understanding unipolarity: a realist perspective

8/11/2019 Understanding Unipolarity: A Realist Perspective

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Understanding Unipolarity: A Realist Perspective

Afrimadona

Tulisan ini mencoba memperdebatkan kembali hakikat systeminternasional pasca Perang Dingin. Secara teoretis, perdebatan tentanghakikat system internasional sesungguhnya bukanlah isu yang sudah basi.beberapa pemikir dari aliran neoclassical realis seperti William Wohlforthdan Stephen Brooks bahkan sedang menjalankan sebuah proyek besaruntuk memahami hakikat system internasional masa kini dan bagaimanakita menyikapinya. Begitu pula dengan jurnal World Politics edisi !bulan "anuari #!!$ yang secara ekslusif membahas persoalan ini. Dalamtulisan ini, penulis mencoba masuk dalam ranah perdebatan tentangsystem internasional ini yang di %ndonesia masih jarang diperbincangkan.Penulis mencoba melihat hakikat system internasional masa kini dari

perspektif &ealism. Seperti apakah penjelasan &ealis tentang hakikatsystem internasional sekarang' inilah pertanyaan besar yang dicoba untukdija(ab dalam tulisan ini. Dalam tulisan ini penulisan berargumen bah(arangkaian dari berbagai )arian realisme *classical realisme, neorealismedan neoclassical realism+ ternyata bisa memberikan argument teoretikyang cukup komprehensif dalam memahami hakikat systeminternasional.

ey(ords- nipolarity, Balancing, /lassical &ealism, 0eorealism dan0eoclassical &ealism

Introduction

This essay attempts to re)isit the debate on the nature of the international system

occurring in the late 1$$!s.12ore than one decade after the heated debate, this essay

(ants to re3e)aluate (hat sort of international system (e li)e in today. %s it still a (orld

of 4radically unbalanced po(er5 in (hich one po(erful state can lay do(n the la( to the

less po(erful, to ske( the terms of cooperation in its o(n fa)our, to impose its o(n

)alues and (ays of doing things and to undermine the procedural rules on (hich stable

and legitimate cooperation must ine)itably depend' %f so, (hat effects (ill it pose for theinternational system' And (hat should the less po(erful do about it' These are three

6uestions that (ill be focus of this essay.

1%n the debate, %& scholars (ere di)ided into t(o camps- those (ho argue for unipolarity and those (hothink of multipolarity. They also debated (hether or not the system is stable and durable. See Wohlforth*1$$$+, 7untington *1$$$+, 2astanduno *1$$8+, 9ayne *1$$8+

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%n ans(ering the 6uestions, % make three propositions that (ill be my thesis

statement in the essay. :irst, the current system is unipolarity (here the nited States

*S+ has preponderant material capabilities that enable it to manipulate global order in

achie)ing its interests e)en at the e;pense other. Second, this structural change from

bipolarity to unipolarity has caused the change in American beha)iour indicated by its

increasing tendency to(ards unilateralism. 7o(e)er, to some e;tent, this unilateral

character is imprudent so that in the long run it can endanger the international system.

Third, to control American unilateralism, t(o options a)ailable for the less po(erful- soft

balancing to shape American leaders5 perception about their relati)e po(er in the long3

term and e;ploiting the domestic politics to influence foreign policy3making process.

% (ill de)elop these three propositions by the guide of realist theories as

conceptual approach. All the propositions abo)e actually can be e;plained by realism.

ilpin *1$?- @!+.

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2en are e6ual. *#+. They interact in anarchy. *@+. They are dri)en by competition,

diffidence and glory.@These three conditions (ill ultimately lead human beings to 4a (ar

of all against all5.

&ealists adopt these hobbesian assumptions on human nature to analyse state

beha)iour in international politics. Applying these three assumptions to international

politics, realist scholars belie)e that the conduct of diplomacy is ultimately constrained

by these conditions of human nature.The assumption that states are e6ual in their global

standing entitles them to compete on e6ual basis for resources pro)ided by nature. With

the absence of an international go)ernment to regulate this competition, the chance for

conflicts is higher. All states are free to do (hate)er they percei)e as essential to (in this

competition. And because states are free to do e)erything to(ards one another, the

absence of an authority to regulate their relations make states accumulate po(er *defined

as material and non3material capabilities+ to protect themsel)es. They ha)e to focus on

their o(n sur)i)al in the system because there is no one (ill guarantee their sur)i)al.

Anarchic international system is a self3help system that states ha)e to accept as an

una)oidable reality.

p to this point, (e need be clear that realism has three main assumptions shared

by all its strands. This is commonly called 4three Ss5 namely, statism, sur)i)al and self3

help.State is the main actor in an anarchic international system. Anarchy re6uires them

to be concerned (ith their o(n sur)i)al because no one (ill guarantee it e;cept they

themsel)es. The logical implication of this assumption is that state needs to accumulate

po(er as much as possible to ensure their security.

While they ha)e shared assumptions on the nature of state and the international

system, they di)erge on (hat shapes state beha)iour in their interaction (ith others. 7ere,

they are di)ided into three strands- classical realism, neo3realism and neo3classical

realism. The first strand, classical realism, belie)es that state beha)iour is shaped by the

leaders controlling the state. Taking hobbesian assumption directly to e;plain state

beha)iour, they argue that state5s dri)e for po(er and their (ill to dominate are rooted in

@Donnelly *#!!- @#+.%bid,Thompson *1$?- #!+ as 6uoted by Donnelly *#!!-@!+Dunne and Schmidt *#!!8- 1@+.

