—also funded and armed the

Taliban. The Saudis remain the only US Arab ally strategically

placed and capable of furnishing weapons to the guerrillas of

Libya. Their assistance would allow Washington to disclaim

any military involvement in the supply chain—even though

the arms would be American and paid for by the Saudis. The

Saudis have been told that opponents of Gaddafi need anti-

tank rockets and mortars as a first priority to hold off attacks by

3

Gaddafi’s armour, and ground-to-air missiles to shoot down his

fighter-bombers.”

Although Fisk does not mention it, the key figure in Saudi

Arabia who provided funding for the Contras was Prince Ban-

dar bin Sultan. When Prince Bandar was the Saudi Ambassador

to the U. S. in the lead-up to 9/11, 2001, his wife, the sister of

Prince Turki, then head of Saudi intelligence, provided funds

to a Saudi intelligence agent in San Diego, al-Bayoumi, who

assisted the first two 9/11 hijackers to enter the U. S. Prince

Bandar had access to a significant slush fund for covert opera-

tions as a result of fees he received related to the BAE Systems

arms deal with Saudi Arabia known as Al-Yamamah. From 2005

to 2012 he was head of the Saudi National Security Council. In

that position, he would have been involved in efforts to pro-

vision the Libyan opposition with weapons. And today, as the

current head of Saudi intelligence, he is once again aiding al-

Qaeda, now in Syria.

Although the Saudi response to Obama’s request is not

known, according to a December 5, 2012 New York Times ar-

ticle, in the Spring of 2011 President Obama approved the

provision of weapons by Qatar and the U. A. E. to the Libyan

Islamic Fighting Group, led by Abdel Hakim Belhadj. According

to a Wall Street Journal article from October 17, 2011, 20,000

tons of weapons were provided not to the Transitional National

Council, but directly to militias run by Belhadj in 18 shipments:

“Qatar flew at least 18 weapons shipments in all to anti-Qad-

dafi rebel forces. . . The majority of these National Transition

shipments went not through the rebels’ governing body, the

national Transitional Council, but directly to militias run by Is-

lamist leaders including Mr. Belhadj.” The article reports that

much of Qatar’s aid was guided by Libyan cleric Ali al-Sallabi

who left Libya in 1988 to study in Saudi Arabia and Sudan. His

younger brother Ismail headed the February 17 Brigade before

the Benghazi attack. A dozen other Qatar-funded shipments

came to Libyan rebels allied with the LIFG via Sudan. The ship-

ments continued in September, even after the fall of Tripoli.

According to the New York Times article, Obama insisted

that the weapons not be weapons produced in the U. S., so that

they would not be traceable to the U. S. According to the New

York Times, these weapons are now being shipped to al-Qaeda

in Syria and Mali. It is most likely that these weapons were used

to kill Ambassador Stevens and three other Americans, but

Obama took precautions to ensure that the weapons could not

be traced back to him. To have, thus, intentionally attempted

to conceal the source of the weapons reveals criminal intent.

A UN report issued on March 20, 2012 confirms that the

U. A. E. “may have transferred military materiel to Libya.” The

U. A. E. told UN investigators that NATO had told them that in-

quiries on this matter should be directed to NATO. As of Janu-

ary 12, 2012 NATO never replied to the UN inquiries.

The same report states in respect to Qatar: “During inter-

views with the Minister of Defence and a representative of the

armament section of the Ministry of Defence conducted by the

Panel in July 2011 in Benghazi, the Panel was clearly informed

that several countries, including Qatar, were supporting the op-

position through deliveries of arms and ammunition. Accord-

ing to the same sources, between the beginning of the upris-

ing and the day of the interview, approximately 20 flights had

delivered military materiel from Qatar to the revolutionaries in

Libya, including French anti-tank weapon launchers (MILANs).”

A follow-up report, issued on April 9, 2013 by the UN Se-

curity Council’s Group of Experts, reports that weapons, which

flowed into Libya in violation of the UN arms embargo, are now

flooding into a total of 12 nations including Syria and Mali. This

final report states: “The Panel stands by its findings that Qatar

supplied arms and ammunition to the opposition during the

uprising in breach of the arms embargo.”

The Panel also reports: “The Syrian Arab Republic was pre-

sented a prominent destination for Libyan fighters. A number of

them have joined brigades as individuals or through networks

to support the Syrian opposition. Materiel has also been sent

out from Libya to the Syrian Arab Republic through networks

and routes passing through either Turkey or northern Lebanon.”

Saudi funding of the Benghazi Attack

According to the hacked memo from Sidney Blumenthal to

Hillary Clinton dated February 16, 2013, “information provid-

ed by the French service indicates that the funding for both at-

tacks (Benghazi and In Amenas) originated with wealthy Sunni

Islamists in Saudi Arabia. During July and August 2012 these fi-

nanciers provided funds to AQIM contacts in Southern Europe,

who in turn passed the money onto AQIM operatives in Mauri-

tania. These funds were eventually provided to Ansar al Sharia

and its allied militias in the Benghazi region in support of their

attack on the U. S. consulate. The money was used to recruit

operatives and purchase ammunition and supplies.”

The memo continues: “In a separate conversation, the Al-

gerian DGSE officers note in private that Libyan intelligence of-

ficers tell them that the Benghazi attacks were funded by these

financiers in Saudi Arabia.”

The Perpetrators of the Benghazi Attack

Before Qaddafi was overthrown by the al-Qaeda–affiliated

LIFG, the military wing of the Transitional National Council

4

(TNC) was initially run by Gen. Abd al-Fatah Yunis. However, he

was assassinated on July 28, 2011. Some reports indicate that

the assassination was carried out by Ansar al-Sharia, headed by

bin Qumu. According to the Associated Press, a deputy of Yunis,

Mohammed Agoury, stated that the February 17 Brigade was

behind the assassination.

Once Qaddafi was driven away from Tripoli, the former

emir of the LIFG, Belhadj, became the military commander of

the Tripoli Military Council. The Benghazi Military Council, in

turn, was run by Ismael al-Sallabi, an ally of Belhadj, and the

brother of Ali al-Sallabi, who is described as the spiritual lead-

er of the revolution. Ismael and Ali al-Sallabi are the sons of

Mohamad al-Sallabi who participated in the founding of the

Muslim Brotherhood in Benghazi in the 1960s. Approximately

one week after Belhadj was named commander of the Tripoli

military Council, in August, 2011, he and Ismail al-Sallabi ac-

companied TNC Chairman Jalil on a trip to Qatar, where they

met with the financiers of the revolution and NATO officials,

according to the report issued by Kronos Advisory, LLC.

A report issued in July, 2012 by New York University’s Cen-

ter on International Cooperation also reports that, according

to a New York Times article, the Supreme Security Committee

(SSC) was formed on September 4, 2011, and that Belhadj was

appointed as one of the 21 members. The SSC operates under

the Interior Ministry.

Three of the military brigades operating in the Benghazi

area—Ansar al-Sharia, Libya Shield, and the February 17 Bri-

gade, the latter two of which operate in coordination with the

Libyan Ministry of Defense—participated in the attack on the

United States mission and the CIA annex in Benghazi, killing

U. S. Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans, on

the 11th anniversary of the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda at-

tacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. These three

organizations were the chief American combat allies in the

drive to overthrow Qaddafi.

To be specific: Ansar al-Sharia, led by Abu Sufian bin Qumu,

a former al-Qaeda Guantanamo detainee; the Libya Shield—

which met the Marines who came from Tripoli at the airport,

and accompanied them to the CIA annex,—led by Wisam bin

Hamid, identified by the Library of Congress as possibly the

head of al-Qaeda in Libya; and the February 17 Brigade—

which provided security for the mission,—led by Ismail Sallabi,

are all run by the al-Qaeda–affiliated LIFG. Two other organiza-

tions implicated in the attack are the Supreme Security Council

(SSC), under the command of the deputy interior minister for

eastern Libya and LIFG senior member Wanis al-Sharif, and the

British-run Blue Mountain Group, a private security firm that

employed Libyans.

