unlearning cognitive dissonance: toward an understanding of the development of dissonance

Unlearning Cognitive Dissonance: Toward an Understandingof the Development of Dissonance

Joel Cooper

Princeton University

Received: November 3, 1997; revised: July 27, 1998; accepted: August 1, 1998

The results of two experiments support the idea that cognitive dissonance is weakenedfollowing misattribution, suggesting a role for experience in the development of disso-nance. The first experiment placed people in an essay-writing, induced compliancesituation and replicated the finding that people who misattributed their arousal to anexternal source did not show evidence of dissonance arousal. The second experimentinvolved the same participants and placed them in a different dissonance arousingsituation. The data showed that participants who had previously misattributed theirdissonance showed very little evidence of dissonance arousal despite not having a stimulusto which they could misattribute their arousal. The results are discussed in terms of thepossibility that we may learn to experience dissonance. The implications of these resultsfor the role of dissonance in an emerging self-system are also discussed.r 1998 Academic

Press

Do people learn to experience cognitive dissonance? There has been very littleresearch on how people come to experience dissonance. It is especially difficultfor research to identify the moment at which children experience arousal whenconfronted with dissonant cognitions. Dissonance reduction has been found withchildren as young as five years old (e.g., Aronson & Carlsmith, 1963; Clemence,1990; Zanna, Lepper, & Abelson, 1973), but the developmental process has notbeen identified.

One way to approach the possibility that dissonance is learned is to see if it canbe unlearned. If we consider the possibility that cognitive dissonance is a learneddrive state, then it might be possible to teach people not to experience it. Underthe appropriate circumstances, we might be able to extinguish the dissonancedrive.

I thank Adam Galinsky, Ian Skurnik, Jeff Stone, and Mark Zanna for their helpful advice and MarciaGonzales and Brian Epstein for serving as experimenters.

Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to Joel Cooper, Department of Psychology,Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544.

JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY34, 562–575 (1998)ARTICLE NO. JS981365

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0022-1031/98 $25.00Copyrightr 1998 by Academic PressAll rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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Several alternative models of dissonance have been advanced that claim tospecify most accurately the motivational underpinnings of dissonance (Aronson,1968; 1992; Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Harmon-Jones, Brehm, Greenberg, Simon, &Nelson, 1996; Steele, 1988). We will use the language of Cooper and Fazio’s(1984) dissonance motivation model as the vehicle to highlight the variables thatare important for the current analysis. In the Cooper and Fazio view, dissonancearousal is a function of accepting responsibility for having brought about anaversive consequence. Consider a prototypical research procedure in the inducedcompliance paradigm: A participant is asked to write an essay advocating aposition with which he or she disagrees, such as reducing funding for handi-capped services on his or her campus (e.g., Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995).The experimenter explains that the essay will be read by a committee that is in aposition to make funding decisions. In the dissonance motivation model, thevariables necessary for dissonance arousal are the participant’s having broughtabout an unwanted event (such as convincing the committee to reduce funding)and the person’s accepting responsibility for being at least partly the causal agentof that consequence.

Suppose dissonance were not innately part of the unfolding of human develop-ment but rather came about through the typical process of interacting with theenvironment. One way of conceptualizing how the learning process might occuris to imagine a toddler interacting with his or her parents. One day, in the act ofexploring the home environment, our toddler innocently knocks over a floor lamp.The nurturing agent may well respond with either anxiety or anger. Should asimilar incident occur, the nurturing agent will again respond with anger or someother form of negative emotion. In more general, abstract terms, the toddler learnsthat whenever he or she produces an unwanted event, the nurturing agentresponds with a discomfort-producing, negative emotion. The child learns toanticipate the coming of negative emotional states without their having to occur(cf. Sullivan, 1953). When producing an unwanted event, the typical pairing ofthat event with negative emotion causes the child to become aroused withouthaving to wait for any scolding by a nurturing adult.