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the fla(ed characters of human beings represented by their leaders. 8>erman foreign

policy in the 1$@!s for e;ample can be e;plained by 7itler5s ambitious character (hose

dri)e for more po(er created World War %%.

%t is note(orthy that classical realists concede the causal relations bet(een the

change in relati)e po(er of a country and the moti)ation of the country5s leader.

Thucydides5 account of the Peloponnesian (ar indicates this. To him, the gro(th of

Athenian po(er has encouraged the leaders to make inflated estimates of their ability to

control e)ents and this ultimately moti)ated them to con6uer others. ? Similarly, this

change in relati)e po(er unfa)ourable to Sparta has caused fear on the part of its leaders

and this moti)ated them to balance Athenian po(er that subse6uently (as misinterpreted

by Athena as a challenge to its domination. %t is the conjunction bet(een the t(o most

fundamentals of human moti)ations, ambition and fear, that had led these t(o countries

to the (ar.$

Analysis on human nature as the causes of state beha)iour brings classical realists

to study the ethical element of international relations. Because the beha)iour of a state

depends on that of its leaders, it is important for leaders to be prudent in their pursuit of

national interests. Prudence here is not construed as total conformity to international

norms and morality. %t only necessitates leaders to act 4in (ays that are compatible (ith

international order5.1!/lassical realists are a(are that o)er(helming po(er can cause

hubris and easily leads leaders to act (ithout any consideration of moral and ethical

principles. 7o(e)er, this imprudence (ill (eaken influence that in turn also undermines

po(er. After all, to classical realists, po(er and influence is different. %nfluence is the

inter)ening )ariable that relates po(er and outcomes. &a( attributes of po(er cannot

automatically generate outcomes. %t has to be transformed into political influence through

(hich control o)er others can be e;erted. And because influence is a psychological

relationship, psychological sensiti)ity to others5 needs for self3esteem is important.11

Therefore, prudence is indispensable.

8This argument is actually implied in 2orgenthau5s classic (ork,Politics Among Nationsin (hich hestates that politics, like society in general, is go)erned by objecti)e la(s that ha)e their roots in humannature5 *C1$? 1$- +.?0ed 9ebo( *#!!8+$Dunne and Schmidt *#!!8+1!%bid, p. 1$110ed 9ebo( *#!!8- $+.


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While classical realists argue that state beha)iour is shaped by its leader5s

characters, the second strands, neo3realists, contend that it is international structure rather

than leaders5 beha)iour that determines state beha)iour.1# There are t(o structural

)ariables affecting state beha)iour- the lack of an o)erarching authority abo)e states and

distribution of po(er in the system.1@To neorealists, of the t(o )ariables affecting state

beha)iour, the latter is more important. %ndeed, it is the key independent )ariable. This is

because anarchy is a constant nature of the international system so that it can be taken for

granted.1 This ultimately lea)es us (ith distribution of capabilities as the only )ariable

that determines state beha)iour. The change in distribution of capabilities (ill determine

the form of the structure (hether it is unipolarity, bipolarity or multipolarity. And this

ultimately influence state beha)iour.1

1#%n fact, the emergence of neorealism is as a response to the (eaknesses of classical realism. 0eorealistsrepresented by enneth Walt= 6uestion the historical facts that despite )ariation in leaders5 characters,many states demonstrate similar beha)iour (hen faced (ith the same structural constraints. They detect thelogical fallacy inherent in classical realist thinking especially 2orgenthau5s as a result of reductioniste;planation about international outcomes. /lassical realism thinks that causes mo)e in one direction, fromhuman characters to states to the outcomes that their acts and interactions produce. The conse6uence of thise;planation is that moti)es and interactions (ill be considered to be consistent (ith the outcomes theyproduce. E)il human (ill produce e)il beha)iour ultimately leading to (ar. %n reality, ho(e)er this isfre6uently not the case because international systems impose constraints on states actions. %n the absence ofsystemic prere6uisites for stability, e)en a conser)ati)e nation (ith peace3lo)ing leader (ould not be ableto stabilise an international order. See Walt= *1$??- 1311+F and >addis *1$$#G1$$@- @13@#+1@These t(o )ariables stem from the definition of structure de)ised by enneth Walt=. To him, there arethree elements of the structure- *1+. ordering principle, *#+. Differentiation of units and *@+ distribution ofcapabilities. To Walt= under anarchic en)ironment, all units *states+ perform similar functions. This isbecause they do not (ant to depend on one another. nder anarchy (here there is no central authorityabo)e states, states are compelled to stand on their o(n feet. Dependence on others (ill endanger theirsur)i)al. By assuming that state is similar, t(o )ariables are left here- *1+ and *@+. See 7olsti *1$$+F andDunne and Schmidt *#!!8- 1$+.1This does not mean that neorealists ignore the possibility of hierarchy in the international system. %ndeed,they admit it. 7istory also demonstrates that some sorts of hierarchical order had e)er e;isted in the (orldlike &oman empire. 7o(e)er, because their presence is )ery rare in history, it can be assumed that anarchyrather than hierarchy is the ordering principle of the (orld. See Walt= *1$8$+17o(e)er, to pro)e the proposition that distribution of capabilities can influence state beha)iour, se)eralassumptions must be met. *1+. State5s interest is sur)i)al, thus ma;imi=ing its security. *#+. state is unitary