Ansar Al-Sharia

The leader of the Ansar al-Sharia (AAS) brigade in Beng-

hazi and Derna, that actually carried out the assault on the

U. S. mission and the CIA annex in Benghazi on 9/11, 2012, is

Sufian bin-Qumu. As the Senate Homeland Security Commit-

tee’s report, issued on December 30, 2012, states: “The group

took credit on its own Facebook page for the attack before later

deleting the post.” The same report also says individuals af-

filiated with Ansar al-Sharia were allegedly involved in storm-

ing the Tunisian consulate in Benghazi on June 18, 2012. Ac-

cording to his Guantanamo detainee assessment report, Qumu

received monthly stipends from one of the financiers of the

original 9/11, 2001 attack:

Detainee’s alias is found on a list of probable

Al-Qaida personnel receiving monthly stipends.

His alias was found on al-Qaeda’s 11 September

attacks financier Mustafa Al Hawsawi’s laptop as

an Al-Qaeda member receiving family support.

The assessment continues:

Detainee is assessed as a former member

of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a probable

member of Al-Qaeda. The detainee is assessed

as a MEDIUM to HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose

a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

Prior history: he served as a tank driver in

the Libyan armed forces as a private. The Libyan

Government states he was addicted to illegal

drugs/narcotics and had been accused of a num-

ber of crimes including murder, physical assault,

armed assault and distributing narcotics. He was

sentenced to 10 years in prison. In 1993 he es-

caped and fled eventually to Afghanistan and

trained at Osama Bin Laden’s Torkham Camp.

After Afghanistan he moved to Sudan where he

worked as a truck driver for one of OBL’s com-

panies. He joined the LIFG and was assigned to

the military committee. He left Sudan, allegedly

withdrew from the LIFG in 1998 and returned to

Afghanistan. Captured in 2001, he was sent to

Guantanamo.

According to the report, he has admitted associations with

al-Qaeda / LIFG facilitator Ayyub al-Libi, Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq,

which is the nom de guerre of Abdel Hakim Belhadj, who is the

leader of LIFG, and Abu Al Munihir, a. k. a. Sami al-Saadi, who

drew up the war plan to overthrow Qaddafi in the mid-2000s.

5

An August, 2012 report from the Library of Congress, “Al-

Qaeda in Libya: A Profile,” reports that in June, 2012, Ansar al-

Sharia held a demonstration in Benghazi attended by several

other militias, including Free Libya, which, it reports, were Lib-

ya Shield, the al-Sahati Brigade, headed by Ismael al-Sallabi,

and the Abu Obeida Bin al-Jarrah brigade, headed by Amed

Abu Khattala (Bukatela). The Library of Congress report states

that these militias “probably make up the bulk of al-Qaeda’s

network in Libya.”

According to Canadafreepress.com, Ansar al-Sharia also

provided security for the hospital where Ambassador Stevens

was taken after the attack.

Libya Shield

The last signed diplomatic cable from Ambassador Stevens

back to the State Department in Washington, dated Septem-

ber 11, 2012, described a tense September 9 meeting in Beng-

hazi between U. S. security officials and two leaders of Libya

Shield, Wissam bin Hamid (misidentified as Wisam bin Ahmed)

and Shaykh Muhammad al-Garabi, in which they argued that, if

the Muslim Brotherhood candidate for Prime Minister, Alwad

al-Barasi, should win, he would appoint the commander of the

February 17 Brigade, Fawzi Bukatif, as Minister of Defense.

“Bukatif’s appointment,” the memo says, “would open the

MOD [Ministry of Defense] and other security ministries and

offices to plum appointments for his most favored brigade

commanders—giving February 17 and Libya Shield tacit con-

trol of the armed forces.” On the other hand, if Jibril, whom the

U. S. government was supporting, won, “they would not con-

tinue to guarantee security in Benghazi, a critical function they

asserted they were currently providing.”

According to alFetn.com, Bin Hamid fought against Ameri-

can forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan before returning to the

Benghazi-Derna area of eastern Libya to “ally” with Washing-

ton to overthrow and execute Qaddafi. The same alFetn.com re-

ported in late October, 2011 that bin Hamid became the head

of a newly-formed “supreme board of the Libyan mujahideen.”

According to the Library of Congress, bin Hamid is widely iden-

tified as the actual head of al-Qaeda in Libya. He also held a dem-

onstration in Sirte in March, 2012, which was attended by the head

of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, Mokhtar bel Mokhtar. Yet, his Libya

Shield militia was entrusted with security for the U. S. mission in

Benghazi, and the September 9, 2012 meeting likely provided the

group with the travel plans of Ambassador Stevens, who arrived in

Benghazi on September 10 for a scheduled several-day visit.

According to the Senate Homeland Security Committee re-

port, U. S. government security personnel who arrived at the

Benghazi airport from Tripoli were delayed for at least three

hours by Libya Shield. “The exact cause of this hours-long de-

lay, and its relationship to the rescue effort, remains unclear

and merits further inquiry.” The report asks: “Was it part of a

plot to keep American help from reaching the Americans under

siege in Benghazi?” The attack on the CIA annex began only

after Libya Shield fighters escorted a Marine rescue team from

the airport to the location, hours after the initial attack on the

U. S. mission where Ambassador Stevens was killed.

February 17 Brigade

According to Joan Neuhaus Schaan, a fellow in Homeland

Security and Terrorism at Rice University’s Baker Institute for

Public Policy in Houston, the February 17 Brigade, which pro-

vided security for the U. S. Mission in Benghazi, was founded

by Ismail Sallabi, a known member of al-Qaeda and the LIFG.

Both the Kronos Advisory, LLC report of December 16, 2011,

and a Brookings Doha Center policy briefing, dated May, 2012,

entitled “Libyan Islamists Unpacked: Rise, Transformation, and

Future,” also report that Sallabi heads the February 17 Brigade

based in Benghazi.

On September 16, 2011 The Guardian identified Sallabi

as the head of the Benghazi Military Council, the counterpart

to the Tripoli Military Council led by Abdel Hakim Belhadj. Ac-

cording to Al Arabiya News, the commander of the February 17

brigade is Fawzi Bukatif.

According to Al-Hayat, Belhadj was in Benghazi, where he

helped organize the February 17 Brigade, in April, 2011.

Included in the security force for the Benghazi mission

proper, were four members of the February 17 Brigade, de-

scribed by a State Department source as “a friendly militia

which has basically been deputized by the Libyan government

to serve as our security, our host government security.” Addi-

tional 16 militia members were part of the quick-reaction se-

curity team based at the CIA compound described as the mis-

sion’s “annex.”

Ismael al-Sallabi (who is the brother of Libya’s leading

Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamist, Ali al-Sallabi) also leads

the Martyr Rafallah Sahati Brigade, which began as a battalion

of the February 17 Brigade. The Brigade’s commander, Shaykh

Muhammad al-Garabi, who is also associated with Libya Shield,

met with U. S. officials on September 9, along with Wisam bin

Hamid of the Libya Shield.

The State Department Accountability Review Board (ARB)

report questions whether the February 17 Brigade guards at

the U. S. mission ever alerted the February 17 Brigade barracks,

less than 2 km away from the mission, of the attack. The Sen-

6

ate Homeland Security Committee report notes that U. S. annex

personnel attempted to contact the February 17 Brigade to ask

for assistance upon being notified about the attack on the mis-

sion. When they left for the mission, they made a second at-

tempt to contact the February 17 Brigade. Both attempts were

of no avail.

The Senate Homeland Security Committee report states

that “U. S. Department of State personnel were concerned

about the involvement of members of the February 17 Brigade

in the extrajudicial detention of U. S. diplomatic personnel in

at least one incident in Benghazi. . . Some U. S. personnel also

questioned the Brigade’s loyalty to the Libyan government and

their capacity or desire to safeguard American interests.”

