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UnderstandingLawEnforcementIntelligenceProcessesReporttotheOfficeofUniversityPrograms,ScienceandTechnologyDirectorate,U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurityJuly2014


Understanding Law Enforcement Intelligence Processes

AboutThisReport

TheauthorsofthisreportareDavidCarter,Ph.D.,MichiganStateUniversity;SteveChermak,Ph.D.,MichiganStateUniversity;JeremyCarter,Ph.D.,IndianaUniversity‐PurdueUniversityIndianapolis;JackDrew,MichiganStateUniversity.Questionsaboutthisreportshouldbedirectedtoinfostart@start.umd.edu.ThisreportispartoftheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)project,“FactorsimpactingtheU.S.IntelligenceProcess.”ThisresearchwassupportedbytheDepartmentofHomelandScienceandTechnologyDirectorate’sOfficeofUniversityProgramsthroughAwardNumber2012‐ST‐061‐CS0001,CenterfortheStudyofTerrorismandBehavior(CSTAB)2.13madetoSTARTtoinvestigatetheunderstandingandcounteringofterrorismwithintheU.S.Theviewsandconclusionscontainedinthisdocumentarethoseoftheauthorsandshouldnotbeinterpretedasnecessarilyrepresentingtheofficialpolicies,eitherexpressedorimplied,oftheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurityorSTART.

AboutSTARTTheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)issupportedinpartbytheScienceandTechnologyDirectorateoftheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecuritythroughaCenterofExcellenceprogrambasedattheUniversityofMaryland.STARTusesstate‐of‐the‐arttheories,methodsanddatafromthesocialandbehavioralsciencestoimproveunderstandingoftheorigins,dynamicsandsocialandpsychologicalimpactsofterrorism.Formoreinformation,[email protected].

CitationsTocitethisreport,pleaseusethisformat:Carter,David,andSteveChermak,JeremyCarter,JackDrew.“UnderstandingLawEnforcementIntelligenceProcesses,”ReporttotheOfficeofUniversityPrograms,ScienceandTechnologyDirectorate,U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.CollegePark,MD:START,2014.


Understanding Law Enforcement Intelligence Processes

ContentsExecutiveSummary..............................................................................................................................................................................1

Introduction.............................................................................................................................................................................................3

DataandMethodology.........................................................................................................................................................................4

Demographics.....................................................................................................................................................................................6

DataMeasures....................................................................................................................................................................................6

Results.........................................................................................................................................................................................................7

PerceptionsofTerroristThreats................................................................................................................................................7

InformationSharingIssues...........................................................................................................................................................9

IndicatorsofPreparedness........................................................................................................................................................11

AnalyticStrategy.................................................................................................................................................................................13

Discussion..............................................................................................................................................................................................15

References..............................................................................................................................................................................................18

Appendix.................................................................................................................................................................................................19


Understanding Law Enforcement Intelligence Processes 1

ExecutiveSummaryTheSeptember11thattacksimpactedsocietygenerally,andlawenforcementspecifically,indramaticways.Oneofthemajortrendshasbeenchangingexpectationsregardingcriminalintelligencepracticesamongstate,local,andtribal(SLT)lawenforcementagencies,andtheneedtocoordinateintelligenceeffortsandshareinformationatalllevelsofgovernment.Despiteclearevidenceofsignificantchanges,verylittleresearchexiststhatexaminesissuesrelatedtotheintelligencepracticesofSLTlawenforcementagencies.ImportantquestionsonthenatureoftheissuesthatimpactSLTintelligencepracticesremain.WhilethereissomeuncertaintyamongSLTlawenforcementaboutcurrentterrorismthreats,thereiscertaintythatthesethreatsevolveinalargelyunpredictablepattern.Asaresultthereisanongoingneedforconsistentandeffectiveinformationcollection,analysisandsharing.Littleinformationisknownaboutperceptionsofhowinformationisbeingsharedbetweenagenciesandwhethertechnologieshaveimprovedorhurtinformationsharing,andlittleisknownaboutwhetheragenciesthinktheyarecurrentlypreparedforaterroristattack,andthekeyfactorsdistinguishingthosethatthinktheyarecomparedtothosewhodonot.Thisstudywasdesignedtoaddresstheseissues,andabetterunderstandingoftheseissuescouldsignificantlyenhanceintelligencepracticesandenhancepublicsafety.TodevelopabetterunderstandingofperceptionsaboutterroristthreatsthatSLTagenciesfaceandtheireffortstopreventterrorism,theresearchteamdistributedquestionnairesviaaweb‐designedsurveytotwoseparategroupsoflawenforcementpersonnel.Developmentofthesurveyinvolvedseveralpreliminarydrafts.FeedbackwassoughtfromSLTintelligenceworkersaboutquestioncontentandcoverage,andspecificallywhetherquestionswereambiguousordifficulttoanswer.Aftermakingrevisions,thefinalInstitutionalReviewBoardapprovedinstrumenthad48structured,semi‐structured,oropen‐endedquestions.Thesurvey,despiteitslength,enabledrespondentstoshareinformationaboutissuessuchasperceptionsofterroristthreats,inter‐agencyinteractions,informationsharing,intelligencetraining,andagencypreparedness.Additionalquestionsaskedaboutcharacteristicsoftherespondentandtherespondent’sagency.Therearethreefindingsthatarequiteinteresting.First,lawenforcementperceptionsaboutwhatisaseriousthreatintheircommunityhaschangedsignificantlyovertime.Lawenforcementismuchmoreconcernedaboutsovereigncitizens,Islamicextremists,andmilitia/patriotgroupmemberscomparedtothefringegroupsofthefarright,includingChristianIdentitybelievers,reconstructedtraditionalists(i.e.,Odinists),idiosyncraticsectarians(i.e.,survivalists),andmembersofdoomsdaycults.Infact,sovereigncitizenswerethetopconcernoflawenforcement,buttheconcernaboutwhethermostgroupswereaseriousterroristthreatactuallydeclinedformostgroups(e.g.,theKKK;ChristianIdentity;Neo‐Nazis;RacistSkinheads;ExtremistEnvironmentalists;ExtremeAnimalRightsExtremists).



