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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

INTRODUCTION

The UN Security Council is the primary body of the United Nations for maintaining

international peace and security. One of the main characteristics of the UNSC, which

contrasts with other UN organs, is that it is the only committee whose resolutions are binding

upon all Member States, regardless if they are current members of the UNSC or not.

Moreover, it is also in the Council’s mandate the right to authorize the use of force through

peacekeeping operations or military coalitions and also to impose economic and military

sanctions, but always as a last resort when all negotiations have failed (especially in the case

of military action). Therefore, the UNSC’s first actions when a complaint related to a threat to

international peace and security is brought before it is to recommend to the parties to try and

reach a peaceful solution. It may also help ceasing of the dispute by investigating or

mediating the conflict.

The Council has also ordered ceasefires and imposed economic sanctions or collective

military embargoes on many occasions in which disputes have led to the use of force. At last,

the UNSC may recommend the suspension or expulsion, by the General Assembly, of a

Member State that recurrently violates the principles of the UN Charter. This committee is,

then, essential for maintaining international peace and security and saving succeeding

generations from the scourge of war—the main goal of the United Nations—, while its

relevance goes way beyond security and geopolitics, because its decisions have effects on the

populations directly involved in the conflicts it strives to solve.

The UNSC is formed by fifteen members, of which five are permanent and ten are

selected by the General Assembly for two year terms. The five permanent members of the

Security Council are China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States,

and they hold what is commonly known as “veto power”. That means that for any resolution

to be approved it needs the concurring vote of the five “great powers”, meaning that if they

are against, it will automatically fail. Since 2011 the first five temporary members of the

UNSC are Colombia, Germany, India, Portugal, and South Africa. In 2012, five new

members were elected by the General Assembly, namely Azerbaijan, Guatemala, Morocco,

Pakistan, and Togo.

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TOPIC A: Non-Proliferation —The Situation in Iran

Laura Quaglia, Luciana Brandão,

Bruno Gomes Guimarães, and Willian Moraes Roberto

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1. The formation of Iran

To comprehend the formation of Iran as a major actor nowadays it is necessary to

consider the multiple factors that influenced the development of the Middle East and,

specially, of the ancient Persia (LEWIS, 2004). Since its formation, Iran (or, how it was called

before 1935, Persia) holds unique characteristics that differentiate it from its neighbours in the

Middle East and North Africa. One of these differences is the fact that Iran is a country of

Muslim majority and, in spite of that, it is not an Arab one. The distinction between those two

concepts, therefore, has to be made: whereas Arabism regards ethnic and cultural features;

Islamism concerns religious aspects (VIZENTINI, 2002). The Arab-Islamic conquest that

happened in the 7th century was responsible for drastically changing the cultural patterns of

the societies in the region. In Iran, however, the millenary Persian culture remained strong,

merging with the Arab one (LEWIS, 2003).

A second particularity about Iran is its political structure, which also has its roots in a

past connected with the Arab expansion. The Shiite political orientation, which is directly

related with Iran nowadays, was brought by the Arabs to the country around five centuries

ago (KHALAJI, 2011). According to Lewis (2003) this was the key moment for the

consolidation of a centralized dynasty responsible for unifying the different Iranian territories

in a unique bloc. Unlike the other neighbours with Sunni orientations, Iran was shaped with a

mix of Persian culture and Shiite ideology.

A third factor that held a major influence over Iran’s formation as a State is the fact

that the territory where it is now established has always been a disputed place, being occupied

by different cultures and societies all along its History (LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 2008).

More recently—and until the first half of the 20th century1—the reasons for this kind of

disputes may be summed up to two aspects, namely strategic location and natural resources.

The ancient Silk Road used to connect the West and the East through an overland

transport of goods and this route crossed Persia (KHANNA, 2008). With the improvement in

navigation techniques, after the 14th century, this route was substituted by maritime ones,

1 Another reason will be added to these relations with the development of nuclear energy and nuclear armaments in the second half of the 20th century.

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turning Egypt and the Red Sea into more important places in the region (HOGAN, 2007). The

decay of the Persian terrestrial trade routes, however, did not put an end to the centrality of

that region. On the contrary, Persia would become even more pivotal to the world politics in

the following centuries, especially due to its natural resources. The use of oil as the main

energy source in the 20th century and the discovery of several oil fields to the west of Tehran

put Iran right in the centre of attentions of the great powers. The British company Anglo

Persian, for example, started the exploitation of the region’s sources in 1908. The Russian

Empire also had interests in Persia and also tried to extend and exert its influence over Central

Asia at that time.2

Along the first two decades of the 20th century the attempts pursued by the Iranian

society for political reforms were restrained by the British and Russian empires. They feared

losing control over the region and its resources. With the Russian Revolution in 1917 this

country’s influence over Iran receded, thus, letting the United Kingdom support politically

and financially the establishment of a new government headed by the commandant of the

Persian Cossack Brigade, Reza Shah Pahlavi. Pahlavi deposed the Qajar dynasty3 and started

a series of modernizing reforms. His government, however, ended up revealing more

nationalistic and authoritarian traces than the British administration had hoped for; Pahlavi

did not accomplish any substantial social improvement either. His growing relations with

fascist governments during the Second World War led to a military intervention by the United

Kingdom and the Soviet Union in 1941, known as Operation Countenance. This operation

deposed the Shah and formed a new coalition government under his son, Mohammad Reza

Shah Pahlavi, and the Allies (KINZER, 2003).

The government of Mohammad Reza was sustained with British and American

support in the subsequent decades. Thus, any contrary action or attempt to promote a reform

that threatened the interests of these two great powers would be suppressed with relative

success until 19794.

2 The supplies of Iranian oil provided the necessary means for modernizing the British Navy and ensured the fuel necessary to that country during the First World War. As for Russia, since the 19th century it was trying to expand its influence not only over Persia, but also in Central Asia, in order to acquire a warm water port (YERGIN, 1992). 3 The Qajar dynasty used to be the bureaucratic elite that detained the governmental control over Persia since 1785. It maintained the power inside the Qajar family, as in a monarchy. When the dynasty started to manifest disagreements with the British, the UK supported its deposition, which was already claimed by some sectors of society dissatisfied with the old regime. 4 The most well known case took place in 1953 with Ajax Operation, staged by the Central Intelligence Agency (RISEN, 2000). This was the operation responsible for taking out of the Iranian political scene Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. Mossadegh's autonomy was a threat to the Sha's government and, therefore, to the western presence in Iran. The Operation led to Mossadegh's deposition and exile.

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1.2. The Cold War period and the Iran-Iraq War

The emergence of the Cold War transformed Iran into an indispensable ally for the

United States and other Western countries. At that time, nationalistic and revolutionary

movements sprung up in the Middle East – for instance the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 and

they brought new concerns to the great powers with interests in the region. The disruption of

these revolutions led to the creation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, uniting the conservative

governments of Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom with the purpose of

blocking these revolutions in the area (VIZENTINI, 2002).5

At the same time, the production of nuclear technology by the great powers rose,

generating a new source of fear because of its military uses, but also creating vast

expectations around its peaceful applications. The idea of funding an international agency for

the control over atomic energy came from US President Dwight Eisenhower, in his speech to

the General Assembly called “Atoms for Peace” in 1953. Eisenhower’s proposal was that

governments of the main countries involved would donate stockpiles of fissile material and

natural uranium to a specialized agency responsible for keeping and protecting this material.