Moreover, the contract between the State Department and

the February 17 Brigade had expired by the time of the attack.

On September 8, 2012, just two days before Ambassador Ste-

vens arrived in Benghazi, the principal U.S. diplomatic officer

in Benghazi wrote that, “In early September, a member of the

February 17 Brigade told another Regional Security Officer in

Benghazi that it could no longer support U. S. personnel move-

ments. The RSO also asked specifically if the militia could pro-

vide additional support for the Ambassador’s pending visit and

was told no.” This was communicated to the regional security

officer (RSO) at the U. S. Embassy in Tripoli in an e-mail from

Alec Henderson to John B. Martinec on September 9, 2012, ac-

cording to a footnote in the Interim Progress Report issued by

the Chairman of five House Committees on April 23, 2013.

Supreme Security Council

According to the ARB, the Supreme Security Council was

asked to station a marked police car at the gates of the mission

24/7 during Ambassador Stevens’ visit. The SSC, which is under

the direction of the Interior Ministry, did not do so. Instead, an

individual in a Libyan Supreme Security Council police uniform

was seen taking photos of the mission on the morning of the

attack, and the SSC vehicle deployed to the U. S. mission in the

evening left just before the terrorist attack was launched. The

individual in charge of the SSC in Benghazi was deputy interior

minister Wanis al-Sharif. Wanis al-Sharif has been identified by

the Associated Press as a senior leader of the Libyan Islamic

fighting Group.

As reported above, on September 4, 2011 Belhadj was ap-

pointed to be a member of the Supreme Security Committee.

Al-Sharif’s explanations of the events on September 11

were complete disinformation. He announced that no one was

in the mission at the time of the attack, and, then, after the

news of the deaths was announced, he tried to put the blame

on the U. S. by falsely claiming there was a peaceful demon-

stration outside the mission over the video film in the U. S. at-

tacking the Prophet Mohamed, until U. S. security guards start-

ed firing. He also claimed that those responsible for the attack

were pro-Qaddafi elements.

According to the Libya Herald, Wanis al-Sharif was sacked

on September 17, as was Hussein Abu Humaida, the head of

the Benghazi security directorate. Both were replaced by Colo-

nel Salah al-Din Awad Doghman. However, according to an ar-

ticle by Nancy A. Youssef published by McClatchy on Novem-

ber 13, 2012, both al-Sharif and Humaida had refused to leave

their posts, and Doghman had been unable to even get into

his office. An article written by Steven Sotloff published by

TIME.com on November 26 includes an interview with Wanis

al-Sharif, who is described as an Interior Ministry official re-

sponsible for eastern Libya. As recently as March, 2013, the As-

sociated Press still reports that he is “one of the top security

officials in Benghazi.”

Blue Mountain Group

The Blue Mountain Group, a British security firm that hired

local Libyans is also suspect. The ARB report indicates that no

guards were present outside the compound immediately be-

fore the attack ensued, and that a member of the Blue Moun-

tain contingent responsible for guarding the perimeter may

have left a gate open, allowing the assailants to gain access to

the mission facility unimpeded. The Senate Homeland Secu-

rity Committee report indicates: “After an improvised explo-

sive device (IED) was thrown over the wall of the U. S. facility

in Benghazi on April 7, 2012, . . . a spot report on the day of the

event stated that shortly after the event two individuals were

questioned. The suspects included one current and one former

guard employed by Blue Mountain Group.”

The United Kingdom is known to have been a safe-haven

for the LIFG throughout the 1990s and up until October, 2005,

when the UK finally designated it as a terrorist organization.

In October, 2001, the Bush administration provided Libya with

the names of Libyan militants living in the U. K. On February 8,

2006, the U. S. Treasury Department designated five individu-

als and four entities, including the Sanabel Relief Agency based

in the U. K., for their roles in financing the LIFG. On October 30,

2008, the U. S. Treasury Department designated three addi-

tional U. K.-based individuals for their roles in raising funds for

the LIFG. According to the Treasury Department’s press release

regarding the designations, the U. K. “is the greatest source of

funding for the LIFG.”

7

Abdel Hakim Belhadj

Any serious investigation of Benghazi would have to look

closely at the role of Abdel Hakim Belhadj, the emir of the Liby-

an Islamic Fighting Group, and, after the overthrow of Qaddafi,

the commander of the Tripoli Military Council and a member

of the Supreme Security Committee. As such, he was given re-

sponsibility, as of August 30, 2011, for the security of all for-

eign embassies in Tripoli, including the U. S. Embassy, until he

stepped down as commander of the TMC to form his own po-

litical party (Watan) in May, 2012. He was also put in charge of

coordinating defense on a national level.

There is no indication that he has, indeed, stepped down

as a member of the Supreme Security Committee and, in fact,

as reported above, according to Mathieu Pellerin, director at

the Centre of Strategic Intelligence on the African Continent

(CISCA) based in Paris, Belhadj is “the current head of domestic

security” in Libya.

On November 17, 2012, the Saudi-based publication Arab

News published an article by Ali Bluwi, reporting that the at-

tack on the Benghazi mission was carried out in revenge for

the killing of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a senior Libyan member of al-

Qaeda, killed in a U. S. drone attack in Pakistan in June, 2012.

The article also reports that U. S. Ambassador Chris Stevens

“prevented Abdel Hakim Belhadj from assuming the portfolio

of defense or interior in Libya.”

Indeed, the NYU Center on International Cooperation re-

port, issued in July, 2012 under the title “The International

Role in Libya’s Transition August 2011–March 2012,” reports

that “Belhadj sought to be appointed as the formal head of

the new armed forces,” but on November 22, 2011 was denied

the post of defense minister. Furthermore, according to former

Muslim Brotherhood member Walid Shoebat, Belhadj is the

al-Qaeda operative that the Libyan expatriates claim was the

principal organizer directing the September 11 terrorist attack

in Benghazi.

Also, one of the hacked memos from Sidney Blumenthal to

Hillary Clinton, entitled “Magariaf and the attack on US in Lib-

ya,” dated September 12, 2012, reports that Magarief believed

the Benghazi attack was the product of the security situation

in Libya between 2004 and 2010 (the year when members of

the LIFG, including Belhadj, were rendered to Libya by Western

intelligence services and imprisoned by the Qaddafi regime,

and the year they were released, respectively). He stated that

the attack on the U. S. mission was the result of the atmo-

sphere created by the campaign of “his political opponents

to link him directly to foreign intelligence services,” including

the CIA, through his role in the National Front for the Salva-

tion of Libya. (Both Magarief and the current Prime Minister Ali

Zaidan founded the NFSL.) The memo states that this campaign

is being led by Belhadj who “captured files and documents

describing this relationship from Qaddafi’s offices in Tripoli.”

The report continues: “A separate source adds that messages to

Libya from the CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)

were found among the Tripoli documents . . . indicating that

the United States and Britain were eager to help Libya capture

several senior LIFG figures, including its co-founders Belhadj

and Sammi al-Saadi.”

On May 31, 1997, the LIFG published a letter of support to

Omar Abdal Rahman (a. k. a. the Blind Sheikh), who was convict-

ed of seditious conspiracy for his involvement in the 1993 at-

tack on the World Trade Center. In this letter, LIFG emir Belhadj

warned the “tyrant Americans” to take heed of the growing an-

ger among Muslims. Both an attack on the International Com-

mittee for the Red Cross / Red Crescent in Benghazi on May 22,

2012 and the attack on the U. S. mission in Benghazi on June 6,

2012 were claimed by the Brigades of the Imprisoned Sheikh

Omar Abdel Rahman.

Al-Qaeda’s “Talking Points”

Although it is clearly established that there was no demon-

stration outside the mission, the terrorist attack had no relation-

ship to an anti-Muslim video, and was clearly a premeditated

terrorist incident, the Obama administration adopted the “talk-

ing points” employed by senior al-Qaeda–allied LIFG operatives

Wanis al-Sharif, Ismael al-Sallabi and Abdel Hakim Belhadj.