Second,whenexaminingwhethertherespondentsthoughtthatvariousagenciesandsourceswereusefulintheircounterterrorismefforts,theagenciesthatappeartobemostusefultoSLTlawenforcementincludestate/localfusioncenters,theFBI’sJointTerrorismTaskForce(s),theFBI,andDHSOfficeofIntelligenceandAnalysis.Overall,theinternetandtheuseofopensourcematerials,humanintelligencesources,andthemediawereperceivedasprovidingthemostusefulinformation.Securityclearances,adequatepersonnel,adequatetraining,adequateresources,adequatetime,ortheorganizationalculturewereallperceivedasbarriersforthesharingofintelligenceandinformationacrossagencies.Third,severalfactorsimpactedwhetheranagencywaspreparedforaterroristattack.Agencieswithsatisfiedworkingrelationshipswithstateorganizationsweretwiceaslikelytobeprepared,agenciesthatproducethreatassessmentsandriskassessmentsmorefrequentlyarethree‐and‐a‐halftimesmorelikelytobepreparedthanagencieswhocreatethemlessfrequently,andthecreationofvulnerabilityassessmentsalsoappearstobeapredictorofpreparednessastheymorethanquadrupleanagency’spreparednesslikelihood.Inaddition,asagenciesexperienceproblemsrelatedtopersonnel,training,andresources,thelikelihoodtheywillconsiderthemselvespreparedisreducedbyapproximatelythree‐fold.Agenciesthatfelttheywerenotpreparedhighlightedproblemswithresources,training,andqualityofworkingrelationshipswithotherorganizations.Particularlyforpractitioners,themostimportantaspectofthisresearchmaynotbethefindingsonthevariableanalyses,perse,butonthebenchmarksidentifiedintrendsfoundinthedata.Somecleartrendsemergedwhichindicateprogrammaticsuccessesforinformationsharingandintelligence,aswellasareaswhereproblemsremain.Whenconsideringthesefindingsinthecontextofresearchonorganizationaldevelopment,itisclearthatorganizationalleadershipisanimportantfactorfororganizationalsuccessesininformationsharingaswellasforpreparedness.Iftheleadershipofalawenforcementagencyiswillingtoexpendtheefforttotrainpersonnel,developpartnerships,andparticipateinstate,regionalandnationalinformationsharinginitiatives,thengreaterlevelsofsuccesswillbeachieved.Whileonewouldintuitivelyassumethis,thedataempiricallysupportsit.



IntroductionTheSeptember11thattacksimpactedsocietygenerally,andlawenforcementspecifically,indramaticways.Oneofthemajortrendshasbeenchangingexpectationsregardingcriminalintelligencepracticesamongstate,local,andtribal(SLT)lawenforcementagencies,andtheneedtocoordinateintelligenceeffortsandshareinformationatalllevelsofgovernment.TheNationalCommissiononTerroristAttacksUpontheUnitedStates’(2004)“9/11CommissionReport”highlightedthatdespitetheUnitedStates’sprawlinglawenforcementcommunity,veryfewagenciesotherthantheFederalBureauofInvestigation(FBI)engagedinanytypeofcounterterrorismeffortspriortotheattacks.TheCommissionReportalsostressedthatenhancingintelligenceeffortsandimprovinginformationsharingwerecriticaltothepreventionofterroristacts.LawenforcementintheUnitedStatesisdecentralized,whichposesincrediblechallengesintermsofeffectivelysharinginformationacrossjurisdictionalboundaries,butsuchdecentralizationisalsoanopportunity.AnincreasingnumberofSLTlawenforcementagencieshaveexpandedtheirinformationcollectionandintelligenceanalysispractices,andtherehavebeenfundamentalchangesinthenational,state,andlocalinformationsharinginfrastructure.Despiteclearevidenceofthesedramaticchanges(U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity,2011;U.S.HouseofRepresentatives,2013),lawenforcement’sexpandedroleincounterterrorism,andtheacknowledgementthatlocalintelligenceiscriticaltothepreventionanddeterrenceofterroristacts,verylittleresearchexiststhatexaminesissuesrelatedtotheintelligencepracticesofSLTlawenforcementagencies.ThegrowthofintelligencepracticesinSLTagencieshascoincidedwithanincreasingacknowledgementwithinfederallawenforcement,andinsomeinstancestheintelligencecommunity,oftheimportanceofstate,local,andtriballawenforcementforenhancingthevalueofintelligencerelatedtoterrorism.TheimportanceofSLT’scontributiontotheintelligenceprocesscanbehighlightedinseveralways.First,althoughtheFBIistheleadagencyfortheinvestigationofterrorism,thetypesofinformationprovidedbyvarioussourcesandthesheernumberofcasesandleadsrequiringfollow‐up,highlightstheimportanceofinvolvinglocallawenforcementinterroristinvestigations(Davisetal.,2004).Second,itiscriticaltonotethatterrorismisalocalevent,andthusSLTlawenforcementisinauniquepositiontocontributeimportantintelligencebecauseoftheirknowledgeaboutindividuals,groups,andorganizationsoperatinginlocalcommunities(CarterandCarter,2009a;2009b).Inaddition,thelocalnatureofterrorismclearlyhighlightsthatSLTlawenforcementagenciesmusthaveaccesstotimelyandactionableintelligenceforthepreventionandresponsetoterroristacts.Third,criticalinfrastructuresandhigh‐valuetargetsaredispersedwidelyintheUnitedStates,andmanyofthesepotentialtargetsarelocatedinruralandless‐populatedareas.Locallawenforcementagenciesinthesecommunitiesareinthebestpositiontorecognizewhensuspicioussituationsoccurnearthesecriticaltargets.Fourth,surveyresearchindicatesthattheterrorismexperiencesandexpectationsregardingintelligenceworkofstateandlocalagenciesincreasedafterSeptember11th(Davisetal.,2004).Indeed,theFBIasacknowledgedtheimportanceofSLTlawenforcementincounterterrorism



effortsthroughthepresenceofstateandlocallawenforcementofficerswhoaremembersofeveryFBIJointTerrorismTaskForce(JTTF).ImportantquestionsonthenatureoftheissuesthatimpactSLTintelligencepracticesremain.WhilethereissomeuncertaintyamongSLTlawenforcementaboutcurrentterrorismthreats,thereiscertaintythatthesethreatsevolveinalargelyunpredictablepattern.Asaresultthereisanongoingneedforconsistentandeffectiveinformationcollection,analysisandsharing.Second,littleinformationisknownaboutperceptionsofhowinformationisbeingsharedbetweenagenciesandwhethertechnologieshaveimprovedorhurtinformationsharing.Finally,littleisknownaboutwhetheragenciesthinktheyarecurrentlypreparedforaterroristattack,andthekeyfactorsdistinguishingthosethatthinktheyarecomparedtothosewhodonot.Thisstudywasdesignedtoaddresstheseissues,andabetterunderstandingoftheseissuescouldsignificantlyenhanceintelligencepracticesandenhancepublicsafety.

DataandMethodologyTodevelopabetterunderstandingofperceptionsaboutterroristthreatsthatSLTagenciesfaceandtheireffortstopreventterrorism,theresearchteamdistributedquestionnairesviaaweb‐designedsurveytotwoseparategroupsoflawenforcementpersonnel.ThefirstgroupincludedindividualswhohadattendedtrainingsthroughtheMemorialInstituteforthePreventionofTerrorism(MIPT).Anon‐profitorganization,MIPTwascreatedaftertheOklahomaCitybombingstoincreaseknowledgeaboutterrorismprevention.Inlinewiththisgoalitofferstraditionalandonlineeducationprogramstolawenforcementofficers,especiallywithrespecttosuspiciousactivityreporting;todate,19,000officershaveundertakenthesetrainings.1TheresearchteamthereforeapproachedrepresentativesofMIPTwitharequesttoconductsurveyresearchwithinthispopulationandMIPTsubsequentlyagreedtocontactindividualswhohadregisteredforitstrainingprogramswithaninvitationtoparticipateinthestudy.ThesecondgroupconsistedofindividualswhohadreceivedtrainingfromtheSchoolofCriminalJusticeatMichiganStateUniversity.FundedbytheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,theLawEnforcementIntelligenceToolboxprogramoperatedfrom2005until2011withover4,500officersfrom2,100agenciesenrollingduringthistime(Carter,2013).Manyoftheseindividualshadbeenselectedbytheirdepartmenttolearnhowtodevelopanintelligencecapacity.Thistrainingprovidedtheresourcesandinformationtofamiliarizeparticipantswithimportantissuessurroundingintelligencepractices.Inrelationtothestudy,thissampleisappropriatebecauseitcomprisespersonnelwithanunderstandingofintelligenceconceptsandrequirements,whoareawareoforganizationaleffortstoutilizeknowledgeaboutlawenforcementintelligence.Thisresearchusedapurposivesample,thereforethereisselectionbias;however,itwasintended.Comparativelyfewlawenforcementofficershaveworkedwiththeintelligenceprocess.Evenfewerhaveexperiencewiththeneweststandardsandguidelines.Usingarandomsampleofabroadpopulationof