Children also learn that the falling lamp does not always produce anger in thenurturing agent. There are conditions in which the nurturing agent’s anger wouldnot be directed toward the child. For example, if the child had beenpushed into thelamp by an older sibling, the anger probably would have been directed not to thetoddler but to the older child. That is, if the child is not responsible for the aversiveevent, then the negative emotion that often follows the event may be avoided.

The foregoing account suggests that it is reasonable to think of dissonance asthe learned association of negative arousal that occurs only when one is person-ally responsible for an aversive event. Whenever a dissonance situation arises,that learned association occurs and the individual experiences the unpleasant statewe have come to call dissonance arousal. In the research paradigms used to studydissonance, the reduction of dissonance arousal usually comes about throughattitude or behavior change.

563UNLEARNING COGNITIVE DISSONANCE


There are times when taking responsibility for aversive events does not lead toattitude or behavior change. One of those times is when a person has an externalstimulus available to which to misattribute her or his arousal (Zanna & Cooper,1974). People will typically seize the opportunity to blame their arousal on pills(Zanna & Cooper, 1974), lights (Gonzales & Cooper, reported in Zanna &Cooper, 1976), or an uncomfortable room (Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1978; Fried& Aronson, 1995).

The notion that there are conditions in which a person can take responsibilityfor an aversive event and misattribute that arousal state as something other thandissonance presents an intriguing dilemma. Consider the participant in theinduced compliance study described earlier. She had advocated reducing handi-capped funding and realizes she must accept responsibility. However, if she hadpreviously ingested a pill that she believed produced negative arousal, she wouldnot manifest attitude change. To the contrary, she would attribute her arousal tothe pill and leave her attitudes intact.

The question is, what happens to the typical association with which we havegrown familiar: that being responsible for an aversive event causes arousal? If oneis able to make a motivated attributional error and tie the aversive event to adifferent stimulus, is there a consequence to the learned link between the eventsthat typically produce dissonance and the unpleasant arousal state? Cooper andFazio (1984) speculated that, in such circumstances, there might be a weakeningof the usual link. With sufficiently numerous or salient experiences, a person maybegin to extinguish the connection. In other words, dissonance may be unlearned.

The present study is an attempt to assess whether dissonance can be unlearned—that is, whether misattribution can weaken the link between the conditions thattypically produce dissonance and the arousal state that leads to attitude change. Inthe study, participants will engage in typical dissonance producing behaviors.Some of the participants will have a misattributional opportunity such that theirarousal will be attributed to uncomfortable lighting. They will have produced anaversive event, taken responsibility for it, but will not have seen that as havingcaused them any upset, arousal, or negative emotional state. We will then placethose participants in a subsequent dissonance-producing situation without anymisattributional stimulus. Having once made the judgment that they were notaffected or aroused despite their being responsible for an aversive event, will theyshow a lack of arousal a second time? Will they have learned not to experiencedissonance arousal?

STUDY ONE. ESSAY WRITING

Method

Participants.One hundred four students at Princeton University volunteeredfor what we described only as a ‘‘series of studies.’’ Fifty-three of the participantswere female; fifty-one were male. They were promised $5 for their time. The datafrom four participants were eventually discarded. Three expressed suspicion ofthe procedure and one misunderstood the description of the task.

564 JOEL COOPER


Procedure.The overall rationale for the series of studies was to have studentsparticipate in any of a number of research projects that were needing to be finishedby the end of the semester. Students were told that the studies were not connectedin any substantive way other than their being in need of completion. Participantswere run individually. Each participant was told that he or she was randomlychosen for studies A and C, the ‘‘essay writing’’ and ‘‘measures of performance’’studies, respectively.

Each participant was asked to help the Dean’s Committee to decide whether toinstitute 7 A.M. classes at the university. A pretest had determined that studentswere much opposed to beginning the school day at 7:00, so it seemed anappropriate attitude issue to use in the current study. In a manner similar to manyprevious studies (e.g., Linder, Cooper, and Jones, 1967), the experimenterexplained, ‘‘We have found that one of the best ways to find out what the issuesare on either side of a controversial issue is to have people write strong andforceful essays taking one side of the question.’’ In thehigh choicecondition, theexperimenter added, ‘‘We already have a sufficient number of people arguingagainst 7 A.M. classes so what we would like you to do, if you are willing, is towrite the strongest, most forceful essay you can, taking the position that 7 A.M.classes are a good idea for this university. Are you willing to help us?’’