On September 12, Wanis al-Sharif told the press that there

had been a demonstration protesting a U. S. video attacking

Mohammed. He also falsely claimed that U. S. security guards

fired first.

On September 12, Ismail al-Sallabi said on radio that what

we saw in Benghazi the day before was an intifada to protect

the name of the prophet.

On September 21, Abdel Hakim Belhadj told The Guardian:

“We are fully aware that this despicable hate film, “Innocence

of Muslims,” does not reflect the American people’s views and

that the producers of this film are an extremist minority. . .

[A] hate campaign led by a small number of extremist Islam-

ophobes has led to unacceptable counter-reactions by small

extremist groups.”

As late as October 9, Belhadj gave an interview to the daily

Asharq Al-Awsat, in which he stated: “The information we re-

ceived is that the issue at the beginning was spontaneous.

The people gathered in front of the consulate, and then an

exchange of fire took place between the two sides—between

8

the consulate’s guards and the demonstrators, some of whom

were armed. This later resulted in the regrettable action which

claimed the life of the U. S. Ambassador.”

Agreement to Launch Aggressive War Against Syria

According to Ahmed Manai, President of the Tunisian Insti-

tute of International Relations and a member of the Committee

on Arab Observers in Syria, more than 6,000 Tunisian youth be-

tween the ages of 17 and 30 are now fighting in Syria against

the government of Assad, and are being trained in Libya. Ac-

cording to Manai, this arrangement stems from an agreement

which was reached on December 11, 2011, in Tripoli, Libya.

The meeting was attended by Youssef Qaradhaoui Rached

Ghannouchi, the head of the Tunisian Muslim Brotherhood

party, Ennahda; Hamad Jabber bin Jassim al-Thani, the Foreign

Minister of Qatar who is also the Prime Minister of Qatar; the

number two of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria; the head of

the National Transitional Council in Libya, Ghoulioune Abdel

Jelil; and the former emir of the al-Qaeda–affiliated Libyan Is-

lamic Fighting Group, Abel Hakim Belhadj, who at the time was

the head of the Tripoli Military Council and a member of the

Supreme Security Committee. The agreement reached deter-

mined to arm and send fighters from Libya and Tunisia to Syria.

The basis for this agreement was laid by an October, 2011

deal between Jelil and Burhane Ghalioun, who was made head

of the Syrian National Council in August, 2011 and who was

known to be under the influence of the Syrian Muslim Brother-

hood. Essentially, the December 11, 2011 agreement was an

extension of this agreement, concluded immediately after the

assassination of Qaddafi on October 20, 2011. The Ennahda

party has also, since, come to power in Tunisia in October, 2011.

It should be noted that Hamad Jabber bin Jassim al-Thani

was implicated in an illegal arms deal with BAE Systems worth

£500 million, in which £7 million was transferred into two

trusts in Jersey of which Hamad was named a beneficiary.

Hamad eventually paid the Jersey authorities £6 million, as a

“voluntary reparation.”

Immediately following the October agreement, in Novem-

ber, 2011, according to numerous news sources, including the

Daily Telegraph, Belhadj traveled to Turkey to meet with the

Syrian Free Army, to provide it with training and weapons to

overthrow Assad. Belhadj’s trip to Turkey was supported by the

head of the Transitional National Council, Mustafa Abdel Jalil.

According to Albawaba.com and thetruthseeker.co.uk, dur-

ing that same month, some 600 LIFG terrorists from Libya en-

tered Syria and began military operations. The individual who

leads the Libyan fighters is Mahdi al-Harati, now head of the

Liwa al-Ummah Brigade in Syria. According to a August 9, 2012

article in Foreign Policy magazine by Mary Fitzgerald, entitled

“The Syrian Rebels’ Libyan Weapon,” al-Harati is a Libyan-born

Irish citizen, who was a commander of the Tripoli Brigade, run

by Belhadj during the overthrow of Qaddafi in Libya.

The Tripoli Brigade was one of the first rebel units to enter

the Libyan capital in August, 2011. After Tripoli was taken by

the rebels, al-Harati was appointed deputy head of the Tripoli

Military Council, serving under Abdel Hakim Belhadj. In late

2011 Harati stepped down as commander of the Tripoli Bri-

gade and as deputy head of the Tripoli Military Council, and

left for Syria.

According to Harati, more than 6,000 men across Syria

have joined Liwa al-Ummah since its establishment. Harati

stresses that 90% of its members are Syrians, the rest are Liby-

ans, most of them former members of the Tripoli Brigade, along

with a smattering of other Arabs. According to Reuters, Liwa

al-Ummah includes 20 senior members of the Tripoli Brigade.

According to documents obtained and released by former

Muslim Brotherhood member Walid Shoebat, an array of re-

cords provided to Libyan expatriates from sources inside the

Libyan government establish that al-Qaeda operatives in Libya

are facilitating the passage of jihadists through Libya to Syria.

Specifically, Abd al-Wahhab Mohammad Qaid, a leading mem-

ber of the LIFG whose brother, al-Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-

Libi, was killed in Pakistan in June, 2012 by a U. S. drone attack,

now works in the Libyan Interior Ministry where he is in charge

of Border Control and Strategic Institutions. The position al-

lows him to arrange open-border passage for al-Qaeda opera-

tives, facilitating not only the flow of terrorists into Libya, but

also al-Qaeda efforts to transport terrorists and weapons into

Syria from Libya via Turkey.

Clandestine Al-Qaeda

According to numerous reports, al-Qaeda’s strategy in

Libya is not to operate openly in its own name for security rea-

sons, but rather to operate under the name of various militias.

Nonetheless, at least two known Core al-Qaeda operatives are

known to have been deployed from Pakistan to Libya.

One of the State Department documents released by the

House Oversight Committee in October was from the Research

and Information Support Center, dated March 1, 2012. It gives

the following assessment of the presence of al-Qaeda in the

Benghazi area:

In late December 2011, reports indicated that

the al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan had sent ex-

9

perienced jihadists to Libya to build a new base

of operations in the country. Between May and

December 2011, one of these jihadists had re-

cruited 200 fighters in the eastern part of the

country. Documents seized in Iraq indicate that

many foreign fighters who participated in the

Iraqi insurgency hailed from eastern Libya.

According to the August, 2012 Library of Congress “Al-

Qaeda in Libya” report, the individual sent is believed to be

Abd al-Baset Azzouz, who has been close to al-Qaeda head Al-

Zawahiri since 1980. According to the same report, he is likely

located currently in Libya with another senior Libyan al-Qaeda

operative: Abd al-Hamid al-Ruqhay, alias Abu Anas al-Libi, who

moved in the late 1980s, living at various times in Afghanistan

and Sudan, where he is believed to have met Osama bin Laden

and joined al-Qaeda.

The e-book, “Benghazi: The Definitive Report,” suggests

that another senior al-Qaeda operative who may be in Libya is

Abu Musab al-Suri (misidentified in the book as Yasin al-Suri).

The thesis of this book is that Obama authorized John Brennan

to conduct a secret war in the Middle East and in Africa, outside

the command of the CIA, the Pentagon and the State Depart-

ment, and that operations conducted by Brennan in Libya dur-

ing the summer to force al-Suri to surface stirred a hornet’s

nest, which resulted in a retaliatory attack on the U. S. mis-

sion and CIA annex on 9/11, which Obama and Brennan took

no measures to prevent. While they do not identify the spe-

cific operation conducted by Brennan in Libya, the fact of the

matter is that the drone assassination of Abu Yahya al-Libi in

Pakistan in June, 2012 by Obama and Brennan entails the same

modus operandi, and would have had the same consequences.