and rational calculating any costs and benefits of all possible alternati)es under structural constraint. *@+.They li)e in anarchy. 7o(e)er, if there is one or more of these assumptions do not hold, the hypothesismay not be pro)ed. :or e;ample, if the distribution of capabilities does not make other states concerned(ith their security, or structural constraint make the cost of balancing too high, then balancing cannotoccur. This can e;plain (hy band(agoning rather than balancing sometimes e;ist in the internationalsystem. *"er)is 1$?8- ??+. See also &andall Sch(eller5s study on band(agoning *1$$+. %n the study,Sch(eller argues that states concerned (ith sur)i)al (ill tend to balance. /on)ersely, those (hose moti)eis profit instead of security tend to band(agon. This study to some e;tent supports Walt= proposition thatdistribution of capabilities (ill tend to encourage balancing if security becomes the foremost concern ofstates.


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7o(e)er, ho( the change in distribution of capabilities can precisely shape state

beha)iour is not clear in neorealism. This lack of clarity stems from its ignorance of the

state le)el )ariable. After all, in neorealist theory, states are assumed to be similar so that

they can focus on ho( structural )ariable can influence state beha)iour. %solating state

le)el )ariable is important for them to e;amine clearly the relations among these

)ariables *distribution of capabilities and state beha)iour+. %t means that ho( the change

in distribution of capabilities is transformed to be state policy is not the scope of the

theory. This is admitted by Walt= himself (hen he makes clear that his theory is a theory

of international politics and not a theory of foreign policy.1

This neglect of state le)el process brings about the emergence of the third strand,

neoclassical realism. Although neoclassical realists agree that relati)e material po(er

establishes the basic parameters of a country5s foreign policy, they contend that the

impact of such po(er capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and comple; because

systemic pressures must be translated through inter)ening )ariables at the unit le)el.18

There are t(o inter)ening )ariables offered by these scholars- the perceptions of states5

leaders of their countries5 relati)e po(er and domestic politics.1?

:irst, because foreign policy choices are made by state5s leaders and elites, their

perceptions matter more. There are t(o inseparable issues (ith (hich leaders are

concerned and shape their perceptions- threat and relati)e po(er. States (hose leaders

percei)e that a change in distribution of material po(er could threaten their countries (ill

balance against those rising ad)ersaries. 7o(e)er, (hat to be emphasi=ed here is that this

balancing essentially results from leaders5 perception of the threatposed by the change

that is, ho( dangerous such change of relati)e po(er to their countries5 security is. The

implication of this premise is that if a state does not see such changes as a threat, it is

)ery likely that it (ill not react radically to balance it. Thus, as Stephen Walt argues,

states essentially (ill balance against the most threatening states rather than the most

po(erful states.1$To Walt, states5 threat perception can be influenced by fi)e factors-

1Walt= *1$8$+18>ideon &oss *1$$?- 18+1?Tim Dunne and Brian /. Schmidt *#!!- 181+1$This argument actually can e;plain (hy to some e;tent accrual of a state5s material capabilities does notcreate balancing act by others during the course of history. This e;planation does not re6uire us to rela; oneof the most important realist assumptions that is, state5s ultimate goal is security or sur)i)al. Bymaintaining this assumption, (e can still e;plain anomaly in state beha)iour. See Stephen Walt *1$?8+


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aggregate po(er, pro;imity, ideology, intention and offensi)e capability.#! 7o(e)er,

because threat mostly stems from po(er, especially relati)e po(er in the system, it makes

sense that the threat posed by great po(er is more formidable than that posed by small

one. %t is note(orthy that balance of po(er arises from states5 balancing beha)iour

against threat.#1%t is a states5 action in response to the threat posed by rising ad)ersaries.

The second inter)ening )ariable introduced by neoclassical realists is domestic

structure. 7ere, they find the concept of state strength. State strength here is defined as

the ability of a state to mobili=e and direct the resources at its disposal in the pursuit of

particular interests.## States ability here is manifest in their leaders5 degree of freedom to

e;tract and direct national resources as they might (ish. %n other (ords, a strong state is a

state (hose leaders can freely mobili=e and allocate national resources in an attempt to

achie)e foreign policy goal. This indicates that different types of states posses different

capacities to translate the )arious elements of national po(er into state po(er. This

argument apparently does not assume units are alike. &ather, they regard states are

different. Thus, countries (ith comparable gross capabilities but different state structures

are likely to act differently. The implication of this argument is that in democratic states,

foreign policy (ill reflect public interests rather than leaders5 because the mobili=ation of

national resources to achie)e foreign policy goals can only be done (ith the appro)al of

the public. /on)ersely, in authoritarian countries, foreign policy can reflect leaders5

interests because the leaders ha)e greater freedom to mobili=e national resources to

achie)e foreign policy goals e)en (ithout the appro)al of their people.

Because all these strands collecti)ely can e;plain the nature of the international

system and state beha)iour, % (ill use them all to e;plain the issue addressed in this essay.