In the low choicecondition, the experimenter provided the same rationale butomitted the clause ‘‘if you are willing’’ and did not ask the participant if he or shewas willing to help. Otherwise, the two conditions were precisely the same.

Orthogonal to this manipulation, participants were assigned either to themisattribution or no misattribution condition. In themisattributioncondition, theparticipant was told, ‘‘I do need to apologize for the lighting in this room. It is anew lighting and we have had some reports that it makes some people a bitaroused and tense. It does not affect everyone and the effects are short-lived.’’This information was omitted in theno misattributioncondition.

Participants were then given a piece of blank paper. At the top was a printedtitle stating, ‘‘Why I believe we should have 7 A.M. classes at Princeton.’’ Therewas also a space for the participant to write his or her name and class. Theexperimenter reminded the participant that he or she was to write the strongest,most forceful essay possible to support 7 A.M. classes. The experimenter then leftthe room, allowing the participant to compose his or her essay.

After 10 min, the experimenter returned, thanked the participant and collectedthe essay. In a manner similar to previous research (e.g., Linder et al., 1967), theexperimenter gave the participant a questionnaire. He said, ‘‘Before we conclude,we have found it interesting to find out what participants really feel about 7 A.M.classes. We would appreciate your filling out this questionnaire.’’ The question-naire was a one-item question stating, ‘‘The University should institute 7 A.M.classes.’’ This was followed by a 31-point questionnaire labeled ‘‘strongly agree’’and ‘‘strongly disagree’’ at the end points.

After collecting the major dependent measure, the experimenter gave eachparticipant a second questionnaire. Among the questions on this form, the



participant was asked, ‘‘How free did you feel to decline to write the essay?’’ and,‘‘How would you rate the strength of the essay you wrote?’’ Each of these wasfollowed by a 31-point scale with higher numbers indicating greater freedom andgreater essay strength, respectively.

Finally, the participant was told that the Department of Buildings and Groundswas concerned with collecting data about the lighting in this and every room in thebuilding. Consequently, they were asking people who use the rooms to answersome brief questions about the room lighting. In addition to asking questionsabout the brightness of the room, the questionnaire asked participants to rate howcomfortable or uncomfortable they were with the room lighting.

Results

Check on the manipulation.To check on the choice manipulation, participantswere asked how much freedom they had to decline to write their essay. Resultsshowed a main effect for choice,F(1, 95) 5 8.61, p , .01. High choiceparticipants rated their decision freedom asM 5 24.8 while low choice partici-pants rated their freedom asM 5 9.6.

No differences were found for the participants’ ratings of the strength of theiressays.

Participants’ ratings of the discomfort of the room lighting showed a maineffect for the misattribution manipulation (M 5 14.3 for the misattributioncondition; M5 8.9 for no misattribution),F(1, 95)5 5.87,p , .01. This maineffect was qualified by a marginal choice3 misattribution interaction,F(1, 95)52.91; p , .08). As expected, participants in the high choice, misattributioncondition tended to rate the lighting as more uncomfortable (M 5 15.3) thanparticipants in the other three conditions.

Attitude change.Participants were asked to indicate their attitude toward 7A.M. classes on a 31-point scale wherelower numbers indicated greater agree-ment with the counterattitudinal position. The attitude of the control group was27.9, representing a strong anti-7 A.M. class position. The results of the fourexperimental conditions are shown in Table 1. The misattribution3 choiceinteraction was significant,F(1, 95)5 7.31,p , .01.

In addition, the high choice–no misattribution group (M 5 19.4) was the onlycondition to differ significantly from the control group (M 5 27.9); it also differedsignificantly from each of the other three conditions.