The Sole Suspect in Custody: a Member of Al-Qaeda and the LIFG

In early March it was reported that a suspect by the name

of Faraj al-Chalabi had been arrested. Although it has been

blacked out in the U. S. press, the Libya Herald reports the fol-

lowing: “The man, named as Faraj Al-Chalabi, is said to have

been a member both of al-Qaeda and of Libyan Islamist Fight-

ing Group (LIFG). He and two other Libyans, have been wanted

by Libya in connection with the deaths of Germans Silvan and

Vera Becker near Sirte in 1994. Warrants for the three’s arrest

were issued in 1998. The killings were claimed by the Qaddafi

regime to have been ordered by Osman bin Laden.”

The two other suspects, identified thus far as involved in

the attack on the U. S. mission, are Ali Harzi and Ahmed Abu

Khattala (Bukatela). Ali Harzi was apprehended after the 9/11

attack in Turkey, reportedly on his way to Syria. He was sent

back to his native land, Tunisia, and has since been released

for “lack of evidence.” According to Investors.com, Sen. Saxby

Chambliss stated that Harzi was confirmed to be a member of

Ansar al-Sharia. Eli Lake of The Daily Beast reports that Harzi is

not considered to be a ringleader of the attack, but is consid-

ered a suspect because he used social media to tip off friends

about the attack. His brother is believed to be Tariq Abu Am-

mar, a member of al-Qaeda in Iraq whose job is to arrange trav-

el of fighters from North Africa to Syria. The recent government

crisis in Tunisia raises questions as to the ability and desire of

the Tunisian government to monitor his movement.

Ahmed Abu Khattala (Bukatela), according to the publica-

tion Magharebia, is a suspect in the September 11 terrorist at-

tack on the U. S. mission, as well as a suspect in the assassina-

tion of Major General Yunis on July 28, 2011. He has also been

identified as a suspect in connection with the assassination of

Benghazi police chief, Faraj Drissi on November 20, 2012. He

was the commander of the Abu Obeida Bin al-Jarrah brigade,

which was disbanded after 9/11. He has been linked, as well,

to Ansar al-Sharia. He is now living freely in Benghazi and has

never been interviewed by U. S. investigators. On January 6, he

was the target of an unsuccessful assassination.

The Benghazi Attack—Precursor to an Al-Qaeda / Muslim Brotherhood Coup

On September 12, Mahmoud Jibril was indeed defeated in

his quest to become Prime Minister by Mustafa Abushagur by

two votes, and the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Alwad al-Bar-

asi, became Deputy Prime Minister. When Abushagur failed to

gain approval for his proposed cabinet, he was voted out as

Prime Minister on October 7. He was replaced by Ali Zeidan,

whose proposed cabinet was approved on October 31. Half of

the cabinet members are now members of the National Forces

Alliance, and half—selected by the Muslim Brotherhood Justice

and Construction Party. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood has suc-

ceeded in gaining a major foothold in the new government of

Libya, just as it has done in Egypt and Tunisia, and threatens to

do elsewhere due to the deliberate policy of the Obama Admin-

istration, the British empire, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

On September 24, Fawzi Bukatif, commander of the Febru-

ary 17 Brigade, and Ismail al-Sallabi, founder of the February

17 Brigade and also head of the al-Sahati Brigade, were re-

lieved of their commands and replaced by Army colonels.

On November 20, Colonel Faraj Drissi, the Benghazi se-

curity chief appointed after the attack on the U. S. Benghazi

10

mission, was assassinated outside his home. On December 16

a senior police source informed the Libya Herald that the sus-

pected assassin, who had been detained by police, identified

seven prominent Islamists in connection with the assassina-

tion and related attacks. The most significant among these

are: Sufyan bin Qumu, the head of Ansar al-Sharia, Rafallah al-

Sahati chiefs Mohammed al-Garabi and Ismael al-Sallabi and

Obeida militia chief Ahmed Bukatela. Libya’s new Interior Min-

ister, Ashour Shuwail, stepped in on December 20 to deny that

those named, including Ismail al-Sallabi and the group Ansar

al-Sharia, were being sought in relation to the events in Beng-

hazi. Al-Garabi denied any involvement and Ismael al-Sallabi,

speaking from Turkey, also claimed innocence.

Meanwhile, in the capital city of Tripoli, the Libyan military

tribunal investigating the assassination of General Abdel Fat-

tah Younis near the city of Benghazi on July 28, 2011, issued a

summons to former National Transitional Council (NTC) leader

Mustafa Abdel Jalil, an ally of Belhadj. Tripoli militia forces im-

mediately blocked roads for three days to protest the court’s

summoning of Jalil. As a result, the tribunal announced that it

was abandoning its inquiry.

On January 2, 2013, the acting head of the criminal in-

vestigation department in Benghazi, Captain Abdelsalam al-

Mahdawi, was abducted. He was seized at gunpoint as he was

reportedly about to name suspects in the murder of former

Benghazi police chief Faraj al-Drissi. It has since been reported

that he was murdered.

On January 3, 2013, the President of Libya, Mohammed

Magarief, survived an assassination attempt in a hotel in the

southern oasis of Sabha where he was then staying.

The grip of the LIFG on the government of Libya was then

strengthened on January 11 when Libyan Prime Minister Ali

Zeidan appointed the deputy emir of the Libyan Islamic Fight-

ing Group, Khalid al-Sharif, as the deputy minister of defense

of Libya. When the U. S. invaded Afghanistan in 2001, Khalid

al-Sharif escaped Afghanistan to Pakistan, where he remained

until 2003. In 2003 he was captured in Pakistan and handed

over to the U. S., who later transferred him to Libya in 2005.

He was released with Belhadj and others on March 23, 2010,

but re-imprisoned by Qaddafi once the revolution began. After

the liberation of Tripoli by Belhadj, he began working with the

Tripoli military council and, then, went on to form the National

Guard, which according to the Libya Herald is involved directly

with the Border Guard, patrolling the borders and providing

security to oil installations. It also helps the Judicial Police in

interrogations and supervising many prisons.

On January 19, there was an attempted assassination of

Libya’s Minister of Defense, Mohammed Mahmoud al-Bargati,

as he was leaving the airport in Tobruk, eastern Libya. Tobruk

has been identified as an area controlled by smugglers of arms

across the Egypt-Libya border.

On January 20 The Tripoli Post ran a column proposing that

all of the armed militia could be integrated into the National

Guard, the commander of which is Khalid al-Sharif.

Both The Globe and Mail and The Washington Post reported

on February 15 and 16, respectively, that an agreement was

reached in January between the al-Qaeda–linked militias in

Benghazi, apparently in coordination with the Ministries of the

Interior and Defense, to reestablish their control over Beng-

hazi. Ansar al-Sharia is now in charge of the western entrance

to the city and has resumed guarding two hospitals. Ismail al-

Sallabi, who was sacked by the Libyan government on Septem-

ber 24, 2012, is now a senior leader of Libya Shield. His Rafal-

lah al-Sahati brigade has been renamed “Libyan Shield 3” and

has resumed command of checkpoints on the city’s perimeter

under the command of the Defense Ministry.

An article by John Rosenthal from May 3, 2013 published

by Newsmax further documents the relationship between the

February 17 Brigade, Ansar al-Sharia and Jabhat al-Nusra, the

al-Qaeda group in Syria supported by Saudi Arabia. The article

reports that the Facebook page of the February 17 Brigade dis-

played the black flag of al-Qaeda at the June 7, 2012 demon-

stration in Benghazi which was reported in the Library of Con-

gress report. One entry on the site, dated January 29, 2013,

suggests that Ansar al-Sharia is the target of a “treacherous”

plot to get the brigade blamed for various attacks and assassi-

nation attempts. Another, dated January 20, 2013, announces

that Ansar al-Sharia has begun guarding the western gate of

Benghazi “in the service of our religion and . . . of the Libyan

people.” A March 2, 2013 posting features a graphic celebrat-

ing Jabhat al-Nusra.