All the three strands (ill be used to e;plain the S beha)iour since the end of the /old

War and its effects on the system. While neoclassical realism (ill be used to e;plain the

nature of American foreign policy and the strategies a)ailable to the less po(erful to deal

(ith changing American beha)iour. The ne;t sections (ill address them.

#!%bid, p. #1ai 7e *#!!- 1@+##:areed Hakaria in Dunne and Schmidt *#!!- 181+

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Unipolarity and why it matters

Ine great consensus among %& scholars about the end of the /old War at the turn of

1$$!s is that a great change in international distribution of capabilities has occurred. The

change in this distribution of capabilities has created structural change indicated by the

collapse of the bipolar structure. 2any interpretations put for(ard to e;plain (hat kind of

system (e are li)ing no( is. Some of them argue that it is multipolarity. #@While some

others maintain that it is unipolarity.#The others percei)e it as uni3multipolarity.#

To kno( (hat kind of structure it is no( depends on definition of the respecti)e

structures and the conformity of their measures to the facts. 7ere, % argue that the current

system is unipolarity (here the S has preponderant material capabilities that enable it to

manipulate global order in achie)ing its interests e)en at the e;pense other. %n de)eloping

my argument, % (ill use the definition of unipolarity inherent in the logics of structural

realism.

4nipolarity is a structure in (hich one state5s capabilities are too great to be

counterbalanced5# Different from hegemony, unipolarity only entails po(er position

operationalised mostly by its material capabilities.#8/on)ersely, hegemony entails mostly

non3material capabilities manifest in authoritati)e and legitimate foreign policy.

7o(e)er, it is (orth mentioning that hegemony presupposes the presence of unipolarity.

7egemony cannot e;ist (ithout being a unipolar po(er. But, being a unipolar does not

automatically become a hegemon.#? %n brief, unipolarity indicates capabilities (hile

hegemony follo(s from foreign policy.

&egarding these material capabilities, (e can see ho( unbalanced the capabilities

o(ned by the S compared to others. The S is e;cellent in all the standard components

of national po(er.#$%n terms of economic strength, it is still the biggest economy in the

(orld indicated by its >DP amounted to SJ1@,?11,#!! millions. This is about three

#@Those (ho argue for multipolarity are represented here by egley and &aymond *1$$#+ and 0arramore*#!!?+.#:or those (ho argue for unipolarity, (e cite here Wohlforth *1$$$+F Wohlforth and Brooks *#!!#+F amdrauthammer *1$$!G1$$1F #!!#G#!!@+.#:or the argument about uni3multipolarity, see 7untington *1$$$+.#Wohlforth *1$$$- $+.#8 /apabilities here include population and si=e of territory, resources, economic strength, militarycapability and competence *Walt= 1$8$- 1@1+. %t is seen here that most factors are material.#?See 2oe *#!!-#+F and Wilkinson *1$$$+.#$Books and Wohlforth *#!!#+.

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times that of "apan, the second largest economy in the (orld, four times that of >ermany

and /hina, and si; times that of nited ingdom and :rance. @! %n terms of military

e;penditure, in #!! it spent SJ #8,! millions or just percent of >DP. This

increased to SJ 8?,@1 millions in #!!8.@1Projection for #!!? S military e;penditure

compared to the rest of the (orld conducted by /hristopher 7ellman, re)eals that its

military spending accounts for ? percent, or almost half, of the (orld5s total military

spending.%t is more than the ne;t highest spending countries in the (orld combined.

/ompared (ith its potential ri)als, /hina and &ussia, it spent .? times more than the

former and 1!.# times more than the latter. %t is also $?. times more than %ran, its 2iddle

Eastern enemy and almost times the spending on the si; KrogueL states.@#

%n terms of Po(er /apabilities */IW+ as percentage of hegemon, in this case the

S, only /hina that approaches its po(er capabilities that is, ?$.#8. &ussia only accounts

for @. and its ally, "apan has @@.?8.@@This 6uantitati)e data is supported by 6ualitati)e

description about its military might like its nuclear superiority, dominant air force and

e;cellent blue3(ater na)y.@

%n the element of 4competence5, it also demonstrates its superiority. %t is the

(orld5s leading po(er in the e;ploitation of the military applications of ad)anced

communication and information technology. %t also becomes the (orld5s most

important financial centre symboli=ed by its 4Wall Street5 (hose inde; influences the

le)el of economic transactions (orld(ide. &ecently, its leadership in coordinating

global interest rate cuts follo(ing the collapse of global capital market reinforces this

further.@ %n short, the S is predominant in all categories simultaneously. This is

surely has no precedence in the modern era of international relations.@

@!See >ross Domestic Products #!!8 a)ailable athttp-GGsiteresources.(orldbank.orgGDATASTAT%ST%/SG&esourcesG>DP.pdf @1S%P&% military e;penditure database, a)ailable at http-GGmile;data.sipri.orgGresult.php@#

See /hristopher 7ellman *#!!- 8!+ a)ailable athttp-GG(((.fcnl.orgGno(GpdfG#!!Gmar!.pdf@@7ere % use the dataset from /orrelates of War Projects */IW+ for #!!. %t can be e;tracted fromhttp-GG(((.correlatesof(ar.orgG/IW#M#!DataG/apabilitiesGnmc@3!#.htm the data is in the form of inde;called Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score. % did simple statistical calculation on thisinde; to sho( the comparison of po(er capabilities among four states- SA, "apan, /hina and &ussia. Thismethod is inspired by Wohlforth *1$$$- 1#+.@Brooks and Wohlforth *#!!#- #1+.@See, 2ark 9andler, K&ich 0ations Pushing for "oint :inancial &escue,New York Times, Ict 1!, #!!?.a)ailable athttp-GG(((.nytimes.comG#!!?G1!G11GbusinessG11global.html'@Brooks and Wohlforth *#!!#- #@+.