TABLE 1ATTITUDES TOWARD 7 A.M. CLASSES AS AFUNCTION OF CHOICE AND MISATTRIBUTION

Misattribution No misattribution

High choice 27.3 19.4Low choice 28.1 27.6

Note. n5 20 in each condition. Attitude-only control condition5 27.9. Lower numbers indicategreater agreement with 7 A.M. classes.

566 JOEL COOPER


Discussion

The results of the first study provide a conceptual replication of the misattribu-tion phenomenon in dissonance research. Like Zanna and Cooper’s (1974) study,the results showed that participants manifested dissonance reduction in the nomisattribution condition as a function of decision freedom: Writing a counteratti-tudinal essay under high choice conditions resulted in attitude change in thedirection of the essay. When a misattributional cue was made available (in thiscase, the presence of experimental lighting), participants seized upon it as thereason for their discomfort. As in previous misattribution studies, participantswho could attribute their discomfort to the lighting did so and that weakened theirneed to reduce dissonance.

The present study differs from previous misattribution research by asking whathappens next. Will people’s experience with misattribution alter their subsequentdissonance experience? Participants in the high choice–misattribution conditionare in an interesting position: They were subjected to the conditions that usuallyprovoke dissonance and result in attitude change. They freely wrote an attitudediscrepant essay, knowing that their essay might create the aversive consequenceof promoting a policy with which they disagreed. But, apparently, they did notexperience what Cooper and Fazio (1984) refer to as dissonance motivationbecause they mistakenly attributed their uncomfortable arousal to the lighting thatwe had conveniently provided for them. Relative to all of the other participants,would these participants experience dissonance in a subsequent situation?

For all of the other participants in the first study, nothing out of the ordinaryoccurred. Low choice participants did not experience dissonance arousal, acustomary consequence for people who are coerced into counterattitudinaladvocacy. High choice participants who did not have a salient external cue toexplain their arousal apparently experienced dissonance motivation and changedtheir attitudes accordingly. Only the participants who wrote counterattitudinalessays under high choice conditionsandmisattributed their arousal to the lightshad an atypical experience. We predict that such an experience will weaken thelink between counterattitudinal advocacy and dissonance motivation. Using thesame volunteers who participated in the first experiment, we expect such partici-pants to manifest less dissonance in a subsequent situation, even without having amisattributional opportunity.

STUDY TWO: MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE

Method

Participants.The 100 students who completed Experiment One then partici-pated in the second study. They had volunteered to be in a series of studies. Afterfinishing the dependent measures for Experiment One, each participant wasaccompanied back to the waiting room. There, the participant was immediatelygreeted by a second experimenter and ushered into a different experimental room.



Procedure.In order to make it reasonable that the two dissonance experimentswere not connected, the second experiment used a procedure similar to that usedoriginally by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). The task in the second study wasphenotypically quite different from the counterattitudinal essay writing task inorder to minimize any possible suspicion. The purpose of the procedure is tocreate dissonance by having participants perform a dull task and then, for a smallinducement, having them tell a student who they believe is waiting to participatethat the task is exciting and enjoyable.

Consistent with the original methodology, participants were told that the studywas entitled ‘‘Measures of Performance.’’ They were shown a large peg boardwith 48 rectangular pegs. They were asked to use their left hand to remove each ofthe pegs, then replace them onto the board. When that task was complete, theywere asked to remove each peg with their right hand, then replace them. Thisprocedure was followed for 20 min. Ample research has confirmed that this task isindeed found to be extremely dull and exceedingly boring.

At the end of the 20-min period, the experimenter explained to the participantthat he or she was actually in a control group in this experiment. ‘‘Had you been inthe experimental group,’’ the experimenter explained, ‘‘a confederate who workswith me would have come to tell you that the experiment was one of the mostexciting he had ever been in. We are testing whether what you expect willinfluence the speed and accuracy of performance.’’ This false explanation permit-ted the appropriate rationale for the counterattitudinal behavior.