His idea would evolve into the formulation of the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) statute signed by 81 countries in 1956. This document stated the responsibilities for

the control and development of nuclear energy, which should happen only for peaceful

purposes (FISCHER, 1997).

In this sense, the Iranian government of Mohammad Reza started a partnership with the

United States as a branch of the Atoms for Peace programme6, which was incorporated into

United States legislation by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (USA, 2002). The cooperation

program for the development of pacific nuclear energy in Iran was established in 1957, and a

research centre for nuclear energy at the Tehran University was created (TIMELINE, 2009).

In 1968 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was created.

Iran signed the Treaty in 1968 and ratified it two years later, together with several other

countries. The main goals of the NPT are the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear

weapons and related technologies, the promotion of cooperation for the peaceful utilization of

nuclear energy, and complete nuclear disarmament. One of the main provisions of the treaty is

the establishment of a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic

5 After the Suez Crisis in 1956 the Eisenhower Doctrine was launched, with the goal of sending American troops to the Middle East and stopping any riot attempts by communist uprisings. 6 The Atoms for Peace programme was incorporated into United States legislation by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (USA, 2002). The program would be extended to a series of partnerships among United States and other emergent and allied countries. It reached a total of more than 42 countries in 1959 (FISCHER, 1997).

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Energy Agency. Thereby, the signatories placed themselves at the disposal of the IAEA for

periodical inspections (UN, 1968).

In 1974 the U.S. government signed an agreement with Iran to provide the country with

two nuclear power plants and also a specific amount of enriched uranium to be used as fuel.

In addition to that, during the 1970s, the Iranian government sought partnerships with other

countries—such as Germany, France, and South Africa—to construct additional nuclear

power plants (BRUNO, 2010). It also established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

(AEOI), responsible for the control over Iran’s civil nuclear program (GHANNADI-

MARAGHEH, 2002). This quest for partnerships for technological development, energy

diversification, and infrastructure-building has to be understood in the surrounding context of

Iranian politics for modernization based on the Western model and aligned with American

diplomacy (CURTIS; HOOGLUND, 2008; NASRI, 1983).7 The financing for these activities

came mostly from oil production and export income.

Despite the modern character of the Iranian project, in the political and social scene the

reality was pretty different. The inequalities among the population had been growing deeper

since the beginning of the century and, at the same time, a stronger Islamic and nationalistic

feeling was rising, and it was opposed to Western influence. (ZONIS, 1983). Furthermore,

once Iran’s economy was almost completely dependent on oil, the 1973 crisis compromised

the social and economic situation, creating a power vacuum that allowed for internal fights

between groups searching for a greater influence in the State administration (VIZENTINI,

2002). The whole process would reach its climax in 1979 with the Islamic Revolution, a

movement characterized by a strong anti-imperialist ideal which ended with the establishment

of an Islamic fundamentalist figure in the government of the country: Ayatollah Khomeini.

Right after the Revolution, the Iranian interest in nuclear research and development

diminished and the split with Western powers resulted in the reduction of nuclear cooperation.

Former agreements made with the United States, Germany, and France, for example, were

cancelled or reversed (NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 2009). A couple of years later,

however, Iranian administration would restart the development of its nuclear program, but at

that time with less consent from the Western powers.8

7 Starting in 1961, Iran began implementing a series of reforms supported by the United States through the Kennedy administration that became known as the White Revolution. In this context, Iran was modernized and its economy prospered. This exceptional growth was based on Iran’s oil exportations (USA, 2012a). This is the background where nuclear energy development took place. 8 Later on, in 2003, these activities would be a centre issue for the IAEA, which reported that Iran nuclear development was hidden from the IAEA and, therefore, constituted numerous breaches and failures of Iran's obligation to comply with its safeguards agreement (CORDESMAN; AL-RODHAN, 2006).

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The decade of 1980 was an extremely troubled period for the entire Middle East. The

political changes in Iran meant for the United States and for Israel the loss of their major ally

in that region (HAJI-YOUSEFI, 2003). The Arab-Israeli conflict also escalated, incited by

different political groups in both sides, with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)

being supported by the new Iranian government. This clash led to an atmosphere of

confrontation surrounding both countries; the Islamic Republic of Iran, hence, gave its

support for the Palestinian cause and refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Israeli state

(HAJI-YOUSEFI, 2003).

The development of nuclear armaments in the Middle East enhanced the atmosphere of

distrust that followed from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel, for example, was suspicious that

other countries were developing nuclear technology with military goals. With this argument

Israel took military action in June 1981, attacking and destroying a nuclear reactor in Iraq.

This incident is known as the first attack on a civilian nuclear power plant under IAEA

safeguards and has opened a substantial precedent. The United Nations Security Council

decision about the matter demanded that Israel disassemble its nuclear arsenal. The U.S.

opposed that resolution, threatening to boycott any United Nations body that tried to suspend

or reject Israeli credentials (FISCHER, 1997).

This disagreement between Israel and Iraq would also spread its consequences during

the Iran-Iraq War, a conflict that started in 1980 and finished with a ceasefire promoted by the

United Nations in 1988. This war cleaved and weakened the Muslim world, with the nations

of the Middle East dividing themselves between two opposing sides. Israel would support Iran

due to its belief that Iraq was maintaining or pursuing a nuclear arsenal. Iraq, supported by

Russia and with closer ties with Western nations, presented itself as a possible tool for

crushing the Islamic Iranian government and guaranteeing, therefore, oil supply from the

Gulf. After the war, some of its main consequences were the strengthening of the modern

Iranian armies as well as the legitimization of Khomeini’s government in the internal scene

(VIZENTINI, 2002).

1.3. Recent developments and regional conflicts

After Khomeini’s death, in 1989, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei took his place and the

conservative Rajsanjani was elected president for two mandates until 1997. The new leader

worked towards opening the Iranian economy to the world market and attracting new

international investments. The cooperation in nuclear matters between Iran and other Asian

nations, such as China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, also intensified under

his rule. The development of nuclear energy would also grow at that time, which led the

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Clinton administration to impose unilateral sanctions on Iran, forbidding American companies

to negotiate with the country, including oil and gas related affairs (TIMELINE, 2009). The

election of Khatami, a reformist, in 1997 brought new hopes for the dialogue with the U.S.,

but these were undermined by the election of American president George W. Bush in 2002,

who branded Iran as one of the nations in the “Axis of Evil”.

The election of the new president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 demonstrated the

will of the Iranian society to see their country transformed in an internationally respected

great power (VIZENTINI, 2009). He was elected in June with several reformist proposals,

amongst which were the development of an Iranian nuclear program. The efforts for the

creation of the program started in August of the same year, when Iran notified the United

Nations about plans to start the conversion of raw uranium into its gaseous form for

enrichment (MOUBAYED, 2006; TRAYNOR, 2005). The possibility that there would be a

connection between Iran and the military Lebanese group Hezbollah, considered a terrorist

organization by the USA (PANETTA, 2011), explained a series of sanctions against Iran.9

Therefore, the import and the export of nuclear material were suspended and the financial

assets connected with nuclear activities were frozen. In 2007 and 2008 the sanctions were

tightened and an arms embargo was included.