$
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdfhttp://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4http://www.fcnl.org/now/pdf/2006/mar06.pdfhttp://www.fcnl.org/now/pdf/2006/mar06.pdfhttp://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc3-02.htmhttp://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/11/business/11global.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/11/business/11global.htmlhttp://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdfhttp://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4http://www.fcnl.org/now/pdf/2006/mar06.pdfhttp://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc3-02.htmhttp://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/11/business/11global.html


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%n the area of soft po(er, it also arguably performs (ell. %ts popular culture is

adopted by many young people around the (orld. %ts 7olly(oods mo)ies are

consumed by millions of (atchers. %t e)en becomes a benchmark for the 6uality in

entertaining industry. %ts science and education are also praised (orld(ide.@8 %ts

uni)ersity curriculum is adopted by many uni)ersities around the (orld especially in

de)eloping countries. Being a graduate of an %)y 9eague uni)ersity is a great pride

for many people. Despite many criticisms against its ideology, in many things, it still

becomes trendsetter for the (orld.

All these capabilities ultimately endo( the S (ith the structural opportunity

to achie)e global primacy and establish (orld3scale hegemony.@?The fact that it has

unmatched capabilities and huge structural opportunities has subse6uently changed its

beha)iour in interaction (ith other states. :riendly America gradually changes into

lordly America. As predicted by classical realists, o)er(helming po(er easily

produces hubris and arrogance.@$The first indication for this is re)ealed in the initial

draft of the Pentagon5s Defence Planning >uidance *DP>+ for :iscal


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the /old War. %kenberry5s analysis on American post3(ar grand strategy suggests that

its /old War strategies, realist and liberal grand strategies, ha)e created positi)e

effects on the (orld. &ealist strategy apparent in the American3led alliance system,

for instance, has 4helped generate unprecedented le)els of integration and cooperation

among countries of Western Europe, 0orth America and 0ortheast Asia.5 @Similarly,

its liberal strategy created a positi)e agenda for American leadership. Though it used

its po(er to achie)e national interests, it did so 4in a (ay that helped deepen the

fabric of international community.5 This strategy, to a significant e;tent, helped

create the (orld order and produce mutually beneficial relations bet(een the S and

the rest of the (orld.

After the /old War (hen the American unipolar status becomes ob)ious, its

grand strategy begins to change. abo)e by ensuring no potential challengers arising is the main

priority. 7o(e)er, engagement strategy is still used to dampen any potential

challenges. Therefore, it is difficult to see differences in grand strategies before and

after the /old War. But, one indication of significant change began to be clear in the

mid31$$!s (hen it (anted to e;pand 0ATI despite great concern from &ussia.

While the S officials attempted to ensure &ussia that it (as not a rene(ed

containment policy, they publicly stressed that 4&ussia does not hold a )eto o)er

0ATI e;pansion.5During this period (hen the S has been confident enough (ith

its unipolar status, its international beha)iour becomes increasingly unilateral.

7untington listed these unilateral policies at length such as pressuring other countries

to adopt its )alues, pre)ent others from obtaining military capabilities, sanction those

(ho do not meet the standard of democracy and human rights it has stipulated, and

promoting arms sale abroad (hile banning others from doing so. These unilateral

policies are also clear (ith regard to its actions in multilateral forums.8

@%kenberry *#!!- 1@?+.%bid, p. 1@$.As argued by Posen, 0ATI e;pansion is actually dri)en by the need to maintain S po(er in Europerather than by threat posed by &ussia. See Posen &oss *1$$G1$$8- 118+.2astanduno *1$$8- 81+.87untington *1$$$- @?+. %ndeed, 2adeleine Albright once stated it, 4(e (ill beha)e multilaterally (hen(e can and unilaterally (hen (e must.5 *As 6uoted in /o;, #!!#- #8+. This is an affirmation of Americanunilateralism in its foreign policy.

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The unilateral character of the S foreign policy becomes clear along (ith the

rise of >eorge W Bush to the presidency. E)en before his coming to po(er, he has

declared that hegemony is his primary grand strategic aim. During his campaign, he

proclaimed that he (as resolute not to adhere to agreements or e)en to recognise

current international commitments or legally binding obligations that might run

counter to S national interests.? Shortly after coming to po(er, he realised his

(ords by launching a series of unilateral policies. The (ithdra(al from yoto

Protocol on global (arming, the abandonment of the Anti3Ballistic 2issile Treaty, the

refusal to go along (ith the establishment of the international /riminal /ourt in

&ome, and the suspension of missile talks (ith 0orth orea are but a fe( e;amples

of this unilateral character. This has actually sent signal to its public and the (orld

that 4he is taking the S do(n a dangerous path.5$

The September 11 terrorist attack *$G11+ more )i)idly re)eals American

unilateralism. The (ay it responded to this attack has aroused many concerns around

the (orld about the future of (orld order. Shortly after the attack, the Bush

Administration launched the >lobal War on Terror. The essence of this (ar is that the

S is entitled to attacking any places in the (orld it deems as the basis of terrorist

groups (ithout considering the so)ereignty of the states in (hich the basis e;ists.

nilateral action in the form of pre3empti)e strike is regarded as the only option to

attain and consolidate security simply because terrorist groups cannot be deterred.!