The experimenter then ‘‘realized’’ that the confederate had not yet arrived andthat the next person waiting to participate in the experiment was already seated inthe waiting room. The experimenter seemed to have the spontaneous insight thatshe could ask the participant if he or she would not mind doing her a favor. Shecould work for the experimenter and be the one to tell the waiting participant thatthe task was exciting and interesting.

In the high incentive condition, the experimenter offered the participant anadditional $10 for performing the task. In the low incentive condition, theexperimenter offered $2. As in previous research, convincing the waiting partici-pant (actually a confederate of the experimenter) that the task was exciting whilereceiving only a small amount of incentive for the attitude discrepant behaviorwas expected to lead to dissonance.

The experimenter made clear that serving in the role of confederate was ‘‘notrequired and you do not have to do it. But it would only take another minute ortwo and I would appreciate it if you could help me out.’’ All but two of theparticipants agreed to make the statement. The participant entered the waitingroom and tried to convince the confederate, using whatever words he or shewished, that the task was exciting. The confederate always acted politely and,consistent with Cooper and Worchel’s (1970) research, indicated that he wasconvinced by the participant’s experience. ‘‘I am glad to hear it,’’ he said. ‘‘Mostof the studies I’ve participated in have been, well, frankly, not that interesting. I’mreally looking forward to this one.’’

568 JOEL COOPER


The participant left the experimental room to see a departmental secretary whowas prepared to give the participant the appropriate credit slip for his or herparticipation and the extra incentive that had been promised. In fact, the secretaryserved as the person administering the dependent measure of the second study.She told the participant that the psychology department was conducting a surveywith everyone who participates in research to determine how they feel about thevarious research projects. She then administered the four-item questionnaire thatassessed participants’ attitudes toward the peg sorting task. The questions werebased on those used by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) and modified by Cooper,Zanna, and Goethals (1974). Participants were asked:

1. How enjoyable was the peg sorting task you performed?2. Did you feel you learned anything from the peg sorting?3. Do you think the results of this experiment may have scientific value?4. Would you have any desire to participate in another similar experiment?

As checks on the perception of the manipulation, a second questionnaire askedparticipants about their perception of decision freedom and how much additionalincentive they had been promised. Participants also received the questionnaireallegedly from the Department of Buildings and Grounds that asked them to ratethe lighting in the experimental room.

When participants finished the questionnaires, the secretary signaled the twoexperimenters who reentered the room. Together, they thoroughly debriefed theparticipants. They explained the connectedness of the two studies and the reasonsfor the deception. No participant indicated any suspicion that the two studies wereconnected in any way other than what had been explained to them at the outset oftheir participation. Participants received experimental credit and the extra finan-cial compensation for their participation.

Results

Checks on the manipulation.Participants were asked whether they had beenrequested to assist the experimenter in any way. If so, they were asked how muchadditional incentive they had been offered. All participants recalled the amountcorrectly. Participants also were asked how free they felt to decline to participatein the measure of performance task and how free they felt to decline to assist theexperimenter. For the former question, participants indicated a mean ofM 5 8.47on a 31-point scale labeled ‘‘not at all free’’ (51) and ‘‘completely free’’ (531) atthe endpoints. There were no differences among the experimental conditions.When asked how free they felt to decline to assist the experimenter, participantsindicated considerable freedom on the same 31-point scale (M 5 20.11) and, asexpected, no differences among conditions were found.

It is important to determine that participants in the different conditions did notdifferentially perceive the lighting in the room. Even though nothing was statedabout the lighting being uncomfortable, it is possible that the informationprovided to misattribution participants in Experiment One carried over to Experi-



ment Two. Fortunately, the check on the manipulation shows this not to be thecase. The overall rating of the lighting on a scale of 1 (5very pleasant) to 7(5very unpleasant) was 2.8. A one-way ANOVA failed to reveal any significantdifferences.