Another recently demonstrated challenge is the lack of certainty about Iran related

information, about its doctrine or who is actually in charge of its nuclear planning. The

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released a report in 2007 attesting that Iran would not be

capable of producing a nuclear bomb until 2015 (NIE, 2007). The Iranian ballistic missile

capabilities, however, continue to grow and the advanced missile called Sejil-2,15 was

successfully tested in 2009. Some reports also defend the idea that “Iran’s nuclear and

ballistic missile programs are clearly connected” (RAND, 2012).

The relation between Iran and its neighbours is another aspect of the situation that has

become more pertinent while the political scenario in the Middle East becomes even more

complicated. The foreign minister of Egypt, for example, has decided to re-establish

diplomatic ties with Tehran after 30 years of distancing. Israel, on the other hand, shows great

concern over the lack of a second plan in case the sanctions against Iran fail to prevent the

9 It is stated by the American government that Iran has continuously supported some radical political groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah since the Islamic Revolution. The connection between Iran and Hezbollah would be not only financial, but also ideological and religious, since both of them share the same Shiite orientation. The group Hezbollah, according to the United States, receives an amount of 200 million U.S. dollars a year from Iran (TIMES, 2012). Although there is not an absolute certainty about these relations, the United States government reaffirms its validity (PANETTA, 2011). Therefore, in 2006, the existence of this connection was used as one of the main arguments to impose financial sanctions on Iran, preventing its access to the U.S. financial system, which was being used to provide funds to Hezbollah, according to the United States Administration (KATZMAN, 2012).

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country from advancing its nuclear program (RAND, 2012). Furthermore, the control that Iran

exerts over strategic straits and over the oil trade bring a second issue to the table when

discussing the sanctions and the other attempts of stopping the proliferation (COLE, 2012),

dividing other States opinions and creating a bigger challenge when trying to reach a decision.

2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

2.1. Nuclear Capacity in Iran

2.1.1. The Energy vs. Weapon Dilemma

Since the beginning of its nuclear program, the Iranian government has stated that it

would only use nuclear technology to attend peaceful ends, such as for the development of

medical equipment and energy generation. However, as commonly known, much of the

materials and technologies used to create nuclear energy can also be used in the construction

of nuclear weapons. It is, therefore, hard to determine if a country is actually using nuclear

energy for non-military ends, or whether nuclear weapons are being secretly developed.

Iran has the 4th largest oil reserves and the 2nd natural gas reserves in the world, and is

one of the leading members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the

Organization of Gas Exporting Countries. Almost half of Iran’s revenues come from oil

exports, and petroleum makes up for about 80% of the country’s commodities exports.

However, even though Iran is a net energy exporter, an increase in domestic demand has

caused shortage issues in peak hours in main cities (OPEC, 2012).

Iranian energy sources are formed by four main elements: gas (53%), oil (44%),

hydroelectricity (2%) and coal (1%) (CIA, 2012). Therefore, it is noticeable that the country is

heavily reliant on fossil fuels for its energy generation. Those are the arguments used by Iran

to justify its nuclear program, and it follows an international trend of countries trying to gain

more independence from petroleum and natural gas, i.e. non-renewable energy sources. In this

context, nuclear energy presents itself as a valid option for many of those countries. As such,

about 30 countries already have nuclear power plants today, and at least 50 more are studying

this option with the assistance of the IAEA (WNA, 2012). The spread of nuclear power,

however, could generate conflicts with the prerogatives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

and other similar institutions, for it can be used as camouflage for a nuclear arms program

(MILLER; SAGAN, 2009).

Throughput the years, international concern over the purposes of the Iranian nuclear

program have grown. As such, the international community puts into question Iran’s

intentions not only because of its refusal to allow proper inspection of its nuclear facilities

(SANGER; COWELLL, 2012l), but also because of its posture towards Israel, which is

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believed to already possess atomic weapons. Furthermore, the Iranian uranium enrichment

program is believed—and the Iranian government confirms—to go beyond the 20% of

enrichment necessary to generate energy or to develop medical equipment (IAEA, 2012a).

The government has stated that it is capable of creating highly enriched uranium (over 80%)10

at its facility in Natanz, contributing to international concern.

2.1.2. Nuclear Program

The Iranian nuclear program was actually initiated in the 1950s with the support of

western countries, particularly the United States. As already explained in the historical

background, it was part of Eisenhower’s Cold War policy “Atoms for Peace”, that aimed to

spread technology, supplies, and information on nuclear energy intended for peaceful ends.

The practical results were the spread of nuclear fuel to countries like Iran, Korea, Pakistan,

Romania, amongst others, some of which ended up developing their own atomic bombs

(LINZER, 2005).

Iran’s first nuclear reactor was built by North American company American Machine

and Foundry and the country received not only help with nuclear matters, but also military

aircrafts from the United States up until the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Before then, the

Iranian government of the Shah had repeatedly stated its commitment to use nuclear

technology only to generate energy by signing the Non Proliferation Treaty in 1968; that

commitment was reiterated in 1974 by the Shah’s statement that already predicted an oil

shortage and the need to find alternative energy sources: “Petroleum is a noble material, much

too valuable to burn... We envision producing, as soon as possible, 23,000 megawatts of

electricity using nuclear plants.” (WESTGARD, 2012). 1974 was also the year of the signing

of the Iran-IAEA Safeguard Agreement which stipulates that Iran must provide information

on materials subject to safeguards, as well as the characteristics of their facilities (IAEA,

1974, art. 9); also, the government is required to provide information on materials being used

in activities not covered by the safeguard system, which are understood as non-proscribed

military activities (IAEA, 1974, art. 14).

After the Revolution, western help came to a halt, leaving the construction of nuclear

enterprises unfinished, like the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Constructions for the plant

started back in 1975 by German companies, but stopped in 1979 and were only resumed in

10 Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) is used in commercial light water reactors, the most common type of thermal power reactor; and in research reactors. Enriched uranium is considered LEU when it has a concentration of 235U that is lower than 20%. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is used as fissile material to fabricate nuclear weapons. Enriched uranium is considered HEU when it has a concentration of 235U or 233U between 20% (weapon-usable) and 85% (weapon-grade) or more.

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1995 after the Iranian government signed a contract with a Russian contractor11. Additionally,

when the United States cut the supply of highly enriched uranium fuel to the Tehran Nuclear

Research Center, the facility had to shut down for nearly a decade, until 1988 when Argentina

agreed to help Iran convert the reactor to run from highly enriched uranium to low enriched

uranium, and began selling the low enriched fuel to Iran (JAHANPOUR, 2012).

As mentioned before, in recent years the Iranian nuclear program has regained

strength. One of the reasons is the availability of resources that allow for further development.

Even though the country’s uranium resources are not yet completely known, the Atomic

Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) has conducted exploration activities that have estimated

the presence of around 25,000 tons of triuranium octoxide (U3O8)12 – the first step to enriched

uranium – throughout the country, an amount considered to be enough to supply its own

power plants (GLOBAL SECURITY, 2012). For Iran, nuclear power is the most competitive

fuel to fossil energy sources, especially if the domestic prices of gas and oil keep increasing

(STERN, 2006).