The implication of this policy is formidable. T(o countries regarded as rogue states

become the )ictims. %t attacked Afghanistan and %ra6 and toppled the regimes in those

t(o countries. %t in)aded those countries and attempted to rebuild them according to

its )alues and ideals rather than those of the countries themsel)es. This dangerous

policy has created ci)il (ars in the t(o countries and e)entually trapped itself into the

protracted conflicts there.

What are the implications of this change in the S beha)iour from a benign

post3(ar superpo(er to unilateral superpo(er' :or the (orld, American unilateralism

is dangerous because it can cause instability and global insecurity. 0eo3realism

?:akiolas and :akiolas *#!!8- ?+.$Burbach and Tarbell *#!!- 1#31#8+.!:akiolas and :akiolas *#!!8- $+.

1#


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predicts that unipolarity (ill stimulate balancing beha)iour by others. 7o(e)er, the

facts sho( other(ise. Wohlforth and Brooks note three factors that impede

counterbalancing by others. :irst, the S has good geo3strategic position. 7istory

sho(s that counterbalancing in the past all emerged against 4centrally located land

po(ers that constituted e;istential threats to nearby major states.51 Second, it has

much larger material capabilities than all other states. %ts currently dominant military

po(er and technological po(erhouse can undermine others5 moti)ation to challenge

it. Third, American primacy is an accomplished fact rather than a re)isionist

aspiration. Because historically counterbalance (as directed against re)isionist rather

than status 6uo states, it is less likely to see others (ill counterbalance. # %n short,

there may not be counterbalancing posed by other states against it.

While counterbalancing in traditional sense like military might (ill be less

likely in the near future, this does not mean that balancing beha)iour in other forms

(ill not occur. &eus3smit identifies three forms of balancing that may arise due to this

unilateralism. :irst is 4autonomy balancing5 (here its allies (ill gradually lessen their

dependence on the S. To some e;tent, European nion *E+ has done this.@Second

is 4threshold balancing5 (here any countries that feel threatened by the S are forced

to guarantee their security (ith rudimentary nuclear capacity. 0orth orea and %ran

are t(o e;amples of these. :inally, there (ill be long3term tendency for some

countries to increase their military capabilities to meet the potential threat posed by

American unilateralism. This surely (ill make the (orld unsafe and insecure.

:urthermore, the prospect for unsafe and insecure (orld is heightened by the

terrorists5 increasing capability to retaliate. Though they may not ha)e as much

resources as the S thus, cannot counterbalance it as such, its ability is formidable

enough to arouse fear and insecurity for all.

The negati)e conse6uences for the S are much bigger. /lassical realists

predict that attainment of interests done in a (ay incompatible (ith international

order (ill result in self3defeating situation. After all, classical realists posit that (hile

po(er is important to produce outcomes, it does so through influence. And because

1Wohlforth and Brooks *#!!- 11+.#%bid,@To kno( European perception of the American unilateralism, see sernia *#!!- 1@!31?+.&eus3Smit *#!!@- #$+.

1@


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influence is a psychological relationship, it entails legitimacy and authoritati)e

po(er. sing classical realist insight, (e can argue that unilateralism (ill make

American po(er unsustainable in the future. This is because unilateralism diminishes

legitimacy and its authoritati)e po(er. When these t(o important resources of po(er

decline, the cost of e;ercising po(er becomes more and more e;pensi)e. And

because the S is not po(erful enough to control all the problems in the (orld alone,

this (ill enmesh itself in difficulties and in the long3run, it may lead to its demise.

To conclude, unipolarity matters because it can incline the unipolar po(er to

unilateralism that e)entually, leads to self3defeating results for itself and destabili=ing

conse6uences for the (orld. The implication of unipolarity as e;plained abo)e is

actually deri)ed from realist logic that predict beha)ioural change of the states due to

change in distribution of po(er. %n the ne;t part, (e (ill analyse some options

a)ailable to the less po(erful to deal (ith this big problem.

hat the !ess Power"ul can do#

7a)ing kno(n the global implications of American unilateralism, the ne;t 6uestion is

(hat can (e do about it' Se)eral options de)ised by analysts to constraint S

unilateralism. Due to limited space, % (ill pick up t(o strategies only that can be

e;plained by neoclassical realist theory. % (ill start (ith t(o )ariables that determine

foreign policy in neoclassical perspecti)e- perception of leaders and domestic politics.