1https://www.mipt.org/



lawenforcementofficers,generally,wouldprovidenovaluableresults.Asaresult,useofthissamplingframeprovidedaccesstoapopulationwhereintheresearchteamknewtherespondentshadbeenexposedtobothlawenforcementintelligenceandthecurrentstandardsandpractices.PersonsinboththeMIPTandMSUsampleshadreceivedtrainingusingthesamenationalstandardsandprograms.Moreover,bothtrainingprogramswerefundedbytheDepartmentofHomelandSecuritywhichhadexactingstandardsfortrainingcoursecontentandapprovalaswellasarequirementthattrainingprogramshadtobedeliveredinamannerthatwasconsistent.Thevalueofthesefactorsfromaresearchperspectiveisthatitstrengthensinternalvalidityofthemeasuresandexternalvaliditytothepopulationoflawenforcementofficerswithcontemporaryexperienceinlawenforcementintelligence.Developmentofthesurveyinvolvedseveralpreliminarydrafts.FeedbackwassoughtfromSLTintelligenceworkersaboutquestioncontentandcoverage,andspecificallywhetherquestionswereambiguousordifficulttoanswer.Aftermakingrevisions,thefinalInstitutionalReviewBoardapprovedinstrumenthad48structured,semi‐structured,oropen‐endedquestions.Thesurvey,despiteitslength,enabledrespondentstoshareinformationaboutissuessuchasperceptionsofterroristthreats,inter‐agencyinteractions,informationsharing,intelligencetraining,andagencypreparedness.Additionalquestionsaskedaboutcharacteristicsoftherespondentandtherespondent’sagency.Datacollectioninvolvedthepreparationofaweb‐basedsurveyandthenthetransmissionofemailstoindividualsinbothsamples.Inordertopreservetheconfidentialityofstudyparticipants,MIPTdistributedemailstothefirstsamplewhiletheresearchteamsentemailstotheToolboxsample.Collectionbeganwithaninvitationemailthatoutlinedthepurposeoftheresearchandaskedtheaddresseetocompleteaself‐administered,onlinequestionnaire.ItalsoincludedaURLthatstudyparticipantscouldusetoaccesstheonlinesurvey.Asthestudyprogressed,twosetsoffollowupemailsatmonthlyintervalsweresent.Thenumberofresponsesbyintelligenceworkerswas327fortheMIPTsampleand190responsesfortheToolboxsample.However,asthestudy’sunitofanalysisisattheagencylevel,werecordedcountsfordistinctorganizationsrepresentedbyindividualsinbothsamplingframes.Thus,theresearchteamdeterminedtheMIPTsampleconsistedof597targetand179respondingagencies,whiletheToolboxsampleconsistedof302targetand124respondingagencies.Theresponseratewastherefore30.0percentfortheMIPTsampleand40.6percentfortheToolboxsample.Theseresponseratesarepromisinggivenresponseratestocrosssectionalsurveyshavedeclined(BrickandWilliams,2013)andthatpolicepersonnelworkinginintelligencearehighlysensitivetorespondingtoquestionsregardinginformationsharingpractices(Chermaketal.,2013).Priortoanalysis,submissionswereremovedwherethelawenforcementagencynamecouldnotbeidentified.Thisleft364responsesfromindividualswhoworkedat175agencies,ofwhichresponsesforsevenagencieswereincludedinbothsamples.



Demographics

Table1showscategoricalcountsfortheswornstatus,role,andtenureofthestudyparticipants.MostoftheMIPTrespondentsindicatedtheywereswornofficers(66.2%).Manywereinvestigators(39.7%)oranalysts(32.4%),andveryfewheldadministrativepositions(6.9%).Approximately18percentoftherespondentsrepresentedstateagencies,54percentmunicipalagencies,and28percentrepresentedcountyagencies.Roughlyhalfoftherespondentsalsoreportedservingformorethan15yearswiththeircurrentagency.Conversely,thevastmajorityofToolboxrespondentswerealsoswornofficers(80%)andmosthadservedfor15yearsormore(58.5%).However,mostheldrolesassupervisors(31.3%),investigators(27.3%),oradministrators(25.8%).

Table1:SwornStatus,RoleandTenurewithintheirAgency MIPT ToolboxTraining n Percenta n Percenta

Swornstatus Sworn 151 66.2 108 80.0Non‐sworn 77 33.8 27 20.0Role Administrator 15 6.9 33 25.8Supervisor 47 21.5 40 31.3Investigator 86 39.7 35 27.3Analyst 71 32.4 20 15.6Tenure Lessthanayear 3 1.3 0 01‐3years 16 7.0 2 1.54‐9years 57 25.0 20 14.810‐15years 52 22.8 34 25.2Morethan15years 100 43.9 79 58.5aPercentagesmaynotequal100.0duetorounding.

DataMeasures

Effortstocombatterrorismamongstateandlocallawenforcementagencieshavebeenadifficultareatoempiricallyassess.Concernsoversecurityandthesensitivityofinformationcoupledwithhighfidelityofsuchpracticesacrossagencieshashamperedresearchers’abilitytoprovideinsightsonsuchpracticesascomparedtomoretraditionalaspectsofpolicing.Withthisinmind,thereisvalueinpresentingbothdescriptiveandinferentialinsightsfromthedatagathered.First,descriptivedataispresentedaboutstateandlocallawenforcements’perceptionsofthreats,informationsharingrelationshipsandnetworkedsystems.Second,criticalfactorsareidentifiedthatleadtothebeliefthatanagencywaseither“Prepared”or“NotPrepared”foraterroristattack.



