universals: conceptualism michael lacewing [email protected]

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Universals: conceptualism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy .co.uk

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Page 1: Universals: conceptualism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Universals: conceptualism

Michael [email protected]

.uk

Page 2: Universals: conceptualism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Ontology

• What exists?– Particular things– These are classified: whale, animal, living

thing, physical object

• These classifications are not arbitrary – all whales have something in common, all animals do, etc.– ‘Being a whale’/’whaleness’ – does this

property exist?

Page 3: Universals: conceptualism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Alternatives

• What do all honest people have in common?

• Realism: Honesty – this is a noun, and nouns pick out a ‘something’

• Nominalism (predicate): the term ‘honest’ applies to them– In virtue of similarities between them

• Nominalism (conceptualism): they all fall under the concept HONEST

Page 4: Universals: conceptualism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Conceptualism

• Nominalism: only particular things exist

• We classify particular things using general concepts

• ‘Honest’ doesn’t mean the concept HONEST (properties aren’t concepts)– But something has the property honesty

in virtue of falling under the concept HONEST

Page 5: Universals: conceptualism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Advantage

• Not all concepts/general terms have reference, e.g. WITCH

• Over predicate nominalism: ‘witch’ can’t refer to the resemblances between particulars

• Over realism: ‘witch’ can’t refer to a universal

• But ‘witch’ has meaning – derived from the concept WITCH

Page 6: Universals: conceptualism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Objections

• Where do our concepts/classifications come from?– Must be similarities or resemblance between

particulars– But then ‘resemblance’ is itself what is

fundamental, not the concept

• Russell: ‘resemblance’ is a relation, and relations are universals!– What’s the origin of the concept

‘resemblance’? Real similarities

Page 7: Universals: conceptualism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Objections

• Without universals, we can’t explain our abilities to recognise, categorise or generalise about particulars– But concepts aren’t all-or-nothing, as

universals are, e.g. prototype analysis

• Without universals, explanations fail– E.g. why did the scales move? Because of

the weight– The weight of a particular is independent of

us, even if the system of weight is not

Page 8: Universals: conceptualism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Discussion

• General terms may derive their meaning from our concepts, but the story can’t stop their – our concepts must derive from reality

• Concepts that correspond to reality pick out universals; for concepts that do not, e.g. WITCH, there are no universals

• Alternative: reality is mind-dependent?