The growing concerns about Iran’s nuclear program have led to the beginning of

investigations by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2002, after the public revelation

by the National Council of Resistance of Iran of previously undeclared sites and activities that

allegedly go against NPT clauses and lead to the belief that Iran might be on the path to

creating atomic weapons (SMITH, 2006). Such concerns have not been eased by the signing

of the Additional Protocol13 in 2003, which was ratified that same year. In fact, the signing of

the protocol followed a Board of Governors resolution condemning Iran over its hidden

nuclear developments The main issues were the discovery of a uranium enrichment facility in

Natanz and a heavy water facility in Arak. Since then, the government’s secrecy and refusal to

comply with IAEA requests to inspect its nuclear facilities have given space for increased

concerns over the possibility of the production of nuclear weapons. In its latest reports, the

IAEA has repeatedly denounced Iran’s unwillingness to let agents inspect their nuclear sites

and has urged Iran to stop its uranium enrichment program; all the while Iran defends the

activity’s legality for it is within the scope of the NPT, thus being only used for peaceful

purposes (IAEA, 2011a). However, not only dissident groups inside Iran, but also innumerous

countries and the IAEA itself have declared and produced evidence of possible military

purposes in the Iranian nuclear program. In its report of November/2011 (IAEA, 2011b), the

IAEA published the following list of activities in which Iran has allegedly engaged:

11 Even so, the Bushehr Power Plant was only finished in 2011. 12 U3O8 is mined and milled to turn into yellowcake. 13 Additional Perotocols are an instrument used by the IAEA to expand its investigation capacities in order to detect the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities and materials.

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• Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and

materials by military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);

• Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material

(Annex, Section C.3);

• The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation

from a clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and

• Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the

testing of components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).

2.1.3. Nuclear decision-making

The Iranian political system consists of a complex combination of democratically

elected officials and religious figures in high power positions. Elections are held for President,

the Parliament, and the Assembly of Experts. The Assembly of Experts is formed by Islamic

scholars who, among other duties, choose the Supreme Leader into a lifetime position. The

Supreme Leader is virtually the most powerful person in the government, for it has the power

to appoint the heads of the media, mosque, justice and military, in addition to being the chief

of all armed forces. It is in the hands of the Supreme Leader, therefore, to lay decisions

regarding the nuclear program. He also controls the candidature for president, having the

power to veto candidates; after the election, the Supreme Leader confirms the president. The

laws made by the Parliament are also submitted for the Supreme Leader’s approval

(MALEKI, 2009).

In his official position as Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei has condemned the

use of nuclear weapons. He issued a fatwa – a type of Islamic law – against the acquisition,

development, and use of nuclear weapons in the Islamic Republic, and other important

religious figures have reiterated this position (WEINBERG, 2005). To that regard, re-elected

president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad defends the country’s right to develop its nuclear program,

arguing that they will be solely used for peaceful purposes. Besides the two leaders, the

nuclear program is guided by the Nuclear Energy Council, and regulated by the AEOI. The

group responsible for the key decisions, however, is the Supreme National Security Council,

nominally led by the President, but actually under the Supreme Leader’s authority (NADER,

2012).

2.1.4. The Opposition

The opposition in Iran is heavily censored and repressed, so that many of the

opposition groups are in exile, and only few political parties are allowed to exist in the

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country. In general, the opposition is considered to be less conservative than the government,

and defends political reforms that would benefit human rights and democracy – at least

rhetorically – and proposes a more open dialogue with the West and a better relationship with

Israel. Situation and opposition, however, generally converge in the opinion that Iran is

entitled to develop its nuclear program. Nevertheless, with regards to important groups in

exile it is important to highlight that, although there is a common understanding towards

Iran’s right to develop a nuclear program, such position does not undermine criticism to the

way the government is running the program. For instance, the National Council of Resistance

(NCR), a coalition of five opposition political organizations deemed to be western-friendly,

was one of the first groups to denounce Iran’s nuclear activities as illegal, for the NCR is

against nuclear proliferation (FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL

COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE OF IRAN, 2012). Moreover, Reza Pahlavi, the son of the

former Shah of Iran, defends the idea that before Iran became a Islamic republic, the U.S.,

Germany and France were eager to help the Iranian people obtain nuclear technology—which

he considers an inalienable right—, but now they fear its use for military reasons (PAHLAVI,

2006). The same can be said about the Tudeh Party, of communist orientation. The party is

against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but defends Iran’s right to develop a peaceful

nuclear program. Nevertheless, to its members, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s aggressive rhetoric

serves only the purposes of the United States’ imperialist policy towards the Middle East

(INTERNATIONAL, 2012).

Given that, former president of Iran, Mohammad Khatami believes that Iran’s

different factions will unite with the government if Israel were to attack the country (DPA,

2011). On the other end of the spectrum, Israel’s former Mossad chief, Meir Dagan, suggests

that Israel should offer help to Iran’s opposition groups in order to weaken the present

government, considered to be extremely anti-Israel (THE SPYMASTER, 2012).

2.2. Nuclear Proliferation: regional and transregional determinants of the Iranian crisis

2.2.1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the International Atomic

Energy Agency Safeguard System, and the Additional Protocol

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a process that started in

1958 and was open for signature a decade later. Nowadays the Treaty is widely accepted, with

a total of 190 signatories. Its main objective is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons

worldwide, and it finds its roots in the fear of the policy of deterrence between the U.S. and

the Soviet Union during the Cold War (TREATY, 2012).

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The system lies on three pillars: non-proliferation; disarmament; and peaceful use of

nuclear technology. Non-proliferation, regarded by some as the only pillar, consists of the

agreement of the five Nuclear Weapon States (NWP) which are part of the treaty (United

States, Russia, France, China, and the United Kingdom) to not transfer nuclear weapons to

non-nuclear weapon states, nor induce or encourage non-nuclear weapon states to acquire the

technology to develop nuclear technology for military ends (UN, 1968, art. I). As for the Non-

nuclear Weapon States, article 2 of the Treaty stipulates that they shall not receive or

endeavor to manufacture nuclear weapons (UN, 1968, art. II). Furthermore, they must accept

and establish safeguards in accordance with the International Atomic Energy Agency in order

to ensure the maintenance of the peaceful nature of their nuclear programs (UN, 1968, art.

III).

The disarmament pillar is vaguely mentioned in the treaty, but it consists of the

building of enough trust in the international system as to make it possible to halt the

production of weapons and to liquidate all nuclear-related weaponry in countries’ arsenal. The

NPT text on the matter reads as follows:

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control (UN, 1968, art. VI).

Finally, the peaceful use of nuclear technology refers to the right every country has to

use nuclear energy to generate electricity, for that falls under the designation of peaceful

usage of nuclear technology. Such right appears on the Treaty’s fourth article, which states

that

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. 2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world (UN, 1968, art. IV).

Since the process to generate such energy stops mid-way to the development on

nuclear fuel required in nuclear weapons, it has become difficult to control such right (IAEA,

1970). Consequently, the main principle that guides the NPT is basically a trade-off between

the Nuclear Weapon States and the non-nuclear states, where the latter agree not to acquire a

nuclear arsenal, and the former agree to cooperate by sharing the technology for peaceful use

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of nuclear energy, and to adopt a disarmament policy with the ultimate objective of

eliminating their nuclear arsenals. Lately, criticism has surfaced stating that the NWS ate not

obliging with their part of the bargain, and that the NPT is serving as a mean for these

countries to keep their nuclear power all the while keeping the other countries at bay.

In addition to safeguard agreements, the IAEA has established Additional Protocols

with numerous countries, Iran included. According to the Agency,

The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the IAEA complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements. A principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites (IAEA, 2012c).