Results

PerceptionsofTerroristThreats

In2009,Freilich,Chermak,andSimonepublishedresultsfromaDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)studythatexaminedseveralissues,includinglawenforcementperceptionsofterroristthreatsintheUnitedStates.Datawerecollectedforthisresearchin2006‐2007.Oneofthegoalsofthecurrentprojectwastoagainasklawenforcementofficersabouttheirconcernsaboutseveralpotentialterroristthreatsbytypeofgroupandtypeofincident.TheresultsfrombothstudiesarepresentedinTables2and3forcomparativepurposes.InTable2,respondentswereaskediftheyagreedthatanyoftheseventeenextremistgroupslistedwereaseriousterroristthreat.Inthistable,themeanscoresarepresentedona4‐pointscale(1=stronglydisagreeto4=stronglyagree)andthe(rankorder)ofofficerconcerns.Thereareseveralinterestingfindings.First,thereiswidevariationaboutwhatgroupsareperceivedtobeaseriousterroristthreat.Lawenforcementismuchmoreconcernedaboutsovereigncitizens,Islamicextremists,andmilitia/patriotgroupmemberscomparedtothefringegroupsofthefarright,includingChristianIdentitybelievers,reconstructedtraditionalists(i.e.,Odinists),idiosyncraticsectarians(i.e.,survivalists),andmembersofdoomsdaycults.Second,themajorconcernsoflawenforcementhavechangedconsiderablyovertime.Forexample,whenexaminingthe2006‐07surveyresults,lawenforcement’stopconcernwasIslamicextremists.

Table2.PerceivedThreatofExtremistGroupsbyTypeofGroupTypeofGroup PotentialThreat(2013‐14) PotentialThreat(2006‐07)SovereignCitizens 3.20(1) 2.49(7)IslamicExtremists/Jihadists 2.89(2) 3.13(1)Militia/Patriot 2.67(3) 2.61(6)RacistSkinheads 2.58(4) 2.82(3)Neo‐Nazis 2.56(5) 2.94(2)ExtremeAnimalRightists 2.54(6) 2.79(4)ExtremeEnvironmentalists 2.51(7) 2.74(5)KluxKluxKlan 2.38(8) 2.47(8)Left‐WingRevolutionaries 2.36(9) 2.04(13)ExtremeAnti‐Abortion 2.36(9) 2.30(11)BlackNationalists 2.34(11) 2.35(10)ExtremeAnti‐Tax 2.33(12) 2.47(8)ExtremeAnti‐Immigration 2.33(12) 2.41(9)ChristianIdentity 2.19(13) 2.59(8)IdiosyncraticSectarians 2.19(13) 2.13(12)Millennial/DoomsdayCults 2.17(15) 1.93(14)ReconstructedTraditions 2.13(16) 2.04(13)



The2013‐14studyresultsshowthatlawenforcement’stopconcernissovereigncitizens.AlthoughIslamicextremistsremainamajorconcernforlawenforcement,theyarenolongertheirtopconcern.Approximately39percentofrespondentsagreedand28percentstronglyagreedthatIslamicextremistswereaseriousterroristthreat.Incomparison,52percentofrespondentsagreedand34percentstronglyagreedthatsovereigncitizenswereaseriousterroristthreat.Thisisinterestingbecausesovereigncitizenswererankedastheeighthhighestgroupofconcernamongthe2006‐07sample.Third,althoughestimatesaboutsomegroupswereaseriousterroristthreatincreasedcomparingthetwotimeperiods,(e.g.,Left‐WingRevolutionaries;ExtremeAnti‐AbortionExtremists),theconcernaboutwhethermostgroupswereaseriousterroristthreatactuallydeclinedformostgroups(e.g.,theKKK;ChristianIdentity;Neo‐Nazis;RacistSkinheads;ExtremistEnvironmentalists;ExtremeAnimalRightsExtremists).Thechangeisinterestingastherewassignificantconcernabouttheresurgenceoftheradicalfarright(asevidencedbythe2006‐07survey,aswellasadditionalconcernsraisedafterthe2008electionofPresidentBarackObama),butitappearsasthoughlawenforcementis,atpresent,lessconcernedaboutthesegroups.Suchchangingperceptionsaboutwhatisaseriousterroristthreatisanimportantfindingbecauseidentifyingandprioritizingathreatisakintohittingamovingtargetandevolvesasnewintelligence,data,andeventsdevelop.Lawenforcementmustbesteadfastinidentifyingmajorconcerns,substantiatingtheconcerns,providingproductsandresourcestobetterunderstandthenatureofthethreat,andsupportingeffortstorespondtosuchconcerns.Table3presentsfindingsoftheperceivedlikelihoodofvarioustypesofterroristincidentscomparingthe2006‐07and2013‐14surveyresults.Ingeneral,lawenforcementperceptionsonthelikelihoodofvarioustypesofterroristincidentaresimilarwhencomparingthetwoperiods,althoughtheirtopconcernschanged.Inthe2006‐07survey,lawenforcementofficersratedanattackwithconventionalexplosivedevicesandcyberterrorismasthetwomostlikelyeventsinthatorder.Althoughthemeanaverageforcyberterrorismwasidenticalinthe2013‐14surveyresults,concernabouttheuseofconventionalexplosivedevicesdeclinedsomewhat.Similarly,theresultsfromthe2013‐14surveyshowthatlawenforcementwassomewhatlesslikelytothinkthatmostothertypesofincidentweregoingtooccur,comparedtothe2006‐07results.

Table3.PerceptionsofLikelihoodofTerrorism‐RelatedCrimesbyTypeofIncidentTypeofIncident LikelihoodofIncident

(2013‐14)LikelihoodofIncident(2006‐07)

Cyberterrorism 3.09(1) 3.09(2)ConventionalExplosiveDevices 2.85(2) 3.18(1)MilitaryWeaponsIncident 2.60(3) 2.50(5)Biological 2.37(4) 2.47(7)Agroterrorism(food) 2.35(5) 2.56(3)Agroterrorism(disease) 2.26(6) 2.56(3)Chemical 2.25(7) 2.50(5)Radiological 2.13(8) 2.13(8)



InformationSharingIssues

Table4presentsthefindingsonwhethertherespondentsthoughtthattheagenciesandsourceslistedwereusefultothemintheircounterterrorismefforts.Respondentswereaskedtheiropinionsaboutbothspecificagenciesaswellassourcesofinformation.Meanvaluesona4‐itemLikertscaleareprovidedwith4meaningthattheinformationprovidedbyatypeofsourceoragencywasveryuseful.Overall,thelawenforcementrespondentsthoughtthattheagencieslistedwereusefulorveryusefulsourcesofinformationoncounterterrorismissues.Therewassomevariationofusefulnesscomparingacrossagency.TheagenciesthatappeartobemostusefultoSLTlawenforcementincludestate/localfusioncenters,theFBI’sJointTerrorismTaskForce(s),theFBI,andDHSOfficeofIntelligenceandAnalysis.Theothersourcesaskedaboutwereconsideredtobesomewhatlessusefulcomparedtoagencyinformation.Overall,theinternetandtheuseofopensourcematerials,humanintelligencesources,andthemediawereperceivedasprovidingthemostusefulinformation.