The confederate, who was blind to the condition of the participant, rated hisperception of the strength of the participant’s effort to convince him that the taskwas interesting. Immediately after the participant delivered his or her message,the confederate surreptitiously entered a rating on a scale of 1 (5not at allconvincing) to 7 (5completely convincing). No differences were found amongconditions. The mean of the convincingness ratings wasM 5 5.3.

Dependent measure: Attitudes toward the task.Participants were asked fourquestions pertaining to their perception of the task. As in previous research(Cooper et al., 1974), the items proved highly correlated with each other andproduced an overall alpha of .87. This enabled us to combine the four questionsinto a single index of ‘‘enjoyment toward the task.’’

It should be noted that the peg removal task was indeed boring. Ten additionalvolunteers who had not been in Experiment One participated in the peg removaltask. They only performed the task and filled out the major dependent measure.These participants rated the task as 24.1 on the 31-point enjoyment index.

The overall design of the experiment was a three-way factorial. Two of thefactors derived from the participants’ experience in the first study(choice3 misattribution). The third factor was their experience in the secondstudy. Some participants agreed to convince the waiting subject for a lowincentive and, therefore, were expected to experience a high degree of dissonancemotivation. Others had agreed following a high financial inducement and werenot expected to experience dissonance.

In addition to these eight conditions, 20 students had participated in the controlcondition of Experiment One. They had been asked about their attitudes toward 7A.M. classes but had not been exposed to any experimental manipulations. Theseparticipants also served in Experiment Two, being randomly assigned to high andlow incentive conditions.

Our major prediction was that volunteers who participated in the first experi-ment and wrote counterattitudinal essays under conditions of high choice, but hadan external stimulus to which to misattribute their arousal, would manifest lessattitude change in the measures of performance experiment. In the low incentiveconditions of Experiment Two, dissonance is typically aroused. The hypothesiswas that dissonance reduction, as measured by task enjoyment, would beattenuated in those whose dissonance had been misattributed to the lighting justmoments before during the first experiment.

The results presented in Table 2 support this prediction.At the right side of the table are the data from the participants who had been in

the control condition of Experiment One. These data confirm that the current‘‘measures of performance’’experiment replicate the often-found, inverse relation-ship between incentive magnitude and attitude change. Participants who received

570 JOEL COOPER


only a small incentive to convince the waiting subject that the task was interestingcame to believe that the task was more interesting than those who participated fora high incentive. This difference is significant,t(19)5 2.94,p , .01.

An analysis of variance conducted on the remaining eight conditions reveals asignificant main effect for incentive magnitude,F(1, 91)5 5.12,p , .05. Overall,lower incentives for attitude discrepant behavior led to greater attitude change.However, consistent with the predictions, this main effect is qualified by a secondorder, choice3 incentive3 misattribution interaction,F(1, 91)5 6.33,p , .05.This interaction is most readily interpreted by first examining the pattern in the nomisattribution conditions. These four conditions have a data pattern similar to thatfound in the Control conditions. The standard dissonance effect was obtained:Low incentive condition participants expressed attitudes more in line with theircounterattitudinal behavior than did high incentive participants. However, partici-pants who were in the misattribution conditions during Experiment One showed adifferent pattern: A simple choice3 incentive interaction was found in theseconditions, F(1, 91) 5 8.17, p , .01. As predicted, participants who hadmisattributed their arousal in the high choice condition of the first experiment didnot change their attitudes in the second experiment, even in the usually dissonance-arousing, low incentive condition.

Discussion

It may be possible to unlearn dissonance. The data from the current studiesshow that, under certain conditions, people alter their experience of dissonancemotivation. When they have been in a situation in which dissonance arousal wasmistakenly attributed to external lighting, the subsequent link between counterat-titudinal advocacy and attitude change was significantly weakened.

