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A Unified Theory of Attention

&

Petition to Rename Attention Deficit Disorder

In the DSM-V

Jonathan D. Boyer, M.A.

James Madison University

March, 2007


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Abstract

Attention is typically referred to in terms of what it is being paid to; as if anytime

attention is given there is a price to pay. Similar to a budget, where each transaction of paying

attention causes a re-structuring of ones mental finances, attention requires a psychological

balance of cost. The next question is where, or at what location points, can we say attention is

being given or paid? Attention remains in such constant flux that perhaps the only chance to

identify its ever-changing location is by analyzing its properties when lapses, or mental errors,

occur. By analyzing mental errors, this paper explores whether the function of attention is the

same across different cognitive processes. If it can be demonstrated that the function of attention

does in fact retain its structure across different cognitive tasks, there is evidence to support a

unified theory of attention. Implications of this theory in relation to what has been called

Attention Deficit Disorder are explored particularly why this term is both unnecessarily

negative and inaccurate.


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Background

Often in psychological theory we begin with a word or idea that has been known by

experience to exist, and we investigate that idea in order to more clearly define it conceptually.

Take memory, for example: no one doubts whether or not memory exists, yet it remains difficult

to define without referring to one of its synonyms (things I recall; all that I remember; all

my past recollections). Aside from the vagueness of its term, it is difficult to define memory

because it is always in use we use memory for everything we do: It is a pre-requisite sub-

function of every human function, so to define memory one would need to compile a list of

everything that requires its use (which is everything!). In psychological theory, it follows that

memory is hypothesized to be not just one thing or one idea but many ideas it is composed of

many types. Thus, the discovery of types whether they be types of memory or other types of

mental phenomena is the central focus of psychological theory.

So what are the different types of memory? A quick brainstorm might produce: short-

term, long-term, episodic, procedural, declarative, implicit, and explicit. Now, with such an

explicit list of memory types, it becomes easier for one to imagine the mental activity that each

different type involves and how each activity differs from one another in quality of cognitive

experience.

Even with this differentiation of memory types evident, there is still an uncertainty as to

whether some common memory-thread might exist neurologically, somehow linking all memory

types together, so that, in essence, memory is still just memory and not a scattered dispersion of

types. Although this question of where does the concept of memory begin and end, existentially,

opens itself up to philosophical debate, psychological theory adheres to a more concrete system

of ideas, as cognitive neuroscience often serves as the scientifically objective, theoretical jury.


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Essentially this means that our understanding of the differentiation of brain processes is used to

dissociate one process (e.g. type of memory) or set of processes from another i.e. are they

separate processes in the brain, or is the activity actually one, singularly integrated process? In

other words, if it is demonstrated that memory functions as two differentprocesses in separate

brain regions, these processes should then represent with two different concepts in psychological

theory. Neurocognitive processes, therefore, should have a direct, 1-to-1 correspondence to the

psychological concepts they inspire. Taken to the extreme, one might imagine the hypothetical

unification of cognitive neuroscience and psychological theory as the point where every, single

brain process corresponds to every, single concept in psychological theory.

Double Dissociation

The classic case-study of HM, a 27 year-old man with severe epileptic seizures, is a

hallmark of cognitive neuroscience, dating back to 1953, when for the first time neurological

evidence was found to support the differentiation between long-term and short-term memory as

well as declarative versus procedural memory. Neurological evidence, as the term is used,

generally refers to the results of brain injuries and the particularities of their effects on behavior

and cognition; although there are a number of ways, besides injury, the brain might become

dysfunctional. For the proper amount of experimental control, an isolated brain region needs to

be either damaged or removed so that the abnormalities observed in behavior can be attributed to

that location of brain damage.

In HMs case, a surgeon removed his amygdala (commonly associated with emotional

regulation) and most of his hippocampus, which are both part of the brains limbic system

(Dawson, 1998). The compelling result was that HM, while unable to construct new long-term

memories, was still able to utilize short-term memory functions: Although HM was able to hold


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conversations, the topics under discussion were severely restricted to the immediate present, as

anything already faded to the recent past, beyond short-term memory, was no longer accessible

to HM. The following is an example of a conversation recorded with H.M. following the

surgery:

SC: When youre not at MIT what do you do during a typical day?

HM: Uhh see thats . . . I dont remember things.

SC: Do you remember what you did yesterday?

HM: No I dont.