Table4.UsefulnessofInformationfromAgenciesandSourcesAgency Score Source ScoreState/LocalFusionCenters 3.53 Internet 3.40FBI’sJointTerrorismTaskForce 3.42 Media 3.14FederalBureauofInvestigation 3.34 SourcesontheStreet 3.12DepartmentofHomelandSecurityOfficeofIntelligenceandAnalysis

3.27 Pro.LEPublications 3.06

BureauofAlcohol,Tobacco,andFirearms 3.18 LEO 2.95DrugEnforcementAdministration 3.15 Non‐LawEnforcement

Books2.78

ImmigrationandCustomsEnforcement 3.13 RISS.net 2.76LawEnforcementProsecutors 3.06 AlternativeLiterature 2.70StateOfficeofHomelandSecurity 3.01 RiskAssessments 2.67CustomsandBorderProtection 2.69 HSIN.Intell 2.66StateAttorneyGeneralAnti‐terrorismTaskForce 2.62 Theresearchteamaskedwhethertherespondentwassatisfiedwiththerelationshiptheyhadwithvariouslawenforcementandgovernmentagencies.Table5presentstheseresultsona5‐pointscalewith5meaningverysatisfied.Theresultsshowthatrespondentsoverallwhereverysatisfiedwiththeworkingrelationshipwithmostofthelawenforcement,government,andevenprivatesectoragenciesthatwereaskedabout.Infact,thescoreswereoverfourformostagencies.Someofthehighestaverageswereforstateandlocallawenforcementagencies,state/localfusioncenters,andtheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity.Respondentswereaskedaboutseveralissuesandwhethertheyposedsignificantproblemstothesharingofinformation.Theseissuesincludedsecurityclearances,adequatepersonnel,adequatetraining,adequateresources,adequatetime,ortheorganizationalculturecausedaproblemtothesharingofintelligenceandinformationacrossagencies.Athreeitemscalewasused,withnotaproblem



(0),somewhatofaproblem(1),andsignificantproblem(2)astheresponseoptions.Theresultsindicatethatmostoftheseissuesremainasignificantchallengetoeffectivelysharinginformationandintelligence.Themeanaveragesfortheitemswereasfollows:securityclearance(.82);adequatepersonnel(1.31);adequatetraining(1.19);adequateresources(1.22);adequatetime(1.32);andorganizationalculture(1.17).

Table5.SatisfiedwiththeWorkingRelationshipAgency Score Agency ScoreLocalLawEnforcement 4.47 NationalGuard 4.12State/LocalFusionCenter 4.45 StateOfficeofHomelandSecurity 4.10StateLawEnforcement 4.37 HomelandSecurityInvestigation 4.10DepartmentofHomelandSecurity 4.22 Hospitals 4.08FederalBureauofInvestigation 4.15 PublicTransportation 4.03EmergencyManagement 4.18 PublicWorks 3.99FireMarshals 4.18 PrivateSectorAgencies 3.97DepartmentofCorrections 4.14 PublicHealth 3.93CriticalInfrastructureSecurity 4.01 InternalRevenueService 3.74TribalLawEnforcement 3.99 Finally,variousinformationsystemsandnetworkswereexaminedthatareusedtoshareintelligenceandinformationandwhethertherespondentsweresatisfiedwiththeiruse.Table6presentstheseresults.2InColumn2,theresultsreportthepercentageofrespondentswhodonotusearespectivesystem.Approximatelyone‐thirdoftherespondentshavenotusedATIX,FBINET,orLLIS.Approximately15

2 A brief description of each system follows: ATIX – Automated Trusted Information Exchange. A secure, but unclassified, information and messaging system, managed by RISS, to provide users with access to homeland security, disaster, and terrorist threat information. FBINET – The Federal Bureau of Investigation Network which is a global-wide area network used for communicating classified information at the Secret level, including investigative case files and intelligence pertaining to national security; it also runs administrative applications. Most predominantly used by state and local law enforcement officers in fusion centers and HIDTA intelligence centers. LLIS – Lessons Learned Information Sharing, operated by the Department of Homeland Security, is accessible by law enforcement and emergency response personnel and contains a wide variety of information on best practices, after action reports, relevant alerts and news and a secure communications system. LLIS includes an area specifically for law enforcement intelligence fusion centers. RISS – Regional Information Sharing System operates a secure intranet, known as RISS.NET, to facilitate law enforcement communications and information sharing nationwide. RISS local, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement member agency personnel have online access to share intelligence and coordinate efforts against criminal networks that operate in many locations across jurisdictional lines. HSIN – Homeland Security Information Network is a secure internet-based system of integrated communication networks designed to facilitate information sharing between DHS and other Federal, state, county, local, tribal, private sector commercial, and other non-governmental organizations involved in identifying and preventing terrorism as well as in undertaking incident management activities. LEO – Law Enforcement Online, operated by the FBI, is a secure, Internet-based information sharing system for agencies around the world that are involved in law enforcement, first response, criminal justice, anti-terrorism, and intelligence. With LEO, members can access or share sensitive but unclassified information anytime and anywhere. OSC – Open Source Center the focal point for the intelligence community's exploitation of open source material. It also aims to promote the acquisition, procurement, analysis, and dissemination of open source information, products and services throughout the U.S. Government.



percentoftherespondentshaveneverusedRISS,HSIN,ortheOpenSourceCenter.Only9percentoftherespondentshaveneverusedLEO.Whenarespondentstatedthattheyusedaparticularnetworkorsystem,theyweregenerallyverysatisfiedwithit.TheresponseoptionswereafouritemLikertscalefrom“NotatAllSatisfied(1)”to“VerySatisfied(4).”Therespondentswereatleastsatisfiedwithallofthenetworkandsystems,butweregenerallymoresatisfiedwithLEOandtheOpenSourceCenter.

Table6.DoesNetworkedSystemsMeetInformationSharingNeeds?NetworkedSystem SystemNotUsed LevelofSatisfactionLEO 8.8% 3.33RISS 14.6% 3.28OpenSourceCenter 14.8% 3.31HSIN 15.7% 3.23FBINET 28.3% 3.11ATIX 35.7% 3.04LLIS 32.4% 2.94

IndicatorsofPreparedness

Surveyrespondentswereasked“Inyouropinion,howpreparedisyourorganizationforterroristorcriminalextremistthreatsinyourregion?”Responseoptionsrangedfrom“notatallprepared”to“veryprepared”alongafive‐pointscale.Twodichotomousdependentvariableswerecreatedusingtheresponsestothisquestion.Onlyagenciesindicatingtheywere“veryprepared”werecodedasbeing“Prepared,”andonlytheagenciesindicatingtheywere“notatallprepared”werecodedas“NotPrepared.”Theresearchteamthenexploredwhatcharacteristicsincreasedthelikelihoodthatanagencywaspreparedornotpreparedforthethreatsintheirregion.Theanalysisexploredwhetherthreats,relationships,ororganizationalfactorsaffectthesetwodependentmeasures.Threatsarerepresentativeofseriousandlikelythreatstotherespondingagency’sjurisdiction(seeTable1).Thisthreatvariablewasrecodedintofourcategories.Respondentswereaskedifanumberofterrorist/extremistgroupsposedaseriousthreattotheirjurisdictionwithresponseoptionsrangingfrom“stronglydisagree”to“stronglyagree”alongafour‐pointscale.“Right‐wing”isanadditiveindexofanagency’sresponsetoMilitia,SovereignCitizens,3KluKluxKlan,ChristianIdentity,IdiosyncraticSectarians,Neo‐Nazi,ReconstructedTraditions,andRacistSkinheadsthreats(α=.917;singlefactoreigenvalue=5.156).“Left‐wing”isanadditiveindexofanagency’sresponsetoLeft‐WingRevolutionary,BlackNationalist,ExtremeEnvironmental,andExtremeAnimalRightsthreats(α=.910;singlefactoreigenvalue=3.150).Single‐Issueisanadditiveindexofanagency’sresponsetoExtremeAnti‐Tax,ExtremeAnti‐Abortion,ExtremeAnti‐Immigration,andDoomsdayCultsthreats(α=.913;