We have known for some time that dissonance can be misattributed. This study,like several before it, showed that people who write counterattitudinal essays,who perceive that they have free choice to do so, and who foreseeably bring aboutaversive consequences still may not be motivated to change their attitudes if they

TABLE 2ENJOYMENT INDEX SCORES

Previous experience in essay writing study

Misattribution No misattribution

High choice Low choice High choice Low choice Control

Low incentive to convinceconfederate

19.3(n 5 10)

13.9(n 5 10)

14.3(n 5 9)

14.8(n 5 10)

15.1(n 5 10)

High incentive to convinceconfederate

22.1(n 5 10)

23.2(n 5 10)

21.6(n 5 10)

22.8(n 5 9)

20.7(n 5 10)

Note. Measures of performance control5 24.1. Lower numbers indicate greater enjoyment ofpeg-sorting task.



can misattribute their unpleasant arousal to an external source. The current studydiffers from previous studies by asking the question, What happens next? Thehypothesis that such misattribution would attenuate dissonance motivation in asubsequent condition that usually leads to dissonance was supported. In fact,dissonance was attenuated to the point that the difference between the low andhigh incentive conditions was not close to significant.

The magnitude of the reduction of dissonance in the previous misattribution–high choice conditions was somewhat surprising. Even in the learning literature,one-trial learning is unusual and is generally found only for sensory aversionssuch as taste (Garcia and Koeling, 1966). It is probably true that in the everydayworld outside the laboratory, numerous repetitions of misattribution would berequired for dissonance to be significantly weakened. However, the ability oflaboratory procedures to focus people’s attention on a singular phenomenonprobably emphasized its impact and led to an effect after the first experience. Itis unlikely to expect one-trial elimination of dissonance without such empha-tic focus.

Before addressing the broader theoretical issues posed by these findings, weshould consider the possibility that the results we obtained were a function of thespecific laboratory context in which they were produced. Perhaps the lack ofattitude change in the critical previous misattribution–high choice conditions wascaused by the two experiments being conducted in the same setting. Is it possiblethat participants who believed that the lights were the source of their arousal in thefirst experiment continued to think that their arousal in the second study was dueto the very same lights? Might they then have refrained from reporting anyattitude change because they were still using the lights as an explanation for theirarousal? Although we cannot definitively rule out such a possibility, it seemsunlikely that the present findings were entirely due to the contiguity of time andlocation. First, we structured the physical arrangement to create differencesbetween the two studies such as having different experimenters conduct differenttasks in different rooms of the building. More important, though, is the findingthat participants who had been in the previous misattribution–high choiceconditions of Experiment One did not report greater discomfort to the lights inExperiment Two. If these participants believed the lighting was the source of theirarousal, then it is likely that they would have found the lights less comfortable inthe second experiment. The questionnaire administered in Experiment Tworevealed no differences in participants’ perceptions of the room lighting.

A related explanation is that the dissonance aroused in the first experiment wasnot fully reduced when it had been blamed on the lights. It then may have carriedover to the second experiment. When participants made attitude discrepantstatements in the second study, they may have thought their arousal was caused bythe same stimulus that produced the arousal in the first experiment: ‘‘I must stillbe bothered by the lights,’’ they may have thought. Again, however, the fact thatthe previous high choice–misattribution participants in Experiment one did notattribute greater discomfort to the lights during the second task makes it less likely

572 JOEL COOPER


that these participants were bringing more negative arousal with them into thesecond experiment.