According to an article published in The Daily Beast on Feb-

ruary 26, entitled “Libyan Government Turns to Ansar Al-Sharia

Militia for Crime-Fighting Help,” the Libyan government paid

the assassins of U. S. Ambassador Chris Stevens before 9/11,

2012 and has recently resumed making those payments. As

Daily Beast reporter Jamie Dettmer reveals: “Government pay-

ments to Ansar al-Sharia militiamen also have been resumed

and are made through other Benghazi brigades, including the

17th of February brigade, according to sources in the General

National Congress, Libya’s new Parliament.”

What this means is that the February 17 Brigade, which was

hired by the Obama Administration to protect the U. S. mission

in Benghazi, is paying Ansar al-Sharia, the militia which con-

ducted the attack on the mission, with funds provided by the

Libyan Ministry of Defense. The Deputy Minister of Defense is

11

now, of course, Khalid al-Sharif, formerly the deputy emir of

the LIFG.

Dettmer’s source for this information is none other than

Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad Qaid, who is now the chairman of

the National Security Committee of the General National Con-

gress (Daily Beast, February 20), having been elected to the

Libyan Parliament on the electoral slate of the Hzbal Umma al-

Wasat, the party created by Sami al-Saadi. (Khalid al-Sharif is

also a member of this party.) Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad Qaid

is also the head of the National border guard for southern Libya.

On March 5, armed militia took over the meeting of the GNC

in an attempt to force those present to pass the Political Iso-

lation Law. A second unsuccessful assassination attempt was

made against President Magarief as he left the building. The

proposed law is backed by Abdel Hakim Belhadj, Abd al-Wah-

hab Muhammad Qaid and Sami al-Saadi. It would prevent any-

one who served in the Qaddafi regime in the last 30 years from

serving in the post-Qaddafi government for 10 years. If the law

were to pass, Magarief and Zeidan would be ousted along with

Jibril and about one-third of the General National Council.

On Sunday, May 5, the GNC is scheduled to vote on the Po-

litical Isolation Law. Since the previous Sunday, April 28, armed

militia have surrounded the Foreign Affairs Ministry. They have

also barricaded the Justice Ministry. Voice of America reports

that on May 2, “trucks from the Libyan Shield Force, a grouping

of militias that’s supposed to take its orders from the Defense

Ministry, showed up outside the Foreign Ministry and joined

the blockade.” The Deputy Minister of Defense is Khalid al-

Sharif, Wissam bin Hamid is head of Libya Shield, and Ismail

al-Sallabi is head of Libya Shield 3.

The Hostage-Taking in Algeria

On January 16, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb launched a ma-

jor terrorist attack in Algeria. This operation is directly related

to Obama’s alliance with al-Qaeda in Libya. First, as reported

above, weapons provided by Qatar, with Obama’s approval, to

Belhadj and the LIFG have been supplied to al-Qaeda in Mali.

Second, the leader of the hostage-taking in Algeria is Mokhtar

bel Mokhtar, an Algerian who fought against the Soviet forces

in Afghanistan in the 1980s. As reported above, the Library of

Congress reports that in March, 2012, Wisam bin Hamid, the

leader of Libya Shield, whom a Palestinian newspaper identi-

fied as the leader of al-Qaeda in Libya, held an al-Qaeda–type

demonstration in the city of Sirt. The same newspaper report-

ed that Mokhtar bel Mokhtar, the leader of AQIM in the Sahara,

attended the parade as the honored guest of Wisam. Thus, the

leader of the Algerian terrorist action is a known ally of the

individual who heads Libya Shield, a group which the Obama

administration continues to rely upon for security in Benghazi,

despite its complicity in the assassination of our ambassador

and three other Americans.

On March 5 CNN reported that a phone call was made from

the site of the terrorist attack on the U. S. mission in Benghazi

to Mokhtar bel Mokhtar, a senior leader of al-Qaeda in the

Maghreb. The caller expressed congratulations for the terror-

ist attack. CNN reports the following: “Belmokhtar was one of

several leading militants based in Mali who spent time in Libya

in the aftermath of Moammar Gadhafi’s overthrow, develop-

ing relationships with militant Islamist brigades and buying

weapons with the proceeds of smuggling and kidnapping op-

erations. According to sources in direct contact with Western

intelligence agencies, Belmokhtar was in Libya for four months

from December 2011. They say his visit was facilitated by the

leader of a radical Islamist militia with influence in Benghazi

and the East.”

On January 24, The New York Times reported that a senior

Algerian official said that “several Egyptian members of the

squad of militants that lay bloody siege to an Algerian gas

complex last week also took part in the deadly attack on the

United States Mission in Libya in September.” On January 19,

The Tripoli Post ran a story entitled: “Terrorists Who Attacked

Algerian Gas Complex May Have Been Trained in Libya,” in

which they report, “A US official said that the hostage-takers

appeared to have crossed the Libyan border . . . to carry out the

attack.” The article further reports that there are three camps

in the desert town of Sabha, Libya and that “it was highly possi-

ble that these camps were connected to the attack.” The Libya

Herald ran an article entitled: “Terrorist source claims Libyan

connection with In Amenas attack,” in which they report that

the terrorists “did indeed have support from Libya.”

On January 24, several European governments urged their

citizens to evacuate Benghazi in response to what the U. K. de-

scribed as a “specific and imminent threat to Westerners.” The

Libyan press indicated that sources said the threat existed of

an attack on a Libyan oil field, similar to the attack which had

just occurred in Algeria.

On February 18, Algerian Foreign Ministry spokesman

Ammar Ballani declared Abdel Hakim Belhadj persona non

grata in Algeria. Arabic media sources such as Al-Arabiya TV

and French-language Algerian media such as TSA-Algerie.com

quoted an “Algerian security source” who said the Algerian

government has definite information that Belhadj had prior

knowledge of the attack on the gas production facility in In

Amenas. The source also said that Belhadj had attempted to

enter Algeria in December, 2012 in order to negotiate a deal

12

with Algerian authorities, in which Algeria would strengthen

his influence in Libya, in exchange for his agreement to prevent

arms traffic from Libya to Algeria. Algeria refused to let him

into the country due to his terrorist connections.

What Must Be Done

President Obama swore an oath to “support and defend

the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, for-

eign and domestic,” as did every member of the U. S. Senate

and House of Representatives. Obama has broken that oath by

supporting the enemies of the U. S. Constitution. The issue is

the policy of the Obama administration which contributed to

causing the deaths of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three oth-

ers in Benghazi, and, if continued in respect to Syria, threatens

to bring the world to the brink of thermonuclear war.

On Wednesday, May 8, 2013, the House Oversight Commit-

tee will hold hearings on Benghazi. The hearing promises to be

explosive, as a number of whistleblowers are expected to tes-

tify. At the same time, as of April 26, 2013, a total of 129 Con-

gressmen have signed on as cosponsors of Rep. Frank Wolf’s

H. Res. 36 calling for the creation of a select committee to get

to the bottom of the Benghazi 9/11, 2012 attacks.

Whether the investigation is conducted by standing com-

mittees, or by a select committee, what is needed is a thor-

ough airing of the ongoing alliance between the Obama White

House and al-Qaeda, as mediated by Saudi Arabia. Given the

evidence that Saudi Arabia was involved in funding and sup-

porting both 9/11, 2001 and 9/11, 2012, it is also necessary

that the 28-page chapter of the Joint Congressional Inquiry on

the Saudi involvement in 9/11, 2001 be declassified, and that

a 9/11 Review Commission be initiated, as provided for in the

Defense Authorization continuing resolution signed into law

on March 26.

What makes this particularly urgent is that the al-Qaeda

forces Obama allied with in Libya, who then attacked our mis-

sion in Benghazi, are on the verge of a coup d’etat in Libya. If the

campaign to increase the aid to the al-Qaeda–dominated oppo-

sition in Syria also proceeds, the British empire, Saudi Arabia,

Qatar and their stooge Obama may very well push the world to

the edge of a thermonuclear war with Russia and China.