SC: How about this morning?

HM: I dont even remember that.

SC: Could you even tell me what you had for lunch today?

HM: I dont know to tell you the truth. (Dawson, 1998)

Although HM at least had the short-term memory capacity to understand the questions

being asked long enough to answer them, if those questions delved significantly into the past, his

recollection became a lost cause. HMs neurological case study revealed that after removing

specific regions of the brain, it is possible for long-term memory to become dysfunctional while

short-term memory remains in tact. In other words, the brain region that long-term memory

relies upon is not the same as that of short-term memory; therefore a neurological dissociation

can be established between the two processes.

In reference to the title of this section, this finding is only halfway to establishing a

double dissociation, which is the traditional standard in cognitive science for making a

conceptual distinction between cognitive processes. In HMs case, a single dissociation has

indeed been found, but to round out the memory-based hypothesis we must establish a double


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dissociation by demonstrating that the reverse is true. As soon as it can be demonstrated that a

regionally specific brain lesion that causes short-term memory dysfunction can leave long-term

memory in tact (the reverse), we can establish a double dissociation between the two processes

and make a strong case for a distinction between the two concepts in psychological theory.

Evidence of sub-division within the brain is theoretically compelling, but on some level it

remains clear that the brain is not simply a set of isolated systems. In some way, all sub-systems

worktogethertoward an integrative and adaptive form of all output that functions in the interest

of the organism similar to how a CPU (central processing unit) functions as the integrative

through-point of all sub-systems of a computer. Of course theorizing about a pervasive,

integrative thread that flows through an organism, and all its sub-systems, is again toward the

realm of philosophy or perhaps an entropy-related law of physics; nevertheless, if there is

evidence that something remains constant across brain processes that have been neurologically

dissociated, like attention for example, we have reason to speak of a common thread that bridges

the two, at least on some conceptual level.

Natural Errors

Reflecting on the cause of error has been the source of theoretical revelation in a number

of academic disciplines and life in general. In History, we learn not to repeat the mistakes of our

past. In computer science, we learn by correcting errors that occur in programming code. In

English class, we improve our writing by correcting and understanding our errors. In life, we

learn from our errors by retracing events and figuring out where we went wrong . . .

It seems no matter what type of activity I am engaged in walking, running writing,

keyboarding, listening, or just thinking I can somehow manage to make similar errors of

thought and movement. Not because of any brain damage or general dysfunction (I think), but


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because I sometimes fail to hold it all together mentally my focus, or attention, becomes lost or

somehow in the wrong spot. It is as if the part of my mind whose processes have become

automatic has plans of its own, and those automatic plans win out despite my own, more

conscious cognitive plans and intentions. This proves especially true when there is a

circumstantial lack of focus for whatever reason.

Perhaps error is not the proper term here, as these instances are more a discrepancy

between plans that have become automatic to my organism at an unconscious level and plans

that are currently, cognitively, consciously and intentionally derived. In fact, it would be

difficult to call anything an error without referring to a discrepancy between multiple

intentions because all organisms ultimately have a logical sequence that in retrospect can explain

outputs/decisions, whether these decisions were consciously intended or not.

All things considered, this paper proposes that natural errors are at least one example of

a phenomenon that remains constant across dissociated neurological processes. This is not to

discredit the double-dissociation(s) of processes, per se, but rather to point out the possibility of

an underlying common thread, leaving room for theoretical and experimental advances in

explaining the inter-connective and isotropic properties of the brain.

Ultimately, the purpose of this paper is to provide evidence that the function and structure

of attention remains constant across neurologically dissociated processes (e.g. speech and gross

motor output). Like most psychological theory with adequate external validity, this unified

theory of attention (UTA) is conceptually grounded in mental experiences that are commonly

recognized to occur in many people, which in this case is the occurrence of mental errors.

UTAs hypotheses begin with the proposition that these errors exhibit a direct structural

relationship to changes in location of attention, as pinpointed on a cognitive plan (or blueprint).


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Secondly, UTA hopes to facilitate communication about the concept of attention, particularly

with respect to understanding what has been labeled Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) or

Attention-deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (AD/HD). It is contested that ADD is not a deficit but

rather a misallocation of attentional resources. It follows that a less negative and more

theoretically congruent name is proposed.