At a broader theoretical level, it is interesting to think about the mechanism thatis involved in what we have called the unlearning of dissonance. Was dissonancearousal reduced or was arousal present but the link between that arousal andattitude change weakened? Cooper and Fazio’s (1984) New Look model drew adistinction between dissonancearousaland dissonancemotivation.In the NewLook model, dissonance arousal is the unpleasant tension state produced by theperception of having freely brought about an aversive event. Dissonance motiva-tion is the impetus to alter attitudes or undergo cognitive change. Which wasweakened by the procedures used in our research? It is clear that dissonancemotivation was reduced because the link between bringing about the aversiveevent and the impetus to change attitudes was weakened. The fascinating questionthat remains is whether dissonance was ever aroused by the low incentive,counterattitudinal advocacy of the second study. Did participants who had hadtheir dissonance arousal misattributed to the lights in the first procedure everexperience arousal following their counterattitudinal advocacy in the secondprocedure? The data to answer this question are not definitive because theprocedures were not designed to measure arousal either physiologically (e.g.,Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Losch & Cacioppo, 1990) or psychologically (e.g., Elliot& Devine, 1994; Pallak & Pittman, 1972). However, it seems reasonable tospeculate that if the psychological discomfort and physiological arousal werehigh, then participants would have been inclined to find a source for that arousal(Cooper, Zanna & Taves, 1978). They might have attempted to explain away theirunpleasant arousal through another misattribution. Yet, as we have seen, theyneither used attitude change nor attributed their arousal to the lighting that hadbeen provided for them as a potential explanation in the prior experiment. Hadthey been experiencing arousal, the information that there was experimentallighting in the building that was given to them in Experiment One might havebeen seized upon by participants to misattribute their arousal in Experiment Two.

On the other hand, there is a curious finding in the second experiment that isworth pointing out. Table 2 shows that, in the critical conditions of ExperimentTwo, there was no significant difference between the high choice–low incentiveand high choice–high incentive conditions. It was indeed the crux of theinteraction hypothesis that these conditions would not manifest the usual disso-nance effect and, indeed, this was what was found. However, there is some priorevidence (Linder, Cooper & Jones, 1967; Rosenberg, 1965) that if dissonancearousal is completely eliminated, the effect of incentive may actually reverse—i.e., low incentive may produce less attitude change than high incentive. This didnot happen in the current study, leading to the possibility thatsomedissonancewas still aroused. The theoretical distinction is an interesting one. Future researchshould examine the antecedent role of arousal in what we have called theunlearning process.

The data in this set of experiments provide the first demonstration that



dissonance can be affected by prior experience. If dissonance can be unlearned,this fact may take us one step closer to understanding the possible development ofdissonance. The notion of associative learning, in its broader usage, has been arich and useful heuristic for thinking about the development of the self (e.g.,Kelly, 1955; Sullivan, 1953). If people adopt dissonance reduction strategies asfunctional parts of their emerging self-systems, they may also drop or unlearnsuch strategies when experience teaches them that the strategies are no longerneeded. Envisioning dissonance as a part of a developing self-system may expandour notion of the motivational basis of dissonance. More than merely a need to putcognitions in order, resolving dissonance may be seen as a way for people to dealwith the functional issues of anxiety and emotional pain. It becomes part andparcel of the individual’s development as we learn to avoid unpleasant emotionsby dealing with the cognitive conditions that bring forth such emotions. Thinkingof dissonance in this way may help to open new avenues of research in thedevelopment of dissonance motivation, its timing in the developmental process,and the conditions that lead to its strengthening and weakening.

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McGuire, T. M. Newcomb & P. H. Tannenbaum (Eds.),Theories of cognitive consistency: Asourcebook(pp 5–27). Skokie, IL: Rand McNally.

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Clemence, A. (1990). Effect of social class belonging on the cognitive dissonance resulting from threatseverity.European Journal of Social Psychology,20,525–529.

Cooper, J. & Fazio, R. H. (1984). A new look at dissonance theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),Advances inexperimental social psychology(Vol. 17, pp. 229–266). New York: Academic Press.

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Cooper, J., Zanna, M. P., & Goethals, G. R. (1974). Mistreatment of an esteemed other as aconsequence affecting dissonance reduction.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,10,224–233.

Cooper, J., Zanna, M. P., & Taves, P. A. (1978). Arousal as a necessary condition for attitude changefollowing induced compliance.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,36,1101–1106.

Croyle, R. & Cooper, J. (1983). Dissonance arousal: Physiological evidence.Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology,45,782–791.

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Harmon-Jones, E., Brehm, J. W., Greenberg, J., Simon, L. & Nelson, D. E. (1996). Evidence that theproduction of aversive consequences is not necessary to create cognitive dissonance.Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology,70,5–16.

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unlearning cognitive dissonance: toward an understanding of the development of dissonance

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