3AlthoughmostorganizationsgroupSovereignCitizenswithotherrightwinggroups,theyarequiteunique.Sovereignsdonotspecificallysharethe“supremacist”viewsoftheKlan,etc.Theirfocusisnotonindividuals(e.g.,minorities,Jews,etc.)rathertheirfocusisongovernmentdysfunctionandabuseofauthority.Theiranti‐governmentideologyisarguablymoreakintoleftwinganarchiststhanrightwingKlansmen.



singlefactoreigenvalue=3.717).Jihadisanagency’sresponsetoasingleitemofanIslamicExtremists/Jihadthreat.Respondentswerealsoaskedifanumberoftypesofattackswerelikelytooccurintheirjurisdictionwithinthenextfiveyears.Chemical,Biological,Radiological/Nuclear,andExplosive–CBRNE–isanadditiveindexofanagency’sresponsetothesefourtypesofattacks(α=.856;singlefactoreigenvalue=2.839).Relationshipvariablesarerepresentativeoftheextenttowhichanagencyhassatisfiedworkingrelationshipswithorganizationsacrosssectorsandlevelsofgovernment.Whilerelationshipsbetweenindividualagenciesareimportant,preparednessislikelyreliantonrelationshipswitharangeoforganizationsacrossdifferentlevelsandsectors.Respondentswereaskedtoindicatehowsatisfiedtheywerewiththeirworkingrelationshipwithavarietyoforganizations.Responsesrangedfrom“wehavenorelationship”to“verysatisfied”alongafive‐pointscale.Federalrelationshipsisanadditiveindexofanagency’sresponsetorelationshipswiththeFederalBureauofInvestigation,DepartmentofHomelandSecurity,HomelandSecurityInvestigations,InternalRevenueService,andNationalGuard(α=.790;singlefactoreigenvalue=2.768).Staterelationshipsisanadditiveindexofanagency’sresponsetorelationshipswithStateLawEnforcement,StateFusionCenter,StateGovernmentOfficials,CriticalInfrastructure,DepartmentofCorrections,EmergencyManagement,andStateOfficeofHomelandSecurity(α=.869;singlefactoreigenvalue=3.981).Publicrelationshipsisanadditiveindexofanagency’sresponsetorelationshipswithHospitals,PublicHealthAgencies,PublicWorks,andPublicTransportation(α=.852;singlefactoreigenvalue=2.791).Privatesectorrelationshipisasingleitemofagencyresponsestotheirrelationshipswiththeprivatesector.Organizationalfactorsrepresentavarietyofagencycharacteristicslikelytoinfluencepreparedness.Trainingisanadditivescalerepresentativeofthetotalnumberoftrainingprogramsattendedbypersonnelfromtherespondingagency.ThesetrainingprogramsincludedFundamentalsofIntelligenceTraining,FederalLawEnforcementTrainingCenterAnalystCourse,DepartmentofHomelandSecurityCriticalThinkingaswellasReportWriting,DrugEnforcementAdministrationFederalLawEnforcementAnalystTraining,FederalBureauofInvestigationNationalAcademyaswellasCenterforIntelligenceTraining,NationalWhite‐CollarCrimeCenterIntelligenceAnalystCourse,StateandLocalAnti‐TerrorismTraining,BureauofJusticeAssistance28CFR23,andtheRegionalCounterdrugTrainingAcademy(α=.778;singlefactoreigenvalue=3.560).Threatassessments,threatwarnings,vulnerabilityassessments,andriskassessmentsareanalyticproductscreatedbytherespondingagencyonafive‐pointfrequencyrangeof“never”to“daily.”Respondingagencieswereaskedtoindicatetheextenttowhichanumberofissueswereseriousproblemsintheiragency,rangingfrom“notaproblematall”to“significantproblem.”Theseorganizationalproblemsincludedpersonnel,training,resources,andagencyculture.Respondingagenciesalsoindicatedwhetherornottheyhadreceivedexternalfundingfromfederal,state,orlocalorganizationsinsupportoftraining,personnel,orequipment.Lastly,respondingagenciesindicatedthe



numberoftotalpersonnelemployedbytheirorganizationasoneofsixtotalemployeebrackets.Themodalagencysizeresponsewas501to3,000totalpersonnel.Thetablethatpresentsthedescriptiveforthesevariablesisprovidedasanappendix.

AnalyticStrategyBivariateanalyseswereconductedtoexploretherelationshipbetweenagencypreparednessandjurisdictionalthreats,relationships,andorganizationalfactors.Giventhelimitedempiricalworkinthisarea,onlybivariatelogisticregressionswereemployedtotestwhetherindividualthreats,relationships,andorganizationalfactorspredictedanagency’sperceptionofbeingpreparedornotprepared.ResultsofthesebivariaterelationshipsarepresentedinTable7.DescriptiveinformationforthevariablesincludedisprovidedintheAppendixinTableA.Theresultsareinsightfulandsupportintuitivesuppositions.Withrespecttofactorspredictingpreparedness,agencieswithsatisfiedworkingrelationshipswithstateorganizations(O.R.=2.67)weretwiceaslikelytobeprepared.Itappearsthat,atthebivariatelevel,asagenciesproducethreatassessments(O.R.=3.59)andriskassessments(O.R.=3.61)morefrequently,theyarethree‐and‐a‐halftimesmorelikelytobepreparedthanagencieswhocreatethemlessfrequently.Thecreationofvulnerabilityassessmentsalsoappearstobeapredictorofpreparednessastheymorethanquadrupleanagency’spreparednesslikelihood(O.R.=4.60).Lastly,asagenciesexperienceproblemsrelatedtopersonnel(O.R.=‐3.42),training(O.R.=‐2.71),andresources(O.R.=‐2.45)thelikelihoodtheywillconsiderthemselvespreparedisreducedbyapproximatelythree‐fold.Anumberoffactorsappeartocontributetoanagencybeingnotprepared.Clarificationoftheinterpretationofthesefindingsisneeded.First,wheninterpretingoddsratiosforlogisticregression,thepercentabove1.0indicatesamorelikelyeffectwhilethepercentbelow1.0indicatesaless‐likelyeffect.Ifanoddsratioisnegative,itsimplymeansthepredictinglikelihoodisincreasedinthenegative,oropposite,direction.Second,thereisadifferencebetweenpredictinganagencythatispreparedandnegativelypredictinganagencythatisnotprepared.Whilethepresenceofacertainfactormaynotstatisticallydrivethepredictionofbeingprepared,itspresencemaybestrongenoughtodeteragenciesfrombeingnotprepared.ForexampleinTable7,perceptionsofthesatisfactionofrelationshipswithfederalorganizationsdonotpredictanagencybeingprepared.However,thissameperceptiondoespredictthatagenciesaremorethansixtimes(O.R.=‐6.48)aslikelytobenotprepared.Thusitcouldbeassumedthattheperceptionoffederalrelationshipsamongpreparedagencieswasnotstrongenoughtoindicatewhytheywereprepared,whileagenciesthatdidperceivefederalrelationshipsassatisfactoryweresix‐timesaslikelytoindicatetheywerenotwellprepared.Thisisadramaticdifferenceinperceptionandalsoappliestostate(O.R.=‐5.84),public(O.R.=‐.490),andprivatesector(O.R.=‐5.10)relationships.Itappearsthatasagenciesperceivetobeworkingsatisfactorilywithorganizationsacrosslevelsofgovernmentand



sectors,theywillnotperceivetheagencyasnotbeingprepared.Suchfindingslendsupporttotheimportanceofworkingrelationshipswithexternalorganizations.