The Additional Protocols were deemed a necessity after Iraq, a signatory of the NPT,

managed to hide several features of its nuclear program from the IAEA until basically the end

of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Thus, in 1993 the Agency started formal procedures to enhance

its investigation capabilities, culminating with the Model Additional Protocol in 1997. As

such, the Agency hoped to cover the loophole on safeguard agreements concerning

undeclared activities (HIRSCH, 2004; KIMBALL; DAVENPORT, 2010).

2.2.2. Situation of Nuclear Countries

It is speculated that there are currently nine countries in the world that possess atomic

weapons. Five of them are part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: the United States of America,

France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and China. The other three, which have

not signed the NPT, are India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Lastly, one of them, Israel, does not confirm nor deny having nuclear weapons, although it is

widely regarded as a nuclear State (FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 2011)14.

Thus, the international community generally points to a risk of nuclear weapon usage in

global or regional scenarios.

Regarding the five permanent members of the UNSC, they have publically declared a

will to avoid proliferation worldwide and have called countries to honor their responsibilities

under the NPT through resolution 1887 (UNSC, 2009). As for disarmament, those countries

are also making private commitments. U.S. President Barack Obama has said that “U.S.

Nuclear Disarmament is a moral obligation” (GEHRKE, 2012) and took practical actions

towards it with the New START agreement signed in 2010 with Russia. The United Kingdom

and the US have also signed an agreement on nuclear cooperation, the Mutual Defense

14 Information on total inventory can be found at: http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html

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Agreement (BASC). In accordance with the U.S. deterrence policy, the UK has recently

announced further action to reduce its nuclear stockpile (PRIME MINISTER, 2010). France,

for its part, announced back in 2008 the reduction of the country’s nuclear weapons to less

than 300 warheads; it is also the only permanent member of the UNSC that has shut down its

fissile material production facilities (TETRAIS, 2008). China itself has declared that it

possesses a fairly small nuclear arsenal, enough for its defense (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN

AFFAIRS OF CHINA, 2004). The country also advocates for disarmament. Despite these

countries’ official commitments, analysts still question their true will to eradicate, or even

diminish, their nuclear weaponry capacity.

As for Israel, the country is believed to be Middle East’s first and only country to

possess the nuclear technology to create an atomic weapon. Its “nuclear opacity” policy, the

secrecy that envelops the country’s nuclear program, makes access to hard evidence more

difficult. Western countries in general, mainly the United States, have shown great leniency

towards Israel. France, for example, has been a major partner since Israel began to develop

nuclear technology. In 1969, Tel Aviv and Washington made an agreement where the former

would not declare itself as a nuclear country nor it would use its weapons for diplomatic

gains, earning in exchange an ending of pressure to sign the NPT. Ever since,

the U.S. accepted Israel’s nuclear capacity making sure it would not defy American

nonproliferation policies (NTI, 2012c).

India and Pakistan have not signed the NPT as well, a move directly linked to the fact

that both countries share a relationship immersed in deep rivalry. India’s nuclear program

began shortly after its independence and it served not only to supply the country with cheap

electricity, but also to develop the capacity of producing nuclear weapons. The project

received internal support once it became clear Pakistan was also developing a nuclear

program. Pakistan was highly encouraged to do so after India started developing its own

nuclear capacities, being the key moment 1972, after Islamabad lost an armed conflict

against New Delhi. Even though India refuses to join the NPT and the Comprehensive

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), it has formally articulated a “no-first-use doctrine”,

with Pakistan also adopting it. Islamabad claims that its disarmament depends on whether or

not India will do the same, since its nuclear capacities’ goal is to balance Indian military

power by the means of nuclear force. Pakistan has the support of China, who agreed in 2010

to supply two reactors to the country’s power plants. This deal has been criticized by

the United States, which, in 2005, had unveiled an India-U.S. agreement on nuclear

cooperation (NTI, 2012a; NTI, 2012b)

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Other than those, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Turkey, and Italy have access

to American nuclear weapons under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO)

nuclear sharing program, in its policy of nuclear deterrence. The concept is under the

assumption that if non nuclear countries have access to nuclear weapons from their allies, they

would not feel the need to create their own nuclear weapon program (CHALMERS; LUNN,

2010)15. There are also countries that used to possess nuclear weapons, but allegedly chose to

dispose of them. South Africa disassembled its nuclear arsenal in the early 1990s. Belarus,

Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—former Soviet countries that hosted plenty of the Soviet Union’s

nuclear weapons—are said to have transferred them back to Russia after the dissolution of the

USSR, and the latter did so with the assistance of the United States (NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARCHIVE, 2001).

2.3. Regional Positions in the Middle East

Even if at first one might perceive the Middle-East as a unified region under Islam,

with the only exception of Israel, a deeper look will prove this perception wrong. There are

many tensions inside the region, even among Islamic countries. In the case of Iran, these

tensions have intensified since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war (1980–

1988). The former brought the fear of a Shia Islam anti-monarchy insurgency throughout the

region, and the latter essentially put Arabs and Persians in opposite sides of the conflict,

making Iran stand out against the group of unified Arab countries.

Furthermore, since the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s foreign policy has been dubious and

somewhat confusing, since it has oscillated between radical revolutionary ideals and

pragmatic economic advances. Even if Iran was able to turn some foes into friends as years

went by, recently published documents suggest Iran’s aggressive foreign policy and its

nuclear program have not only kept Israel at a distance, but have also driven many Arab

neighbors away. Such is the case of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, which were allegedly in favor

of a military strike on the country’s nuclear plants (MOHAMMED; COLVIN, 2010).

Israel is the most obviously hostile country to Iran in the region, for the animosity

between both countries is not veiled. The two countries fostered a good relationship up until

the Islamic Revolution, when the new Islamic regime cut official ties with Israel. Iran does

not recognize the State of Israel, instead referring to the area as “occupied Palestinian State”.

Tehran views that Tel Aviv may undermine its rising influence in the region. In

15 The nuclear sharing practice involves military personnel from the non-nuclear countries to handle, in this case, American nuclear weapons, but all the codes to activate them are held by the U.S., and in peace times American soldiers guard the nuclear installations (CHALMERS; LUNN, 2010).

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turn, Israel also feels threatened by the Islamic Republic’s policies in the region, mainly

by Iran’s willingness in developing nuclear capacities, even though it has affirmed that its use

would be for civilian purposes (KAYE et al, 2011). As such, some forces inside Israel have

been claiming that a preemptive strike targeting the Islamic Republic would be useful to

dismiss Tehran’s aggressive moods and to destroy its nuclear facilities. However, a large part

of the Israeli civilian society does not agree with such an attack, since it could destabilize the

whole region. Washington has also been asking Israel to act with prudence on this issue.

Besides Iran, Israel, and the Arab states, there are powers at play in the Middle East

that are not geographically limited to the region but contribute to the geopolitical relationships

within it. The economic relevance of the region, namely its oil and gas reserves, not only

fosters a local concern-interest trade off, but also attracts the attention of the US, Russia,

France, Britain, and even China. These powers seek to secure and dominate their supply of

oil, which leads to their meddling in the political affairs of the region.