Obama’s crimes of failing to provide sufficient security to

the mission, and not responding after the attack by providing

military backup, and, then, lying to the American people and

the world, are the result of the underlying policy. These crimes

and the lies of the Obama Administration’s “talking points,”

which were designed to cover them up, are a result of the un-

derlying crime of having allied with known enemies of the

United States of America. As RSO officer Eric Nordstrom testi-

fied before the House Oversight Committee in October, “In my

view, the Taliban is inside the building.”

The killings of the Ambassador and three other Americans

were carried out by the very terrorists Obama and his masters

intentionally supported to overthrow Qaddafi, and are sup-

porting now to overthrow Assad.

The designation of al-Nusra in Syria as a terrorist organiza-

tion is just a fig leaf. As reported in the September 11 memo

sent by Ambassador Stevens to Washington, Wisam bin Hamid

and al-Garabi told U. S. officials on September 9: “fluid rela-

tionships and blurry lines” define membership in the brigades

in Benghazi. “They themselves were members of multiple bri-

gades, they said.” The same is true in Syria.

As this fact sheet conclusively demonstrates to be the case

in Libya, and as the Syrian opposition itself has affirmed in re-

spect to Syria by proclaiming that they are all al-Nusra, the en-

tire Syrian opposition is dominated by al-Qaeda.

The individual in Saudi Arabia most prominently support-

ing al-Qaeda in Syria is Saudi Minister of Intelligence Prince

Bandar bin Sultan. As Saudi Ambassador to the United States at

an earlier time, the same Bandar’s wife Haifa funneled money

to a Saudi intelligence agent in San Diego who assisted the

first two 9/11 hijackers to arrive in the U. S. Bandar was head

of the Saudi Arabian National Security Council from 2005 until

his appointment as intelligence chief in July, 2012. His role in

both 9/11, 2001 and 9/11, 2012 needs to be investigated.

As this fact sheet conclusively establishes, Obama is in bed

with al-Qaeda. Petraeus was forced to resign for less. Obama

must be forced to resign or be impeached now.

Policy Questions to be Asked by Congressional Investigators

1. According to the hacked February 16, 2013 memo from

Sidney Blumenthal to Hillary Clinton, French Intelligence told

Algerian intelligence that the Benghazi terrorist attack was

funded by “wealthy Sunni Islamists from Saudi Arabia.” Ac-

cording to Algerian intelligence, Libyan intelligence gave them

the same information. Saudi Arabia is suspected of responsi-

bility for the original 9/11 attack on the U. S., but just as there

has been a cover-up of Benghazi, the Saudi role in 9/11, 2001

has been covered up through classification of the 28-page

chapter of the report of the Joint Congressional Inquiry on the

Saudi involvement. Unless this cover-up ends, more terrorist

events like Benghazi and the Boston Marathon event are likely

to occur. Why was this 28-page chapter classified? Why has

Obama not fulfilled his promise to the families of 9/11 victims

13

to declassify it? Shouldn’t it be immediately declassified, given

charges that Saudis also funded the Benghazi event? Have we

contacted French, Algerian and Libyan intelligence to obtain

their intelligence on the Saudi funding of Benghazi? Who were

the “wealthy Sunni Islamists from Saudi Arabia”? Were they a

cut-out for Prince Bandar?

2. According to The Independent from March 7, 2011, the

Obama administration asked Saudi Arabia to provide weapons

to the Benghazi opposition to Qaddafi. It is known that both

Qatar and the U. A. E. did so. This is reported by the United Na-

tions. What was the response of Saudi Arabia to this request?

What was the involvement of Prince Bandar, who then headed

the Saudi National Security Council? Did Saudi Arabia provide

weapons and ammunition directly, or indirectly through Qatar

and the U. A. E. to the opposition?

3. The LIFG was listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization

(FTO) by the U. S. State Department, the UN Security Council and

the U. K. Home Office before it officially disbanded in February,

2011, and merely renamed itself the Libyan Islamic Movement

for Change. In 2007 al-Qaeda announced the merger of al-Qa-

eda and the LIFG. There are numerous links between the LIFG

and 9/11, 2001 known to the U. S. from interrogations in Guan-

tanamo. The sole suspect currently in custody is a member of

al-Qaeda and of the LIFG. How does the Obama administration

justify allying with leading members of the LIFG in Libya? Did

Obama authorize the decision to work with the LIFG? Given the

U. S. State Department designation of the LIFG as an FTO, did

anyone in the White House or the State Department object to

this policy? Why has the Obama administration not designated

the Libyan Islamic Movement for Change as an FTO?

4. The emir of the LIFG, Abdel Hakim Belhadj, fought to-

gether with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and, then, moved

with him to Sudan in 1992. He ran training camps for al-Qaeda

in Afghanistan in the late 1990s. He fled Kabul in 2001 and

went with Osam bin Laden to Tora Bora. He was listed as a co-

conspirator in the 2004 Madrid bombings. In Libya he received

weapons approved by Obama from Qatar. He became the mili-

tary commander of the Tripoli Military Council in August, 2011,

and was responsible for security at all foreign embassies. Why

did we ally with a known terrorist to overthrow Qaddafi? Why

did we allow Qatar to provide him with weapons, bypassing the

Transitional National Council? Did the Obama administration

protest his becoming responsible for the security of all foreign

embassies? Is he, indeed, the “current head of domestic secu-

rity” in Libya, as stated by Mathieu Pellerin, head of the Paris-

based CISCA?

5. General Yunis, the military commander of the TNC, was

assassinated on July 28, 2011. The assassination paved the

way for Belhadj to become the military commander of the Trip-

oli Military Council. A deputy of Yunis, Mohammed Agoury, told

the Associated Press that the February 17 Brigade was behind

the assassination. Other sources have said that Ansar al-Sharia

was responsible. Why did the Obama Administration hire the

February 17 Brigade to provide security in Benghazi under

these circumstances?

6. After Belhadj became head of the Tripoli Military Coun-

cil, he and Ismael al-Sallabi traveled with TNC Chairman Jalil

to Qatar to meet with NATO officials and financiers of the revo-

lution. Who attended this meeting? Why did NATO choose to

meet with known terrorists? Who authorized this meeting?

Who were the financiers?

7. Bin Qumu is head of Ansar al-Sharia. Ansar al-Sharia

took credit for the attack on the U. S. Mission on its own Face-

book page. The Senate Homeland Security committee report

says individuals affiliated with Ansar al-Sharia were allegedly

involved in storming the Tunisian consulate in Benghazi on

June 18, 2012. Bin Qumu is known to be a member of the LIFG

and al-Qaeda, and was assessed to be a medium to high risk to

U. S. interests. He received a monthly stipend from one of the

financiers of the original 9/11. He began training rebel forces

in Derna in April of 2011. What actions did the Obama admin-

istration take against him and Ansar al-Sharia before Septem-

ber 11? Why is Ansar al-Sharia not listed as an FTO?

8. U. S. officials met with Wisam bin Hamid and Muham-

mad al-Garabi on September 9. The Library of Congress reports

that Wisam bin Hamid is possibly the leader of al-Qaeda in

Libya. He leads Libya Shield, which is the same as Free Libya.

He hosted a demonstration in Sirte in March, 2012, attended

by the head of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar,

as his honored guest. Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar has been identified

as the leader of the hostage-taking event which took place, be-

ginning January 13, at a British Petroleum gas field in Algeria.

Bin Hamid also participated in another rally in Benghazi with

other militias on June 7–8, 2012. The Library of Congress re-

ports that these militias “probably make up the bulk of al-Qa-

eda’s network in Libya.” Why did U. S. officials meet with him?

Which officials met with him? Why did we rely on Libya Shield

for security in Benghazi? On November 28 The New York Times

reported that U. S. investigators of the Benghazi terrorist attack

have been escorted by “Mr. Hamid.” Why do we continue to

rely on Wisam bin Hamid and Libya Shield for security, while

investigating a crime in which Wisam bin Hamid must be a sus-

pect?