Structure & Types of Errors

This Unified Theory of Attention outlines three types of errors that, while occurring via

different cognitive processes, are ultimately proposed to be structurally equivalent due to the

same fault in attention: Oral Language, Gross-Motor, and Graphomotoroutputare, in this case,

examples of neurologically dissociated processes that are yet still susceptible to identical mental

errors in terms of how their executions are disorderly structured.

Whether the process being executed is oral language (speech), gross motor output, or the

fine touch of writing, one always has a plan, or mental model, of the general sequence to be

followed when executing the action. When it comes to actions as routine as speech, the planning

phase is so automatized that the cognitive representation of that plan may only exist for a nearly

unconscious split second prior to it being executed, leaving a seamlessly unnoticeable flow

between cognitive planning and subsequent executive decisions.

Moving forward, a central premise of this paper is that most, if not all, of human life is

the re-enactment of a mental plan. Furthermore, our life plans exhibit the same structure,

regardless of the type of cognitive function, which seats planning at the highest, most evolved

level of cognition, superimposing its structure on all executive functions. Therefore, mental

errors occurring across dissociated brain processes will exhibit the same structure in terms of


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how that error misconstrues the plan misconstrues that are often for the sake ofconservation of

mental energy. Psychic energy conservation will be referred to in this paper as the CME

Principle, which for psychologists interested in intelligence theory might see the connection to g-

theory here. In other word, one might hypothesize that the conservation of mental energy

implies that each individual is working with his or her own energy capacity, or intelligence. Of

course this leaves room for any theory of multiple intelligences because the same energy

capacities have the potential to be allocated toward different cognitive avenues based on

personality differences or genetic strengths and weaknesses.

Lastly, there is a tentative, secondary hypothesis that language in some way guides the

structure of all cognitive plans, just as the grammar of ones native language organizes speech

and writing. Taking ideas from Chomsky (1967), the universal grammar that is the foundation

of all language acquisition can be seen as an organizing principle that gives structure to virtually

all human action.

Plan of Action

A plan of action, in this sense, is not necessarily as explicit as someone sitting down to

draft the contingency plans of a hostage negotiation. Day-to-day plans, on the other hand, require

much less thought, or cognitive resources, especially if that plan has been executed countless

times and is stiffly cemented in routine. Once plans have become such a routine, there is no

longer a need to mull over them cognitively or analyze them step-by-step. After all, doing so

would be a waste of time a waste of mental energy. It therefore makes sense that when action

plans are executed on a consistent basis, there is a natural drive to have that plan become implicit

so that one can conserve mental energy and ones attention can be allocated to tasks or ideas that

demand more explicit cognitive resources. As a general rule, cognitions or actions that require


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mental energy (or cognitive resources) are explicit or intentional, and those that require less

mental energy are more implicit or routine.

Often I roll out of bed, put on clothes, and brush my teeth without remembering the effort

it took to complete that sequence; but I can remember the time my zipper got stuck because it

threw a wrench in my routine and forced me to summon mental energy. At that point my actions

suddenly needed to be explicit and effortful, which made it possible to later recall what my plan

had been to get my zipper unstuck. In any case, just because a plan is implicit, subconscious, or

not remembered does not mean there was no plan; it may just have been done so many times that

it did not require much attention.

Like memory, we often talk about attention as if we understand what it refers to, but in

the reality of psychological theory attention is a concept not so easy to grasp. It is perhaps the

hardest to grasp because there is no observable proof of where ones attention is at any given

time here, there, or elsewhere. Although it is a common phrase to describe someones mind as

elsewhere, this expression only means that we are not exactly sure where or how far away that

is. We just know that it is somewhere else. There is even a symptomatic description of AD/HD,

according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), as the mind

appearing to be elsewhere, which begs the question: where exactly might elsewhere be? If its

definition is as general as anywhere else but here, one can imagine the great difficulty of trying

to locate attention because it is never constant its location is always changing. In light of this

quandary the best we can do, from the standpoint of UTA, is derive location points on a given

cognitive plan and locate attention in relation to those points.

To locate attention in relation to points on a cognitive plan, we must first break down and

understand the structure of that plan. Because many cognitive plans are largely implicit and


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nearly unconscious, the best way to understand their structure is through post-error analysis. In

this sense, we can learn from mental errors by indulging in the cognitive pauses they incite,

allowing insight into the implicit processes of planning and attention. The wordpause is

emphasized here because the objective of automatic and implicit planning processes are to

prevent pauses, i.e., there should no longer be a need to pause and allocate attentional resources

to cognitive planning because it has become routine. It should also be noted that mental errors

only give us the opportunity to pause and reflect on our implicit behaviors; meaning, of course,

that reflection does not happen automatically. In fact, the errors we make on a daily basis are

often discarded or laughed at, while the foundation of this paper is exactly the opposite.