To neoclassical realist, perception of leaders is important in translating structural

factors to foreign policy outcomes. 9eaders5 perception about their countries5 relati)e

po(er in the international system (ill influence the (ay they see problems thus,

influence the policies they de)ise to sol)e them. The implication of this proposition is

that to change a policy of a country, the perception of its leaders needs be changed in the

first place. The strategy of changing the leaders5 perception can be done by sho(ing them

that the cost of particular policies is higher thus, deterring them from adopting suchpolicies. Ine strategy that the less po(erful can de)ise here is the so3called soft

Analysis that legitimacy is an important source of po(er is actually also implied in classical realist(orks. See 0ed 9ebo(5s interpretation of Thucydides and 2orgenthau5s (orks *0ed 9ebo( #!!1F#!!8+.7ere, he analyses such concept as hegemonia*rule based on consent of others+ as opposed to arche*controle;ercised through threat and bribes+. 7e also finds the concept ofpeitho*persuasion+ in Thucydides5 (ork.According &eus3Smit, 4legitimacy is an inherently social phenomenon. Ine5s actions are not legitimateunless they are recognised as such by other social actors5 *#!!@- #+.

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balancing. Different from hard balancing (hich attempts to balance a unipolar po(er

directly through military means, soft balancing is aimed at 4making a superior state5s

military force harder to use5 as the instrument of foreign policy.8Because this strategy

can increase the cost of using some resources, especially military resources as instrument

of foreign policy, it can constrain the policy3makers from de)ising particular policies.


16/22

future ambition5.$The success of this strategy is indicated not only by (hether or not the

superpo(er abandon the policies opposed, but also by (hether more states join a soft

balancing coalition against the superpo(er. Again, the S (ar against %ra6 can represent

this strategy.

All soft balancing strategies abo)e do not directly challenge the S military

pro(ess indeed. 7o(e)er, it can complicate calculation of leaders regarding some policy

options. 7a)ing kno(n that the possibility of implementing some policies is limited and

they are constrained by others in doing so, the leaders e)entually can change their

perception on their country5s relati)e po(er in the (orld. This can ha)e long3term effects

regarding the tendency to unilateralism. Pape summarises the effects of this strategy

arguing, 4they all make it more difficult for the nited States to e;ercise that po(er. They

impose immediate costs and constraints on the application of .S. po(er by entangling

the nited States in diplomatic maneu)ers, reducing the pressure on regional states to

cooperate (ith its military plans, and bolstering the claims of target states that .S.

military threats justify the acceleration of their o(n military programs. They also

establish a ne( pattern of diplomatic acti)ity- cooperation among major po(ers that

e;cludes the nited States.5!7o(e)er, (hat to be remembered here is that some soft

balancing strategy assume that norm of multilateralism is strong enough to enable the

strategies to (ork (ell. This is (hy balancing strategy in economic issues can (ork

better than in security ones.1

Ither strategy attributable to neoclassical realist logic is e;ploiting S domestic

constraint on policy3making process. As a democratic country, the go)ernment is

constrained by the so3called checks and balances mechanism. This mechanism is in turn

super)ised by strong public control through increasing popular participation in the

process. As Wang "isi obser)es,

Oalthough the president enjoys so3called Kking5s po(erL in foreign relations, he is still

restricted by forces from the /ongress, the 0ational Security /ouncil, the State Department, the Defense Department, and other e;ecuti)e organi=ations (hen it comes to issues suchas (aging large scaled (ars, defense budget, military strategy, and major foreign policyinitiati)es, thus making it impossible for him to proceed at (ill, to take actions entirelyaccording to his indi)idual desires and political interest. As a (hole, America5s foreign

policy ser)es its long3term national interest, unlike 0a=i >ermany under 7itler or %ra6

$%bid, p. @8.!%bid, p. !.1See %kenberry *#!!@+.

1


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under Saddam 7ussein (hose foreign policies (ent to the fanatic e;treme, and becameshort3sighted and irrational.#

Wang "isi5s obser)ation indicates ho( limited the ability of leaders to mobili=e national

resources for particular polices is. As a democracy, po(er is concentrated in many parties

thus complicate the policy3making process. %n democracy like the S, the role of public

opinion is )ery big. Popular )oice and media ha)e strong influence on the policy3making

process. Any policies can easily be canceled if public and congress are opposed to them.

American retreat from ietnam War is a notable e;ample of the po(erful impact of

media and popular )oice on foreign policy.

Ibser)ing the reality of S domestic politics, (e can see that internal di)ision

has fre6uently coloured the process of making important decisions. This is because most

American public still hold humanitarian )alues. :oreign policy sur)eys sho( that S

citi=ens remain casualty3a)erse unless )ital S interests such as pre)enting terrorism

seem to be at stake. And e;cept for a brief period of bipartisanship after September 11,

the country has al(ays been di)ided in many issues regarding its international role.

%nternal di)isions fre6uently pre)ent the S from acting as 6uickly, decisi)ely, or

forcefully as its material resources (ould allo(. This reality does not go unnoticed by

other nations- (hat seems like democratic debate to S citi=ens may appear to others as a

lack of resol)e or an opportunity for political manipulation, further complicating thee;ecution of S foreign policy.@ With this internal political reality, the tendency of

American imperious beha)iour can be controlled. %n fact, it is its o(n people that can

restrain its aggressi)eness more po(erfully.

Conclusion

Departing from realist theories, this essay analyses ho( a change in international

distribution of capabilities has changed states5 beha)iour as (ell. The end of the /old

War lea)ing the S as the only superpo(er in the international system has changed its

beha)iour from a benign hegemon to imperious superpo(er. Along (ith the (idening

gap bet(een its material po(er and that of the rest of the (orld, its unilateral tendency

also increases. Beginning in the /linton5s era in the mid31$$!s, this unilateral character

#Wang *#!!@- $+.@ Talmadge *#!!#+.