9. The Supreme Security Council police car assigned to the

mission left the scene of the terrorist attack just as it began. An

individual wearing an SSC police uniform took photos of the

14

mission on the morning of the attack. On September 12 Wanis

al-Sharif, deputy interior minister for eastern Libya, in charge

of the SSC in Benghazi, and a senior leader of the LIFG, spread

disinformation about the terrorist attack. On September 17 he

was sacked by his own government. And yet, until at least 2

months later Wanis al-Sharif had defied the order, and refused

to step down. Why was Wanis al-Sharif sacked? Why was he,

nonetheless, still in his office until, at least, mid-November?

Since he continues to be referred to as a top security official

in Benghazi by the media, what is his current status? What are

we doing to identify the individual who took photos? Have

we interviewed al-Sharif to find out why he lied, and why he

did not provide a marked police car outside the mission 24/7?

Have we interviewed the driver who left the scene? As deputy

interior minister for eastern Libya, what is his involvement in

running weapons to al-Qaeda in Syria and Mali?

10. The Senate Homeland Security Committee report indi-

cates that a current, and a former employee of Blue Mountain

were suspects in the bombing of the mission on April 6, 2012.

The ARB report says that a Blue Mountain guard may have left

the gate to the mission open, and had done so on a previous

occasion. Why did we continue to employ Blue Mountain?

11. The February 17 Brigade was formed by Ismael al-

Sallabi. Belhadj was in Benghazi in April, 2011 to help form

the brigade. According to the Senate Homeland Security Com-

mittee report, the February 17 Brigade was involved in ex-

trajudicial detentions of U. S. diplomatic personnel prior to

September 11. On September 11, according to the ARB, the

February 17 Brigade guards at the mission failed to notify the

February 17 Brigade barracks. According to the Senate Home-

land Security Committee, the February 17 Brigade failed to

respond to two calls for assistance from the CIA annex. On

September 24, Ismael al-Sallabi and Fawzi Bukatif, the founder

and commander of the February 17 Brigade, were sacked by

the Libyan government. On February 16, 2013, The Washington

Post reported that al-Sallabi is now a senior member of Libya

Shield 3. The Daily Beast reports that the Ministry of Defense

of Libya is now paying Ansar al-Sharia through the February 17

Brigade. Why did we rely on the February 17 Brigade for se-

curity in the first place, given that it was created by known

LIFG operatives? Why did we continue to employ the Febru-

ary 17 Brigade after they conducted extrajudicial detentions,

and after their loyalties were called into question? Why were

al-Sallabi and Bukatif sacked? Why is al-Sallabi now working

with Libya Shield under the Defense Ministry? Why is the Feb-

ruary 17 Brigade currently paying Ansar al-Sharia?

12. In October 2011, Burhane Ghalioun, head of the Syr-

ian National Council, and Jelil, the head of the Libyan Transi-

tional National Council, signed an agreement, in which Libya

agreed to assist in the overthrow of the Syrian government

of Assad. Belhadj traveled to Turkey to meet with the Syrian

Free Army in November, 2011 to provide money, weapons and

fighters to overthrow the Syrian government. On December 11,

2011, the October agreement was expanded in a meeting in

Tripoli involving Jelil; Youssef Qaradhaoui Rached Ghannouchi,

head of the Tunisian Muslim Brotherhood party, Ennahda; Ha-

mad Jabber bin Jassim al-Thani, the Foreign and Prime Minister

of Qatar; the number two of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria;

and Abdel Hakim Belhadj. The agreement reached determined

to arm and send fighters from Libya and Tunisia to Syria. What

role did the Obama administration play in the October and De-

cember agreements? Did Obama know about Belhadj’s trip to

Turkey to meet the Free Syrian Army? Did Obama approve this

trip? Did this trip result in the provision of weapons, personnel

and training to the Free Syrian Army?

13. 600 LIFG fighters went to Syria in November, 2011, led

by al-Harati, the deputy commander of the Tripoli Military Council

under Belhadj. Who knew about, and approved this deployment?

14. Belhadj and the LIFG are now providing weapons, pro-

vided to them in violation of the UN arms embargo by Qatar

and the U. A. E., with the approval of Obama, to al-Qaeda in Syr-

ia and Mali. What is the role of the U. S. and NATO in facilitating

this weapons flow? Why has the U. S. or NATO not intercepted

these weapons, which in the case of Syria are transported to

Turkey by ship?

15. It is reported that Ambassador Stevens opposed Bel-

hadj becoming either Minister of Defense, or Minister of the

Interior in Libya. Is this true and, if so, why? Did Ambassador

Stevens in any way oppose the policy carried out by Belhadj of

sending weapons to al-Qaeda in Syria and Mali?

16. The Libyan Interior Ministry official in charge of border

control is Abd al-Wahhab Mohammad Qaid, a leading member

of the LIFG whose brother, al-Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi,

was killed in Pakistan in June, 2012 by a U. S. drone attack. He

is now the chairman of the National Security Committee of the

Libyan Parliament. What contact does the Obama administra-

tion have with him about the transport of jihadists and weap-

ons to and from Libya? What is his involvement in the events

in Benghazi on September 11, given the killing of his brother

in June, 2012, which some sources identify as a motivation for

the attack?

17. Wisam bin Hamid and Muhammad al-Garabi told U. S.

officials on September 9 that they would not continue to pro-

vide security for the mission, if Jibril became prime minister.

On September 12, one day after September 11, Jibril was de-

feated. Now the Muslim Brotherhood controls nearly half of

15

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the cabinet positions in Libya, and the Muslim Brotherhood

candidate for Prime Minister, Barasi, who was supported by

them, is a deputy Prime Minister. Did the U. S., and Ambassa-

dor Stevens support Jibril for Prime Minister in the General Na-

tional Congress elections which took place September 10–12?

Did the Obama administration support this ascension of the

Muslim Brotherhood to power in Libya?

18. The last meeting Ambassador Stevens had in Benghazi

before the terrorist attack was with the Turkish ambassador. What

was the purpose of Ambassador Stevens’ meeting with the Turkish

ambassador in Benghazi, just before the attack on September 11?

19. The Accountability Review Board (ARB) report states

that U. K. diplomatic personnel were in Benghazi on Septem-

ber 11. The attack began immediately after U. K. security per-

sonnel left the U. S. mission. What was the purpose of this one-

day visit, and did they meet with Ambassador Stevens?

20. Besides the mission, the U. S. also maintained an an-

nex in Benghazi run by the CIA. What was the purpose of the

CIA annex in Benghazi? Why was the mission in Benghazi “nev-

er formally notified to the Libyan government,” as reported by

the ARB? Was it involved in support operations for supplying

weapons or personnel to Syria?

21. Leading spokesmen for the Libyan Islamic Fighting

Group stated that the attack on the mission in Benghazi on

9/11 was a spontaneous demonstration against an anti-Muslim

video. Did the Obama administration tailor its talking points to

protect its al-Qaeda assets in Libya who were responsible for

the terrorist attack?

22. On January 11, Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan ap-

pointed the deputy emir of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,

Khalid al-Sharif, as the deputy minister of defense of Libya. Did

the Obama administration protest this appointment of an indi-

vidual who was the second in command of the al-Qaeda–allied

LIFG? Is the U. S. military now working directly with Khalid al-

Sharif in his position as deputy defense minister?

23. Khalid al-Sharif is also the head of the Libyan National

Guard, which is under the Ministry of Defense, and involved di-

rectly with the Border Guard, patrolling the borders and provid-

ing security for Libyan oil installations. On January 24, the U. K.,

Germany, and the Netherlands advised their citizens to leave

Benghazi due to an imminent terrorist threat. The Libyan press

reported that the threat was that of an attack on a Libyan oil

field. Has the Obama administration demanded that Khalid al-

Sharif be dismissed? If not, why not? What has the Obama ad-

ministration done to prevent the Libyan militias from being con-

solidated in the National Guard under Khalid al-Sharif’s control?

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