Automatic Transmissions

With implicit versus explicit types of cognition in mind, mental errors can be described

as occurring when there is a discrepancy between the two when the will of a planning principle

that is well seated in routine contradicts the demands of a situation that is novel enough to need

explicit cognitive re-structuring. One might reflect on the difficulty of driving an automatic

transmission after many years of driving a standard transmission. Breaking at a stoplight, ones

left foot might go for the clutch . . . . . . . but it isnt there! The manual clutch routine has

become so powerful that, despite the novel situation, cognitive re-structuring of the relevant

planning principle (driving in this case) does not occur. There is a discrepancy between a past

history of implicitness and the need to be explicit in the present.

Although the clutch example has its merits, this type of mental error is primarily the

result of a discrepancy between a history of routine and new cognitive planning requirements,

which is not always necessary to cause a mental error. In fact, routines that cannot be traced to

ones history can still intrude on cognitive intentions. It becomes an issue of attention when


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there is no history of routine that might conflict with the required plan of action, yet still there

occurs a curious mental error. These errors-without-history are hypothesized to be the result

of a dislocation of attention, which can happen for a number of reasons that fall into three main

categories 1) the cognitive task requires more attention than one is energized or willing to give,

or 2) the mis-location is abiding by the principle ofconservation of mental energy. A general

rule is that in some way it is usually both.

Errors in Gross-Motor Output

One evening, I was sitting in the passenger seat of a friends car as we pulled up to an

ATM. It didnt take too much thinking, but I was aware that I had two things to do before

exiting the car. I was needed to both unfasten my seatbelt, which was on my left, and take my

wallet out, which was in my back right pocket. Of course it would be difficult to reach for my

wallet with my seatbelt fastened, so the unfastening part of my plan was logically set to come

first in sequence. Interestingly, as my arm reached for the seatbelt, I found it was my left arm

not my right reaching across my body to unfasten my wallet? My mind had somehow

combined a plan that consisted of two main actions (seatbelt and wallet) into a single action by

incorporating a property of each. In this case, each of the two main actions within my original

plan consisted of two parts: plane-of-reach and endpoint-of-reach (e.g. arm-across-body and

seatbelt). As for the mental error, although the plane of reach was retained for unfastening my

seatbelt (arm across body), the endpoint was not. For the sake of conserving mental energy, my

attention was dislocated one step ahead of the plan to my wallet, removed in some type of plan

combination effort. It seems as if the conservation of mental energy principle was implicitly

aware that both actions involved arm movements and thus took advantage of this similarity by

restructuring my cognitive plan that was not being paid enough attention. In this sense, there can


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be said to be an implicit, logical compulsion that looks for ways to achieve the goals of both

action plans through more efficient combination efforts, all for the sake of conserving mental

energy.

Notice the presence of plans-within-plans: inside the two-part plan of unfastening seatbelt

and retrieving wallet, there is also an individual plan for each action, each consisting of

coordinating arm movements. The two-part macroplan is more oriented toward sequence, that

is, cognitively ordering the steps and execution of each microplan what comes first, next, and

so on. As the number of plans-within-plans increase in terms of their level of microcosm, the

sequence or brain process needed to execute that plan becomes further implicit and less

conscious. As the plan increases in terms of its level of macrocosm, the plan becomes further

explicit, more conscious, and of a higher order of cognition. The upper limit of macroplan order

seems only bound by short-term memory, long-term memory, and the cognitive pre-disposition

(personality) to macroplan.

Figure 1:

*1 = Unfasten; 2 = Get Wallet** a & b are only hypothesized to be plane of reach and endpoint of reach, as these


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microplans are difficult to break down and are verging on implicit. Certainly thecoordinating processes within a & b are implicit and thus not part of an intentional

cognitive plan.

Action 1a (plane-of-reach = across body) is combined with action 2b (endpoint = wallet)

to form the new CME action of (a1, b2). As compelled by the CME Principle, dislocations of

attention seem to be focused on the end-state or final action (2b) that completes all macroplans

and microplans therein: they are inherently forward looking. Ironically, what the CME principle

fails to realize is that these new efficient actions actually end up costing more energy, as we

often have to start over following error.