Iran’s long standing feud with the U.S. has pushed the Persian State towards an

alliance with Russia, which culminated with the entrance of Iran as an observer member in the

Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2005. Recently, however, the relationship between

both countries has been shaken by the sanctions passed by the UNSC, when Russia suspended

its supply of military resources to Iran (STROKAN, 2012). This situation has not had a deep

impact in the economic ties between Iran and Russia, who is one of Iran’s major partners in

the energy sector (SHAHRIARI; MASHAYEKHI, 2010).

As such, many alliances and animosities are fostered by proxy, following the rule of

thumb which states that “an enemy of my enemy is my friend; a friend of my enemy is my

enemy as well”. Such is the case of Iran’s relationship with Turkey. Both countries

maintained a good relationship, with Turkey, in co-ordinance with Brazil, trying to forge an

agreement of nuclear fuel swap in order to help Iran avoid sanctions in 2010 (IRAN, 2010).

However, since Turkey’s deeper involvement with NATO and its agreement to position a

missile defense shield in its south-eastern border, the relationship between both countries has

suffered major changes. Iran feels that Turkey has changed its traditionally neutral policy in

the region in favor of a more aggressive stand which aids U.S. interests in the region,

protecting Israel in case of a counter-attack attempt by Iran (POMEROY, 2011).

In contrast, Iran’s good relationship with Syria is based on their mutual animosity

towards the U.S. and Israel. Iran, alongside Russia and China (TRENIN, 2012), has supported

President Assad’s regime throughout the civil uprisings that have swept Syria since 2011. The

political crisis in Syria has brought the Persian regime and Syria closer together, since Tehran

sees the Syrian uprising as a U.S. ploy to remove the anti-Zionist government of al-Assad

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(ABDO, 2011). This situation has also had its effects on Iran-Israel relations. For the Israeli

leaders, the involvement of Iran and its allies in handling the Syrian crisis has weakened the

Western role and Israel’s role to a greater extent in the Arab world (BARZEGAR, 2012).

3. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION

In recent years, Iran has suffered pressures from different nations and organizations

that feared the use of its nuclear energy for military purposes. These concerns have surfaced

in the form of innumerous attempts to negotiate the terms of nuclear energy use in Iran and

ways in which the international community would compensate Iran’s cooperation. However,

most of these attempts failed because the parties would not agree on all matters negotiated.

3.1. Negotiations

Since 2003, the Iranian government and the international community have held

negotiations to solve the issue of nuclear power in Iran. The first attempt came from the

government in Tehran, who reached out to Washington with a series of key items concerning

issues of interest to both. In exchange for a relief of sanctions and access to nuclear

technology, Iran offered transparency over its nuclear program, aid against terrorist

organizations and a more lenient stand on Israel. The United States, under the George W.

Bush administration, turned Iran down in favor of a more aggressive approach, such as an

increase in pressure (DAVENPORT, 2012b).

Following this failed proposal, the three most prominent members of the European

Union – France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – started talks with Iran on the condition

that Iran would halt its uranium enrichment program. After a temporary stop in the

negotiations due to the non-compliance of the condition on Iran’s part, the talks produced four

proposals from Iran and one from the European countries, in the course of over a year. In

August of 2005 Iran rejected the proposal from the European leaders, arguing that the

proposal did not recognize the country’s right to uranium enrichment.

The following year, Russia, China, and the United States joined France, Germany, and

the United Kingdom to renew the talks. This cycle of negotiations comprising Iran and the so-

called P5+1 (the five UNSC countries plus Germany) started in 2006 and is still being

discussed. It started with a proposal from the P5+1 in June 2006 which was rejected by

Tehran. The two parts went back and forth with proposals, but the key issue, Iran’s

enrichment program, was never resolved.

In early 2010, Turkey and Brazil started diplomatic talks with Iran, in an attempt to

solve a fuel swap negotiation going on between Iran and the United States. The terms being

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negotiated between Iran and the US stated that the latter would exchange fuel to the Tehran

Research Reactor for a high percentage of Iranian low-enriched uranium (LEU); however,

Iran was unwilling to release an answer due to mistrust and internal opposition. Thus, Brazil,

Turkey, and Iran wrote a proposal called the “Tehran Declaration”, where Turkey would

house the Iranian LEU for a month while the American enriched fuel would be tested and

used (JOINT DECLARATION, 2010). France, Russia, and the United States rejected the

proposal arguing that Iran was now enriching uranium at 20%, an issue that had not been

addressed in the declaration (DAVENPORT, 2012b).

In July 2011, the Russian government developed a proposal based on the demands

from the P5+1 and Iran. In this document, each side would get some of their key demands in

exchange of some giving in. Iran would have to stop its nuclear enrichment program in

exchange for the suspension of all sanctions against the country. The changes would progress

on the course of four steps, beginning with Iranian limitation of uranium enrichment in

Natanz and the suspension of some UN sanctions, and ending with the suspension of all

enrichment-related activities in Iran, the lifting of all UN and bilateral sanctions, and

implementation of the P5+1 proposed incentives (DAVENPORT, 2012b).

Even though the Russian proposal was not fully accepted, the idea of building a

framework based on steps and gradual changes was adopted in the most recent proposal

developed. Talks on it started back in April 2012 and were followed by three other

negotiation rounds where both sides presented proposals and agreed to negotiate in expert-

level talks. However, the point of disagreement continues to be the same. Iran is set on having

its rights to nuclear enrichment recognized, whereas the P5+1 wants Iran to halt all 20%

enrichment activities (DAVENPORT, 2012b).

3.2. Treaties

Iran is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran has signed it as a non-

nuclear weapon state, and as such is required, under Article II of the treaty, to

[…] not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (UN, 1968, art. 2).

Additionally, under Article III, the non-nuclear weapon states are required to accept

safeguards, which grant the IAEA agents access to the country’s nuclear facilities in order to

verify its compliance to the NPT .This is reinforced in the text of the Iran-IAEA Safeguard

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Agreement itself (IAEA, 1974). Following repeated reports by the IAEA of non-compliance

to the Safeguard Agreement’s conditions, Iran signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA

in December 2003.

However, the latest reports by the IAEA keep denouncing Iran’s unwillingness to

permit full access of its nuclear facilities to the IAEA agents. The May 2012 Report shows

several situations in which Iran has either failed to provide further information on suspect

behavior or just plain refused access to the agents (IAEA, 2012b). Furthermore, it was

verified that Iran continues to enrich uranium at 20% and to work on Heavy Water related

projects. As a consequence, the conclusion of this last document reports that the IAEA cannot

prove that Iran is only using its nuclear facilities to peaceful ends:

While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities (IAEA, 2012b).

3.3. UNSC Resolutions

The United Nations Security Council works closely with the IAEA Director General

and Board of Governors, and based on the agency’s reports and resolutions, it has drawn its

own resolutions. Since 2006, the UNSC has adopted six resolutions regarding Iran’s nuclear

program, the latest one being S/RES/1929 of 2010.

The UNSC Resolutions on Iran started relatively lenient. In July 2006, Resolution

1696 was adopted, but its content was more of a warning, calling on Iran to stop its

enrichment program and fall into accordance with the IAEA. The resolution asked for the rest

of the Member States to take measures of vigilance towards Iran, and warned the Islamic

regime that failing to comply with the terms of the resolution within 30 days would result in

harsher measures (UNSC, 2006a).