Table7.BivariateRelationshipsofFactorsInfluencingAgencyPreparedness Prepareda NotPreparedb

Threats Coef OddsRatio Coef OddsRatioRight‐Wing .092 1.39 ‐.097 ‐1.84Left‐Wing .104 1.19 ‐.124 ‐1.87Single‐Issue .131 1.31 ‐.125 ‐1.26Jihad .233 .76 ‐.272 ‐1.36CBRNE .246 1.91 ‐.156 ‐1.84 Relationships Federal .223 1.84 ‐.262 ‐6.48***State .236 2.67** ‐.234 ‐5.84***Public .203 1.67 ‐.227 ‐4.90***Private .835 1.80 ‐.807 ‐5.10*** Organizational Training .043 .47 ‐.304 ‐3.85***ThreatAssessments .847 3.59*** ‐.829 *2.65**ThreatWarnings .347 1.65 ‐.525 ‐4.01***VulnerabilityAssessments .964 4.60** ‐1.287 ‐2.75**RiskAssessments .678 3.61*** ‐1.501 ‐2.87**PersonnelProblem ‐1.169 ‐3.42*** .414 2.25*TrainingProblem ‐1.122 ‐2.71** .733 4.03***ResourcesProblem ‐.886 ‐2.45* .446 2.83**AgencyCultureProblem ‐.394 ‐1.28 .706 3.81***ReceivedFederalFunding .834 1.33 .105 .21ReceivedStateFunding 1.231 1.36 ‐.088 ‐.15ReceivedLocalFunding ‐.094 ‐.09 ‐.014 ‐.02AgencySize .242 1.50 ‐.131 ‐.82

aThereferencegroupforthe“Prepared”dichotomousdependentvariableisrepresentativeofanagencyindicatingtheiragencyis“veryprepared”toapreparednessquestion.bThereferencegroupforthe“NotPrepared”dichotomousdependentvariableisrepresentativeofanagencyindicatingtheiragencyis“notatallprepared”or“notprepared”toapreparednessquestion.

***p<.001,**p<.01,*p<.05



Attendanceattrainingprogramsalsohasadramaticimpactontheperceptionofbeingnotprepared.Asattendanceattrainingprogramsincreases,theperceptionofbeingnotpreparedisreducedbyalmostfour‐times.Moreover,analyticproductsalsoreducethelikelihoodthatanagencyperceivestobenotprepared.Asthreatassessments,threatwarnings,vulnerabilityassessments,andriskassessmentsareproducedmorefrequently,thereisapproximatelyathree‐foldreductioninanagency’sperceptionofbeingnotprepared.Lastly,problemswithintheagencythatinhibitinformationsharingappeartoincreasetheperceptionofbeingnotprepared.Problemsrelatedtopersonnel(O.R.=2.25)andresources(O.R.=2.83)doublethelikelihoodofanagencyindicatingtheyarenotprepared.Trainingproblems(O.R.=4.03)hasaquadruplingeffectonbeingnotpreparedwhileproblemsrelatedtotheagency’sculture(O.R.=3.81)leadstoamorethanthree‐foldincreaseinbeingnotprepared.

DiscussionParticularlyforpractitioners,themostimportantaspectofthisresearchisnotthefindingsonthevariableanalyses,perse,butonthebenchmarksidentifiedintrendsfoundinthedata.Somecleartrendsemergedwhichindicateprogrammaticsuccessesforinformationsharingandintelligenceaswellasindicatorsofareaswhereproblemsremain.Whenconsideringthesefindingsinthecontextofresearchonorganizationaldevelopment,itisclearthatorganizationalleadershipisanimportantfactorfororganizationalsuccessesininformationsharingaswellasforpreparedness.Iftheleadershipofalawenforcementagencyiswillingtoexpendtheefforttotrainpersonnel,developpartnerships,andparticipateinstate,regionalandnationalinformationsharinginitiatives,thengreaterlevelsofsuccesswillbeachieved.Whileonewouldintuitivelyassumethis,thedataempiricallysupportsit.Thefindingsprovideindicatorsofprogressthathasbeenmadeinthedomesticintelligenceenterpriseaswellasobstaclesthatremaintobeovercome.Thereaderiscautionedtonotexclusivelyjudgeone’sownagencybaseduponthefindingsofoneortwovariablesinthisstudy.Thefindingscollectivelyreflectapointintimeonacontinuumofdevelopment.Ratherthanjudgehowone’sagencyratesonaspecificvariable–forexample,thenatureofpublic‐privatepartnershipsinthejurisdiction–thereadershouldviewallpreparednessvariablesandmakeajudgmentofprogressandusethefindingsasaroadmaptoincreasepreparednessandfunctionalityoftheintelligenceprocess.Acoreresponsibilityofstrategicintelligenceistoidentifychangesinthethreatpicture,whetherthatistheemergenceofnewthreats,changesinthemethodologyofcurrentthreats,oradiminishedthreatfromsomegrouporideology.Thefindingsindicatethatrespondentsbelievethatthechangingnatureofthreatsisofcontinuedconcerntolawenforcement.Respondentsalsoindicatedthenatureofthechangingthreatshavebeeneffectivelyidentifiedinthestrategicintelligenceprocessandsharedwithofficersthroughbulletinsandintelligenceproducts.Thus,itappearstheintelligenceprocessisproducingactionablestrategicresults.