From this long-winded example, there are a number of conclusions that might be reached

regarding the potential structure of mental error and its relation to planning and attention. First,

the mental error and accompanying dislocation of attention causing the error is always in

reference to the original cognitive plan that failed to be executed properly. The best we can do to

locate attention is to refer to its point on the cognitive plan. Second, the specific error that was

outlined involves a combination of elements from two separate actions; and because the two

actions occur in sequence, the combination must include an element from opposite parts of both

sequences. In other words, the combination could not involve both endpoints 1b and 2b (seatbelt

and wallet) because the sequence is not logically possible, and the action would not be capable of

performance. Third, one element of this combination corresponds to the point where attention

became dislocated, which generates another general rule that the element at the point where

attention is mislocated often becomes incorporated in the combination.

Errors in Speech

One of the first mental errors I logged in prelude to this paper occurred during a graduate

statistics class in which my professor was explaining the advantages and disadvantages of using


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multiple-choice tests as a form of assessment. At some point during the lecture my professor

accidentally said multiple chest and then corrected the mistake by snickering and saying

excuse me multiple choice test. In the time that was taken to say excuse me and make the

correction, the mental error had raised the professors awareness to the need for increased

attention to the action sequence at hand; otherwise the same mistake would be made again.

Like the seatbelt/wallet example, the cognitive plan in this case can be broken into two

parts1 saying the words 1)choice and 2)test. Of course if we refer to the entire sentence

being spoken as the macroplan (although the upper limit of the macroplan would still be

unclear), these two words are simply isolated microplans that came to be combined. Both

microplans are further decomposable into phoneme structure (e.g. ch - oice and t - est), as there

is evidence that this is the functional level at which speech is planned and executed. For

example, I once misspoke the word responsibility by saying, responsilibity. By transposing the

L and B sounds, my error occurred at the level of the phoneme, giving evidence that in terms

of cognitive planning, speech and therefore attention to speech is sequenced by phoneme. In

light of this attention structure, the choice-test error can be diagramed as follows:

Figure 2:

1 The word multiple is disregarded because it is not part of the mental error.


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The most outstanding feature of the diagram is that it contains the same structure as that

of the gross-motor planning example. Particularly the combination style, of substituting 2b for

1b, is evidence that the structure and dislocation of attention in relation to cognitive planning

remains constant across cognitive processes that are neurologically dissociated, i.e. speech and

gross motor movement. Furthermore, there is a natural drive acting as a common thread

amongst these errors, which is the winning out of the compulsory CME Principle over the more

explicit intentions of a cognitive plan.

Besides the CME Principle, there are other factors that may contribute to errors of this

nature, particularly thefluidity or ease of pronunciation when speaking. Perhaps best illustrated

by so-called tongue twisters, we are more prone to speech errors when there is a lack of

fluidity about what is being spoken. A skunk sat on a stump. The stump thought the skunk

stunk, and the skunk thought the stump stunk. In the case of the skunk, the stump, and who

stunk, there is a constant recoiling of the tongue so that the position of the tongue after speaking

each word or syllable is not well set up for ease of speaking the following word or syllable.


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Again, it all reverts back to the CME Principle, as a marked lack of fluidity requires more

intentional restructuring2 of tongue movements, which in turn necessitate increased mental

energy. Although not to the degree of the skunk example, the choice-test error still suffers from

this same lack of fluidity: The position the tongue is left in after saying OICE does not lend

itself to the subsequent T-sound and ST-sound in the word test. Examine yourself and notice

your tongue and lip movements when moving from OICE to TEST: not only does the tongue

have to fully recoil to touch the roof of the mouth for the T-sound, but the upper lip is awkwardly

tensed for the duration. At this point it is important to note that the CME Principle is not so

concerned with the muscular requirements of tongue and lip movements but the attention

required to successfully execute those movements. Different muscular sequences may in fact

consume similar amounts ofphysical energy yet differ in sequential fluidity; therefore the crucial

difference remains the amount ofmental energy required for a successfully executed sequence.

Errors in Writing

The physical act of writing involves a combination of skills and neurological processes.

All at once, there occurs an integration of what one is planning to write, ones knowledge of

spelling, and the fine motor skills required to coordinate pen/pencil movements. Given the

foundation already established by this paper in regard to speech and gross-motor errors, I will

bypass the use of a diagram and give a quick example of how writing errors can be of similar

structure in both purpose and combination style.