18


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becomes more apparent in the Bush administration. This surely poses greater

conse6uences for the (orld as (ell as itself. While neorealist theory fail to pro)e that

unipolarity can stimulate balancing actions by others, classical realists can e;plain the

conse6uences of unipolarity and unilateralism (ell. :inally, neoclassical realism offers

some strategies that can be done by the less po(erful to deal (ith American unilateralism

in this unipolar era.

Re"erence:

Burbach, &oger and "im Tarbell,Imperial Overstretch: George W. Bush an the!u"ris o# $mpire*0e( . and William /. Wohlforth, KAmerican Primacy in Perspecti)e,L%oreign A##airs, )ol. ?1, no. *"ulyGAugust #!!#+, pp. #!3@@.

33333333 and William /. Wohlforth, K%nternational &elations Theory andthe /ase against nilateralism,LPerspectives on Politics, )ol. @, no. @ *September#!!+, pp. !$3#.

/o;, 2ichael, KAmerican Po(er Before and After 11 September- Di==y (ith Success'LInternational A##airs&ol. 8?, 0o. # *#!!#+, pp. #13#8.

Donnelly, "ack, K&ealismL in Scott Burchill, Andre( 9inklater, &ichard Da)etak, "ackDonnelly, 2atthe( Paterson, /hristian &eus3Smit and "ac6ui True *eds+ Theorieso# International 'elations, *0e( ilpin,&obert >. KThe &ichness of the Tradition of Political &ealismLInternational Organi(ation, ol. @?, 0o. #. *Spring, 1$?+, pp. #?83@!.

7ellman, /hristopher, KThe &una(ay 2ilitary Budget- An Analysis,L%riens -ommitteeon National egislation, 2arch #!!, no. 8!, p. @

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7olsti, Ile &, KTheories of %nternational &elations and :oreign Policy- &ealism and %ts/hallengersL,in /harles W. egley. "r *ed.+, -ontroversies in International'elations Theor+: 'ealism an Neoli"eral -hallenge, St. 2artin5s Press, 0e(. "ohn, KAmerica5s %mperial Ambition,L%oreign A##airs, )ol. ?1, no. *SeptemberGIctober #!!#+, pp. 3!.

3333333, K%s American 2ultilateralism in Decline'LPerspectives on Politics, )ol. 1, no. @*September #!!@+, pp. @@3!.

3333333, KPo(er and 9iberal Irder- America5s Post(ar World Irder inTransitionL, International 'elations o# the Asia/Paci#ic, )ol. *#!!+, pp. 1@@3

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"er)is, &obert, KThe /ontribution of President enneth 0. Walt=L,Political ,cience, ol,#!, 0o. , *Autumn 1$?8+, pp. ?3?1

ai 7e, KDynamic Balancing- 0eoclassical &ealism and /hina5s :oreign PolicyL,Paper#or the 01thAnnual -onvention o# International ,tuies Association at ,an 2iego,-A, 2arch ##3#, #!!

egley, /harles W. "r. and >regory A. &aymond, K2ust We :ear a Post3/old War2ultipolar System'L The 3ournal o# -on#lict 'esolution, ol. @, 0o. @ *Sep.,

1$$#+, pp. 8@3?

rauthammer, /harles, KThe nipolar 2oment &e)isited,L The national Interest,*Winter #!!#G#!!@+, pp. 318

9andler, 2ark, K&ich 0ations Pushing for "oint :inancial &escue, New York Times, Ict1!,#!!?. a)ailable at http-GG(((.nytimes.comG#!!?G1!G11GbusinessG11global.html

9ayne, /hristopher, KThe nipolar %llusion- Why 0e( >reat Po(ers (ill rise,LInternational,ecurit+, )ol. 18, no. *Spring 1$$@+, pp. 31

2astanduno, 2ichael, KPreser)ing the nipolar 2oment- &ealist Theories and S>rand Strategy after the /old War,LInternational,ecurit+, )ol. #1, no. *Spring1$$8+, pp. $3??.

2oe, Espen, Q7egemony and nipolarityQPaper presente at the annualmeeting o# the International ,tuies Association& e -entre ,heraton !otel&

)ontreal& *ue"ec& -anaa Online R.PD:. #!!?31!31! fromhttp-GG(((.allacademic.comGmetaGp8?inde;.html

1$
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0arramore, Terry, K/hina and Europe- Engagement, 2ultipolarity and Strategy.LThePaci#ic 'eview, ol. #1, 0o. 1 *2arch #!!?+, pp. ?831!?

0ed 9ebo(, &ichard and &obert elly, KThucydides and 7egemony- Athens and thenited States,L'eview o# International ,tuies, ol. #8 *#!!1+.

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4nilateralism an $uropean 2iscontent*0e(


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Walt=, enneth 0, KPolitical StructureL in Theor+ o# International Politics*0e(


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%&

Iccupation - 9ecturer in %nternational &elations Departments at P0

KeteranL "akarta, %0 Syarif 7idayatullah "akarta,

ni)ersitas Prof. Dr. 2oestopo *Beragama+ and

ni)ersitas Budi 9uhur "akarta.

understanding unipolarity: a realist perspective

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