Akeyissueforlawenforcementinthepost‐9/11environmenthasbeen“informationsharing”–therehadlongbeenachorusthatinformationsharingamongstateandlocallawenforcementwaslimited,butitwasvirtuallynon‐existentwithfederallawenforcement.Inthisstudy,SLTlawenforcementrespondentsclearlyindicatethatthecounterterrorisminformationsharinginfrastructureandprocessesputinplacepost‐9/11(oftenreferredtotheDomesticIntelligenceEnterprise)havebeenworkingtoprovideinformationamonglawenforcementagenciesatalllevelsofgovernment.Anecdotally,thecurrentconcernisnotaboutinformationsharingprocesses,butoftenaboutthequalityoftheinformation.Forexample,anFBIorDHSintelligenceproductwillbewidelydisseminatedtostateandlocallawenforcement,butitisoftenofthenaturethatofficersshouldbe“onalert”forcertaintypesofthreats,withoutmorespecificdetails.Conversely,federallawenforcementoftendoesnothaveanymoredetailaboutthreatstoprovide.Respondentsindicatedtheywerehighlysatisfiedwiththeirrelationshipswithotherlawenforcementagencies,governmentagenciesandselectedprivatesectorpartnersintheircounterterrorismactivities.Stateandlocallawenforcementagencies,state/localfusioncenters,andtheDepartmentofHomelandSecurityreceivedthehighestlevelsofsatisfactioninmutualrelationships.Despitethesenotablesuccesses,therearestillbarrierstoeffectiveinformationsharingthatneedtobeaddressedintheeyesofSLTlawenforcement.Themostprominentare:securityclearancesforSLTpersonnel,adequatestaffingoftheintelligencefunction,theneedforadequatepre‐assignmenttrainingandin‐servicetraining,adequateresourcestoeffectivelyperformtheintelligenceprocessandchangingtheorganizationalculturetoutilizetheintelligenceprocess.Interestingly,withtheexceptionofsecurityclearances,themajorbarriersasviewedbytherespondentswerefactorswithinthelawenforcementagencies.Hence,thesearebarriersthatcanbemoreeasilyovercomethansystemicbarriers.Perhapsthegreatestchallengeischangingtheorganizationalculture,whichistrueforvirtuallyanytypeoforganizationalchange.Acoreinvestmentbythefederalgovernmenttoincreaseinformationsharinghasbeendevelopingorenhancingelectronicinformationsharingsystemsandnetworks.Intheunclassifiedenvironmentthisincludes,mostnotably,RISSnet,4LawEnforcementOnline(LEO)5andtheHomelandSecurityInformationNetwork(HSIN).6Thefindingsindicatethatmanyoftheinformationsharingnetworksandsystemsappeartobesomewhatunderutilized.Anecdotally,analystsandinvestigators,whilehavingaccesstoallofthesesystems,typicallyrelypredominantlyononeofthesystemsforsimplicity,despitethefactthateachsystemwillhavesomewhatdifferentinformation.7However,thosewhousethosenetworksandsystemsarehighlysatisfiedwiththeiroperationsandvalue.

4http://www.riss.net5http://www.fbi.gov/about‐us/cjis/leo6http://www.dhs.gov/homeland‐security‐information‐network7Acommoncomplaintofusersofthesesystemsistheinconvenienceofthelogonprocessesaswellasauto‐logoffifthesystemhasbeenidle.EffortsofdevelopingaSingleSignOnhavebeenunsuccessful.



Theresearchteammeasuredseveralfactorsonthegeneralvariableof“preparedness”toassessthekindsofknowledge,relationships,andtacticalplansthatwereinplaceforattacksbyvariousgroupsandmethods.Overall,respondentsstatedtheiragenciesweregenerallywellprepared,althoughthereisalwaysroomforimprovement.Itisprobablethatpreparednessisalsocorrelatedwithagencysizeandresources;however,thisconclusioncannotbevalidatedbythecurrentdata.Nonetheless,itisclearthattheinformationsharingstructuresandprocessesaswellasothertrainingandtechnicalassistanceprovidedtolawenforcementagenciespost‐9/11hasincreasedbothawarenessandpreparednessinresponsetothreatsbycriminalextremists.Inparticular,thefindingsshowthatthoseagencieswhichproduceregularthreatassessmentsandriskassessmentsarethemostprepared.Aconclusionthatmightbedrawnfromthisfindingisthatnotonlydotheassessmentsidentifythreatsandrisks,butleadersofagenciesthatrequiresuchassessmentsaremoreattunedtopreparedness.Respondentshadattendedanumberoftrainingprogramsrelatedtointelligenceandcounterterrorism.Interestingly,asattendanceattrainingprogramsincreases,theperceptionofbeingnotpreparedisreducedbyalmostfour‐times.Whiletrainingiscertainlyacomponentofpreparedness,therearemanyotherpolicyandresourcefactorsthatcontributetooverallagencypreparedness.However,consistentlytherespondentstothisstudyviewedunderstandingthethreatandresponsestothreatsviatrainingasanimportantcomponentinoverallagencypreparedness.Similarly,respondentsindicatedthatanalyticproductsalsosupporttheperceptionthattheagencyispreparedforthreats.Ideally,thismeansthreatswerebeingrecognizedandtacticalresponsestothreatsbeingdeveloped.However,pragmaticallyonemustalsoconsiderthefactthatmereknowledgeofthreatscontributedtotherespondents’perceptionofpreparedness.Interestingly,asthreatassessments,threatwarnings,vulnerabilityassessments,andriskassessmentsareproducedmorefrequently,thereisapproximatelyathree‐foldreductioninanagency’sperceptionofbeingnotprepared.Thissuggeststhatanagencywhichdevotestimeandexpertisetoanalysisandinformationsharingwithrespecttoitsthreatenvironmentseesvalueinthistypeofintelligenceand,consequently,wouldpresumablyactonthatinformationtopreventormitigatethreats.Thefindingspresentedhereareconsistentwithpreviousexaminationsoflawenforcement’sprogressinimprovinginformationsharingandintelligencepracticesatamoremacro‐level(seeU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity(2011)andtheU.S.HouseofRepresentativesCommitteeonHomelandSecurity(2013)).Collectivelythefindingsshowsignificantprogressamonglawenforcementagenciesfordevelopingandsharingintelligenceandinformationrelatedthreatsbycriminalextremists.Notsurprisingly,barriersstillremain,yettheprogressissignificantinseveralfronts.



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sharing infrastructure: A national assessment. Police Quarterly, 16(2), 211-244. Davis, L. M., Riley, J. K., Ridgeway, G., Pace, J., Cotton, S. K., Steinberg, P. S., Damphousse, K. and Smith. B.

L. (2004). When terrorism hits home: How prepared are state and local law enforcement? Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation.

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Appendix

Table A. Descriptives Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Prepared 0.08 0.27 0 1 Not Prepared 0.15 0.36 0 1 Threats

Right-Wing 19.76 4.91 8 32 Left-Wing 9.74 2.84 4 16 Single-Issue 11.27 3.18 5 20 Jihad 2.89 0.90 1 4 CBRNE 9.56 2.36 4 16

Relationships

Federal 17.79 4.89 5 25 State 27.55 5.85 7 35 Public 15.01 3.89 4 20 Private 3.65 1.20 1 5

Organizational

Training 3.20 2.65 0 11 Threat Assessments 2.52 1.23 1 5 Threat Warnings 3.16 1.43 1 5 Vulnerability Assessments 2.25 1.10 1 5 Risk Assessments 2.33 1.14 1 5 Personnel Problem 1.47 0.85 0 3 Training Problem 1.36 0.86 0 3 Resources Problem 1.39 0.87 0 3 Agency Culture Problem 1.36 0.91 0 3 Received Federal Funding 0.41 0.49 0 1 Received State Funding 0.08 0.27 0 1 Received Local Funding 0.11 0.31 0 1

Note: Modal agency category is 501-3000.

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