While taking notes in class a few days ago, I was in the midst of writing the word

discussion when I found myself subject to error. It happened during the curving motion of

writing the letter c, when instead of finishing the letter properly and continuing to the letter u

2 Intentional restructuring is simply the awareness or attention to the direction of what is next in sequence, so in

general where there is intention there is attention.


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in the word discussion, I finished the c as if I were finishing the u. The CME Principle is so

cleverly aware of similarities between components of ones current plan (e.g. the curving

motions in both letters c and u), that it assumed my curving around the bottom of the c

was a sufficient and efficient segway into finishing the u. So then, both individual letter-

plans were combinedto form a single, mutated letter that looked more like a d without the

extended chimney top. It is as if the underlying principle was purporting, lets get this done

quickly and conserve energy by any means possible. Once again we can describe this fault of

attention as forward-looking and being dislocated one step ahead of the current plan onto the

letter u. Ironically, the CME Principle was imploring me to conserve energy, but I still ended

up having to erase my error and expend more energy.

Semantics and Associations in Mental Errors

Much of the discussion surrounding the preceding diagrams and analyses have been

focused on the sequence of cognitive plans. Although this might imply a linear or serial model

of cognition, this is certainly not the case or the absolute contention of this paper. It is clear that

sequence plays a role and is an important component in how cognitive plans are organized;

however, ones decision or arrival at the proper sequence of action is not always linear or

narrow-minded i.e. there can be more than one cognitive storyline. I liken this to either a game

of connect-the-dots or completing a pencil maze, in which the picture or sequential solution is

not immediately clear. First, one must cognitively appraise the situation and possibly mix-and-

match solutions. The ultimate goal is still the discovery of sequence, but the cognitive

workbench, so to speak, used to make such a discovery is multi-dimensional and has an array of

tools at its disposal. The various mental faculties having influence over the construction of


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cognitive plans can seemingly arise from any associative direction; in other words, the process is

inherently spatial.

To give a more concrete example, I once observed a colleague of mine use of the phrase

let on to believe. After noticing the phrase was a bit odd sounding, it became clear to me that

there were originally two phrases in mind that were being considered for mental execution both

equivalent in logic and meaning and both of which could have fulfilled the semantic intention of

what was trying to be expressed. The two original phrases being considered were let on and

led to believe, both implying some degree of deceit or incidental misunderstanding, depending

on the context. It seemed my colleague, when constructing his speech plan, was faced with two

semantic equivalents to choose between, and instead of mulling over (losing mental energy) such

an ambivalent choice, the CME Principle took precedence and conjured up a healthy / clever

combination. It would appear this is evidence that there exists a semantic gestalt in the human

model of cognition that comes into play when planning/choosing words and phrases for speech.

The semantic gestalt, as a kind of two-part schema, comprised of the two phrases

equivalent in semantic content, is attempted to be retrieved for inclusion in the speech plan, only

at this point there are still two different directions one could go in let on or led to believe.

Going beyond semantics to any type of cognitive planning, we begin with some type of

schematic3 gestalt of what is thought to be relevant to or near a solution to a situation that

requires a plan whether it be the proper sentence, the proper arm movements, or the proper

letters to write and we analyze the components of that gestalt in order to pick-and-choose, mix-

and-match what best fits the situation both sequentially and meaningfully.

3 The gestalt is the schema in the sense that we retrieve it as a whole; however, there may be different types based on

different content and different situations.


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A strikingly similar example of note is my witnessing the use of the quasi-word

pervading when trying to describe a pervasive and invading feeling. The feeling in need of

description was simultaneously felt to be both pervasive and invading, yet the feeling still had a

single essence or quality that was compelled to be expressed as a single word, as motivated by

either the CME Principle, the individual, or both. Saying one word, of course, takes less energy

than saying two.

The purpose of the preceding examples was to illustrate the spatial nature of attention in

relation to cognitive planning and the gradual construction of action sequence. The consequence

of this spatial quality of how a mental plan is represented is that the construction of ones plan

can be influenced by a variety of linguistic elements from all associative corners of the mind.