In December 2006, upon Iran’s failure to comply with the previous resolution,

Resolution 1737, which repeated the previous demands of Resolution 1696 and added a

request for Iran to suspend its work with heavy water related activities, was approved by the

UNSC. It also imposed sanctions against Iran and certain Iranian individuals connected to the

nuclear program, requesting that states refrain from transferring certain nuclear and ballistic

missile-related products to or from Iran, as well as not assisting the country whatsoever in

matters related to such goods (UNSC, 2006b).

Once again, Iran failed to comply with the demands of the previous resolution, leading

the UNSC to adopt yet another resolution on the matter. In March 2007, Resolution 1747 was

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adopted, again requesting that Iran falls in accordance with the IAEA terms, as well as

encouraging negotiations with the P5+1 group. The resolution also raised the sanctions

adopted previously, by enlarging the list of individuals and entities that are related to the

Iranian nuclear program, and asking other member countries to take measures such as

freezing the assets of said groups and reporting them. This resolution also increased the

restrictions of trade with Iran, broadening the sanctions to any arms or related material,

instead of just nuclear and ballistic missile-related goods (UNSC, 2007).

The next resolution, like its predecessors, was adopted because Iran decided not to

accept the provisions of the previous resolution. Resolution 1803 from March 2008 has a

more direct and aggressive approach, reiterating the previous provisions and adding to the

growing list of sanctions against Iran. Once again the list of individuals and entities that must

be reported and have their finances frozen was increased. The resolution also asks other

Member states to prevent certain individuals from entering and circulating in their territories.

Member-States are discouraged of making financial transactions with Iran, in case these funds

are used to fuel the nuclear program of the Islamic country (UNSC, 2008). In September 2008

resolution 1835 was adopted, this time only reaffirming the previous resolutions and keeping

the same sanctions as resolution 1803.

Lastly, resolution 1929 was adopted in June 2010. Twelve countries were in favor,

Lebanon abstained, and Brazil and Turkey voted against the resolution. Through this

resolution, the UNSC reiterates that Iran must stop its uranium enrichment practices and its

assumed nuclear weapon development activities. The resolution highlights the importance of

the IAEA and the obligation Iran has with the Agency (UNSC, 2010).

Sanctions went further into isolating Iran and preventing it from any operation

remotely related to nuclear energy, including a complete arms embargo:

Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (“the Committee”)[…] (UNSC, 2010, nº8).

The resolution also defines a vigilance regime to avoid smuggling of any forbidden

product to and from Iran, calling upon Member States to inspect any vessel or aircraft of

Iranian origin suspect of carrying such goods. Finally, the resolution imposes financial

sanctions on Iran, demanding that States freeze assets from major Iranian organizations and

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asking Member States to control private business with Iran. This ban also applies to Iran’s

finance and banking institutions (UNSC, 2010).

As indicated in the last IAEA report (IAEA, 2012b), Iran is still not in compliance

with the agency’s terms, which implies Iran’s disregard for UNSC’s resolutions.

4. BLOC POSITIONS

Due to its strategic location, Azerbaijan plays an important role in the Iranian nuclear

issue. The country is located in Iran's north border and in the Caspian Sea west coast. Thus,

Azerbaijan has officially tried to prevent the use of its territory as route of illicit traffic of

materials related to nuclear proliferation. This country has a successful experience in

developing a national control system with the objective of preventing nuclear traffic (UNSC,

2012b). The Azerbaijani security services already arrested groups of Iranian agents that were

suspicious of planning terrorist attacks (COHEN, 2012). Regarding the Iranian nuclear issue,

Azerbaijan remains officially neutral. Iran, however, is skeptical of Azerbaijan's neutrality.

The strengthening of ties between Azerbaijan and Israel – signaled by a purchase of Israeli

made-weapons in the value of U$1.6 billion – and Iran's support of Armenia in the latter’s

long running territorial dispute with Azerbaijan are also causes of tension in Azerbaijani-

Iranian relations (HERSZENHORN, 2012).

For Chinese officials, it is extremely necessary to deal with the Iranian issue in a

comprehensive, flexible manner. The most proper measure to keep the negotiations going

would be through dialogue and respect, trying to avoid any kind of higher confrontation in the

Middle East (UNSC, 2012d). According to China, the excessive pressure imposed on Iran

through unilateral sanctions, especially those taken by the USA, can intensify regional

tensions and the possibility of outbreak of a conflict. China is in accordance with the Security

Council resolutions and believes those should be implemented, but other unilateral measures

and sanctions are only jeopardizing the process of negotiation (DAVENPORT, 2012a).

Besides that, Iran and China are important partners, with commercial and financial ties.

China's growing demand for energy made the country become the biggest Iranian oil

customer and a major economic partner. Both countries also cooperate on the development of

infrastructure, military modernization, and implementation of technology and research in

several areas, including nuclear energy (HAROLD; NADER, 2012).

Colombia is a non-nuclear-weapon State and has historically attempted to promote

nuclear disarmament, since it considers nuclear weaponry the most destructive kind.

Colombia is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has supported the

universalization of it as an important instrument to foment disarmament. Colombia has also

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adopted a Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA and signed the Additional Protocol to it; the

country is a member of the Conference on Disarmament and believes that the existence of a

treaty prohibiting the production of fissile materials would facilitate the task of disarmament.

It is also greatly concerned with the threat of non-state actors and terrorist groups possessing

weapons of mass destruction (UNSC, 2012b). Colombia is the current Chairman of the "1737

Committee" for the mandate that lasts until December 2012 and relies on the P5+1

negotiations with Iran to help solve the issue in question.

France, together with other European Union countries, strongly supports the Non-

Proliferation Treaty and Iran's right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Iran,

however, must conduct its nuclear activities under the full control of the IAEA. France made

several diplomatic efforts regarding the matter from 2003 to 2008, in the light of a general

approach defined by the European Council. This general approach included proposals for

helping Iran to develop its civil nuclear power program as well as cooperation in the

economic, political, and military fields. Since this negotiation process did not show the

expected results, France now supports a dual-track approach with regards to the Iranian

situation (IRAN’S, 2012). France endorses the restrictive measures determined by the

Security Council resolutions, and requests that Iran suspend all processes related with

uranium enrichment. France also believes that UNSC sanctions shall continue to be

implemented, for they have shown great efficacy in preventing Iran’s acquisition of nuclear

and ballistic material that could be used for military purposes (UNSC, 2012d). Included in the

dual-track approach, France has maintained its efforts on negotiating multilaterally with Iran,

through the meetings of the P5+1. This means that the dialogue channel between the two

nations remains open (FRANCE, 2012; FRANCE, 2011).

Germany is closely participating in the negotiations with Iran, since it is a member of

the ‘P5 + 1’’ negotiation group. Germany is determined to put pressure on Iran in order to

solve the nuclear issue, and it reaffirms the necessity of every country to also implement the

regime of sanctions. For Germany, a nuclear-armed Iran would pose a threat to the entire

region (PODOLSKY, 2012). Despite having the capacity to produce nuclear armaments,

Germany has compromised itself with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, remaining and non-

nuclear-weapon State (WNA, 2012b). Another great concern for Germany is the issue of

Iran’s weapons export to Syria and Hezbollah and how to find diplomatic solutions for these

questions (UNSC, 2012d).

Guatemala is a great supporter of the three pillars of the NPT: non-proliferation,

disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. Therefore the country

believes that Iran should act in serious commitment with the Treaty and, also, that its right to

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use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be respected. Guatemala is a strong supporter

of the “two-channel focus”, corroborating the Security Council sanctions and also hoping that

a solution can be found through the negotiation process. Guatemala is a non-nuclear state and

has no technology to produce nuclear power. It has also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-

Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), reaffirming its commitment to stop nuclear tests and to promote

nuclear disarmament worldwide (GUATEMALA, 2012).