When retrieving words, phrases, or ideas from memory and attempting to incorporate them into a

cognitive plan, one becomes vulnerable to the erroneous intrusion of random associations and

semantic congruencies related to these ideas. In other words, one might have the intention to

retrieve a word/idea/element from a schema and accidentally incorporate an element associated

with the one intended into the cognitive plan. For example, I once was in the midst of retrieving

the name of a UConn (University of Connecticut) basketball player named Rudy Gay when I

erroneously said Udy Gay. During the retrieval process, my attention was located around the

schema, or gestalt, that shares the common characteristic of being associated with UConn (See

Figure 3). Because my attention remained stuck and located (at least partially) on the UConn

quality of the schema, I became vulnerable to the error that occurred. This dislocation was also

convenient for the CME Principle because of its tendency to notice intra-cognitive similarities

and the obvious/easy substitution of the U in UConn for the u in Rudy (See Figure 4). The

shared quality of the schema acting as its elemental thread was the elements relation to UConn,


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so my error appears to be evidencing a compulsion to express the entire gestalt (UConn) on

which ones attention is located or at least the common thread that defines it. Because it takes

mental energy to break the gestalt down into the elements of planning that should also abide by

the laws of language, it is more likely that ones attention will remain dislocated outside the

elements onto the shared quality.

As a concluding general rule in regards to the spatial nature of planning and attention, the

presence of a gestalt, of whatever type, always precedes its decomposition and subsequent

organization into planning the sequence of a cognitive task.

Figure 3 The UConn Schema/Gestalt:


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parties. In this way, the name of a mental disorder is essential for effective communication

between parents, teachers, administrators, and psychologists.

After thinking about the name Attention Location Dysfunction (ALD) for some time, it

began to appear too general for my liking. Perhaps being overly ambitious and psychologically

minded, I attempted to derive a name that would encompass something more complex and paint

a clearer picture of how the dysfunction is structured. I location element I thought was essential,

but I felt there was something more that needed to be illustrated about how ones attention is

specifically managed an allocated to different stimuli. With this in mind, I began entertaining

the names: Attention Location Dysfunction, Attention Management Dysfunction, and Attention

Allocation Dysfunction. Again, the problem is not that one lacks the attentional resources;

rather, those resources are mismanaged or misallocated relation to societal and educational

demands. In fact, some cases of Attention Deficit Disorder might be more properly named

Attention OverloadDisorder, as an overload would seem capable of disrupting the allocation

process.

Subtypes & the DSM-IV

Every subtype of ADHD in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

(DSM-IV) is laden with symptomatic descriptions that ultimately amount to dislocations of

attention, yet somehow the disorder insists on being called a deficit. The inattentive type lacks

close attention to detail, makes careless mistakes, and appears as if his or her mind is

elsewhere. What these descriptions fail to qualify is the type of tasks during which this is true

(at home versus at school is far too vague). When there is a lack of close attention to detail, is

there close attention to something else, or is the child in some kind of comatose state? This

question is essentially answered by another quality of the inattentive type, that is, his or her mind


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is often elsewhere. In other words, the child is paying attention to something, just not what is

demanded of them by whoever would like to direct their attention.

Even the hyperactive-impulsive type displays these dislocations through their typical

physical manifestations, as this type of child is described as often blurting out answers and

having difficulty waiting their turn. Once might also call this impatience, as the child can be

described as rushing to be one step aheadof the current task: their attention is dislocated

forward, that is, forward looking in the same sense of as the CME Principles demonstrated

tendency. Still, it is important not to disregard to role of impulsivity in the context of this

subtype because impulse control is a distinct neurological process at play that may be one of the

causes of dislocation. For this reason, the hyperactive-impulsive subtype is a helpful descriptor

and is recommended to be unchanged in the DSM-V. On the other hand, the inattentive type is

in need of clarification because it is narrowly defined in terms of what is educationally and

developmentally adaptive. In this way, the childs problem can be better described as

disorganization rather than a lack of attention. At this time, this paper awaits further input from

petition responses to conclude what best represents the attention dysfunction called AD/HD;

however, at this time, the working title of Attention Management Dysfunction will be used,

along with the three emerging types:

1) Attention Management Dysfunction Disorganized Type2) Attention Management Dysfunction Hyperactive/Impulsive Type3) Attention Management Dysfunction Combined Type


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References

Chomsky, N. (1967). Transformational grammar and linguistic universals. Bobbs-Merrill

Dawson, M. (1998). Understanding Cognitive Science. Blackswell Publishers: Oxford.

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