India has played an important role regarding Iran's nuclear issue. These two countries

maintain cordial political and economic relations, due to their cultural affinities and historical

diplomatic relations. Iran is of major importance for India’s energy security, since this country

relies on Iran for 12% of its imports on crude oil. In order to strengthen the country’s energy

security, India decided that it would be cutting its oil imports from Iran by 11%

(BHADRAKUMAR, 2012). This country was one of the main voices against the

implementation of unilateral sanctions and military threats against Iran. Despite that, the

Indian government supports the resolutions taken by the Security Council regarding the

nuclear issue. It also urges that all efforts be made in order to avoid penalizing any legitimate

commercial activity with Iran. India is also an important partner of the United States and of

Israel and lately has intensified its military cooperation with both countries (HEYDARIAN,

2012).

Morocco’s relations with Iran have been developed over a broad cultural and religious

background. The two countries share some similarities, like the Arab culture, but their

differences end up creating a certain amount of tension between them. Morocco is a country

of Sunni tradition and Iran is committed with the Shiite Islamic. Tensions have escalated to

the point where, in 2009, Morocco ended up cutting diplomatic ties with Iran (MOROCCO,

2009). The country is a signatory of all international instruments on nuclear disarmament and

non-proliferation (MOROCCO, 2011). It supports the work of the IAEA and urges all

countries to cooperate with this institution, since it believes that this is a matter of utmost

importance for Middle East security (IAEA).

Pakistan believes that the sanctions applied by the Security Council over Iran are just

one of the alternatives to solve the crisis, and other mechanisms based on dialogue and

cooperation should be encouraged. Pakistan’s great concern is to avoid the uproar of any kind

of conflict in the region, so it has put a major effort in trying to find a solution through

diplomacy. In this regard, the sanctions should not be seen as an end in themselves. Whereas

this country reaffirms that Iran, as a party of the NPT, should fulfill its international

obligations, it also calls attention to the fact that Iran has the right to develop nuclear power

for peaceful and civilian purposes, as stated in the treaty (UNSC, 2012a).

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Portugal’s position concerning the Iranian issue is in alignment with the European

Union foreign policy, which means that it supports the dual-track strategy based on dialogue

and also in the reinforcement of economic sanctions. When the European Union, in the first

half of 2012, raised its unilateral sanctions over Iran's energy and bank sectors, Iran responded

cutting oil exports to six European countries, including Portugal (LABOTT, 2012). Portugal

supports the meetings taken by the P5+1 in the attempt to persuade Iran to stop its process of

enriching uranium. Portugal is a signatory of the NPT and of the CTBT.

The Russian Federation has taken a cautious approach in the Security Council

meetings. The country stands against any action that might artificially increase tensions over

Iran’s nuclear issue and defends the necessity of reaching a comprehensive political

agreement among the parties (UNSC, 2012a). Russia maintains long-term relations with Iran,

both in the economic and military grounds. Besides having important cooperation agreements

in the oil and gas sector, Russia has also contributed to the development of the nuclear energy

sector, investing in the building of nuclear power plants (IRAN, 2011a). The two countries

also had contracts in the military field concerning Russian exports of armaments to Iran,

which had to be canceled in 2010 when the Security Council passed Resolution 1929

(RUSSIA, 2012). Therefore, the Russian Federation has cooperated with all resolutions of the

Security Council regarding Iran's crisis while, on the other hand, it condemns the unilateral

sanctions as harming to the negotiations. The country highlights that Iran is dedicated to

cooperate in finding a reasonable solution and stands for evolving on the negotiations between

the P5+1 and Iran (BAKLITSKY, 2012).

South Africa, in accordance with the Non-Aligned Movement, praises for a pacific

resolution for the Iranian conflict (FINAL, 2012). South Africa perceives all kinds of nuclear

weaponry as inhuman, and defends the necessity of a nuclear disarmament (UNSC, 2012b).

The other nations who possess nuclear armaments should also put a great effort in the

banishment of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, South Africa defends the right to use

nuclear power for pacific purposes, in accordance with the NPT. The confidence on Iranian

intentions to make pacific use of its nuclear program should then be restored (UNSC, 2012d).

Togo is highly compromised with eliminating all nuclear weapon stockpiles. This

country urges all the other nations to do the same, collaborating with disarmament and the

NPT regime. The Togolese Republic also highlights the importance of nuclear technology

when used as a tool to promote development; the country defends the use of nuclear energy in

the fields of health, industry, and agriculture in African developing countries as a way to

overcome the obstacles and to reach the Millennium Development Goals (UNSC, 2012b).

Togo believes that Iran must start acting in accordance with the NPT, complying with IAEA

Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past.

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inspections to all fields and access to all documents in order to solve the current crisis. It also

shows great concern with the possibility of non-state actors having access to nuclear weapons,

urging the Council to take measures to prevent this (UNSC, 2012a).

The United Kingdom is one of the leading actors in the negotiation process with Iran.

The country is part of the P5+1 and has based its decisions in the dual-track approach. The

United Kingdom has put great effort in trying to find a middle ground with Iran: it has

participated in several negotiations between 2003 and 2008 together with other European

nations. The United Kingdom reinforces the necessity for Iran to start complying with

international law, the NPT regime, and the IAEA surveillance system (UNSC, 2012c). The

country urges the Security Council to strengthen its sanctions, since Tehran’s government has

not shown the willingness to cooperate (UNSC, 2012a).

The United States of America has played a major role in former measures taken by

the Security Council regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis. The US worries about Iran’s nuclear

technology development, especially processes linked to uranium enrichment (USA, 2012b)

since it believes this experience shows Iranian intentions to produce nuclear armament. The

country has been involved in diplomatic talks with Iran together with the P5+1 group and it

has offered an assured supply of fuel for Iran's reactor to produce nuclear energy with civil

and pacific purposes. Given Iran’s refusal to abide by American terms, the United States of

America has decided to support the UNSC in taking all the necessary steps to ensure a better

implementation of the existing sanctions and to hold Iran responsible for the current crisis

(UNSC, 2012a). Also, under Obama’s presidency, the U.S. has adopted a “Dual Track

Policy”, where it combines diplomatic talks through separate negotiations with increased

pressures through economic and political sanctions. So far this strategy has not been

successful, largely due to the lack of trust the added sanctions caused on the diplomatic talks.

5. QUESTIONS TO PONDER

1) How can the Security Council guarantee that the economic sanctions imposed over

Iran are being effective and will lead to nuclear disarmament?

2) The Security Council has traditionally worked closely with the IAEA surveillance

system and, lately, has supported the attempt of negotiations promoted by the P5+1.

Is that the best approach to deal with Iran crisis, in terms of diplomacy? Could the

Security Council implement any other channel of communication in order to

facilitate the negotiations with the Iranian government?

3) How can the Security Council deal with the possibility of non-state actors and

terrorist groups inside Iran territory possessing weapons of mass destruction?

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4) What measures should the Council take if Iran non-compliance persists?

5) What lessons could be derived for the development of nuclear programs elsewhere?

How to separate pacific usage of nuclear energy from nuclear weapon development?

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